RURAL BANK OF ANDA, INC.,Petitioner, - versus -ROMAN
CATHOLICARCHBISHOP OF LINGAYEN-DAGUPAN,Respondent. G.R. No. 155051
The Case This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated
15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66478. The Facts The lot in
dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion
of Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300
square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739
also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imeldas
Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is
bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by
the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help
of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1. Lot 1 of Plan
II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name
of respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent)
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An
annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being
claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley. In
1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the
fence separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent the
caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was
already bothering the priests living in the seminary.[3] The
concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west,
and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any
time of the day.[4] On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and approved Resolution Nos. 104[5]
and 105.[6] Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an
institutional lot to a commercial lot. Resolution No. 105
authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease
for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736
with an area of 252 square meters.[7] In December 1997, Fr. Arenos,
the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was
being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998,
the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor
Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor
Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the
building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped. On 24 March
1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali
fence and restore the concrete fence. On 20 May 1998, Mayor
Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the building
of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to
discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.
On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of
Illegal Constructions, Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. On 4 January 2000, the trial
court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff [Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Lingayen-Dagupan]: 1. Making the writ of preliminary injunction
permanent; 2. Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the
concrete wall with iron railings, to cause to be removed the sawali
fence, both at the expense of the defendants, jointly and
severally, and 3. Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and
severally, to the plaintiff the amount of P25,000.00 as litigation
expenses, attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and the costs
of this suit.SO ORDERED.[8] On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision with the modification that the awards of
litigation expenses, attorneys fees, and costs should be deleted.
The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank
of Anda. The Ruling of the Trial CourtThe trial court found that
Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in the name of
respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The
trial court held that Lot 736 is public in nature. Since Lot 736 is
property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man.
Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its
authority when it adopted Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting
Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot and
authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease
for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a 252 square meter
portion of Lot 736 . The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court
of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Lot 736 is property of
public dominion and is used by the public as a pathway. Respondent
and the Municipality of Binmaley are mere claimants with no
sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of Lot 736. The Court
of Appeals held that property of public dominion is intended for
the common welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation either
by the state or by private persons. Since Lot 736 is for public
use, it is a property of public dominion and it is not susceptible
of private ownership. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void
for being enacted beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binmaley. The contract of lease between the Municipality of
Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda is therefore void. The Court of
Appeals also ruled that since neither the respondent nor the
Municipality of Binmaley owns Lot 736, there is no basis for the
monetary awards granted by the trial court. The IssueThe issue in
this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Binmaley are valid. The Ruling of the Court The petition
has no merit. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley
admit that they do not have title over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief
of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management Services in
Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was
ever presented to their office.[9] Respondent claims Lot 736 based
on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted
possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even
the witnesses for respondent testified that Lot 736 was used by the
people as pathway, parking space, and playground.[10] On the other
hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole
claimant of Lot 736 based on the Property Identification Map, Tax
Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality of Binmaley, and the Lot
Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley.
However, these documents merely show that the Municipality of
Binmaley is a mere claimant of Lot 736. In fact, the chief of
Survey Division of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral
survey[11] of Lot 736, which was surveyed for the Municipality of
Binmaley in 1989, had not been approved.[12] The cadastral survey
was based on the Lot Data Computation[13] of Lot 736 which was
likewise contracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989. The
records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school,
the seminary, or the church, which are all located on lots adjoined
to Lot 736.[14] Lot 736 was also used for parking and
playground.[15] In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in
general. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to
prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has never been
acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of
acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned
by the state. As held in Hong Hok v. David:[16] There being no
evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired
by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or
by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled
that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the government. It is indispensable
then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other
mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement
of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes
follows: The applicant, having failed to establish his right or
title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the
present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has
been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the
public domain. This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine
which holds that the state owns all lands and waters of the public
domain.[17] Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the state. Municipal corporations cannot
appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior
grant from the government.[18] Since Lot 736 is owned by the state,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are
void and consequently, the contract of lease between the
Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion
of Lot 736 is also void. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM
the Decision dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23
August 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA,
petitioners, vs.SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.R E S
O L U T I O NPER CURIAM:Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa
brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).In its resolution of
September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on
October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition
be dismissed for lack of merit.On October 19, 1998, respondents
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment.
The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over
natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition
be granted in part.On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors,
composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr.
Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples
(Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition.On March 22, 1999, the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that
the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the
rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous
peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.On
March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with
attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and
pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted.Oral arguments were heard on April 13,
1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced
in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.Petitioners
assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution:"(1) Section 3(a) which defines
the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;"(2) Section 5, in relation
to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other
resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;"(3) Section 6 in relation to
section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;"(6) Section 57
which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and
other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of
natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and"(7) Section 58 which
gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas,
forest cover or reforestation."2Petitioners also content that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found
within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of
private landowners.3In addition, petitioners question the
provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4These provisions are:"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59
which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to
delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;"(2) Section 52[i]
which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the
following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments,
Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development
Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area
terminates;"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law,
traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied
first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership,
hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved
in favor of the indigenous peoples;"(4) Section 65 which states
that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and"(5) Section 66 which vests on the
NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of the indigenous peoples."5Finally, petitioners assail the
validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship
for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that
said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.6Petitioners pray for the following:"(1) A declaration
that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and
other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and
invalid;"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from
implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition
directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department
of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of
1998;"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from
disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus
commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to
comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural
resources."7After due deliberation on the petition, the members of
the Court voted as follows:Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition.
Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno
also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions
of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which
he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale
exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction
with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other
hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant
the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of
the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases
by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice
Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.As the votes
were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant
to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition
is DISMISSED.Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are
the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
and Panganiban.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban
JJ., see separate opinion
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her
husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.N.M. SALEEBY,
defendant-appellee.Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.D.R.
Williams for appellee.JOHNSON, J.:From the record the following
facts appear:First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy,
as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of
Manila.Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years
a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot
of the plaintiffs.Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of
March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said
petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that
the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
the original certificate provided for under the torrens system.
Said registration and certificate included the wall.Fourth. Later
the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court
of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied
by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original certificate
provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot
given in the petition of the defendant also included said
wall.Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912)
the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in
the certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and
correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however,
without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the
theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the
registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in
the name of the defendant.Sixth. That the land occupied by t he
wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.Under these facts, who
is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?The decision
of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding
and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who
did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact
that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part
of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even
though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting
that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and
the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the
defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost
whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have
the same registered in their name, more than six years before.
Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by
simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs
having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall,
were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all
the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not
having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question
is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and
purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The
real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered
the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be
denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the
torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16
Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and
the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action
in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la
Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31;
Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219
U.S., 47.)While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its
consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are
parties, including the government. After the registration is
complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent
third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the
world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government
itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To
permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and
they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and
to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title,
would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The
registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any
better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect
title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be
registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the
fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is
the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should
not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged,
or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A
registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or
diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.For the
difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing
for the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us
no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties
relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the
Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been
registered in the name of two different persons.The rule, we think,
is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the
same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the
world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the
title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not
parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to
rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise
subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be
dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated,
even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered
title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription
(section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to
the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance
of the registration.The question, who is the owner of land
registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented
to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where
the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been
settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the
"Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule
is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the
land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in
part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2
Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7
A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of
Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however
that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules
of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion
of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake,
the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two
certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the
"Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the
excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System,"
page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where
two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in
date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest
in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose
claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the
holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While
the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the
issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a
registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the
same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to
hold the title" (p. 237).Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that;
"It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all
whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of
the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments
or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived
of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land
Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of
the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest.It will be noted, from said section,
that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any
reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud,
after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can
not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct
proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside
in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a
subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe
the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way.We have in this jurisdiction a general
statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of
land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the
name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among
other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it,
who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course,
presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired
title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon
priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the
general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land
Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we
think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have
a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect
of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we
believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real
intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree
that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration
Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall
prevail.In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked
the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other things;
"When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of
Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a
proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right,
and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his
application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right
thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against
them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such
land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their
own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment
duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide
otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above
the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".As was said
above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is
to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure
in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated.
If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the
certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and
the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may
lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the
present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years
which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had
mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right
of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot
be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It
is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under
such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into
consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the
respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee
was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and
if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing
the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a
party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in
question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his
failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the
subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the
appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to
set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity
of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is
located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the
name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his
mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no
more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be
applied to the appellants than to him.We have decided, in case of
double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner
of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the
rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to
successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that
one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered,
transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The
general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right,
title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right
which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the
earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the
owner of the later certificate.We find statutory provisions which,
upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the
vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55,
and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights
and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said
sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which
are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent
purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest
in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be
unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by
virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus
had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an
"innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May
those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake
in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their
right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee?
Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to
an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the
phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections?
Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the
same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two
innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent
purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said
sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are
met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent
purchaser," in said sections.May the purchaser of land which has
been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded
as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of
the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or
vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public
registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record
notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge
of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded,
or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it
contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown
by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record
discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely
necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National
Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate,
sections 710, 710 [a]).When a conveyance has been properly recorded
such record is constructive notice of its contents and all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs.
Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97;
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27
N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7
House of Lords Cases, 341.)Under the rule of notice, it is presumed
that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged
with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to
know every fact which an examination of the record would have
disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of
the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption
cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was
ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons
must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a
rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to
endless confusion and useless litigation.While there is no
statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule
requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the
Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its
validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts
allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the
plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties
were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the
recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason
of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a
purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from
the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser?
May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the
sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We
believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the
public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as
the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead
ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is
contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows
clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is
mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as
logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and
contents of a public record.In view, therefore, of the foregoing
rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part
or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of
another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections
38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not
believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to
such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser"
because of the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a
parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original
certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an
"innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another
earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record
contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior
registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in
a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the
vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we
think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase
"innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only
to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a
certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought
under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate
and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good
fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the
appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never
had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had
sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of
transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee
be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his
vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The
record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the
possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor?
Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title
of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative.
We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the
purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee.
We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later
certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to
his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present,
rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has
been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original
certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure
in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict
therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights.
The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate,
by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the
knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence,
should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase,
rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was
innocent of any act of negligence.The foregoing decision does not
solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from
double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent
transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the
effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the
registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view,
without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system,
supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it
will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded
alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens
system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.It would be
seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired
equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired
it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law
should be protected.In view of our conclusions, above stated, the
judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The
record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising
the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with
direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may
correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the
second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of
the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates
issued.Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.Arellano,
C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 114299 September 24, 1999TRADERS ROYAL BANK,
petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA,
ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY and RAMON A.
