SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002GABRIEL L.
DUERO,petitioner,vs.HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A.
ERADEL,respondents.QUISUMBING,J.:This petition for certiorari
assails the Decisionl dated September 17, 1997, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No.. 2340- UDK, entitledBernardo Eradel
vs. Non. Ermelino G. Andal, setting aside all proceedings in Civil
Case No.1075,Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, before the
Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur
.The pertinent facts are as follow.Sometime in 1988, according to
petitioner, private respondent Bemardo Eradel2entered and occupied
petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302,
located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax
declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. When
petitioner politely informed private respondent that the land was
his and requested the latter to vacate the land, private respondent
refused, but instead threatened him with bodily harm. Despite
repeated demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his
refusal to leave the land.On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before
the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two
others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner appended
to the complaint the aforementioned tax declaration. The counsel of
the Ruenas asked for extension to file their Answer and was given
until July 18, 1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the, Ruenas executed
a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a
partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement,
the Ruenas through their counsel, Atty. Eusebio Avila, entered into
a Compromise Agreement with herein petitioner, Gabriel Duero.Inter
alia, the agreement stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound
themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero.3Herein
private respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he
was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the
complaint.4Petitioner presented his evidenceex parteon February 13,
1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and
private respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over
Lot No.1065 Cad. 537-D to petitioner; pay petitioner P2,000 annual
rental from 1988 up the time he vacates the land, and P5,000 as
attorney's fees and the cost of the suit.5Private respondent
received a copy of the decision on May 25, 1996.On June 10, 1996,
private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he
has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr.,
since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and
summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the
latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend
any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion
for new trial.1wphi1.ntMeanwhile, RED Conflict Case No.1029, an
administrative case between petitioner and applicant-contestants
Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending with the Office
of the Regional Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in Davao City. Eventually, it was forwarded to
the DENR Regional Office in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur .On July
24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for
Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion
for New Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination on
who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate the land. He
also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch
as the heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable
parties, were not impleaded.On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana
Soledad and Virginia, all surnamed Laurente, grandchildren of
Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed a Motion for
Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.On October 8, 1996, the
trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from
Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private
respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case,
since the value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was
under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. On November
22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.On January
22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC
granted on January 28. On February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was
made of record and a writ of execution was issued by the RTC on
February 27,1997. On March 12,1997, private respondent filed his
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.The Court of
Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private
respondent is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction 'of the
RTC, Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private respondent
filed with said court his Motion for Reconsideration And/Or
Annulment of Judgment. The Court of Appeals decreed as follows:IN
THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. All
proceedings in "Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et. al. Civil
Case 1075" filed in the Court a quo, including its Decision,Annex
"E"of the petition, and its Orders and Writ of Execution and the
turn over of the property to the Private Respondent by the Sheriff
of the Courta quo, are declared null and void and hereby SET ASIDE,
No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.6Petitioner now comes
before this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it held that:I....THE LOWER COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MA TTER OF THE CASE.II...PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WAS NOT THEREBY ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEREFROM.III...THE FAlLURE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IS JUSTIFIED.7The main issue before
us is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and
that private respondent was not estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before
it. The secondary issue is whether the Court of appeals erred in
holding that private respondent's failure to file an answer to the
complaint was justified.At the outset, however, we note that
petitioner through counsel submitted to this Court pleadings that
contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition,8we
find that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in
holding that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed
toAnnex E9of his petition which supposedly is the Certification
issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao,
specifically containing the notation, "Note: Subject for General
Revision Effective 1994." But it appears thatAnnex Eof his petition
is not a Certification but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real
Property. Nowhere does the document contain a notation, "Note:
Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." Petitioner also asked
this Court to refer toAnnex F,10where he said the zonal value of
the disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m., thus placing the computed
value of the land at the time the complaint was filed before the
RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal
court and within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
However, we find that these annexes are both merely xerox copies.
They are obviously without evidentiary weight or value.Coming now
to the principal issue, petitioner contends that respondent
appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion. By "grave
abuse of discretion" is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or a lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.11But here we find that in its decision holding that the
municipal court has jurisdiction over the case and that private
respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the RTC, respondent Court of Appeals discussed the facts on which
its decision is grounded as well as the law and jurisprudence on
the matter.12Its action was neither whimsical nor capricious.Was
private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the RTC? In this case, we are in agreement with the Court of
Appeals that he was not. While participation in all stages of a
case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority
in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by
estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction,13we note that
estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both substantive
and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not
merely its equitable enforcement.14Hence, estoppel ought to be
applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise
thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied,
estoppel may become a tool of injustice.15In the present case,
private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag,
Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was petitioner
who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other
parties before the said court,16believing that the RTC had
jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act
769117amending BP 129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction
already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said
amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the
mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late
Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito
Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do
anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint,
private respondent was declared in default. He then filed a Motion
for New Trial in the same court and explained that he defaulted
because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his
landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence
to prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land
because of his long, continuous and uninterrupted possession
asbona-fidetenant-lessee of the land.18But his motion was denied.
He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a Motion
for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion,
hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that private
respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the
case was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the
RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as
well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two
motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to
reconsider the denial of private respondent's motion for relief
from judgment, it went on to issue the order for entry of judgment
and a writ of execution.Under these circumstances, we could not
fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding
that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is
that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot
be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even by their express consent.19Further, a party
may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any
stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.20The appellate court
did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself
barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent
actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the
doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him
because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
anytime and at any stage of the action.21Precedents tell us that as
a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of
acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a
matter of law.22Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to
confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and
exceptional circumstances.23The Court of Appeals found support for
its ruling in our decision inJavier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:x x
x The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his
suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed
sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an
honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal
provisions.If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such
course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court
which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into
believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct
forum.Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an
action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the
Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be
impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132,
Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same.
[Emphasis ours.]24Indeed, "...the trial court was duty-bound to
take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its
failure to do so, makes its decision a 'lawless' thing."25Since a
decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could
logically never become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom
by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort by private
respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
was in order .In holding that estoppel did not prevent private
respondent from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction, the appellate
court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must be applied only in
exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a
miscarriage of justice. Here, we find that petitioner, who claims
ownership of a parcel of land, filed his complaint before a court
without appropriate jurisdiction. Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy
status is still pending before the proper administrative agency
concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the case on
jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein could
not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related
issues. This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not
to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake when
he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he
realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but
within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him
in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue
to obtain a proper resolution of his case. Furthermore, if the
RTC's order were to be sustained, he would be evicted from the land
prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No.1029 would remain
unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if allowed could result
in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to
till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.1wphi1.ntHaving
determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the
appellate court in ruling that private respondent was not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to
consider in detail the second issue. Suffice it to say that, given
the circumstances in this case, no error was committed on this
score by respondent appellate court. Since the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case, private respondent had justifiable
reason in law not to file an answer, aside from the fact that he
believed the suit was properly his landlord's concern.WHEREFORE,
the petition isDISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals isAFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No.1075 entitledGabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel,
its Order that private respondent turn over the disputed land to
petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, areANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner .SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 129638 December 8, 2003ANTONIO T.
