JIABS 7-2

THE JOURNAL

tbFTHE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

A. K. Narain

University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

EDITORS

Alexander W. Macdonald

Universiti de Paris X

Nanterre, France

Ernst Steinkellner

University oj Vienna

Wien, Austria

Bardwell Smith

Carleton College

Northfield, Minnesota, USA

Jikido Takasaki

University of Tokyo

Tokyo, Japan

Volume 7

Robert Thurman

Amherst College

Amherst, Massachusetts, USA

ASSISTANT EDITOR

Roger Jackson

1984 Number 2

THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.

This journal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Stud_ ies, Inc., and is governed by the objectives of the Association and accepts scholarly contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various disciplines such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology art, archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The jIABS is published twice yearly in the summer and winter.

Manuscripts for publication and correspondence concerning articles should be submitted to A. K. Narain, Editor-in-Chief, jIABS, Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A. Please refer to the guidelines for contributors to the jIABS printed on the inside back cover of every issue.

The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views' expressed by the authors in the Association's journal and other related' publications.

Books for review should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. The Editors cannot guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to the senders.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Andre BaTeau (France) joseph M. Kitagawa (USA)

M.N. Deshpande (India) jacques May (Switzerland)

R. Card (USA) Hajime Nakamura Uapan)

B.C. Cokhale (USA) john Rose1lfield (USA)

P.S. jaini (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.)

J. W. de jong (Australia) E. Zurcher (Netherlands)

CONTENTS

1. ARTICLES

1. The Buddhist Path to Liberation: An Analysis of the Listing of Stages, by Rod Bucknell 7

2. Temporary Ordination in Sri Lanka, by Richard Gom-brich 41

3. The Symbolism of the Early Stiipa, by Peter Harvey 67 4. Reason as the Prime Principle in Tsong kha pa's

Delineation of Deity Yoga-as the Demarcation Between Siitra and Tantra, by Jeffrey Hopkins 95

5. Buddhism and Belief in Atma, by Y. Krishan 117 6. Giuseppe Tucci (1894-1984), by Luciano Petech 137 7. Kokan Shiren and Muso Soseki: "Chineseness" vs.

"J apaneseness" in Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century Japan, by David Pollack 143

8. The Rasavahini and the Sahassavatthu: A Comparison, by Telwatte Rahula 169

9. A Study of the Theories of Yavad-bhavikata and Yatha-vad-bhavikata in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, by Ah-yueh Yeh 185

II. BOOK REVIEWS

1. Alone With Others: An Existential Approach to Buddhism, by Stephen Batchelor; The Way of Siddhartha: A Life of the Buddha, by David J. and Indrani Kalu-pahana (reviewed by Roger Jackson) 208

2. The Buddha, by Michael Carrithers (reviewed by Paul Griffiths) 216

3. Buddhist and Western Psychology, edited by Nathan Katz (reviewed by Paul Griffiths) 219

4. A Lamp for the Path and Commentary, by Ansa, translated and annotated by Richard Sherburne (reviewed by Jose Cabezon) 224

5. Religious Festiv.als in South India and Sri Lanka, edited and prefaced by Guy R. Welbon and Glenn E. Yocum (reviewed by Peter Claus) 226

III. NOTES AND NEWS

1. 7th Conference of the International Association Buddhist Studies

2. L.M. Joshi: A Brief Communication 3. LA.B.S., Inc. Treasurer's Report OBITUARY John Brough (1917-1984)

Contributors

of 230 232 233

236

239

The Buddhist Path to Liberation: An Analysis of the Listing of Stages*

by Rod Bucknell

The noble eightfold path (ariya attangika magga) is generally considered, by practising Buddhists and scholars alike, to be a complete summary of Gotama's course of practice leading to the cessation of suffering. However, there are in the Tipitaka several other lists of stages which are demonstrably also statements of that course of practice, and which, while broadly resembling the eightfold path, differ from it in omitting certain stages and/or including certain others. In this paper, a selection of these alternative lists of stages is subjected to a comparative analysis, some aspects of Gotama's course of practice are reinterpreted accordingly, and it is argued that the noble eightfold path does not entirely deserve the high status usually accorded it. l

Five lists of stages, chosen for their overall resemblance to the eightfold path, are dealt with. They are- drawn from the first four nikiiyas of the Sutta-pitaka. List 1 occurs there some sixty times, List 2 three times, Lists 3 and 4 each occur once only, and List 5 occurs ten times. However, the importance of these lists of stages is considerably greater than their relatively infrequent occurrence would suggest, as the analysis that now follows will demonstrate.

List 1

The most obvious candidate for inclusion in this comparative study is the following list of ten stages, found in each of the first four nikiiyas.2 It differs from the eightfold path only in having two further items following right concentration:

7

8 JIABS VOL. 7 NO.2

1. samma-diUhi (right view) 2. samma-sankappa (right aspiration) 3. samma-vaca (right speech) 4. samma-kammanta (right action) 5. samma-aj'iva (right livelihood) 6. samma-vayama (right effort) 7. samma-sati . (right mindfulness) 8. samma-samadhi (right concentration) 9. samma-nalJa (right insight)

10. samma-vimutti (right liberation).

This list is given various names-"the noble path," "the ten qualities of an adept," "the ten states conducing to the ending of the cankers (asavas)," etc.3 Here, it will be called, for convenience, "the tenfold path."

At some of its occurrences, the tenfold path is stated to be superior to the eightfold path. For example, in the Maggasa'f!Zyutta Gotama says:

I will teach you, monks, the worthy and the still more Worthy than the worthy .... And who, monks, is the worthy? Herein, monks, a certain one has right view, right aspiration, ... right concentration. This one, monks, is called "the worthy." And who, monks, is the still more worthy than the worthy? Herein, monks, a certain one has right view, right aspiration, ... right concentration, right Insight, right liberation. This one, monks, is called "the still more worthy than the worthy."4

Similarly, in the Mahacattarfsaka-sutta, the only sutta that deals with the tenfold path at any length, a listing of the ten maggangas or path-factors is followed immediately by the statement: "In this way, monks, the course of the learner (sekha) is possessed of eight components, and that of the perfected one (arahant) of ten components."5 In addition, as C.A.F. Rhys Davids pointed out half a century ago,6 the Anguttara implicitly assigns superior status to the tenfold path by discussing it far more frequently: while in the Eights the eightfold path is listed only twice,7 in the Tens the tenfold path is listed no fewer than fiftyfour times.8

The existence of this tenfold path suggests that the eight-

BUDDHIST PATH TO LIBERATION 9

fold path is incomplete. Unfortunately, the Tipitaka contains no detailed stage-by-stage explanations of the tenfold path comparable to those given for the eightfold path;9 the two extra path-factors, samma-iiar:ta ~nd samma-vimutti, are nowhere explaine? .It se~ms s~fe to mfer that the tenth factor, .sammavimuttz (nght lIberatIOn), refers to the summum bonum, mbbana. If this suggestion is correct, the absence of samma-vimutti from the eightfold path is no real defect, since-it can be arguedthe path is the way to the final realization and therefore need not include that realization. There remains, however, the ninth factor, samma-iia1Ja (right insight, or wisdom, or knowledge). This factor appears to be of crucial importance. Its name indicates that it has to do with the development of intuitive wisdom, a vital prerequisite to liberation; and its penultimate position in the list suggests that it is a very advanced stage, more advanced, for example, than mastery of the jhanas, with which sammasamadhi (the eighth factor) is equated.Io

On this question of serial position in the list, the following paragraph from the Mahiicattarfsaka-sutta is informative:

As to this, monks, right view comes first. And how, monks, does right view come first? From right view proceeds right aspiratIOn, from right aspiration proceeds right speech, from right speech proceeds right action, from right action proceeds right livelihood, from right livelihood proceeds .. right effort, from right effort proceeds right mindfulness, from right mindfulness proceeds right concentration, from right concentration proceeds nght insight, from right inSIght proceeds right liberation.!!

The path is therefore sequential; the order of listing represents the sequence in which the factors are developed in practice.!2 This sequence is more or less as one would expect, with more fundamental and straightforward practices preceding more specialized and sophisticated ones. For example, while the major moral precepts (stages 3, 4, 5) apply even to lay followers practising at a relatively elementary level, the jhiinas (stage 8) are normally practised only by monks; and the development of right insight (stage 9) would imply a high degree of .spiritual advancement. (The status of right view (stage 1) in this respect is Jess evident; it will be discussed below.)

10 JIABS VOL. 7 NO.2

The Mahacattarfsaka-sutta also indicates that the path series is cumulative; factors already established are maintained as new, more advanced factors are developed, at least as far as right concentration: '

And what, monks, is ariyan right concentration with its c!l.Usal ~ssociati~ns .and accon:panim~nts? It is this: right VIew, nght aspIratlOn, ... nght mmdfulness; whatever mental onepointedness, monks, is accompanied by these seven, this is called ariyan right concentratlOn with its causal associations and accompaniments. 13

This, too, is as one would expect. Clearly, the monk does not, for example, abandon right livelihood (stage 5) in order to give all his attention to right effort (stage 6); rather, his right livelihood facilitates his right effort and is in turn enhanced by it. The path is therefore both sequential and cumulative.

From this, it is clear that the ninth factor, right insight, is developed after right concentration, that is, after the jhanas have been mastered. This is in keeping with the sequence implied in the various extant broad outlines of the Buddhist course of practice, for example the often-stated threefold division into sZla, samadhi, and panna (morality, concentration, and insight),14 and the twofold division into samatha and vipassana (tranquillity meditation and insight meditation); 15 insight always comes after concentration.

The above discussion suggests that the eightfold path, lacking right insight, is incomplete. However, it may be that right insight is not (as implied above) an active practice to which the meditator must direct his energies after he has mastered right concentration. Perhaps it is, like right liberation, a fruit of the practice of the preceding eight stages, something that will arise spontaneously once the eight have been perfected-in which case its omission from the path is no real defect. Accounts of the tenfold path throw no light on this question, since they never explain the individual stages. Some understanding of the nature of right insight can, however, be arrived at through comparison with other lists of stages, as will now be shown.


List 2

The second of the five lists to be considered occurs at three different places in the Majjhima. 16 Its three occurrences are identical as regards content, though differing slightly in mode of presentation. We examine first the presentation in the Cu{aHatthipadopama-sutta, the Lesser Discourse on the Simile of the Elephant's Footprints,l7 That sutta relates how a brahman

. named JaQ.ussoQ.i goes to see Gotama after hearing his attainments praised in terms of a simile: Just as an elephant-tracker, seeing in the forest a great footprint, long and broad, knows that a great elephant has passed that way, so people seeing the "footprints" of the Tathagata know him to be a fully self-awakened one. Gotama explains to JaQ.ussoQ.i the nature of these "footprints" by describing a series of twelve stages in an aspirant's progress to liberation. The series may be summarized as follows. IS

1. Dhammalsaddhiilpabbajja: A layman hears a Buddha teach the Dhamma, comes to have faith in him, and decides to take ordination as a monk.

2. sfla: He adopts the moral precepts. 3. indriyasa7(l,vara: He practises "guarding the six sense-doors." 4. sati-sampajanna: He practises mindfulness and self-posses

sion (actually described as mindfulness of the body, kayanussati). 5. jhiina 1: He finds an isolated spot in which to meditate,

purifies his mind of the hindrances (nfvaralJa), and attains the first rupa-jhana. 6.Jhiina 2: He attains the second jhiina. 7. jhiina 3: He attains the third jhiina. 8. jhiina 4: He attains the fourth jhiina. 9. pubbenivasanussati-nalJa: He recollects his many former exis

tences in sa7(l,sara. 10. sattana7(l, cutupapata-nalJa: He observes the death and rebirth of beings according to their karmas. 11. asavakkhaya-nalJa: He brings about the destruction of the asavas (cankers), and attains a profo~nd realization of (as opposed to mere knowledge about) the four noble truths. 19

12 JIABS VOL.. 7 NO.2

12. virnutti: He perceives that he is now liberated, that he has done what was to be done. The description of stage 5 (jhana 1) begins with a resume of the preceding three stages: "Equipped with this ariyan moral Conduct [stage 2], equipped with this ariyan guarding of the sense_ doors [stage 3], equipped with this ariyan mindfulness and selfpossession [stage 4], he .... " This affirms the cumulative nature of the series up to that point. The description of each of the stages 5 to 12 concludes with the statement: "This, brahman, is a footprint of the Tathagata .... " There are, therefore, eight "footprints."

To discover how this series of stages relates to the tenfold path, the two lists will now be compared, item by item, making

. use of Gotama's definitions of the path-factors as given in the M aha-S atipatthana-sutta. 20

Stage 1 in the "footprint" series has three components: (i) hearing a Buddha teach, (ii) coming to have faith in him, and (iii) deciding to take ordination as a monk. Of these, (i) and (ii) imply acquiring a basic knowledge of, and confidence in, the Buddha's teaching. Now the first factor of the tenfold path, sarnrna-ditthi (right view), is defined as knowledge about the four noble truths. 2 ! Since the four noble truths constitute the essence of the Buddha's teaching, it follows that the first pathfactor, sarnrna-diUhi, is functionally equivalent to components (i) and (ii) of stage 1 in the "footprint" series. 22

The second path-factor, sarnrna-sankappa (right aspiration or resolve), is defined as aspiration towards renunciation, nonhatred, and non-harming. Of these three, the second and third (aspiration towards non-hatred and non-harming) ate expected of all Buddhists, being presupposed in the adoption of the silas. The first (aspiration towards renunciation) is less generally expected, being the essence of the decision to become a monk. The first aspect of right aspiration is therefore equivalent to component (iii) of stage 1 in the "footprint" series. It follows that stage 1 of List 2 is broadly equivalent to the first and second path-factors together.

Stage 2 of List 2, adopting the moral precepts (sila), corresponds to right speech, action, and livelihood together, that is, to the third, fourth, and fifth path-factors.


Stage 3, guarding the six sense-doors, consists, according to the sutta, in preventing the arising of unskilful mental states in response to stimuli received through the six senses. Now the sixth path-factor, sammii-viiyiima (right effort), is defined as the practice of the four padhiinas (exertions): (i) preventing the arising of unarisen unskilful mental states, (ii) eliminating already arisen unskilful states, (iii) encouraging the arising of unarisen skilful states, and (iv) consolidating already arisen skilful states. The first of these four is identical with guarding the sensedoors. Consequently, stage 3 corresponds to the first component of the sixth path-factor.

Stage 4, mindfulness and self-possession, is actually described as mindfulness of the body, that is the first of the four components of the seventh path-factor, sammii-sati. (The remaining three are mindfulness of feelings (vedanii), mind (citta), and dhammas.)

Stages 5 to 8 cover the development of the four Jhiinas. These four are therefore collectively equivalent to the eighth path-factor, sammii-samiidhi, which is defined as mastery of the jhanas.

Stages 9 to 12 are described in the sutta as follows. 23

Stage 9:

Thus with the mind composed, quite purified, ... immovable, he directs and bends down his mmd to the knowledge and recollection of former habitations. He recollects a variety of former habitations, thus: one birth, two births, three ... four ... five ... ten ... twenty ... thirty ... forty ... fifty ... a hundred ... a thousand ... a hundred thousand births, and many an eon of integration, and many an eon of disintegration, and many an eon of integration-disintegration: "Such a one was I by name, having such and such a clan, such and such a colour, so was I nourished, such and such pleasant and painful experiences were mine, so did the span of life end. Passing from this, I came to be in another state where I was such a one by name, ... so did the span of life end. Passing from this I arose here." Thus he recollects divers former habitations in all their modes and detail.


Stage 10:

With the mind composed, ... he directs and bends down his mind to the knowledge of the passing hence and the arising of beings. With the purified deva-vision surpassing that of men, he sees beings as they pass hence or come to be; he comprehends that beings are mean, excellent, comely, ugly, well-going, ill-going, according to the consequences of deeds, and thinks: "Indeed these worthy beings who were possessed of wrong conduct in body, speech, and mind, ... at the breaking up of the body after dying, have arisen in a sorrowful state, a bad bourne, the abyss, Niraya Hell. But these worthy beings who were possessed of good conduct in body, speech, and mind, ... at the breaking up of the body after dying, have arisen in a good bourne, a heaven world." Thus wIth the purified deva-vision surpassing that of men does he see beings as they pass hence and as they arise.

Stage II:

With the mind composed, ... he directs and bends down his mind to the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers. He realizes as it really is: This is suffering .... This is the arising of suffering .... This is the cessation of suffering .... This is the course leading to the cessation of suffering. He realizes as it really is: These are the cankers .... This IS the arising of the cankers .... This is the cessation of the cankers .... This is the course leading to the cessation of the cankers.

Stage 12:

Knowing thus, seeing thus, his mind is freed from the canker of sense-pleasures, ... of becoming, ... of ignorance. In freedom the knowledge comes to be: I am liberated; and he comprehends: Destroyed is birth, brought to a close in the Brahma-faring, done is what was to be done, there is no more of being such or so.

These four stages of List 2 are together identical with the three supernormal knowledges (v0jiis) that Gotama attained on the night of his enlightenment. In the Tipitaka, .Gotama frequently recounts how, having stilled his mind by practising the


jMnas, he developed a series of three supernormal knowledges, one in each of the three watches of the night. 24 The first knowledge is identical with stage 9 of List 2, the second with stage 10, and the third with stages 11 and 12 together.

In List 2, the set of three stages 9 to 11 is preceded by the jMnas and followed by liberation; and, similarly, in the tenfold path the ninth factor, samma-iiarJa, is preceded by the jhanas (samma-samadhi) and followed by liberation (samma-vimutti). Since, in addition, stages 9 to 11 all bear names ending in "-iiarJa," it is clear that the three are together equivalent to the ninth path-factor, samma-iiiirJa.

It follows from the above that Lists 1 and 2 are related as shown in Table 1. Some of the correspondences shown are only partial: indriyasar(lvara (guarding the sense-doors, stage 3 of List 2) is only the first of the four aspects of samma-vayama (right effort); and, similarly, sati-sampajaiiiia (stage 4) is only the first of the four aspects of samma-sati. Nevertheless the correspondence is so close as to indicate that Lists 1 and 2 are differently worded accounts of a single course of practice. The two lists differ mainly in emphasis: List 1 tends to subdivide earlier stages (e.g., dividing s'ila into three components), while List 2 tends to subdivide later stages (e.g., dividing samma-iiarJa into three).

A further correlation between Lists 1 and 2 has to do with their cumulative nature. List 2 is explicitly stated to be cumulative as far as jhana 1 (stage 5); the description of that stage begins: "Equipped with this ariyan moral conduct, ... guarding of the sense-doors, ... mindfulness and self-possession, ... " Similarly, as noted above, the account of List 1 given in the Mahacattar'isaka-sutta indicates that the tenfold path is cumulative as far as right concentration. Thus, in both List 1 and List 2 the series is stated to be cumulative as far as the practice of the jhanas.

The above analysis of List 2 is based on the presentation found in the Cifla-Hatthipadopama-sutta. There exist two other presentations of List 2, which, however, differ only trivially from the above. In the Cifla-Sakuludayi-sutta,25 the refrain "This, brahman, is a footprint of the Tathagata . , ." is replaced by "This is a thing superior and more excellent, for the sake of realizing which monks fare the Brahma-faring under me"; and


this refrain occurs only seven times instead of eight, because stages II and 12 are combined into a single item. In the Kanda_ raka-sutta26 there is no such refrain, so that it is unclear how many stages are recognized. But these are the only differences among the three occurrences of List 2; the total course of practice described is identical.

List 3

In the Maha-Assapura-sutta, Gotama instructs his monks in the "things that are to be done by recluses and brahmans," giving the following list. 27

l. hirilottappa: The recluse or brahman cultivates a sense of shame and fear of blame.

2. parisuddha kaya-samacara: He cultivates pure conduct of body.

3. parisuddha vaci-samacara: He cultivates pure conduct of speech.

4. parisuddha mano-samacara: He cultivates pure conduct of mind.

5. parisuddha ajzva: He cultivates pure livelihood. 6. indriyasa'J!lvara: He guards the six sense-doors. 7. bhojane mattannuta: He exercises restraint in eating. S. jagariya: He practises wakefulness. 9. sati-sampajanna: He is mindful and self-possessed.

10.jhana 1: He attains the firstjhana.

13. jhana 4: He attains the fourth jhana. 14. pubbenivasanussati-narJa: He recollects his former existences. 15. sattana'J!l cutupapata-narJa: He observes the death and rebirth of beings. 16. asavakkhaya-narJalvimutti: He destroys the asavas, realizes the four noble truths, and perceives that he is liberated.

The description of stage 1 begins with the question: "And what, monks, are the things to be done by recluses and brahmans?"; and the descriptions of stages 2 to 10 begin with "And what, monks, is there further to be done?" For the remaining stages, 11 to 16, this formula is lacking. There are, therefore, apparently ten "things to be done," of which the tenth com-


pris~S the four jhanas and the three knowJedges, including liberatIOn. . Each stage up to the ninth closes with a summary of the stages thus far completed: Stage 1: "Weare endowed with a sense of shame and fear of

blame." Stage 2: "We are endowed with a sense of shame and fear of

blame; our conduct of body is quite pure." Stage 3: "Weare endowed with a sense of shame and fear of

blame; our conduct of body is quite pure; our conduct of speech is quite pure."

And so on up to: Stage 9: "We are endowed with a sense of shame and fear of

blame; our conduct of body is quite pure; ... we are intent on wakefulness; we are mindful and self-possessed .... "

No such summarizing formula is provided for stages 10 to 16. This situation resembles that already noted in Lists 1 and 2: the series is stated to be cumulative as far as jhana 1.

Four of the stages of List 3, namely stages 1, 4, 7, and 8, introduce terms not encountered in Lists 1 or 2. Stage 1 consists in cultivating a sense of shame (hiri) and fear of blame (ottappa). These two qualities are explained elsewhere as follows:

He [the ariyan disciple] comes to have shame (hiri); he is ashamed of wrong conduct of body, of wrong conduct of speech, of wrong conduct of mind .... He comes to fear blame (ottappa); he fears blame for wrong conduct of body, for wrong conduct of speech, for wrong conduct of mind .... 28

Hiri and ottappa as described would clearly be conducive to adherence to precepts and conventional codes of morality; their position in List 3, immediately before the silas (stages 2-5), is therefore as one would expect. Again, hiri and ottappa have much in common with samma-sankappa of List 1 (aspiration towards non-harming, etc.), which similarly comes immediately before the silas. Stage 7, restraint in eating, is a special case of guarding the sense-doors-in effect "guarding the tastedoor." This is made clear in the concluding words of the textual


description, which emphasize control of unskilful mental states: "Thus, I will eliminate old feeling and will not give rise to new feeling."29 It is, therefore, appropriate that in the list this stage is located next to guarding the sense-doors.' Stage 8, wakeful_ ness, is closely allied to both guarding the sense-doors and satisampajanna: the monk practising it attempts to cleanse his mind of obstructive states, and is described as sato sampajano.30 Here, again, the position in the list is appropriate. Thus, each of the stages 1, 7, and 8 is located in the series where it seems logically to belong, and the three add little that is new.

The remaining new item, pure conduct of mind (parisuddha mano-samacara, stage 4) is less straightforward. Being a mental discipline or condition, pure conduct of mind appears out of place among the physical sllas. That it should follow pure conduct of body and speech is not, in itself, anomalous, firstly because mental discipline (the samadhi group) always follows physical discipline (the szla group); and secondly because the triad "body, speech, and mind" (items 2, 3, and 4 of List 3) occurs frequently in sutta references to conduct. (It occurs, for example, in the explanation of hirilottappa quoted above, and in the description of the second knowledge, observing the death and rebirth of beings (stage 10 of List 2).) What is anomalous about the position of pure conduct of mind in List 3 is the fact that it is followed by pure livelihood; a mental discipline or condition is thus illogically located between two forms of physical discipline.

Pure livelihood is a widely recognized category of szla. Several suttas in the D'igha describe the well-disciplined monk as " ... equipped with skilful action of body and speech, pure in livelihood ... ";:\ I and the szla section of the eightfold or tenfold path comprises right speech, action, and livelihood. There exist, therefore, two widely recognized triads relating to conduct: (i) pure conduct of body, speech, and mind; and (ii) right speech, action, and livelihood. The set of items 2 to 5 in List 3, in which pure conduct of body"speech, and mind is illogically followed by pure livelihood, therefore has the appearance of a hybrid, produced by combining these two triads thus:

BUDDHIST PATH TO LIBERATION

Triad (i) + pure conduct of body pure conduct of sp.eech pure conduct of mmd

Triad (ii) right speech right action right livelihood

---7 Composite pure conduct of body pure conduct of speech pure conduct of mind pure livelihood

19

The likely significance of this will be considered below. First, however, we examine a second anomaly to be found in the early part of List 3. It concerns the item hirilottappa. In other lists where hiri and ottappa occur, they are invariably reck

·oned as two separate items-unlike, for example, sati-sampa-janna, which is always reckoned as a single item. Examples are to be found in the panca balani (five powers): saddha, hiri, ottappa, viriya, panna (faith; shame, fear of blame, energy, insight),3~ and the satta saddhamma (seven excellent qualities): saddha, hiri, ottappa, bahussuta, viriya, sati, panna (faith, shame, fear of blame, hearing much, energy, mindfulness, insight).:l3

Two anomalies in the early part of List 3 have now been noted: (a) the illogical positions of pure conduct of mind and pure livelihood, suggesting a combination of the two familiar triads; and (b) the atypical treatment of hiri and ottappa as a single stage. These two anomalies are in one respect complementary: the first amounts to the addition of an extra stage, the second effectively reduces the total number of stages by one. This suggests that the two are perhaps associated aspects of a single textual corruption. The observed facts can be accounted for with the following hypothesis:

The list of ten "things to be done by recluses and brah-mans" formerly began thus:

1. hiri 2. ottappa 3. pure conduct of body 4. pure conduct of speech 5. pure livelihood 6. guarding the sense-doors

etc. Monks responsible for memorizing and transmitting this list

20 JIARS VOL 7 NO.2

were also familiar with the triad of conduct in body, speech and mind. Since the list contained the first and second mem~ bers of this triad, they added the third member; and to compensate for the resulting increase in the number of "things to be done," they simultaneously combined hiri and ottappa into a single item. This corruption-which may have been carried out largely unconsciously-went undetected because the list occurred only once in the entire Tipitaka (in the Maha-Assapura_ sutta).34 Hence the list as we now have it.

