Labor Cases Set 2

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995NITTO ENTERPRISES,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI,respondents.KAPUNAN,J.:This petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision1rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement2for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital.Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter3which reads:August 2, 1990Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang sariling kamay.Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:Emergency and doctor fee P715.00Medecines (sic) and others 317.04Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang kamay.Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat sa itaas ay totoo.Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking pagkakasala sa hindi pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.(Sgd.) Roberto CapiliRoberto CapiliOn August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79.4Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the money claims dismissed for lack of merit.The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as financial assistance.SO ORDERED.5Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto Capilian was valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without authority and proper training.6On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his work last performed with backwages computed from the time his wages were withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further hear complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining.SO ORDERED.7The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by ruling thus:As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an apprenticeship agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as basis to conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain "apprentice" on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was respondent's regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon respondent, pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div., Feliciano,J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid cause. Absent such proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was illegally dismissed.8On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private respondent's representative was present.On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the Writ, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at No. l 74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places where their properties are located and effect the reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the option of the respondent by payroll reinstatement.You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.Hence, the instant petition forcertiorari.The issues raised before us are the following:IWHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.IIWHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.We find no merit in the petition.Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement was executed.Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an employer-apprentice relationship.Petitioner's argument is erroneous.The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a conditionsine quo nonbefore an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a conditionsine qua nonbefore any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased.Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer,except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."9Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists.10Without which, the dismissal becomes void.The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation.11As held in the case ofPepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC:12The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written notices before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which, any judgment reached by management is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not voluntary and deliberate.Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante").He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice.13Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latter's alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part.WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, vs COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA C. PALAD(G.R. No. 152894)The Facts cralawOn 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as fish cleaner atpetitioners tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an apprenticeship agreement with petitioner.Palad received an apprentice allowance of P138.75 daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeshipprogram for approval to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioners apprenticeship program. According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November 1997, where petitioner gavePalad a rating ofN.I. or needs improvement since she scored only27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator.Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation, Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As aconsequence, petitioner issued a termination notice dated 22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of hertermination effective at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997. Palad then filed a complaint for illegaldismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of pro-rated 13thmonth pay for the year 1997.ISSUES:1) WHETHER OR NOT THE APPRENTICESHIP AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND BINDINGBETWEEN THE PARTIES2) WHETHER OR NOT PALAD WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY THE PETITIONERHELD:1) The Court held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not valid andbinding because it was executed more than two months before the TESDA approvedpetitioners apprenticeship program.The Court cited Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission, where it was heldthat an apprenticeship program should first be approved by the DOLE before an apprenticemay be hired, otherwise the person hired will be considered a regular employee. It ismandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall beentered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of theproposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a conditionsine qua nonbefore anapprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into. The Labor Code defines an apprenticeas a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with an employer.Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement wasenforced before the TESDAs approval of petitioners apprenticeship program, Palad is deemeda regular employee performing the job of a fish cleaner. Clearly, the job of a fish cleaner isnecessary in petitioners business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article 280 of theLabor Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged toperform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.2) Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee for justcauses or for authorized causes. under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the employer must send theemployee who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the causes for termination and mustgive the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Thus, to constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just orauthorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defendhimself.Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a performance evaluation on Palad,petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor performance. In fact, Palad denies any knowledgeof the performance evaluation conducted and of the result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits thatPalad did not receive the notice of termination because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work.The records are bereft of evidence to show that petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity to explainand defend herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking in this case

