Remedial Law Review 2 || Rule 72-91: Settlement of Estate and
Escheats
G.R. No. 128781 August 6, 2002
TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C. NICOLAS and the HEIRS OF ANTONIO
NICOLAS,petitioners,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PABLO P.
INVENTOR and RAMON NICOLAS,respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court which prays that the Decision dated February
28, 1997 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1997 issued by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42958,1be set aside; and, that another
judgment be entered ordering the Presiding Judge of Branch 123 of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to give due course to
petitioners notice of appeal, to approve their record on appeal and
to elevate the records of Sp. Proc. No. C-1679 to respondent
appellate court for further proceedings.
The factual background:
Herein petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed
administratrix of the estate of Rafael C. Nicolas in Sp. Proc. No.
C-1679, entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Rafael
C. Nicolas". Said case was subsequently consolidated with Sp. Proc
No. C-18102and Civil Case No. C-17407.3Deceased spouses Rafael and
Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner Teresita N. de Leon,
Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas (deceased husband of
petitioner Zenaida Nicolas and predecessor of the petitioners Heirs
of Antonio Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas and Roberto Nicolas.
On September 19, 1994, private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, an
oppositorapplicant in the intestate proceedings, filed a "Motion
for Collation," claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas, during his
lifetime, had given the following real properties to his children
by gratuitous title and that administratrix-petitioner Teresita
failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent:
"1. Title No. T-36734 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of
14,119 sq. m. distributed as follows:
1.1 10,110 sq. m. given to daughter Estrellita N. Visconde
1.2 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas
2. Title No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of
1,000 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas
3. Title No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of
4,000 sq. m. given to daughter Teresita N. de Leon (herein
petitioner)
4. Title No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of
283 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas
5. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m.
given to daughter Teresita N. de Leon
6. T-68554 located at Caloocan City with an area of 690 sq. m.
given to son Ramon (Oppositor-Applicant herein)
7. T-10907 located at Caloocan City with an area of 310 sq. m.
given to son Ramon but was somehow transferred to Antonio Nicolas,
and the property is now titled in the name of the latters widow,
Zenaida Carlos Nicolas."
x x x x x x x x x."4On September 27, 1994, the RTC issued an
Order directing Ramon "to submit pertinent documents relative to
the transfer of the properties from the registered owners during
their lifetime for proper determination of the court if such
properties should be collated, and set it for hearing with notice
to the present registered owners to show cause why their properties
may not be included in the collation of properties."5On October 10,
1994, respondent Ramon filed an Amended Motion for Collation
specifying the properties to be collated and attaching to said
motion, the documents in support thereof, to wit:
"3. A more complete list of the properties to be collated is as
follows:
1. Title No. T-36734 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of
14,119 sq. m., xerox copy hereto attached as Annex "A", distributed
as follows:
1.1 10,110 sq. m. given to daughter Estrellita N. Visconde,
under TCT No. V-554 of Valenzuela Bulacan (Annex "B"), and later
sold by Estrellita to Amelia Lim Sy for P3,405,612.00 and the Deed
of Sale hereto attached as Annex "B-1";
"1.2 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas, xerox copy
hereto attached as Annex "C";
2. Two lots, covered by TCT No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan
with an area of 4,000 sq. m. and TCT No. T-33658 located at Polo,
Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. "given to daughter Teresita N.
de Leon by a Deed of Sale, xerox copies are hereto attached as
Annex "D", "D-1" and "D-2";
The 4,000 sq. m. lot was sold by Petitioner Teresita for the
amount of P1,888,000.00, xerox copy of the Deed of Sale is hereto
attached as Annex "D-3";
4. Son Antonio received additional properties under a Deed of
Sale, hereto attached as Annex "E", which are those covered by TCT
No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 283 sq. m.;
TCT No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 1,000 sq.
m. and TCT No. T-10907 located at Caloocan City with an area of 310
sq. m., xerox copies hereto attached as Annexes "E-1", "E-2" and
"E-3";
The lot with an area of 310 sq. m. is supposedly earmarked for
Oppositor-applicant Ramon but was somehow included in the Deed of
Sale to son Antonio, and the property is now titled in the name of
the latters widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas;
5. TCT No. T-68554 located at Caloocan City with an area of 690
sq. m. where the ancestral home is presently located;
6. Son Antonio received another property with an area of 1,876
sq. m. and sold for P850,000.00, hereto attached as Annex "F";
7. Son Antonio received another property with an area of 1,501
sq. m. and sold for P200,000.00, hereto attached as Annex "G";
x x x x x x x x x."6A comparison with the original motion for
collation reveals that the amended motion refers to the same real
properties enumerated in the original except Nos. 6 and 7 above
which are not found in the original motion.
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order, to wit:
"Acting on the Amended Motion for Collation filed by
oppositor-applicant Ramon G. Nicolas and the comment thereto filed
by petitioner-administratrix, the Court finds the following
properties to be collated to the estate properties under present
administration, to wit:
(1). 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas described in
paragraph 1.2 of the Amended Motion For Collation, marked as Annex
"C"; (the xerox copy of the transfer certificate of title in the
name of Antonio Nicolas did not state "the number and the technical
description of the property. The administratrix should get hold of
a certified copy of the title of Antonio Nicolas about subject
property;
(2). Two lots, covered by TCT No. T-36989 located at Polo,
Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq. m. and TCT No. T-33658 located at
Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. given to daughter
Teresita N. de Leon by a Deed of Sale;
(3). The property covered by TCT No. T-36987 located at Polo,
Bulacan, with an area of 283 sq. m.; the property covered by TCT
No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan, with an area of 1,000 sq. m.
and another property covered by TCT No. T-10907 located at Caloocan
City with an area of 310 sq. m. xerox copies of which are attached
to the Amended Motion For Collation, marked as Annexes "E1", "E-2"
and "E-3";
(4). The lot with an area of 310 sq. m. given to son Antonio
Nicolas which property is now titled in the name of the latters
widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas.
"Accordingly, the Administratrix is hereby ordered to include
the foregoing properties which were received from the decedent for
collation in the instant probate proceedings.