DONATO,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, FILOMENO ARCEPE, TIMOTEO
BARCELONA, IGNACIO BENDOL, THELMA P. BULICANO, ROSALINDA CAPARAS,
ROSITA DE COSTO, FELIZA DE GUZMAN, LETICIA DE LOS REYES, ROGELIO
GADDI, PAULINO GAJARDO, GERONIMO IMPERIAL, HOMER IMPERIAL, ELVIRA
LESLIE, CEFERINO LUGANA, HECTOR PIMENTEL, NIMFA PIMENTEL, AURELIO
G. ROCERO, ILUMINADA TARA, JUANITO VALLESPIN, and NARCISO
YABUT,respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before us is a
"petition for review on certiorari" filed on July 17, 1997 which
should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. It assails the Resolutions1dated March 21, 1997 and June 23,
1997 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394.2The
factual background of the case is as follows:Petitioner Antonio T.
Donato is the registered owner of a real property located at
Ciriaco Tuason Street, San Andres, Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 131793 issued by the Register of Deeds of
the City of Manila on November 24, 1978. On June 7, 1994,
petitioner filed a complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(Branch 26) of Manila (MeTC) for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer against 43 named defendants and "all unknown occupants" of
the subject property.3Petitioner alleges that: private respondents
had oral contracts of lease that expired at the end of each month
but were impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere
acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped paying
rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to
vacate; the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him
to file the ejectment case against them.4Of the 43 named
defendants, only 20 (private respondents,5for brevity) filed a
consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994 wherein they denied
non-payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted
because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and
priority right to purchase the subject property; and that there was
a negotiation for the purchase of the lots occupied by them but
when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they decided to
continue payment of rentals and tendered payment to petitioners
counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the
rentals in Civil Case No. 144049 while they await the outcome of
the negotiation to purchase.Following trial under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered judgment on September 19, 1994
against the 23 non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate
the premises occupied by each of them, and to pay jointly and
severallyP10,000.00 per month from the date they last paid their
rent until the date they actually vacate, plus interest thereon at
the legal rate allowed by law, as well asP10,000.00 as attorneys
fees and the costs of the suit. As to the 20 private respondents,
the MeTC issued a separate judgment6on the same day sustaining
their rights under the Land Reform Law, declaring petitioners cause
of action as not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of
the case and dismissing the case without prejudice.Not satisfied
with the judgment dismissing the complaint as against the private
respondents, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 47) of Manila (RTC).7In a Decision8dated July 5, 1996, the
RTC sustained the decision of the MeTC.Undaunted, petitioner filed
a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity),
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41394. In a Resolution dated March 21,
1997, the CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: (a) the
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners
counsel and not by petitioner himself, in violation of Revised
Circular No. 28-91;9and, (b) the only annex to the petition is a
certified copy of the questioned decision but copies of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition are not annexed, contrary
to Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).10On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration,11attaching thereto a photocopy of the
certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by petitioner
himself12and the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC.13Five
days later, or on April 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement14to
his motion for reconsideration submitting the duly authenticated
original of the certification of non-forum shopping signed by
petitioner.15In a Resolution16dated June 23, 1997 the CA denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration and its supplement, ruling
that "petitioners subsequent compliance did not cure the defect in
the instant petition."17Hence, the present petition anchored on the
following grounds:I.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION BASED ON HYPER-TECHNICAL GROUNDS BECAUSE:A.
PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR
NO. 28-91. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS A DULY AUTHENTICATED CERTIFICATE OF
NON-FORUM SHOPPING WHICH HE HIMSELF SIGNED AND EXECUTED IN THE
UNITED STATES.B. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SECTION
3, RULE 6 OF THE REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
PROCEEDINGS COPIES OF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS IN THE CASES BELOW.C.
PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS APPEAL, AND HE STANDS TO LOSE
SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY IF THE APPEAL IS NOT GIVEN DUE COURSE. THE
RULES OF PROCEDURE MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO DO SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE.II.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING
THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT IN THE CASE
AT BAR.III.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
RTC MANILA, BRANCH 47, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDING OF MTC MANILA, BRANCH 26, THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT
BE EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THEIR
SECURITY OF TENURE EVEN IF THE TERM OF THE LEASE IS MONTH-TO-MONTH
WHICH EXPIRES AT THE END OF EACH MONTH. IN THIS REGARD,A.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT TENANTS UNDER P.D.