GONZALES, respondents.G.R. No. 118862 September 24, 1999PATRIA,
RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed
CAPAY, and RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs.SPS. HONORATO D.
SANTOS and MARIA CRISTINA S. SANTOS, SPS. CECILIO L. PE and
JOSEFINA L. PE, FLORA LARON WESCOMBE, SPS. TELESFORO P. ALFELOR II
and LIZA R. ALFELOR, SPS. DEAN RODERICK FERNANDO and LAARNI MAGDAMO
FERNANDO, REMEDIOS OCA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.KAPUNAN, J.:The present controversy
has its roots in a mortgage executed by the spouses Maximo and
Patria Capay in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) pursuant to a
loan extended by the latter to the former. The mortgage covered
several properties, including a parcel of land, the subject of the
presentdispute. 1 The loan became due on January 8, 1964 and the
same having remained unpaid, TRB instituted extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgaged property.1wphi1.ntTo
prevent the property's sale by public auction, the Capays, on
September 22, 1966, filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. Q-10453) before the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging that the mortgage was void
since they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. The trial
court initially granted the Capays' prayer for preliminary
injunction.On March 17, 1967, the Capays caused to be filed in the
Register of Deeds of Baguio City a notice of lis pendens over the
disputed property. Said notice was entered in the Day Book, as well
as in the Capays' certificate of title.Subsequently, the injunction
issued by the trial court was lifted thus allowing the foreclosure
sale to proceed. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and on
October 17, 1968, the property was sold to TRB which was the
highest bidder at the auction sale. A sheriff certificate of sale
was issued in its name on the same day. On February 25, 1970, the
property was consolidated in the name of TRB, the sole bidder in
the sale. TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was then
cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16272, 2 was entered in the
bank's name. The notice of lis pendens, however, was not carried
over in the certificate of title issued in the name TRB.Thereafter,
the Capays filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying for
the recovery of the property with damages and attorney's fees.
Trial in Civil Case No. Q-10453 proceeded and, on October 3, 1977,
the CFI rendered its decision declaring the mortgage void for want
of consideration. The CFI ordered, among other things, the
cancellation of TCT No. T-16272 in the name of TRB and the issuance
of new certificates of title in the name of the Capay spouses.TRB
appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
Court of Appeals, TRB on March 17, 1982 sold the land to Emelita
Santiago in whose name a new certificate of title, TCT No. 33774, 3
was issued, also, without any notice of lis pendens annotated
thereon. Santiago in turn divided the land into six (6) lots and
sold these to Marcial Alcantara, Armando Cruz and Artemio Sanchez,
who became co-owners thereof. 4 Alcantara and his co-owners
developed the property and thereafter sold the six (6) lots to
seperate buyers who issued seperate titles, again, bearing no
notice of lis pendens. 5On July 30, 1982, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision modifying the decision of the trial court as
to the award of damages but affirming the same in all other
respects.For having been filed out of time and for lack of merit,
the petition for certiorari filed by TRB before this Court 6 was
denied in a Resolution dated September 12, 1983. TRB's motion for
reconsideration was similarly denied in a Resolution dated October
12, 1983. The Court's September 12, 1983 Resolution having become
final and executory on November 9, 1983, the trial court issued a
writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds of Baguio City to
cancel TCT No. 16272 in the name of TRB, and to issue a new one in
the name of the Capay spouses.Said writ, however, could not be
implemented because of the successive subsequent transfers of the
subdivided property to buyers who obtained separate titles thereto.
Thus, a complaint for recovery of possession ownership dated 8 June
1985 was filed before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court against
TRB and the subsequent transferees of the property, the respondents
in G.R. No. 118862 (hereinafter, "the non-bank respondents").
