33
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS,Petitioner,
vs.ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of
Pampanga,Respondent.E. M. Banzali for petitioner.Acting Provincial
Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcelo
L. Mallari for respondentTUASON,J.:The petitioner herein, an
accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for
trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the
justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in
order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and
her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength
of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The
motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
proceeding.According to the memorandum submitted by the
petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of
his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the
preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of
the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded
guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty.
"Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence
so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined
in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private
prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence,"
and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of
first instance.Leaving aside the question whether the accused,
after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of
that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial,
is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did
not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for the
purpose set out therein. InDequito and Saling Buhay vs.Arellano,
G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent
justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's
objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the
preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we
sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11
of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of
the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108
defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting
the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course
of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."But we made
it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel
the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they
had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the
order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the
constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor
will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of
his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary
investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to
a fair trial.The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided
court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied even
any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge
holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and
his witnesses to testify anew.Upon the foregoing considerations,
the present petition is dismissed with costs against the
petitioner.Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ.,
concur.Separate OpinionsFERIA,J.,dissentingI am sorry to dissent
from the decision.The petitioner in the present case appeared at
the preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace of
Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal
charges against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty,
pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for the petitioner moved that
the complainant present her evidence so that her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by
law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to
petitioner's motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to
present his evidence, and the case was forwarded to the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga.The counsel for the accused petitioner
filed a motion with the Court of First Instance praying that the
record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace of
Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony.
The motion was denied, and for that reason the present special
civil action ofmandamuswas instituted.It is evident that the
refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his evidence during
the investigation in the justice of the peace, was not a waiver of
his alleged right to be confronted with and cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution, that is, of the preliminary
investigation provided for in General Order No. 58 and Act No. 194,
to which he claims to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as
soon as the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance,
counsel for the petitioner filed a motion with said court to remand
the case to the Justice of the Peace of Masantol ordering the
latter to make said preliminary investigation. His motion having
been denied, the petitioner has filed the present action in which
he squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11,
Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be
confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII,
of the Constitution. In the case ofDequito and Saling
Buhayvs.Arellano, No. L-1336, we did not discuss and decide the
question of validity or constitutionality of said section 11 in
connection with section 1 of Rule 108, because that question was
not raised therein, and we merely construed the provisions on
preliminary investigation or Rule 108. In said case the writer of
this dissenting opinion said:It may not be amiss to state that,
modesty aside, the writer of this dissenting opinion, then a
practising attorney, was the one who prepared the draft of the
Rules of Court relating to criminal procedure, and the provisions
on preliminary investigation in the draft were the same as those of
the old law, which gave the defendant the right to be confronted
with and to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. But
the Supreme Court approved and adoptedin totothe draft, except the
part referring to preliminary investigation which it modified, by
suppressing said right and enacting, in its stead, the provisions
of section 11 of Rule 108 in its present form. I prefer the old to
the new procedure. But I can not subscribe to the majority
decision, which is a judicial legislation and makes the exercise of
the right of a defendant to be confronted, with and cross-examine
the witnesses against him, to depend entirely upon the whim or
caprice of a judge or officer conducting the preliminary
investigation.But now the question of the validity of said section
11, Rule 108, is squarely presented to this Court for decision, we
have perforce to pass upon it.Section 13, Article VIII, of the
Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall have power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, but said rules shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights." The constitution added the last part of the
above-quoted constitutional precept in order to emphasize that the
Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not enact or
promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules
which diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are
substantive and not adjective laws or rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. It does not require an elaborate arguments
to show that the right granted by law upon a defendant to be
confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecuted
in preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is
a substantive right. It is based on human experience, according to
which a person is not prone to tell a lie against another in his
presence, knowing fully well that the latter may easily contradict
him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of his
testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is
substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may
show, even if he has no evidence in his favor, that the testimonies
of the witnesses for the prosecution are not sufficient to indicate
that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and he
is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is entitled to be
released and not committed to prison, and thus avoid an open and
public accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a
public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering
which a criminal prosecution always entails.This right is not a
constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an accused
outside of the City of Manila because of the usual delay in the
final disposition of criminal cases in provinces. The law does not
grant such right to a person charged with offenses triable by the
Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of the
promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are
tried and disposed of in the Court of First Instance of said city.
