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THIRD DIVISION

STOLT-NIELSEN MARINE SERVICES,

INC. (now STOLT-NIELSENTRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC.),Petitioner,

- versus -

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ARIEL C.

SANTOS, RICARDO O. ATIENZA andRAMON ALPINO,Respondents.

G.R. No. 147623

Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., ChairmanSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES, andGARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 13, 2005

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 seeking the reversal

of the decision[1] dated March 29, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.51046and its Resolution dated March 2, 2001, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The assailed decision affirmed the resolution[2]dated August 29, 1997 of the National

Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) denying petitionersUrgent Motion to Reduce or be

Exempted from Filing an Appeal Bond.

The factual background of the case may be stated, as follows:

In 1978, herein private respondent Ramon Alpino was employed as motorman by

petitioner Stolt Nielsen Marine Services, Inc., a corporation based in Connecticut, U.S.A., for the

latters vessel M/T Stolt Sincerity. Respondents employment with petitioner, albeit not

continuous, lasted until 1984 when he was repatriated to the Philippines after being diagnosed

with Cardiac Enlargement, Pulmonary Hypertension and Acute Psychotic Reaction and

declared unfit for sea duty.

In early 1985, respondent filed a complaint before the Philippine Overseas and

Employment Agency (POEA), docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 85-01-039, forrecovery of

sickness and disability benefits and claim for personal belongings and underpayment of

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wagesagainst petitioner. Petitioner offered to amicably settle the money claims of respondent,

which offer was accepted by respondents sister and attorney-in-fact Anita Alpino by virtue of a

Special Power of Attorney (SPA). Thus, on March 21, 1985, respondent, through his sister and

attorney-in-fact, executed a Receipt and Release whereby he acknowledged receipt of the

sum of P130,000.00 representing disability benefits, medical and hospitalization expenses, anddamages. On the basis of said Receipt and Release, POEA dismissed Case No. (M) 85-01-

039.

In December 1987, another complaint against petitioner was lodged by respondent

before the POEA for the same causes of action (recovery of sickness and disability benefits and

claim for personal belongings and underpayment of wages). The case, docketed as POEA Case

No. (M) 87-12-997, was dismissed by the POEA on ground ofres judicata.

On March 14, 1989, respondent filed another complaint against petitioner, this time with

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2009, for

the Annulment of the Receipt and Release. In his complaint, respondent alleged that he was

mentally incapacitated to execute the SPA in favor of his sister Anita Alpino. In an Order dated

July 16, 1993, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. Q-89-2009 for insufficiency of evidence.

Therefrom, respondent went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed[3]the RTCs judgment of

dismissal. In time, respondent moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied by the

appellate court.[4]

Undaunted, on July 26, 1994, respondent filed a case against petitioner with the POEA

forrecovery of sickness and disability benefits, allegedly arising from his sickness while under

the latters employ. The case was docketed asPOEA Case No. (M) 94-07-2223.

By reason of the passage of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant

Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,[5]POEA Case No. (M) 94-07-2223 was transferred

to the NCR-Arbitration Branch of the NLRC and assigned to herein public respondent, Labor

Arbiter Ariel Santos.

On May 6, 1997, Labor Arbiter Santos rendered a decision declaring invalid and

ineffectual the SPA executed by respondent in favor of his sister Anita and the

subsequent Receipt and Releasesigned by the latter in behalf of her brother. In resolving the

case, Labor Arbiter Santos ratiocinated as follows:

The principal issue to be resolved is whether or not the special power ofattorney executed by [respondent] in favor of [his] sister and the subsequentReceipt and Release are valid documents to forestall any claim by [respondent].

After a careful and judicious study of the respective pleadings and piecesof evidence submitted by both parties, undersigned finds that the documentsadverted and relied upon by [petitioner] to negate [respondents] claim are shotwith loopholes that would render it voidable and unenforceable.

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First, it is to be noted that [petitioner] did not controvert the merit of[respondents] claim for sickness and disability benefits but relied mainly on theinvalid Receipt and Release signed by [respondents] sister as the basis fordismissing [respondents] claim.

A cursory look at the documents Receipt and Release and the SpecialPower of Attorney marked as Annex 1 and Annex 2, respectively, wouldreadily indicate that they were prepared with haste and haphazardly to render itvalid and lawful. Both documents were prepared on the same day. In fact, theReceipt and Release was not even executed under oath so that its due executionis put under a cloud of doubt.

Secondly, even gratia argumenti that the documents adverted to are validand were entered into voluntarily, the consideration thereof is oppressive,unreasonable and unconscionable. It is a public policy that where theconsideration in a public document is disproportionately unconscionable to the

claims of [respondent] who was declared to be mentally unfit, the State shouldstep in to protect the rights of the aggrieved party and declare the samedocument to be invalid and without force and effect.