Plaintiffs in said case were Patria Capay, her children by Maximo 7
who succeeded him upon his death on August 25, 1976, and Ramon
Gonzales, counsel of the spouses in Civil Case No. Q-10453 who
become co-owner of the property to the extent of 35% thereof as his
attorney's fees (collectively, "the Capays"). On March 27, 1991,
the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs against the defendants and ordering the Register of
Deeds for Baguio to cancel TCT No. T-36177, Books 198, Page 177 in
the names of defendants Spouses Honorato D. Santos and Maria
Cristina Santos; to cancel TCT No. 36707, Book 201, Page 107 in the
names of defendant Spouses Cecilio Pe and Josefina L. Pe; to cancel
TCT No. T-36051, Book 198, Page 51 in the name of Flora Laron
Wescombe, married to Kevin Lind Wescombe (now deceased); to cancel
TCT No. 36147, Book 198, page 147 in the names of Spouses Telesforo
P. Alfelor II and Liza R. Alfelor; to cancel TCT No. T-36730, Book
201, Page 130 in the names of Spouses Dean Roderick Fernando and
Laarni Magdamo Fernando; to cancel TCT No. 37437, Book 205, Page 37
in the name of Remedios Oca, and issue new ones free from all liens
and encumbrances, together with all the improvements therein in the
names of plaintiffs sharing pro indiviso as follows: 35% to Ramon
A. Gonzales, married to Lilia Y. Gonzales, of legal age, with
postal address at 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City 37.92%
to Patria B. Capay, of legal age, widow, Filipino; 5.41% each to
Ruby Ann Capay, of legal age, Filipino married to Pokka Vainio,
Finnish citizen; Chona Margarita Capay, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Waldo Flores; Rosario Capay of legal age, Filipino,
married to Jose Cuaycong, Jr.; Cynthia Capay, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Raul Flores; Linda Joy Capay, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Pedro Duran, all with postal address at 37
Sampaguita St., Capitolville Subd., Bacolod City, ordering said
defendants to vacate the premises in question and restoring
plaintiffs thereto and for defendant Traders Royal Bank to pay each
of the plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
P40,000.00 in exemplary damages and P40,000.00 as attorney's fees,
all with legal interest from the filing of the complaint, with
costs against defendants.SO ORDERED. 8TRB and the non-bank
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
promulgated on February 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, the
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. 9
It ruled that the non-bank respondents cannot be considered as
purchasers for value and in good faith, having purchased the
property subsequent to the action in Civil Case No. Q-10453 and
that while the notice of lis pendens was not carried over to TRB's
certificate of title, as well as to the subsequent transferees'
titles, it was entered in the Day Book which is sufficient to
constitute registration and notice to all persons of such adverse
claim, citing the cases of Villasor vs. Camon, 10 Levin vs. Bass 11
and Director of Lands vs. Reyes. 12As regard TRB, the Court of
Appeals said that the bank was in bad faith when it sold the
property knowing that it was under the litigation and without
informing the buyer of that fact.On April 26, 1994, TRB filed with
this Court a petition for review to set aside the CA decision,
docketed herein as G.R. No. 114299, invoking the following
grounds:I.THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN PROMULGATING THE DISPUTED DECISION AND
THEREBY DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHOLLY CONTRARY TO SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE AND TOTALLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISION OF
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.II.THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS COMMITTED SO GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN
SANCTIONING A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF BY
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.a) The public respondent has plainly
and manifestly acted whimsically, arbitrarily, capriciously, with
grave abuse of discretion, in excess of jurisdiction tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction.xxx xxx xxxb) The public respondent erred in
not finding that it was not the fault of petitioner when the notice
of lis pendens was not carried over to its new title.xxx xxx xxxc)
The public respondent erred in not finding that PD No. 1271 had
legally caused the invalidation of the Capay's property and the
subsequent validation of TRB's title over the same property was
effective even as against the Capays. 13Meanwhile, the non-bank
respondents moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals'
decision. Convinced of the movants' arguments, the Court of Appeals
in a Resolution promulgated on August 10, 1994 granted the motion
for reconsideration and dismissed the complaint as against them.
The dispositive portion of the resolution states:ACCORDINGLY, in
view of the foregoing disquisitions and finding merit in the motion
for reconsideration, the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the
decision of this Court, promulgated on February 24, 1994, is hereby
RECONSIDERED. The complaint filed against defendants-appellants
with the court a quo is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the
certificate of titles originally issued to them in their individual
names are hereby ordered restored and duly respected. We make no
pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. 14The Capays thus filed with
this Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 118862 to
set aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals raising the
following errors:ITHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING
ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT TUAZON VS. REYES, 48 PHIL. 814 AND
RIVERA VS. MORAN, 48 PHIL. 836 ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREOF, WHILE
PINO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 198 SCRA 436, IS APPLICABLE.IITHE COURT
OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT
ATUN VS. MUNOZ, 97 PHIL. 762 AND LAROZA VS. GUIA, 134 SCRA 34, ARE
NOT APPLICABLE.IIITHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING
ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT LEVIN VS. BASS, 91 PHIL. 419 VILLASOR
VS. CAMON, 89 PHIL. 404 AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. REYES, 68 SCRA
73, ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREOF.IVTHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED
IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF
LACHES.VTHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY
NOW HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO DISTINCTION IN THE REGISTRATION OF
VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS VIS-A-VIS INVOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS.VITHE COURT
OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS WHO ARE LAWYERS, RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS AND
WELL-RESPECTED RESIDENTS IN THE COMMUNITY, ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE
EFFECTS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE ARISING FROM REGISTRATION.VIITHE
COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF WITH REGARDS TO
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, AFTER THE LATTER HAS PERFECTED ITS APPEAL TO
THE SUPREME COURT.VIIITHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT
RULING ON THE COUNTER-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THAT:B) THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. Q-10453.Subsequently, G.R. No. 118862 was
consolidated with G.R No. 114299, pursuant to this Court's
Resolution dated July 3, 1996. 15The consolidated cases primarily
involve two issues: (1) who, as between the Capays and the non-bank
respondents, has a better right to the disputed property, and (2)
whether or not TRB is liable to the Capays for damages.On the first
issue, we rule for the non-bank respondents.IFirst, when TRB
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, the notice of lis
pendens that the Capays caused to be annotated on their certificate
of title was not carried to the new one issued to TRB. Neither did
the certificate of title of Emelita Santiago, who purchased the
property from TRB, contain any such notice. When Santiago caused
the property to be divided, six (6) new certificates of title were
issued, none of which contained any notice of lis pendens. Santiago
then sold the lots to Marcial Alcantara and his co-owners who next
sold each of these to the non-bank respondents. The non-bank
respondents, therefore, could not have been aware that the property
in question was the subject of litigation when they acquired their
respective portions of said property. There was nothing in the
certificates of title or respective predecessors-in-interest that
could have aroused their suspicion. The non-bank respondents had a
right to rely on what appeared on the face of the title of their
respective predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound to go
beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of the
principal objects of the Torrens system of land registration, that
is, to facilitate transactions involving lands.The main purpose of
the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real
estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving
the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate
of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights
over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order
the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an
outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the
certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered
under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as
to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by
the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor
and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate
to determine the condition of the property.The Torrens system was
adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land
on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he
should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition
was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him.