"SO ORDERED."7We note that only those lots described under
paragraphs 3.1.2, 3.2 and 4 of the "Amended Motion for Collation"
were ordered included for collation.1wphi1.ntOn November 18, 1994,
petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging that the properties subject of the Order "were already
titled in their names years ago"8and that titles may not be
collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. On February 23,
1995, the RTC issued an Order denying said motion, ruling that it
is within the jurisdiction of the court to determine whether titled
properties should be collated,9citing Section 2, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the final order of the court
concerning questions as to advancements made shall be binding on
the person raising the question and on the heir.
Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated February 23, 199510which
respondent opposed.11On July 18, 1995, the RTC issued an Order,
pertinent portions of which read:
"x x x Foremost to be resolved is the issue of collation of the
properties of the deceased Rafael Nicolas which were disposed by
the latter long before his death. The oppositor-applicant Ramon
Nicolas should prove to the satisfaction of the Court whether the
properties disposed of by the late Rafael Nicolas before the
latters death was gratuitous or for valuable consideration. The
Court believes that he or she who asserts should prove whether the
disposition of the properties was gratuitously made or for valuable
consideration.
The Court has already set for hearing on July 21, 1995, at 8:30
a.m., the reception and/or presentation of evidence in the issue of
collated properties disposed before the death of Rafael
Nicolas."12On November 4, 1996, the RTC removed petitioner from her
position as administratrix on ground of conflict of interest
considering her claim that she paid valuable consideration for the
subject properties acquired by her from their deceased father and
therefore the same should not be included in the collation;13and,
ordered the hearing on the collation of properties covered by TCT
No. T-V-1211 and T-V-1210 only.14On November 28, 1996, acting on
the impression that the collation of the real properties enumerated
in the Order dated November 11, 1994 is maintained by the RTC,
petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration
praying that her appointment as administratrix be maintained; and
that the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-36989, T-33658, T-36987,
T-40333, T-10907 and a portion of TCT No. T-13206 described as Lot
4-A with 4,009 square meters be declared and decreed as the
exclusive properties of the registered owners mentioned therein and
not subject to collation.15The RTC denied said motion in its Order
dated December 23, 1996.16Petitioners Teresita N. de Leon, Zenaida
Nicolas (the surviving spouse of Antonio Nicolas) and the Heirs of
Antonio Nicolas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction claiming
that:
"I
"RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONERS
OPPORTUNITY TO VENTILATE THEIR APPEAL HE INSISTED ON HEARING THE
MATTERS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF A REGULAR ADMINISTRATOR AND COLLATION
ON DECEMBER 24, 1996 AND RESETTING ITS CONTINUATION TO JANUARY 21
and 28, 1997 INSPITE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL AND/OR
RE-AFFIRMATION OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM WHICH ACTS THERE IS NO
APPEAL NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF LAW."
"II
"RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE
DID NOT INCLUDE IN HIS ORDER-ANNEX J THE HEARING ON THE FINAL
DETERMINATION OF TCT NOS. T-36734, T-36989, T-33658, T-36987,
T-40333 and T-10907 (WHETHER THEY ARE STILL PART OF THE ESTATE OR
SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE INVENTORY/ESTATE) THEREBY ASSUMING
WITHOUT ANY BASIS THAT THESE PROPERTIES TO BE STILL PART OF THE
ESTATE OF RAFAEL NICOLAS WHEN THEY ARE NOT BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN
SOLD WAY BACK IN 1979 FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS TO PETITIONER
TERESITA N. DE LEON AND ANTONIO NICOLAS HUSBAND OF PETITIONER
ZENAIDA NICOLAS."17After private respondent Ramon had filed his
comment, and petitioners, their reply, and after hearing the oral
arguments of the parties, the Special Fourth Division of the Court
of Appeals found the petition devoid of merit, ruling that the
Order dated November 11, 1994 directing the inclusion of the
properties therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased Rafael
Nicolas had already become final for failure of petitioners to
appeal from the order of collation; that the appeal of the
petitioner from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 3,
1996 removing petitioner as administratrix is timely appealed; and,
observing that the notice of appeal and record on appeal appear to
be unacted upon by the RTC, the appellate court resolved:
"WHEREFORE, while finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Judge, he is hereby ORDERED to act on
petitioners appeal on the matter of the removal of petitioner as
administratrix.
SO ORDERED."18Hence, herein petition anchored on the following
assignments of error:
"FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR"RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN
IT DECLARED IN THE QUESTIONED DECISION THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURTA
QUODATED NOVEMBER 11, 1994 WAS FINAL.
"SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED IN THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION THAT THERE WAS NO COGENT OR COMPELLING REASON
TO DISTURB THE QUESTIONED DECISION."19Petitioners claim that:
private respondent never presented any document to prove that the
properties transferred by their deceased parents to petitioners are
by gratuitous title; private respondent never notified petitioner
of any hearing on said documents to give them opportunity to show
cause why their properties should not be collated; the assailed
Order dated November 11, 1994 is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical,
confiscatory, depriving them of due process; the said order is
interlocutory in nature and therefore non-appealable; the
properties acquired by petitioner Teresita N. de Leon and her
deceased brother Antonio Nicolas, married to petitioner Zenaida C.
Nicolas and their children, were sold to them as evidenced by
public documents; and, the properties were already titled in their
respective names or sold to third persons.
Private respondent contends that: due process has been afforded
the petitioners when the RTC resolved the issue of collation of the
subject properties after hearing; petitioner deliberately omitted
certain material facts in the petition to mislead the Court because
petitioners were actually given at least three (3) times the
opportunity to ventilate and oppose the issue of collation; as
stated by the appellate court in the Resolution promulgated on
February 10, 1997, both parties affirmed that the RTC had proceeded
to conduct hearings on January 21 and 28, 1997 as originally
scheduled; presentation of evidence had been terminated and the
twin issues of the appointment of a new administratrix and the
collation of two (2) properties covered by TCT No. T-V-1210 and
T-V-1211 were already submitted for resolution to the court
below;20subject properties are collatable under Articles 1601 and
1071 of the Civil Code and Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court and the ruling inGuinguing v. Abuton and Abuton, 48 Phil.
144; petitioner failed to present evidence that there was valuable
consideration for these properties and failed to rebut the evidence
that petitioners do not have the financial capability to pay for
these properties as evidenced by the testimony of credible
witnesses who are relatives of spouses decedents.
We find the petition partly meritorious.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the Order
of November 11, 1994 had become final for failure of petitioners to
appeal therefrom in due time, we hold that said Order is
interlocutory in nature. Our pronouncement inGarcia v.
Garciasupports this ruling:
"The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a
deceased person through the filing of the corresponding
proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties,
and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the
inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains
all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the
administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this
duty the court has also inherent power to determine what
properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included
in or excluded from the inventory.Should an heir or person
interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the
courts attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or
credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the
courts duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if
such observations should be attended to or not and if the
properties referred to therein belongprima facieto the intestate,
but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the
ownership of the said properties."21(Emphasis supplied)
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate
proceeding,22can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally.23The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of
the aggrieved party are expounded inJimenez v. Court of
Appeals:
"The patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction
and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which
result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, can only be settled in a separate action.
"All that the said court could do as regards said properties is
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the
opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do so."24Further,
InSanchez v. Court of Appeals, we held:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed
to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so."25Guided by the above jurisprudence, it
is clear that the Court of Appeals committed an error in
considering the assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 as final or
binding upon the heirs or third persons who dispute the inclusion
of certain properties in the intestate estate of the deceased
Rafael Nicolas. Under the foregoing rulings of the Court, any
aggrieved party, or a third person for that matter, may bring an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims.
Private respondents reliance on Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
"SEC. 2.Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions
as to advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order
of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
question and on the heir."
in support of his claim that the assailed Order is a final order
and therefore appealable and that due to petitioners failure to
appeal in due time, they are now bound by said Order, is not
feasible.
What seems to be a conflict between the above-quoted Rule and
the aforediscussed jurisprudence that the Order in question is an
interlocutory and not a final order is more apparent than real.
This is because the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as
an order of collation both by the RTC and the appellate court. For
all intents and purposes, said Order is a mere order including the
subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent.
The Court held inValero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals26that the order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final
order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle
once and for all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing
rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be
instituted by the parties.
In the Rodriguez case, the Court distinguished between an order
of collation and an order of exclusion from or inclusion in the
estates inventory, thus:
"We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the
probate court that the two disputed lots are not subject to
collation was a supererogation and was not necessary to the
disposition of the case which merely involved the issue of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of the testators
estate. The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that
early stage of the testate proceeding. It is not necessary to
mention in the order of exclusion the controversial matter of
collation.
"Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and
whether Mrs. Rustias Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible are
matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all. How
those issues should be resolved, if and when they are raised, need
not be touched upon in the adjudication of this appeal.
"The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the
estates of the deceased Valero spouses were consolidated, as
ordered by the lower court on November 21, 1974, so that the
conjugal estate of the deceased spouses may be properly liquidated,
as contemplated in section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court and Act
No. 3176.
"We have examined theexpedientesof the two cases. We found that
the proceedings have not yet reached the stage when the question of
collation or advancement to an heir may be raised and decided. The
numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net
remainder (remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet
been determined. On the other hand, up to this time, no separate
action has been brought by the appellants to nullify Mrs. Rustias
Torrens titles to the disputed lots or to show that the sale was in
reality a donation.
"In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of
collation and to decide whether Mrs. Rustias titles to the disputed
lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the
stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs have to be determined."27In the light of the
foregoing, Section 2, Rule 90 should be interpreted in the context
of Section 1 of the same Rule, to wit:
"Section 1.When order for distribution of residue made. When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to
the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on
the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall
assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the
same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is
entitled, and such person may demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless
the distributes, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed
by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs."
Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the lower
courts have perceived to be as an Order of Collation is nothing
more than an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate
which, as we have already discussed, is an interlocutory order. The
motion for collation was filed with the probate court at the early
stage of the intestate estate proceedings. We have examined the
records of the case and we found no indication that the debts of
the decedents spouses have been paid and the net remainder of the
conjugal estate have already been determined, and the estates of
the deceased spouses at the time filing of the motion for collation
were ready for partition and distribution. In other words, the
issue on collation is still premature.
And even if we consider,en arguendo, that said assailed Order is
a collation order and a final order, still, the same would have no
force and effect upon the parties. It is a hornbook doctrine that a
final order is appealable. As such, the Order should have expressed
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the laws on which it
is based as mandated by Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, which
provides:
"SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefore."
An examination of the subject Order as quoted earlier,28readily
reveals that the presiding Judge failed to comply with the said
constitutional mandate. The assailed Order did not state the
reasons for ordering the collation of the properties enumerated
therein. The Order simply directed the inclusion of certain real
properties in the estate of the deceased. It did not declare that
the properties enumerated therein were given to the children of the
deceased gratuitously, despite the title in the childrens names or
deeds of sale in their favor. Moreover, in his Comment, private
respondent makes mention of the testimonies of his witnesses but
these were not even mentioned in the Order of November 11, 1994.
Petitioner would have been deprived of due process as they would be
divested of the opportunity of being able to point out in a motion
for reconsideration or on appeal, any errors of facts and/or law
considering that there were no facts or laws cited in support of
the assailed Order of collation. As a final Order, it is, on its
face patently null and void. It could have never become final. A
void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid
judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative
by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.29For
it to be considered as a valid final order, the RTC must then first
rule and state in its order whether the properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-36734, T-36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333, T-10907 and the
4,009 square meter lot were acquired by petitioners from the
deceased parents of the parties by onerous or gratuitous title; and
must specifically state in its order the reasons why it ordered the
subject properties collated. It is only then that the order of
collation may be the subject of a motion for reconsideration and/or
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Until and unless the
constitutional mandate is complied with, any appeal from said Order
would have been premature.
Either way therefore, whether the Order in question is a final
or interlocutory order, it is a reversible error on the part of the
appellate court to rule that the so-called order of collation dated
November 11, 1994 had already attained finality.