Thirdly, the consideration of P130,000.00 paid by [petitioner] to[respondents] attorney-in-fact corresponds only to [respondents] claim for lostluggages and should not extinguish [respondents] right to claim for sickness anddisability benefits as recognized under insurance health cover before anyseaman can board any foreign vessel.[6]

The dispositive portion of Labor Arbiter Santos decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding the subject documents Annex 1 and Annex 2 of[petitioners] Answer to be invalid and ineffectual, [petitioner] is hereby directed topay [respondents] claim for sickness and disability benefits.

The Research and Information Unit is hereby ordered to make the propercomputation which will become part and parcel of this decision.

SO ORDERED.[7][Words in brackets added].

In compliance with the above directive, herein other public respondent Ricardo Atienza,Acting Chief of Research and Information Unit of NLRC, made a computation of respondent

Alpinos claim for sickness and disability benefits as follows:

Sickness benefit for October 1979(Payment for sickness & operation) = US$11,427.32

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Injury and sickness for Sept. 1980(Payment for last finger cut) = 5,568.42

Sickness benefit for March 1985

(Payment for sickness ofAcute Psychotic Reaction) = 28,810.60

TOTAL AWARD = US$45,806.34[8]

On July 25, 1997, or seven days after its receipt of the aforementioned Labor

Arbiters decision, petitioner filed with the respondent NLRC its Appeal with Attached

Urgent Motion to Reduce or be Exempted from Filing Appeal Bond.[9]Petitioner argued therein

that the money claims of respondent Alpino were already barred by prescription; that said

claims should have been dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on ground ofres judicata; and that the

validity of the Receipt and Releaseand the Special Power of Attorney had already been passed

upon by the RTC of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-89-2009 and affirmed by the Court of

Appeals.

In a Resolution[10]dated August 29, 1997, respondent NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters

decision and denied petitionersUrgent Motion to Reduce or be Exempted from Filing an Appeal

Bondon account of petitioners failure to post cash or surety bond within the reglementary

period. In so ruling, the NLRC reasoned:

The URGENT MOTION TO REDUCE OR BE EXEMPTED FROM FILINGAPPEAL BOND is denied.

Sections 6 and 7, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRCprovides:

SECTION 6. BOND. In case the decision of a LaborArbiter, POEA Administrator and Regional Director or his dulyauthorized hearing officer involves a monetary award, an appealby the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cashor surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company dulyaccredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amountequivalent to the monetary award xxx.

SECTION 7. NO EXTENSION OF PERIOD. No motionor request for the extension of the period within which to perfectan appeal shall be allowed.

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The aforequoted provisions are very clear, that all the requirements forthe perfection of an appeal must be made and complied with within thereglementary period to appeal, that is: the filing of the appeal and the posting of acash or surety bond must be made within the period of ten (10) days. The filing of

a Motion to Reduce Bond will not suspend the running of the ten (10) daysperiod. If at all, the movant should have secured the approval of the Commissionfor the reduction of bond within the same period allowed by law. Considering thatthe movant failed to comply with the requirements for perfecting an appeal, saidmotion is therefore denied.

The NLRC then decreed:

WHEREFORE, the URGENT MOTION TO REDUCE OR BE EXEMPTEDFROM FILING APPEAL BOND is DENIED for non-perfection of the appeal.

Accordingly, the decision dated May 6, 1997 is AFFIRMED in toto.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC in its decision dated

October 28, 1997[11]petitioner went to this Court viaa petition forcertiorari which this Court

referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to its September 16, 1998 decision in St. Martin

Funeral Home vs. National Labor Relations Commission.[12]

As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision of March 29, 2000,

affirmed the judgment of the NLRC, thus:

The law is clear. An appeal, per article 223 of the Labor Code, shall beperfected only upon posting of a cash or surety bond in cases involving monetaryaward. On perfection of appeal, it is well entrenched in this jurisdiction thatperfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is

jurisdictional and non-compliance with such requirement is fatal and has theeffect of rendering the judgment final and executory.

In implementing article 223, respondent NLRC however laid down the ruleallowing reduction of the amount of bond which it can approve in meritoriouscases. There is a caveat however that the filing of the motion to reduce bonddoes not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal.

The plain import of article 223 of the Labor Code and the amendedsection 6, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure is that the reduction of thebond should be approved within the ten (10) day appeal period and the appellantshould exert its utmost diligence to obtain the approval of respondent NLRCbefore the lapse of the period or else there is a big risk that the appeal will bedismissed for non-perfection of the appeal due to the absence of the appealbond. This is evident form the last sentence of Section 6, Rule VI that the filingxxx of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period toperfect appeal. Thus the present rule is unequivocal that the filing of the motion

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does not toll the running of the period of appeal and the logical implication andinevitable result is the dismissal of the appeal if the reduction is denied. xxx.Thus respondent NLRC correctly affirmed the decision of Arbiter Santos sincethe appeal was not perfected due to lack of an appeal bond.

xxx xxx xxx

There being no capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise judgment onthe part of respondent NLRC, this petition perforce must fall.

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its

Resolution of March 2, 2001, petitioner is now with us on the following grounds:

I.

IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, IN EFFECT,AFFIRMING PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC, THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS, IN EFFECT, SANCTIONED THE DECISION DATED MAY 6, 1997OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT LABOR ARBITER WHICH ON ITS FACE WASMANIFESTLY RENDERED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION IN THAT

A. AS SHOWN IN THE UNILATERAL COMPUTATIONOF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ATIENZA WHICH FORMEDPART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT LABOR ARBITERSDECISION DATED MAY 6, 1997, THE QUESTIONED

AWARD IN THE AMOUNT OF US$45,806.34 ALLEGEDLYREPRESENTING DISABILITY AND SICKNESS BENEFITSFOR OCTOBER 1979, SEPTEMBER 1980, AND MARCH1985 IS CLEARLY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION ASPRIVATE RESPONDENS COMPLAINT WAS FILED ONLYON JULY 26, 2994;

B. THE ALLEGED MONEY CLAIM IS ALREADY BARREDBY RES JUDICATA, NOT ONCE, BUT TWICE, AS THESAME HAD ALREADY BEEN RULED UPON BY THE POEA,THE QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY WHICH THEN HAD THEJURISDICTION OVER SAID CLAIM IN ITS ORDERS, TO WIT

i. ORDER DATED APRIL 17, 1985 INPOEA CASE NO. (M) 85-01-039 DISMISSINGTHE CASE WITH PREJUDICE IN VIEW OFTHE AMICABLE SETTLEMENT ENTEREDINTO BY THE PARTIES; AND

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ii. ORDER DATED MAY 28, 1988 IN POEACASE NO. (M) 87-12-997 DISMISSING THECASE ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA.

C. PUBLIC RESPONDENT LABOR ARBITER EXCEEDEDHIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE DECLARED AS INVALIDAND INEFFECTUAL THE RECEIPT AND RELEASE ANDTHE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY THE VALIDITY OFWHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN PASSED UPON BY:

i. THE POEA, NOT ONCE BUT TWICE,IN POEA CASE NO. (M) 85-01-039 ANDSUBSEQUENTLY IN POEA CASE NO. (M) 87-12-997;

ii. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 104 OF QUEZON CITY IN ITSORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 6, 1991 INCIVIL CASE NO. Q-89-2009 DISMISSINGPRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FORINSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE; AND

iii. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS ITSELF IN ITS DECISION DATEDJULY 16, 1993 IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 35954

AFFIRMING WITH FINALITY THEAFOREMENTIONED ORDER OF THEREGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRNACH 104 OFQUEZON CITY.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRCGROSSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHENTHEY STUBBORNLY IGNORED THE CURRENT POLICY OF THISHONORABLE COURT CALLING FOR LIBERAL INTERPREATTION OF

ARTICLE 223 OF THE LABOR CODE WITH RESPECT TO THE POSTING OFAN APPEAL BOND AS A CONDITION FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL ANDHOLDING THAT A MOTION TO REDUCE BOND BASED ON MANIFESTLYMERITORIOUS GROUNDS IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE THEREOF.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED AND GRAVELYABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT WITTINGLY AND STUBBORNLYREFUSED TO CONSIDER THE SUBSTANTIAL MERITS OF PETITIONERSCASE WHICH IMPERATIVELY CALL FOR THE LIBERAL APPLICATION OF

ARTICLE 223 OF THE LABOR CODE AS THE VERY FACTUAL BASIS ANDGROUNS OF PETITIONERS PETITION ARE THEMSELVES RECOGNIZED

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BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS DECISION OF MARCH29, 2001.

IV.

TH HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISERABLY ABDICATED ITSJUDICIAL POWER OF REVIEW OVER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AND FAILEDTO EXERCISE CANDOR IN THE DISPOSITION OF PETITIONERSPETITION.[13]

The petition lacks merit.

Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of

due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in

accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same mustcomply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.[14]

Article 223 of the Labor Code sets forth the rules on appeal from the Labor Arbiters

monetary award, thus:

Article 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiterare final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or bothparties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, ororders. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by theemployermay be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or suretybond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by theCommission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgmentappealed from. (Emphasis ours)

Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC[15]implements the aforequoted

Article. The pertinent provisions of Rule VI which were in effect when petitioner filed its appeal

on July 25, 1997, provides, inter alia, as follows:

Section 1. Periods of Appeal. - Decisions, awards ororders of the LaborArbiter and the POEA Administratorshall be final and executory unlessappealed to the Commission by any or both partieswithin ten (10) calendardays from receipt ofsuch decisions, awards ororders of the Labor Arbiter orof the Administrator, and in case of a decision of the Regional Director or his dulyauthorized Hearing Officer within five (5) calendar days from receipt of such

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decisions, awards or orders. If the 10 th or 5th day, as the case may be, falls on aSaturday, Sunday or a holiday, the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the nextworking day. (As amended on November 7, 1991)

xxx xxx xxx

Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. -(a) The appeal shall be filedwithin the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall beunder oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the postingof a cash or surety bond as provided on Section 5 of this Rule; shall beaccompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds reliedupon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statementof the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or awardand proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestatedshall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 6. Bond. -In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter, POEAAdministrator and Regional Director or his duly authorized hearingofficerinvolves a monetary award,an appeal by the employer shall beperfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by areputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the SupremeCourt in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of moral andexemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The employer as well as counsel shall submit a joint declaration under oathattesting that the surety bond posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect untilfinal disposition of the case.

The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant,reduce the amount of the bond. The filing, however, of the motion to reducebond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal. (As amendedon November 5, 1996)

Section 7. No Extension of Period. -No motion or request for extension of theperiod within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.[Emphasis ours]

Evident it is from the foregoing that an appeal from rulings of the Labor Arbiter to the

NLRC must be perfected within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof, otherwise the same

shall become final and executory. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shallbe perfected only upon (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee and (2) posting of a

cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company and (3) filing of a memorandum

of appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites mentioned shall

not stop the running of the period for perfection of appeal.[16]

Here, petitioner received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on July 18, 1997. From July 18,

1997, petitioner has a limited period of ten (10) days to perfect its appeal. Petitioner filed its

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memorandum of appeal on July 25, 1997. However, in lieu of the required cash or surety bond,

petitioner filed a motion to reduce or be exempted from filing an appeal bond.[17]The NLRC

denied the motion and consequently dismissed the appeal for non-perfection. Petitioner now

insists that its Motion to Reduce Bondconstitutes a substantial compliance of the requirement

for perfecting an appeal under Article 223 of the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure.

We disagree.

The requirement of a cash or surety bond for the perfection of an appeal from the Labor

Arbiters monetary award is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and non-compliance

therewith is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and executory.[18]The reason

therefor is explained by the Court in this language:

[T]he obvious and logical purpose of an appeal bond is to insure, during theperiod of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recoveryunder the judgment if subsequently affirmed; it also validates and justifies, at

least prima facie, an interpretation that would limit the amount of the bond to theaggregate of the sums awarded other than in the concept of moral andexemplary damages.[19]

The mandatory filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is evident from the

aforequoted provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code which explicitly states that the appeal

may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond. The word only makes it

perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond to be the

exclusive means by which an employers appeal may be perfected. This requirement is intended

to dissuade employers from using the appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy

their employees just and lawful claims.[20]

Further, the implementing rules of respondent NLRC are unequivocal in saying that the

filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal.

Thus, petitioner should have seasonably filed the appeal bond within the ten-day reglementary

period following its receipt of the decision of Labor Arbiter Ariel Santos in order to forestall the

finality of said decision. Since petitioner failed to post an appeal bond within the reglementary

period, no appeal was perfected from the decision of Labor Arbiter Santos, for which reason, the

decision sought to be appealed to the NLRC had become final and executory and therefore

immutable.

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It is true that the requirement of posting a bond on appeals involving monetary awards

has been given a liberal interpretation in certain cases.[21]However, relaxation of this rule can

only be done where there was substantial compliance of the NLRC Rules of Procedure or where

the party involved, at the very least, demonstrated willingness to abide by the rules by posting a

partial bond.[22]

Petitioner did not post a full or partial appeal bond within the prescribed period. Petitioner

could have even paid a moderate and reasonable sum as premium for such bond as the law

does not require outright payment but merely the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will

be eventually paid should the appeal be dismissed, but still, petitioner failed to do so. Hence, we

find no cogent reason to apply the same liberal interpretation in this case.

While, admittedly, Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure allows thereduction of the appeal bond upon motion of the appellant, the exercise of the authority

is not a matter of right on the part of the movant but lies within the sound discretion of the

NLRC upon showing of meritorious grounds.[23]Nevertheless, even granting arguendothat

petitioner has meritorious grounds to reduce the appeal bond, the result would have been the

same since it failed to post cash or surety bond within the prescribed period.

As payment of the appeal bond is an indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and not a

mere technicality of law or procedure, we find the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in

accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. No. 51046 AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 181480 January 30, 2009

JOSEFINA CADA, Petitioner,vs.

TIME SAVER LAUNDRY/LESLIE PEREZ, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 451of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitionerJosefina Cada assailing the Decision2of the Court of Appeals dated 17 December 2007 in CA-G.R. SPNo. 94616, which declared the Resolutions dated 30 November 2004 3and 28 February 2006 of theNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)4as null and void on the ground of lack of proper service ofsummons on respondent Leslie Perez (Perez). In its Resolution dated 30 November 2004, the NLRCaffirmed5the Decision6dated 16 March 2004 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 05-06071-03 infinding that petitioner Josefina Cada was illegally dismissed by respondents Perez and Time Saver

Laundry (TSL).

The Petition at bar stemmed from a Complaint7dated 21 May 2003 filed before the NLRC by petitioneragainst respondents for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary, nonpayment of overtime pay, holidaypay, premium pay for holiday and rest day pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA,separation pay and attorneys fees. The Complaint was docketed as NLRC -NCR Case No. 05-06071-03.

Respondent TSL is a sole proprietorship engaged in the laundry business. Respondent Perez is theowner/proprietor of TSL.8

Petitioner alleged that she was employed by the respondents on 28 September 2002 as Presser,receiving a salary ofP220.00 per day. She worked for 12 hours a day, from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., butshe was not paid overtime pay. She also did not receive holiday pay, premium pay for holidays and rest

days, 5 days service incentive leave pay (SILP), and 13th month pay. While she was working on 7 May2003, the management called her attention for quarreling with her co-employee. Without giving her anopportunity to explain and defend her side, petitioner was sent home and prevented to work further,compelling her to file the Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents.

Respondents failed to appear for the entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter heardthe case ex parte directing the petitioner to file her position paper.9On the basis of the petitionersposition paper, the case was submitted for decision.

In its Decision dated 16 March 2004, the Labor Arbiter ruled:

WHEREFORE, finding complainant to have been illegally dismissed, she is entitled to payment of

separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as aforestated and backwages. Accordingly, respondents TimeSaver Laundry and Leslie Perez are hereby ordered to pay complainant the following:

1. P 7,280.00 - separation pay

2. P80,563.17 - backwages from May 7, 2003 to date of this decision which will further becomputed until finality of this decision

3. P 5,670.00 - salary differentials from September 28, 2002 to May 7, 2003

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4. P 5,670.60 - ECOLA

5. P29,534.38 - overtime pay

P128,718.75 - TOTAL

6. P12,871.88 - 10% of the total award as and by way of attorneys fees.

P141,590.63 - TOTAL MONETARY AWARD

All other claims are ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.10

On 21 June 2004, respondents appealed to the NLRC11essentially arguing that they were denied dueprocess on the ground of improper service of summons and that the monetary award in favor of petitionerwas without basis. Respondents appeal was docketed as CA No. 040723 -04.

The NLRC issued its Resolution dated 30 November 2004, sustaining the finding of the Labor Arbiter thatpetitioner was illegally dismissed:

Conclusively of first impression, [herein petitioner] filed her verified complaint on May 21, 2003, allegingamong others, the fact of her dismissal on May 7, 2003. Thereafter, [petitioner] submitted her verifiedPosition Paper which takes the place of her direct testimonies which substantiate her claim for illegaldismissal, stating with particularity the facts attending her illegal dismissal as follows:

"x x x. On May 7, 2003, while working, her attention was called to the Office by Management and accusedher of quarreling with an employee of the Company. From there, and without giving her an opportunity toexplain and defend her side, was sent home and prevented to work further. x x x" (Complainants PositionPaper, p. 1, Record, p. 13)

In this jurisdiction, it is the unwavering rule that the "onus probandi" to show that the dismissal of anemployee from service is for cause and due process rests upon the shoulders of the employer. Failure todischarge this burden, the dismissal is tainted with illegality.

At bar, [herein respondents] failed to discharge this burden. A mere denial that they did not dismiss the[petitioner] is not a sufficient measure of the required proof to belie or controvert the latters assertion thatshe was dismissed from service, much less, illegally; more so, when [petitioner] satisfactorily narrated theultimate facts attending her dismissal.

In fine, for want of just or authorized cause and in the absence of due process, the dismissal of[petitioner] from service is therefore tainted with illegality.12

The NLRC did not give credence to respondents argument that they were denied due process:

The issue interposed by the [respondents] that their right to due process was denied in the discernment ofthe present dispute is now rendered moot and academic as We give (sic) them the opportunity to explainand be heard through the judicious resolution of the substantive merits of this case:

"The party who has had ample opportunity to present its side of the controversy not only before the LaborArbiter but also the NLRC on appeal, it cannot interpose lack of due process for what the fundamental lawabhors is simply the absolute absence of opportunity to be heard." (CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc.vs. NLRC, 303 SCRA 99).13

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The NLRC then determined the monetary awards to which petitioner would be entitled to:

Finding the dismissal of [petitioner] as illegal, she is entitled, under Art. 279 of the Labor Code, toreinstatement and full backwages. However, considering that reinstatement would not be in the interest ofthe parties as there is now of ruptured and strained relationship exists between them, it is moreappropriate to award separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement.

In the absence of proof of payment on the [petitioners] money claims as these were not substantiallybelied nor controverted by [respondents], the awards for salary differential, overtime pay, SILP and 13thmonth pay are hereby affirmed.

The claim for attorneys fees is granted based on salary differential, overtime pay and ECOLA pursuant toArticle 111 of the Labor Code.

All other claims, for lack of factual or legal basis, are DISMISSED.14

In the end, the NLRC decreed:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of 16 March 2004 with modification on the award of attorneys fee isAFFIRMED.15

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 November 2004 Resolution of theNLRC.16They followed this up with a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration which only reiterated thearguments presented in their appeal.17

In a Resolution dated 28 February 2006, the NLRC denied respondents Motion and Supplemental Motionfor Reconsideration.18

Thereafter, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 19of the

Revised Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94616.