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 152894 August 17, 2007CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION,Petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA C. PALAD,Respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis is a petition for review1of the Decision2dated 12 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 5 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.The FactsOn 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as "fish cleaner" at petitioners tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an apprenticeship agreement3with petitioner. Palad received an apprentice allowance ofP138.75 daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for approval to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioners apprenticeship program.4According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November 1997, where petitioner gave Palad a rating of N.I. or "needs improvement" since she scored only 27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator. Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation, Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As a consequence, petitioner issued a termination notice5dated 22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of her termination effective at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997.Palad then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997.On 25 February 1999, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but ordered petitioner to pay Palad her last salary and her pro-rated 13th month pay. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by the complainant against the respondents in the above-entitled case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant the amount of ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P1,632.00), representing her last salary and the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (P7,228.00) PESOS representing her prorated 13th month pay.All other issues are likewise dismissed.SO ORDERED.6On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiters decision, thus:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Arbiter dated 25 February 1999 is hereby MODIFIED in that, in addition, respondents are ordered to pay complainants backwages for two (2) months in the amount ofP7,176.00 (P138.75 x 26 x 2 mos.). All other dispositions of the Arbiter as appearing in the dispositive portion of his decision are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.7Upon denial of Palads motion for reconsideration, Palad filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 12 November 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned decision of the NLRC is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered, to wit:(a) finding the dismissal of petitioner to be illegal;(b) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner her underpayment in wages;(c) ordering private respondent to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority rights and to pay her full backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld from her up to the time of her reinstatement;(d) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner attorneys fees equivalent to ten (10%) per cent of the monetary award herein; and(e) ordering private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.SO ORDERED.8The Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not valid and binding because it was executed more than two months before the TESDA approved petitioners apprenticeship program. The Court of Appeals citedNitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,9where it was held that prior approval by the DOLE of the proposed apprenticeship program is a conditionsine qua nonbefore an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to show that Palad was properly apprised of the required standard of performance. The Court of Appeals likewise held that Palad was not afforded due process because petitioner did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.The IssuesPetitioner raises the following issues:1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE; and2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.10The Ruling of the CourtThe petition is without merit.Registration and Approval by the TESDA of Apprenticeship Program Required Before Hiring of ApprenticesThe Labor Code defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with an employer.11One of the objectives of Title II (Training and Employment of Special Workers) of the Labor Code is to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices.12In line with this objective, Articles 60 and 61 of the Labor Code provide:ART. 60.Employment of apprentices. Only employers in the highly technical industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. (Emphasis supplied)ART. 61.Contents of apprenticeship agreements. Apprenticeship agreements, including the wage rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months.Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75 percent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship programs duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship. (Emphasis supplied)InNitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,13the Court cited Article 61 of the Labor Code and held that an apprenticeship program should first be approved by the DOLE before an apprentice may be hired, otherwise the person hired will be considered a regular employee. The Court held:In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law.It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased.Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondents assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code x x x. (Emphasis supplied)14Republic Act No. 779615(RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has transferred the authority over apprenticeship programs from the Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE to the TESDA.16RA 7796 emphasizes TESDAs approval of the apprenticeship program as a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices. Such intent is clear under Section 4 of RA 7796:SEC. 4.Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:x x xj)"Apprenticeship"training within employment with compulsory related theoretical instructions involving acontract between an apprentice and an employer on an approved apprenticeable occupation;k)"Apprentice"is a person undergoingtraining for an approved apprenticeable occupationduring an established period assured by an apprenticeship agreement;l)"Apprentice Agreement"is a contract wherein a prospective employer binds himself to train the apprentice who in turn accepts the terms oftraining for a recognized apprenticeable occupation emphasizing the rights, duties and responsibilities of each party;m)"Apprenticeable Occupation" is an occupation officially endorsed by a tripartite body andapproved for apprenticeship by the Authority [TESDA]; (Emphasis supplied)In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into between the parties before petitioner filed its apprenticeship program with the TESDA for approval. Petitioner and Palad executed the apprenticeship agreement on 17 July 1997 wherein it was stated that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end approximately in December 1997.17On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for approval its apprenticeship program, which the TESDA subsequently approved on 26 September 1997.18Clearly, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced even before the TESDA approved petitioners apprenticeship program. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement is void because it lacked prior approval from the TESDA.The TESDAs approval of the employers apprenticeship program is required before the employer is allowed to hire apprentices. Prior approval from the TESDA is necessary to ensure that only employers in the highly technical industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations.19Thus, under RA 7796, employers can only hire apprentices for apprenticeable occupations which must be officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved for apprenticeship by the TESDA.1avvphilThis is to ensure the protection of apprentices and to obviate possible abuses by prospective employers who may want to take advantage of the lower wage rates for apprentices and circumvent the right of the employees to be secure in their employment.The requisite TESDA approval of the apprenticeship program prior to the hiring of apprentices was further emphasized by the DOLE with the issuance of Department Order No. 68-04 on 18 August 2004. Department Order No. 68-04, which provides the guidelines in the implementation of the Apprenticeship and Employment Program of the government, specifically states thatno enterprise shall be allowed to hire apprentices unless its apprenticeship program is registered and approved by TESDA.20Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was enforced before the TESDAs approval of petitioners apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a regular employee performing the job of a "fish cleaner." Clearly, the job of a "fish cleaner" is necessary in petitioners business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article 28021of the Labor Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.Illegal Termination of PaladWe shall now resolve whether petitioner illegally dismissed Palad.Under Article 27922of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just causes23or for authorized causes.24Furthermore, under Article 277(b)25of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the causes for termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Thus, to constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.26In this case, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner terminated Palad for habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance. Under Section 25, Rule VI, Book II of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance are among the valid causes for which the employer may terminate the apprenticeship agreement after the probationary period.However, the NLRC reversed the finding of the Labor Arbiter on the issue of the legality of Palads termination:As to the validity of complainants dismissal in her status as an apprentice, suffice to state that the findings of the Arbiter that complainant was dismissed due to failure to meet the standards is nebulous. What clearly appears is that complainant already passed the probationary status of the apprenticeship agreement of 200 hours at the time she was terminated on 28 November 1997 which was already the fourth month of the apprenticeship period of 1000 hours. As such, under the Code, she can only be dismissed