As to the prayer of petitioners that the RTC be ordered to give
due course to their notice of appeal from the Orders dated November
4, 1996 and December 23, 1996 removing petitioner Teresita N. de
Leon as administratrix of the estate of private parties deceased
parents,30to approve their record on appeal31and to elevate the
records of Special Proceeding No. C-1679 to the Court of Appeals It
is not disputed by the parties that said Orders are appealable. In
fact, the Court of Appeals had correctly directed the RTC to give
due course to petitioners appeal and this is not assailed by the
private respondent.
But, the approval or disapproval of the record on appeal is not
a proper subject matter of the present petition for review on
certiorari as it is not even a subject-matter in CA-G.R. SP No.
42958. Whether or not the record on appeal should be approved is a
matter that is subject to the sound discretion of the RTC, provided
that Sections 6 to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court are observed by
appellant.
Finally, the elevation of the records of Special Proceedings No.
C-1679 to the Court of Appeals for the purpose of petitioners
appeal from the order removing the administratrix is unnecessary
where a record on appeal is allowed under the Rules of Court. The
courta quoloses jurisdiction over the subject of the appeal upon
the approval of the record on appeal and the expiration of the time
to appeal of the other parties; but retains jurisdiction over the
remaining subject matter not covered by the appeal.32WHEREFORE,the
petition is partlyGRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 28,
1997 and Resolution dated April 3, 1997 of the Court of Appeals
areMODIFIED. The Order dated November 11, 1994 issued by the
Regional Trial Court and all other orders of said court emanating
from said Order which involve the properties enumerated therein are
considered merely provisional or interlocutory, without prejudice
to any of the heirs, administrator or approving parties to resort
to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title.
The Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 123) is
directed to immediately act, without further delay, on petitioners
appeal from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 23,
1996, subject to Sections 6 to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.1wphi1.ntNo costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150164 November 26, 2002GLORIOSA V. VALARAO,petitioner,
vs. CONRADO C. PASCUAL and MANUEL C. DIAZ,1respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO,J.:
FELICIDAD C. PASCUAL died at seventy-one (71) years, femme sole,
leaving a substantial inheritance for her querulous collateral
relatives who all appear disagreeable to any sensible partition of
their windfall.
To divide the disputed estate are five (5) groups of legal heirs
which include respondents Conrado C. Pascual, a brother of the
deceased, and Manuel C. Diaz, a nephew, son of her sister Carmen P.
Diaz, and petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao who is the decedent's
niece. The bloodlines marking the groups of heirs are: (a) the
legitimate children of her late sister Leoncia P. Villanueva,
including petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao; (b) the legitimate
children of her late sister Carmen P. Diaz including respondent
Manuel C. Diaz; (c) the legitimate children of her late brother
Macario Pascual; (d) the legitimate children of her late sister
Milagros P. de Leon; and, (e) the decedent's surviving sister
Augustia C. Pascual and brothers Leonardo C. Pascual and Conrado C.
Pascual, the latter being one of respondents herein.
On 27 May 1998 petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao initiated before
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City special proceedings
docketed as SP No. 98-061 for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor over the estate of Felicidad C.
Pascual. On 29 September 1998 respondent Conrado C. Pascual and
some of his co-heirs, including respondent Diaz, filed with the
same probate court a petition for probate, docketed as SP No.
98-0124, of an alleged holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual.
The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated.
On 26 January 1999, by agreement of the parties in the
proceedings a quo, petitioner Valarao and respondent Diaz were
appointed joint administrators of the estate of Felicidad C.
Pascual. On 8 February 2000, RTC-Br. 260 of Paraaque City rendered
a Decision which dismissed SP No. 98-0124, denying probate of the
alleged holographic will of the decedent and giving due course to
the intestate settlement of the estate.2On 22 March 2000 respondent
Pascual appealed the Decision to the Court of Appeals by notice of
appeal.
On 2 May 2000, in view of the appeal taken from the disallowance
of the holographic will, petitioner Valarao moved in the probate
court for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate.
On 9 May 2000 respondent Diaz also asked for his designation as
special co-administrator of the estate alongside petitioner. On 10
May 2000 the motions were heard wherein petitioner opposed the
request of respondent Diaz on the ground that he had allegedly
neglected his previous assignment as co-administrator of the
estate.
On 7 June 2000 the probate court issued an Order appointing
petitioner Valarao as special administratrix based on this
observation -
Weighing the pros and cons of the situation, considering the
unanimity of choice by the heirs, of Mrs. Valarao as special
administratrix, and the vigorous objection to Mr. Diaz as
co-administrator, not to mention the fact that the heirs on the
side of Mrs. Valarao represent a numerical majority of the legal
heirs of the deceased, the Court believes that it will be to the
best interest of the estate and the heirs themselves if Mrs.
Gloriosa Valarao is appointed special administratrix.3On 29 June
2000 the probate court approved petitioner's bond ofP500,000.00,
and on 6 July 2000 she took her oath of office as special
administratrix.
On 19 July 2000 respondent Diaz moved for reconsideration of his
rejection as special co-administrator of the estate. He contested
the allegation of petitioner Valarao that he had been remiss in his
duties as co-administrator. He cited as examples of his services
the collection of rentals for properties included in the estate,
the payment of estate taxes and the deposit of aboutP4,000,000.00
in a joint bank account held in trust for the estate by him and
petitioner as co-administrators. Respondent Diaz further alleged
that justice and equity demanded that his group of heirs be also
represented in the management of the estate.
On the other hand, petitioner reiterated the alleged
uncooperative conduct of respondent Diaz in discharging his tasks
as co-administrator, and at the same time moved that he and his
group of sympathetic heirs be compelled to surrender to her as
special administratrix the books and records of a corporation where
the estate owned substantial interests.
On 11 September 2000 the probate court denied the motion for
reconsideration and ordered respondent Diaz and all the heirs to
respect the authority of petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix, especially by furnishing her with copies of
documents pertinent to the properties comprising the estate. Anent
the charges of nonfeasance in his tasks as co-administrator, the
probate court found -
x x x [respondent] Diaz has not disputed these charges beyond
making a mere general denial, stating that he had been diligent and
regular in the performance of his duties when he was still the
estates co-administrator. Considering the allegations of both
Manuel Diaz and Gloriosa Valarao and assessing the circumstances
surrounding the case, this Court is of the considered view that the
best interest of the estate will be best protected if only one
administrator is appointed for, in that way, conflicting interests
which might work to the detriment of the estate may be avoided.4On
25 September 2000 respondents Pascual and Diaz along with other
heirs moved for reconsideration of the 11 September 2000 Order on
the ground that petitioner Valarao as special administratrix was
not authorized to dispossess the heirs of their rightful custody of
properties in the absence of proof that the same properties were
being dissipated by them, and that the possessory right of
petitioner as special administratrix had already been exercised by
her "constructively" when the heirs on her side took possession of
the estate supposedly in her behalf. Respondents further alleged
that the motion was pending resolution by the probate court.
On 10 October 2000, while the motion for reconsideration was
pending resolution, respondents filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61193, to reverse and set
aside the Orders dated 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000 insofar as
the probate court appointed only petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix, and to order the appointment of respondent Diaz as
special co-administrator of the estate.
On 15 May 2001 the probate court upon motion cited respondents
for indirect contempt of court for refusing to turn over to
petitioner Valarao documents covering properties belonging to the
estate and ordered them arrested until compliance with the order to
hand over the documents. The warrant of arrest was subsequently
lifted by the probate court after respondents promised to deliver
the documents.
On 13 June 2001 respondents filed their supplemental petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 61193 seeking permanent injunction
against the enforcement of the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11
September 2000 also as they mandated the turn over of documents to
petitioner Valarao.
On 28 September 2001 the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision reversing and setting aside the Order of 7 June 2000 of
RTC-Br. 260, Paraaque City, appointing petitioner Valarao as lone
special administratrix although the fallo of the CA Decision was
silent on whether the probate court should also appoint respondent
Diaz as special co-administrator of the estate of Felicidad C.
Pascual.5The appellate court explained that since the heirs were
divided into two (2) scrappy factions, justice and equity demanded
that both factions be represented in the management of the estate
of the deceased, citing Matias v. Gonzales,6Corona v. Court of
Appeals,7and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete.8Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Petitioner Valarao claims that the probate court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it rejected the application of
respondent Diaz for appointment as special co-administrator of the
estate because of his indubitable uncooperative attitude towards
effective administration of the estate. She also argues that
diverse interests among different groups of heirs do not give each
of them the absolute right to secure the appointment of a
co-administrator from within their ranks since it remains the
discretion of the probate court to designate the administrators of
an estate. She further asserts that as special administratrix of
the estate she possesses the authority to demand the surrender of
documents pertinent to the estate insofar as necessary to fulfill
her mandate.
On 26 February 2002 respondents filed their Comment on the
petition alleging the absence of special reasons to justify a
review of the assailed Decision and of the partiality of the trial
judge in favor of petitioner.
We grant the petition. To begin with, the probate court had
ample jurisdiction to appoint petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix and to assist her in the discharge of her functions,
even after respondents had filed a notice of appeal from the
Decision disallowing probate of the holographic will of Felicidad
C. Pascual. This is because the appeal is one where multiple
appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required.9In this
mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the
subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the
special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of
further remedies which the parties may avail of, including the
appointment of a special administrator.10Moreover, there is nothing
whimsical nor capricious in the action of the probate court not to
appoint respondent Diaz as special co-administrator since the
Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000 clearly stipulate the
grounds for the rejection. The records also manifest that the
probate court weighed the evidence of the applicants for special
administrator before concluding not to designate respondent Diaz
because the latter was found to have been remiss in his previous
duty as co-administrator of the estate in the early part of his
administration. Verily, the process of decision-making observed by
the probate court evinces reason, equity, justice and legal
principle unmistakably opposite the core of abusive discretion
correctible by the special civil action of certiorari under which
the appellate court was bound to act. Finally, the extraordinary
writ does not operate to reverse factual findings where evidence
was assessed in the ordinary course of the proceedings since
perceived errors in the appreciation of evidence do not embroil
jurisdictional issues.11Respondents cannot take comfort in the
cases of Matias v. Gonzales,12Corona v. Court of Appeals13and Vda.
de Dayrit v. Ramolete,14cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to
their claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right
demandable from the probate court to appoint special
co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of
squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the
authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also
two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now
whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs
are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its
sound discretion.15Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and
Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances other than the
incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from
the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a
special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as the
universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we
considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during
the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower
court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one
special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the
act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive
status in the selection of another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's
choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to
serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the
testatrix in her will,"16for this Court to compel her appointment
as special co-administrator. It is also manifest from the decision
in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the
heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a
second special administrator as this fact was taken into account
only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the
objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and
lack of kinship."17Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the
designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-administrator
because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as
petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that
she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of
any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate
of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."18The
special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration
of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals19where
we held that the widow would have more interest than any other next
of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she
possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal
partnership for which the good or bad administration of the estate
may affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked
ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals20we
recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as
regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we
counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case
to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias,
Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent
proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that
were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being
repeatedly urged by respondents.
We also rule that the probate court in issuing the Order of 11
September 2000 did not err in commanding respondents to turn over
all documents pertinent to the estate under special administration
and in enforcing such order by means of contempt of court. The
powers of a special administrator are plainly delineated in Sec. 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, vesting upon him the authority to
"take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits
and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor
or administrator afterwards appointed x x x x"
Contrary to respondents' assertion, there is nothing in Sec. 2
requiring a special administrator to take possession of the estate
only upon a prior finding that the heirs have been wasting
properties of the estate which are in their possession. The law
explicitly authorizes him to take possession of the properties in
whatever state they are, provided he does so to preserve them for
the regular administrator appointed afterwards. Clearly, the
special administrator enjoys not merely subsidiary possession to be
carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but the primary
and independent discretion of keeping them so they may be preserved
for regular administration.
Moreover, respondents cannot deprive the special administratrix
of access to and custody of essential documents by arguing that
their possession thereof allegedly in behalf of petitioner is
already the equivalent of "constructive possession" which
constitutes full compliance with the possessory powers of
petitioner as special administratrix under Sec. 2 of Rule 80.
Contrary to what respondents seem to understand by "constructive
possession," the right of possession whether characterized as
actual or constructive invariably empowers the special
administrator with the discretion at any time to exercise dominion
or control over the properties and documents comprising the
estate.21Hence, even if we are to give credence to the theory that
petitioner also has "constructive possession" of the documents
alongside respondents' actual possession thereof, respondents would
nonetheless be under the obligation to turn them over whenever the
special administratrix requires their actual delivery.
In any event, as we have held in De Guzman v. Guadiz,22the
partisan possession exercised by litigants over properties of the
estate differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special
administrator under the Rules of Court. Quite obviously, with this
distinction, the possession of portions of the estate by
respondents as heirs necessarily excludes the possessory right over
the same properties inherent in the mandate of a special
administrator.
The language of Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, also
unmistakably gives a special administrator the discretion to take
actual custody of the properties of the estate for the purpose of
preserving them for regular administration. This appreciation of
the powers of a special administrator is fairly evident from the
combination of the words "possession" and "charge" in Sec. 2, so
much so that even if we have to concede that "possession" means
only the fictitious custody of a thing as respondents suggest, the
word "charge," i.e., the commitment of a thing to the care and
custody of another,23would emphasize the requirement of actual
possession of the properties of the estate whenever vital according
to the discretion of the special administrator. When taken
together, the words "possession" and "charge" serve to highlight
the fact that a special administrator must be able to subject the
properties of the estate to his control and management when in his
good judgment such action is needed. Indeed, this understanding of
the possessory right of a special administrator is indispensable in
fulfilling his mandate to preserve the properties of the estate
until a regular administrator is designated, for fiction and
illusion cannot stand in place of the concrete and tangible
exercise of possession if he is to function effectively.
Finally, respondents cannot disobey the reasonable exercise of
the authority of a special administrator on the dubious ground that
the order appointing petitioner Valarao as special administratrix
had not in the meantime become final and executory because of a
pending motion for reconsideration filed by them. The fallacy of
this reasoning is apparent, for an interlocutory order is not
instantly appealable and therefore there is no period nor action to
suspend or interrupt by a motion for reconsideration;24it is even
well settled that a special civil action for certiorari does not
suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory order
absent a temporary restraining order or an injunction.25In the same
manner, the appointment of a special administrator being an
interlocutory order is not interrupted by a motion for
reconsideration and thus must be obeyed as the proceedings in the
probate court progress.26The ruling in PAFLU v.
Salvador27reiterated in Republic Commodities Corporation v. Oca28is
enlightening -
[The] refusal to accord due respect and yield obedience to what
a court or administrative tribunal ordains is fraught with such
grave consequences x x x x If such a conduct were not condemned,
some other group or groups emboldened by the absence of any reproof
or disapproval may conduct themselves similarly. The injury to the
rule of law may well-nigh be irreparable x x x x When judicial or
quasi-judicial tribunals speak, what they decree must be obeyed;
what they ordain must be followed. A party dissatisfied may ask for
reconsideration and, if denied, may go on to higher tribunal. As
long as the orders stand unmodified, however, they must, even if
susceptible to well-founded doubts on jurisdictional grounds be
faithfully complied with.
Needless to state, the special administratrix appointed by the
probate court must be constantly aware that she is not a
representative nor the agent of the parties suggesting the
appointment but the administrator in charge of the estate and in
fact an officer of the court. As an officer of the court, she is
subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and is
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate,
especially its smooth administration and earliest
settlement.29Whatever differences that may exist between the heirs
shall be ironed out fairly and objectively for the attainment of
that end. She ought to be sensitive to her position as special
administratrix and neutral possessor which under the Rules of Court
is both fiduciary and temporary in character upon which
accountability attaches in favor of the estate as well as the other
heirs, especially respondents Pascual and Diaz in light of her
alleged rivalry with them.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2001 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 61193, "Conrado C. Pascual and Manuel P. Diaz v. The Hon.
RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 260, and Gloriosa V. Valarao," is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated 7 June 2000 and 11
September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, of Paraaque
City, rejecting the application of respondent Manuel C. Diaz30as
special co-administrator of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual and
ordering respondents Conrado C. Pascual and Manuel C. Diaz and all
other heirs who may have in their possession or custody papers,
records, certificates of titles over parcels of land, etc.,
pertaining to properties of the estate of the late Felicidad C.
Pascual to turn over such papers, records and titles to petitioner
Gloriosa V. Valarao as special administratrix thereof, are
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ
ARIOLA,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR.,J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the
Decision1of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 48831 affirming the dismissal2of the petitioners complaint in
Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC)
and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement3in the amount
ofP128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the
purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose
Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum
payable in five equal annual amortizations ofP43,745.96 due on May
31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another
loan agreement,4this time in the amount ofP123,156.00. It was
intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit
of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with
accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again,
Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said
amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they
also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5for the loan dated
December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic
will.6Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced
before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the
heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of
the decedent.7During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola,
executed a Joint Agreement8dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed
to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3)
tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor
for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their
late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively
taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities9was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others,
assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters10for the settlement of his account were sent by
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the
latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint11for sum of
money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence,
before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case
No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended
for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and
there was no information on his address or the date of his return
to the Philippines.12Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down
to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her
Answer13and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since
she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement
signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the
probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to
the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 63.14Consequently, trial on the merits
ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of
the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint
for lack of merit.15The trial court found that the claim of the
petitioner should have been filed with the probate court before
which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending,
as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the
said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement
apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22,
1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent.
However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had not
been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court
further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the
now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had
assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the
contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets
and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling that
the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the
trial court held that the petitioners cause of action against
respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its
case to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as
errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURTA QUOERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT
(EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURTA QUOERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED.
3. THE COURTA QUOERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.16The petitioner asserted before the CA that the
obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate children
and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional
signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped
respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her
liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed
by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer
necessary to present the same before the probate court for
approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of
those enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and
the active participation of the heirs, particularly respondent
Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was
tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that
the money claim of the petitioner should have been presented before
the probate court.17The appellate court found that the appeal was
not meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed its
claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition
made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition
may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the
CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the
subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased
referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active
participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not
amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision,viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby
AFFIRMEDin toto.
SO ORDERED.18In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes
the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER
THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH
OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OFP128,000.00
AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OFP123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19The petitioner claims that the
obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need
for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the
heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed
the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S.
Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is now
estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The
petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the
deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of
the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will.
The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S.
Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners claim
amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the
probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed
the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the
tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the
said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the
trial and appellate courts failed to consider the fact that
respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan
documents, all establishing thevinculum jurisor the legal bond
between the late Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature
of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated
May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim
Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence,
made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are
concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the
express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the
promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must
be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there
was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the
probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving
heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not
as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola
maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money
from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been
filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of
the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing
probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However, to
avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the
obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the
said agreement.1a\^/phi1.netAccording to the respondent, the trial
court and the CA did not err in declaring that the agreement was
null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was
voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still
have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she
had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the
courta quothat the claim should be filed with the probate court.
Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in
estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not
signed any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any
document presented as evidence to show that she had caused herself
to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether
or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is
valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness
of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold
the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.1awphi1.ntAt the
outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered.20The said court
is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and
distribution of the estate.21In our jurisdiction, the rule is that
there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the
probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will
is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will.22This, of course,
presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will.23In the present case, the
deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will24which
contained,inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may
be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the
proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in
favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an
all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the
decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was
making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so,
any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not
valid. The joint agreement25executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially
so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will
covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already
acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased,
including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it
with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.26Every act intended
to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a
sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.27Thus,
in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature
of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court
of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is
within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the
identity of the heirs of the decedent.28In the instant case, there
is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the
only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of
the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet
to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund
and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the
three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the
other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim
against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs
assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule
in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the
heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of
them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken
as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside
Credit Corp."29The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
possession and use of their respective share under the agreement.
It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that
they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as
earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such
tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be
given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
decedent.l^vvphi1.netThe petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the
late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with
the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5.Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
filed barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited
in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they
may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor
or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor
or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may
set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead
of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided,
and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action;
and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against
the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before
the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the
probate court is mandatory.30As we held in the vintage case ofPy
Eng Chong v. Herrera:31 This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule
is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or
heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its
debts and distribute the residue.32Perusing the records of the
case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S.
Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father.
The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory
notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court,
at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent
under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course,
subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner.
As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter
further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner
had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of
the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its
assets and liabilities.33The petitioner in its complaint alleged
that "by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981
executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and
Union Bank of the Philippines"34However, the documentary
evidence35clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of
assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom
Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation
therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or
testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of
the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that
plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to
take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists;
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA
504).36This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the
complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its
cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing
the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140929 May 26, 2005MARGARITO R. JAMERO,petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE ACHILLES L. MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 4,
ATTY. ALBERTO BAUTISTA, in his capacity as the appointed SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, and ERNESTO R. JAMERO,respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:
This refers to the petition for review oncertiorariseeking that
the Resolution1of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 14,
1999 dismissing the petition forcertiorarifiled with it by
petitioner Margarito R. Jamero and the Resolution promulgated on
November 24, 1999 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration be
set aside and declared null and void on the ground that said
Resolutions were issued in a way not in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner filed Special Proceedings No. 1618 for the
Administration and Settlement of the Estate of his deceased mother
Consuelo Jamero with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
Tagbilaran City. Private respondent Ernesto R. Jamero, a brother of
petitioner, opposed the latters petition for appointment as regular
administrator of the estate.
Upon motion of private respondent Ernesto and over the
objections of petitioner, the respondent court, in its Order dated
December 4, 1998,2appointed Atty. Alberto Bautista as special
administrator pending the appointment of a regular administrator.
Petitioner received said Order on December 11, 1998 and filed a
motion for reconsideration on December 28, 1998, the last day of
the 15-day reglementary period, that is, December 26, 1998, falling
on a Saturday during which, according to petitioner, the Bureau of
Post Office held no office. The courta quodenied petitioners motion
for reconsideration in its Order dated February 26, 1999 which
petitioner received on March 4, 1999.3On April 21, 1999, petitioner
filed a petition forcertiorariwith the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 53020, entitledMargarito R. Jamero, Petitioner vs. Hon.
Achilles L. Melicor, as Judge RTC of Tagbilaran City, Branch 4, and
Alberto Bautista.
On June 14, 1999, the CA issued the herein assailed Resolution,
to wit:
A perusal of the petition indicates no statement as to the date
when the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
public respondents decision, in violation of Section 3, paragraph
2, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by
Circular No. 39-98 dated August 18, 1998 of the Supreme Court, to
wit:
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further
indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution subject hereof was received when a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice
of the denial thereof was received.
The attention of the petitioner is likewise called to the
amended Section 4, Rule 65 (Ibid.).
SEC. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. The petition may be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or,
if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether
or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or
reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order or
resolution the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within
the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5)
days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No
extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days.
Hence, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46, the
petition may be dismissed outright. In any case, even if we
consider the date of the Motion for Reconsideration (December 26,
1998) as the date of its filing, the petition would be late by
three (3) days.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied due course and accordingly
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
the appellate court denied in its Resolution, promulgated on
November 24, 1999, to wit:
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our
Resolution of dismissal dated June 14, 1999, imploring us to use
merciful discretion by relaxing the rules on technicality to effect
substantial justice, and citing the importance of the legal issues
involved herein.
We find the motion devoid of merit. This Court has no authority
to extend the definitive period fixed in Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
In any case, the appointment of a special administrator is
discretionary to the appointing court. Being an interlocutory
order, the same is not appealable nor subject tocertiorari.
WHEREORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.5Hence, the present petition for review
oncertiorarifiled by petitioner against Judge Achilles L. Melicor,
Atty. Bautista and, this time, including oppositor Ernesto R.