Even without allowing for textual corruption in the manner postulated above, it is evident that List 3 is essentially equivalent to Lists 1 and 2. This can readily be seen in Table 2, which sets out the lists in parallel. In its earlier part, List 3 more closely resembles List 1, recognizing the same broad division of sfla; in its latter part, it more closely resembles List 2, giving the same full enumeration of the jhiinas and knowledges. Thus, Lists 1, 2, and 3 represent, with certain differences in emphasis, one and the same course of practice.

List 4

In the Sekha-sutta, Ananda is called on by Gotama to teach a . "learner's course" to a group of disciples. 35 Ananda begins by

enumerating the stages 1 to 6 listed below. Then, after explaining them one by one, he states that an ariyan disciple who has completed this "learner's course" becomes "one for successful breaking through," like a chick that is ready to break out of the egg-shell. He then describes three "breakings through," making nine stages in all: 1. sfla: An ariyan disciple adopts the moral precepts. 2. indriyasarrz,vara: He guards the sense-doors. 3. bhojane mattannuta: He exercises restraint in eating. 4. jagariya: He practises wakefulness.

·5. satta saddhamma: He develops the seven "excellent qualities." 6. jhiina: He attains without difficulty the four jhiinas. 7. pubbenivasanussati-na1Ja: He recollects his former existences. 8. sattanarrz, cutupapata-na7Ja: He observes the death and rebirth of beings.


9. asavakkhaya-narJ,alvimutti: He destroys the asavas and perceives that he is liberated.

The clear division of the list into two sections (stages 1-6 and stage 7-:-9) is emphasized in several ways. First, there is a difference in the refrains which conclude the descriptions of the stages: stages 1 to 6 conclude with "It is thus, Mahanama, that an ariyan disciple ... "; while stages 7 to 9 conclude with "This is the first ( ... second ... third) breaking through as a chick's from the egg-shell." Second, at the end of his discourse Ananda states that stages 1 to 6 constitute carary,a (practice), while stages 7 to 9 constitute vijja (insight, wisdom). Third, the description of stage 7 is prefaced with a resume of the stages mastered thus far: "When, Mahanama, an ariyan disciple is thus equipped with moral conduct, is one who thus guards his sense-doors, ... is one who thus acquires at will, without trouble, without difficulty, the four jhanas, ... "

The only item in List 4 that has not been encountered in earlier lists is satta saddhamma, the seven excellent qualities. The seven are given as saddha, hiri, ottappa, bahussuta, viriya, sati, panna (faith, sense of shame, fear of blame, hearing much, energy, mindfulness, insight), and each is briefly defined. (This list, and the definitions for hiri and ottappa, are as quoted above in the discussion of List 3.)

The presence of satta saddhamma in fifth position in List 4 disrupts an otherwise close correspondence with Lists 1,2, and 3; the resemblance among the four lists would have been virtually complete had the fifth position of List 4 been occupied not by satta saddhamma but by sati-sampajanna. The item satta saddhamma is itself a list of separate items. Such lists within lists are common; for example, each of the stages szla, sati-sampajairiia, and samma-samadhi embraces a set of sub-stages, which are often enumerated in full in the explanations accompanying lists. However, the case of the saddhammas is different in two important respects: (a) Two of the seven saddhammas duplicate stages already present in the larger list (i.e., in List 4 as a whole): viriya (energy) is described in the sutta as "for getting rid of unskilled mental states, for acquiring skilled mental states ... ", indicating that it duplicates guarding the sense-doors, stage 2 of List 4;36 and panna (insight, wisdom) appears to duplicate stages 7 to 9,


which Ananda groups under the heading vijja. (b) A further three of the seven saddhammas are inappropriately placed in the larger list: saddha, hiri, and ottappa properly belong before sila (stage 1 of List 4), as was shown in the discussion of Lists 2 and 3. Of the two remaining saddhammas, one, bahussuta (hearing much), has not been encountered before, and its status vis-a.-vis the other stages is difficult to evaluate. The other, sati (mindful_ ness), is the only one of the seven that is located where it appears to belong, for as noted above, the satta saddhamma occupy the spot where one would expect to find sati-sampajafi:na.

The existence of the anomalies (a) and (b) above indicates that we probably have here another case of textual corruption. The superficial similarity of the terms satta saddhamma and satisampajanna suggests that the corruption may have taken place as follows: The "learner's course" formerly had, as its fifth stage, sati-sampajanna. Later, this term was accidentally replaced by the superficially similar satta saddhamma, either through mishearing in chanting or through misreading in the copying of manuscripts; and later again, as part of a general explicatory elaboration, a listing of the individual saddhammas was added. This corruption went unnoticed because List 4 occurred only once in the Sutta-Pitaka.

If allowance is made for this postulated textual corruption, List 4 comes into close correspondence with Lists 1, 2, and 3. (See Table 2.) As regards content, it most closely resembles List 3, differing from it only in lacking hirilottappa. As regards the clear division into two sections, it is identical with List 1: in List 4 the stages up to and including the jhanas are referred to as the learner's course-also as cara1Ja (practice)-and set apart from the stages that follow them; and, as noted above, in List 1 the stages up to and including samma-samadhi are similarly referred to as the learner's course-more commonly as the noble eightfold path-and set apart from the stages that follow them.

On the other hand, there is one respect in which List 4 disagrees with the other lists. In Lists 1,2, and 3 the summaries of stages already mastered, which affirm the partially cumulative nature of the series, is prefaced to the jhanas; but, in List 4, it is prefaced to the first of the three knowledges, one stage lower in the series. In spite of this, it is apparent that List 4 is yet another statement of the same sequence of stages leading to liberation.


['ist 5

The fifth and last list to be con~idered occurs in the Samanfiaphala-sutta37 and elsewhere (see below). Gotama, questioned by King Ajatasattu regarding the "fruits of the life of a recluse," replies with the following series of stages:

1. Dhammalsaddhalpabbajja: A layman hears a Buddha teach the Dhamma, comes to have faith in him, and decides to take ordination as a monk. 2. sfla: He adopts the moral precepts. 3. indriyasarrtvara: He guards the six sense-doors. 4. sati-sampajanna: He is mindful and self-possessed. 5. santuHhi: He is content with his meagre robes and almsfood. 6. jhana 1: He attains the first jhana.

9. jhana 4: He attains the fourth jhiina. 10. na'f}adassana: He develops knowledge and insight into the nature of the body and into the distinction between it and the mind. 11. manomaya kaya: He practises calling up a mind-made body. 12. iddhividha: He develops certain miraculous physical powers, such as the ability to walk on water. 13. dibbasota: He develops the "divine ear," the ability to hear distant sounds. 14. cetopariya-na'f}a: He acquires the "knowledge that penetrates others'minds." 15. pubbenivasanussati-na'f}a: He recollects his former existences. 16. sattanarrt cutupapata-na'f}a: He observes the death and rebirth of beings. 17. asavakkhaya-na'f}alvimutti: He destroys the asavas, realizes the four noble truths, and perceives that he is now liberated. (Some texts add bhojane mattannuta (restraint in eating) after indriyasarrtvara. )38

The description of each of the stages 2 to 5 opens with the question "And how, 0 king, does the monk ... ?" and closes with the corresponding answer "Thus, 0 king, does the monk .... " This question-and-answer format is then abandoned; each of the remaining stages, 6 to 17, instead closes with the refrain, "This, 0 king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse." Stages 2 to 5 are summarized in a preface to stage 6


(jhana 1): "Equipped with this ariyan moral conduct [stage 2], equipped with this ariyan guarding of the sense-doors [stage 3], equipped with this ariyan mindfulness and self-possession [stage 4], equipped with this ariyan contentment [stage 5], he .... "39 Thus, in this respect, List 5 is in complete agreement with Lists 1,2, and 3.

List 5 contains six stages not found in the other four lists. The first of them is stage 5, santutthi (contentment), described as a readiness on the part of the monk to make do with his meagre robes and alms-food, travelling everywhere with them, as a bird with its two wings. 40 Actually, a paragraph identical in wording with the description of this stage does occur in List 2; however, it is not there recognized as a separate stage, but, instead, is included as the last of the many sub-items under the heading szla. 41 The relationship between Lists 2 and 5 in respect of santutthi is, therefore, as shown in Table 3. This situation suggests that in one or the other of these two lists santutthi has been shifted. However, it is not easy to say which of the two positions of santutthi is more appropriate and therefore likely to be the earlier. On the one hand, santutthi is of a type with the szlas since it has to do with two of the monk's basic requisites, his robes and his alms-food-whence it is appropriately placed, as in List 2; and on the other hand, santutthi appears to be a form of mental discipline, resembling the elimination of the mental hindrances (nzvarar;,a), which is a prerequisite to the attainment of the first jhana-whence its position in .List 5 seems equally appropriate. Thus, on this criterion, neither of the two lists can be seen as more likely to have preserved the earlier arrangement. It may be that in an earlier form of List 5 santutthi was combined with szla as in List 2, and later became separated from it and shifted to a new position two places further down the list; or it may be that the shift took place in the reverse direction in the development of List 2. Examination of other lists containing santutthi does little to clarify the matter. There exists a list (it departs too widely from the "path" pattern to be eligible for inclusion in the present study), in which santutthi is located between viriya (= indriyasa'f[lvara) and sati.42 This position is intermediate between those of List 2 and List 5, which lends support to the suggestion that santutthi has undergone a shift. However, the question whether the movement was upwards or downwards in the series remains unresolved.43


The remaining five new items in List 5, grouped as stages 10 to 14 between the jhiinas and the three knowledges, are all supernormal powers. They are said to be possessed by the Buddha; howev~r, their importance in the attaining of enlighten-1Ilent and liberation is doubtful. According to Gotama's frequently repeated account of his own enlightenment,44 he proceeded directly from mastery of the jhiinas (stage 9 of List 5) to recollection of his former existences (stage 15); no mention is made there of attainments corresponding to stages 10 to 14. In the case of the iddhis (stage 12), Gotama actually warns against their practice as dangerous and a potential obstruction to progress. For example, in the Kevaddha-sutta he says: "It is because I see danger in the practice of the iddhis that I loathe and abhor and am ashamed of them."45 It therefore appears that the five items 1 0 to 14 are optional extras rather than essential stages on the path to liberation.46 J"

, If we bracket out these five items, as well as the inconsistent stage 5, santuUhi, the result is a sequence indentical with that of List 2. (Those versions of List 5 which add bhojane mattannutii after indriyasarp,vara are in that respect in agreement with Lists 3 and 4. See Table 2.)

List 5 is repeated in nine other suttas, all grouped with the Siimannaphala in the Silakkhandha-vagga of the DzghaY The list therefore dominates that vagga, occurring in ten of its thirteen suttas (suttas 2-8, 10-12). However, as is usual in cases where a list is reiterated in closely grouped suttas, needless repetition of lengthy portions of text is avoided by liberal use of the abbreviatory device pe, the Pali equivalent of our sign " ... ". (Since List 5, with its many sub-lists and explanations, extends over some twenty pages of text, the saving in space is considerable.) The list is therefore set out in full only at its first occurrence, that is, in the Siimannaphala. In effect, then, List 5 occurs only once in the Tipitaka, a fact that is relevant to the question of possible textual corruption involving santuUhi. The only noteworthy differences among the ten occurrences of List 5 have to do with the mode of division into groups of stages. Mostly, the division is as in the Siimannaphala, with a clear split after stage 5; however, in three suttas it is different. In the AmbaUha-sutta there is a split into two groups of stages, 1-9 and 10-1"7, called, like their counterparts in List 4, cara1Ja and vijjii respectively;48 and, in the Kassapaszhaniida- and Subha-suttas, there is a split into


three groups, 1-2, 3-9, and 10-17, called respectively sUa, samadhi (or citta-sampada), and panna. 49 The significance of these groupings will be considered below.

Summary and assessment

This completes the preliminary comparison of Lists 1 to 5. The demonstrated relationships among them are summarized in Table 2. There, Lists 3 and 4 are shown as they would have been before the postulated corruptions, and List 5 is shown with the inconsistent santutthi omitted.

To conclude on the basis of Table 2 that the five lists are essentially identical entails a certain circularity of argument: the far-reaching correspondence apparent in the table is in part a consequence of minor modifications to Lists 3, 4, and 5 to correct for postulated textual corruptions; and it is in part in order to account for observed departures from perfect correspondence that those corruptions are postulated. However, observed departures from perfect correspondence are not the only basis for the inference that there has been textual corruption in some of the lists. In each case, there exist associated anomalies sufficient in themselves to indicate corruption, as well as conditions that clearly would have been conducive to corruption. Thus, in List 4, which has the seven saddhammas where the other four lists have mindfulness and self-possession, there exists the associated anomaly that two of the seven saddhammas duplicate stages already present in the list, while a further three are inappropriately located in the total sequence; and the superficial resemblance between the terms satta saddhamma and sati-sampajanna, combined with the fact that List 4 occurs only once in the Tipitaka, provides an adequate basis for explaining how the corruption could have come about. As an interpretative procedure, postulating textual corruption is naturally to be used only with caution. The subjective element which such postulation necessarily entails is minimized by the technique adopted here of comparing several broadly similar lists of items. The present study thus illustrates a methodology that may prove more generally applicable as an objectively based means for identifying corruptions in Buddhist texts.


Even after allowance has been made for textual corruption, there remain several factors tending to mask the essential identity of the five lists shown in Table 2. The most obvious one is inconsistency in terminology: often one and the same practice or attainment is referred to by different terms. Some of the synonymies are self-evident and trivial, for example, "sammasati (List 1) = sati-sampajaiiiia (Lists 2-5)." Others become apparent only when reference is made to the available definitions, for example, "samma-vayama (List 1) = indriya-saf!1,vara (Lists 2-5) = viriya (one of the seven saddhammas)." Recognizing such synonymies is clearly an important step in interpreting Buddhist doctrine. It is greatly facilitated by the comparative procedure adopted here.

A second obscuring factor is variation, from list to list, in the degree of fineness with which the total course of practice is divided up. For example, where List 1 has the single stage samma-samadhi, Lists 2, 3, and 5 each recognize four stages, jhiina 1, ... jhiina 4. In this case, the needed equation, "sammasamadhi = the four jhanas," is readily established, thanks to definitions provided in the texts. However, in the case of less well documented practices it is not so simple. An important example is the equation, "samma-iiary,a (List 1) = the three knowledges (Lists 2-5)." This identity, though it can be inferred with some confidence, is not immediately apparent, and consequently has hitherto not been generally recognized.

In the case of the last-mentioned identity, another obscuring factor is inconsistency in the treatment of the final attainment, vimutti. In List 1, and in the Ci1:la-Hatthipadopama presentation of List 2, vimutti is set apart as a separate stage; elsewhere, it is comprehended under the third knowledge. This kind of inconsistency is widespread. For example, Lists 3 and 4 (and variant versions of List 5 as well) have restraint in eating (bhojane mattaiiiiuta) as a separate stage following guarding the sense-doors, of which it is a special case. The result is an appearance of difference between lists where no real difference exists. This phenomenon accounts also for the lack, in List 4, of an evident counterpart for the stage DhammalsaddhiilpabbaJja of Lists 2 and 5: the seemingly missing stage is in fact comprehended under szla. Evidence that this is so comes from two sources. The first is the mode of grouping the stages of List 5 as


presented in the Kassapasihaniida- and Subha-suttas. There a , s noted above, the stages are recognized as falling into three groups, termed sila, samiidhi (or citta-sampadii), and panna, the first point of division being located after the stage sila, and the second after Jhiina 4. The sila group, therefore, embraces the stages DhammalsaddhiilpabbaJJii and sila-from which it is evident that Dhammalsaddhiilpabbajjii was regarded not as a separate stage but as a subdivision of the stage sila. The second source of evidence is the fact that the cumulative summaries for Lists 2 and 5 do not include an item Dhammalsaddhiilpabba;ja. This indicates again that hearing a Buddha teach the Dhamma coming to have faith in him, and deciding to become a monk were reckoned as subsumed under the heading of sUa. All of this serves to point out that the recognizing (in the early part of this study) of DhammalsaddhiilpabbaJjii as a stage distinct from sila, was merely an expedient device designed to reduce the lengthy textual accounts to a manageable form. While it seems reasonable that hearing a Buddha teach, and so on, should be recognized as a stage distinct from adoption of the moral precepts, it appears that the compiler(s) of the lists saw it otherwise: in the texts those earliest experiences and practices of the aspirant are treated as part of the stage sila.

In view of the existence of so many obscuring factorsalong with the textual corruptions identified earlier- it is little wonder that the essential identity of the lists in question has hithertp generally escaped notice. Nevertheless, the overriding consistency among the five lists is unmistakable.

A striking example of this consistency is to be found in the cumulative summaries which are provided with all of the five lists. Except in List 4, the summaries consistently embrace all stages from the beginning down to the first jhiina. The probable significance of this fact becomes apparent when one considers what the higher stages of the path would entail in practical terms. A monk practising the jhiinas or the three knowledges would still be possessed of sila, guarded sense-doors, and mindfulness. However, whereas the attainment of the first jhana would not entail abandoning these earlier stages, attainment of the second jhiina would entail abandoning the first jhiina. So much can be inferred from accounts of the jhiinas: the factor vitakka-vicara, present in Jhiina 1, is absent from jhiina 2 ;50 jhanas 1 and 2 cannot, therefore, be practised simultaneously. Similar


reasoning applies for the remaining jhiinas. In the transition froID the jhiinas to the first of the three knowledges, much the same situation appears to exist. Descriptions of the first knowledge indicate rich and varied mental content (detailed memoties of former existences);51 the attaining of this knowledge, therefore, clearly entails abandoning the mental onepointedness (cittass' ekaggata) of the jhiinas. 52 These admittedly speculative inferences regarding the nature of the higher practice are in keeping with the fact that the cumulative summaries accompanying the lists extend as far as the first jhiina but not beyond it. The exceptional case of List 4, in which the summaries extend to the first knowledge, remains unexplained.

The reasoning presented in the preceding paragraph indicates that the first jhiina is "in one respect a pivotal point in the course of practice. As far as the first jhiina, the series is cumulative: each stage is added to its predecessors; thereafter, the series is partly substitutive: each stage replaces its immediate predecessor. This may explain why, in three of the five lists, there is a marked difference in the mode of presentation beginning with

,jhiina 1. In List 2, the term "footprint of the Tathagata" is applied to each of the stages from jhiina 1 to the end, but not to the stages preceding jhiina I; in List 3 each of the stages up to and including jhiina 1, but none of the stages following it, is

,-- described as a "thing to be done"; and, in List 5 as presented in the Samannaphala-sutta, the term "fruit of the life of a recluse" is

, applied to each of the stages from jhiina 1 to the end but not to the stages preceding it. (The same phenomenon is found in five other suttas containing List 5, though different terms are used.)53

This recognizing of the stages beginning with jhiina 1 as constituting a group apart from the remainder is not found in Lists 1 and 4; there, as noted earlier, it is the stages following jhana 4, i.e., the three knowledges and vimutti, that are set apart. The lists examined therefore divide up the total course of practice in two main ways. One way (List 2, List 3, and most versions

, of List 5) is apparently intended to emphasize the transition, at jhana 1, from a cumulative series to a substitutive; the other' (List 1, List 4, and some versions of List 5) is apparentJy intended to emphasize the unique and very advanced nature of the three knowledges and resulting liberation.

This last point is relevant to a suggestion made early in this


paper regarding the noble eightfold path: as a summary of Gotama's course of practice, the eightfold path, lacking as it does the stages sammii-iiiiTJa and sammii-vimutti, appears to be incomplete. This raises the problem why this incomplete account of the course of practice should have been given so much prominence in the Tipitaka.

One possible explanation would be that right insight (sammii-iiiiTJa) , despite its seemingly crucial importance in the course of practice, perhaps does not really need to be mentioned. This would be the case if, as many present-day Buddhists assume, the three knowledges are not meditative techniques which the meditator must take up after mastering the jhiinas, but, instead, are spontaneously arising insights which come of themselves once the mind has been properly prepared for them through jhiina practice. This possibility appears, however, to be incompatible with the nature of the three knowledges as described in the texts. The Tipitaka account of recollection of former existences (the first of the three), though too brief to provide much guidance on this point, does suggest an effortful, intentional practice: " ... he directs and bends down his mind (citta'J!!- abhinfharati abhininniimeti) to the knowledge and recollection of former habitations .... "54 The more detailed Visuddhimagga account does make clear that the practice entails a systematic, active attempt to recall past experiences, and gives practical advice on how this should be done."" The notion that insight will arise spontaneously once the jhiinas have been per- . fected also appears to be at odds with the recognition of insight meditation (vipassanii) as a discrete mode of practice following. on, and superior to, concentration practice (samatha). Again, if insight arises spontaneously in the manner suggested, then there is nothing to distinguish Gotama's course of practice from those of his early teachers (from whom he learnt the jhiinas) , or, indeed, from those of the meditative yoga schools, in which the perfecting of jhiina is the principal practical goal."() It was precisely its emphasis on insight as an achievement superior to jhiina that set Gotama's teaching apart from those of other samanas. As Pande rightly says, "His [Gotama's] originality appears to have consisted in the association of Samadhi and Panna in order to advance from the Jhanas to the Three Vijjas and Sambodhi."57 Clearly, this advance from the jhiinas to the three vijjiis (knowledges) does not come about spontaneously.


A second possible explanation for the high status accorded the eightfold path is provided by the widely accepted notion that insight (panna) is covered by the first stage, samma-diHhi (right view).58 This interpretation is rendered superficially plausible by the fact, noted earlier, that the texts equate sammaditthi with knowledge of the four noble truths. However, the k~~wledge of the four noble truths with which samma~ditthi is identified is merely described as dukkhe na'f}a1p" dukkhasamudaye fta'f}a1p" ... -knowledge about suffering, knowledge about the arising of suffering, etc.59 By contrast, the knowledge of the four noble truths which characterizes enlightenment, that is which comes with the third of the three know ledges, is described thus: So ida1p, dukkhan ti yathiibhuta1p, pajanati, aya1p, dukkhasamudayo ti yathabhllta1p, pajanati ... -He knows as it really is, "This is suffering"; he knows as it really is, "This is the arising of suffering"; etc. 50 This second description indicates a penetrating and direct realization, very different from the mere "knowledge about" represented by samma-ditthi. This suggests that samma-ditthi is an intellectual understanding of the truths sufficient to motivate a beginner to set out on the path, while samma-na'f}a (as perfected in the third knowledge) is the direct inner realization of the truths which brings liberation.

Those who would equate samma-ditthi with the panna group usually account for the anomaly that samma-ditthi comes first in the eightfold path rather than last by maintaining that the order of listing the path-factors is without significance: the eight factors, it is said, must be developed together rather than in a definite sequence.51 However, this claim conflicts with the

. textual statements, quoted in the analysis of List 1, regarding the sequential-and partly cumulative-nature of the path. It also conflicts with the abundant evidence provided by Table 2 for the importance of sequence in the course of practice.

The notion that samma-ditthi, the first-named stage of the eightfold path, corresponds to the attainment of panna (insight) is of great antiquity, appearing already in the cuta-Vedallasutta. 52 In that sutta, a nun named Dhammadinna is asked to explain how the eightfold path is related to the well-known division of the practice into three categories, sZla, samadhi, and panna (moral discipline, mental discipline, and insight). She answers that the two are related as shown in Table 4. This explanation entails a distortion of the sequence of listi~g: the


first two path-factors have to be transferred to the end of the list. In spite of this, Dhammadinna's interpretation has been widely accepted by commentators down to the present day.53

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the cause of the difficulty lies in the absence of the vital ninth and tenth stages. When one considers the tenfold path rather than the eightfold, it becomes clear that the true correspondences are as shown in Table 5.64 Support for this interpretation is to be found in the Kassapaszhanada- and Subha-suttas. As noted above those two suttas group the stages of List 5 into three sections a~ shown in Table 6. This mode of division is identical with that proposed here for the tenfold path.

There is a third possible explanation for the prominence given in the Tipitaka to the incomplete eightfold path. It may be that Gotama recognized that the practice of right insight (samma-na1Ja) was too difficult for most people, and therefore intentionally omitted it from his discourses except when instructing monks already well advanced in meditation. The eightfold path would thus have been the popular version, while the tenfold path (or its equivalents, Lists 2 to 5) was taught only to elite groups of advanced practitioners. This suggestion, however, raises some difficult and controversial issues which cannot be pursued further here.65

The present study has shown that the eightfold path is but one of several differently worded statements of Gotama's course of practice leading to liberation. Five alternative lists of stages have been examined; however, a preliminary survey of the Sutta-Pitaka indicates the existence of a further forty or more lists, all representing more or less completely the same path to liberation, and therefore all eligible for inclusion in an expanded version of the analysis presented here.55 (The seven saddhammas and the five powers, both discussed earlier, are examples.)67 It appears, then, that in teaching his path of practice, Gotama made use of many different, though essentially equivalent, summarizing lists of stages, but that for some unclear reason one of those lists, the noble eightfold path, was favoured by his followers to such an extent that it came to overshadow completely the many alternative versions.

Perhaps more important than the above specific conclusions regarding the textual accounts of the path is the demonstration of the efficacy of the methodology employed. It has


been shown that comparison of broadly similar lists of stages :an be a powerful tool in Buddhist textual analysis. Though ipplied here to a sample of just five lists, the technique is demonstrably . applicable to the wider corpus of lists mentioned Ibove, and to a variety of other lists of doctrinal items as well.

List 1 (Tenfold Path)

1. sammii-ditthi }

2. sammii-sankappa -

3. sammii-viicii I 4. sammii-kammanta =

5. sammii-iifiva

6. sammii-viiyiima

7. sammii-sati

8. sammii-samiidhi

9. sammii-iiii~w

lO. sammii-vimutti

List 2 (CiJ/a-H atthipadopama)

1. DhammalsaddlullpabbaJj"ii

2. sfla

3. indriyasaJ!2vara

4. sati-sampajariiia

5. jhiina 1

6. jhiina 2

7. jhiina 3

8. jhiina 4

19. pubbeniviisiinussati-iiii~w

10. sattiinaJ!2 cutUpapiita-iiiirJa

11. iisavakkhaya-iiiirJa

12. vimutti

Table 1. Correspondences between Lists 1 and 2.

List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 List 5

5. ditthi Dhamma/saddha/ Dhamma/saddha/ 5. san kappa pabbajja hiri, ottappa pabbajja 5. vaca p. kayasamacara 5. kammanta szla p. vaczsamacara sfla szla 5. ajfva p. ajfva 5. vayama indriyasa'f{tvara indriyasa'f{tvara indriyasarrwara indriyasa'f{tvara

bhojane mat. bhojane mat. (bhojane mat.) jagariya jagariya

5. sati satisampajanna satisampajanna satisampajanna satisampajanna jhana 1 jhana 1 jhana 1

s.samadhi jhana 2 jhana 2

4jhanas jhana 2

jhana 3 jhana 3 jhana 3 jhana 4 jhana 4 jhana 4

na'f!adassana etc. pubbenivas. pubbenivas. pubbenivas. pubbenivas. '

5. na'f!a cutiipapata. cutiipapata. cutiipapata. cutiipapata. asavakkhaya. asavakkhaya. / asavakkhaya.l asavakkhaya. /

5. vimutti vimutti vimutti vimutti vimutti

Table 2. Correspondences among the five lists. Lists 3 and 4 are shown as they would have been before the postulated corruptions came about, and List 5 is shown with the inconsistent santu{thi omitted.

,

Ul ....

<-. ..... >t;d IJJ

(3 l'

--l

Z o ~


List 2 List 5

1. Dhammalsaddhrilpabbajja --..... 1. DhammalsaddhrilpabbaJJa 2. szla (including -_ .................. _·2. szla . santutthi) "__ _---... 3. indriyasar[lvara 3. indriyasar[lvara ... :.a-c;_.><::._"'4. sati-sampajanna 4. sati-sampajaniia .. --- -"'5. santutthi 5.jhrina 1 ... - ..... --.... ---- ..... • 6. jhrina 1

etc. etc.

Table 3. Position of santutthi in Lists 2 and 5.

Eightfold Path Dhamma-kkhandhas

3. samma-viicii )

4. samma-k~mmanta = 1. szla

5. samma-aJzva

6. samma-vayama

)~ 7. samma-sati 2. samadhi

8. samma-samadhi

1. samma-ditthi

} 3.paiina 2. samma-sankappa

Table 4. Correspondence between the eightfold path and the three dhammakkhandhas, according to Dhammadinna.

36

Tenfold Path

1. samma-ditthi

2. samma-sankappa

3. samma-vaca

4.samma-kammanta

5.samma-afiva

6. samma-vayama

7. samma-sati

8. samma-samadhi

9. samma-nana }

10. samma-vimuttz

JIABS VOL. 7 NO.2

Dhammakkhandhas

1. szla

2.sam(ldhi

3. panna

Table 5. Proposed correspondence between the tenfold path and the three dhammakkhandhas.

BUDDHIST PATH TO LIBERATION

. List 5

Dhamma/saddha/

pabbajja

sila

indriyasar!wara

sati-sampajanna

jhiinas 1-4

iianadassana, etc. )

pubbenwasanussatz-

iiarJa etc.

Groupings

1. sila

2. samlidhi

3.paniia

37

Table 6. Groupings of stages according to the Kassapasihanadaand Subha-suttas.


NOTES

* I am grateful to N. Ross Reat and Martin Stuart-Fox of the University of Queensland for reading an earlier draft of this papc;r and offering valuable suggestions for improvement.

1. The noble eightfold path (sammii-ditthi, -sankappa, -viicii, -kammanta -iijiva, -viiyiima, -sati, -samiidhi), as the fourth of the four noble truths realized by Gotama in his enlightenment, figures prominently in the "first sermon" (S v 420-425) and many other suttas. The high status accorded it therefore appears, on the surface, well deserved.

2. D ii 217, iii 271,291,292, M i 44, 446-447, ii 29, iii 76, S ii 168, v 20, A ii 89, v 212-310. Translations are my own unless otherwise stated.

3. A v 244, 222, 237. 4. S v 20. 5. M iii 76. 6. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Introduction to vo!' 5 of The Book of the Gradual

Sayings (Anguttara-nikiiya), trans!' F.L. Woodward (London: Luzac & Co., 1955), pp. x-xi.

7. A v 189, 346. 8. A v 212-310. In most cases, however, the list appears merely as

"sammii-diHhi ... pe ... sammii-vimutti" and is accompanied by only one or two lines of text.

9. E.g., at D ii 312-313; 10. D ii 313. II. M iii 75-76. 12. This statement appears to conflict with the widely held view, early

expressed by the nun Dhammadinna (M i 30 I), that the first two path-factors, sammii-diHhi and sammii-sankappa, are equivalent to the third dhammakkhandha, pannii. This question will be discussed toward the end of the analysis.

13. M iii 71. 14. D i 206 etc. 15. D iii 273 etc. 16. M i 179-184,344-348, ii 38-39. 17. M i 175-184. 18. The terms DhammalsaddhiilpabbaJjii, sUa, etc., are adopted here to

stand in for the sometimes very lengthy descriptions given in the sutta. 19. So idar[L dukkhan ti yathiibhutar[L pajiiniiti, ayar[L dukkhasamudayo ti yathiib-

hUtar[L pajiiniiti, ... (M i 183) 20. Dii312-313. 2 L Dukkhe niir;ar[L, dukkhasamudaye niir;ar[L, .... 22. Here, again, the nature of sammii-diHhi comes into question. This

important point will be taken up towards the end of the analysis. 23. The translation follows closely that of I.B. Horner, departing from it

mainly for the sake of consistency in ter"minology. See I.B. Horner (trans!.) The Middle Length Sayings, vol 1 (London: Luzac & Co., 1967), pp. 28-29.

24. E.g., M i 22-23. 25. M i 339-349.


26. M ii 29-39. 27. M i 271-281. 28. M i 356. 29. M i 273. 30. M i 274. 31. E.g., n i 63. The inversion of bodily action and speech as between

this list and List 1 is trivial; the pancasfla agrees with List 3 in putting bodily action before speech.

32. A iii 9, v 123-124. The better-known set of five powers listed at D ii 120, etc., does not include hiri and ottappa.

33. D iii 252, M i 356. 34. Had the earlier list occurred in several suttas in different nikayas,

. palpable discrepancies would have resulted, thereby alerting the memorizers to the corruption. Thus, generally speaking, infrequent occurrence of a textual passage would be conducive to corruption of it.

35. M i 353-359. 36. M i 356. The identity of viriya with sammii-viiyiima and indriyasa'f{lvara,

already apparent from the description quoted, is further indicated by the definition of sammii-viiyiima given at D ii 312 ( ... chanda'f{l janeti viiyamati viriya'f{l iirabhati ... ) and the definitions of viriya and sammii-viiyiima given at DhammasangaYfi 11,12.

37. D i 62-85. 38. See D i 62, note 3. The counterpart of List 5 in the Chinese Tripi~aka

similarly includes this item, and further differs from the standard Pali version in omitting santu{{hi. (See Taisho No. 1(20) = A Mo Chou Ching.)

39. Di71. 40. Di71. 4l. M i 180. 42. A v 23-29, 89-9l. The list runs: sfla, ... viriya, santuUhi, sati, panna.

As shown above, viriya can be identified with indriyasa'f{lvara. (Cf. note 36 above.)

43. The Chinese version of List 2 has santutthi as a stage in its own right between sfla and indriyasa'f{lvara, thus providing a further intermediate form between List 2 and List 5. (See Taisho No. 26(146) = Hsiang Chi Yii Ching.)

44. E.g., M i 21-23. 45. D i 213. Paradoxically, this condemnation of the iddhis is followed by

the same list of seventeen stages (List 5), one of which is again mastery of the iddhis.

46. In the Chinese version (Taisho No. 1(20)) these five items are set apart under the group heading sheng fa, "superior dhammas."

47. D i 100, 124, 147, 157-158, 159-160, 171-174,206-209,214-215, 232-233.

48. D i 100. It is possible that the same division is followed in the SOYfa-da7!4a, but extensive use of pe obscures the situation (See D i 124.)

49. D i 171-174,206-209. 50. See, e.g., D i 73-76. 5l. See the description quoted earlier. The possible significance of the


three knowledges in terms of meditative practice is discussed in Rod Bucknell and Martin Stuart-Fox, "The 'three knowledges' of Buddhism: Implications of Buddhadasa's interpretation of rebirth," Religion, 13 (1983), pp. 99-112.

52. The lists always place recollection of former ej(istences directly after jhana 4, described as pure ekaggata.

53. D i 147, 157-158, 159,214-215,232-233. 54. D i 81. 55. Visuddhimagga 412. 56. Pataiijali defines yoga as "cessation of the movements of mind" (yogas

cittav:ttinirodha~). (Yogasiitra i 2). 57. Govind Chandra Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism 2nd rev. ed.

(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), p. 538, note 145. 58. On this interpretation see, for example, Nyanatiloka, The Word of the

Buddha (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971), pp. 26-27; also TO. Ling, A Dictionary of Buddhism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), pp. 1 09-111, where samma-ditthi is taken as having a double reference, including both initial faith in the Buddha (saddhii) and the final liberating insight (panna) .

59. Dii312. 60. M i 183. 61. E.g., TO. Ling, A Dictionary of Buddhism, p. 110. 62. M i 301. According to Pande, the Cii{a-Vedalla is relatively late among

the Majjhima suttas, and "shows very clearly the tendencies of scholastic systematization." Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, pp. 134, 179.

63. Buddhaghosa adopted it as the framework for his Visuddhimagga. 64. Rarely, four rather than three groups (dhammakkhandhas) are recog

nized: sUa, samadhi, panna, vimutti (D ii 122, iii 229, A ii 1, 78, 141). This version permits an equating of the ninth path-factor with panna, and the tenth with vimutti.

65. A discussion of these issues is presented in Rod Bucknell and Martin Stuart-Fox, "Did the Buddha impart an esoteric teaching?" forthcoming.

66. Such an analysis is currently in preparation. 67. That the saddhammas are such a list of stages is evident from the

demonstration, presented above, that the saddhammas largely duplicate the stages of List 4.

Temporary Ordination In Sri Lanka

by Richard Gombrich

Theravada Buddhists have always regarded monks as both the preservers of their tradition and its principal exemplars. Monks are the spiritual elite. Questions surrounding membership of this elite are therefore of the greatest importance.

Full membership is achieved by receiving the higher ordination (upasampada). At this rite the ordinand, who must be at least twenty years old, asks an assembled chapter of monks for ordination; when it is conferred, he is told that for the rest of his life (yavafivaT(l)! he should try to live extremely frugally (the frugality is classified as four "dependencies," nissaya) and must not commit any of the four disbarring offenses (parajika). It is at this point in the ceremony that the prescribed text, which goes back to the beginnings of Buddhist history (probably, as Buddhists claim, to the Buddha himself) explicitly states that the intention of all concerned is that ordination should be for life.

This does not mean that ordination has ever been, in either theory or practive, an irrevocable step. The brahminical renouncer (saT(lnyasin) leaves the lay world by enacting his own post-funerary rites;2 he thus dramatizes the conception that he becomes dead to human society. The dead may not rise again: if such a saT(lnyasin lapses, for instance by cohabiting, he becomes an anomaly with no place in the social order and a hazardous future. The Buddha, who did so much to demystify the world, took a more pragmatic view: if an ordained person finds the monastic role too difficult to sustain, far better to leave the Order than to break its rules and so harm both one's colleagues and oneself. And, indeed, all the evidence, beginning with the Vinaya Pitaka itself, suggests that it has never been p4rticularly rare for members of the Sangha voluntarily to revert to lay status.

41


Before one becomes a monk, one has to become a novice. This is done by the rite of pabbajja, lower ordination. The minimum age for this is that one must be able to shoo crows aWay,3 which in practice means about seven. According to the canoni_ cal text on the subject, the terms pabbajja and upasampada Were originally synonymous.4 The Buddha initially authorized his monks to ordain recruits by a very simple rite: the candidate was to shave his head, put on yellow robes with the upper robe over one shoulder, touch the feet of the ordaining monk with his head, squat with his hands together in the anjali, and simply say three times that he was taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha-the formula of taking refuge which in Theravada Buddhist societies still begins every rite and religious occasion for the laity. This ordination could be conferred by a single monk with no one else present. The same text goes on to tell5 that subsequently the Buddha rescinded the use of this rite as upasampada and substituted the more elaborate rite still in use. However, he did not do away with the earlier, simpler rite as pabbajja-a point which is not clear from Miss Horner's translation.6

The original simple pabbaJja ordination, conferred by a single monk, survives among Theravadinsto this day, with only some minor additions to the wording. The intending novice asks to wear the yellow robe in order to realize nirvaI).a. 7 But the original identity of pabbaJja and upasampada has left an enduring trace in the ritual. When a candidate presents himself for higher ordination, the upasampada ceremony proper has to be preceded by a pabbajja ceremony. Even if-as will invariably be the case, for example, in Sri Lanka-the ordinand has had a previous pabbajja and spent time as a novice, he has to enact a brief reversion to lay status and wear lay clothes in order again to discard them in this pabbajja ceremony which forms a pre-lude to the upasampada. .

In Burma, every boy is supposed to become a novice for a few days (anything up to a month, though often far less). The ceremony, called shin-byu, is conducted with great pompgreater, indeed, than an ordinary adult ordination. Ideally, it takes place at puberty; in Spiro's sample of 60 boys, the mean age was 11 but the range from 2 to 18.8 The ritual contains elements which indicate that the practice has a historical link

TEMPORARY ORDINATION IN SRI LANKA 43

with the Hindu upanayana, an obligatory rite de passage for upper-caste males which is performed over a similar age range. (Though the lawbooks prescribe upanayana for the top three var1!a-brahmin, k~atriya and vaisya-in practice only the brahmins tend to observe it punctiliously.) lowe my information on this matter to Mr. G. HoutmanY An essential officiant at a traditional shin-byu is someone Houtman calls a "pseudo-brahmin." Houtman, on the basis of a Burmese printed source, writes lO that "the following texts are generally considered standard knowledge" of this ritual specialist; he then lists the Burmese names of the Yajur Veda, If.g Veda and Atharva Veda (in that order). What follows suggests that the "pseudo-brahmin" has no actual knowledge of those texts and needs none, as they are irrelevant to the ritual he performs; but the same could be said of the real brahmin, supposed to be learned in the Vedas, who performs the Indian upanayana. After some rituals of explicitly Buddhist character, such as invoking the Buddha, the "pseudobrahmin" puts a thread, usually referred to as a "mantra thread" (Burmese: chi-man-gwin) , around the neck of each initiand. Though this thread "derives its efficacy from the recitation of parittas by monks,"ll it is clearly the descendant of the brahminical sacred thread, which has thus been converted to Buddhism. The initiands are then ritually fed, and almost immediately thereafter conducted to the monastery, where they are shaved and ordained.

The Burmese name of the "pseudo-brahmin" is beitheik saya, which derives from Sanskrit abhi0eka acarya, "consecration teacher." The term suggests to me that in the remote past the ritual was tantric; that would not be surprising, as tantric Buddhism was prevalent in Burma before Theravada took over in the eleventh century. (After all, the whole of tantric Buddhism can in my view be seen as a Hinduization of Buddhism.) But this hypothetical past is irrelevant l2 to the obvious interpretation of what we can still see: that the upanayana has been copied in Burma but legitimized by turning it into a Buddhist novitiate. The original Hindu-derived element has become so unimportant that, as Houtman records, modernizing Burmese Buddhists now dispense with it altogether. Houtman also believes that in the past the novice stayed in the monastery for long enough to receive some real education there; if so, he was


even more like the Hindu "student" (brahmacarin). As we shall see, the parallel custom in Thailand is also that the temporary ordinand ~hould stay in robes long enough to learn something of BuddhIsm. '

Thai Buddhists have a practice rather like the shin-byu: every young man is supposed to enter the Sangha for a short time before marriage, ideally for the three months ofthe litur_ gical "rains" retreat (vassa) from July to October. But there is an interesting difference from the Burmese custom: whereas in Burma the candidates are boys, so that they of course take the lower ordination only, in Thailand the parallel custom is to take the upasampada. This means that the Thai short-term ordinands are usually in their early twenties. Thus, we find that whereas Burmese males have to enter the Sangha as boys, and normally stay only for a few days, the Thai have to enter as young men, and are supposed to stay for three months. Since the Thai first received their Buddhism from Burma, there must be a historical link between the two customs; why then are they different? If we survey human societies, the early twenties are not a very common age for a major rite de passage other than marriage. If I am right in thinking that the Burmese custom has been decisively influenced by the upanayana, a puberty ceremony, it is the Thai variant which remains in need of explanation. I would offer a guess: that since becoming a fully ordained monk is considered by all Buddhists more meritorious than becoming a mere novice, the Thai encouraged their young men to take the upasampada rather than just the pabbajja; but for this the Vinaya regulations compelled them to wait until they were twenty. At this age, the Buddhist character of the custom is then taken seriously, in that the young man stays in the monastery long enough to learn something; the experience thus becomes a vital finishing touch to his education. Perhaps the postponement came more easily to the Thai because their remoteness from India had caused them to lose the sense that it was some kind of puberty ceremony. Thus, my hypothesis is that it is not that Thai males take the upasampada (rather than the pabbajja) because they are over twenty; it is that they are over twenty because they are waiting to take the upasampada.

Short-term novitiates also exist in Thailand; but to become a novice is not to undergo the necessary rite de passage. Bunnag


writes: "During the Lenten season the number of novices also increases temporarily; some boys are ordained simply to make merit for senior relatives, both the living and the dead, whilst others become novices or monastery boys in order to accompany their elder brothers who have been ordained for a short time .... "13 In other words, the temporary novice is primarily serving the needs of others-though to be sure he is thereby earning merit for himself too; the temporary monk, on the other hand, is completing his preparation for adult life. "In former days-and in some country areas to this day-it is said that a young man's prospects for marriage might depend upon whether or not he had spent a season in the wat."14

Social anthropologists have been struck by the general flexibility of Thai social arrangements, 15 and this flexibility has also influenced monastic life, in that monks can and frequently do revert to lay status at any time, and such a reversion carries no stigma. However, it would not be right to conclude that Thai Buddhism has quite lost the ideal of a permanent commitment to monkhood, or that all Thai ordinations are envisaged as temporary. Bunnag's account makes it clear that the "temporary" or "short-term" (chua khrao) ordination taken by almost every young layman is a distinct institution; other monks do not refer to themselves as chua khrao, nor do others so refer to them, even if it should in fact turn out that they leave. 16

In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, the institution of temporary ordination has been unknown. Sinhalese Buddhism has preserved what seems to have been the position in ancient times: one must enter the Order with the intention of doing so for life, but can leave it one feels one must. Many do leave, but more commonly early in life, often, indeed, while still novices. (That means under the age of twenty, for a Sinhalese monastic career usually begins in youth.) There is normally no stigma attached to leaving before receiving the higher ordination, but some stigma does attach to being an ex-monk; there is an idiomatic term for such a man, h'iratuva, which is felt to be opprobrious. This stigma does not accord with the Buddha's teaching, but presumably reflects the Hindu view of the lapsed renunciate.

When I say that "the institution of temporary ordination has been unknown" I leave open the possibility that individuals


may have taken ordination intending it to be temporary and done so with the connivance of their ordainers. In fact, I know of a monastery where this has been occurring in recent times. This monastery, Kandubo<;la, was founded in 1956 as a medita_ tion centre; while itself symptomatic of modern trends in Buddhism, to which we shall return below, it has also been a centre and focus of innovation. Meditators at Kandubo<;la have occasionally taken the lower ordination for a while; in particular, a layman who styles himself Brahmacarl Aryatilaka and is now a professional meditation teacher, becomes a novice when he goes to Kandubo<;la for his holidaysY However, this is not advertised or widely known. It is, therefore, not directly relevant to the story I am about to tell-though I shall later suggest its indirect relevance.

Our story concerns the public and formal attempt to set up temporary ordination as a new institution in Sri Lanka. 18 On 5 July 1982, the full moon day which marked the beginning of the rains retreat that year, a group of five Buddhist laymen received the lower ordination at a monastery in central Colombo on the public and formally stated understanding that they would revert to lay life after exactly a fortnight. Though the initiator of the event was inspired by the Thai model, there were many differences, of which the two most salient were that the ordinands were far from young, and that they took only the lower ordination. The ensuing controversy, however, entirely ignored these points; in particular, all concerned treated the innovation as one of temporary monkhood. The Sinhala term, pavidda, refers to all membership of the Sangha, whether one has taken the higher ordination or not. But curiously enough, the fact that the ordinands took only the lower ordination, a· fact which would be of crucial importance in traditional Buddhism, was adduced in argument by neither the opponents nor the defenders of the new practice. Controversy was concerned entirely with the general question whether temporary ordination (tavakalika pavidda) was a good or a scandalous thing.

Before reporting the controversy, let me relate what actually happened. I write as of January 1983: the present tense refers to that time. The whole affair is the brainchild of the Ven. Galbo<;la N al).issara 19 of Gangarama, a monastery in H unupitiya, Colombo, who has also taken the leading part in the


; execution of the project. The actual incumbent of Gangaraina is the Ven. NaQ.issara's teacher, but since he is old and infirm,

. the Ven. N aQ.issara acts as the executive head of the monastery . . He is widely known as "PoQi Hamuduruv0," "The Little Monk," not because he is small physically or in any other respect--quite the reverse is the case-but presumably because he is still formally only the future incumbent. He ·was kind enough to grant me an interview and to provide me with photographs and printed materials, as well as introducing me to the temporary ordinands in residence at the time. I am most grateful for his help and friendliness.

Gangarama is a temple of the Siyam Nikaya monastic fraternity. Though the Siyam Nikaya is sometimes labelled conservative, not least because it traditionally has ordained only members of the highest (goyigama) caste, its general character is of little relevance to setting the tone of Gangarama compared to the fact that Gangarama is in central Colombo. Indeed, it is the temple which lies closest to the very heart of Colombo, the Fort; while being close to various headquarters of government and business, it is also near wealthy residences. Both the President and the Prime Minister (who also is the local M.P.) live nearby and are among its patrons. Indeed, the temple is so influentially placed that it receives large donations from businessmen who are not even Buddhists. With such donations it has managed to put up some spectacular buildings, notably the hall called SImamalaka built on a platform projecting into Beira Lake in which this ordination ceremony took place. We shall have something more to say about the innovations of Gangarama under the

. Ven. NaQ.issara's leadership near the end of this article. The Ven. NaQ.issara says that he was inspired to introduce

temporary ordination to Sri Lanka by the Ven. Kirinde Dhammananda, incumbent of the monastery in Kuala Lumpur (Ma- . laysia), when on a visit to that monastery he witnessed three temporary ordinations. (We should thus note that a Sinhalese monk in Malaysia was already performing such ordinations.)20 According to the Ven. NaQ.issara, it was the aspiration of the late Professor G. P. Malalasekera to introduce such ordination to Sri Lanka, but at the time his proposal was not welcomed, whereas now the time was ripe. (Professor Malalasekera similarly had a scheme to reintroduce the higher ordination for


women from a living Mahayanist tradition in Taiwan or Viet_ nam, but that too came to nothing.) The Ven. NaI).issara told Desatiya:'21 "This is a good time for the temporary ordination. It is a period when our people are gradually drawing away from a Buddhist life-style. Today Buddhists' religious faith is more sluggish; their knowledge of Buddhism has begun to decline. The devotion of the laity to the Sangha has also declined. By means of temporary ordination this unfortunate state of affairs can be remedied." To his reasons for thinking so we shall return below.

The Ven. NaI).issara announced the impending availability of temporary ordination through notices in the press. He also prepared form letters to be sent to applicants and forms of application, the latter in both Sinhala and English. Applicants are informed that the temple will meet all their expenses, supplying their monastic requisites. Apart from various personal details, each applicant has to furnish certificates from his local temple and from his grama sevaka, the local government official who has replaced the traditional village headman. If he is under age (i.e., under I8?) he has also to produce a letter of consent from his guardian. The most striking requirement, however, is a letter of consent to disrobe after 14 days. Should he find after 14 days that he would like to stay in the Sangha for longer, Gangarama cannot help: he must disrobe and then apply to another temple for re-ordination. The rational-bureaucratic approach is evident in the statement: "Your presence is not necessary until called for"; quite a contrast to traditional Indian ideas of religious initiation and teacher-pupil relations. We shall shortly see that this somewhat impersonal approach is also evident in the programme of training which the ordinands receive. But it is worth remarking that one aspect of this comparative impersonality is that the caste of applicants for ordination is no longer a consideration; indeed, it is possible that in some cases it is not even ascertained.

Applicants are also informed that those who do not wish to have their hair shaved off can instead take the ten precepts and wear another form of yellow robe; they then participate in the same programme of training as those ordained. This strikes me as a point of some historical interest. To explain it, I must here lay the groundwork for my analysis.

A layman who takes the ten precepts has made the same


undertakings as any novice. In traditional Sri Lanka, the only men normally to take the ten precepts were elderly people retired from active life. They normally wore white and spent much of their time at their local temples. A century ago Don David Hewavitarne adopted the title and name of Anagarika Dharmapala. Anagarika was an invented role: he took vows of abstention like a monk, but remained active in the world-a this-worldly asceticism which made him a founder of what Obeyesekere has dubbed "Protestant Buddhism." At first, Dharmapala found few imitators in this role, but more recently, as Protestant Buddhism has spread, other laymen have similarly undertaken a celibate and generally ascetic existence, calling themselves either anagarika or brahmacari (the Hindu term for a religious student). Hitherto, it has been normal, so far as I know, for such men to wear white. Here, however, we find introduced a new kind of anagarika and a new costume to match. For, at the first temporary ordination ceremony one gentlemen did indeed refrain from being actually ordained but kept his hair and assumed the title of anagarika and a new style of yellow robe, 22 looking rather like the outer robe of a Chinese Buddhist monk.

What this all amounts to is that the traditional external indicators of the deepest division in Sinhalese society, that between monk and layman, are becoming blurred. Like the temporary ordinand, this new kind of anagarika is an interstitial role which is half in and half out of the monastery. Moreover, the Ven. NaQ.issara has other projects which tend in the same direction. He hopes' to have groups of schoolboys taking temporary ordination, but that has not yet happened. However, in September 1982 he organized a programme by which a group of schoolboys, aged about 15, took the ten precepts and spent a week learning Buddhism and meditating at Gangarama: a junior version of the temporary ordination programme. This will no doubt be repeated. For such young people to take the ten precepts-unless they become novices-is wholly untraditional. He says that he also hopes to arrange a similar programme for women-though of course they could not stay at the monastery. (Since this has not yet taken place, we shall not g9 into the complicated question of what religious statuses for women exist in Sinhalese Buddhism.)

The initial response was overwhelming: the Ven. NaQ.is-


sara received over five hundred applications for temporary Ordination. For the first programme, five men were selected to be . ordained and one to become an anagarika. They ranged in age from 50 to 79. All were well educated, and I believe that they were men of standing; indeed, a newspaper described them as "leading personalities."23 Despite the initial enthusiasm, ho'wever, it was not clear to me whether the flow of suitable applicants would be maintained: when I visited Gangarama in early January, 1983, there were only two novices on the . current Course.

The ceremony on the morning of 5 July was attended by monks from all three Nikayas, a catholicism normal on secular public occasions but most unusual for a vinaya-kamma, a formal act of the Sangha. 24 But a public occasion it certainly was. The Prime Minister and his wife, Mrs. Premadasa, were among the five eminent laymen who presented the five ordinands with their monastic requisites. The Prime Minister made a speech in which he said that Gangarama was making history by initiating this programme. "This group who have taken temporary ordination have made a great sacrifice. This programme is an example to the whole country. We must make such a programme effective to steer the people ever more towards Buddhism and to lead successful lives in accordance with the principles of Buddhist conduct. If there is any aid the government can give, it is prepared to give it." The Ven. NaQ.issara also spoke, and expressed the hope that this new institution would make for closer relations between the Sangha and the laity.25

On their first afternoon, the Ven. NaQ.issara took the new trainees to the leprosy hospital at Hendala to heighten their awareness, he said, of sasara duka, the sadness of life. This might be described as an innovation on a classical theme. Theravadin tradition has two kinds of meditation specifically designed to increase one's distaste for the world and its seeming pleasures. One, still widely practised, is to list the 32 constituents of the body and to analyse oneself in these terms and so realize that one's body is but the sum of these disgusting parts. The other is to watch the putrefaction and disintegration of a corpse; this must have been easier to do in the days when corpses were left exposed in cemeteries; it is little used nowadays, but a few monks (probably only forest-dwellers)26do visit morgues for the purpose. But I am not aware of a precedent


for observing the physical disint~gration of the living as a spiritual exercise.

After this excursion, the novices settled into special quarters (a hous.e called Dhammaloka on Green Path) which belong to Gangarama and are nearby but quite separate from the monastery. Thus, they did not in fact share the lives of the permanent residents of the monastery. On the wall of their quarters was a neatly printed timetable for twelve days, 6-17 July inclusive; the same programme would in due course be followed by subsequent groups.

In accordance with the traditional formula which sums up the path to enlightenment, the first four days are labelled sfla (morality), the next four samadhi (concentration) and the last four paiiii,ii (wisdom). Each day is divided into no less than fifteen sections, with some features common to every day. More than four hours a day are left free for meals and other breaks. The day begins at 6 a.m. with a Buddha pilja and ends at 10:45 . p.m., when they "go to sleep with kind thoughts." Except for this last, every section of the timetable is under the supervision of a specific monk and it is so organized that nine monks participate each day, though never quite the same nine-in all, 32 monks are on the programme. (Incidentally, the Ven. NaI).issara himself is not one of them.) The majority of the sessions are lectures by monks; every fourth day, however, this pattern is broken with long periods of what is called "doctrinal discussion" (dharma sakacchava), which probably gives more scope for questions. There is much emphasis on famous scriptures: Jataka stories (an hour a day), the Dhammapada, the Metta Sutta, the Mahii SatipaUhana Sutta and the Thera- and Therf-gathii; Other lectures are on such doctrinal fundamentals as the four noble truths and the three hallmarks (tri-lak?ar;,a) of phenomenal existence; and there are four lectures on relations between laity and clergy.

The approach to meditation seems modest. On the first three mornings, there are lectures on pratyavek?a, and then each day there is time set aside to practise it. The Ven NaI).issara translated the term "introspection," but this is a bit misleading; it refers to a specific practice inculcated into all novices, that they should never use their four "requisites" (robes, bowl, lodging and medicine) without awareness that they have them only


for strict necessities-in the case of robes, for instance, that they are worn to avoid extremes of temperature, to ward off insects and to preserve modesty. There are formulae listing these necessary uses, and once a day (normally in the evening) one is to recollect the events of the day and check that one has not exceeded them, for example by trying to look well in one's robes. This form of basic training in awareness (Pali: sati) is thus traditionally monastic; in fact, the term pratyave~a is not used in the kind of meditation known to and practised by laymen. On the three days of lectures on samadhi and the three days of lectures on panna, there are daily periods called bhavana puhur;uva, "meditation practice"; they form a series of six and a series of three periods. Into the series of six, the Ven Nal).issara has written on my copy the topics of each day: the first two days are "understanding meditation," the last four are raga, dosa, moha and mana (passion, hatred, delusion and conceit) respectively. This suggests to me that the sessions are primarily lectures.27

On the three days of samadhi lectures, the day ends with a further period of "meditation practice"; these are on asubha, the meditation topic which in Sri Lanka traditionally refers to listing the thirty-two constituents of the body. The programme makes no specific mention of the awareness of breathing, which is a favourite meditation exercise at modern meditation centres. Altogether, the content of the course appears to be quite traditional; there is no sign of any attempt at virtuoso religion, at finding a short cut to nirval).a. 28 On the other hand, the whole style of the programme, and especially the multiplicity of instructors, is reminiscent of a modern institutional course rather than traditional religious discipleship. Monks appear here as specialist teachers rather than as general counsellors and role models.

At the end of their fortnight, the group recorded their sentiments in a kind of visitors' book established for the purpose. I noticed that all this first batch had written in English. All were full of praise and declared themselves enriched by the experience. One of them, acting as spokesman for the group, also said to Desatiya: "Even our bodies have begun to feel aware of the advantages of moral restraint. We get the chance to hear new things, to clear up things we have heard about and to resolve our doubts. Some of us have taken fourteen days holi-


day to get this ordination, but to popularize this system the government should consider giving leave for the purpose of ordination. In countries like Thailand people taking temporary ordination are granted paid leave."

Whether their experience has consequences for the ordinands themselves is a private matter which is not my concern. The main public consequence so far has been the controversy in the press over the pros and cons of the new institution. On the whole, it does not seem to me important to establish just who has expressed himself for or against it, as this is doubtless determined largely by group loyalties and other personal ties; it is the arguments which I find interesting.

To begin with the proponents. The Ven. NaI)issara himself has several times publicly given his reasons for starting the scheme. He finds Buddhism around him in decline and a growing distance between Sangha and laity. Through this institution, he told Desatiya, "Monks can improve their knowledge of Buddhism by explaining it to laymen who have taken temporary ordination. And in this way the laymen's families too can participate in Buddhist work. We have learnt from laymen who are considering this programme that many would like to become monks for life; but for various reasons not everyone can be given lifelong ordination." He also said: "Some of those who take temporary ordination may conceive the wish to be ordained for life. Thus the number of those ordained for life may

. " even Increase. A different type of argument deployed in favour of the

new institution is precisely the argument that it is not new, the argument from precedent-the alleged precedent of Sri Lanka itself as well as of other Theravadin countries. A monk described as a Buddhist missionary (dhammaduta) living in London couched his statement to Desatiya in these terms. "Sri Lanka is the only Theravada country to lack temporary ordination .... In Siam only people who have taken temporary ordination can be employed in government service .... Thai men attach value to spending three months as monks, and schoolchildren there live as monks (mahar;,a dam puranne) in their holidays .... But can we say that the method of temporary ordination is entirely new to us? King Dhatusena (461-79 A.D.) became a monk (mahar;,a) as a child, in General Diksanda's monastic school (piri-


verJa) . ... It was the experience he gained while in the Order which enabled him to rule so effectively."

The article in Rivirasa gives great prominence to this line of argument. "The system of temporary ordination is new neither to Sri Lanka nor to Buddhism. In the great periods when ancient heroes ruled this land as a single kingdom, temporary ordination existed along with the unity of Buddhists and close relations between the laity and the Sangha. With the passing of time, in the periods when both government and society declined because of the disunity brought about by foreign invasions, this type of effort disappeared." It goes on to describe the introduction of temporary ordination as a "rebirth" (punarjanmaya). It also quotes "Poc;li Hamuduruvo" as saying that "if Thailand and Malaysia can use the system of temporary ordination, for Sri Lanka alone to remain aloof is a loss, a deficiency, a failure to care."

The argument that temporary ordination used to exist in the days of Sri Lanka's ancient glory so that this is merely a revival does not seem to have originated with the Ven. NaI)issara. When I asked him about it he accepted it but showed little interest in it. It is, in fact, based on a misunderstanding: King Dhatusena had been ordained as a boy,29 but there is no evidence that that was a temporary ordination and it is extremely unlikely-certainly the alleged source, the Mahava'Y(lsa, does not say SO.30 The argument is, however, all the more interesting for being false. The argument that temporary ordination exists in the other Theravadin countries, on the other hand, is, as we have seen, broadly correct, though it has been stated in such a way as to ignore the difference between lower and higher ordination and with various exaggerations: even in Thailand, it is not normal for schoolchildren to spend their holidays as novIces.

The newspaper DinamirJa devoted a full page of its issue of 26 July 1982 to a debate on temporary ordination, with five articles (one by a layman) expressing different points of view. Both there and in the Desatiya article monks express the need for caution, making such neutral points as that it could go wrong if taken up by the wrong kind of people or from the wrong motives. Others point out that one can leave the Order anyway, and therefore question the need for the new practice.

We turn now to more definite criticisms. In the opinion of


a forest-dwelling monk quoted by Desatiya, "it is improper for someone who has asked, 'Please grant me ordination into this yellow robe so that I may destroy all sorrow and experience ·nirvaJ).a' toput the robes on for just a few days. How well does it accord with Buddhist conceptions for someone to undertake the rules for a novice31 for just fourteen days? The monastic tradition of Sri Lanka is respected throughout the Buddhist world for its custom of lifelong ordination. Some think that that respect may be forfeited if temporary ordination takes root here. The new custom is something poor monasteries cannot effectively undertake, so it may be restricted to the rich ones .... " Another monk quoted in the same article expressed the fear that "people who have taken temporary ordination in monasteries may reveal monks' weaknesses to the world."

One of the articles in DinamirJa is far more negative than is suggested by its title, "Problems may arise in the future." After observing that there is no reference to temporary ordination in the Pali canon, and that the mere fact that it is done elsewhere is no argument for introducing it to Sri Lanka, the Ven. Pinvatte Devananda points out that anyone is free to wear the traditional attire of a pious layman (upasaka); he suggests that one can even shave one's head if one pleases. Thus far, his argument is basically that the innovation is unnecessary. But he goes on to argue that those who become good monks conceive a spontaneous desire for monkhood already as children, because of the disposition they have acquired in previous lives (sasara purudda). It is therefore unwise to impose monkhood on laymen. Finally, he expresses fears that politicians may exploit the situation, and ends in most traditional fashion by calling for a purification of the Sangha.

The most violent attack to have come to my hand is an article by a monk in the newspaper Divayina32 headed "Temporary Ordination should be Banned." The author makes five points:

(1) A layman takes the five precepts to regulate his life; if he feels that to be inadequate he can take eight or even ten. Someone who cannot sort himself out even then certainly cannot do so as a monk.

(2) Temporary monks would need to be labelled so as not to mislead the public.

(3) The institution could be a cloak for political activity.


(4) This could become a free holiday for government servants.

(5) (A view attributed to another monk): It could even lead to all monks becoming temporary. '

It is not my purpose to pass judgement on all these comments, let alone to come down for or against temporary ordina_ tion (a matter on which I am in fact perfectly neutral). But a few remarks of elucidation and analysis may be helpful. Most of the points adduced against temporary ordination, though they might have some validity if the practice were suddenly to spread throughout Sinhalese society, are hardly relevant to what is in fact happening-or likely to happen in the foreseeable future. At Gangarama there are rigid safeguards. Every applicant has to produce two character certificates. Far more important, the temporary ordinands are in fact virtually segregated, both from the rest of the monastery and from lay society. No novice in his first fortnight would in any case ever be sent out to preach or otherwise to represent the Sangha, so there is no question of a temporary ordinand thus misleading the publie. On the other hand, the argument that poor monasteries could not afford to introduce temporary ordination is fitted precisely to the present circumstances: Gangarama can afford to meet all expenses beacuse it has such wealthy support. Yet one could argue that the necessary expenses are quite modest, no greater than people often spend anyway on religious purposes (for example, three months after the death of a relative), so that if the custom were to catch on one would expect the Thai model to prevail and the ordinand's expenses to be met by his family.

The fear expressed in Divayina that the practice could develop into an extra paid holiday for government servants may seem far-fetched, until we recall that the spokesman for the first batch of ordinands did make just this request, and that in his speech at the initial ceremony the Prime Minister promised government help. Perhaps the article in Divayina may since have made him pause.

The criticism by the same writer that one who cannot set his life in order as a laymar cannot hope to do so as a monk is on a different footing from the others: it attacks individual aspirants rather than the institution as such. One doubts wheth-


er it would cut much ice with those concerned. The same might be said of the argument from the extremely traditional monk in Dinamir;,a that monks are born not made; a modern urban layroan would. probably argue effectively against such an ascriptive view of religious roles.

The main argument of the Ven. Nal).issara himself addresses what he sees as the broader problem of the state of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and in particular clerical-lay relations. While I agree in seeing this as the nub of the problem, I do not think that this stated argument is the only element in his personal motivation: as will be further illustrated below, he is a roan of restless energy who seems to be ever seeking new outlets for his organizing ability. His argument that this opportunity to explain Buddhism will do monks good is at first blush surprising, for one would have thought that they had plenty of opportunity to do that in other contexts. But a visit to Gangarama gives one a feeling for what he means: he has been so successful at building up his monastery that he has spare capacity in both buildings and manpower which he is longing to put to use. On his card he describes himself as "Director, Sri Gnaneswara University Pirivena, Sri Jinaratana Bhikkhu Training College, Vocational Training Centre and Pre School"; and these institutions (which are all attached to the monastery) have magnificent premises which, like those of most educational institutions, are much of the time unoccupied, and I strongly suspect also staff who are likewise unoccupied for much of the time but who, being monks, are always there. All this in the middle of the modern capital, with the feel of things happening all around. Small wonder if an efficient organizer in such a position has the urge to show that he too can be go-ahead and productive.

For a monk to busy himself in the world may not conform to the original ideal of renunciation; but for a large part of the Sangha that ideal was already compromised in ancient Sri Lanka when they decided that the preservation of Buddhism ("book-duty") should take precedence over the individual quest for salvation ("insight-duty"). These two roles became institutionalized in "village-dwelling" and "forest-dwelling" fraternities. Probably the tension between the two ideals is necessary for the good of Buddhism; it is symptomatic that the monk


quoted in Desatiya as raising the purist objection that one requests ordination in order to strive for an end to sorrow, i.e., nirval)a, was a forest-dweller. The gulf between the two ideals has widened in the last hundred years, and especially for those "village-dwellers" whose village has become a city-for urbanization has been accompanied by the rise of the "Protestant Buddhism" mentioned above, a current of Buddhism which arose as both a protest against and a reflex of Protestant Christianity.

One of the main criticisms which nineteenth-century Protestant missionaries levelled against the Sangha was precisely that they were too little active in the world and did not carry their mission among the laity. They criticized the monks for not behaving as priests-or rather, as Protestant pastors. At the same time, as part of the same climate of opinion, laymen began to feel that they were not to leave religion all to the monks: they too had responsibilities, both for the welfare of Buddhism as a whole and for their own salvation. The modern Buddhist layman, especially is he is urban and educated, has been protestantized: he feels that it is up to him to improve himself spiritually.

Other features of Protestant Buddhism in Sri Lanka have been and are being documented elsewhere. Here, we are concerned only with what the Ven. Nal)issara sees as the growing gulf between the Sangha and the laity. I see this gulf as having two aspects. The social distance between the two parties in Sri Lanka was enormous. (Of this the claim by the Ven. Devananda that there are, as it were, "natural" monks and "natural" laymen, affords an illustration.) On the other hand, it is true that in a village community the monk or monks at a local temple are bound to be extremely well known to the villagers, their parishioners. In central Colombo, by contrast, even monks and their supporters must be affected by the anonymity typical of social relations in a modern city. A successful temple like Gangaraqma probably has far more supporters than any village monastery; but, by the same token, they are too many to know personally.

The other aspect of the gulf is the confused state of clergylay relations brought about by Protestant Buddhism. In an abstract sense, the gulf is being bridged by the creation of intersti-


tial roles like anagarika-and temporary ordinand. The BrahmacarI Aryatilaka, who gets ordained for his holidays, is an extreme example but he exemplifies a trend.

What must concretely affect and disturb thoughtful members of the Sangha is that the pious laity are increasingly leading their religious lives without any recourse to monks or monasteries. My article "From Monastery to Meditation Centre" discusses this development. In Theravadin tradition, laymen were not expected to meditate in any but the minimal sense of reciting verses and formulae: it was an advanced activity appropriate only to those who had renounced the world. Moreover, it was difficult and even dangerous, so that it could only be properly undertaken under the guidance of an experienced teacher. The social practice of meditation was thus congruent with the hierarchic interpretation of the path to enlightenment as consisting of morality, concentration and wisdom, each stage being a pre-requisite for the next, and reinforced the general view that the monk alone had authority in religious matters. Moreover, monastic control over the essential salvific practice, meditation, is important for the maintenance of doctrinal orthodoxy and even for aspects of orthopraxy. Now, however, it has become common in urban Sri Lanka for people to go on meditation courses for anything from a day up to a few weeks; some of these courses are residential, and some of them do not involve any monks or monasteries at all.

As Sri Lanka rapidly becomes more urban, the Sangha certainly has a problem in maintaining its religious leadership. I see this as connected, as both cause and effect, with its relative failure to recruit city-dwellers. Nobody, so far as I know, has yet studied this, though it would be easy to do, as the first part of the name of a Sinhalese monk is his birthplace. One can tell at a glance that the proportion of monks born in large towns is far below the proportion of the Sinhalese population who live in those towns. The Sinhalese Sangha seems always to have recruited predominantly from the upper strata of society, whether in terms of caste or class, so it would not be surprising to find that the Sangha now recruits very few slum-dwellers. A generation ago, a few members of the urban-educated, professional classes joined the Sangha; Vajirarama in Bambalapitiya, Colombo 4, was famous for having such monks, and accordingly


attracted educated, professional Buddhist laity to its functions. It seemed, therefore, that the Sangha was successfully adapting to social change. However, it is my impression that the trickle of recruits from the professional classes has not increased but, on the contrary, more or less dried up; such people are now pursuing their Buddhist activities, both organizing and meditating, as laymen. Thirty years ago, the Sangha might well have expected the highly educated elderly gentlemen who recently took temporary ordination to become monks, that being the traditional and still the obvious way in which to pursue Buddhist religious goals. Now, half a loaf seems better than no bread.

Thus, the most important element in my interpretation of the introduction of temporary ordination into Sri Lanka is that it is a clerical counter-attack against modern lay Protestant Buddhism, and in particular against the meditation centre. This counter-attack is not fully conscious, and I am sure that the Ven. N aDissara and his colleagues would never issue a blanket condemnation of meditation centres. But the message of their new institution, as I read it, is addressed to the modern urban laity and reads, "By all means devote yourselves to the study of Buddhism and even-in moderation-try some meditation; but do so under the direction and control of us monks."

The other arguments both for and against the innovation are interesting to me as instances of how the contemporary Sinhalese Sangha is thinking, but are--jf I am right-mostly· beside the point. This is certainly not a revival of a fine old Sinhalese custom, evoked by Rivirasa in the style of Dharmapala; but neither is it a daring modernism which marks a further irreversible step in that decline of the Teaching which traditional Buddhists believe in. 33 I see it, rather, as a conservative move. In the interests of conservatism it has had to compromise with modernity in such features as the veneer of bureaucratically efficient procedures and also the multiplication of interstitial roles. But the groups of devout men firmly penned into their quarters and lectured daily on the Jatakas pose no threat to traditional Buddhist order; they rather reaffirm it.

Thus, I see the Thai precedent as a red herring. It gave the Ven. NaDissara the idea and the pretext for his innovation. But


quite apart from the actual differences in practice, on which I need not expatiate, the custom of temporary ordination has a completely different function in Thai (and other Theravadin) society from that which I see it as having in Sri Lanka. Even if the Gangarama experiment is successful, even if it spreads to some other monasteries-and we have yet to see either development-we can be sure that temporary ordination will never be a rite de passage in village Sri Lanka, if only because village Sri Lanka is disappearing so fast that it will no longer exist by the time that such a change could happen.

Colourful and imaginative as the present scheme may be, it is not likely to make a great impact as a counter-attack on modernism, as the latter is rooted in widespread trends in society. A colleague of the Ven. NaDissara, explaining that the new custom could lead men to lead a better lay life, said, "If you take an example, the precept of celibacy is observed better or can be observed better once one goes back to lay life after going through the experience of ordained life. Abstinence is viewed as more practicable .... " In traditional Buddhist society a married man was not supposed to abstain from having sexual relations with his wife, merely to be chaste within marriage-as in the Hindu tradition. I have plenty of data to confirm that educated Sinhalese laymen are coming to regard complete sexual abstinence as an ideal appropriate to their own lay lives. Insofar as they succeed in attaining it, they cease to consider it a special accomplishment and cause for admiration of the Sangha-a "sacrifice," as the Prime Minister said in his speech.

Another and rather different hallmark of modernism is to consider religious progress as (inter alia) useful for secular ends. It is quite contrary to Sinhalese Buddhist tradition to regard meditation, for example, as an instrument for worldly success. Maybe this is what is meant by those monks who fear that temporary ordination will be abused. But I catch resonances of this very attitude in the statements of its lay supporters. "In a society distorted by the spread of western commercialism," writes the Rivirasa reporter, "temporary ordination will help people to understand and approach their aim in life." And the Prime Minister in his address said, "We must make such a programme effective to steer the people ever more towards Buddhism and to make them lead successful lives in accordance


with the principles of Buddhist conduct." Of course, both ~tate_ ments are perfectly unexceptionable; but I find it significant that there is at least an ambiguity about whether the "aim in life" and the "successful lives" are to be measured in purely religious terms.

To conclude, let me mention (as did the Prime Minister in that address) another innovation by the Ven. NaI).issara, because it affords interesting parallels. Under his leadership, Gangarama invented in 1979 a brand new annual religious festivaI,34 the Navam Perahara ("Navam Procession"). The Asala Perahara is a world-renowned annual pageant35 which takes place in Kandy; members of the Kandyan nobility, with musicians, dancers and elephants, escort the Buddha's tooth in procession around the city. Asala and Navam are months in the Sinhalese lunar calendar; the Asala Perahara usually falls in August; Navam is six months away, in February-a blank Spot in the liturgical calendar. While the Kandy perahara grew up to convey an elaborate symbolic message, the N avam Perahara has no particular point,36 1et alone symbolism: the object carried on the largest elephant as the climax of the procession is a Buddha image recently brought from Thailand for the purpose. It has been founded frankly very much as a tourist attraction in the dead season. Seats for viewing the perahara are put up by the monastery and sold for its benefit. The large and excellently produced souvenir programme in both Sinhala and English carries many advertisements and a tear-out form for anyone who would like to become a benefactor of the temple. The 81 people who have provided elephants are also listed.

The Ven. NaDissara is keen to stress that his perahara is even bigger that the Kandy one. However, what he stressed to me most of all was its efficiency. Like all such traditional events, the timing of the Kandy procession is uncertain; even though it sets out at an auspicious moment it is invariably later than advertised. His perahara, the Ven. NaDissara stressed to us, was punctual to the minute; and that was because he himself had twice paced out the whole route.

The Navam Perahara is modern, efficient, even commercial; just what one would expect, perhaps, of the modern capital, Colombo, asserting its superiority to the old capital, Kandy. But this new procession has one quite remarkable feature:


rnonksnot only organize it and watch it, both slightly dubious features for a traditional purist; they even walk in it! They are themselves part of the spectacle, featured on the programme as a tourist attraction.

I am notsuggesting that temporary ordination affords any parallel to this lapse from dignity. But what the Navam Perahara illustrates is that while the Sangha can perhaps successfully innovate to rival or even surpass lay institutions, the element of imitation in such enterprises may put the Sangha's traditionally distinctive character at risk.

The parallel dilemma for the Christian clergy in the West today is well known. Both because they are themselves members of society subject, even unconsciously, to its influences, and because they fear that an image of the Church as oldfashioned may lose them support, many clergymen try to move with the times. Yet the "up-to-date" is inevitably transient, and the fashionable clergyman risks the displeasure of those who look to religious professionals to represent "timeless" values. It will be interesting to see whether and in what form this dilemma will affect the Sangha.

NOTES

1. Vinaya Pi!aka, (ed. Oldenberg), vol. 1, p. 58 = Mahavagga I, 30,4. 2. P. V. Kane, History of Dharma§astra (Poona, 1941), II, 958. 3. Mahavagga I, 51. 4. Mahavagga I, 12. 5. Mahavagga I, 28, 3. 6. The Book of the Discipline, vol. IV, p. 72: "I abolish that ordination ... " 7. He says: "Sabbadukkhanissara7fanibbanasacchikara7fatthaya ima7!l kasava7!l

dava pabbajetha mam bhante anukampa7!l upadaya." This formula is not in the Canon, and Dr. the Ven. Walpola Rahula thinks it could be as late as the Po!onnaruva period (9th to 12th centuries).

8. Melford E. Spiro, Buddhism and Society (New York, etc., 1970), p. 235. Two would however appear to be exceptionally young, not quite "the done thing"; Houtman (see next note) reports the minimum age as five.

9. "Lay-Meditation and Monastic Initiation in Burma: a Shift in Burmese Discourse about Buddhism," seminar paper given in Oxford, May 1983; also personal communication.

10. Personal communication. 11. Personal communication.


12. Another matter irrelevant to the purpose of this paper calIs for passing comment. If I understand correctly, the Hindu sacred thread appears twice in this ceremony, though under different Burmese names. The boys go through the whole first part of the ceremony, up to the ,actual ordination, clad in a kind of "royal attire," which includes the sa-lwe, defined in Judson's Burmese-English Dictionary (Rangoon 1966) as " a thread of distinction, worn over the left shoulder and under the right arm, as the Brahmanical thread (chi sa-lwe)." A proper Indian noble (~atriya) would himself have received the upanayana and been invested with the sacred thread, so it would be part of his costume. Hence the duplication.

13. Jane Bunnag, Buddhist Monk, Buddhist Layman (Cambridge 1973), p. 89. By "Lenten season" she means vassa.

14. Bunnag, p. 37. Wat means "monastery." 15. See Bunnag, Chapter 6, "The loosely structured social system: red

herring or rara avis?" 16. Bunnag, p. 37. 17. lowe this information to my friend Mr. Godwin Samararatne. For

Kaiiduboq.a, see my article "From Monastery to Meditation Centre" in Buddhist Studies Ancient and Modern, ed. Philip Denwood and Alexander Piatigorsky (London 1983), pp. 28-9 and references there cited. For BrahmacarI Aryatilaka see pp. 29-30 of that article.

18. My attention was drawn to the event by myoid friend and patron Col. Ananda de Alwis; without his initiative, this article would not exist. I am no less grateful to Mrs. Chitra Wijesekera, who collected for me many articles about temporary ordination which appeared in the Sinhalese press soon after its first occurrence, helped me to translate them, and herself interviewed one of the monks at Gangarama.

19. In English, he spells his name Gnanissara. I am transliterating from the Sinhala form.

20. According to Riviriisa, 11.7.1982, p. 12, he began it in about 1978; but this seems to conflict with the statement in the same article that the Ven. NaI.Iissara learnt about temporary ordination when visiting him in about 1976.

21. Vincent Periyapperuma, "Maiidaka~a h6 abinikmanaka yedlme aramunin," Desatiya, 30 July 1982, pp. 13-14. Desatiya is a periodical issued by the Sri Lankan Department of State.

22. The Riviriisa article notes "a special yellow garment." 23. Daily News, Tuesday, July 6, 1982. 24. One could however argue that this occasion, a lower ordination, was

not really a vinaya-kamma either. 25. Davasa, 7 July 1982, p. 3. 26. These are professional meditators; see p. below. 27. The reader may be irritated at my speculating about such details and

wonder why I did not ask. Experience tells me that to ask what goes on in religious instruction is usually pointless; one can only find out by being there.

28. This is an allusion to recent developments; see my article "From Monastery to Meditation Centre" cited in note 14 above; also p. below.


29. Cillavarrtsa 38, 17. 30. Similarly, King Silakala (524-37) had when young been a monk in

India at Bodh Gaya. But again there is no evidence, or likelihood, that his ordination was intended to be temporary.

31. This is the only reference in my material to the precise status of the ordinands as novices (siima1'!era).

32. Issue of 26.8.1972, p. 6, "Tavakalika pavidda tahanam kala yutuyi," by Doc;!ampe Siddhartha Himi (the Ven. D. Siddhartha).

33. See my Precept and Practice (Oxford, 1971), pp. 284-293. The Hindu belief that we are living in the kali-yuga is similar and, no doubt, historically connected.

34. It is amusing and instructive to note that a Japanese periodical has already called it a "typical" Buddhist festival of Sri Lanka. Kawaguchi, no. 66, 1982, cover-caption to a photograph of the Ven: Nal)issara at a microphone with the President of Sri Lanka in reverent posture immediately behind him.

35. See H. L Seneviratne, Rituals of the Kandyan State (Cambridge, 1978). 36. The printed programme carries this note: "On this Navam full

moon day, Sariputtha and Moggallana became the Chief Disciples of Lord Buddha. The first Buddhist Council was also held on this day. The Navam Procession is being held to commemorate this event." Which of the two events?

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The Symbolism of the Early Stupa*

by P eter Harvey

I. Introduction

In this paper, I wish to focus on the symbolism of the Buddhist stl1pa. In its simplest sense, this is a "(relic) mound" and a symbol of the Buddha's parinibbana. I wish to show, however, that its form also comprises a system of overlapping symbols which make the stl1pa as a whole into a symbol of the Dhamma and of the enlightened state of a Buddha.

Some authors, such as John Irwin,! Ananda Coomaraswamy,2 and, to some extent, Lama Anagarika Govinda,3 have seen a largely pre-Buddhist, Vedic meaning in the stilpa's symbolism. I wish to bring out its Buddhist meaning, drawing on certain evidence cited by Irwin in support of his interpretation, and on the work of such scholars as Gustav Roth. 4

II. The Origins of the Stupa

From pre-Buddhist times, in India and elsewhere, the remains of kings and heroes were interred in burial mounds (tumuli), out of both respect and fear of the dead. Those in ancient India were low, circular mounds of earth, kept in place by a ring of boulders; these boulders also served to mark off a mound as a sacred area.

According to the account in the Mahiiparinibbana Sutta (D.II.141-3), when the Buddha was asked what was to be done

*First given at the Eighth Symposium on Indian Religions (British Association for the History of Religion), Oxford, April 1982

67


with his remains after death, he seems to have brought to mind this ancient tradition. He explained that his body should be treated like that of a Cakkavatti emperor: after wrapping it in many layers of cloth and placing it within two iron vessels, it should be cremated; the relics should then be placed in a sttlpa "where four roads meet" (catummahapathe). The relics of a "disciple" (savaka) of a Tathagata should be treated likewise. At the sttlpa of either, a person's citta could be gladdened and calmed at the thought of its significance.

After the Buddha's cremation, his relics (sarzras) are said to have been divided into eight portions, and each was placed in a stupa. The pot (kumbha) in which the relics were collected and the ashes of the cremation fire were dealt with in the same way (D.IL166).

One of the things which Asoka (273-232 B.C.) did in his efforts to spread Buddhism, was to open up these original ten stu pas and distribute their relics in thousands of new stupas throughout India. By doing this, the sttlpa was greatly popularised. Though the development of the Buddha-image, probably in the second century A.D., provided another focus for devotion to the Buddha, sttlpas remain popular to this day, especially in Theravadin countries. They have gone through a long development in form and symbolism, but I wish to concentrate on their early significance.

III. Relics

Before dealing with the stupa itself, it is necessary to say something about the relics contained in it. The contents of a sttlpa may be the reputed physical relics (sarzras or dhatus) of Gotama Buddha, of a previous Buddha, of an Arahant or other saint, or copies of these relics; they may also be objects used by such holy beings, images symbolising them, or texts seen as the "relics" of the "Dhamma-body" of Gotama Buddha.

Physical relics are seen as the most powerful kind of contents. Firstly, they act as reminders of a Buddha or saint: of their spiritual qualities, their teachings, and the fact that they have actually lived on this earth. This, in turn, shows that it is possible for a human being to become a Buddha or saint. While

SYMBOLISM OF THE EARLY STOPA 69

even copies of relics can act as reminders, they cannot fulfill the second function of relics proper. This is because these are thought to contain something of the spiritual force and purity of the person they once formed part of. As they were part of the body of a person whose mind was freed of spiritual faults and possessed of a great energy-for-good, it is believed that they were somehow affected by this. Relics are therefore seen as radiating a kind of beneficial power. This is probably why ch. 28 of the BuddhavaT(lsa says:

The ancients say that the dispersal of the relics of Gotama, the great seer, was out of compassion for living beings.

Miraculous powers are also attributed to relics, as seen in a story of the second century B.C. related in the MahavaT(lsa XXXI v.97-100. When king DunhagamaI).i was enshrining some relics of Gotama in the Great Stilpa at Anuradhapura, they rose into the air in their casket, and then emerged to form the shape of the Buddha. In a similar vein, the Vibhanga Atthakathii p. 433 says that at the end of the 5000 year period of the sasana, all the relics in Sri Lanka will assemble, travel through the air to the foot of the Bodhi tree in India, emit rays of light, and then disappear in a flash of light. This is referred to as the parinibbana of the dhiitus. Relics, then, act both as reminders of Gotama, or some other holy being, and as actual tangible links with them and their spiritual powers. The MahiivaT(lsa XXX v.IOO says, indeed, that there is equal merit in devotion to the Buddha's relics as there was in devotion to him when he was alive.

IV. The Symbolism of the Stupa's Components

The best preserved of the early Indian stilpas is the Great StfIpa at Sand, central India. First built by Asoka, it was later enlarged and embellished, up to the first century A.D. The diagramatic representation of it in figure 1 gives a clear indication of the various parts of an early stfIpa.

The four tOTa1Jas, or gateways, of this stilpa were built between the first centuries B.C. and A.D., to replace previous


wooden ones. Their presence puts the stO.pa, symbolically, at the place where four roads meet, as is specified in the Mahapar_ inibbana Sutta. This is probably to indicate the openness and universality of the Buddhist teaching, which invites all to Come and try its path, and also to radiate loving-kindness to beings in all four directions.-

In a later development of the stOpa, in North India, the orientation to the four directions was often expressed by means of a square, terraced base, sometimes with staircases on each side in place of the early gateways. At Sand, these gateways are covered with carved reliefs of the B odhisatta career of Gotama and also, using ani conic symbols, of his final life as a BUddha. Symbols also represent previous Buddhas. In this way, the gates convey Buddhist teachings and the life of the Buddhas to those who enter the precincts of the stiipa.

Encircling SanCl stiipa, connecting its gateways, is a stone vedika, or railing, originally made of wood. This encloses and marks off the site dedicated to the stOpa and a path for circumambulating it. Clockwise circumambulation, or padakkhir;,al prada~ir;,a, literally "keeping to the right," is the main act of devotion performed at a stiipa. It is also performed round a Bodhi tree and, especially in Tibet, round any sacred object, building or person. Keeping one's right side towards someone is a way of showing respect to them: in the Pali Canon, people are often said to have departed from the Buddha keeping their right side towards him. The precedent for actual circumambulation may bave been the Brahmanical practice of the priest walking around the fire-sacrifice offerings, or of a bride walking around the domestic hearth at her marriage.5 All such practices demonstrate that what is walked around is, or should be, the "centre" of a person's life.

From the main circumambulatory path at Sand, a devotee can mount some stairs to a second one, also enclosed by a vedika. This second path runs round the top of the low cylindrical drum of the stiipa base. The Divyavadana refers to this as the medhi, or platform, while some modern Sinhalese sources refer to it as the asana, or throne. This structure serves to eleva~e the main body of the stiipa, and so put it in a place of honour. In later stiipas, it was multiplied into a series of terraces, to raise the stiipa dome to a yet more honourific height. These terraces


were probably what developed into the multiple rooves of the East Asian form of the stupa, often known in the West as a

. pagoda. . The most obvious component of the stupa is the solid

dome, resting on the base. Its function is to house the precious relics within (the Burmese say that the presence of relics gives a stiipa a "heart"). The relics are kept in a relic-chamber, usually somewhere on the central axis of the dome. In this, they are often found to rest in a golden container, placed within a silver, then bronze, then earthenware ones. The casing of the stt1pa dome seems therefore to be seen as the outermost and least valuable container of the relics. Indeed, the usual term for the dome of a stt1pa, both in the Sinhalese tradition and in two first century A.D. Sanskrit texts, translated from their Tibetan versions by Gustav Roth,6 is kumbha, or pot. The Sanskrit Mahaparinirva1'}a Sutra also reports the Buddha as saying that his relics should be placed in a golden kumbha, 7 while the Pali Mahaparinibbana Sutta says that the Buddha's relics were collected in a

. kumbha before being divided up. Again, kumbha is used as a word for an urn in which the bones of a dead person are collected, in the Brahmanical A.svalayana Grhya-Sutra.8 These facts reinforce the idea of the stupa dome being seen as the outermost container of the relics.

The dome of the stupa is a "kumbha" not only as a relic pot, but also because of symbolic connotations of the word kumbha. At S.II.83, it is said that the death of an Arahant, when feelings "grow cold" and sarzras remain, is like the cooling off of a kumbha taken from an oven, with kapallani remaining. Woodward's translation gives "sherds" for this, but the Rhys Davids and Stede Pali-English Dictionary gives "a bowl in the form of a skull ... an earthenware pan used to carry ashes." The implication of the cited passage would seem to be that a (cold) kumbha is itself like the relics of a saint; certainly Dhp. v.40 sees the body (kaya) as like a kumbha (in its fragility, says the commentary). Thus, the stt1pa dome both is a container of the relics, and also an analogical representative of the relics.

The use of the term kumbha for the stlipa dome may well have further symbolic meaning. It may relate to the pur1'}a-ghata (or pur1'}a-kumbha), or vase of plenty. This is one of the eight auspicious symbols in the Sinhalese and Tibetan traditions, and


is found as a decoration in ancient Indian Buddhist art. Purna_ gha(a designs, for example, were among those on the dome' of the Great StUpa at Amaravatl. 9 The ptlrr:w-ghata is also an auspi_ cious symbol in Hinduism, where it is probably equivalent to the golden kumbha, containing amrta (the gods' nectar of immortality), which emerged at the churning of the cosmic ocean. 10

To decide on the symbolic meanings of kumbha in Buddhism, we may fruitfully look at further uses of the word kumbha in sutta similies. At S.V.48 and A.V.337, water pouring out from an upturned kumbha is likened to an ariyan disciple getting rid of unskilful states, while at Dhp. v.121-2, a kumbha being gradually filled by drops of water is likened to a person gradually filling himself with evil or merit. In this way, the kumbha is generally likened to the personality as a container of bad or good states. A number of passages, though, use a full kumbha as a simile for a specifically positive state of being. At A.II.I04, a person who understands, as they really are, the four ariyan truths, is like a full (puro)kumbha. Miln.414, with Sn. v. 721-2, sees one who has perfected his reduseship (an Arahant, surely) as being like a full kumbha, which makes no sound when struck: his speech is not boastful, but he teaches Dhamma. At A.I.131, a person of wide wisdom (puthupanno) , who bears in mind the Dhamma he has heard, is like an upright kumbha which accumulates the water poured into it. The implication of these passages is that the stUpa dome, if known as a kumbha and even decorated with purrJa-ghata motifs, would be a natural symbol for the personality of someone who is "full" of Dhamma: a Buddha or saint. While the Hindu purrJa-ghata contains amrta, the Buddhist one contains Dhamma, that which brings a person to the amata and which in the highest sense (Nibbana) is this "deathless" state.

The above symbolism neatly dove-tails with another indication of the dome's meaning. As stu pas developed, they sometimes came to have interior strengthening walls radiating from the centre, as in figure 2. As the stUpa dome, in plan, is circular, the impression is strongly given of the Dhamma-wheel symbol. This symbolises both the Buddha and the Dhamma-teaching, path and culmination-in a number of ways. For example, i) its regularly spaced spokes suggest the spiritual order and mental


rintegration produced in one who practices Dhamma; ii) as the ;spokes converge in the hub, so the factors of Dhamma, in the sense of the path, lead to Dhamma, in the sense of Nibbana; iii)

-as the spokes stand firm in the h'ub, so the Buddha was the discoverer and teacher of the Dhamma: he firmly established its practice in the world. The Dhamma-wheel is also a symbol of universal spiritual sovereignty, which aligns with the significance of the stl1pa's openness to the four directions (see above).

The stl1pa dome, then, is not only a container of the Buddha's relics and their power, but also symbolises both the state of the Buddha, and the Dhamma he encompassed. The dome is also known, in the third century A.D. Divyiivadiina, as the arp!a, or egg. The meaning of this must be that, just as an egg contains the potential for growth, so the stOpa dome contains relics, sometimes known as bf.ias, or seeds. By devotion to the stOpa and its relics, a person's spiritual life may grow and be fruitful. This connotation is a neat parallel to that of the dome as a "vase of plenty."

Another connection with spiritual growth is provided by the association of the stiipa dome with the lotus (which, incidentally, is often portrayed growing out of a pilrry,a-ghata). Domes are often decorated with lotus designs, and their circular plans resemble the circle of an open lotus flower, as in the lotus-medallion shown in figure 3. In addition, the Burmese see the shape of the stiipa (whose bulk is its dome) as that of a lotus bud, with the name of its components recalling the idea of a flower bud with its young leaves folded in adoration. 11 We see, then, that a further Buddhist symbol is included in the stOpa as a symbol-system.

The lotus, of course, is a common Buddhist symbol from early times. While it is a popular pan-Indian symbol for birth, its meaning in Buddhism is best given by a passage frequently recurring in the suttas (e.g., S.1I1.140):

"Just as, monks, a lotus, blue, red, or white, though born in the water, grown up in the water, when it reaches the surface stands unsoileil by the water; just so, monks, though born in the world, grown up in the world, having overcome the world, a Tathagata abides unsoiled by the world."

Just as the beautiful lotus blossom grows up from the mud and


water, so one with an enlightened mind, a Buddha, develops out of the ranks of ordinary beings, by maturing, over many lives, the spiritual potential latent in all. He thus stands OUt above the greed, hatred and delusion of the-world, not attached to anything, as a lotus flower stands above the water, unsoiled by it. The lotus,then, symbolises the potential for spiritual growth latent in all beings, and the complete non-attachment of the enlightened mind, which stands beyond all defilements.

Not only are the Dhamma-wheel and lotus symbols incorporated within the stt1pa but, as we shall now see, the other key symbol, the I}odhi tree, also finds a place in this symbol-system. On top of SancY stllpa can be seen a y~ti, or pole, with three discs on it (figure 1). These discs represent ceremonial parasols, the ancient Indian emblems of royalty. Large ceremonial parasols are still used in South-East Asia, for example to hold over a man about to be ordained, i.e., over someone in a role parallel to that of prince Siddhattha. In Tibetan Buddhism, such parasols are held over the Dalai Lama on important occasions. By placing parasols on a stt1pa, there is expressed the idea of the spiritual sovereignty of the Buddha and his teachings (also expressed by the Dhamma-wheel symbol). In accordance with this interpretation of a stt1pa's pole and discs, we see that king DunhagamaI}.i of Sri Lanka (second century B.C.), when he had finished the Great Stt1pa at Anuradhapura, placed his royal parasol on it, conferring on it sovereignty over Sri Lanka for seven days (Mahava'Y{lSa XXXI v. 90 and 111); he later replaced his parasol with a wood or stone copy.

While there are three honourific parasol-discs at SancY, on later stllpas these generally increased in number, so as to increase the inferred honour. 12 Sometimes, they came to fuse into a spire, as seen in the present super-structure of the Great Stt1pa at Anuradhapura (figure 4). Another phase in the development of a spire can be seen in the 14-16th century Shwe Dagon Stt1pa in Rangoon (figure 5). Here, the dome is bellshaped and has come to merge with the spire, to form one flowing outline. Because the spire no longer really conveys the impression of a series of parasol-discs, a separate, large metal parasol is placed at its summit.

The use of the parasol as an emblem of royalty probably derives from the ancient custom of a ruler sitting under the shade of a sacred tree, at the centre of a community, to admin-


ister justice. The shading tree thus became an insignia of sovereignty. When the ruler moved about, it came to be represented by a parasol. The parasols on a stupa, then, while being an emblem of sovereignty, also connote a sacred tree. Indeed, a second century B.C. relief from AmaravatI depicts a stllpa which, in place of the ya.yti and parasol discs, has a tree with parasol-shaped leaves (figure 6). .

Of course, the Buddhist sacred tree is the Bodhi tree, 13 so the ya.yti and parasols on a stllpa must symbolically represent this, itself a potent Buddhist symbol. This idea is re-inforced by the fact that, in Burma, free-standing parasols are sometimes worshipped as Bodhi tree symbols, and the metal parasols on stlipas sometimes have small brass Bodhi leaves hanging from them. That the ya.yti and parasol-discs represent a Bodhi tree is also supported when we examine the structure immediately below them on a stllpa. Figure 1 shows that, at Sand, this is a cubical stone, surrounded by another vedikii, or railing. Now these two features are reminiscent of ones found at pre-Buddhist tree-shrines, which had an altar-seat at their base, and a railing to surround their sacred enclosure. In Buddhism, descendants of the original Bodhi tree became objects of devotion for, as in the case of physical relics, they were a tangible link with the departed Buddha and his spiritual power. Such Bodhi trees were enclosed by railings in the same way as the previous tree shrines. As the style of the stupa developed, the cubical stone structure expanded in size and came to incorporate the vedika in the form of a carved relief on its surface, as in figure 4. The important point to note is that Bodhi tree shrines developed into more complex forms, as seen for example in figure 7; as this happened, the superstructure of stlipas mirrored this development, as seen in figure 8. This is clear evidence that the superstructure of a stllpa was symbolically equated with a Bodhi tree and its shrine.

The Bodhi tree, of course, as the kind of tree under which the Buddha attained erilightenment, became established as a symbol for that enlightenment, in early Buddhism. 14 Like the lotus, it is a symbol drawn from the vegetable kingdom. While both, therefore, suggest spiritual growth, the lotus emphasizes the potential for growth, whereas the Bodhi tree indicates the culmination of this growth, enlightenment.

The structure underneath the royallBodhi tree symbol


came to be known, e.g., in the Divyavadana, as the harmika, or "top enclosure." This was the name for a cool summer chamber on the roof of a building. This connection need not contradict the idea of the structure as a symbolic Bodhi tree shrine, for both a cool "top enclosure" and a Bodhi tree can symbolise the enlightened mind: the chamber suggests its "coolness," and the tree suggests its enlightened nature.

While all the components of the stiipa seem now to have been discussed, there remains one of crucial importance: the axial pillar running down the centre of the dome. This is hidden in most stiipas, but it can be seen in the stiipa shown in figure 9. John Irwin has reported the finding of axis holes in early stiipas, some containing fragments of a wooden axis pole. 15 In the case of the Lauriya-Nandagarh Stiipa (excavated 1904-5), he reports the finding of a waterlogged wooden axisstump, penetrating deep below the original ground-level. Irwin regards this stiipa as a very ancient one, pre-third century B.C., but S.P. Gupta argues against this. 16 In the most ancient stiipas known (fourth-fifth centuries B.C.), Vaisall and Piprahwa, we find, respectively, only a pile of earth and a pile of mud faced with mud bricks. They had no axial pole or shaft. Irwin's evidence, however, is well marshalled, and shows that a wooden axis pole had become incorporated in Buddhist stiipas by the third-second centuries B.C.; S. Paranavitana also has found evidence of what can only have been stone axial pillars in the ruins of early Sinhalese stiipas.t7 Axial pillars were also a very important feature of East Asian "pagodas," as shown in figure 10. The pagoda form probably developed from a late form of the Indian stiipa and certain multi-rooved Chinese buildings. It is important to note, though, that none of the pre-Buddhist Chinese precursors had an axial pillar: this must have derived from the Indian stiipa, therefore. 18

The archaeological evidence, then, indicates that in early Indian stiipas, after the most ancient period, wooden axial pillars were incorporated, and that in later ones, they were superseded by stone pillars. Originally, they projected above the stiipa dome, with the ya~ti and parasols as separate items, as in the case of the Amaravati Stiipa (dating from Asokan times) shown in figure 9. When, however, the domes of stiipas came to be enlarged, the axes became completely buried within, and the ya~tis were fixed on top of them, as if being their extensions.


The Divyavadana refers to ~ "yupa-ya,yti" being implanted in the summit of an enlarged stilpa. 19 This, and other references, shows that the usual term for the axial pillar of a stl1pa was

. yupa. Somewhat surprisingly, this was the term for the wooden ,. post where,. in Vedic religion, an animal would be tethered

before it was sacrificed to the gods. There is a parallel in more than name, however. The Vedic yupa was square at the bottom, octangular in the middle, and round at the top, while the stone axial pillars of ancient Sinhalese stl1pas are found to be of the same basic shape. 20 Clearly, then, the axial pillars of stupas had

. close associations with the Vedic sacrificial post. How can this be explained? While the non-violent teachings of Buddhism rejected animal sacrifice, early Buddhist stl1pas may well have been built round Vedic sacrificial posts by converted Brahmins. Indeed, excavation of the early Gotihawa Stl1pa, by which Asoka placed a pillar, has revealed animal bones below the original ground level at the base of the stilpa axis, where a wooden post once stood. The most ancient stilpas lack signs of any axial pillar, probably because Buddhism was not sufficiently well established in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. for the conversion of a Brahmanic site to have been acceptable. With the increasing popularity of Buddhism, it would have come to be acceptable for stilpas to be built around existing Vedic yupas. These already marked sacred spots of sorts: building stupas on these spots showed that they were now taken over by the new religion. In such early stilpas, the original wooden Vedic yupa was probably retained to form the stilpa axis, but later on, a stone yupa would have been erected to mark the sacred spot which would b~ the centre of a new stl1pa.

The axial yupa of a stl1pa surely had a further symbolic function. To fully explore this, it is also necessary to note an alternative name for the stupa axis. Paranarvitana has reported

. that the monks of Sri Lanka (in the 1940s) gave the traditional term for the stupa axis as Inda-khfla, equivalent to the Sanskrit Indra-kfla, Indra's stake.21 The monks did not know the reason for this name, however. John Irwin has argued that both the terms yupa and Indra-kila show the stupa axis to symbolise the axis mundi: the world pillar or world tree of Vedic mythology. 22

I shall summarise Irwin's arguments below before going on to' my own preferred interpretation. Firstly, he argues that the Vedic sacrificial yupa was itself a substitute for the axial world


tree, as demonstrated by the way it is addressed in Brahmanic texts, and the fact that the tree sections of the yupa (square octagonal and round) are regarded as representing, respective~ ly, the earth, the atmosphere, and the heavens. 23 Secondly, Irwin notes that "Indra's stake" is the designation, in the Vedas for the stake with which Indra pegged the primaeval mound t~ the bottom of the cosmic ocean on which it floated, thus giving our world stability.24 Thirdly, Irwin argues that this stake is mythologically synonymous with the Vedic world axis. 25 He refers to a Vedic cosmogonic myth in which Indra, with his vajra, slays the obstructing dragon Vrtra, so as to release the waters of fertility and life locked up in the primaeval mound, floating on the cosmic ocean. At the same time, Indra props up the atmosphere and heavens with the world axis or tree (which seems equivalent to his vajra), and pegs the mound to the ocean bottom, as above. The world axis and Indra's stake can therefore be seen as running into each other, merging into one.26

Fourthly, Irwin cites certain archaeological evidence which might suggest that Buddhist stilpa builders actually conceived of the stupa axis as symbolising the world axis or world tree of the above Vedic myth.27 Some of this evidence is as follows:

i) a reliquary from the Great Stilpa at Anuradhapura has a yupa obtruding from its top, sprouting leaves as if it were a tree (as shown in figure 11).

ii) the description of the relic chamber of the above stupa at Mahava'r(lsa XXX 63 ff. refers to a huge golden Bodhi tree standing at the centre of the stilpa, as if the tree were the stilpa axis. 28

iii) the circumambulatory paths of some early stilpas were paved with azure-blue glass tiles, or glazed tiles decorated with water-symbols, suggesting, perhaps, that the stupa dome symbolically rests on the cosmic ocean, as did the primaevaI mound of Vedic myth. 29

Irwin, therefore, sees the stilpa as an image of the creation of the universe (the archetype of regeneration), with the stilpa axis founded on the waters and rising through the earth, atmosphere and heavens so as to unite them and form a communicating link between them.30


I do not want to rule out Irwin's interpretation (though it seems unlikely), but I feel that there are more "Buddhist" ones easier to hand: after all, the Bodhi tree and water-born lotus are well established Buddhist symbols. Moreover, Irwin himself thinks that while the above Vedic myth affected stiipa construction and the meaning of the axis, the Vedic significance came to be mostly forgotten as the old meaning was -adapted for the new and increasingly dominant doctrinal scheme.

Inasmuch as the stiipa axis seems to have originated as a Vedic sacrificial post, it can surely have taken on a symbolic meaning from this association. To see what this was, we have, firstly, to examine what the Buddhist equivalent of "sacrifice" was. In the Kiltadanta Sutta (D.1.144 ff.) it is said that the Buddha was once asked by a Brahmin about the best form of "sacrifice." Instead of describing some bloody Brahmanical sacrifice, he answers by talking about giving alms-food and support to monks, Brahmins and the poor, about living a virtuous life, being self-controlled, practicing samatha and vipassana meditations,and attaining Nibbana. He describes each such stage of the Buddhist path as a kind of "sacrifice," with the attainment of its goal being the highest and best kind. Again, at D.III.76 it is said that a yilpa is the place where a future Cakkavatti emperor will distribute goods to all, renounce his royal life to become a monk under Metteyya Buddha, and go on to become an Arahant. Therefore, what was once a sacrificial post could naturally come, in the new religion of Buddhism, to symbolise the Buddhist path and goal-the Dhamma-and all the "sacrifices" involved in these. Indeed, at Miln. 21-22, it is said of the monk Nagasena that he is engaged in

pointing out the way of Dhamma, carrying the torch of Dhamma, bearing aloft the yilfJa of Dhamma, offering the gift of Dhamma ... sounding the drum of Dhamma, roarmg the lion's roar, thundering out Indra's thunder and thoroughly satisfying the whole world by thundering out sweet utterances and wrapping them round with the lightning flashes of superb knowledge, filling them with the waters of compassion and the great cloud of the Deathlessness of Dhamma ...

This passage certainly shows that Buddhism could draw on


Vedic symbolism, but also shows that such symbolism is fUlly Buddhicized when it is used. "Yilpa" is used as a metaphor for Dhamma: the Buddhist teaching, path and goal, and Indra's releasing of the cosmic waters is a meta'phor for a great Dhamma-teacher's compassionate bestowal of that which brings Deathlessness.

When we look at the other term for the stupa axis,"Indra's stake," we also see that this came to have a clear Buddhist meaning. Firstly, we see that from the Vedic myth about Indra's stabilising stake, Indra-kzla came to be a term for the huge pillars standing firmly in the ground at the entrance to ancient Indian and Sinhalese cities, being used to secure the heavy gates when they stood open. It also became a term for the gateposts of houses. Indeed, Indra-kila became a term for anything which was stable and firmly rooted and which secured the safety of something. While it might be thought that the stupa axis was called an Indra-kila because it structurally stabilised the sWpa, this does not seem to have been the case, architecturally.3! It is more likely that the axis was an "Indra's stake" in a purely symbolic sense, symbolising the Dhamma, the stable centre of a Buddhist's life, which secures his safety in life's troubles and also acts as a "gateway" to a better life and, ultimately, to Deathlessness. The use of "Indra's stake" in metaphors in the suttas indicates that, in particular, the term symbolises that aspect of the Dhamma which is the unshakeable state of mind of Arahants and other ariyan persons. At S.V.444, one who understands the four ariyan truths and has sure and well-founded knowledge is like an unshakeable Inda-khila, while at Sn.v.229, we read:

"As an Inda-khzla resting in the earth would be unshakeable by the four winds, of such a kind I say is the good man, who having understood the ariyan truths, sees them (clearly). This splendid jewel is the Sangha; by this truth may there be well-being."

Dhp.v.95 uses the metaphor specifically of an Arahant:

Like the earth, he does not resent; a balanced and well disciplined person is like an Inda-khila.

This is probably also the case at Thag.v.663:


But those who in the midst of pain and happiness have overcome the seamstress (craving), stand like an Inda-khila; they are neither elated nor cast down.

Referring tothe stupa axis as "Indra's stake," then, would seem to imply that the axis was seen as symbolising the unshakeable state of an ariyan person's Dhamma-filled mind.32 Such symbolism harmonises with that of the axis as a yupa, and also with that of the dome as a kumbha, representing the personality of someone full of Dhamma.

A final aspect of the symbolism of the stUpa axis is that it was seen to represent Mount Meru, the huge axial world mountain of Hindu and Buddhist mythology, with the circular plan of the stUpa dome representing the circle of the earth. That the stiipa was seen in this way, even in Theravada lands, can be seen from several pieces of evidence. Firstly, the huge Bodhi tree which MahavarJ2sa XXX v.63 ff. describes as being in the relic chamber of the Great Stupa at Anuradhapura, is said to have a canopy over it on which are depicted the sun, moon and stars-which are said to revolve round Meru. Around the trees are said to be placed statues of the gods, the Four Great Kings who are said to guard the slopes of Meru; while the relic chamber walls are said to have painted on them zig-zag shaped walls-such walls, at least in the Tibetan tradition, are used to portray the rings of mountains on the disc of the earth. Secondly, the harmika of ancient Sinhalese stupas sometimes has the sun on the east face and the moon on the west face. Thirdly, in late Sinhalese texts, the term for the drum at the base of the stupa spire (see figure 4) is devata ko(uva, enclosure of the deities. This corresponds to the idea that the lower gods dwell on Meru, with Indra's palace at its summit. :1:1

I would see the significance of the Meru symbolism as being that the stupa axis and dome represent the world of gods and men; the implication of this will be brought out below.

V. The Symbolism of the Stupa as a Whole

So far, I have assigned various symbolic meanings to the components of the stUpa. The dome, container of the precious relics, can be seen to represent a pot full of Dhamma, a


Dhamma-wheel, a lotus flower, or the circle of the earth. The stupa axis, as a yupa, symbolises the Dhamma (teaching, path and realizations) and all its "sacrifices," and, as Inda-khila, symbolises the great stability of the Dhamma and the unshakeable nature of the mind full of Dhamma; it also represents Mount Meru, home of the gods. On top of the stupa dome is a cool "top enclosure" and a ya-?(i complete with honourific parasoldiscs, equivalent to a Bodhi tree, symbol of a Buddha's enlightenment and his enlightened mind.

While a stiipa is worthy of devotion due to the relics it contains, it also serves to inspire because the symbols of its separate components unite together to make an overall spiritual statement. The whole symbolises the enlightened mind of a Buddha (represented by the ya-?ti and parasol-discs as Bodhi tree symbols) standing out above the world of gods and humans (represented by the axis and dome). The symbolism shows that the enlightened mind arises from within the world by a process of spiritual growth (represented by the dome as a lotus symbol, or as a vase of plenty) on a firm basis of the practice of Dhamma (represented by the dome as a Dhamma-wheel). This Dhamma (now represented by the axis) is also the path which leads up out of the world of humans and gods to enlightenment (represented by the ya-?(i and parasol-discs, resting on top of the axis as its uppermost portion). A personality (the dome as a kumbha) full of such Dhamma is worthy of reverence and has an unshakeable mind (represented by the axis as Inda-khila, with the ya-?(i as its extension). In brief, we could say that the stiipa symbolises the Dhamma and the transformations it brings in one who practices it, culminating in enlightenment. It is not surprising, then, that at an early date, the various layers of the stiipa's structure were explicitly seen as symbolising specific aspects of the Dhamma (teaching, path and culmination) and of a Buddha's nature. Gustav Roth has translated, from their Tibetan versions, two ancient Sanskrit texts which see the stiipa as symbolising the Dharmakaya in the sense of the 37 "requisites of enlightenment"(bodhipak-?iya-dharmas) and certain other spiritual qualities.:14 These texts are the first century A.D. Caitya-vibhaga-vinayabhava Sutra, fragments of an unknown Vinaya, and the second century A.D. Stupa-lak-?ana-karikii-vivecana of the Lokottaravadin Vinaya. A scheme of symbolic corre-


spondences identical with that outlined in the first of these texts is shown in figure 12. Each layer of the stlipa's structure represents a group of spiritual qualities cultivated on the path, while the spire represents the powers of a Tathagata.!l!'i

Another interesting passage quoted by Roth, from the first century A.D. Mulasarvastivadin Vinaya K0udraka-vastu, also links the stlipa with the bodhiPa~iyadharmas. The passage deals with the death of Sariputra, at which Ananda-who has Sariputra's relics-evinces dismay to the Buddha. The Buddha consoles him by asking him if Sariputra has taken with him the aggregates of fila, samadhi, prajila, vimukti, or vimuktijnanadar- . sana. He then asks if Sariputra has:

"taken away that which is the substance of my enlightened perception: the four applications of mindfulness ... (the bodhiPa~iyadharmas are hsted)?"

That is, though only the relics of Sariputra remain, in the physical sense, the dharmas cultivated by him still remain; i.e., the Dharmakaya remains. With such passages in mind, it would have been very natural for Buddhists to look on the stlipa not only as a container of physical relics of a Buddha or saint, but also as symbolising the essential Dharma-qualities which such a person embodied, and which still exist, inviting others to embody.

In the Pali passage on the death of Sari putt a (S.IV.161-3), the bodhi-pakkhiyadhammas are not specifically mentioned, though Ananda says that he will bear in mind the strengthgiving Dhamma of Sariputta, and the Buddha recommends him, even after the Buddha's own parinibbana, to abide with himself and Dhamma as refuge. This is to be done by way of the four satipa((hanas, the first set of dhammas in the list of the 37 bodhipakkhiyadhammas. In two Pilli passages on the death of the Buddha, however, there is reference to the bodhipakkhiyadhammas (though not by this name). At D.Il.120, in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, the Buddha lists the 37 dhammas as those known and taught by him, which his disciples should master, meditate on and spread abroad so that the holy life will last long and there shall be good and happiness for many. He then refers to his parinibbana as being in three months time, and exhorts his monks, as he does on his death-bed:


"All conditioned phenomena are subject to decay; perfect yourselves with dIligence."

At M.II.243-5, Ananda asks the Buddha to ensure that when: he dies, there will be no unseemly disputes among his disciples, or harm to the manyfolk, as he has heard that there have been at the death of Mahavira, the Jain leader. In reply, the Buddha rhetorically asks Ananda whether any of his monks differ OVer what he has taught out of his abhinna, i.e., the 37 bodhipakkiya_ dhammas. He goes on to imply that these comprise the essential magga and patipada; if disputes arise after his death, they will only be on matters of Vinaya, and be of trifling importance.

These passages all emphasize the idea that, even though a Buddha or Arahant dies, there still remains the essence of the path he taught and realized, in the form of the 37 bodhipakkiyadhammas, and that bearing these in mind, .and practicing tpem, will be of great benefit to people. After the Buddha's parinibbiina, while physical relics were important, the Dhamma is more so, as the Buddha emphasized to Vakkaliwhen he said, "He who sees the Dhamma sees me, he who sees me sees the Dhamma." It is not surprising, then, thatthe stupa, the primary focus of early Buddhist devotion, should not only contain the relics of the Buddha or a saint, but should also symbolise the Dhamma, or the Buddha in the form of his Dhammakaya. Such a symbolic equation of the stupa with the Buddha is, in fact, reflected in the early Vinayas, in which, where a stlipa is seen as having its own property (land and offerings), it is sometimes seen as "the property of the stupa," and sometimes as the "property of the Buddha."

As a final point, I would like to try to tie together the functions of the stupa as a reliquary with that of it as a Buddhasymbol, so as to show how the stlipa may be seen to depict both the Buddha's physical and spiritual personality. The classical stlipa contains relics of the Buddha, i.e., some of the mahiibhiltas which composed his body, and should be' placed "where four roads meet" (catummahiipathe) (D.II.142). Even ignoring the fact that the stlipa dome came to be known as a kumbha, a common metaphor for th~ personality, these facts suggest that the stlipa may originally have been intended as a model of theenlightened personality. This can be seen from a passage at S.IV.194-


5. Here, a simile is given in which a town stands for the kaya (the body, or perhaps the personality other than viiiiu'lrJa) , the "lord" of the town stands for viiiiiiirJa, the "lord" of the town sits '\in the midst in a square (where four roads meet)" (majjhe singhiitako) , which represents the four mahiibhutas (extension, cohesion, heat and motion), and the "lord" receives a "message of truth," representing Nibbana. As the classical stl1pacontains the four mahiibhutas of the Buddha and stands at the meeting of four roads, its dome can be seen to represent his kiiya (Dhp.v.40 sees the kaya as like a kumbha), the relics represent the essentials of his body, and the centralya.)(i and parasol-discs (and later the axis, too), represents his viiiiiiirJa, which has received the "message" of Nibbana, and been transformed by it.

In this paper, I hope to have shown that, even prior to its complex symbolism in the Vajrayana tradition, the stl1pa had developed, from simple beginnings, into system of inter-locking and mutually supporting symbols representing the Dhamma (teaching, path and realizations) and the enlightened personality embodying the culmination of Dhamma-practice.

=-o.->.--ya~"t;i and ansol-discs

t oraJ;,l8.

Figure 1


Figure 2

Figure 3


Figure 4

Figure 5

88 ]IABS VOL. 7 NO.2

Figure 6

Figure 7


Figure 8

Figure 9 -V--

Figure 10


Figure 11

VI SAITA BO-JJHANGA.

PANCA BALANI

PANGINORIYANI

CAITARO IOOHIPADA

CAITAR.I SAMMAPPAOHANANI

GAITARI SATIPATTHANANI

Figure 12


ABBREVIATIONS A. Anguttara Nikiiya D. Dfgha Nikiiya Dhp. Dhammapada M. Majjhima Nikiiya Miln. Milindapanha S. Sa7!!yutta Nikiiya Sn. Sutta-Nipiita Thag. Theragiithii References to Pali texts are all to the Pali Text Societies editions.

NOTES

* First given at the Eighth Symposium on Indian Religions (British Association for the History of Religion), Oxford, April 1982.

1. "The Stilpa and the Cosmic Axis-The Archaeological Evidence," South Asian Archaeology 1977 (papers from the Fourth International Conference of South Asian Archaeologists in Western Europe; Naples, Instituto Universitario Orientale Seminaro di Studi Asiatici, 1979) pp. 799-845; and "The Axial Symbolism of the Early Stilpa-An Exegesis," in A.L. Dallapiccola (ed.) The Stupa-Its Religious, Historical and Archaeological Significance (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980) pp. 12-38.

2. Elements of Buddhist Iconography, Cambridge, Mass., 1935, re-published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.

3. The Psycho-Cosmic Symbolism of the Buddhist Stilpa, Emeryville, California, Dharma Press, 1976.

4. "The Symbolism of the Buddhist Stilpa," in A.L. Dallapiccola (ed.), op. cit.

5. Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1910) Vol. III, p. 657.

6. op. cit. 7. Ibid. 8. M. Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Delhi, Motilal Banar

sidass. 9. D. Mitra, Buddhist Monuments (Calcutta, Sahitya Samsad, 1971) p. 204. 10. B. Walker, Hindu World (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1968)

Vol. II, p. 132. 11. S. Yoe, The Burman, his Life and Notions (London, Macmillan and Co.,

1910) pp. 158-9. 12. G. Roth, op. cit., p. 184, points out that in the Mulasarviistiviidin Vin

aya K~udraka-vastu, it is said that a Tathagata's stilpa should have 13 parasoldiscs, that of Arahants should have 4, that of Non-returners 3, that of Oncereturners 2, and that of Stream-enterers 1.

13. While the Asvattha tree-now known as the Bodhi tree-was the species of tree under which Gotama is said to have become enlightened, the Mahiipadiina Sutta states that the six previous Buddhas were each enlightened under different species of tree (D.l1.2-8).


14. Early carved stone reliefs sometimes briefly depict the Buddha's life by showing symbols for the key events in his life:. B.odhi tree (enlightenment), Dhamma-wheel (first sermon), and stl1pa (panmbbana). Examples of such reliefs, from the second and third centuries A.D. are iltustrated in D.L. Snell_ grove (ed.), The Image of the Buddha (Paris, UNESCO, 1978), p. 38.

15. "The Stl1pa and the Cosmic Axis." 16. S.P. Gupta, The Roots of Indian Art (Delhi, BR Publishing Corpora_

tion, 1980) pp. 246-269. 17. The Stupa in Ceylon-Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of Ceylon,

Volume 5 (Colombo, 1946). 18. L. Ledderose, "Chinese Prototypes of the Pagoda," in A.L. Dallapic_

cola (ed.), op. cit., p. 239 19. Ed; C.B. Cowell and R. Neil, Cambridge, Cambridge University

Press, 1886, p. 244. 20. J. Irwin, "The Axial Symbolism of the Early Stl1pa," p. 21. 21. Op. cit., p. 38. 22. See note l. 23. "The Axial Symbolism of the Early Stl1pa," pp. 14 and 28. 24. Ibid, pp. 22-3. 25. "The Stl1pa and the Cosmic Axis," p. 826. 26. They can also be seen as equivalent to Indra's vajra. This is shown in

the Apstamba Srautasutra VII,10,3 (as cited by A. Gail, "Cosmic Symbolism of the Spire of the Ceylon Dagoba," in A.L. Dallapiccola, op. cit., p.260), where it is stated that, when the Vedic yupa is raised, it is said:

"Rend open the earth, split the heaven-cloud, give us rain water. ... " 27. "The Stl1pa and the Cosmic Axis," p. 836. 28. "The Axial Symbolism of the Early Stl1pa," p. 18. 29. "The SWpa and the Cosmic Axis," pp. 831-2: 30. Ibid., p. 826. 31. J. Irwin, "The Axial Symbolism of the Early Stl1pa," p. 21. 32. Given that "Indra's stake" is closely associated with, and probably

mythologically synonymous with, Indra's thunderbolt-sceptre, or vajra (see note 26). it is also significant that, at A.I.I24, an Arahant is described as having a citta like a vajira, a term which may mean diamond, or be equivalent to Sanskrit vajra.

33. M. Spiro, Buddhism and Society (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1971), p. 203 reports that in contemporary Burma, the stl1pa is often seen as representing Meru, with the three worlds (kama, rupa and arupa) represented by the plynth and two parts of the dome, with the spire representing the Buddha.

34. See note 4. 35. The diagram does not depict the rains canopy (var~a-sthat'i), said to

symbolise the Buddha's "great compassion." The details of the symbolism in the second text differ slightly, and it also sees the ground as symbolising sUa, and the first platform as symbolising dana.


FIGURES

1. The Great Stilpa at Sand, adapted from A. Volwahsen, Living Architecture-India (London, Macdonald, 1969) p. 91.

2. Lotus medallion design, from a railing on Bharhut Stilpa, second century B.C., in' the Indian Museum, Calcutta.

3. Plan of the third century A.D. Nagarjunakol!c;la Stilpa, from G. Combaz, "L'Evolution du Stupa en Asie. Etude D'Architecture Bouddhique," in Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques (Bruxelles, L'Institut Beige des Hautes Etudes Chinoisses, 1933), Vol. 12 (1932-3), pp. 163-306, figure 71.

4. The Great Stilpa at Anuradhapura, second century B.C., 54 metres high.

5. Shwe Dagon Stupa, Rangoon, 112 metres high, reputedly containing two hairs of Gotama Buddha, and belongings of three previous Buddhas; from G. Combaz, ''L'Evolution du Stilpa en Asie. Les Symbolismes du Stupa," in Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques (Bruxelles, L'Institut Beige des Hautes Etudes Chinoisses, 1936), Vo1.l4 (1935-6),pp.l-126, figure 29.

6. Relief of a stupa supertructure on a drum slab, AmaravatI, second century B.C., British Museum. Drawn from a photograph (figure 24) in J. Irwin, "The Stupa and the Cosmic Axis" (reference as in note 1).

7. Relief medallion depicting a tree-temple (Bodhi-ghara). Mathura, second century B.C. Now in Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Taken from J. Irwin, "The Stupa and the Cosmic Axis," figure 27.

8. Stilpa depicted on gateway of stupa no. 3, SancY. Drawn by Margaret Hall, as in J. Irwin,"The Stilpa as Cosmic Axis," figure 28.

9. Superstructure of the Great Stupa at AmaravatI, as depicted on a relief slab originally encasing the stupa. Second century A.D., Government Museum, Madras.