What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in
the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be
attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence
would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and
complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not
even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of
the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of
titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law
are satisfied. 16Second, the foregoing rule notwithstanding, the
non-bank respondents nevertheless physically inspected the
properties and inquired from the register of Deeds to ascertain the
absence of any defect in the title of the property they were
purchasing an exercise of diligence above that required by
law.Thus, respondent Aida Fernando Meeks, who bought Lot 5 for her
son Dean, testified:Q How did you come to live in Baguio City,
particulary in Kim. 2.5 San Luis, Baguio City?A In one of my visits
to my sister who has been residing here for twelve (12) years now,
I got interested in buying a property here.Q How did you come to
know of this property at Asin Road where you now reside?A My
sister, Ruth Ann Valdez, sir.Q When this particular property was
bought by you, when was that?A I do not remember the exact date,
but it was in 1984, sir.Q At the time when you went to see the
place where you now reside, how did it look?A This particular
property that I bought was then a small one (1) room structure, it
is a two (2)-storey one (1) bedroom structure.Q What kind of
structure with regards to material?A It is a semi-concrete
structure, sir.Q And aside from this two (2)-storey one (1)-room
structure, how did the surrounding area look like at the time you
visited?A There were stone walls from the road and there were stone
walls in front of the property and beside the property.Q At the
time you went to see the property with your agent, rather your
sister Ruth Ann Valdez did you come to know the owner?A We did
because at the time we went there, Mr. Alcantara was there
supervising the workers.Q And who?A Amado Cruz sir.Q After you saw
this property, what else did you do?A My first concern then was am
I buying a property with a clean title.Q In regards to this concern
of yours, did you find an answer to this concern of yours?A At
first; I asked Mr. Alcantara and I was answered by him.Q What was
his answer?A That it was a property with a clean title, that he has
shown me the mother title and it is a clean title.Q Aside from
being informed that it is a property with a clean title, did you do
anything to answer your question?A Yes, sit.Q What did you do?A
Well, the first step I did was to go to the Land Registration
Office.Q Are you referring to the City Hall of Baguio?A Yes, the
City Hall of Baguio.Q And what did you do in the Registry of
Deeds?A We looked for the title, the original title, sir.Q When you
say we, who was your companion?A Mr. Alcantara and my present
husband, sir.Q The three (3) of you?A Yes, sir.Q What title did you
see there?A We saw the title that was made up in favor of Amado
Cruz, sir.Q And what was the result of your looking up for this
title in the name of Amado Cruz?A We had to be reassured that it
was a genuine one, so we asked Atty. Diomampo who heads the office.
We showed him a copy of that title and we were also reassured by
him that anything that was signed by him was as good as it is.Q Did
this Atty. Diomampo reassure you that the title was good?A He did.Q
After your conversation with the Register of Deeds, what did you
do?A The second step we did was to confer with our lawyer, a friend
from RCBC Binondo, Manila this is Atty. Nelson Waje.Q What is your
purpose in going to this lawyer?A We wanted an assurance that we
were getting a valid title just in case we think of buying the
property.Q What was the result of your conference with this
lawyer?A He was absolutely certain that was a valid title.Q Mrs.
Meeks, after looking at the place, going to the Register of Deeds,
looking at the title and seeing your lawyer friend, what decision
did you finally make regarding the property?A We wanted more
reassurances, so we proceeded to Banaue, as advised by that same
lawyer, there is another office of the Bureau of Lands. I cannot
recall the office but it has something to do with registration of
the old.Q What is your purpose in going to this Office in Banaue?A
I wanted more reassuances that I was getting a valid title.Q What
was the result of your visit to the Banaue Office?A We found the
title of this property and there was reassurance that it was a
clean title and we saw the mother title under the Hilario family.Q
Mrs. Meeks, when you say Banaue, what particular place is this
Banaue?A It is in Banaue Street in Quezon City, sir.Q And when you
saw the title to this property and the mother title, what was the
result of your investigation, the investigation that you made?A We
were reassured that we were purchasing a valid title, we had a
genuine title.Q When you were able to determine that you had a
valid, authentic or genuine title, what did you do?A That is when I
finally thought of purchasing the property. 17Telesforo Alfelor II,
the purchaser of Lot 4, narrated going through a similar routine:Q
How did you come to know of this place as Asin Road where you are
presently residing?A It was actually through Mrs. Flory Recto who
is presently the Branch Manager of CocoBank. She informed my wife
that there is a property for sale at Asin Road, and she was the one
who introduced to us Mr. Alcantara, sir.Q When you were informed by
Mrs. Recto and when you met with Mr. Alcantara, did you see the
property that was being offered for sale?A Yes, sir.Q When did you
specifically see the property, if you can recall?A I would say it
is around the third quarter of 1983, sir.Q When you went to see the
place, could you please describe what you saw at that time?A When
we went there the area is still being developed by Mr. Alcantara.
As a matter of fact the road leading to the property is still not
passable considering that during that time it was rainy season and
it was muddy, we fell on our way going to the property and walked
to have an ocular inspection and physical check on the area,
sir.xxx xxx xxxQ What was the improvement, if any, that was in that
parcel which you are going to purchase?A During that time, the
riprap of the property is already there, the one-half of the riprap
sir.Q Do you know who was making this improvement at the time that
you went there?A I would understand that it was Marcial Alcantara,
sir.Q After you saw the place riprap and you were in the course of
deciding to purchase this property, what else did you do?A First, I
have to consider that the property is clean.Q How did you go about
determining whether the title of the property is clean?A
Considering that Marcial Alcantara is a real estate broker, I went
to his office and checked the documents he has regarding the
property.Q And what was the result of your checking as to whether
the title of the property is clean?A He showed me the copy of the
title and it was clean, sir.Q Aside from going to Mr. Alcantara to
check up the title of the property, what else did you do?A Well,
the next thing is I requested his wife to accompany me to the
Bureau of Lands or rather the Registry of Deeds, sir.Q What
registry of Deeds are you referring to?A The Registry of Deeds of
Baguio City, sir.Q And were you able to see the Register of Deeds
regarding what you would like to know?A Yes, and we were given a
certification regarding this particular area that it was clean,
sir.Q What Certification are you referring to?A It is a
Certification duly signed by the employee of the Registry of Deeds
Adelina Tabangin, sir.Q Do you have a copy of that Certification?A
Yes, I have, sir. 18The testimonies of Honorato Santos 19 and
Josefina Pe 20 were to the same effect.The non-bank respondent
predecessor-in-interest, Marcial Alcantara, was less thorough:Q And
will you give a brief description of what you do?A I normally
acquire land, quite big tract of land and subdivide it into smaller
lots and sold it to some interested parties.Q Specifically, Mr.
Alcantara will you please inform the Court in what place in Baguio
have you acquired and subdivided and sold lots?A Dominican Hill,
Leonila Hill, Cristal Cave and Asin Road, sir.Q You mentioned Asin
Road, what particular place in Asin Road are you referring?A That
property I bought from Emelita Santiago, sir.Q When you say you
bought it from Emelita Santiago, how did you come to know that
Emelita Santiago is disposing of the property?A Because of the
father, he is the one who offered me the property, sir, Armando
Gabriel.Q Is he also a resident of Baguio?A He is from Buyagan, La
Trinidad sir,Q How did you come to know of this Armando Gabriel
wanting to sell a property in Asin?A He approached me in the house,
sir. He has acquired a title from the Traders Royal Bank.Q Can you
inform the Honorable Court when you had this conversation with
Armando Gabriel on the sale of the property at Asin Road?A Later
part of March, 1983, sir.Q Now, when this Armando Gabriel informed
you that he wants his property to be sold, what did you do?A I went
to the place with the agent, sir.Q When you say you went to the
place with the agent, what place?A Kilometer 2, Asin Road sir.Q And
when you went there to see the place, did you actually go there to
see the place?A By walking, I parked my car a kilometer away, sir.Q
Is it my understanding that when you went to see the property there
were no roads?A None, sir.xxx xxx xxxQ Mr. Alcantara, when you went
to see this place at Asin Road last week of March, 1983, will you
please briefly describe how this place looked like at that time?A
The place was mountainous, grassy, there were cogon trees, some of
the roads were eroding already, so we cannot possibly enter the
property, sir.Q At the time you entered the place, was there any
visible sign of claim by anyone?A None, sir.Q In terms of fence in
the area?A There is no such, sir.xxx xxx xxxQ Aside from looking or
going to the property, what else did you do to this property prior
to your purchase?A I investigated it with the Register of Deeds,
sir.Q What is your purpose in investigating it with the Register of
Deeds?A To see if the paper in clean and there are no encumbrances,
sir.Q To whom did you talk?A To Atty. Ernesto Diomampo, sir.Q And
when you went to the Registry of Deeds to investigate and check,
did you have occasion to talk with Atty. Diomampo?A Yes, sir.Q And
what was the result of your talk with Atty. Diomampo?A The papers
are clean except to the annotation at the back with the road right
of way, sir.Q After making this investigation with the Register of
Deeds and talking with Atty. Diomampo, what else transpired?A We
bought the property, sir.Q After purchasing the property from
Emelita Santiago, could you please tell the Honorable Court what
you did with that deed of sale?A We registered it with the Register
of Deeds for the Certificate of Title because at that time when we
bought the property, Emelita Santiago had it subdivided into six
(6) lots, sir.Q Is it our understanding that prior to your purchase
the property was subdivided into six (6) parcels?A Yes, sir.Q Could
you please inform the Honorable Court if you have any buyers in the
subdivision of this property prior to your purchase?A Yes, I have.Q
This subdivision of this property, to what office was it brought
for action?A Bureau of Lands, San Fernando, La Union, sir.Q Now,
Mr. Alcantara, at the time that you had this property subdivided by
the owner, could you please inform the Court if there was any claim
by any other party opposing the subdivision or claiming the
property?A None, sir.Q When the Deed of Sale was executed and you
said that you presented it to the Register of Deeds and after the
subdivision already, what action did the Register of Deeds have
regarding the matter?A They approved it and registered it already
in six (6) titles, sir.Q In whose names?A One (1) title under my
name, Amado Cruz and Dr. Sanchez, sir.Q Initially, Mr. Alcantara,
you said that you are the sole purchaser of this entire area of One
Thousand Five Hundred Ninety One (1,591) Square Meters. Now, you
are informing this Honorable Court that one Amado Cruz and one Dr.