In its Decision dated 17 December 2007, the Court of Appeals held that respondent Perez was indeeddenied due process based on the following ratiocination:

As above-quoted, service of summons in cases before the Labor Arbiters shall be served on the partiespersonally or by registered mail, provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may beeffected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court. In this case, since [hereinrespondent] Leslie Perez is the sole proprietor of Time Saver Laundry, service of summons must bemade to her personally or by registered mail. The bailiff chose to serve the summons personally upon[respondent Perez]. However, said service of summons was invalid as it was not personally received by[respondent Perez] herself. The records show that the summons was received by one Alfredo Perez onJune 7, 2003. It appears that Alfredo Perez is a co-employee of [herein petitioner]. x x x.

x x x x

Considering that there was no proper service of summons upon [respondent Perez], the Labor Arbiter didnot acquire jurisdiction over his (sic) person. Perforce, the proceedings conducted and the decisionrendered is nugatory and without effect.

x x x x

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The lack of proper service of summons clearly deprived [respondent Perez] of her right to due process oflaw. She should have been afforded her day before the labor arbiter. She was deprived of her right to beheard and to present evidence which are essential ingredients of due process of law. While it is true thatthe Labor Arbiters and the NLRC are not bound by technical rules of evidence and procedure, suchshould not be interpreted so as to dispense with the fundamental and essential right of every person to

due process of law.20

The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction on the part of public respondent, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutionsdated November 30, 2004 and February 28, 2006, respectively, of public respondent NLRC are herebydeclared NULL and VOID.21

Aggrieved, petitioner comes before us22with the following assignment of errors:

I THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE ON QUESTION OF LAW AND SUBSTANCE

DETERMINABLE BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT

II THE COURT OF APPEALS IN DECIDING, HAS DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL ANDACCEPTED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS DEROGATORY TO THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONER.23

We determine that the fundamental issue for our resolution in the present Petition is whether there hadbeen improper service of summons upon respondent Perez which renders the judgment by the NLRCagainst her null and void.

We rule in the negative.

The NLRC Rules governing the issuance and service of summons provide 24:

Sec. 3. Issuance of Summons. Within two (2) days from receipt of a case, the Labor Arbiter shall issuethe required summons, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint/petition and supporting documents, ifany. The summons, together with a copy of the complaint, shall specify the date, time and place of theconciliation and mediation conference in two (2) settings.

Section 6. SERVICE OF NOTICES AND RESOLUTIONS. a) Notices or summonses and copies of ordersshall be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or duly authorized public officer withinthree (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; provided that in special circumstances, service ofsummons may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; Providedfurther, that in cases of decisions and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties andtheir counsel/representative by registered mail; provided further that in cases where a party to a case orhis counsel on record personally seeks service of the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party

shall be deemed effected upon actual receipt thereof; provided finally, that where parties are sonumerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of complainants, as maybepracticable, which shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224(a) of the Labor Code, asamended.25(Emphasis supplied.) 1avvph!1.net

Sec. 6. Proof and completeness of service. The return is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein.Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent; but if the addresseefails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of thepostmaster, service shall take effect after such time.26

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Sec. 5. x x x

(b) The bailiff or officer serving the notice, order, resolution or decision shall submit his return within two(2) days from the date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return, his name, the names of the personsserved and the date of receipt, which return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of therecords of the case. In case of service by registered mail, the bailiff or officer shall write in the return, thenames of persons served and the date of mailing of the resolution or decision. If no service was effected,the serving officer shall state the reason therefor in the return.

Based on the foregoing rules, notices or summonses shall be served on the parties to the casepersonally. The same rule allows under special circumstances, that service of summons may be effectedin accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court regarding service of summons read:

RULE 14SUMMONS

Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served byhanding a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it by tenderingit to him.

Sec. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within areasonable time as provided in the proceding section, service may be affected (a) by leaving copies of thesummons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residingtherein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with somecompetent person in charge thereof.

As borne by the records, summons and notices were served on respondents under the circumstancesdescribed below:

1) Summons to respondents dated 27 May 2003, received by Alfredo Perez, employee ofTSL and uncle of respondent Perez, on 7 June 2003 as shown by the bailiffs return dated 10June 200327;

2) Notice of Hearing set on 10 July 2003, received for the respondents by Beth Diapolet,Cashier at respondent TSL, on 1 July 2003. During the hearing, only the petitioner and hercounsel appeared, respondents failed to appear28;

3) Notice of Hearing set on 31 July 2003, received for the respondents by Beth Diapolet,Cashier at respondent TSL, on 26 July 2003 as shown by bailiffs return dated 28 July 2003.Petitioner and counsel appeared but the respondents did not appear. During this hearing, the

Labor Arbiter required the parties to file their position paper29

;

4) Notice of Hearing set on 20 August 2003, received for the respondents by Vivian Bon,Supervisor at respondent TSL, on 13 August 2003 as shown by the bailiffs return dated 15

August 2003.30Only the petitioner appeared and filed her position paper. The Labor Arbiterset the case for hearing anew on 18 September 2003;

5) Notice of hearing and to file position paper set on 18 September 2003 with a warning thatupon failure to appear on this date, the case will proceed ex parte. This notice was received

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for the respondents by Beth Diapolet, cashier at respondent TSL on 15 September 2003 asshown by the bailiffs return dated 17 September 2003.31Again, respondents did not appearbefore the Labor Arbiter or file their position paper on the date indicated in the notice; and

6) Notice of Hearing set on 9 October 2003 with a second "Warning." This was received forthe respondents by "Benjie,"32delivery boy at respondent TSL, on 3 October 2003 as shownby the bailiffs return dated 6 October 2003.33

Following the explicit language of the NLRC Rules, service of summons on respondent Perez should bemade personally. But was personal service of summons practicable? Conversely, was substituted serviceof summons justified? Obviously, in this case, personal service of summons was not practicable. Byrespondent Perezs own admission, she was out of town during the entire proceedings before the LaborArbiter.34Given this admission, she would be unable to personally receive the summons and later thenotices from the Labor Arbiter. Thus, even if the bailiff would return at some other time to personally servethe summons on respondent Perez, it would still yield the same result. To proceed with personal serviceof summons on respondent Perez who unequivocally admits that she was out of town during the entireproceedings before the Labor Arbiter would not only be impractical and futile - it would be absurd.35While

we are not unmindful of the NLRC rules which state that service of summons should be made personally,considering the circumstances in the instant case, we find that service of summons at TSL, respondentPerezs place of business,36amounts to substantial compliance with the Rules.37In the fairly recent caseof Scenarios v. Vinluan,38service of summons by registered mail at therein petitioners place of businesswas considered valid. This Court declared in the said case that technical rules of procedure are notstrictly applied in quasi-judicial proceedings; only substantial compliance is required. That the summonswas served in the premises of therein petitioners office was enough to convince the court that the serviceof said processes was completed and resultantly, the requirement of notice has been served .39

In quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC and its arbitration branch, procedural rules governingservice of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. Theconstitutional requirement of due process with respect to service of summons only exacts that the serviceof summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired .40Once the service

provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is answered, thetraditional notion of fair play is satisfied, due process is served.41

To apply the technical rules on service of summons would be to overturn the bias of the Constitution andthe laws in favor of labor. In labor cases, punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules maybe relaxedin the interest of the working man; it should not defeat the complete and equitable resolution of the rightsand obligations of the parties. This Court is ever mindful of the underlying spirit and intention of the LaborCode to ascertain the facts of each case speedily and objectively without resort to technical rules .42

In Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,43we expounded onthe presumption of regularity in the service of summons and other notices, to wit:

[U]nless the contrary is proven, official duty is presumed to have been performed regularly and judicial

proceedings regularly conducted. This presumption of the regularity of the quasi-judicial proceedingsbefore DOLE includes the presumption of regularity of service of summons and other notices. x x x.

Moreover, it is a legal presumption, based on wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularlyperformed; that the proceedings of a judicial (and quasi-judicial) tribunal are regular and valid, and thatjudicial (quasi-judicial) acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed.44The burdenof proving the irregularity in official conduct, if any, is on the part of respondents who, in this case, clearlyfailed to discharge the same.

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It has not escaped our attention the respondents denial of receipt of the notices from the Labor Arbiter,yet they were able to receive a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision and file a timely appeal with theNLRC.

Indeed, respondents were able to seek the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiterwhen they seasonably filed their appeal before the NLRC. A party who has availed himself of theopportunity to present his position cannot claim to have been denied due process. Despite suchopportunity, respondents failed to convincingly establish that their defense is meritorious.45

We must emphasize that even though respondents did not participate in the proceedings before theLabor Arbiter, they were eventually able to argue their case on appeal before the NLRC. In their appeal,respondents had the opportunity to substantiate with evidence their claim that they did not receive thesummons and notices from the Labor Arbiter, and that petitioner was not illegally dismissed. Article22346of the Labor Code allows an appeal from a decision of the Labor Arbiter "if serious errors in thefindings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable injury to the appellant." The NLRC, inthe exercise of its appellate powers, is authorized to correct, amend or waive any error, defect orirregularity in substance or in form. This Court had previously allowed evidence to be submitted onappeal, emphasizing that, in labor cases, technical rules of evidence are not binding. The NLRC in factwent over the arguments of respondents but it remained unconvinced.

Necessarily, respondents contention that they were denied due process because of improper service ofsummons and notices is devoid of merit. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heardor as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seeka reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of theopportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been affordedthe opportunity to present his side.47A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instancesessential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair andreasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.