But this right, though not a constitutional one, can not be
modified, abridged, or diminished by the Supreme Court, by virtue
of the rule making power conferred upon this Court by the
Constitution.Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as
construed by this Court in several cases, (in which the question of
constitutionality or validity of said section had not been squarely
raised) do away with the defendant's right under discussion, it
follows that said section 11 diminishes the substantive right of
the defendant in criminal case, and this Court has no power or
authority to promulgate it and therefore is null and void. The fact
that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited case
ofDequitoand Saling Buhayvs.Arellano, that the inferior or justice
of the peace courts have discretion to grant a defendant's request
to have the witnesses for the prosecution recalled to testify again
in the presence of the defendant and be cross-examined by the
latter, does not validate said provision; because to make the
exercise of an absolute right discretionary or dependent upon the
will or discretion of the court or officer making the preliminary
investigation, is evidently to diminish or modify it.Petition is
therefore granted.PERFECTO,J.,dissentingIn our concurring and
dissenting opinion in the case ofDequito and Saling Buhay
vs.Arellano, No. L-1336, we said:In our opinion, section 11 of Rule
108 must be read, interpreted, and applied in a way that will not
contravene the constitutional provision guaranteeing to all accused
the right "to meet the witnesses face to face." (Section 1 [17],
Article III.)chanrobles virtual law libraryConsequently, at the
preliminary hearing contemplated by said reglementary section, the
defendant is entitled as a matter of fundamental right to her the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and to cross-examine
them.Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot
finally be convicted, he is liable to endure the ordeal eloquently
depicted in the decision, and the constitutional guarantee protects
defendants, not only from the jeopardy of being finally convicted
and punished, but also from the physical, mental and moral
sufferings that may unjustly be visited upon him in any one of the
stages of the criminal process instituted against him. He must be
afforded the opportunities to have the charges against him quashed,
not only at the final hearing, but also at the preliminary
investigation, if by confronting the witnesses for the prosecution
he can convince the court that the charges are groundless. There is
no justice in compelling him to undergo the troubles of a final
hearing if at the preliminary hearing the case can be terminated in
his favor. Otherwise, the preliminary investigation or hearing will
be an empty gesture that should not have a place within the
framework of dignified and solemn judicial proceedings.On the
strength of the above quoted opinion the opinion should be granted
and so we vote.Petition dismissed.R E S O L U T I O NMarch 8, 1949
TUASON,J.: This cause is now before us on a motion for
reconsideration.In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said,
citingDequito and Saling Buhayvs.Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336: "The
constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor
will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of
his right to confront witness. As a matter of fact, preliminary
investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to
a fair trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose
the constitutional question pleaded in the application
forcertiorari. Heeding the wishes of the petitioner, we shall
enlarge upon the subject.It is contended that section 11 of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court1infringes section 13, Article VIII, of
the Constitution.2It is said that the rule in question deals with
substantive matters and impairs substantive rights. We can not
agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule
108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a
substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates
substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to
be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights,
or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause
of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for
their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)As applied to
criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are
crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as
distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates
the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. (22
C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and
essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal
prosecution.As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also
procedural. Evidence - which is the "the mode and manner of proving
the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" - is
identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private
law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal
law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to
pleading, evidence and practice. (Statevs. Capaci, 154 So., 419;
179 La., 462.) the entire rules of evidence have been incorporated
into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down section 11 of Rule
108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code
of evidence embodied in these Rules. In Beazellvs. Ohio, 269 U. S.,
167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States Supreme Court
said:Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to
the effect that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed
by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure.SeeCaldervs.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummingsvs. Missouri, 4
Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kringvs. Missouri, 107 U. S.
221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Ct. Rep., 443. And there
may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a
defense available under the laws in force at the time of the
commission of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a
harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional
prohibition. Kringvs. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2
Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompsonvs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 42 L. ed.,
1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But it is not well settled that
statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence,
which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate
only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are
not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the
class of persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the
disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not anex post
factolaw. Hoptvs. Utah, 110 U. S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the
rules of evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible
against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible,
Thompsonvs. Missouri, 171 U. S., 380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 922; or which changes the place of trial, Gut.vs. Minnesota,
9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which abolishes a court for hearing
criminal appeals, creating a new one in its stead.SeeDuncanvs.
Missouri, 152 U. S., 377, 382, 38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 sup. Ct.
Rep., 570.Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the
curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary
investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given evidence
for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the
constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the beginning,
preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process
of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done,
mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can
not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibitionWhile
section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to
cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right
to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional
right to be informed of the charges against him both at such
investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of
the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process
comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The
degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused
may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently
waived.The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is
incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a
question of degree. (Dextervs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazellvs.
Ohio,supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case
beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass
without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected,
as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition.
(Statevs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable
that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive
rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to
expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and
arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in
a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the
Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules
of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's approval.
This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general,
complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and
different rules without regard to their source and discarding old
ones.The motion is denied.Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon,
Briones, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.FERIA,J.,dissenting:I
dissent.The motion for reconsideration must be grantedAccording to
the resolution, the right of a defendant to be confronted with and
cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution in a preliminary
investigation granted by law or provided for in General Orders, No.
58, as amended, in force prior to the promulgation of the Rules of
Court, is not a substantive right but a mere matter of procedure,
and therefore this Court can suppress it in section 11, Rule 108,
of the Rules of Court, for the following reasons:First. Because
"preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial;
it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution." . . . "As a
rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural." . . .
"The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules
of Court." And therefore "we can not tear down section 11 of Rule
108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole Code
of evidence embodied in these rules."Secondly. Because,
"preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process
of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done,
mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can
not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition."Lastly.
Because, "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is
incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a
question of degree" . . . It is difficult to draw a line in any
particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy and
procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of
parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by
general condition. . . . "This being so, it is inevitable that the
Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights,
and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect
such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and
arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in
a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage."Before
proceeding it is necessary to distinguish substantive law from
procedure, for the distinction is not always well understood.
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines, and
regulates rights as opposed to objective or procedural law which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights. What constitutes
practice and procedure in the law is the mode or proceeding by
which a legal right is enforced, "that which regulates the formal
steps in an action or judicial proceedings; the course of procedure
in courts; the form, manner and order in which proceedings have
been, and are accustomed to be had; the form, manner and order of
carrying on and conducting suits or prosecutions in the courts
through their various sages according to the principles of law and
the rules laid down by the respective courts." 31 Cyc. Law and
Procedure, p. 1153;id., 32, section 405; Rapalje & Lawrence's
Law Dictionary; Anderson Law Dictionary; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary.Substantive rights may be created or granted either in
the Constitution or in any branch of the law, civil, criminal,
administrative or procedural law. In our old Code of Civil
Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, there are provisions which
create, define and regulate substantive rights, and many of those
provisions such as those relating to guardianship, adoption,
evidence and many others are incorporated in the Rules of Court for
the sake of convenience and not because this Court is empowered to
promulgate them as rules of court. And our old law of Criminal
Procedure General Orders No. 58 grants the offended party the right
to commence a criminal action or file a complaint against the
offender and to intervene in the criminal prosecution against him,
and grants the defendant in the Court of First Instance (except in
the City of Manila) the right to bail, and to a preliminary
investigation including his rights during said investigation, and
the rights at the trial, which are now reproduced or incorporated
in Rules 106, 108, 110, and 111 of the Rules of Court, except the
rights now in question. And all these, and others not necessary for
us to mention, are obviously substantive rights.(1) As to the first
argument, the premise "the preliminary investigation is eminently
and essentially remedial is not correct. Undoubtedly the majority
means to say procedural, in line with the conclusion in the
resolution, because remedial law is one thing, and procedural law
is another. Obviously they are different branches of the law.