1517 MAY BE EVICTED FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT, TERMINATION OF LEASE
OR OTHER GROUNDS FOR EJECTMENT.B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED "PRIORITY RIGHT TO BUY THE LOT THEY
OCCUPY" DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE LANDOWNER DOES NOT INTEND TO SELL
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR.C. RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED WITHIN A ZONAL
IMPROVEMENT AREA OR APD.D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE
RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS UNDER
THE LAW RESULT IN THE WAIVER OF PROTECTION AGAINST EVICTION.E.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER P.D. 2016 SINCE THE
GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF ACQUIRING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.F.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THERE IS AN ON-GOING
NEGOTIATION FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THAT IT
RENDERS THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PREMATURE.G. RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED CASE FOR
CONSIGNATION DOES NOT BAR THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.IV.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER A REASONABLE
COMPENSATION FOR THEIR USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN
THE AMOUNT OF AT LEASTP10,000.00 PER MONTH FROM THE DATE THEY LAST
PAID RENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ACTUALLY VACATE THE SAME, WITH LEGAL
INTEREST AT THE MAXIMUM RATE ALLOWED BY LAW UNTIL PAID.V.RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
SHOULD PAY PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION OF
AT LEASTP20,000.00, PLUS COSTS.18Petitioner submits that a
relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure is called for
in view of the attendant circumstances showing that the objectives
of the rule on certification of non-forum shopping and the rule
requiring material portions of the record be attached to the
petition have not been glaringly violated and, more importantly,
the petition is meritorious.The proper recourse of an aggrieved
party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review
oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the
error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper
remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by the
Court inFortich vs. Corona:19Anent the first issue, in order to
determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it
is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an
error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.20(Emphasis
supplied).Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the
dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws involving
the jurisdiction of the courta quoto entertain the petition, it
falls within the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.At the time the instant
petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997, the
prevailing rule is the newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, considering that the CA Resolution being
assailed was rendered on March 21, 1997, the applicable rule is the
three-month reglementary period, established by
jurisprudence.21Petitioner received notice of the assailed CA
Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April 4, 1997. He
filed his motion reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only
thirteen days of the 90-day period. Petitioner received the CA
Resolution denying his motion on July 3, 1997 and fourteen days
later, or on July 17, 1997, he filed a motion for 30-day extension
of time to file a "petition for review" which was granted by us;
and petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15, 1997, which is
well-within the period of extension granted to him.We now go to the
merits of the case.We find the instant petition partly
meritorious.The requirement regarding the need for a certification
of non-forum shopping in cases filed before the CA and the
corresponding sanction for non-compliance thereto are found in the
then prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-91.22It provides that the
petitioner himself must make the certification against forum
shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for
the rule of personal execution of the certification by the
petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual
knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or
proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of record
may be unaware of such fact.23The Court has ruled that with respect
to the contents of the certification, the rule on substantial
compliance may be availed of. This is so because the requirement of
strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification of
non-forum shopping simply underscores its mandatory nature in that
the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby
interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances.24The petition for review filed before
the CA contains a certification against forum shopping but said
certification was signed by petitioners counsel. In submitting the
certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself in his
motion for reconsideration,25petitioner has aptly drawn the Courts
attention to the physical impossibility of filing the petition for
review within the 15-day reglementary period to appeal considering
that he is a resident of 1125 South Jefferson Street, Roanoke,
Virginia, U.S.A. were he to personally accomplish and sign the
certification.We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically
impossible for the petition to have been prepared and sent to the
petitioner in the United States, for him to travel from Virginia,
U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C.,
U.S.A., in order to sign the certification before the Philippine
Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the Philippines
within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find that
petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign
the certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.We have
stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness
as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective26which is
simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping.27The
subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the
petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance,pro
hac vice.In like manner, the failure of the petitioner to comply
with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to
append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material
portions of the records as would support the petition, does not
justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be
emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain
leeway to require parties to submit additional documents as may be
necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3,
paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA,28the CA may require the parties
to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the
petition is given due course, the CA may require the elevation of a
complete record of the case as provided for under Section 3(d)(5)
of Rule 6 of the RIRCA.29At any rate, petitioner attached copies of
the pleadings and other material portions of the records below with
his motion for reconsideration.30In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals,31the
Court reiterated the doctrine laid down inCusi-Hernandez vs.
Diaz32andPiglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission33that
subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for
reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance which calls for
the relaxation of the rules of procedure. We find no cogent reason
to depart from this doctrine.Truly, in dismissing the petition for
review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the
expense of a just resolution of the case.Needless to stress, "a
litigation is not a game of technicalities."34When technicality
deserts its function of being an aid to justice, the Court is
justified in exempting from its operations a particular
case.35Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not
frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a
laudable objective, granting substantial justice is an even more
urgent ideal.36The Courts pronouncement inRepublic vs. Court of
Appeals37is worth echoing: "cases should be determined on the
merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of
their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be
better served."38Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a
party litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life,
honor or property on mere technicalities.39This guideline is
especially true when the petitioner has satisfactorily explained
the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion for
reconsideration,40as in this case.In addition, petitioner prays
that we decide the present petition on the merits without need of
remanding the case to the CA. He insists that all the elements of
unlawful detainer are present in the case. He further argues that
the alleged "priority right to buy the lot they occupy" does not
apply where the landowner does not intend to sell the subject
property, as in the case; that respondents cannot be entitled to
protection under P.D. No. 2016 since the government has no
intention of acquiring the subject property, nor is the subject
property located within a zonal improvement area; and, that
assuming that there is a negotiation for the sale of the subject
property or a pending case for consignation of rentals, these do
not bar the eviction of respondents.We are not persuaded. We shall
refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues in the present petition
for certiorari.1wphi1The issues involved are factual issues which
inevitably require the weighing of evidence. These are matters that
are beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action for
certiorari. These issues are best addressed to the CA in the
petition for review filed before it. As an appellate court, it is
empowered to require parties to submit additional documents, as it
may find necessary, or to receive evidence, to promote the ends of
justice, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 9, B.P. Blg.
129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
to wit:The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try
cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and
all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings.WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in
CA-G.R. No. 41394, entitled, "Antonio T. Donato vs. Hon. Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, Filomeno Arcepe, et
al."SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 142037 October 18, 2004Spouses EDGARDO
and CECILIA GONZAGA,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses
ALFONSO and LETICIA ABAGAT,respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO,
SR.,J.:This is a petition for the review of the Decision1and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48687 filed by
the Spouses Edgardo and Cecilia Gonzaga.The Antecedents On October
22, 1991, the respondents, Spouses Abagat, filed a complaint
against the petitioners, Spouses Gonzaga, for the recovery of
possession of a parcel of land identified as Lot 11, Block No. 15.
The lot was located in Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 128186 issued in their
names, as owners.The respondents alleged, inter alia in their
complaint that they were the owners of a small hut (barong-barong)
constructed on the said lot, which was then owned by the
government. On February 22, 1961, when he was still single, the
respondent Alfonso Abagat filed an application for a sales patent
over the said parcel of land. The hut was, however, gutted by fire
on January 26, 1973. According to the respondents, after the fire
the Spouses Miguel and Violeta Gregorio built a two-storey house on
the property without their consent. As such, they filed a complaint
for ejectment against the Spouses Gregorio but the complaint was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because in their answer to the
complaint, the petitioners therein claimed ownership over the
house. Thereafter, the Spouses Gregorio sold the house to the
petitioners forP100,000.00 under a deed of conditional sale, in
which Spouses Gregorio undertook to secure an award of the land by
the government in favor of the petitioners. On January 2, 1986, the
Bureau of Lands granted the application of respondent Alfonso
Abagat for a sales patent over the property on the basis of which
TCT No. 128186 was issued by the Register of Deeds to and in his
name. The respondents demanded that the petitioners vacate the
property, but the latter refused to do so. The respondents prayed
that judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is respectfully prayed before this Honorable Court
that judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs 1. Ordering
the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate
Lot 11, Block 15 located at 2063 Bagong Sikat Street, Baclaran,
Paraaque, Metro Manila and to demolish at their own expense the
house constructed thereon;Ordering the defendants:a) to
payP10,000.00 as attorneys fees, plusP500.00 as appearance fee for
every court hearing;b) to payP45,500.00 as compensatory damages
representing the unearned rentals on the subject premises from
March 1984 to October 1991, andP500.00 as land rental every month
thereafter;c) to payP20,000.00 as exemplary damages;d) to pay the
costs of this suit.PLAINTIFFS pray for such other and further
reliefs as may deemed (sic) equitable in the premises.2In their
Answer to the complaint, the petitioners averred that they
purchased the house from the Spouses Gregorio forP100,000.00 under
a deed of conditional sale with the understanding that Miguel
Gregorio would secure an award in their favor over the lot.
However, the Spouses Gregorio failed to do so. Thereafter, they and
the Spouses Gregorio executed a Deed of Final and Absolute Sale
over the property. According to the petitioners, their refusal to
vacate the property was justified in view of the Memorandum of
Agreement executed between them and the Spouses Gregorio, whereby
they agreed to rescind the deeds of conditional sale and final and
absolute sale they earlier executed. The said agreement was made in
consideration of the refund of the amount ofP90,000.00 to take
place on or before December 15, 1991, which amount was earlier paid
by them to the Spouses Gregorio under the deed of conditional sale.
Until then, the petitioners alleged, they had the right to remain
in the property. The petitioners prayed that the court render
judgment in their favor, thus:1) Dismissing the complaint for lack
of merit;2) Awarding defendants moral damages in such amount as may
be proven during the trial and exemplary damages in such amount as
may be awarded by this Honorable Court;3) Ordering plaintiff to pay
the cost of suit.Defendants likewise pray for such other relief
just and equitable under the premises.3On September 29, 1992, the
petitioners filed a motion for leave to file a third-party
complaint against the Spouses Gregorio, appending thereto the said
third-party complaint. They prayed that judgment be rendered in
their favor, thus:WHEREFORE, Third-Party Plaintiffs pray for
judgment ordering Third-Party Defendants to indemnify Third-Party
Plaintiffs for whatever is adjudged, if any, against the latter in
favor of Plaintiffs in the main case now pending with this
court.FURTHER, praying for such and other reliefs as may be deemed
just and equitable.4The petitioners likewise appended a copy of the
deed of conditional sale executed between them and the third-party
defendants which contained the following terms, among others:11.
The VENDOR herein shall bear the costs of notarization of this deed
of conditional sale.12. The VENDOR herein warrants that he is the
legal owner in full, without any lien and encumbrance, of such
house, and the VENDOR herein warrants to defend his ownership over
such house against unlawful claims by any third parties. The VENDOR
herein further warrants to indemnify the VENDEE herein for any
material damage that may be caused by any unlawful claims from
third parties.5Even before the Court could resolve the said motion,
the Spouses Gregorio filed their Answer to the Third-Party
Complaint, alleging that the petitioners were entitled to indemnify
them for any award which may be adjudicated in favor of the
respondents. Thus:WHEREFORE, herein third-party defendants
voluntarily manifest their full admission of the truth and veracity
of the entirety of Pars. 1 to 9 of the Third-Party Complaint, and
that the defendants/third-party plaintiffs are entitled to the
legal benefit ofindemnity or subrogation, as against the herein
third-party defendants, under Sec. 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court.6Although he was already the counsel of the petitioners,
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. entered his appearance as counsel of
the Spouses Gregorio.7The latter, with the assistance of Atty.
Laserna, Jr., likewise, filed a motion for intervention and filed
their Answer-In-Intervention in which they alleged that the
respondents were able to secure a sales patent over the residential
lot in question through fraud and deceit; and prayed that the
complaint be dismissed.8On November 12, 1992, the trial court
issued an Order granting the motion of the Spouses Gregorio to
intervene and admitting their Answer-in-Intervention. The trial
court also granted the respondents motion to strike off the
appearance of Atty. Laserna, Jr. as counsel of the Spouses Gregorio
as he was already the petitioners counsel of record. The trial
court, however, no longer resolved the motion of the petitioners
for leave to file a third-party complaint against the Spouses
Gregorio.The Evidence for the RespondentsOn February 22, 1961,
respondent Alfonso Abagat, then single, filed a sales application
patent over a residential lot, particularly Lot 11, Block 15,
Bagong Isla Subd., Baclaran, Paraaque, Rizal, Philippines.9He built
a house thereon and declared the house for taxation purposes
beginning 1961.10He later paid the realty taxes for the house for
the period of 1969 to 1970.11Pending the processing of his sales
patent application, respondent Alfonso Abagat leased the hut to the
Spouses Miguel and Violeta Gregorio at a monthly rental of seventy
pesos (P70.00). On January 26, 1973, the house was destroyed by
fire. The Spouses Gregorio, along with the other residents, near
the area were evacuated to the Baclaran Elementary School.In light
of the certification of the Committee on Resettlement of Baclaran
Fire Victims, on February 28, 1973, the respondents were allowed to
return to the property and to build a make-shift house out of the
ruins. They allowed his nephew, Roberto "Boy" Abagat, to occupy the
said "house," but for some reason, he left and resettled
somewhere.In August 1973, the Spouses Gregorio, surreptitiously
occupied the abandoned make-shift house of the respondents. The
couple "remodeled" the make-shift structure into a two-storey
house. On April 7, 1977, the respondents, thru counsel, demanded
payment of rental for his house for the period from 1976 to March
977 amounting toP350.00 but Miguel Gregorio offered to pay only the
amount ofP280.00 which the plaintiffs refused. On April 25, 1977,
Miguel Gregorio wrote respondent Alfonso Abagat that, in view of
his persistent refusal to accept the amount ofP280 for the rent
covering the period of January to April 1977, he would consign the
amount to the court.12Respondent Alfonso Abagat filed a complaint
with the Municipal Trial Court of Paraaque for unlawful detainer
against the Spouses Gregorio, docketed as Civil Case No. 3898. On
January 14, 1983, the court rendered a decision dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction.13Unknown to Alfonso Abagat, the Spouses
Gregorio, as vendors, and the Spouses Edgardo and Cecilia D.
Gonzaga, as vendees, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the
house for the price ofP100,000.00 under the following terms and
conditions:2 The VENDOR herein hereby acknowledges receipt of the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency,
in cash, from the VENDEE herein, as part and representing the FIRST
DOWNPAYMENT.3 The VENDEE herein shall remit and pay to the VENDOR
herein the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine
Currency, in cash, within the month of May, 1984, as part of and
representing the SECOND DOWNPAYMENT of this sale.4 The VENDOR
herein shall apply, file with and work for the issuance, approval
and release of the government order, decree and award of the
official ownership over the government land on which the said house
now stands in favor of the VENDOR, after which, the VENDOR herein
shall transfer such right over said government award to and in
favor of the VENDEE herein.5 Upon the approval, release and
issuance of such government award, as mentioned in the immediately
preceding paragraph, the VENDEE herein shall remit and pay to the
VENDOR herein the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00),
Philippine Currency, in cash, as part of and representing the FINAL
AND FULL PAYMENT in settlement in full of the obligation of the
VENDEE.6 The VENDOR herein shall see to it that such government
award of ownership over the government land on which the said house
now stands shall be made, done and processed by the concerned
government agency with utmost speed and facility.7 The VENDOR
herein shall shoulder all the official and incidental costs and
fees relative to the filing and application for, and the processing
of, such government award.14During the period of April 13, 1984 to
July 11, 1985, Miguel Gregorio received from the petitioners the
total amount ofP55,000.0015thereby leaving a balance ofP30,000.00.
For Miguel Gregorios failure to secure an award from the
government, as agreed upon, they further agreed to reduce the
balance of the purchase price of the house toP25,000.00. Petitioner
Edgardo Gonzaga paid to Miguel Gregorio following the latters
execution on July 12, 1985 of a Deed of Final and Absolute Sale in
favor of Edgardo Gonzaga, under the following terms and
conditions:1. That the VENDOR shall exert utmost effort, diligence
and speed in securing a government award over the said property for
subsequent transfer to the VENDEE within one (1) year from the
execution hereof.2. That all costs and expenses relative to such
government award shall be for the account of the VENDOR;3. That all
costs and expenses relative to the execution of this Deed of Final
and Absolute Sale shall be for the account of the VENDOR;4. That
all costs and expenses for the future or subsequent issuance of
Torrens Title over the said property shall be for the account of
the VENDEE;5. That the VENDOR hereby grants and affords the VENDEE
a WARRANTY AGAINST EVICTION, and that the VENDOR shall be liable to
the VENDEE for damages that might arise from any false
representations as to the prior validity of her rights, interest,
or ownership over the said property.16When Miguel Gregorio learned
that respondent Alfonso Abagat had earlier filed an application for
a sales patent over the property, he and petitioner Edgardo Gonzaga
filed a protest in the Bureau of Lands. On January 2, 1986, the
Bureau of Lands rendered a decision ordering the dismissal of the
protest and granting the application of respondent Alfonso Abagat
for a sales patent. The Spouses Gonzaga were, likewise, ordered to
vacate the property. The decretal portion of the said decision
reads:WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the protest filed by spouses
Miguel Gregorio and Violeta Gregorio against the Insular Government
Property Sales Application No. (IV-1) 191 of Alfonso Abagat be as
hereby it is, dismissed and this once, dropped from the records.
Protestants and their privies the spouses Edgardo Gonzaga and
Cecilia Gonzaga, are hereby directed to vacate the land in question
and remove whatever improvements introduced thereon within sixty
(60) days from a receipt of a copy hereof. The I.C.P.S.A. No.
(IV-1) 191 of Alfonso Abagat shall be given further due
course.17After the decision of the Bureau of Lands had become final
and executory, respondent Alfonso Abagat filed motions for
execution of the decision and the demolition of the house thereon
on August 12, 1986 and February 17, 1987.On May 22, 1987, the
Bureau of Lands issued an Order of Execution directing the District
Land Officer:WHEREFORE, and pursuant to the provisions of Section
1844 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3077, you are hereby enjoined to repair to the premises of the land
in question and enforce the aforementioned decision by ordering the
claimants-protestants, their tenants, relatives and all those
acting for and in their behalf to vacate the said land, remove
their improvements therefrom and placing the applicant-respondent
in peaceful possession thereof.In complying herewith, you should
set forth the whole proceeding in writing signed by the parties and
witnesses, if possible, and submit the returns to this Office
within sixty (60) days from this date to be used as evidence should
it be necessary to institute action, criminal or otherwise, against
any party who may refuse to obey the same.SO ORDERED.18The Director
of Lands executed a Deed of Sale over the parcel of land in favor
of respondent Alfonso Abagat19who also paid the realty taxes over
the property.20Alfonso Abagat made demands to Edgardo Gonzaga to
vacate the property in two Letters dated June 17, 1990 and August
8, 1991, but Edgardo Gonzaga refused. On August 19, 1991, Edgardo
Gonzaga and Gregorio executed a Memorandum of Agreement in which
they agreed to rescind the deed of conditional sale and the deed of
final and absolute sale they had earlier executed, and that Miguel
Gregorio would refund the amount of P90,000.00 on or before
December 15, 1991, and that in the meantime, Edgardo Gonzaga would
remain in the property until his receipt of the said
amount.21However, even before Miguel Gregorio could refund
theP90,000.00 to petitioner Edgardo Gonzaga, Alfonso Abagat filed a
complaint against the petitioners for recovery of possession with
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.Evidence for the
PetitionersUnknown to the petitioners, the respondents had filed an
application with the Bureau of Lands for a sales patent over the
land. On March 30, 1984 the Spouses Gregorio, as vendors, and the
petitioners as vendees, executed a deed of conditional sale over
the house forP100,000.00, payable on installment basis.The Decision
of the Trial CourtOn October 10, 1994, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the respondents and against the petitioners
and intervenors. The fallo of the decision reads:WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1. Ordering
defendants-spouses Gregorios and Gonzagas and all persons claiming
rights under them to vacate the premises at Lot 11, Block 15
located at No. 2063 Bagong Sikat, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and for
defendants-spouses Gregorios to demolish at their own expense, the
house constructed thereon;2. Ordering defendants-Gregorios to pay
plaintiffs the amount ofP45,000.00 representing unearned rentals on
subject premises from March, 1984 up to October 1991, andP500.00
land rental every month thereafter;3. Ordering defendants-spouses
Gonzagas and Gregorios jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the
amount ofP10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and4. Ordering
defendants-spouses Gregorios and Gonzagas jointly and severally to
pay plaintiffs the costs of suit.22The intervenors did not appeal
the decision. The petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals, contending that:e. Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs now
have the right to compel defendants to remove their house on the
questioned land, should not the third-party defendants spouses
Gregorio be mandated to REFUND the purchase price paid by
defendants/3rd-party plaintiffs plus damages arising out of this
case to which defendants were implicated by reason of spouses
Gregorios failure to comply with their 1984 and 1985 agreements
with defendants/3rd party plaintiffs?In such a scenario, spouses
Gregorio have the legal duty to refund spouses Gonzaga the purchase
price the latter paid to the former in 1984 and to answer for all
damages that spouses Gonzaga may sustain by reason of any judgment
in favor of plaintiffs against defendants.It will be noted that
third-party defendants spouses Gregorio have filed a voluntary
Appearance and a Manifestation admitting the truth and fairness of
the Third-Party Complaint filed by defendants spouses Gonzaga
against them.23The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court on
December 19, 1997. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error afflicting it, the
appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.24On the plea of the petitioners that the trial court should
have ordered the intervenors to refund to them theP90,000.00 the
latter had received as payment for the house, the appellate court
ruled that a separate complaint should have been filed against the
Spouses Gregorio, instead of appealing the decision of the trial
court.Dissatisfied, the Petitioners filed the instant petition,
raising the sole question of whether or not the RTC and the CA
erred in not ordering the intervenors to refund to them
theP90,000.00 they had paid for the house and which the latter
promised to do so under their Memorandum of Agreement.The
petitioners aver that in the light of the admission made by the
intervenors in their pleadings in the trial court, including their
Answer to the third-party complaint and their urgent motion for
intervention, that they were liable to the petitioners for any
judgment for damages adjudged by the trial court in favor of the
respondents, the trial court should have ordered the intervenors to
refund to them the aforesaid amount ofP90,000.00. The petitioners
assert that while the trial court did not rule on their motion for
leave to file a third-party complaint against the Spouses Gregorio,
the caption of the Order dated March 8, 1993, included the Spouses
Gregorio as intervenors and third-party defendants.25The
petitioners aver that the interest of substantial justice and the
avoidance of multiplicity of suits should likewise be considered by
the Court.In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver
that the liability of the intervenors to the petitioners in the
Memorandum of Agreement is personal. Since they were not privies to
the Agreement, the respondents contend that the claim for refund of
the petitioners against the intervenors must be presented in a
separate action against the latter. Moreover, the respondents
insist that the petitioners did not pray, in their third-party
complaint, for the refund by the Spouses Gregorio of the amount
ofP90,000.00. Hence, the respondents assert, even if the trial
court had granted leave to the petitioners to file a third-party
complaint against the Spouses Gregorio and admitted the said
complaint, the petitioners would not have been entitled to a refund
of the said amount.The petition has no merit.We agree with the
petitioners that a judgment should be complete by itself. It should
not leave open any judicial question to be determined by
others.26The Court is to dispose finally of the litigation so as to
preclude further litigation between the parties on the same subject
matter thereby avoiding a multiplicity of suits between the parties
and their privies and successors-in-interests. However, the Court
has no authority to roam at will and grant relief to the parties
prescinding from their pleadings and prayers. The rule is that a
party is entitled only to such relief consistent with and limited
to that sought by the pleadings or incidental thereto. A trial
court would be acting beyond its jurisdiction if it grants relief
to a party beyond the scope of the pleadings.27Moreover, the right
of a party to recover depends, not on the prayer, but on the scope
of the pleadings, the issues made and the law. A judgment which
determines questions not within the courts jurisdiction, because
not in issue, is, to that extent, void.28There is no principle
better established than that what is not juridically presented
cannot be juridically decided.29Also, where a party has prayed only
for specific relief or reliefs as to a specific subject matter,
usually no different relief may be granted.30A judgment which
grants reliefs of a character not sought is void.31Where a prayer
for general relief is added to the demand of specific relief, the
court may grant such other appropriate relief as may be consistent
with the allegations and proofs.32In this case, the petitioners
failed to file any pleading against the Spouses Gregorio for the
enforcement of the deed of conditional sale, the deed of final and
absolute sale, and the Memorandum of Agreement executed by them.
The petitioners filed their motion for leave to file a third-party
complaint against the intervenors, the Spouses Gregorio, and
appended thereto their third-party complaint for indemnity for any
judgment that may be rendered by the court against them and in
favor of the respondents. However, the petitioners did not include
in their prayer that judgment be rendered against the third-party
defendants to refund theP90,000.00 paid by them to the Spouses
Gregorio. Worse, the court denied the petitioners motion. The
petitioners failed to assail the trial courts order of denial in
the appellate court. Even after the trial court had granted leave
to the Spouses Gregorio to intervene as parties-defendants and the
latter filed their Answer-in-Intervention, the petitioners failed
to file a cross-claim against the intervenors for specific
performance for the refund of theP90,000.00 they had received from
the petitioners under their deed of conditional sale, the deed of
final and absolute sale and the memorandum of agreement and pay
filing and docket fees therefor. Hence, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to render judgment in favor of the petitioners
ordering the intervenors to refund theP90,000.00 to them. In fine,
if the trial court had rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioners by ordering the enforcement of the deeds executed by
the parties and directing the intervenors to refund theP90,000.00
paid by the petitioners for the house on the subject property, the
courta quowould have acted beyond its authority.We agree that the
intervenors admitted their liability for the payment ofP90,000.00
in their Answer to the Third-Party Complaint of the petitioners.
However, the said answer was of no legal consequence because the
court denied the motion of the petitioners for leave to file a
third-party complaint against the intervenors. Moreover, the
intervenors, it appears, were inveigled by the petitioners to
engage their lawyer, Atty. Laserna, Jr. as their counsel as
intervenors, which the trial court rejected.The petitioners did not
raise in their pleadings the issue of their entitlement to the said
refund.33The only issues raised by the petitioners in their
Pre-Trial Brief are the following:1. Who owns the house constructed
in 1973 by the Sps. Gregorio using their own funds and at their own
expense at 2063 Bagong Sikat St., Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro
Manila?2. Who owns the parcel of lot located at 2063 Bagong Sikat
St., Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila?3. Who has the right of
possession of the house and/or lot mentioned above, or both?4. May
the plaintiff legally demand the defendants to vacate the lot in
question and demolish the subject house at the latters expense?5.
Was there gross bad faith and value on the part of the defendants
in refusing to vacate the lot in question and to demolish the
subject house?34On the other hand, the reliefs prayed for by the
petitioners are as follows:X.Reiteration of the Defendants
Prayer:In consideration of the foregoing, defendants respectfully
pray for them:1. Dismissal of the Complaint for lack of merit2.
Awarding in favor of the defendants moral damages for the undue
harassment and loss of reputation continuously experienced by the
defendants as well as the mental anguish suffered by the defendants
because of the acts of the plaintiffs.3. Order plaintiffs to pay
costs of suit.35The petitioners did not include in their Pre-Trial
Brief a prayer for the refund of the amount ofP90,000.00 to be made
by the intervenors.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,the petition
isDENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.SECOND
DIVISIONG.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004ARNEL
ESCOBAL,petitioner,vsHON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice
of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive
Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch
21, Luz N. Nueca,respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is
a petition forcertiorariwith a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by
Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand by the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records of Criminal
Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City,
Branch 21.The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:The
petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine
National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting
surveillance operations on drug trafficking at theSa Harong Caf Bar
and Restaurantlocated along Barlin St., Naga City. He somehow got
involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one
Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information
was filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain
Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias "Jun Bombita" with murder. The
accusatory portion of the amended Information reads:That on or
about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court by virtue of the
Presidential Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each
other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel
Escobal armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney
Nueca thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal wounds
which caused his death,and as a consequence thereof, complainant
LUZ N. NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, and moral and exemplary damages in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency.1On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively
suspending the petitioner from the service under Presidential
Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the
said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on October
6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending the
petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.2The
petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC,
while accused Bombita remained at large. The petitioner posted bail
and was granted temporary liberty.When arraigned on April 9,
1991,3the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash4the Information alleging that as
mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408,5in relation to Section 1,
Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the
court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving PNP members and officers.Pending the resolution of the
motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of the
PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his
suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the
same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23, 1993,6the PNP
Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting
information on whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners
suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994, the
petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order
of suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive
suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied
the motion on March 9, 1994.7Trial thereafter proceeded, and the
prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the
presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion
to Dismiss8the case. Citing Republic of thePhilippines v. Asuncion,
et al.,9he argued that since he committed the crime in the
performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive
jurisdiction over the case.On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an
Order10denying the motion to dismiss. It, however, ordered the
conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the
crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his
office as a member of the PNP.In the preliminary hearing, the
prosecution manifested that it was no longer presenting any
evidence in connection with the petitioners motion. It reasoned
that it had already rested its case, and that its evidence showed
that the petitioner did not commit the offense charged in
connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the
Philippine Constabulary. According to the prosecution, they were
able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was not
wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the offense was
committed just after midnight; (c) the petitioner was drunk when
the crime was committed; (d) the petitioner was in the company of
civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse called
"Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant."11For his part, the petitioner
testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he was at
theSa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurantat Barlin St., Naga City, to
conduct surveillance on alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to
Mission Order No. 03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R.
Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of
Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his testimony
that he was on a surveillance mission on the aforestated date.12On
July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the
petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the performance
of his official function. The trial court added that upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13the issue had become moot and
academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the
offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the
petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in
or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless
ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the
ruling in Republic v. Asuncion14and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment
consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the
offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the
performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his
office.lawphi1.ntThe petitioner filed a motion for the
reconsideration15of the said order, reiterating that based on his
testimony and those of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the
offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official
functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to consider the
exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975,
which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied
retroactively.16The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario
Nueca, the mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and
unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission when
the crime was committed.On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte
face and issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31,
1995 Order. It declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he
was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded
that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence
thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her
complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official
mission when the shooting happened.The RTC ordered the public
prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the
offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance
of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and,
conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as
well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is
hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby declared that
after preliminary hearing, this Court has found that the offense
charged in the Information herein was committed by the accusedin
his relation to his function and duty as member of the then
Philippine Constabulary.Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R.
No. 180208, March 11, 1994:(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby
ordered to file a Re-Amended Information alleging that the offense
charged was committed by the Accused in the performance of his
duties/functions or in relation to his office, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt hereof;(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended
Information, the complete records of this case, together with the
transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the entire
proceedings herein, are hereby ordered transmitted immediately to
the Honorable Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila,
for appropriate proceedings.17On January 8, 1996, the Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court
IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of
Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City,
Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A.
No. 7975,18the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering
that the petitioner had a salary grade of "23." Furthermore, the
prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had
commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on
continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with
the case and render judgment therein after trial.Upon the remand of
the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for the
petitioner to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing
his evidence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,
assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
remanding the records of the case to the RTC.The threshold issue
for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the
case to the RTC.The petitioner contends that when the amended
information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No.
1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him
as he was charged with homicide with the imposable penalty of
reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed while in the
performance of his duties. He further asserts that although P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides
that crimes committed by members and officers of the PNP with a
salary grade below "27" committed in relation to office are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment thus
introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively.
This is so, the petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A.
No. 7975, only those cases where trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of the law should be referred to
the proper trial court.The private complainant agrees with the
contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the
remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should
be applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the crime committed by the petitioner when the
amended information was filed with the RTC, by the time it resolved
petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 had
already taken effect. Thus, the law should be given retroactive
effect.The Ruling of the CourtThe respondent Presiding Justice
acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he
ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.The
jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the
allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in
effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such
statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. The
jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the
Information.19Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the
inception of the case continues until the case is
terminated.20Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D.
No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
involving the following:(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code;(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional
or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine ofP6,000.00
.21However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction
under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in
relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing
the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the
discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It
is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office
because that would be a conclusion of law.22The amended Information
filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any
allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the
discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the
offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the
re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation
that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The
trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to
the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending
P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the
law:In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.Under the law, even if the offender committed the
crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional
Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the
petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23."
He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal.
Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged
conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.The petitioners contention
that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal
basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive
procedural law which may be applied retroactively.23IN LIGHT OF ALL
THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez,
and Tinga, JJ.,concur.
EN BANCG.R. No. 155001 May 5, 2003DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR.,
JOSEPH B. CATAHAN, JOSE MARI B. REUNILLA, MANUEL ANTONIO B. BOE,
MAMERTO S. CLARA, REUEL E. DIMALANTA, MORY V. DOMALAON, CONRADO G.
DIMAANO, LOLITA R. HIZON, REMEDIOS P. ADOLFO, BIENVENIDO C.
HILARIO, MIASCOR WORKERS UNION - NATIONAL LABOR UNION (MWU-NLU),
and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(PALEA),petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO.,
INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA,
in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and
Communications,respondents,MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION,
DNATA-WINGS AVIATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, MACROASIA-EUREST
SERVICES, INC., MACROASIA-MENZIES AIRPORT SERVICES CORPORATION,
MIASCOR CATERING SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
CORPORATION, and MIASCOR LOGISTICS
CORPORATION,petitioners-in-intervention,x---------------------------------------------------------xG.R.
No. 155547 May 5, 2003SALACNIB F. BATERINA, CLAVEL A. MARTINEZ and
CONSTANTINO G. JARAULA,petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR
TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his
capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, and SECRETARY SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, in his capacity
as Head of the Department of Public Works and
Highways,respondents,JACINTO V. PARAS, RAFAEL P. NANTES, EDUARDO C.
ZIALCITA, WILLY BUYSON VILLARAMA, PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, PROSPERO A.
PICHAY, JR., HARLIN CAST ABAYON, and BENASING O.
MACARANBON,respondents-intervenors,x---------------------------------------------------------xG.R.
No. 155661 May 5, 2003CEFERINO C. LOPEZ, RAMON M. SALES, ALFREDO B.
VALENCIA, MA. TERESA V. GAERLAN, LEONARDO DE LA ROSA, DINA C. DE
LEON, VIRGIE CATAMIN RONALD SCHLOBOM, ANGELITO SANTOS, MA. LUISA M.
PALCON and SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PALIPARAN NG PILIPINAS
(SMPP),petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO.,
INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in
his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and
Communications,respondents.PUNO,J.:Petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention filed the instant petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to
prohibit the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and its
Secretary from implementing the following agreements executed by
the Philippine Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and the
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO): (1) the
Concession Agreement signed on July 12, 1997, (2) the Amended and
Restated Concession Agreement dated November 26, 1999, (3) the
First Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement
dated August 27, 1999, (4) the Second Supplement to the Amended and
Restated Concession Agreement dated September 4, 2000, and (5) the
Third Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement
dated June 22, 2001 (collectively, the PIATCO Contracts).The facts
are as follows:In August 1989, the DOTC engaged the services of
Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the
present airport can cope with the traffic development up to the
year 2010. The study consisted of two parts: first, traffic
forecasts, capacity of existing facilities, NAIA future
requirements, proposed master plans and development plans; and
second, presentation of the preliminary design of the passenger
terminal building. The ADP submitted a Draft Final Report to the
DOTC in December 1989.Some time in 1993, six business leaders
consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio
Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then President Fidel
V. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the
construction and operation of a new international airport terminal.
To signify their commitment to pursue the project, they formed the
Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) which was registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 15, 1993.On
October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a
build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as
amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).1On December 2, 1994, the DOTC issued
Dept. Order No. 94-832 constituting the Prequalification Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III
project.On March 27, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia endorsed
the proposal of AEDC to the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA). A revised proposal, however, was forwarded by the
DOTC to NEDA on December 13, 1995. On January 5, 1996, the NEDA
Investment Coordinating Council (NEDA ICC) Technical Board
favorably endorsed the project to the ICC Cabinet Committee which
approved the same, subject to certain conditions, on January 19,
1996. On February 13, 1996, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2
which approved the NAIA IPT III project.On June 7, 14, and 21,
1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of
an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC's
unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as
amended. The alternative bidders were required to submit three (3)
sealed envelopes on or before 5:00 p.m. of September 20, 1996. The
first envelope should contain the Prequalification Documents, the
second envelope the Technical Proposal, and the third envelope the
Financial Proposal of the proponent.On June 20, 1996, PBAC Bulletin
No. 1 was issued, postponing the availment of the Bid Documents and
the submission of the comparative bid proposals. Interested firms
were permitted to obtain the Request for Proposal Documents
beginning June 28, 1996, upon submission of a written application
and payment of a non-refundable fee of P50,000.00 (US$2,000).The
Bid Documents issued by the PBAC provided among others that the
proponent must have adequate capability to sustain the financing
requirement for the detailed engineering, design, construction,
operation, and maintenance phases of the project. The proponent
would be evaluated based on its ability to provide a minimum amount
of equity to the project, and its capacity to secure external
financing for the project.On July 23, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC
Bulletin No. 2 inviting all bidders to a pre-bid conference on July
29, 1996.On August 16, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3
amending the Bid Documents. The following amendments were made on
the Bid Documents:a. Aside from the fixed Annual Guaranteed
Payment, the proponent shall include in its financial proposal an
additional percentage of gross revenue share of the Government, as
follows:i. First 5 years5.0%
ii. Next 10 years7.5%
iii. Next 10 years10.0%
b. The amount of the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment shall be
subject of the price challenge. Proponent may offer an Annual
Guaranteed Payment which need not be of equal amount, but payment
of which shall start upon site possession.c. The project proponent
must have adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement
for the detailed engineering, design, construction, and/or
operation and maintenance phases of the project as the case may be.
For purposes of pre-qualification, this capability shall be
measured in terms of:i. Proof of the availability of the project
proponent and/or the consortium to provide the minimum amount of
equity for the project; andii. a letter testimonial from reputable
banks attesting that the project proponent and/or the members of
the consortium are banking with them, that the project proponent
and/or the members are of good financial standing, and have
adequate resources.d. The basis for the prequalification shall be
the proponent's compliance with the minimum technical and financial
requirements provided in the Bid Documents and the IRR of the BOT
Law. The minimum amount of equity shall be 30% of the Project
Cost.e. Amendments to the draft Concession Agreement shall be
issued from time to time. Said amendments shall only cover items
that would not materially affect the preparation of the proponent's
proposal.On August 29, 1996, the Second Pre-Bid Conference was held
where certain clarifications were made. Upon the request of
prospective bidder People's Air Cargo & Warehousing Co., Inc
(Paircargo), the PBAC warranted that based on Sec. 11.6, Rule 11 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law, only the
proposed Annual Guaranteed Payment submitted by the challengers
would be revealed to AEDC, and that the challengers' technical and
financial proposals would remain confidential. The PBAC also
clarified that the list of revenue sources contained in Annex 4.2a
of the Bid Documents was merely indicative and that other revenue
sources may be included by the proponent, subject to approval by
DOTC/MIAA. Furthermore, the PBAC clarified that only those fees and
charges denominated as Public Utility Fees would be subject to
regulation, and those charges which would be actually deemed Public
Utility Fees could still be revised, depending on the outcome of
PBAC's query on the matter with the Department of Justice.In
September 1996, the PBAC issued Bid Bulletin No. 5, entitled
"Answers to the Queries of PAIRCARGO as Per Letter Dated September
3 and 10, 1996." Paircargo's queries and the PBAC's responses were
as follows:1. It is difficult for Paircargo and Associates to meet
the required minimum equity requirement as prescribed in Section
8.3.4 of the Bid Documents considering that the capitalization of
each member company is so structured to meet the requirements and
needs of their current respective business undertaking/activities.
In order to comply with this equity requirement, Paircargo is
requesting PBAC to just allow each member of (sic) corporation of
the Joint Venture to just execute an agreement that embodies a
commitment to infuse the required capital in case the project is
awarded to the Joint Venture instead of increasing each
corporation's current authorized capital stock just for
prequalification purposes.In prequalification, the agency is
interested in one's financial capability at the time of
prequalification, not future or potential capability.A commitment
to put up equity once awarded the project is not enough to
establish that "present" financial capability. However, total
financial capability of all member companies of the Consortium, to
be established by submitting the respective companies' audited
financial statements, shall be acceptable.2. At present, Paircargo
is negotiating with banks and other institutions for the extension
of a Performance Security to the joint venture in the event that
the Concessions Agreement (sic) is awarded to them. However,
Paircargo is being required to submit a copy of the draft
concession as one of the documentary requirements. Therefore,
Paircargo is requesting that they'd (sic) be furnished copy of the
approved negotiated agreement between the PBAC and the AEDC at the
soonest possible time.A copy of the draft Concession Agreement is
included in the Bid Documents. Any material changes would be made
known to prospective challengers through bid bulletins. However, a
final version will be issued before the award of contract.The PBAC
also stated that it would require AEDC to sign Supplement C of the
Bid Documents (Acceptance of Criteria and Waiver of Rights to
Enjoin Project) and to submit the same with the required Bid
Security.On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People's
Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and
Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security
Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their
competitive proposal to the PBAC. On September 23, 1996, the PBAC
opened the first envelope containing the prequalification documents
of the Pa