Sanchez were also issued two (2) titles. Could you explain how
these titles came into their possession?A Actually, two (2) are our
co-owners, sir.Q So, is it our understanding that the Deed of Sale
from Emelita Santiago is in favor of these two (2) Atty. Cruz and
Dr. Sanchez?A Yes, sir. 21Third, between two innocent persons, the
one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one
to bear the resulting loss. 22 The Capays filed the notice of lis
pendens way back on March 17, 1967 but the same was not TRB's
title. The Capays and their counsel Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales knew in
1968 of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property to TRB
and the consolidation of title in the bank's name following the
lapse of the one-year period of redemption. But in the next fifteen
(15) years or so, they did not bother to find out the status of
their title or whether the liens noted on the original certificate
of title were still existing considering that the property had
already been foreclosed. In the meantime, the subject property had
undergone a series of transfers to buyers in good and for value. It
was not until after the land was subdivided and developed with the
buyers building their houses on the other lots when the Capays
suddenly appeared and questioned the occupants' titles. At the very
least, the Capays are guilty of laches. Laches has been defined as
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption
that the party entitled to it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it. 23Verily, the principle on prescription of actions is
designed to cover situations such as the case at bar, where there
have been a series of transfers to innocent purchasers for value.
To set aside these transactions only to accommodate a party who has
slept on his rights is anathema to good order.Independently of the
principle of prescription of actions working against petitioners,
the doctrine of laches may further be counted against them, which
latter tenet finds application even to imprescriptibleactions. . .
. 24In De La Calzada-Cierras vs. Court of Appeals, 25 we held:While
it is true that under the law it is the act of registration of the
deed of conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey the
land registered under the Torrens System (Davao Grains, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 612), the petitioners cannot
invoke said dictum because their action to recover Lot 4362 is
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.The act of registering
the conveyance to Rosendo was constructive notice to the whole
world of the fact of such conveyance (Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 253).But the petitioners'
complaint to recover the title and possession of Lot 4362 was filed
only on July 21, 1981, twelve (12) years after the registration of
the sale to Rosendo. The petitioners failed and neglected for an
unreasonably long time to assert their right, if any, to the
property in Rosendo's possession.Being guilty of laches, the Capays
cannot invoke the ruling in Villasor vs. Camon Levin Bass and
Director of Lands vs. Reyes 26 to the effect that entry of the
notice of lis pendens in the day book (primary entry book) is
sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to
all persons of such adverse claim. Certainly, it is most iniquitous
for the Capays who, after sleeping on their rights for fifteen
years to assert ownership over the property that has undergone
several transfers made in good faith and for value and already
subdivided into several lots with improvements introduced thereon
by their owners.In the same vein, the cases cited by the Capays in
their first two (2) assignment of errors, do not help them any, as
the transferees in said cases were not innocent purchasers for
value and in good faith. In Tuazon vs. Reyes andSiochi, 27 where
the land involved therein was sold by Petronilo David to Vicente
Tuazon, it was with a deed containing the recital that the land was
in dispute between the vendor and Roberto Siochi. Tuazon, who was
merely subrogated to the rights of the vendor was aware of the
dispute and, furthermore, David did not warrant the title to the
same. In Rivera vs. Moran, 28 Rivera acquired interest in the land
before the final decree was entered in the cadastral proceedings.
Rivera, the transferee, was aware of the pending litigation and,
consequently, could not have been considered a purchaser in good
faith. Similarly, in Atun, et al. vs. Nuez, et al. 29 and Laroza
vs. Guia, 30 the buyers of the property at the time of their
acquisition knew of the existence of the notice of lis pendens. In
contrast to the cited cases, the non-bank respondents in the case
at bar acquired their respective portions of the land with clean
title from their predecessors-in-interest.IIWe come now to TRB's
liability towards the Capays.The Bank unconvincingly tries to wash
its hands off the present controversy, and attempts to shift the
blame on the Capays, thus:xxx xxx xxx23. The petitioner Bank,
during all the time that it was holding the title for over fourteen
(14) years that there was no legal impediment for it to sell said
property, Central Bank regulations require that real properties of
banks should not he held for more than five (5) years:24. The fault
of the Register of Deeds in not carrying over the Notice of Lis
Pendens to the new title of the petitioner Bank should not be
absorbed by the latter considering that in all good faith, it was
not aware of the existence of said annotation during all the time
that said title was in its possession for almost fourteen (14)
years before the property was sold to Emelita G. Santiago. . . .
31TRB concludes that "(t)he inaction and negligence of private
respondents allowing ownership to pass for almost 15 years
constitute prescription of action and/or laches." 32Sec. 25 of the
General Banking Act, 33 provides that no bank "shall hold the
possession of any real estate under mortgage or trust, deed, or the
title and possession of any real estate purchased to secure any
debt due to it, for a longer period than five years." TRB, however,
admits hoding on to the foreclosed property for twelve (12) years
after consolidating title in its name. The bank is, therefore,
estopped from involving banking laws and regulations to justify its
belated disposition of the property. It cannot be allowed to hide
behind the law which it itself violated.TRB cannot feign ignorance
of the existence of the lis pendens because when the property was
foreclosed by it, the notice of lis pendens was annotated on the
title. But when TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was
cancelled after the foreclosure, TCT No. T-16272 which was issued
in place thereof in the name of TRB did not carry over the notice
of lis pendens.We do not find the Capays guilty of "inaction and
negligence" as against TRB. It may be recalled that upon the
commencement of foreclosure proceedings by TRB, the Capays filed an
action for prohibition on September 22, 1966 against the TRB before
the CFI to stop the foreclosure sale. Failing in that attempt, the
Capays filed a supplemental complaint for the recovery of the
property. The case reached this Court. Prescription or laches could
not have worked against the Capays because they had persistently
pursued their suit against TRB to recover their property.On the
other hand, it is difficult to believe TRB's assertion that after
holding on to the property for more than ten (10) years, it
suddenly realized that it was acting in violation of the General
Bank Act. What is apparent is that TRB took advantage of the
absence of the notice of lis pendens at the back of their
certificate of title and sold the property to an unwary purchaser.