"Remedial statute" is "a statute providing a remedy for an injury
as distinguished from a penal statute. A statute giving a party a
mode of remedy for a wrong where he had none or a different one
before. . . . Remedial statutes are those which are made to supply
such defects, and abridge such superfluities in the common law, as
arise either from the general imperfections of all human law, from
change of time and circumstances, from the mistakes and unadvised
determination of unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from any
other cause whatsoever." (Black's Law Dictionary, third edition,
pp. 1525, 1526.)It is also not correct to affirm that section 11 of
Rule 108 relating to right of defendant after arrest "is a rule of
evidence and therefore is also procedural." In the first place, the
provisions of said section to the effect that "the defendant, after
the arrest and his delivery to the court has the right to be
informed of the complaint or information filed against him, and
also to be informed of the testimony and evidence presented against
him, and may be allowed to testify and present witnesses or
evidence for him if he so desires," are not rules of evidence; and
in the second place, it is evident that most of the rules of
evidence, if not all, are substantive laws that define, create or
regulate rights, and not procedural. "Rules of evidence are
substantive rights found in common law chiefly and growing out of
reasoning, experience and common sense of lawyers and courts."
(Statevs. Pavelich, et al., 279 P., 1102.) "It is true that
weighing of evidence and the rules of practice with respect thereto
form part of the law of procedure, but the classification of proofs
is sometime determined by the substantive law." (U. S.vs. Genato,
15 Phil., 170, 176.) How can the law on judicial notice, conclusive
as well asjuris tantumpresumption, hearsay and best evidence rule,
parol evidence rule, interpretation of documents, competency of a
person to testify as a witness be considered procedural? Therefore,
the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear down section 11
of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the
whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules," is evidently
wrong, not only for the reason just stated, but because our
contention that the defendant can not be deprived of his right to
be confronted with and cross-examine the witness of the prosecution
is a preliminary investigation under consideration would not, if
upheld, necessarily tear down said section. Our theory, is that
said section 11 should be so construed as to be valid and
effective, that is, that if the defendant asks the court to recall
the witness or witnesses for the prosecution to testify again in
his presence, and to allow the former to cross-examine the latter,
the court or officer making the preliminary investigation is under
obligation to grant the request. But if the defendant does not so
ask the court, he should be considered as waiving his right to be
confronted with and cross-examine the witness against him.(2) With
respect to the second argument or reason, it is true that the
preliminary investigation as provided for in the General Orders,
No. 58, as amended, is not an essential part of due process of law,
because "due process of law" is not iron clad in its meaning; its
does not necessarily mean a particular procedure. Due process of
law simply requires a procedure that fully protects the life,
liberty and property. For that reason the investigation to be made
by the City Fiscal of the City of Manila under Act No. 612, now
section 2465 of the Administrative Code, before filing an
information, was considered by this Court as sufficient to satisfy
the due process of law constitutional requirement (U. S.vs. Ocampo,
18 Phil., 1; U. S.vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122). But it is
also true that we have already and correctly held that: "The law
having explicitly recognized and established that no person charged
with the commission of a crime shall be deprived of his liberty or
subjected to trial without prior preliminary investigation
(provided for in General orders, No. 58, as amended) that shall
show that there are reasonable grounds to believe him guilty, there
can be no doubt that the accused who is deprived of his liberty,
tried and sentenced without the proper preliminary investigation
having been made in his regard,isconvicted without the process of
law," (United Statesvs. Banzuela, 31 Phil., 564).The ruling in
Beazellvs. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, quoted in the
resolution, has no application to the present case, for the
question involved therein was the power of Congress to alter the
rules of evidence and procedure without violating the
constitutional precept that prohibits the passing ofex post facto
law, while the question herein involved is the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure,
which diminish thesubstantive rightof a defendant, expressly
prohibited by the same provision of the Constitution that confers
upon this Court the power to promulgate said rules.(3) The last
reason or argument premised on the conclusion that "the distinction
between remedy and 'substantive right' is incapable of exact
definition;" indeed "the difference is somewhat a question of
degree," (Dextervs. Edmonds, 89 F 487), is immaterial, because, as
we have already said in refuting the majority's first reason,
remedy and procedure are two completely different things.As above
defined, substantive law is clearly differentiated from procedural
law and practice. But even assumingarguendothat it is difficult to
draw the linein anyparticular casebeyond which the power of the
court over procedure can not pass without touching upon the
substantial right of the parties, what this Court should do in that
case would be to abstain from promulgating such rule of procedure
which many increase, diminish or modify substantive right in order
to avoid violating the constitutional prohibition above referred
to. Because as this Supreme Court is not empowered by the
Constitution to legislate on or abrogate substantive rights, but
only to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure which
"shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights," this
Court can not step on them in making the rules, and the
Constitution must be presumed not to tolerate nor expect such
incursion as would affect the substantive rights of the accused in
any manner.Besides, depriving an accused of his right to be
confronted and cross-examine the witness against him in a
preliminary investigation would affect the accused not in a limited
and unsubstantial but in a harsh and arbitrary manner. The
testimony of a witness given in the absence of the defendant and
without an opportunity on the part of the latter to cross-examine
him is a hearsay evidence, and it should not be admitted against
the defendant in a preliminary investigation that is granted to the
latter as a protection against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions (U. S.vs. Grant and Kennedy,supra). Otherwise, an
accused who is innocent and should not be arrested, or if arrested
should be released immediately a short time after his arrest after
the preliminary investigation, would have to be held for trial and
wait for a considerable period of time until the case is tried and
acquitted after trial by the Courts of First Instance in provinces
on account of the admission of such evidence in the preliminary
investigation, evidence not admissible at the trial.Therefore, the
motion for reconsideration is granted, and after the necessary
proceedings the decision of the majority reversed or modified in
accordance with my dissenting opinion.PERFECTO,J.:We dissent. Our
opinion in the Dequito case still stands. The motion for
reconsideration should be granted.Endnotes:TUASON, J.: 1Rights of
defendant after arrest. - After the arrest of the defendant and his
delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the complaint or
information filed against him. He shall also be informed of the
substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and,
if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his
favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses
need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be
taken in writing and subscribed by him. 2The Supreme Court shall
have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
National Assembly shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.[G.R.