for cause, in this case, for poor efficiency of performance on the job or in the classroom for a prolonged period despite warnings duly given to the apprentice.We noted that no clear and sufficient evidence exist to warrant her dismissal as an apprentice during the agreed period. Besides the absence of any written warnings given to complainant reminding her of "poor performance," respondents evidence in this respect consisted of an indecipherable or unauthenticated xerox of the performance evaluation allegedly conducted on complainant. This is of doubtful authenticity and/or credibility, being not only incomplete in the sense that appearing thereon is a signature (not that of complainant) side by side with a date indicated as"1/16/98". From the looks of it, this signature is close to and appertains to the typewritten position of "Division/Department Head", which is below the signature of complainants immediate superior who made the evaluation indicated as "11-15-97."The only conclusion We can infer is that this evaluation was made belatedly, specifically, after the filing of the case and during the progress thereof in the Arbitral level, as shown that nothing thereon indicate that complainant was notified of the results. Its authenticity therefor, is a big question mark, and hence lacks any credibility. Evidence, to be admissible in administrative proceedings, must at least have a modicum of authenticity.This, respondents failed to comply with. As such, complainant is entitled to the payment of her wages for the remaining two (2) months of her apprenticeship agreement.27(Emphasis supplied)Indeed, it appears that the Labor Arbiters conclusion that petitioner validly terminated Palad was based mainly on the performance evaluation allegedly conducted by petitioner. However, Palad alleges that she had no knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted and that she was not even informed of the result of the alleged performance evaluation. Palad also claims she did not receive a notice of dismissal, nor was she given the chance to explain. According to petitioner, Palad did not receive the termination notice because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work after being informed of the result of the evaluation.Under Article 227 of the Labor Code, the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.28Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that Palad was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the NLRC found that petitioner failed to prove the authenticity of the performance evaluation which petitioner claims to have conducted on Palad, where Palad received a performance rating of only 27.75%. Petitioner merely relies on the performance evaluation to prove Palads inefficiency. It was likewise not shown that petitioner ever apprised Palad of the performance standards set by the company. When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.29Furthermore, Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a performance evaluation on Palad, petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor performance. In fact, Palad denies any knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted and of the result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits that Palad did not receive the notice of termination30because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work. The records are bereft of evidence to show that petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity to explain and defend herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking in this case.WHEREFORE, weAFFIRMthe Decision dated 12 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 5 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.SO ORDERED.Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaTHIRD DIVISIONATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC.G.R. No. 187320and/orROBERT CHAN,Petitioners,Present:CARPIO MORALES,J., Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN,- versus -VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO,JJ.Promulgated:APRILITO R. SEBOLINO,KHIM V. COSTALES,January 26, 2011ALVIN V. ALMOITE,andJOSEPH S. SAGUN,Respondents.x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NBRION,J.:For resolution is the petition for review oncertiorari[1]assailing the decision[2]and the resolution[3]of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered onNovember 4, 2008andMarch 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 99340.[4]The AntecedentsThe facts are summarized below.In the months of February and March 2005, complainants Aprilito R. Sebolino, Khim V. Costales, Alvin V. Almoite, Joseph S. Sagun, Agosto D. Zao, Domingo S. Alegria, Jr., Ronie Ramos, Edgar Villagomez, Melvin Pedregoza, Teofanes B. Chiong, Jr., Leonardo L. dela Cruz, Arnold A. Magalang, and Saturnino M. Mabanag filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims, as well as claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees against the petitioners Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) and its President and Chief Operating Officer Robert Chan.Atlantais a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel pipes.The complaints were consolidated and were raffled to Labor Arbiter Daniel Cajilig, but were later transferred to Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Medroso, Jr.The complainants alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to work withAtlantafor more than six (6) months from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired.In defense,Atlantaand Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master List)[5]prior to their engagement as apprentices.OnMay 24, 2005, dela Cruz, Magalang, Zao and Chiong executed aPagtalikod at Pagwawalang Saysaybefore Labor Arbiter Cajilig.The Compulsory Arbitration RulingsOnApril 24, 2006, Labor Arbiter Medroso dismissed the complaint with respect to dela Cruz, Magalang, Zao and Chiong, but found the termination of service of the remaining nine to be illegal.[6]Consequently, the arbiter awarded the dismissed workers backwages, wage differentials, holiday pay and service incentive leave pay amounting toP1,389,044.57 in the aggregate.Atlantaappealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In the meantime, or onOctober 10, 2006, Ramos, Alegria, Villagomez, Costales and Almoite allegedly entered into a compromise agreement withAtlanta.[7]The agreement provided that except for Ramos,Atlantaagreed to pay the workers a specified amount as settlement, and to acknowledge them at the same time as regular employees.On December 29, 2006,[8]the NLRC rendered a decision, on appeal, modifying the ruling of the labor arbiter, as follows: (1) withdrawing the illegal dismissal finding with respect to Sagun, Mabanag, Sebolino and Pedregoza; (2) affirming the dismissal of the complaints of dela Cruz, Zao, Magalang and Chiong; (3) approving the compromise agreement entered into by Costales, Ramos, Villagomez, Almoite and Alegria, and (4) denying all other claims.Sebolino, Costales, Almoite and Sagunmoved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the NLRC denied the motion in itsMarch 30, 2007[9]resolution. The four then sought relief from the CA through a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They charged that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) failing to recognize their prior employment withAtlanta; (2) declaring the second apprenticeship agreement valid; (3) holding that the dismissal of Sagun, Mabanag, Sebolino and Melvin Pedregoza is legal; and (4) upholding the compromise agreement involving Costales, Ramos, Villagomez, Almoite and Alegria.The CA DecisionThe CA granted the petition based on the following findings:[10]1.The respondents were already employees of the company before they entered into the first and second apprenticeship agreements Almoite and Costales were employed as early as December 2003 and, subsequently, entered into a first apprenticeship agreement from May 13, 2004 to October 12, 2004; before this first agreement expired, a second apprenticeship agreement, from October 9, 2004 to March 8, 2005 was executed. The same is true with Sebolino and Sagun, who were employed byAtlantaas early asMarch 3, 2004. Sebolino entered into his first apprenticeship agreement with the company fromMarch 20, 2004toAugust 19, 2004, and his second apprenticeship agreement fromAugust 20, 2004toJanuary 19, 2005. Sagun, on the other hand, entered into his first agreement fromMay 28, 2004toOctober 8, 2004, and the second agreement fromOctober 9, 2004toMarch 8, 2005.2.The first and second apprenticeship agreements were defective as they were executed in violation of the law and the rules.[11]The agreements did not indicate the trade or occupation in which the apprentice would be trained; neither was the apprenticeship program approved by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA).3.The positions occupied by the respondents machine operator, extruder operator and scaleman are usually necessary and desirable in the manufacture of plastic building materials, the companys main business. Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were, therefore, regular employees whose dismissals were illegal for lack of a just or authorized cause and notice.4.The compromise agreement entered into by Costales and Almoite, together with Ramos, Villagomez and Alegria, was not binding on Costales and Almoite because they did not sign the agreement.The petitioners themselves admitted that Costales and Almoite were initially planned to be a part of the compromise agreement, but their employment has been regularized as early asJanuary 11, 2006; hence, the company did not pursue their inclusion in the compromise agreement.[12]The CA faulted the NLRC for failing to appreciate the evidence regarding the respondents prior employment withAtlanta. The NLRC recognized the prior employment of Costales and Almoite onAtlantas monthly report for December 2003 for the CPS Department/Section datedJanuary 6, 2004.[13]This record shows that Costales and Almoite were assigned to the companys first shift from7:00 a.m.to3:00 p.m.The NLRC ignored Sebolino and Saguns prior employment under the companys Production and Work Schedule for March 7 to 12, 2005 dated March 3, 2004,[14]as they had been Atlantas employees as early as March 3, 2004, with Sebolino scheduled to work on March 7-12, 2005 at 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., while Sagun was scheduled to work for the same period but from7:00 p.m.to7:00 a.m.The CA noted thatAtlantafailed to challenge the authenticity of the two documents before it and the labor authorities.Atlantaand Chan moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in a resolution rendered onMarch 25, 2009.[15]Hence, the present petition.