This notwithstanding the adverse decision of the trial court and
the pendency of its appeal. TRB, whose timing indeed smacks of bad
faith, thus transferred caused the property without the lis pendens
annotated on its title to put it beyond the Capays' reach. Clearly,
the bank acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy and should be held liable for damages. 34Considering
however, that the mortgage in favor of TRB had been declared null
and void for want of consideration and, consequently, the
foreclosure proceedings did not have a valid effect, the Capays
would ordinarily be entitled to the recovery of their property.
Nevertheless, this remedy is not now available to the Capays
inasmuch as title to said property has passed into the hands of
third parties who acquired the same in good faith and for value.
Such being the case, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair
market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita
Santiago, the transferee of TRB.WHEREFORE, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated Frebruary 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920,
as modified by its Resolution dated August 10, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED. In addition, Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the
Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was
sold to Emelita Santiago.This Decision is without prejudice to
whatever criminal, civil or administrative action against the
Register of Deeds and or his assistants that may be taken by the
party or parties prejudiced by the failure of the former to carry
over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate of title in the
name of TRB.1wphi1.ntSO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164687 February 12, 2009SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.,
Petitioner, vs.ANGELA V. MADAYAG, Respondent.D E C I S I O
NNACHURA, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 19, 2004 and
Resolution dated July 15, 2004, which set aside the lower courts
order to suspend the proceedings on respondents application for
land registration.On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan
an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of
1,492 square meters located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan.2 Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of
Survey Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services
(LMS) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City.On August 20, 2001, petitioner
SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional
Survey Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the
respondents survey plan because the lot encroached on the
properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that,
despite being the new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not
notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001.3Petitioner then
manifested its opposition to the respondents application for
registration. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also
filed their respective oppositions.On February 6, 2002, petitioner
filed its formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had
recently bought seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta,
delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in
Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the
Land Registration Commission on August 26, 1976, and previously
covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090 approved by the Bureau of
Lands on December 29, 1970. These parcels of land are covered by
separate certificates of title, some of which are already in the
name of the petitioner while the others are still in the name of
the previous owners.On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a
general default, except as to the petitioner, the Republic, and the
heirs of Romulo Visperas. Thereafter, respondent commenced the
presentation of evidence.Meanwhile, acting on petitioners request
for the cancellation of the respondents survey plan, DENR Assistant
Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs,
Allan V. Barcena, advised the petitioner to file a petition for
cancellation in due form so that the DENR could properly act on the
same.4 Accordingly, petitioner formally filed with the DENR a
petition5 for cancellation of the survey plan sometime in March
2002, alleging the following grounds:I.THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS
ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT LOT IN THIS
CASEII.NO NOTICE WAS MADE UPON PETITIONER (AS ADJOINING LANDOWNER
AND WHO BEARS INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT LOT) MUCH LESS THE OWNERS
OF ADJOINING LANDS.III.THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENTLY SHOW THAT BAD
FAITH AND/OR MALICE ATTENDED THE APPROVAL OF (PLAN WITH PSU NO.
01-008438).6On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proceedings7 in the land registration case, alleging that
the court should await the DENR resolution of the petition for the
cancellation of the survey plan "as the administrative case is
prejudicial to the determination" of the land registration case.On
October 8, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion,
thus:WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby GRANTS the
instant motion and suspends the proceedings herein. In the
meantime, and until receipt by this Court of a copy of the
resolution of the petition for cancellation by the DENR, the
instant case is hereby ARCHIVED.SO ORDERED.8Emphasizing that a
survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in land
registration proceedings, the RTC agreed with the petitioner that
the cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to the
petition for land registration.9On February 13, 2003, the RTC
denied the respondents motion for reconsideration of its order.10
Respondent thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the order suspending the proceedings.On March 19, 2004,
finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the proceedings, the CA granted the petition for
certiorari, thus:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Orders dated October 8,
2002 and February 13, 2003 of the respondent Court are declared
NULL and VOID.The Court a quo is directed to continue the
proceedings until its final determination. No pronouncement as to
costs.SO ORDERED.11The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which
was duly approved by the DENR should be accorded the presumption of
regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine
all questions arising from an application for registration.12On
July 15, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution13 denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner was, thus, compelled to file
this petition for review, ascribing the following errors to the
CA:I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION
CASE IS LEGAL AND PROPER PENDING THE DETERMINATION AND RESOLUTION
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES-REGION 1.II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE
LOWER COURT HAVE PROPER AND SUFFICIENT BASES IN FACT AND IN
LAW.III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN HOLDING
THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
SUSPENDING THE PROCEED