No. 129742.September 16, 1998]TERESITA G. FABIANpetitioner, vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS
F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and
NESTOR V. AGUSTINrespondents.D E C I S I O NREGALADO,J:Petitioner
has appealed to us bycertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18,
1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for
reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from
administrative charges forinter aliagrave misconduct committed by
him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH).IIt appears from the statement and
counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita
G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in
the construction business.Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was
the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he
allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively
charged in the Officein the office of the Ombudsman.Promat
participated in the bidding for government construction project
including those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly
taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner
into an amorous relationship.Their affair lasted for some time, in
the course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public
works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the
same in his office.Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents
developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to
terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats.She eventually filed the
aforementioned administrative case against him in a
letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.The said complaint sought the
dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19,
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an
ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension.For purposes of this
case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of
oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.On
January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a
resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct
and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits under the law.His resolution bore the approval of Director
Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant OmbudsmanAbelardo Aportadera of
their office.Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated
February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with
modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct
and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one
year.After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent
Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his
"classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself.The case
was transferredto respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrerowho,
in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the
February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated
private respondents from the administrative charges.IIIn the
present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)[1]pertinently provides that -In
all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
SupremeCourt by filing a petitionforcertiorariwithinten (10)days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsiderationin accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)However, she
points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order
No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),[2]when
a respondent is absolved of the charges in an
administrativeproceedingdecision of the ombudsman is final and
unappealable.She accordingly submits that theoffice of the
ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner
provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by
Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power ofreview of this
Court.Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of
Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an
alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because
of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals underRule 45
of the Rules of Court.Respondents filed their respective comments
and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the
Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of
procedure.Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can
"(p)romulgateits rules of procedure and exercise such other powers
or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law."Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional
mandate with these relevant provisions:Sec.14.Restrictions.- x x x
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against
the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court
on pure question on law.x x xSec. 18.Rules of Procedure.-(1) The
Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of procedure
for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions,
and duties.x x xSec. 23.Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative
investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in
accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with the due
process.x x xx x xSec. 27.EffectivityandFinality of Decisions.-All
provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately
effective and executory.A motion for reconsideration of any order,
directive or decisionof the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
withinfive (5) days after receipt of written notice shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:x x xFindings of
fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantialevidenceare conclusive.Any order, directive or
decisionimposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and
unappealable.In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filingapetition
forcertiorariwithin ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
forreconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.The above rules may be amendedor modified by the Office of
the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.Respondents
consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and
statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the
rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman
governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including those with
respect to the availabity or non-avalability of appeal in
administrative cases. Such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No.07.Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's
proposition that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by
categorizing the same as "an appeal bycertiorariunder Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement
which in effect asks that, should the remedy underRule 45 be
unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an
original action forcertiorariunder Rule 65.The parties thereafter
engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for
review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 and a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65.Ultimately, they also attempt to reviewand
rationalize thedecision of this Court applyingSection 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 vis--vis Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07.As correctly pointed out by public
respondents, Ocampo IV vs.Ombudsman, et al.[3]andYoung vs. Office
of the Ombudsman, et al.[4]were original actions forcertiorariunder
Rule 65.Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.[5]was commenced
bya petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45.Then came Cruz,
Jr. vs. People, et al.,[6]Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et
al.,[7]Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[8]and Jao, et al. vs.
Vasquez,[9]which were forcertiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus
under Rule 65.Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al.[10]was initiated by a
pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition
forCertiorariand/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary
remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto, et al.[11]which was a special civil action
forcertiorari.Considering, however the view that this Court now
takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which will shortly
be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the
controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and
propriety of application of the writ ofcertiorariwhen used as a
mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and
whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or
alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto appear to
be.Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabutsand Alba
could bear reexamination and clarification.Hence, we will merely
observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal
bycertiorariunder Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative diciplinary action.It cannot be taken into account
where an original action forcertiorariunder Rule 65 is resorted to
as a remedy for judicial review, such asfrom an incident in a
criminal action.IIIAfter respondents' separate comments had been
filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does appear to
have been seriously considered before, that the
administrativeliability of a public official could fall under the
jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of
the Ombudsman.Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private
respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770
and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807.Yet, pursuant to the
amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No.
7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in
administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court
of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of
the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.It could thus be
possible that in the same administrative case involving two
respondents, the proceedings against one could eventually have been
elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found
its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to
this Court.Yet systematic and efficient case management would
dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals,
both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting
decisions.Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed
increasing the appellate indiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that
Republic Act No. 6770, with its challengedSection 27, took effect
on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional
grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did
so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall
explain.Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of
the judiciary and other departments of the government and the
judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts arenot at
liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance
evasions thereof.When it is clear that a statute trangresses the
authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the
courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute,
governs in a case before them for judgement.[12]Thus, while courts
will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are
not raised in the pleadings,[13]the rule has been recognized to
admit of certain exceptions.It does not preclude a court from
inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a
judgement that it lacks jurisdiction to enter.If a statuteon which
a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional,
the court has no jurisdiction in theproceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily
follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the
statute.[14]Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and
orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellatecourt is
involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the
court's own motion.[15]The Courtex mero motumay take cognizance of
lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where the fact is
developed.[16]The court has a clearly recognized right to determine
its own jurisdictionin any proceeding.[17]The foregoing authorities
notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should
be further heard on this constitutional question.Correspondingly,
the following resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material
parts stating as follows:The Court observes that the present
petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "anappeal
bycertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the 'Joint
Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No.