The PetitionAtlanta seeks a reversal of the CA decision, contending that the appellate court erred in (1) concluding that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were employed by Atlanta before they were engaged as apprentices; (2) ruling that a second apprenticeship agreement is invalid; (3) declaring that the respondents were illegally dismissed; and (4) disregarding the compromise agreement executed by Costales and Almoite. It submits the following arguments:First. The CAs conclusion that the respondent workers were company employees before they were engaged as apprentices was primarily based on the Monthly Report[16]and the Production and Work Schedule forMarch 7-12, 2005,[17]in total disregard of the Master List[18]prepared by the company accountant, Emelita M. Bernardo. The names of Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun do not appear as employees in the Master List which contained the names of all the persons who were employed by and at petitioner.[19]Atlanta faults the CA for relying on the Production and Work Schedule and the Monthly Report which were not sworn to, and in disregarding the Master List whose veracity was sworn to by Bernardo and by Alex Go who headed the companys accounting division. It maintains that the CA should have given more credence to the Master List.Second. In declaring invalid the apprenticeship agreements it entered into with the respondent workers, the CA failed to recognize the rationale behind the law on apprenticeship. It submits that under the law,[20]apprenticeship agreements are valid, provided they do not exceed six (6) months and the apprentices are paid the appropriate wages of at least 75% of the applicable minimum wage.The respondents initially executed a five-month apprenticeship program withAtlanta, at the end of which, they voluntarily and willingly entered into another apprenticeship agreement with the petitioner for the training of a second skill[21]for five months; thus, the petitioners committed no violation of the apprenticeship period laid down by the law.Further, the apprenticeship agreements, entered into by the parties, complied with the requisites under Article 62 of the Labor Code; the companys authorized representative and the respondents signed the agreements and these were ratified by the companys apprenticeship committee. The apprenticeship program itself was approved and certified by the TESDA.[22]The CA, thus, erred in overturning the NLRCs finding that the apprenticeship agreements were valid.Third. There was no illegal dismissal as the respondent workers tenure ended with the expiration of the apprenticeship agreement they entered into. There was, therefore, no regular employer-employee relationship betweenAtlantaand the respondent workers.The Case for Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and SagunIn a Comment filed onAugust 6, 2009,[23]Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun pray for a denial of the petition for being procedurally defective and for lack of merit.The respondent workers contend that the petition failed to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which requires that the petition be accompanied by supporting material portions of the records. The petitioners failed to attach to the petition a copy of the Production and Work Schedule despite their submission that the CA relied heavily on the document in finding the respondent workers prior employment withAtlanta.They also did not attach a copy of the compromise agreement purportedly executed by Costales and Almoite. For this reason, the respondent workers submit that the petition should be dismissed.The respondents posit that the CA committed no error in holding that they were already Atlantas employees before they were engaged as apprentices, as confirmed by the companys Production and Work Schedule.[24]They maintain that the Production and Work Schedule meets the requirement of substantial evidence as the petitioners failed to question its authenticity. Theypoint out that the schedule was prepared by Rose A. Quirit and approved by Adolfo R. Lope, head of the companys PE/Spiral Section. They argue that it was highly unlikely that the head of a production section of the company would prepare and assign work to the complainants if the latter had not been company employees.The respondent workers reiterate their mistrust of the Master List[25]as evidence that they were not employees of the company at the time they became apprentices. They label the Master List as self-serving, dubious and even if considered as authentic, its content contradicts a lot of petitioners claim and allegations,[26]thus -1.Aside from the fact that the Master List is not legible, it contains only the names of inactive employees. Even those found by the NLRC to have been employed in the company (such as Almoite, Costales and Sagun) do not appear in the list. If Costales and Almoite had been employed with Atlanta since January 11, 2006, as the company claimed,[27]their names would have been in the list, considering that the Master List accounts for all employees as of May 2006 the notation carried on top of each page of the document.2.There were no entries of employees hired or resigned in the years 2005 and 2006 despite the as of May 2006 notation; several pages making up the Master List contain names of employees for the years 1999 - 2004.3.The fact thatAtlantapresented the purported Master List instead of the payroll raised serious doubts on the authenticity of the list.In sum, the respondent workers posit that the presentation of the Master List revealed the intention of the herein petitioner[s] to perpetually hide the fact of [their] prior employment.[28]On the supposed apprenticeship agreements they entered into, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun refuse to accept the agreements validity, contending that the companys apprenticeship program is merely a ploy to continually deprive [them] of their rightful wages and benefits which are due them as regular employees.[29]They submit the following indubitable facts and ratiocinations:[30]1.The apprenticeship agreements were submitted to TESDA only in 2005 (with dates of receipt on1/4/05&2/22/05[31]), when the agreements were supposed to have been executed in April or May 2004. Thus, the submission was made long after the starting date of the workers apprenticeship or even beyond the agreements completion/termination date, in violation of Section 23, Rule VI, Book II of the Labor Code.2.The respondent workers were made to undergo apprenticeship for occupations different from those allegedly approved by TESDA. TESDA approvedAtlantas apprenticeship program on Plastic Molder[32]and not for extrusion molding process, engineering, pelletizing process and mixing process.3.The respondents were already skilled workers prior to the apprenticeship program as they had been employed and made to work in the different job positions where they had undergone training. Sagun and Sebolino, together with Mabanag, Pedregoza, dela Cruz, Chiong, Magalang and Alegria were even given production assignments and work schedule at the PE/Spiral Section from May 11, 2004 to March 23, 2005, and some of them were even assigned to the 3:00 p.m. 11:00 p.m. and graveyard shifts (11:00 p.m. 7:00 a.m.) during the period.[33]4.The respondent workers were required to continue as apprentices beyond six months. The TESDA certificate of completion indicates that the workers apprenticeship had been completed after six months. Yet, they were suffered to work as apprentices beyond that period.Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun resolutely maintain that they were illegally dismissed, as the reason for the termination of their employment notice of the completion of the second apprenticeship agreement did not constitute either a just or authorized cause under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code.Finally, Costales and Almoite refuse to be bound by the compromise agreement[34]thatAtlantapresented to defeat the two workers cause of action. They claim that the supposed agreement is invalid as against them, principally because they did not sign it.The Courts RulingThe procedural issueThe respondent workers ask that the petition be dismissed outright for the petitioners failure to attach to the petition a copy of the Production and Work Schedule and a copy of the compromise agreement Costales and Almoite allegedly entered into material portions of the record that should accompany and support the petition, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.InMariners Polytechnic Colleges Foundation, Inc. v. Arturo J. Garchitorena[35]where the Court addressed essentially the same issue arising from Section 2(d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,[36]we held that the phraseof the pleadings and other material portions of the record xxx as would support the allegation of the petition clearly contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner in the selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant to the petition. The crucial issue to consider then is whether or not the documents accompanying the petition sufficiently supported the allegations therein.[37]As inMariners,we find that the documents attached to the petition sufficiently support the petitioners allegations. The accompanying CA decision[38]and resolution,[39]as well as those of the labor arbiter[40]and the NLRC,[41]referred to the parties position papers and even to their replies and rejoinders. Significantly, the CA decision narrates the factual antecedents, defines the complainants cause of action, and cites the arguments, including the evidence the parties adduced.If any, the defect in the petition lies in the petitioners failure to provide legible copies of some of the material documents mentioned, especially several pages in the decisions of the labor arbiter and of the NLRC. This defect, however, is not fatal as the challenged CA decision clearly summarized the labor tribunals rulings.We, thus, find no procedural obstacle in resolving the petition on the merits.The merits of the caseWe find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the NLRC decision[42]and in affirming the labor arbiters ruling,[43]as it applies to Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that the four were illegally dismissed because (1) they were already employees when they were required to undergo apprenticeship and (2) apprenticeship agreements were invalid.The following considerations support the CA ruling.First. Based on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the company as employees before they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself recognized the respondents status through relevant operational records in the case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for December 2003[44]which the NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and work schedule forMarch 7 to 12, 2005[45]cited by the CA.Under the CPS monthly report,Atlantaassigned Costales and Almoite to the first shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.) of the Sections work. The Production and Work Schedules, in addition to the one noted by the CA, showed that Sebolino and Sagun were scheduled on different shiftsvis--visthe production and work of the companys PE/Spiral Section for the periods July 5-10, 2004;[46]October 25-31, 2004;[47]November 8-14, 2004;[48]November 16-22, 2004;[49]January 3-9, 2005;[50]January 10-15, 2005;[51]March 7-12, 2005[52]and March 17-23, 2005.[53]WestressthattheCAcorrectlyrecognizedtheauthenticityof theoperationaldocuments,for the failure of Atlanta to raise a challenge against thesedocumentsbeforethelaborarbiter, the NLRC and the CA itself. Theappellatecourt,thus,found the saiddocumentssufficientto establish the employment of the respondents before their engagement as apprentices.Second. The Master List[54](of employees) that the petitioners heavily rely upon as proof of their position that the respondents were not Atlantas employees, at the time they were engaged as apprentices, is unreliable and does not inspire belief.The list, consisting of several pages, is hardly legible. It requires extreme effort to sort out the names of the employees listed, as well as the other data contained in the list. For this reason alone, the list deserves little or no consideration. As the respondents also pointed out, the list itself contradicts a lot of Atlantas claims and allegations, thus: it lists only the names of inactive employees; even the names of those the NLRC found to have been employed by Atlanta, like Costales and Almoite, and those who even Atlanta claims attained regular status on January 11, 2006,[55]do not appear in the list when it was supposed to account for allemployees as of May 6, 2006.Despite theMay 6, 2006cut off date, the list contains no entries of employees who were hired or who resigned in 2005 and 2006. We note that the list contains the names of employees from 1999 to 2004.We cannot fault the CA for ignoring the Master List even if Bernardo, its head office accountant, swore to its correctness and authenticity.[56]Its substantive unreliability gives it very minimal probative value.Atlantawould have been better served, in terms of reliable evidence, if true copies of the payroll (on which the list was based, among others, as Bernardo claimed in her affidavit) were presented instead.Third. The fact that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship (as established by the evidence) renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted by the CA finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder operator - tasks that are usually necessary and desirable inAtlantas usual business or trade as manufacturer of plastic building materials.[57]These tasks and their nature characterized the four as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.Thus, when they were dismissed without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.[58]Even if we recognize the companys need to train its employees through apprenticeship, we can only consider the first apprenticeship agreement for the purpose. With the expiration of the first agreement and the retention of the employees,Atlantahad, to all intents and purposes, recognized the completion of their training and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To foist upon them the second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which was not even mentioned in the agreement itself,[59]is a violation of the Labor Codes implementing rules[60]and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees, to say the least. This we cannot allow.Fourth. The compromise agreement[61]allegedly entered into by Costales and Almoite, together with Ramos, Villagomez and Alegria, purportedly in settlement of the case before the NLRC, is not binding on Costales and Almoite because they did not sign it. The company itself admitted[62]that while Costales and Almoite were initially intended to be a part of the agreement, it did not pursue their inclusion due to their regularization as early asJanuary 11, 2006.[63]WHEREFORE,premises considered, we herebyDENYthe petition for lack of merit. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED.Costs against the petitioner Atlanta Industries, Inc.SO ORDERED.Atlanta Industries vs. Sebolino DigestG.R. No. 187320, January 26, 2011

ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. and/or ROBERT CHAN, petitioners, vs. APRILITO R. SEBOLINO, KHIM V. COSTALES, ALVIN V. ALMONTE, and JOSEPH H. SAGUN, respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

Sebolino et al. filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims as well as damages. They alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six (6) months from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired.

In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master List) prior to their engagement as apprentices.

The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal to be illegal with respect to nine out of the twelve complainants. Atlanta appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed the illegal dismissal decision with respect to Sebolino and three others. They moved for reconsideration but this was denied. They then brought the case up to the Court of Appeals, which held that Sebolino and the three others were illegally dismiised.

The CA ruled that Sebolino and the three others were already employees of the company before they entered into the first and second apprenticeship agreements. For example, Sebolino was employed by Atlanta on March 3, 2004 then he entered into his first apprenticeship agreement with the company on March 20, 2004 to August 19, 2004. The second apprenticeship agreement was from May 28, 2004 to October 8, 2004. However, the CA found the apprenticeship agreements to be void because they were executed in violation of the law and the rules. Therefore, in the first place, there were no apprenticeship agreements.

Also, the positions occupied by the respondents machine operator, extruder operator and scaleman are usually necessary and desirable in the manufacture of plastic building materials, the companys main business. Sebolino and the three others were, therefore, regular employees whose dismissals were illegal for lack of a just or authorized cause and notice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Sebolino and three others were illegally dismissed.

HELD: The petition is unmeritorious.

LABOR LAW - Illegal dismissals

The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the NLRC decision and in affirming the labor arbiters ruling, as it applies toCostales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that the four were illegally dismissed because (1) they were already employees when they were required to undergo apprenticeship and (2) apprenticeship agreements were invalid.