Jamero, based on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT ALLOWED TECHNICALITY TO
OVERRIDE, AND TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER, THE DEMONSTRATED SUBSTANTIVE
MERITS OF THE PETITION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR IS DISCRETIONARY TO THE APPOINTING COURT, AND
THAT BEING AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER THE SAME IS NOT APPEALABLE NOR
SUBJECT TOCERTIORARI.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT APPOINTING ATTY. ALBERTO Y. BAUTISTA AS SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE CONSUELO R. JAMERO, IN
THAT:
(A) THE LATE CONSUELO R. JAMERO DIED INTESTATE, LEAVING NO
DEBTS. HENCE, THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR IS NOT
NECESSARY AS IT WOULD ONLY UNDULY BURDEN OR OTHERWISE EXPOSE THE
ESTATE TO BEING WASTED OR SQUANDERED.
(B) ASSUMINGARGUENDOTHAT A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR IS NECESSARY,
THE ORDER OF PREFERANCE PRESCRIBED BY THE RULES IN THE APPOINTMENT
OF REGULAR ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN OBSERVED. THUS, THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD HAVE DESIGNATED THE PETITIONER WHO POSSESSES
BENEFICIAL INTERESTS AS A CO-OWNER OF THE ESTATE, RATHER THAN ATTY.
ALBERTO Y. BAUTISTA WHO IS ONLY A THIRD PARTY.
(C) ASSUMING, FURTHER, THAT THE DESIGNATION OF ATTY. ALBERTO
BAUTISTA WHO IS A THIRD PARTY IS PROPER, THE AUTHORITY OF A SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR CANNOT BE EXERCISED IN DEROGATION OF THE RIGHTS OF
PETITIONER AS A CO-OWNER OF THE PROPERTIES FORMING PART OF THE
ESTATE.6Private respondent Ernesto Jamero who was not a party in
CA-G.R. SP No. 53020 filed his Comment contending that in the
absence of clear, convincing and satisfactory proof that the
decision is outrageously wrong, conspicuously mistaken and
whimsically arrived at, the judgment of the CA must be regarded as
final, citingMacapagal vs. CA, et al.7andBustamante, Jr. vs.
NLRC.8In his Reply, petitioner pointed out that the issue on the
timeliness of the filing of the petition forcertiorariwith the CA
has now become moot and academic in view of A.M. Circular No.
00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1, 2000, amending Section
4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of
said motion.
. . .
Both petitioner and private respondent Ernesto filed their
respective memoranda. Private respondent Bautista, the special
administrator designated by the RTC, failed to submit his
memorandum despite due notice of the Resolutions requiring him to
do so. Consequently, on October 20, 2004, the Court issued a
Resolution directing the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to arrest and detain him until he shall have
paid the total amount ofP4,000.00 fine and shall have filed his
explanation and memorandum.9The NBI has not submitted its
return.
The Court is dispensing with the filing of the memorandum by
private respondent Bautista in view of the Comments he filed on
October 12, 2000 stating that he has no personal interest in the
subject matter of the petition and the subject matter of Special
Proceedings No. 1618, RTC, Bohol; and that he will abide by
whatever judgment/order/resolution that the Court may issue in this
case.10However, Atty. Bautista is not relieved from paying the
amount of theP4,000.00 fine for his failure to comply with the
Resolutions of the Court.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether or not the CA erred in
dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 53020 for having been filed out of time;
(2) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the appointment of
special administrator is discretionary to the appointing court and
that being an interlocutory order, the same is not appealable nor
subject tocertiorari; and (3) whether or not the appointment of a
special administrator is in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
As to the first issue, the Court finds merit to the claim of
petitioner that A.M. Circular No. 00-2-03-SC as herein quoted
earlier, further amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
should be given retroactive effect. The Court held inRepublic vs.
Court of Appeals:11The amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC quoted
above is procedural or remedial in character. It does not create
new or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is settled
that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation
of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, insomuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure.12Thus, applying the same to CA-G.R. SP No. 53020, the
petition forcertiorarifiled by petitioner with the CA should now be
considered as having been filed within the reglementary period
provided under said circular. Petitioner would have had sixty days
from March 4, 1999 or until May 3, 1999 within which to file his
petition in the CA. The petition forcertiorariwas filed on April
21, 1999.
However, far from rendering the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 53020
moot and academic, as claimed by petitioner, the third issue will
have to be passed upon by the CA in the petition forcertiorarifiled
with it.
As to the second issue, suffice it to be stated that indeed, the
appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory,
discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-appealable. However,
it may be subject ofcertiorariif it can be shown that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction. As the Court held inPefianco vs. Moral,13even as the
trial courts order may merely be interlocutory and
non-appealable,certiorariis the proper remedy to annul the same
when it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.14It is for this
reason that the third issue, as already stated, will have to be
considered and passed upon by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially granted. The assailed
Resolutions dated June 14, 1999 and November 24, 1999 are SET ASIDE
and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
The Resolution of this Court dated October 20, 2004 is amended
to the effect that the NBI is directed to arrest and detain the
person of Atty. Alberto Bautista until full payment of the fine of
Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00); and to submit its return within
thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146006. April 22, 2005JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in
their capacities as President and Corporate Secretary,
respectively, of Philippine International Life Insurance Company,
and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP,Petitioners,vs.REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA,
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G.
RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special
Administratrix, and other persons/public officers acting for and in
their behalf,Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA,J.:
For resolution is private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes
omnibus motion to cite petitioners in indirect contempt of Court
and for the disbarment and/or imposition of disciplinary sanctions
on petitioners counsel1for their refusal to comply with the final
and executory decision of this Court dated February 23, 2004.
This case began with a petition for letters of administration of
the intestate estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez filed 25 years ago
on September 24, 1980. Forming part of the inventory of the estate
were 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life
Insurance Company (Philinterlife). During the pendency of these
proceedings, Juliana, Jose and Rafael (all surnamed Ortaez), the
surviving legitimate spouse and legitimate children of the decedent
respectively, executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate,
partitioning it (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among
themselves. Thereafter, Juliana and Jose sold the 2,029 shares to
the Filipino Loan Assistance