0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V.
Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,'
which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave
misconduct, among other."It is further averred therein that the
present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the
Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7
whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding.It will be
recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with
Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative
diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.The Court notes, however, that neither the
petition nor the two comments thereon took into account or
discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No.
8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advise and consent."The Court also invites
the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling inFirst Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals , et al. (G.R. No. 110571,
October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions ofits former
Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the
1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.In view of the fact
that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and
involved and in this case, and the foregoing legal consideration
appear to impugn the constitutionalityand validity of the grant of
said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary
that the parties beheard thereon and the issue be first resolved
before conducting further proceedings in this appellate
review.ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to
Submit their position and arguments on the matter subject of this
resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings within ten (10)
days from notice hereof.IVThe records do not show that the Office
of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement, hence
the Court dispenses with any submission it should have presented.On
the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision
in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal
bycertiorarito this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of
the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution.She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of
law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as
provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction
includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved."Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution
authorizes this Courtto review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal orcertiorarithe aforesaid final judgement or orders "as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does
not increase this Court may provide," said section 27does not
increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing
that the mode of appeal shall be by petition forcertiorariunder
Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law
of which this Court already has of which this Court already has
jurisdiction.We are not impressed by this discourse.It overlooks
the fact that by jurisprudential developments over the years, this
Court has allowed appeals bycertiorariunder Rule 45in a substantial
number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are
directly involved and have to be resolved by the appellate
court.[18]Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies
that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein
is to be exercised over "final judgements and orders of lower
courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial
system.It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies,
hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or
resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that
effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency
and, for that matter, any special statutory court.No such provision
on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the
integrated judicial systembecause they are what are referred to and
already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by
privaterespondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure[19]preclude
appealsfrom quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court viaa
petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45.In the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal byCertiorarito the
Supreme Court," explicitly states:SECTION 1 .Filing of petition
with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal bycertiorarifrom
a judgement or final order or Resolution of theCourt of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review oncertiorari.The petition shall raise only
question of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Italics
ours).This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of
Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to
be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from
certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the
purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of
law.That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just
discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule
45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies.Under the present Rule 45, appeals may
be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only
from judgments and final orders of the courtsenumerated in Section
1 thereof.Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies[20]are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals
on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for
quasi-judicial agencies .[21]It is suggested, however, that the
provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary"
quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman
which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this
distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that
proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes
the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission,
although the latter is even an independent constitutional
commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a
constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.Regarding
the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of
fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable
feature.After all, factual controversies are usually involved in
administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from
the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier
of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same.On
the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45
since it now applies only to appeals from the regular
courts.Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review
therein is limited to jurisdictional questions.*The submission that
because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as
"acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction
contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous.The
jurisdiction of a court is not of acquiescence as a matter of fact
but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have
already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies
of some statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances
when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would
not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.Private
respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to
decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can be
decided on other grounds.As a general proposition that is
correct.Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of
judicial determination.Also, the constitutional question, at the
instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although
there was even no need for that because the Court can rule on the
mattersua spontewhen its appellate jurisdiction is involved.The
constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even
be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue
confronting the Court.Finally, the resolution of the constitutional
issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present
case.[22]It is, however, suggested that this case could also be
decided on other grounds, short of passing upon; the constitutional
question.We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but
regret that we must reject the same.That private respondent could
be absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is
final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of
the issues here.The prevailing rule that the Court should not
interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or
dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this administrative
case, as earlier explained.That two decisions rendered by this
Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7
of Rule III is precisely under review here because of some
statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the
decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to invoke the
same would be to beg the question.VTaking all the foregoing
circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore,
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize
anappealto this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases.It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against
a law which increases the Appellatejurisdiction of this Court.No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such
disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly
explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs.The Court of Appeals,
el al.[23]was intended to give this Court a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court[24]We perforce
have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in
First LepantoCeramicsand some statements in Yabut and Alba,not only
because of the difference in the factual settings, but also because
those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be
clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case.By way of
anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court
of competent jurisdiction.Furthermore in addition to our preceding
discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded
the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent,
private respondent's position paper correctly yields the
legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26,
1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No.
13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be
Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House
of Representatives.[25]The Senate was informed of the approval of
the final version of the Act on October 2, 1989[26]and the same was
thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17,
1989.Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that
the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from
the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the
provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution.It also
reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the
principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision
will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on
Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the
matter, thus:INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANIx x xThereafter, with
reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in
reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would
agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in laws
increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that
the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the
matter.He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review,
adding that they should be appeals oncertiorari.[27]There is no
showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was
ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent .[28]VIAs a
consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line
with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.There is an intimation in
the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate
jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be
disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially
if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of
substantive rights.Obviously, however, where the law is procedural
in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose
a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power
of this Court.This brings to fore the question of whether Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.It will be
noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or
statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this
Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive.In fact,
a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive
in another.[29]It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.[30]It is
not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic
approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and
jurisdictional system.In determining whether a rule prescribed by
the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower
courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
a disregard or infraction of them.[31]If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural.If the rule creates a right such
as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means o implementing an existing
right then the rule deals merely with procedure.[32]In the
situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a
review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which
shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction
thereover, relates to procedure only.[33]This is so because it is
not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by
the law.That right has been preserved.Only the procedure by which
the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed.The rationale
for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular
remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing
vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which
relate to the remedy.[34]Furthermore, it cannot be said that
transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this
case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power
of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate
courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power.Neither
can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because
the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to
administer that remedy.[35]Thus, it has been generally held that
rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to
another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they
are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into
effect[36]or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was
declared.Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdictionex
hypothesithe validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to
the Court of Appeals can be sustained.WHEREFORE, Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision
of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as
they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from
the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby
declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.The instant
petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals
for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the
Court of Appealspro hac viceas a petition for review under Rule 43,
without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such
amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or
records as it may deem necessary and proper.SO ORDERED.LU VS LU YM
Sr. GR No. 153690 & 157381, February 15,
2011RESOLUTIONNACHURA,J.:For resolution is the Motion for
Reconsideration[1]filed by petitioners John Lu Ym and Ludo &
LuYm Development Corporation (movants), praying that we reconsider
our Decision[2]dated August 26, 2008, where we disposed of the
three consolidated cases in this wise:WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 153690 and 157381
areDENIEDfor being moot and academic; while the petition in G.R.
No. 170889 isDISMISSEDfor lack of merit.Consequently, theStatus
QuoOrder datedJanuary 23, 2006is herebyLIFTED.The Court of Appeals
isDIRECTEDto proceed with CA-G.R. CV No. 81163 and to resolve the
same with dispatch.SO ORDERED.[3]In support of their motion, the
movants advance the following arguments:1. Private respondents are
guilty of fraud in avoiding payment of the correct docket fees by
not listing the real properties in their Complaint and Amended
Complaint despite their admission that the real properties are the
subject matter of the case and by their act of annotating notices
oflis pendenson the properties of Ludo Dev.2. The present action is
not an intra-corporate controversy and therefore the RTC, being a
special commercial court, has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case.3. The RTC has no jurisdiction to order the
dissolution of the Corporation.However, should this Honorable Court
decide that the foregoing grounds are not sufficient justification
to warrant a dismissal of SRC-021 CEB, petitioners ask that
theStatus QuoOrder of this Court be maintained during the appeal of
the case or that a Writ of Injunction be issued to stop the
immediate implementation of the March 1, 2004 decision based on the
following grounds:a) TheMarch 1, 2004decision of the RTC was null
and void for denying petitioners right to due process.b) The
Management Committee organized by the RTC in theMarch 1,
2004decision was unlawfully constituted.c) Supervening event has
made the management committeefunctus oficio.[4]To resolve the
motion judiciously, it is necessary to restate, albeit briefly, the
factual and procedural antecedents that gave rise to these
consolidated petitions.OnAugust 14, 2000, David Lu, Rosa Go,
Silvano Ludo and CL Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ofCebuCitya complaint against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., Paterno Lu
Ym, Jr., Victor Lu Ym, John Lu Ym, Kelly Lu Ym, and Ludo& Luym
Development Corporation (LLDC) forDeclaration of Nullity of Share
Issue, Receivership and Dissolution.The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-25502.The plaintiffs, shareholders of LLDC, claimed
that the Lu Ym father and sons, as members of the Board of
Directors, caused the issuance to the latter of 600,000 of the
corporations unsubscribed and unissued shares for less than their
actual value.They then prayed for the dissolution of the
corporation and the appointment of a receiver during the pendency
of the action.The defendants therein moved to dismiss the complaint
for non-compliance with the requirement of certification of
non-forum shopping, and for failure of the plaintiffs to exert
efforts towards a compromise.The trial court denied the motion and
placed LLDC under receivership.Defendants Lu Ym father and sons
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64154.However, the same was
dismissed for insufficient signatures on the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.Subsequently, they re-filed a
petition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64523.OnDecember 20,
2001, the CA granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the
complaint.Aggrieved, David Lu (David), et al., came to this Court
via G.R. No. 153690.Meanwhile, the Presiding Judge of Branch 6 of
the RTC of Cebu City, where the case was initially raffled,
inhibited himself on motion of the Lu Ym father and sons.The case
was re-raffled to Branch 11.The Presiding Judge of the latter
branch directed the parties to amend their respective pleadings in
order to conform to the requirements of Republic Act No. 8799, and
the case was re-docketed as SRC Case No. 021-CEB.The Lu Ym father
and sons then filed with the trial court a motion to lift the order
of receivership over LLDC.Before the matter could be heard, David
instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA
on the issue of the motion to lift order of receivership, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 73383.On February 27, 2003, the CA granted the
petition and ruled that the proceedings on the receivership could
not proceed without the parties amending their pleadings.The Lu Ym
father and sons thus filed a petition for review with this Court
(G.R. No. 157381).In the meantime, the Presiding Judge of Branch 11
also inhibited himself, and the case was transferred to Branch
12.OnMarch 31, 2003, the plaintiffs therein filed a Motion to Admit
Complaint to Conform to the Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies, which was admitted by the trial court.OnJanuary 23,
2004, the Lu Ym father and sons inquired from the Clerk of Court as
to the amount of docket fees paid by David, et al.John Lu Ym
further inquired from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
on the correctness of the amount paid by David, et al.The OCA
informed John Lu Ym that a query on the matter of docket fees
should be addressed to the trial court and not to the OCA.OnMarch
1, 2004, the RTC decided the case on the merits.It annulled the
issuance of LLDCs 600,000 shares of stock to the Lu Ym father and
sons.It also ordered the dissolution of LLDC and the liquidation of
its assets, and created a management committee to take over
LLDC.The Lu Ym father and sons appealed to the CA, where the case
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 81163.In view of the executory
nature of the decision of the trial court, as mandated in
theInterim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies,[5]the Lu Ym father and sons moved for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction which, however, was denied by
the CA.They filed a motion for reconsideration, wherein they
further questioned the sufficiency of the docket fees paid by
David, et al. in the RTC.OnDecember 8, 2005, the CA denied the
motion for reconsideration and stated that the matter should be
raised in the appellants brief to be threshed out in the
appeal.Hence, the Lu Ym father and sons filed with this Court a
special civil action forcertiorariand prohibition (G.R. No.
170889).OnAugust 26, 2008, this Court rendered judgment as
aforesaid.Lu Ym father and sons filed the instant Motion for
Reconsideration.We required David, et al., to submit their Comment
thereto.With our directive complied with, we now resolve the Motion
for Reconsideration.In ourAugust 26, 2008Decision, we declared that
the subject matter of the complaint filed by David, et al., was one
incapable of pecuniary estimation.Movants beg us to reconsider this
position, pointing out that the case filed below by David, et al.,
had for its objective the nullification of the issuance of 600,000
shares of stock of LLDC.The complaint itself contained the
allegation that the real value of these shares, based on underlying
real estate values, was One Billion Eighty Seven Million Fifty Five
Thousand One Hundred Five Pesos (P1,087,055,105).[6]Upon deeper
reflection, we find that the movants claim has merit.The 600,000
shares of stock were, indeed, properties in litigation.They were
the subject matter of the complaint, and the relief prayed for
entailed the nullification of the transfer thereof and their return
to LLDC.David, et al., are minority shareholders of the corporation
who claim to have been prejudiced by the sale of the shares of
stock to the Lu Ym father and sons.Thus, to the extent of the
damage or injury they allegedly have suffered from this sale of the
shares of stock, the action they filed can be characterized as one
capable of pecuniary estimation.The shares of stock have a definite
value, which was declared by plaintiffs themselves in their
complaint.Accordingly, the docket fees should have been computed
based on this amount.This is clear from the following version of
Rule 141, Section 7, which was in effect at the time the complaint
was filed:SEC. 7.Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. (a)For filing an
action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an
estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a
third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in
intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the
total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of
the property in litigation, is:We have earlier held that a court
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the
prescribed fees.[8]Hence, without payment of the correct docket
fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action
filed by David, et al.We also stated in our Decision that the
earlier rule inManchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals[9]has been relaxed.Subsequent decisions now uniformly hold
that when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the
plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government,
theManchesterrule does not apply.[10]Addressing this point, movants
argue that David, et al., were guilty of fraud in that, while they
did not mention any real property in their complaint, they were
able to obtain the annotation of notices oflis pendenson various
real properties of LLDC by alleging in their motion to conduct
special raffle that there was an imminent danger that properties
subject matter of this case might be disposed of.Moreover, David,
et al., prayed for, among others, the liquidation and distribution
of the assets of the corporation, so that they may receive their
share therein.Among the assets of the corporation are real
properties.Hence, the case was, in actuality, a real action that
had for its objective the recovery of real property.Fraud is a
generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity
can devise and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an
advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of
truth, and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and
any unfair way by which another is cheated.[11]Since fraud is a
state of mind, its presence can only be determined by examining the
attendant circumstances.[12]It is true, as we held in our Decision,
that David, et al., merely relied on the assessment made by the
Clerk of Court and cannot be faulted for their payment of
insufficient docket fees.However, movants now point out that when
David Lu moved for the annotation of notices oflis pendenson real
properties owned by LLDC, they in effect acknowledged that the case
they filed was a real action.A notice oflis pendensis governed by
Rule 13, Section 14 of the Rules of Court, which states:Sec.
14.Notice of lis pendens.In an action affecting the title or the
right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may
record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in
which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action.Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the
object of the action or defense, and a description of the property
in that province affected thereby.Only from the time of filing such
notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the
property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of
the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the
parties designated by their real names.The notice oflis
pendenshereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of
the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose
of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.[13]A
notice oflis pendensis an announcement to the whole world that a
particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning
that one who acquires interest over said property does so at his
own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over
the said property.The filing of a notice oflis pendenscharges all
strangers with notice of the particular litigation referred to
therein and, therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire over
the property is subject to the eventuality of the suit. Such
announcement is founded upon public policy and necessity, the
purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the
power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to
prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation.[14]As a general rule, the only instances in which a
notice oflis pendensmay be availed of are as follows: (a) an action
to recover possession of real estate; (b) an action for partition;
and (c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the title
to the land or the building thereon or the use or the occupation
thereof.Additionally, this Court has held that resorting tolis
pendensis not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to
or possession of real property.This annotation also applies to
suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or
interest in, a specific real property; orto enforce a lien, a
charge or an encumbrance against it.[15]From the foregoing, it is
clear that a notice oflis pendensis availed of mainly in real
actions.Hence, when David, et al., sought the annotation of notices
oflis pendenson the titles of LLDC, they acknowledged that the
complaint they had filed affected a title to or a right to
possession of real properties.At the very least, they must have
been fully aware that the docket fees would be based on the value
of the realties involved.Their silence or inaction to point this
out to the Clerk of Court who computed their docket fees,
therefore, becomes highly suspect, and thus, sufficient for this
Court to conclude that they have crossed beyond the threshold of
good faith and into the area of fraud.Clearly, there was an effort
to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket
fees.Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case.Anent the issue of estoppel, we earlier ruled that
the movants are barred from questioning the jurisdiction of the
trial court because of their participation in the proceedings
therein.In passing upon this issue, we takeheed from the
pronouncement of this Court in the recent caseVargas v.