The following considerations support the CA ruling.

FBased on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the company as employees before they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself recognized the respondents status through relevant operational records in the case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for December 2003 which the NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and work schedule for March 7 to 12, 2005 cited by the CA.

The CA correctly recognized the authenticity of the operational documents, for the failure of Atlanta to raise a challenge against these documents before the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA itself. The appellate court, thus, found the said documents sufficientto establish the employment of the respondents before their engagement as apprentices.

The fact that Sebolino and the three others were already rendering service to the company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship (as established by the evidence) renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted by the CA finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder operator - tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlantas usual business or trade as manufacturer of plastic building materials. These tasks and their nature characterized the four as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.Thus, when they were dismissed without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 122917 July 12, 1999MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P. PASCUAL, RAQUEL ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR., CELSO M. YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C. DELOS REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKE CABANDUCOS, COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO, JOSE E. SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY V. GRUELA, BERNADETH D. AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ, MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION, DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY BALOLOA, ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO and TIMOSA,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,respondents.PANGANIBAN,J.:TheMagna Cartafor Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained the status of regular workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatments is rooted not merely on charity or accomodation, but on justice for all.The CaseChallenged in the Petition forCertiorari1before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision2of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),3which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan. The labor arbiter's Decision disposed as follows:4WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint for lack of merit.Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution5of the NLRC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.The FactsThe facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise:6Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called "Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers". (pp. 68 & 69, Records) The full text of said agreement is quoted below:EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FORHANDICAPPED WORKERSThis Contract, entered into by and between:FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla, Intramuros, Manila, represented herein by its Assistant Vice President, MR. FLORENDO G. MARANAN, (hereinafter referred to as the "BANK");-and-, years old, of legal age, , and residing at (hereinafter referred to as the ("EMPLOYEE").WITNESSETH : ThatWHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes that there is a need to provide disabled and handicapped persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize their potentials, uplift their socio-economic well being and welfare and make them productive, self-reliant and useful citizens to enable them to fully integrate in the mainstream of society;WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be filled-up by disabled and handicapped persons, particularly deaf-mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded citizens and authorized government agencies [regarding] the possibility of hiring handicapped workers for these positions;WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers who [were] recommended for possible employment with the BANK;NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and in compliance with Article 80 of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered into this Employment Contract as follows:1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and faithfully work with the BANK, asMoney SorterandCounter.2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties and responsibilities:i. Sort out bills according to color;ii. Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine;iii. Wrap and label bills per hundred;iv. Put the wrapped bills into bundles; andv. Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month, after which the BANK shall determine whether or not he/she should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract.4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment in the sole judgment of the BANK, payable every 15th and end of the month.1wphi1.nt5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week, from Mondays thru Fridays, at eight (8) hours a day. The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as circumstance may warrant, for which overtime work he/she [shall] be paid an additional compensation of 125% of his daily rate if performed during ordinary days and 130% if performed during Saturday or [a] rest day.6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:i. Proportionate 13th month pay based on his basic daily wage.ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.iii. SSS premium payment.7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply with all the BANK Rules and Regulations and Policies, and to conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the BANK.8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been employed under a special employment program of the BANK, for which reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not applied in his/her case. Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges and accepts the fact that the terms and conditions of the employment generally observed by the BANK with respect to the BANK's regular employee are not applicable to the EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the terms and conditions of the EMPLOYEE's employment with the BANK shall be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and by the applicable rules and regulations that the Department of Labor and Employment may issue in connection with the employment ofdisabledand handicapped workers. More specifically, the EMPLOYEE hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, particularly on regulation of employment and separation pay are not applicable to him/her.9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or from to unless earlier terminated by the BANK for any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this Contract shall be in writing and therefore this Contract will automatically expire at the end of its terms unless renewed in writing by the BANK.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their signature[s] this day of , at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19); in 1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six months such that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by respondent under the said employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and whose contract expired on July 1993.xxx xxx xxxDisclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers the hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to "pakiusap" which must be considered in the light of the context career and working environment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of professionals trained and qualified officers and regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders from excellent schools which is an unbending policy in the hiring of regular employees; that in addition to this, training continues so that the regular employee grows in the corporate ladder; that the idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a special arrangement basis; that it was adopted the special program to help tide over a group of workers such as deaf-mutes like the complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of counting and sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-mutes that the counting and sorting of money are tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of the tellers' normal functions; that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bank plantilla for sortes or counters; that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their duties (p. 97, Records); that through the "pakiusap" of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations.Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dimissed,viz:7NAME OF PETITIONERWORKPLACEDate HiredDate Dismissed