Equally without merit is respondents' assertion that they were not afforded due process when the LaborArbiter rendered his decision based only on the evidence adduced by petitioner. The authority of theLabor Arbiter to render judgment based solely on the evidence adduced by a complainant is explicitlysanctioned by Section 2, Rule V of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which provides:

Section 2 of Rule V:

Sec. 2. x x x.

x x x x

In case of non-appearance of the respondent/s during the first conference, a second conference shallproceed. Non-appearance of the respondent during the second conference shall immediately terminatethe mandatory conciliation/mediation conference. The complainant shall thereupon be allowed to file his

position paper as well as submit evidence in support of his cause or causes of action after which, theLabor Arbiter shall render his decision on the basis of the evidence on record .48(Emphasis supplied.)

Undoubtedly, respondents were afforded ample opportunity to be heard. Despite any purportedprocedural flaw that may have marred the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, it should be deemedrectified in the subsequent proceedings in the NLRC, to the Court of Appeals, and before this Court.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Granted. The Decision dated 17 December 2007of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94616 is reversed and set aside; and the NLRC Resolutions

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dated 30 November 2004 and 28 February 2006 in CA No. 040723-04, affirming with modification theDecision dated 16 March 2004 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 05-06071-03, are reinstated.Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

The present petition forcertioraristemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein privaterespondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III,in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Managerof petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract ofemployment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll.On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal

Revenue (BIR). 1

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncleof Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, privaterespondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financialassistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondentvoluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of thebusiness. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other governmentfees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made somechanges in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed toparticipate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging thatpetitioner had illegally terminated his employment. 2

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner onOctober 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and,therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. 3

Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the laborarbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked asa "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23,1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationshipbetween him and petitioner. 4

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remandingthe case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. 5 Petitioner then filed a motion forreconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack ofmerit, 6 hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. 7

Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent andopportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicialreview it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasingnumber of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over

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the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of thePhilippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.

We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department ofLabor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to beappealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.

On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect sixmonths after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached tothe Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination only. 9 Initially, Article 302(now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of theNLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolishedsuch appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.

Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision ofthe NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely

provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of theappellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereofby the parties.

When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to reviewthe decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision forappellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlyingpower of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction eventhough no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep theadministrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it isthat part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary andunjust adjudications. 11

Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of theaggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further orsubsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil action ofcertiorariunder Rule65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision.Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed ascontemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizanceof the petition forcertiorarion jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementaryperiod under Rule 65.14

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided asfollows:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs ofmandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeascorpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid ofits appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RegionalTrial Courts; and

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(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisionsof this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) ofthe fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conducthearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factualissues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, includingthe power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.

These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines

and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.15

Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effectiveMarch 18, 1995, to wit:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs ofmandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeascorpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid ofits appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RegionalTrial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,

instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and ExchangeCommission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees CompensationCommission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within theappellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, theLabor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, theprovisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph andsubparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issuesraised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the powerto grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Courtof Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months,unless extended by the Chief Justice.

It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, 16 thefollowing amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No.7902, viz.:

1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippinesand theCentral Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting theCourt of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.

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2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of thesection, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling withinthe appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Codeof the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and ofsubparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied).

3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies overwhich the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities andExchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commissionand the Civil Service Commission.

This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of purpose and terminology.As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time nowbeen understood to be by a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, ofcourse, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack orexcess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grantsexclusive appellatejurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional TrialCourts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others,"those falling within the appellatejurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Codeof the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarilycontradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of theNLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot bebrought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals hasno appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Courtin accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases inSection 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from theexclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementionedamendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical andimpracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no casesin the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are withinthe appellatejurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may havebeen an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminologyused therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in

labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode ofreview. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from theconsiderations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and theReference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18

In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech 19 from whichwe reproduce the following excerpts:

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The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its jurisdiction andpowers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final

judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions,resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards andcommissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the SupremeCourt in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and ofsubparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of theJudiciary Act of 1948.

Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Courtby the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court ofAppeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of theappellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph ofSection 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the"decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippinesand by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Courtare labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the exceptionsenumerated in Section 9and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate reviewof the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and ExchangeCommission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees CompensationCommission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court.(Emphases and corrections ours)

xxx xxx xxx

Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides

the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of the Supreme Court withoutdepriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.

In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:

. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the SupremeCourt of the burden of reviewing these cases which present noimportant issues involved beyond the particular fact and the partiesinvolved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time tocases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as theguardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basicrights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determinewhether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality ofthe Government.

We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has beencut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we are now back to400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shallcontinue to mount and add to the number of cases pending.

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In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we havesubmitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the support andcollegial approval of our Chamber.

xxx xxx xxx

Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced bythe said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired: 20

Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in accordance withthe Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINESUNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, thatissues arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment isapproved.

Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This wasalso discussed with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives and as weunderstand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment isapproved.

Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.

Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committeeamendments.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment isapproved. (Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on secondreading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21 The ConferenceCommittee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approvedby the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme

Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action ofcertiorariwas and stillis the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relationthereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumaebecause appealsby certiorariand the original action forcertiorariare both modes of judicial review addressed to theappellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court isparticularly concern