Caminas:[16]The Court finds thatTijamis not applicable in the
present case.The general rule is that lack of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.InCalimlim
v.Ramirez, the Court statedthatTijamis anexceptionto the general
rule because of the presence oflaches:A rule that had been settled
by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to
cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of
the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent
or agreement of the parties.The lack of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
principally from the ruling in the cited case of[Tijam].It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied
to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein.The
exceptional circumstance involved in [Tijam] which justified the
departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection
to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine
had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in
[Tijam] not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that
the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or
byestoppel.InTijam, the lack of jurisdiction was raised for the
first time in a motion to dismiss filed almostfifteen (15)
yearsafter the questioned ruling had been rendered.Hence, the Court
ruled that the issue of jurisdiction may no longer be raised for
being barred by laches.The circumstances of the present case are
different fromTijam.Spouses Vargas raised the issue of jurisdiction
before the trial court rendered its decision.They continued to
raise the issue in their appeal before the Court of Appeals and
this Court.Hence, it cannot be said that laches has set in.The
exception inTijamfinds no application in this case and the general
rule must apply, that the question of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings.Spouses Vargas are
therefore not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
trial court.[17]The exhortations of this Court in the above-cited
case have constrained us to look more closely into the nature of
the participation of the movants in the proceedings, to determine
whether the exceptional principle of estoppel may be applied
against them.The records show that the very first pleading filed by
the Lu Ym father and sons before the courta quowas a motion to
dismiss, albeit anchored on the ground of insufficiency of the
certificate of non-forum shopping and failure of the plaintiffs to
exert efforts towards a compromise.When the trial court denied
this, they went up to the CA oncertiorari,where they were sustained
and the appellate court ordered the dismissal of the complaint
below.Next, the Lu Ym father and sons filed a motion for the
lifting of the receivership order, which the trial court had issued
in the interim.David, et al., brought the matter up to the CA even
before the trial court could resolve the motion.Thereafter, David,
et al., filed their Motion to Admit Complaint to Conform to the
Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies.It was at
this point that the Lu Ym father and sons raised the question of
the amount of filing fees paid.They raised this point again in the
CA when they appealed the trial courts decision in the case
below.We find that, in the circumstances, the Lu Ym father and sons
are not estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the trial
court.They raised the insufficiency of the docket fees before the
trial court rendered judgment and continuously maintained their
position even on appeal to the CA.Although the manner of challenge
was erroneous they should have addressed this issue directly to the
trial court instead of to the OCA they should not be deemed to have
waived their right to assail the jurisdiction of the trial
court.The matter of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court is one
that may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.More
importantly, this Court may pass upon this issuemotu proprio.Hence,
notwithstanding that the petition in G.R. No. 170889 is a special
civil action forcertiorariand prohibition assailing an
interlocutory resolution of the CA, we have the power to order the
dismissal of the complaint filed in the court of origin and render
all incidents herein moot and academic.With the foregoing findings,
there is no more need to discuss the other arguments raised in the
Motion for Reconsideration.In summary, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure of David, et.al. to
pay the correct docket fees.Consequently, all interlocutory matters
pending before this Court, specifically the incidents subject of
these three consolidated petitions, must be denied for being moot
and academic.With the dismissal of the main action, the ancillary
motions have no more leg to stand on.WHEREFORE,in view of the
foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by John Lu Ym and
Ludo & LuYm Development Corporation isGRANTED.The Decision of
this Court datedAugust 26, 2008isRECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.The
complaint inSRC Case No. 021-CEB, now on appeal with the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 81163, isDISMISSED.All interlocutory
matters challenged in these consolidated petitions areDENIEDfor
being moot and academic.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208976, October 13, 2014THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN,Petitioner,v.LEOVIGILDO DELOS REYES, JR.Respondent.R E S
O L U T I O NLEONEN,J.:This resolves the petition for review
oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Court of Appeals' decision1dated March 1, 2013, which set aside the
Office of the Ombudsman's decision and order in OMB-C-A-04-0309-G
finding respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr. guilty of grave
misconduct and gross neglect of duty,2and order dated August 29,
2013, which denied petitioner Office of the Ombudsman's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
To generate more funds in line with its mandate, the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) maintains On-line Lottery
Terminals in its main office and in provincial district offices.
The Marketing and On-line Division of PCSO's Central Operations
Department (COD) manages the terminals in the main office under
Agency Number 14-5005-1.3Respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr.
(Delos Reyes) served as the COD Division Chief.4
On June 13, 2001, PCSO auditors submitted a consolidated report
based on a surprise audit conducted on June 5, 2001.5The auditors
found that the cash and cash items under Delos Reyes' control were
in order.6However, the auditors recommended that the lotto proceeds
be deposited in a bank the next working day instead of Delos Reyes
keeping the lotto sales and proceeds in a safe inside his
office.7
On June 5, 2002, COD Manager Josefma Lao instructed OIC-Division
Chief of the Liaison and Accounts Management Division Teresa Nucup
(Nucup) to conduct an account validation and verification to
reconcile accounts due to substantial outstanding balances as of
May 31, 2002.8On August 16, 2002, Nucup reported that Agency No.
14-5005-1 had unremitted collections in the amount of P428,349.00
from May 21, 2001 to June 3, 2001.9The amount was subsequently
reduced to P387,879.00 excluding penalties.10
Nucup also found that "there was a deliberate delay in the
submission of the periodic sales report; that the partial
remittance of total sales were made to cover previous collections;
and that the unremitted collections were attributed to Cesar Lara,
Cynthia Roldan, Catalino Alexandre Galang, Jr., who were all
employed by [PCSO] as Lottery Operations Assistants II, and
Elizabeth Driz, the Assistant Division Chief."11
After conducting its own investigation, the PCSO Legal
Department recommended filing formal charges against Delos Reyes
and Elizabeth Driz (Driz) for dishonesty and gross neglect of duty.
The PCSO Legal Department found that the Lottery Operations
Assistants turned over the lotto proceeds and lotto ticket sales
reports to Delos Reyes as the Division Chief. In case of his
absence, the proceeds and reports were turned over to Driz.12Driz
would then deposit the proceeds in the bank. If both Delos Reyes
and Driz were absent, the proceeds would be placed in the vault
under Delos Reyes' control and deposited the next banking
day.13
On May 14, 2003, formal charges were filed against Delos Reyes
and Driz, with the cases docketed as Administrative Case Nos. 03-01
and 03-02, respectively.14Delos Reyes and Driz were preventively
suspended for 90 days.15
On June 8, 2004, PCSO filed an affidavit-complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman.16Delos Reyes and Driz were criminally
charged with malversation of public funds or property under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code, and administratively charged with
dishonesty and gross neglect of duty under Section 46(b)(l) and