1. MARITES BERNARDOIntramuros12-Nov-9017-Nov-93

2. ELVIRA GO DIAMANTEIntramuros24-Jan-9011-Jan-94

3. REBECCA E. DAVIDIntramuros16-Apr-9023-Oct-93

4. DAVID P. PASCUALBel-Air15-Oct-8821-Nov-94

5. RAQUEL ESTILLERIntramuros2-Jul-924-Jan-94

6. ALBERT HALLAREWest4-Jan-919-Jan-94

7. EDMUND M. CORTEZBel-Air15-Jan-913-Dec-93

8. JOSELITO O. AGDONIntramuros5-Nov-9017-Nov-93

9. GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR.Intramuros6-Sep-8919-Jan-94

10. CELSO M. YAZARIntramuros8-Feb-938-Aug-93

11. ALEX G. CORPUZIntramuros15-Feb-9315-Aug-93

12. RONALD M. DELFINIntramuros22-Feb-9322-Aug-93

13. ROWENA M. TABAQUEROIntramuros22-Feb-9322-Aug-93

14. CORAZON C. DELOS REYESIntramuros8-Feb-938-Aug-93

15. ROBERT G. NOORAIntramuros15-Feb-9315-Aug-93

16. MILAGROS O. LEQUIGANIntramuros1-Feb-931-Aug-93

17. ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARIIntramuros22-Jan-9322-Jul-93

18. IKE CABUNDUCOSIntramuros24-Feb-9324-Aug-93

19. COCOY NOBELLOIntramuros22-Feb-9322-Aug-93

20. DORENDA CATIMBUHANIntramuros15-Feb-9315-Aug-93

21. ROBERT MARCELOWest31 JUL 93 81-Aug-93

22. LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJOWest15-Jun-9021-Nov-93

23. JOSE E. SALESWest6-Aug-9212-Oct-93

24. ISABEL MAMAUAGWest8-May-9210-Nov-93

25. VIOLETA G. MONTESIntramuros2-Feb-9015-Jan-94

26. ALBINO TECSONIntramuros7-Nov-9110-Nov-93

27. MELODY B. GRUELAWest28-Oct-913-Nov-93

28. BERNADETH D. AGEROWest19-Dec-9027-Dec-93

29. CYNTHIA DE VERABel-Air26-Jun-903-Dec-93

30. LANI R. CORTEZBel-Air15-Oct-8810-Dec-93

31. MARIA ISABEL B.CONCEPCIONWest6-Sep-906-Feb-94

32. DINDO VALERIOIntramuros30-May-9330-Nov-93

33. ZENAIDA MATAIntramuros10-Feb-9310-Aug-93

34. ARIEL DEL PILARIntramuros24-Feb-9324-Aug-93

35. MARGARET CECILIA CANOZAIntramuros27-Jul-904-Feb-94

36. THELMA SEBASTIANIntramuros12-Nov-9017-Nov-93

37. MA. JEANETTE CERVANTESWest6-Jun-927-Dec-93

38. JEANNIE RAMILIntramuros23-Apr-9012-Oct-93

39. ROZAIDA PASCUALBel-Air20-Apr-8929-Oct-93

40. PINKY BALOLOAWest3-Jun-912-Dec-93

41. ELIZABETH VENTURAWest12-Mar-90FEB 94 [sic]

42. GRACE S. PARDOWest4-Apr-9013-Mar-94

43. RICO TIMOSAIntramuros28-Apr-9328-Oct-93

As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Hence, this recourse to this Court.9The Ruling of the NLRCIn affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as follows:We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion that complainants were hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] were covered by . . . Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbitera quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties.10The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, "considering the prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case."IssuesIn their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners money sorters and counters working in a bank were not regular employees.II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the employment contracts signed and renewed by the petitioners which provide for a period of six (6) months were valid.III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the provisions of the Magna Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against disabled persons.11In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.This Court's RulingThe petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employement was illegal.Preliminary Matter:Propriety of CertiorariRespondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the NLRC is not allowed in a petition forcertiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon the findings of public respondent that petitioners were not regular employees.True, the Court,as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in acertiorariproceeding. In resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall not change the facts found by the public respondent. Our task is merely to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the law to the established facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.Main IssueAre Petitioners Regular Employee?Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as "special workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank."12Rather, they were "special" workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners, whose employment was merely an "accommodation" in response to the requests of government officials and civic-minded citizens. They were told from the start, "with the assistance of government representatives," that they could not become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for "money sorters," whose task used to be performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not because of need "but merely for humanitarian reasons." Respondent submits that "as of the present, the "special position" that was created for the petitioners no longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special employment contracts."At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondent's effort to provide employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.1wphi1.ntAccording to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the Labor code, which provides;Art. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include:(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent of the applicable legal minimum wage;(c) The duration of employment period; and(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives.The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited provision. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons),13however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates thata qualifieddisabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment asa qualifiedable-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:Sec. 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down inDe Leon v.NLRC,14in which this Court held:The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensibility of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exist.Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, the following twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo.As held by the Court, "Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary appointments,ad infinitum."15The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the employees' fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees.16No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause,17these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.18Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged,18petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.20Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and hence not entitled to the same benefits.Applicability of theBrent RulingRespondent bank, citingBrent School v.Zamora21in which the Court upheld the validity of an employment contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing. It adds that the petitioners had in fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera and Representative Arturo Borjal.We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were disabled, and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the Labor Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to bequalifieddisabled persons who, under the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed byqualifiedable-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners arequalifiedfor their positions. The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts, imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of the very mischief sought to be addressed by the new law.Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest.22Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the "parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other."23Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied employees.Respondent's reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned