Land Titles Day 5 to 8 CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

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FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998] SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioners, vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent. D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN, J: In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree? The Case These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for mandamus[1] under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022.[2] The Facts Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing thus:[3] WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto. As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880 Rizal Ave., Manila. After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order[4] dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for mandamus.[5] Attached to the LRAs comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which explained public respondents refusal to issue the said decree:[6] In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record, the following comments are respectfully submitted: On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda Laburada; After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said subdivision plan is Annex A hereof; The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively; On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex B hereof, requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar; On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex C hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex D hereof; After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April 15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex E hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate


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of title with complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received by this Authority; After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex F hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are [sic] incomplete. For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, 1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et al.,); x x x. In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be dismissed for being premature. After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, dated September 4, 1995,[7] for an early resolution of the case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995, which ordered:[8] x x x Acting on the urgent motion for early resoon of the case dated 04 September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what concrete and specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993 (the date of respondents Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City, might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917. On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution, to which was attached a letter dated November 27, 1997 of Felino M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, which states:[9] With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is incomplete. It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et. al.). Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over the same parcel of land. Issue Petitioners submit this lone issue:[10] Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68). The Courts Ruling The petition is not meritorious. Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy? Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office x x x. They cite four reasons why the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to perform because, as land registration is an in


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rem proceeding, the jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should be complied with.[11] Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to take the cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595. Rather, it is the sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of petitioners application for registration. Third, petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595 notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles.[12] Fourth, the State consented to its being sued in this case[;] thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case as final and make provision for its satisfaction.[13] On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that [the] Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree for the same land is null and void.[14] On the question of whether the LRA can be compelled to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez[15] which held:[16] Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another. It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, (t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration. The application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Underscoring supplied.) We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three reasons. First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration. We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals:[17] It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction. Petitioners contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.


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In Ramos vs. Rodriguez,[18] this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings. True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which provides: SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal herein before provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39). However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to register -- Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 -- is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRAs refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of the trial court void. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void,[19] since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.[20] Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia:[21] As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said: As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners. In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law.


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Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: [22] Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234: Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177). Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one (De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). x x x (Underscoring supplied.) Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion.[23] Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete.[24] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded.[25] But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties.[26] As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by mandamus.[27] The court has to decide a question according to its own judgment and understanding of the law.[28] In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed according to the facts and the law, as herein discussed. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as herein discussed. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur. [1] This case was filed prior to the issuance of Revised Administrative Circular 1-95 which directs that actions against quasi-judicial bodies in general should be filed in the Court of Appeals. [2] Per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila (now Pasig City), Branch LXVIII. [3] Rollo, p 5. [4] Rollo, p 6.


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[5] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 25, 1997, upon this Courts receipt of the public respondents reply in compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 10, 1996. [6] Rollo, pp. 48-49. [7] Rollo, pp. 83-84. [8] Rollo, p 85; original text in upper case. [9] Rollo, p 113. [10] Rollo, p 70; petitioners memorandum, p 2. [11] Rollo, p 71; petitioners memorandum, p 3 [12] Rollo, p 72; petitioners memorandum, p 4. [13] Rollo, p 73; petitioners memorandum, p 5. [14] Rollo, p 63; the LRAs rejoinder, p 2; citing Rojas, et al., vs. City of Tagaytay and Hon. Jimenez, 106 Phil 512, November 24, 1959; Duran vs. Olivia, 3 SCRA 154, September 29, 1961. [15] 244 SCRA 418, 423-424, May 29, 1995, per Romero, J. [16] Rollo, p. 165; the LRAs reply, p. 5. [17] 168 SCRA 503, December 15, 1988, per Padilla, J.; citing Section 32, PD 1529; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil 113; Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil 256; Afalla and Pinanoc vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil 622; Roman Catholic Bishops of Cebu vs. Phil Railway Co., 49 Phil 540; De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil 227; Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil 558, June 22, 1922; Director of Lands vs. Busuego, 12 SCRA 678. [18] Supra, at 422. [19] Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 783, November 17, 1992, citing Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil 558, June 22, 1922. [20] PD 1529 provides: SEC. 14. Who may apply. -- The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. xxx xxx xxx [21] Supra, at pp 159-160, per Labrador, J; citing Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, supra; Timbol vs. Diaz, 44 Phil 587, 590, March 5, 1923; Perez vs. Bolbon, 50 Phil 791, 795, September 30, 1927; Singian vs. Manila Railroad Co., 60 Phil 192, 203, June 19, 1934; Addison vs. Payatas Estate Improvement Co., 60 Phil 673, September 27, 1934; Sideco, et al. vs. Aznar, 92 Phil 952, April 24, 1953. [22] 85 Phil 256, 260-261, December 29, 1949, per Tuason, J. [23] Go vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 564, 567, January 29, 1996. [24] Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99, July 17, 1996, University of San Agustin, Inc. vs. CA, 230 SCRA 761, March 7, 1994; Tamano vs. Manglapus, 214 SCRA 567, October 13, 1992; Marcelo vs. Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA 439, July 7, 1986; Samson vs. Barrios, 63 Phil 198, July 20, 1936. [25] Pelileo vs. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil 272, December 29, 1949.


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[26] Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280, 284, April 25, 1991; Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil 608, July 11, 1952. [27] Go vs. Court of Appeals, supra. [28] Lupisan vs. Alfonso and Arguieta, 78 Phil 842, July 31, 1947.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 154409. June 21, 2004] Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE VERA, respondent. D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN, J.: Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under the Torrens system. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the March 21, 2002 Amended Decision[2] and the July 22, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 62391. The Amended Decision disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original DECISION of this case, promulgated on November 19, 2001, is SET ASIDE and another one is entered AFFIRMING in part and REVERSING in part the judgment appealed from, as follows: 1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the rightful owner and with better right to possess the property in question, being an innocent purchaser for value therefor; 2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the following to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo, to wit: As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera: 1. P300,000.00 plus 6% per annum as actual damages; 2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; 3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; 4. P30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and 5. Cost of suit. As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo: 1. P50,000.00 as moral damages; 2. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; 3. P30,000.00 as attorneys fees;


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4. Cost of suit.[4] The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration. The Facts Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as follows: As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent antecedents amply summarized by the trial court: On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the vendor and the vendees. On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Gloria Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name. Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved [on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996. On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo]. On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name. On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as Civil Case No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the parties therein submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant case that neither of them can physically take possession of the property in question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.[5] Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case [with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City] for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages [against respondent and Gloria Villafania]. After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the assailed Decision dated January 4, 1999, awarding the properties to [petitioners] as well as damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and attorneys fees. Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].[6] Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its original Decision promulgated on November 19, 2001, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent Romana de Vera.[7] Since Gloria Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void. The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002 Amended Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.[8] Hence, this Petition.[9] Issues


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Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues below: 1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Gloria Villafania in favor of [R]espondent Romana de Vera is valid. 2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a purchaser for value in good faith. 3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the property in question.[10] In the main, the issues boil down to who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the property. The Courts Ruling The Petition is bereft of merit. Main Issue: Better Right over the Property Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer belonged to her.[11] They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for value.[12] Law on Double Sale The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed property to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on October 23, 1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent Romana de Vera. Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus: Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.[13] There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system. This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529[14] which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument -- except a will -- purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration.[15] Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.[16] In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act 3344.[17] For her part, respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens system[18] because, during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.[19] Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice Edgardo L. Paras: x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is used under Art. 1544 x x x.[20]


10

We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free patent registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30522.[21] The OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafanias name.[22] As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515 thereafter issued to respondent. Soriano v. Heirs of Magali[23] held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in time principle was not applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo. Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo[25] explained the difference in the rules of registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens system in this wise: Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals[26] is a case in point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the said original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,[27] this Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon. Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.[28] Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as a notice to the whole world.[29] All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.[30] Good-Faith Requirement We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith.[31] Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration.[32] We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals,[33] which we quote: Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers rights) ---- from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.[34] (Italics supplied) Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate.[35] Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required to go


11

behind the registry to determine the condition of the property, since such condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of title.[36] Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.[37] Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,[38] petitioners contend that their prior registration under Act 3344 is constructive notice to respondent and negates her good faith at the time she registered the sale. Santiago affirmed the following commentary of Justice Jose C. Vitug: The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26 December 1984) In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992). x x x x x x x x x Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing for the registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act 496), cannot improve his standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that registration thereunder would not prejudice prior rights in good faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, Civil Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has been held to be inapplicable to execution sales of unregistered land, since the purchaser merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and acquires the latter's interest as of the time the property is sold (Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see also Fabian vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there is only one sale (Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138).[39] (Emphasis supplied) Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. Nogales,[40] which held: Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On account of the undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by [the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the [second buyers] for which they had been issued certificates of title in their names. x x x.[41] Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first buyers registered the sale under the Torrens system, as can be inferred from the issuance of the TCT in their names.[42] There was no registration under Act 3344. In Bayoca, when the first buyer registered the sale under Act 3344, the property was still unregistered land.[43] Such registration was therefore considered effectual. Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in Santiago, are not on all fours with the present case. In Revilla, the first buyer did not register the sale.[44] In Taguba, registration was not an issue.[45] As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the property is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case. We quote below the additional commentary of Justice Vitug, which was omitted in Santiago. This omission was evidently the reason why petitioner misunderstood the context of the citation therein: "The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981),"[46] Respondent in Good Faith


12

The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether respondent was an innocent purchaser for value.[47] After its factual findings revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good faith, it explained thus: x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Veras vendor, appears to be the registered owner. The subject land was, and still is, registered in the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her certificate of title and in the circumstances of the transaction or sale which warrant [Respondent] De Vera in supposing that she need[ed] to look beyond the title. She had no notice of the earlier sale of the land to [petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that her vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the subject property by examining her vendors title in the Registry of Deeds and actually going to the premises. There is no evidence in the record showing that when she bought the land on October 23, 1997, she knew or had the slightest notice that the same was under litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, between Gloria Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not even a party to said case. In sum, she testified clearly and positively, without any contrary evidence presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know anything about the earlier sale and claim of the spouses Abrigo, until after she had bought the same, and only then when she bought the same, and only then when she brought an ejectment case with the x x x Municipal Court of Mangaldan, known as Civil Case No. 1452. To the [Respondent] De Vera, the only legal truth upon which she had to rely was that the land is registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her vendor, and that her title under the law, is absolute and indefeasible. x x x.[48] We find no reason to disturb these findings, which petitioners have not rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base their position only on the general averment that respondent should have been more vigilant prior to consummating the sale. They argue that had she inspected the property, she would have found petitioners to be in possession.[49] This argument is contradicted, however, by the spouses own admission that the parents and the sister of Villafania were still the actual occupants in October 1997, when Respondent De Vera purchased the property.[50] The family members may reasonably be assumed to be Villafanias agents, who had not been shown to have notified respondent of the first sale when she conducted an ocular inspection. Thus, good faith on respondents part stands. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave. [1] Rollo, pp. 3-22. [2] Id., pp. 24-31. Former Fifth Division. Penned by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with the concurrence of Justices Hilarion L. Aquino (acting chairman) and Perlita J. Tria Tirona (member). [3] Id., p. 33. [4] CA Amended Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 30-31. [5] CA Decision dated November 19, 2001, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 163-164. Citations omitted. [6] Id., pp. 3 & 164. [7] Id., pp. 5 & 166. [8] CA Amended Decision dated March 21, 2002, p. 7; rollo, p. 30. [9] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 29, 2003, upon this Courts receipt of petitioners Memorandum signed by Atty. Villamor A. Tolete. Respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty. Daniel C. Macaraeg, was received by this Court on May 13, 2003. [10] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 252. [11] Id., pp. 6 & 253. [12] Id., pp. 11 & 258.


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[13] Gabriel v. Mabanta, 399 SCRA 573, 580, March 26, 2003; Bayoca v. Nogales, 340 SCRA 154, 166, September 12, 2000; Balatbat v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 858, 872, August 28, 1996. [14] The Property Registration Decree, June 11, 1978. [15] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, 274 Phil. 516, May 20, 1991. [16] Revilla v. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480, 484, March 30, 1960. [17] 113 of Chapter XIII of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) provides: SEC. 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered lands. No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. x x x x xx x x x. The sale by Gloria Villafania to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go was registered on June 18, 1993, while the sale by Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go to the Spouses Abrigo was registered on October 30, 1997. Petitioners Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 257. [18] Formerly Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act, November 6, 1902; now PD 1529. [19] Respondents Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 229. [20] Id., pp. 13 & 236; citing Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1990), Vol. V, p. 154. [21] Id., pp. 4 & 227. [22] Ibid. [23] 8 SCRA 489, July 31, 1963. [24] 395 SCRA 43, January 13, 2003. [25] Supra. [26] 31 SCRA 558, February 18, 1970. [27] The second paragraph of this provision states: Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. x x x. (Italics supplied.) [28] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra, pp. 521-522, per Gancayco, J. [29] Alvarico v. Sola, 383 SCRA 232, 239, June 6, 2002; Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 595, October 2, 1915. [30] Ibid. [31] Gabriel v. Mabanta, supra; Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 38, 50, May 21, 2001; Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 446, 454, February 28, 1994. [32] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, supra. [33] 344 Phil. 253, September 5, 1997. [34] Id., p. 265, per Panganiban, J; citing Cruz v. Cebana, 129 SCRA 656, 663, June 22, 1984, per Teehankee, J (later CJ).


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[35] Lu v. Manipon, 381 SCRA 788, 796, May 7, 2002. [36] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 456; Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra, p. 518. [37] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra. [38] 247 SCRA 336, August 14, 1995. [39] Id., p. 346, per Melo, J; citing Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence (1993), pp. 604-605. [40] Supra. [41] Id., p. 167-168, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J. [42] Supra, p. 339. [43] Supra, p. 159. [44] Supra, p. 484. [45] 132 SCRA 722, 728, October 23, 1984. [46] Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, supra, p. 604. This paragraph was originally between the two paragraphs cited in Santiago. [47] An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, GR No. 146222, January 15, 2004. [48] CA Amended Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 29-30. [49] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 12; id., p. 259. [50] Id., pp. 13 & 260.

EN BANC HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, - versus - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179987 Promulgated: April 29, 2009 x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x D E C I S I O N Tinga, J.: One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.


15

xxx The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business transactions. If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize. - Hernando De Soto[1] This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems. I. On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5] Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7] On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.


16

SO ORDERED. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9] Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree. The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit: 1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier? 2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code? 3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription? 4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?[13] Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions. With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]


17

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19] The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable. Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof. II. First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act. A. Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21] May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.[23] This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only agricultural lands. Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguit explained: When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which


18

provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads: SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case. The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison: Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent. D E C I S I O N REYES, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision1 dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456. On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu an application3 for land registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525 square meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his application, which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property, which is more particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the latters other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and (c) he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.


19

Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-0008934 to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation on the advance survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibaez, Chief of the Map Projection Section, stating that "CONFORMED PER L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. 2545 Project No. 28 certified on June 25, 1963, verified to be within Alienable & Disposable Area".5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabels name Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137 to prove that she had been in possession of the property since 1965. To support his claim that he had been religiously paying the taxes due on the property, Espinosa presented a Certification6 dated December 1, 1998 issued by the Office of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax declarations for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 Tax Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and 010717.8 Petitioner opposed Espinosas application, claiming that: (a) Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosas predecessor-in-interest possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the tax declarations do not prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest are in the character and for the length of time required by law. On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment9 granting Espinosas petition for registration, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering for the registration and the confirmation of title of Espinosa over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New), situated at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of 5,525 square meters and that upon the finality of this decision, let a corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor of the herein applicant in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529. SO ORDERED.10 According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the property is alienable and disposable and that he complied with the requirements of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically: After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the above-entitled case, the Court is convinced, and so holds, that Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and possession over the subject lot which is within the area considered by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, public, continuous, adverse and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec. 14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with the Land Registration Act.11 Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosas failure to prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest were for the period required by law. As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516, Isabels possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of the PLA. On the other hand, Espinosa came into possession of the property only in 1970 following the sale that transpired between him and his mother and the earliest tax declaration in his name was for the year 1978. According to petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in possession for more than thirty (30) years is inconsequential absent proof that such possession began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.12 Petitioner also claimed that Espinosas failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy thereof is fatal to his application. Citing Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines13 and Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the submission of the original tracing cloth is mandatory in establishing the identity of the land subject of the application.15 Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance survey plan is not the evidence admissible to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable.16 By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled that possession for at least thirty (30) years, despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to private. Thus: The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the following grounds: a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has successfully established valid title over the subject land and that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, adverse, public and undisturbed possession of said land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years before the filing of the application. Established jurisprudence has consistently pronounced that "open, continuous and


20

exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same into private property (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vests title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 41); and b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 is the latest amendment of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141), but a strict implementation of the law would in certain cases result in inequity and unfairness to Espinosa. As wisely stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567: "Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more."17 The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other documentary evidence, not necessarily the original tracing cloth plan, as the identity and location of the property can be established by other competent evidence. Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without merit. While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes may be the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission, the court may sufficiently order the issuance of a decree of registration on the basis of the blue print copies and other evidence (Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70594, October 10, 1986). The said case provides further: "The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant sufficient to justify the registration and confirmation of her titles and did not find it necessary to avail of the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission for purposes of comparison, should not militate against the rights of the applicant. Such is especially true in this case where no clear, strong, convincing and more preponderant proof has been shown by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of said plans which were found both by the lower court and the Court of Appeals as conclusive proofs of the description and identities of the parcels of land contained therein." There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic, supra the Supreme Court pronounced that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement, and that failure to comply with such requirement is fatal to ones application for registration. However, such pronouncement need not be taken as an iron clad rule nor to be applied strictly in all cases without due regard to the rationale behind the submission of the tracing cloth plan. x x x: x x x x As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be established by other competent evidence like a duly approved blueprint copy of the advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and technical description of Lot 8499, containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area and location of the lot, the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be excused.18 Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property is alienable and disposable: Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and disposable. In the duly approved Advance Survey Plan As-07-0000893 (sic) duly approved by the Land Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, it is certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the alienable and disposable area of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain.19 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its Resolution20 dated February 13, 2006. Petitioners Case Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CAs assailed decision and attributes the following errors: (a) Espinosa failed to prove by competent evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable; (b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan identifies the property in preparation for a judicial proceeding but does not convert the property into alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to determine the exact metes and bounds of the property; and (d) a blueprint copy of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the property only if it bears the approval of the Director of Lands.


21

Issues The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy of confirmation and registration is hinged on the determination of the following issues: a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially complies with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529; and b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the geodetic engineer who conducted the survey sufficed to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable. Our Ruling The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosas application is anchored on Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA and the grant thereof is warranted in view of evidence supposedly showing his compliance with the requirements thereof. This Court is of a different view. Based on Espinosas allegations and his supporting documents, it is patent that his claim of an imperfect title over the property in question is based on Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed under the two (2) latter provisions. On the contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for thirty (30) years, or through prescription. Therefore, the rule that should have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states: Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: x x x x (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts disposition of this case stemmed from their failure to apprise themselves of the changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent over the years. Section 48(b) of the PLA originally states: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: x x x x (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was since July 26, 1894 or earlier. On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty (30)-year prescriptive perio

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