10. Cross-section of Horyuji Pagoda, Nara, seventh century A.D. Figure 1 (p. 257) in D. Seckel, "Stupa Elements Surviving in East Asian Pagodas," in A.L. Dallapiccola (ed.) The Stupa (reference as in note 1).

11. Gold reliquary in the form of a stupa. From the Ruvanvali stilpa, Anuradhapura, attributed to first century B.C. Figure 23 in J. Irwin, "The Stupa and the Cosmic Axis."

12. "Cross section of the ideal Dagoba or Chorten" (showing correspondences to the 37 bodhiPa~ivadharmas), figure 13 in Lama Anagarika Govinda, The Psycho-Cosmic Symbolism of the Buddhi5t Stupa (Emeryville, California, Dharma Press, 1976).

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Reason as the Prime Principle in Tsong kha pa's Delineation of Deity Yoga as the Demarcation Between Sutra and Tantra

by] effrey H apkins

In the first of fourteen sections in his Great Exposition of Secret Mantra (sNgags rim chen mo),! Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), founder of the dGe lugs pa, Virtuous or Joyous2 Way, sect of Tibetan Buddhism, presents his view on the difference between sutra and tantra in Buddhism. The section is a long, involved argument in which, although Indian sources are cited, the central appeal is to reasoning. Typical of much of his writing, the argument is so involved and the principles behind the steps in the presentation so taken for granted that an introduction which presents the same material in a more straightforward manner is needed. I have attempted to provide this in Tantra in Tibet, which is centered around translation of Tsong kha pa's first section, through translating and editing an oral commentary by His Holiness the Dalai Lama XIV.:l

The extreme rules of redundancy that often make Tibetan writing laconic to the point of obfuscatiori do not apply to oral commentary, and thus the Dalai Lama's explanation provides a more free-flowing introducion to this complex argument. It is the type of introduction that a well-versed Tibetan scholar will give to a student before launching into a topic; it smoothes the way, and thus is invaluable for a beginner. The. simplified version, however, is not meant to replace the twists and turns of Tsang kha pa's argument; rather, one is encouraged to become acquainted with the system to the point where the implicit principles are explicit to the mind of the reader of Tsong kha pa's text. This seems to be the Dalai Lama's point when, during

95


public lectures,he has encouraged dGe lugs pas not to forsake Tsong kha pa's writings for later simplified presentations.

In much the same spirit, it is germa~e to simplify Tsang kha pa's and the Dalai Lama's arguments even further for the sake of getting a firm grip on the broad structure of the myriad points being made. I read the argument as follows (page num_ bers in parentheses refer to Tantra in Tibet): .

Because people are of different capacities, dispositions and interests, Sakyamuni Buddha taught many different paths. He set forth sutra and tantra; within sutra, he taught four different schools of tenets-Great Exposition School (Vaibha~ika), Sutra School (Sautrantrika), Mind Only School (Cittamatra), and Middle Way School (Madhyamika)-and within tantra, he set out four different sets of tantra-Action (Kriya) , Performance (Carya), Yoga and Highest Yoga (Anuttarayoga, literally "Unsurpassed Yoga").

Within the four schools of the sutra syste~, he descri.bed three. varieties of paths-for Hearers (Sravaka), Sohtary Reahzers (Pratyekabuddha), and Bodhisattvas. Each of the four schools has internal sub-divisions, and the four divisions of tantra also contain many different types of processes and procedures of meditation. The result is that there are many different levels of commitment-ranging from the assumption of tantric vows down to the assumption of only the refuge vow-many different paths and many different styles. (pp. 20-21)

In determining the difference between sutra and tantra, first it is necessary to settle the diffe~ence between the vehicles in sutra-the Hearers' Vehicle (Sravakayana), Solitary Realizers' Vehicle (Pratyekabuddhayana), and Bodhisattvas' Vehicle (Bodhisattvayana) or Great Vehicle (Mahayana)-and then consider the further division of the latter into its slitra and tantra forms. "Vehicle" (yana) has two meanings:

1 Since ya means to go, and na indicates the means of going, a vehicle is comprised of those practices which carry one to a higher state-those practices which, when actualized in the mental continuum, cause manifestation of a higher type of mind. . 2 Somewhat unusually, "vehicle" can also refer to the destInation-that place or state at which one is aiming. This is because just as a vehicle can bear or carry a certain load, so

DEMARCATION BETWEEN SDTRA AND TANTRA 97

the state of Buddhahood-the goal of the Bodhisattva Vehicle-can bear or carry the we1fare of all sentient beings, whereas the state of a Hlnayana Foe Destroyer (Arhan)4 can bear much less. (p. 43)5

Since "vehicle" has these two meanings, the difference between the two Buddhist Vehicles-Hearer and Solitary Realizer (being Hlnayana) and Bodhisattva (or Mahayana)-must occur either within the sense of vehicle as the means by which one progresses or within the sense of vehicle as the destination or state to which one is progressing, or both.

In the Prasarigika-Madhyamika interpretation of Hlnayana and Mahayana (as delineated by Tsong kha pa), there isa tremendous difference between the two in the sense of vehicle as that to which one is progressing. In Hlnayana, practice culminates as a Foe Destroyer, one who has overcome the foe of ignorance but is not omniscient and thus is not a Buddha. Unlike a Buddha, a Foe Destroyer does not have the ability spontaneously to manifest m various forms in order to help all beings. Smce the states of being a Buddha and a Foe Destroyer are very different, there is ~ significant differ~nce between Hln~yana a~d Mahayana m the sense of vehIcle as that to which one IS progressing-the goal-Buddhahood and Arhanship.

With this difference in goal, there must also be a difference in the two vehicles in the sense of the practices by which one progresses to these goals. The difference between Hlnayana and Mahayana in terms of the means of progress can occur in only two places-method and wisdom, these two comprising the entire path in that method mainly produces the Form Body (Riipakaya) of a Buddha and wisdom mainly produces the Truth Body (Dharmakaya) (p. 57). In the Prasarigika-Madhyamika interpretation, Hlnayana and Mahayana do not differ with respect to wisdom, in that both require realization of the subtle emptiness of inherent existence of all phenomena such as body, mind, head, eye, wall, consciousness, etc. (pp. 38-:-41, 98-9). Although Hlnayana and Mahayana do differ m terms of how wisdom is cultivated-how many reasonings one uses. for getting at the subtle emptiness, Bodhis<!-tt,,:as using mynad reasomngs and Hlnayamsts only a few6-m terms of the object of the wisdom consciousness, the subtle emptiness of mherent existence, there is no difference between the emptiness a Hlnayanist realizes and the emptiness a Mahayanist realizes. In this sense, there is no difference in wisdom.


Since wisdom in Hlnayana and Mahayana do not diff~r in terms of the type of emptiness bei~g ~ognized, the dIfference between the two vehIcles must he III method (p 55). "Method" here specifically means ,motivation and tli~ deeds that it impels. No matter how much compassion a Hlnayanist may bave, his or her primary motivation is to release hi~ or ~er self fro~ cyclic e~ist<;nc~ (saqlara). However, III Mahayana the pnmary motIvatIOn IS the altruistic aspiration to highest enlightenment (bodhicitta) , induced by great love and compassion, in which one takes on the burden of the welfare of all beings. Thus, there is a significant difference between Hlnaya:na and Mahayana in terms of method" even though not III ~isdo~. (pp. 98-9)

Hence, Hlnayana and Mahayana dIffer III both senses of vehicle, as the means by which one progresses as well as that to which one progresses. , - In the Mahayana itself, there are two vehicles-the Perfection Vehicle (Paramitayana) and the Mantra or Tantra Vehicle (Mantrayana, Tantrayana).7 The Perfection Vehicle is sutra Mahayana, and the Mantra Vehicle is mantra or tantra Mahayana.

Do sutra Mahayana and tantra Mahayana differ in the sense of vehicle as that to which one is progressing? The goal of sutra Mahayana is Buddhahood, ana Tantrayana cannot have another goal separate from Buddhahood, as there is no attainment higher than, the Buddhahood explained in SUlra as attainment of the Truth and Form Bodies. Sutra describes a Buddha as a being who has removed all obstructions and attained all auspicious attributes, a being who has no movement of coarse winds (pra1'}a, inner energies);8 thus, such Buddhahood has to include the attainments of even Highest Yoga Mantra (Anuttarayogamantra), the primary aim of whidi is to stop the movement of all coarse winds and manifest the most subtle consciousness-the mind of clear light-simultaneously appearing in totally pure form.9 Hence, the Vajradharahood often mentioned as the goal of tantra and the Buddhahood described in sutra are the same. (pp. 55, 139-42)

There being no difference between the Perfection Vehicle and Mantra Vehicle in terms of the goal-the destination-they must differ in the sense of vehicle as the means by which one progresses. They must differ either in terms of method, or wisdom, or both. If the difference lay in wisdom, there would be many problems, because the Perfection Vehicle contains Nagarjuna's Madhyamika teachings on emptiness, and there would have to be some other


more subtle emptiness than that which Nagarjuna establishes with many different arguments in the twenty-seven chapters of his Treatise on the Middle Way (MadhyamakSastra) , 10 whereas there is none. Thus, there is no difference between'sutra and tantra in the view, which here refers to the objective view, that is, the object that is viewed (Tib. Jut gyi ita ba)-emptiness or ultimate truth-not the realizmg consciousness, since sutra Mahayana and Highest Yoga Tantra do differ with respect to the subtlety of the con-

~ sciousness realizing emptiness. Specifically, in Highest Yoga Tantra, more subtle, enhanced consciousnesses are generated to realize the same emptiness of inherent existence. Still, because the object realIzed is the same whether the consciousness is more subtle or not, the "objective view" is the same. (pp. 55-7,110)

In this way, between the sutra and tantra Mahayanas there cannot be any difference in the factor of wisdom in terms of the object that is understood by a wisdom consciousness. Hence, the difference again has to lie in method.

In both the sUtra and tantra Mahayanas, the basis of method is the altruistic intention to become enlightened for the sake of all sentient beings (bodhicitta); because of this, the motivational basis of the deeds of the path is the same. The other main factor of method has to do with the deeds induced by that method, which in sutra Mahayana are the practices induced by this altruistic aspiration-the perfections of giving, ethics, and patience. However, since these are also practiced in tantra, the difference cannot be found there, either. Furthermore, tantra has an even greater emphasis than sutra on the deeds of the perfections, in that a tantric practitioner is committed to engage in them at least six times during each day. (pp. 57-8)

Moreover, the distinction could not be made on the basis of speed of progress on the path, because within the four tantra sets-Action, Performance, Yoga, and Highest Yoga Tantra-there are great differences in speed, and in sutra Mahayana there are five different modes of progress, slow to fast. In addition, the difference must not lie in some small or insignificant feature, but in· an important one. (pp 58, 100-1)

The profound difference occurs in the fact that in tantra there is meditation in which one meditates on one's body as similar in aspect to a Buddha's Form Body, whereas in sutra Mahayana there is no such meditation. This is deity yoga (Tib. lha'i mal 'byor), which all four tantra sets have, but sutra systems do not. Deity yoga means to imag-


ine oneself as having the Form Body of a Buddha now; one meditates on oneself in the aspect of a Buddha's Forlll. Body. (pp. 61-5,115-16)

In tIie Perfection Vehicle, there is meditation similar in aspect to a Buddha's Truth Body-a Buddha's wisdolll. consciousness. A Bodhisattva enters into meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness with nothing appeanng to the mind except the final nature of phenomena, the emptiness of inherent existence; the wisdom consciousness is fused with that emptiness. Even though, unlike his tantric counterpart, a sutra Bodhisattva does not specifically imagine that the state of meditative equipoise is a Buddha's Truth Body,!! meditation similar in aspect to a Buddha's Truth Body does occur in the sutra system in the sense that· the state of meditative equipoise on emptiness mimics a Budd?~'s exalted. wisdom consciousness in its aspect of perceIvmg the ultImate. However, the sutra PerfectIOn Vehicle does not involve meditation similar in aspect to a Buddha's Form Body. There is meditation on Buddhas and so forth as objects of offering, etc., but there is no meditation on oneself in the physical body of a Buddha. (pp. 60, 62, ll5)

Such meditative cultivation of a divine body is included within the factor of method because it is mainly aimed at achieving a Buddha's Form Body. In the sutra system, the sole means for achieving a Buddha's Form Body is, on the basis of the altruistic intention to become enlightened, to engage in the first three perfections-giving, ethics, and patience-in limitless ways over a limitless period of time. Though the Mantra Vehicle also involves practice of the perfections of giving, ethics, and patience, it is not in limitless ways over 1imitless periods of time. Despite emphasis on the perfections, practice in limitless ways over limitless time is unnecessary, because one is engagmg in the additional technique of meditation on oneself m a body similar in aspect to a Buddha's Form Body.!2 In other words, in the tantric systems one meditates on oneself as similar in aSf>ect to a Buddha in terms of both body and mind in oraer to become a Buddha. This practice is significantly different, and thus those systems wh.ich involve it constitute a separate vehicle, tantra Mahayana.

In deity yoga, one first· meditates on emptiness and then uses that consciousness realizing emptiness-or at least an imitation of it-as the basis of emanation of a Buddha. The wisdom consciousness itself appears as the physical form of a Buddha. This one consciousness thus has two parts-a factor of wisdom and a factor of method, or fac-

DEMARCATION BETWEEN SOTRA AND TANTRA 101

tors of (1) ascertainment of emptiness and (2) appearance as an ideal being-and hence, through the practice of deity yoga, one simultaneously accumulates the conections of merIt and wisdom, making their amassing much faster. (pp. 62-3) .

The systems that have this practice are called the Vajra Vehicle, because the appearance of a deity is the display of a consciousness which is a fusion of wisdom understanding emptiness and compassion seeking the welfare of othersan mseparable union symbolized by a vajra, a diamond, the foremost of stones, as it is "unbreakable" (pp. 22-3, 51, 107~8). Since the two elements of the fusion-compassionate method and penetrating wisdom-are the very core of the Perfection Vehicle, one can understand that siitra and tantra, despite being different, are integrated systems. One can understand that compassion is not superseded by, but essential to, tantra, and that the wisdom of the Perfection Vehicle is not forsaken for a deeper understanding of reality in the Tantra Vehicle.

To summarize: the difference between the vehicles must lie in the sense of vehicle as that by which one progresses or _that t~ which one prog~ess~s. Hlnayana differs from Mahayana m both. The destmatIOn of the lower one is the state of a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer and of the higher one, Buddhahood. Concerning "vehicle" in the sense of means by which one progresses, although there is no difference in the wisdom reahzing the subtlest nature of phenomena, there is a difference m methodHlnayana not having and Mahayana having the altruistic mind of en~ightenment (tJ:1at is, the altruistIC intention to become enhghtened) and Its attendant deeds.

Siitra and tantra Mahayana do not differ in terms of the goal, the state being sought, since both seek the highest enlightenment of a Buddha, but there is a difference in the means of progress, again not in wisdom but in method. Within method they dIffer not in the basis or motivation of the deeds, the altruistic intention to become enlightened, nor in having the perfections as deeds, but in the additional technique of deity yoga. A deity is a supramundane being who himself or,herself is a manifestation of compassion and wisdom. Thus, in the special practice of deity yoga one joins one's own body, speech, mind, and activities wIth the exalted body, speech, mind, and activities of a supramundane being, manifesting on the path a similitude of the state of the effect.

The appeal throughout this presentation is to reason; never-


theless Tsong kha pa also cites supportiv~ Indian sources. Foi instance, in establishing that according to the Prasarigika-Mad_ hyamika system even those who are Hlnayax:ists by path-that is to say, Hearers and Solitary Realizers (as opposed to Hlnayanists by tenet, the Vaibha~ikas and Sautrantikas)13_ must realize the mast subtle emptiness, he presents an abridged version of his own extensive argument on this in his commen_ tary to Candraklrti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (Madhyamakavatara) , citing Candraklrti's Supplement (p. 94), Nagarjuna's Precious Garland (Ratnavali) (p. 94), Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (MadhyamakaSastra) (pp. 95 and 96), Praise of the Non-Conceptual ([?]Nirvikalpastava) (p. 95), two Perfection of Wisdom Siitras (pp. 95-96), and a Hlnayana siitra (p. 96). (That the Prasarigika-Madhyamika view on the emptiness of inherent existence (svabhava-siddhi) is needed in order to become a Foe Destroyer is extremely controversial, as it means that no follower of Vaibha~ika, Sautrantika, Cittamatra, or even Svatantrika can complete the Hlnayana path and become a Foe Destroyer by means of any of those paths alone.)14

Considering counter-arguments, Tsong kha pa makes reference (pp. 96-97) to presentations in both Hlnayana and Mahayana texts that propound the opposite, i.e., that to get out of cyclic existence (sa'Y[lSara, 'khor ba) it is sufficient to have the fully developed wisdom that understands that the person is not substantially existent, a coarser type of selflessness (pp. 179-81). Again, the conflict is settled by reasoning through differentiating what is definitive (nitartha, nges don) and what is interpretable (neyartha, drang don). This not being a main subject of the Great Exposition of Secret Mantra, the author leaves the matter with a brief admonition to learn how to make such hermeneutical distinctions-implicitly indicating the benefit of studying his Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snying po), where the dominant argument is that scriptural reference is not sufficient, since a supporting scripture would require another, which, in turn, would require another, ad infinitum, and thus reasoning is necessary. The working principles revolve around showing that the conception of inherent existence is the root of cyclic existence and that some trainees are temporarily incapable of receiving teaching on such a subtle topic. The interpreta-

DEMARCATION BETWEEN SUTRA AND TANTRA 103

tion of the opposing scriptures is made (1) on the basis of the ontological fact, determined by reasoning, that the emptiness of inherent existence is the final mode of subsistence of phenomena and (2) in the context of the existential situation of the epistemological needs of the trainees to whom the doctrines were taught.

Tsong kha pa resolves other seeming contradictions by taking into account the frame of reference of a remark. For instance, Kulika PUl).Qarlka's (Rigs ldan Pad rna dkar po) commentary on the Kalacakra Tantra, called the Stainless Light (Vimalaprabha) , explains the term "vajra" in "Vajra Vehicle" (Vajrayana) in the context of the Kalacakra Tantra, a Highest Yoga Tantra, in such a way that the meaning applies only to that class of tantra and not to all four classes. Tsong kha pa comments (pp. 107-8):

The meaning of "Vajra Vehicle" is given through taking "Vajra" as an indivisibility of the effect-the Mantra mode-and the cause-the Perfection mode. Here, "cause and effect" refer to totally supreme emptiness and supreme immutable bliss. The Brief Explication of Initiations (Sekhoddesa) [included in the Kalacakra cycle] says:

That bearing the form of emptiness is the cause, That bearing immutable compassion is the effect. Emptiness and compassion indivisible Are called the mind of enlightenment.

The indivisibility of these two is a Cause Vehicle in the sense of being the means by which one progresses, and it is an Effect Vehicle in the sense of being that to which one is progressing. Such a Vajra Vehicle has reference to Highest Yoga Tantra and cannot occur in the lower tantras. For the supreme immutable bliss can only arise when one has attained the branch of meditative stabilization [in the system of the Kalacakra] and thus the branches of mindfulness· and those below must be the means of achieving it. The three lower tantras do not have all the factors that are included in these causal branches.

Therefore, this interpretation of "Vajra Vehicle" bears little relation to its general meaning, and the same applies to that of the meanmg of the Vehicles of Cause and Effect. [Or, more literally: Therefore, (this interpretation)

104 .lIABS VOL. 7 NO.2

is too narrow here in the context of identifying the general meaning of the Vajra Vehicle, and positing the meaning of the Vehicles of Cause and Effect through that mode (of interpretation) is also too narrow in a' general presenta_ tion.] Here the meaning of "Vajra Vehicle" should be taken in accordance with what is said in Ratnakarasanti's Handful 31 l!'lowers, Expla:"ation of !.he . GuhyasamiiJa !antra (KusumiinJalzguhyasamiiJanzbandha): WIth regard to Its being called the Vajra Vehicle, those which included all the Mahayana are the six perfections. Those that include them are method and wisdom; that which include them as one taste is the mind of enlightenment. That is the Vajrasattva; meditative stabilization; just this is a vajra. Because it is both a vajra and a vehicle, it is the Vajra Vehicle, the Mantra. Vehicle." Thus, ~he Vajrasattva yoga t~at indivisibly umtes method and wIsdom IS the VaJra VehIcle. It OCCurs at the time of both the path and the fruit.

Tsong kha pa explains that since the three lower tantras do not have the paths necessary for the generation of a fusion of totally supreme emptiness (here referring to a form empty or devoid of material particles) and supreme immutable bliss ("immutable" here referring to non-emission), this interpretation,. in the Kiilacakra mode, of "Vajra Vehicle" is too narrow (khyab chung ba). He adds that interpreting "Vehicles of Cause and Effect" in this way is also too narrow for a general presentation. Rather, the general meaning of "Vajra Vehicle" must apply to all four classes of tantra, not just Highest Yoga. As explained above, he indicates that this is an indivisible union of method and wisdom.

In his The Buddhist Tantras, Prof. Alex Wayman condenses Tsong kha pa's presentation to the point where he mistakenly makes it seem that for Tsang kha pa the passages from the Stainless Light and the Brief Explication of Initiations present a properly formulated demarcation between the Perfection and Mantra Vehicles in general. Wayman says: 15

According to passages cited by Tsoil.-kha-pa in the introductory section of liis work on the stages of Tantra called Snags rim chen mo, the Mahayana (Great Vehicle) has two divisions-the prajna paramlta method (that part of Mahayana whic.h IS not tantric) and the man~ra metb?d (the stnctly tantnc part of the Mahayana). In hIS quotatlOn (fo-


lio 12b-4) from the (Kalacakra work) Vimalaprabha, these two wings of the Mahayana are termed "cause" and "effect". But also the Diamond Vehicle (Vajrayana)-so called because the diamond is unsplittable and unbreakable--can be considered the Vehicle that incorporates both the prajnaparamita side (the "cause") and the mantra side (the "effect"). Therefore, the vehicle of the Bodhisattvas (who are the Mahayana saints) has two degrees, first the perfection of insight (prajnaparamita) and then the practice of mantras, initiatIOn in the malJ-rjala, etc. ... Tsmi. kha pa introduces fur~her terminology (folio 12b-6) with a passage from the Sekhodde.sa':

Holding the form of the void is the cause; . The fruit is the adherence to incessant compassion. The indissoluble union of voidness (Sunyata) and compassion (karulJ-a) is called "mind of enlightenment" (bod-hicitta). .

At 17a-l, he quotes the Tantra called the Vajrapanjara ...

Wayman seems to be taking the position of KuIika PUl).Qarlka's Stainless Light (Vimalaprabha) and the Brief Explication of Initiations (Sekhoddesa), which Tsong kha pa rejects as being too narrow, as being Tsong kha pa's own accepted version of the meaning of "Vajra Vehicle" in general.I 6 By citing those two texts and then the Vajrapanjara Tantra as if they are in accord, one misses the movement of Tsong kha pa's critical analysis of the flaws of accepting the first two as applying to a general treatment of the Perfection and Mantra Vehicles and then explication of an appropriate opinion. Tsong kha pa is making the point that the type of union of method and wisdom described in those texts applies only to Highest Yoga Tantra and that a meaning of "Vajrayana" applicable to all four tantras must be found elsewhere.

Prof. Herbert Guenther cites the same passage in a chapter on "Paramitayana and Mantrayana" in his Tibetan Buddhism Without Mystification: 17

... Vajrayana is the indivisibility of cause or Paramita method and effect or Mantra method.-According to the dBang mdor bstan:


Awareness of no-thing-ness is the cause; To feel unchanging bliss is the effect. The indivisibility of no-thing-ness And bliss is known as the enlightenment of mind.

Here the indivisibility of awareness which directly intuits no-thing-ness and the unchanging, supreme bliss is conceived as consisti?g of the two p~enomena <?f goal-ap_ proach and goal attamment. Such an mterpretatIOn of V <Yrayana, however, applies to the Anuttarayogatantras, not to the three lower tantras, because, if this unchanging, supreme bliss has to be effected by meditative practICes preceding and including inspection, since it settles after the bliss-no-thing-ness concentration has been realized, these causal factors are not present in their entirety in the lower tantras. Therefore, while this is correct for the general idea of Vajrayana, it is not so for the distinction in a causal situation course or in one anticipating the goal.

The last sentence (des na 'dir rdo rje theg pa spyi'i don ngos 'dzin pa'i skabs su khyab chungs pa yin la tshul des rgyu 'bras kyi theg pa'i don 'jog pa yang spyi'i rnam bzhag la ma khyab pa yin no)18 literally reads, "Therefore, [this interpretation] is too narrow here on the occasion of identifying the general meaning of the Vajra Vehicle, and positing the meaning of the Vehicles of Cause and Effect through that mode [of interpretation] is also too narrow in a general presentation." Guenther, however, has Tsong kha pa saying that this interpretation is "correct for the general idea of Vajrayana," thereby contradicting his own explanation in the previous sentence that the interpretation of Vajra Vehicle according to the Stainless Light applies only to Highest Yoga Tantra and is not wide enough to apply to all four tantras.

Both Wayman and Guenther have missed the argument of this section of the Great Exposition of Secret Mantra, though the former worse than the latter. As this section is mainly comprised of critical analysis that appeals to reason, it would have to be said that they have misconstrued the main point being made in Tsong kha pa's elaborate argument on the difference between the Perfection and Mantra Vehicles. That these scholars, who are indeed luminaries in the field of Tibetan Buddhism, miss such a fundamental point is itself sufficient justification for a style of translation and exposition that spends more time on the ground of the tradition itself.


With respect to scriptual authority for the distinction between the sutra and tantra Mahayanas, Tsong kha pa quotes a passage from the Vajrapanjara Tantra (p. 117), rejects the commentaries of Knl).apada and Indrabodhi (p. 120), and critically uses the commentary of Devakulamahamati (pp. 120-1), accepting some parts and rejecting others. Having established that deity yoga is the dividing line between the two Mahayanas, he reinforces this with citations from or references to works on Highest Yoga Tantra by Jiianapada (pp. 122-8), Ratnakarasanti (pp. 129, 134), Abhayakara (pp. 129-30), Durjayacandra (p. 130), Srldhara (p. 130), Samayavajra (p. 131), Jinadatta (p. 131), and Vinayadatta (p. 131-2). The general drift is illustrated by a passage (p. 129) from Ratnakarasanti's Commentary on (Dipankarabhadra's) "Four Hundred and Fifty" (bZhi rgya lnga cu paY as Tsong kha pa cites the title, or Commentary on (Dipankarabhadra's) "Rite of the Guhyasamaja Ma'Y}rjala" (Guhyasamajama'Y}rjalavidhitika) , as it is listed in the Tibetan Tripitaka19 :

If one cultivates only [a path] having the nature of a deity, one cannot become fully enlightened through that because the fulfillment of [yogic] actIvities is not complete. Or, if one meditates on the suchness of a deity and not on that deity, one will attain Buddhahood in many countless aeons but not quickly. Through meditating on both, one will attain the highest perfect complete enlightenment very quickly because to do so is very appropriate and has special empowering blessings.

In short, the path to speedy attainment of enlightenment must involve both deity yoga and emptiness yoga; one without the other is not sufficient.

Prof. Wayman criticizes my translation of that passage and offers his corrections: ~() (em phases his)

If one cultivates only with adoption of the ego of a deity, one cannot become fully enlightened merely through that, because the completion of the ritual part is not fulfilled. Or, if there are no deities zn the sense of cultivating the reality of deities, one might attain Buddhahood in many countless aeons but not quickly. Hence, the cultivation of both [reality of deities and ritual Fart], because it is highly gratifying, and because it has specia empowering blessings, quickly achieves the highest perfect complete enlightenment.


Let us cite the Tibetan:~l

yang na lha'i bdag nyid can 'ba' zhig tsam bsgoms na de lta22 na ni de tsam gyis 'tshang rgya ba nyid du mi 'gyur tel las rdzogs pa ma tshang ba'i phyir roll yang na lha rnams kyi de kho na nyid bsgom gyi lha rnams ma yin na n.il de lta na ~ang bskC:"l pa grang~ med pa mang por sangs rgyas nyzd thob par gyur gyz myur du nz ma yin noll de bas na gnyis ka sgom pa ni shin tu yid du 'ong ba yin pa'i phyir dangl byin gyis brlabs kyi khyad par gyis mchog tu myur bar bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub thob par 'gyur ro

His changes miss the point. First, bdag nyid here is synonymous with ngo bo and rang bzhin, and thus means "nature" or "entity"; that which has such a divine nature could be a maIJQala, a divine body itself, or a path that involves cultivation of such. There is no need to construe bdag nyid as "ego," though indeed the pride of being that deity (lha'i nga rgyal) must be cultivated. Wayman is forced not only to add in the word "adoption" but also to supply an instrumental ending ("with"). Rather, lha'i bdag nyid 'ba' zhig tsam is the direct object of bsgoms: "cultivates [or literally, cultivated] only [ a path] having the nature of a deity."

Second, Wayman's preference for "because completion of the ritual part is not fulfilled" becomes self-contradictory when later in brackets he identifies the two factors that are necessary for speedy attainment of Buddhahood as "cultivation of both [reality of deities and ritual part]," whereby "ritual part" comes to stand for deity yoga, since the "reality of deities" clearly refers to their emptiness and the two topics of the passage are deity yoga and emptiness yoga. This is self-contradictory because in the first sentence the reason clause is speaking of the incompleteness of the yoga due to the absence of emptiness yoga, the specific activity or "ritual part" that is lacking clearly being identified as emptiness yoga, not cultivation of a divine body, as Wayman would have it. The basic point of the passage and the reason for Tsong kha pa's citing it have been lost in Wayman's translation. The context clearly indicates that the incompleteness of yogic activities in the first sentence refers specifically to the absence of emptiness yoga, the yogic activities themselves standing for the entire corpus of the path and not just one part.


Third, his translation of thob pax 'gyur in its two occurrences first as "might attain" and then as "achieves" is unfounded. The 'gyur ending with a present verb makes that verb future, and my original translation in both cases as "will attain" reflects this meaning. 23

Fourth, shin tu yid du 'ong ba (literally, "very much coming to the mind") means not "highly gratifying" as Wayman prefers but, literally, "very attractive," in the sense that since a Buddha has both a Truth Body (Dharmakaya) and a Form Body (Rupakiiya) it is very appropriate or attractive that on the path one cultivate both emptiness yoga and deity yoga, the former having as its main result the Truth Body and the latter, the Form Body.

Fifth, in yang na lha rnams kyi de kho na nyid bsgom gyi lha rnams ma yin na the particle gyi in bsgom gyi is not a genitive ending but a non-case particle meaning "and" or "but." As Tibet's foremost grammarian, Si-tu Pal).-chen, says:24

There is also a usage of those [genitive endings,] gi and so forth, for a non-case meaning, for they are also used as word-ornaments indicating that the latter word is contradictory or discordant, as in, "This is true, andlbut the other is obscured," "Our refuge is the Teacher Buddha andlbut is not Rudra and so forth," "It indeed is correct this way but ... " (gi la sogs pa de rnams rnam dbye'i don ma yin parzhan la'ang 'jug pa yod del 'di ni bden gyi gzhan ni gti mug go bdag cag gi skyabs ni ston pa sangs rgyas yin gyi drag po sogs ma yin noll 'di ltar 'thad mod kyi 'on kyangl zhes pa lta bu phyi tshig 'gal ba'am mi mthun par ston pa'i tshig gi rgyan la'ang 'jug pa'i phyir ro).

Wayman mistakes the non-case particle gyi for a genitive case particle, seeking to reform the clause to "if there are no deities in the sense of cultivating the reality of deities." He thereby suggests that if one meditates on the reality or suchness (tattva, de kho na nyid) of a deity one cannot simultaneously perceive a divine body. This is not true to the system, since the very assertion of the difference between the sutra and tantra Mahayanas is made on the basis of the simultaneous union in one consciousness of the factors of method and wisdom, specifically the appearance of the divine form and ascertainment of its emptiness.


Wayman cites this passage and gives his "corrections" as a sole sample of what he considers my error-laden translation of prose citations in Tsong kha pa's work:

... while Hopkins does.reason:ab~y well ~ith Tso~-k~a-pa's own prose, he has contmual dIffICulty wIth the CItatIOns in prose or verse, and despite the labor of tracing out these passages in the canon-taking up most of the notes-he still exhibits a result which is more typical of language beginners, of giving an obscure and non-cogent renditIOn as though it represents the original, while in truth the translater does not understand the original.

His attempt at correction doubles back on him, displaying his own failure to catch even the general thread of the argument of the text.

Having cited such passages in Highest Yoga Tantras and commentaries to show the distinctive presence of deity yoga, Tsong kha pa makes brief citations for Yoga, Performance, and Action Tantras by referring to Sakyamitra (p. 132), Anandagarbha (p. 133), and Buddhaguhya (p. 133), skirting for the time being the considerable controversy on whether Action and Performance Tantras have deity yoga, since he tackles that problem at the beginning of the section on Action Tantra.25

Despite Tsong kha pa's many citations of tantras and Indian commentaries, it is clear that they are used only as supportive evidence for his argument. Tradition is only supportive, not the ultimate authority. The arbiter is reason, specifically in the sense of determining coherence and consistency within a path structure. Tsong kha pa refutes Ratnarak~ita and Tripitakamala (pp. 143-50), for instance, not because they differ from the aforementioned sources, but because their presentations fail in terms of consistency with the path structure. By doing so, he moves the basis of the argument from scriptural citation to reasoned analysis of a meditative structure.

To determine the context of Tsong kha pa's analysis and investigate whether it is correct, it will be necessary first to examine the presentations on the difference between sutra and tantra given by (1) his predecessor and chief source, the Sa skya scholar Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364), (2) his near con-

DEMARCATION BETWEEN SOTRA AND TANTRA III

:emporary, the rNying-ma scholar kLong chen rab 'byams : 1308-63), who exemplifies the type of presentation Tsong kha Ja is refuting, (3) the later bKa' brgyud pa scholar Pad ma dkar ::>0 (1527-92) who sided with a different tradition while ac~nowledgingTsong kha pa's well-reasoned argument, (4) Tsong kha pa's critic Bo dong Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1376-1451), who opposes Tsong kha pa's argument with reason, and :5) later dGe lugs scholars who wrote condensations or elabora:ions of Tsong kha pa's presentation as the implications of his work came to the fore. 26 With such data, we will be 'well srounded for pursuing our own analyses. In the meantime, we :an say, upon determining Tsong kha pa's argument, that his procedure is that of a thorough scholar, analyzing sources and :ounter-opinions with careful scrutiny and determining the place of the pillars of his analysis in the general structure of a system. His intention is clearly not just to present a catalogue of views as Bu ston mainly did, but to adjudicate conflicting systems of interpretation, thereby, at least by style, establishing a new one.

The intellectual intricacy of his presentation is no match for the immediately evocative style of the great rNying-ma scholar kLong chen rab 'byams, for instance. However, when the principles of his position have been so internalized that the reader can supply the unspoken interstices, the experience of re-reading the text can evoke palpable glimpses into the experience of deity yoga. The argument itself becomes an exercise moving the mind toward developing the ability to combine the profound realization of emptiness and manifestation as an ideal being, such that one begins to sense the possibility of consciousness itself appearing as form-the union of method and wisdom that, for Tsong kha pa, is at the very heart of tantra. dGe lugs is often criticized, both in Tibet and in the West, for being overly verbal, overly abstract, but I would suggest that this is due to the critics not having put sufficient time into first getting the positions of the dGe lugs scholars straight and then allowing the metaphysical imagination to be stimulated. The danger of over-abstraction in some areas of dGe lugs thought is great, but the intricately woven arguments, when probed over time, lead to an internalization of knowledge and palpable experience of principles, which are then the basis for


verbalization. In the beginning, the words seem to use the person, but later, a changed person is using the words.

As scholars, we need both patience to go through this process as well as wariness against being trapped' by our own willingness to become absorbed in these complex systems. The dilemma posed by such openness and the need for discrimina_ tion is certainly not solved by refusing to spend the time needed to probe the material or by an affectation of distance that prevents involvement. Tsong kha pa seems to have conquered this dilemma within his own culture with his startlingly refreshing reasoned analysis of traditional accounts, which functions as a hermeneutic, bringing all the more focus to a pivotal practice in tantra-deity yoga-itself founded on the reasoned analysis performed in emptiness yoga.27 The lesson may be that the type of mind needed to follow his argument is also needed in this central practice. Seen in this light, there is a harmony between the form of Tsong kha pa's elaborately reasoned argument on the difference between sutra and tantra and the content, the identification of deity yoga-the first step of which is reasoned meditation on emptiness-as the central tantric feature. The style itself makes the point that reason is not cast aside in tantra.

NOTES

1. The longer title of Tsong kha pa's text is Stages of the Path to a Conqueror and Pervasive Master, a Great Vajradhara: Revealing All Secret Topics (rGyal ba khyab bdag rdo rje 'chang chen po'i lam gyi rim pa gsang ba kun gyi gnad rnam par phye ba). In the Peking edition it is P6210, Vol. 161 (Toh. 5281), but I have mainly used the Dharamsala (Shes rig par khang) edition of 1969, despite flaws, because of its legibility, checking questionable passages against the N gawang Gelek edition (New Delhi, 1978), which is a retouched version of the 1897 Lhasa old lol blocks.

2. Several Tibetan scholars have reported that dge, "virtuous," was originally dga', 'Joyous."

3. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), pp. 13-79. 4. ,The translation of Arhan as "Foe Destroyer" accords with the Tibetan

translation as dgra bcom pa; for discussion of the etymology and justification of the translation see my Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), n. 553.

5. The page reference here is to the Dalai Lama's commentary. Tsong kha pa also speaks of these two meanings of "vehicle," but the line was unin-


tentionally deleted from Tantra in-Tibet at the beginning of the last paragraph on p. 106. It should read: "About 'vehicle', there is an effect vehicle which is that to which one is proceeding and a cause vehicle which is that by which one proceeds. Due to proceeding [it is called] a vehicle. With respect to ... "

- 6. Tsong kha pa discusses this point in some detail in his commentary (dGongs pa rab gsa!:) on Chandraklrti's Supplement to (Niigiirjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (Madhyamakiivatiira), the first five chapters of which are translated in Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider and Co., 1980), pp. 174-5. (For justification of my translation of Madhyamakiivatiira as Supplement to the "Treatise on the Middle Way", see my Meditation of Emptiness, pp. 462-9 and 866-9.) Tsong kha pa says (p. 175, diacritics added):

To establish that even a single phenomenon does not truly exist, Mahayanists use limitless different reasonings as set forth in the Treatise on the Middle Way. Hence their minds become greatly broadened with respect to suchness. Hlnayanists use only brief reasoning to establish suchness by valid cognition, and since they do not establish emptiness the way Mahayanists do, do not have a mind broadened with respect to suchness .... This difference arises because Hearers and Solitary Realizers strive to abandon only the afflictions [the obstructions to liberation], and cognizing a mere abbreviation of the meaning of suchness is sufficient for that. Mahayanists are intent on abandoning the obstructions to omniscience, and for that it is necessary to have a very broadened mind of wisdom opened to suchness.

7. The term "Tantrayana" has great favor in the West, but it does not appear to have been popular in Tibet. There the favored term is Guhyamantrayana (gsang sngags kyi theg pa).

8. This is one among many points that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa makes in defending the position that the Buddhahoods of sutra and tantra are the same. See his Great Exposition of "Tenets" (Grub mtha' chen mo), (Mussoorie: Da Lama, 1962), ca 44b. 6-47a. 8.

9. See Lati Rinbochay's and Hopkins' Death, Intermediate State and Rebirth in Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider and Co., 197,9), pp. 69-73.

10. Also known as the Madhyamakakiirikii. 11. The source here is Kensur Losang Wangdu, abbot of the Tantric

College of Lower Lhasa during the time of its re-location in South India; he is currently residing atJang-dzay (Byang rtse) College at Gan-den (dCa' ldan) in Mundgod, Karnataka, having been appointed head of the dGe lugs order.

12. See the Mongolian scholar Ngag dbang dpalldan's statement of this in Tsong ka pa's Yoga of Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 211-12.

13. For a discussion o(this, see the first appendix in Tantra in Tibet, pp. 173-7.

14. Tsong kha pa's argument can be found in Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 150-81.

15. The Buddhist Tantras (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1973), p. 4. In this chapter, Wayman is engaged in the admirable task of refuting those who view tantra as a corruption. Tsong kha pa's finely worked argument is itself an indication that Wayman is right in this. -


Wayman's equation of pa;ramitayana with prajnaparamitiiyana is question_ able, since in the Perfection Vehicle the emphasis is on practice of all six perfections, not just the perfection of wisdom, for a "limitless" period of time in "limitless" ways, This is clear in the Mongolian scholar Ngag dbang dpalldan's (b, 1797) Illumination of the Texts ofTantra, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths of the Four Great Secret Tantra Sets (iiSang chen rgyud sde bzhi'i sa lam gyi Tnam bzhag rgyud gzhung gsal byed, 6b. 7-7b.3) cited in Tsong ka pa's Yoga of Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 210, " .. , In the Perfection Vehicle this wisdom consciousness is caused to possess the capacity to abandon the obstructions to omniscience through training for a limitless time in limitless varieties of giving and so forth .. , ." From Ngag dbang dpal Idan's explanation, it would seem that the Perfection Vehicle is so named because of calling for practice of the six perfections for a "limitless" period of time in "limitless" ways due to lacking the practice of deity yoga,

16. Wayman's problem with this passage may revolve around the term khyab chung ba ("to narrow"); his mis-interpretation of this term in his translation of the special insight section of Tsong kha pa's Great Exposition 11' the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Lam rim chen mol in his Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (New York: Columbia, 1978) is documented at length in Geshe Sopa's excellent review,jIABS, Vol. 3, No.1, 1980, pp. 68-100,

17. Tibetan Buddhism Without Mystification (Leiden: Brill, 1966), p. 54. Guenther treats the same topic from the rNying rna viewpoint in his Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972), pp, 155- 170.

Of the six passages which are quoted by Tsong kha pa in Guenther's citation, Guenther gives the Sanskrit titles for only two, leaving the other four in Tibetan transliteration and thus giving the misleading impression that they are texts written in Tibetan. I prefer to translate titles into English (with the Sanskrit at each first citation) in order to give some idea of the contents of the texts, the titles often being named by way of their contents. I have also chosen a style of translation different from Guenther, trying to keep with the literal vocabulary of the tradition as much as possible, building up the meaning of words through establishing context. By doing this, multi-worded translation equivalents from a cognate western system are not needed. However, I deeply appreciate the effort that he has made in this regard; my only quarrel is with his insistence that everyone follow his style.

18. (Dharamsala, 1969), lOa.4. 19 (Tokyo-Kyoto: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1955), Vol. 65, Table of

Contents. 20. Kailash (Kathmandu), V. 7 No. 3-4 (1979), p. 321. 21. 17 a.3-5 of the Dharamsala 1969 edition. 22. Read de lta na for de lha na in accordance with the Ngawang Gelek

edition of the Collected Works (Delhi, 1978), ga 42.6. 23. For the usage of 'gyur with the future, see the exposition by the

grammarian Si tu in his Explanation 11' "The Thirty" and "Usage of Gender," Special Treati.se on the ThoTliUgh Application 11' the Language of the Snowy Country, Beautiful Pearl Necklace of the Wise (Yul gangs can pa'i brda yang dag par sbyor ba'i bstan bcos kyi bye brag sum cu pa dang rtags kyi 'jug pa'i gzhung gi mam par bshad pa


mkhas pa'imgul rgyan mu tig phreng mdzes), 58.5 (Dharamsala, n.d.): "Sounds [used for] future actions [are, for instance,] 'grub par 'gyurl 'chad par 'gyur . .. " (bya 'gyur ma 'ongs pa'i sgra nil 'grub par 'gyurl 'chad par 'gyur . .. ) Note that 'chad is the present form of the verb to explain, the future being bshad.

24. 27.lff (see the previous note for the text.) 25. The Yoga' of Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 47-

62. 26. I did this work in preparation for Tantra in Tibet and intend to

present it in a separate, more historically oriented work. 27. Examples of the reasonings required in emptiness yoga are present

ed in my Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), especially in Parts One and Two (pp. 47-196), as well as the last chapter of Part Five (pp. 549-60).

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Buddhism and Belief in Atma

by Y. Krishan

The question whether the Buddhists believed in a permanent entity, soul or atma has been the subject of great debate. In fact, many scholars of Buddhism hold that the Buddha upheld the doctrine of anatta or anatmavada, no soul. As Oldenberg put it, the Buddhists believed in a becoming and not in a being. In consequence, it is concluded "In Buddhism there is no actor apart from action, no percipient apart from perception. In other words, there is no conscious subject behind consciousness."1 This, in short, leads to action (karma) without a doer (karta). It also repudiates the concept of transmigration and rebirth (punarjanma). To believe in the doctrine of karma without accepting the concepts of fiva and its rebirth is evidently perplexing.

T.W. Rhys Davids2 expresses the resultant dilemma thus: "We have thus arrived at a deadlock; to save what it holds to be a psychological truth, Buddhism rejects the notion of a soul; to save what it holds to be the necessity of justice, it retains the belief in transmigration."

The source of this controversy is to be found in the Anattalakkhana-sutta of the Vinayapitaka (1.6.38 ff.), wherein the Buddha asserts that neither the body (rupa) nor any of the psychical factors of existence, feeling (vedana) , ideas (sanna), volition (sankharas) , consciousness (vinnana) can be said to be atta, the self-the five khandhas or factors of individual existence are perishable, non-enduring, anicca, impermanent.

At the outset, it would be appropriate to set out the views of different schools and sects of Buddhists on this subject.

The Stharviravadins or Theravadins, Kasyaplyas (also called Sthavariyas) and Vibhajyavadins had a pluralistic conception of the constitutent elements of the universe, namarupa. As Anurudhacarya explains in his Abhidhammattha samgaho 1.2

117


(8th-12th Century A.D.), these schools believed that there were four ultimate categories: citta or viiiiiana (consciousness), caitasika (mental properties), rupa (material qualities) and nirvaI)a. They admitted of a pudgala (individual self) only at the empirical level of reality and not as an ultimate real. It needs to be noted, however, that while they believed in pudgalasunyata, they also accepted that citta or viiiiiana was one of the ultimate categories. The MaJjihimanikaya (1.2.66) speaks of a gandhabba (gandharva) as an essential feature in conception. This gandhabba appears to be a form of pudgala. Buddhagho~a, at Vi~ suddhimagga XVII 158-173, speaks of patisandhi viiiiiana, rebirth-linking consciousness. Patisandhi viiiiiana appears to be another version of pudgala.

The MahiSasakas and the Dharmaguptikas believed in nine asamskrta dharmas such as pratisamkhyanirodha, apratisamkhyanirodha, akiiSa, etc., including pratztya samutpada tathata. They also believed in pudgalasunyata.

The Sarvastivadins held that sarvam asti, all things exist. They also subscribed to the doctrine of nairatmya, non-soul or the absence of any permanent substance in an individual. They believed in the eternal existence of 75 dharmas, 72 material categories, and three asainskrta dharmas viz., pratisamkhyanirodha, apratisamkhyanirodha, and akiiSa. They also believed in pudgalasunyatii, but surprisingly, believed in antarabhava, a being having intermediate existence between death of a being and its rebirth.

The Vatslputriyas and Sammitiyas believed in the existence of a pudgala, or a soul, but held that it was avacaya inexpressible (Tattvasamgraha 337).

Sautrantikas, also called Samkrantivadins, repudiated the pudgalavada of the Vatsiputriyas, and called it a metaphysical fiction, like a sky lotus. They did, however, hold that consciousness, vijiiana, one of the five skandhas, migrates at the death of an individual. They postulated an incorruptible seed (bzja) of goodness, an innate, indestructible and perfectly pure factor which persists throughout all change until emancipation or nirvaI)a.

Vasubandhu, a Kashmiri Vaibha~ika, discusses the Vatsiputriya doctrine of anatman exhaustively in the Pudgala viniscaya (also called the Atmavada-prati~edha) of his Abhidharmakosa,

BUDDHISM AND BELIEF IN ATMA 119

and demolishes it. He cites, inter alia, the Bimbisara-sutra to emphasise, "there is no self, nothing mine";3 inner life is void, the outer life is void.4 He explains the parable of the bhiirahara, the carrier of the burden as not justifying the existence of a permanent self. He cites the Paramartha-sunyata-sutra: actions do exist, and they also fructify or bear consequences, but the doer thereof cannot be found. 5

In the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya (AKE) he elaborates: Just as milk and water conventionally describe all their features, like form, etc., likewise, the collection of skandhas, elements of conscious ego, are called pudgala. 6 According to Vasubandhu, a person, e.g., Devadatta is "only an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be unity, to which they give the name Devadatta." But, as noted earlier, Vasubandhu, while repudiating belief in atma, or soul, subscribes to a belief in antarabhava, at Abhidharmakosa 111.10.12.14-18. Evidently, he only denied the existence of an atma as a permanent ego. .

Buddhagho~a (a Theravadin), in his Visuddhimagga also elaborates the non-atman doctrine. At Visuddhimagga XVII 162, he observes: there is no transition of the past existence into (consciousness aggregates), nor does it come into existence without a cause.7 Buddhagho~a (ibid. XVII 164) reiterates: (consciousness) does not arrive here from its past existence, nor does it appear without karmas, sainskaras, etc., as the cause.H In other words, present-life consciousness does not arise from the previous existence but from past causes, like an echo, a lamp, the impression of a seal and a reflection (Visuddhimagga XVII 166). Buddhagho~a goes on to explain: (consciousness) is a continuous series; there is neither identity nor dissimilarity.~) He cites the anology of milk and curds: if there be identity or dissimilarity between the two, the curds cannot be formed from milk (Visuddhimagga XVII 167). It is significant, however, that Buddhagho~a also uses the term patisandhi, rebirth, reunion in explaining the phenomenon of transmigration 'and rebirth, and does not call it a new birth.

Buddhago~a goes on to elaborate, at Visuddhimagga XVIII, that nama consists of sensation (vedana), perception (sanna) and samkhara (volition); consciousness (vinnana) however, is not a part of nama. Rupa is form, and is composed of the four mahii-


bhulas, or elements. He explains, "Name has no power of its own, nor can it go on of its own impulse ... form is also without power and cannot go on its own impulse." They are, however, mutually indispensable to each other. Form goes or moves when supported by name (nama), and name when supported by form. He likens the two to a blind and a cripple; unless they mutually support each other, it is not possible for them to move. I I In short, consciousness manifests itself only as namarupa (name and form). At Visuddhimagga XX, 12 Buddhagho~a

asserts that nama and rupa do not arise from any material; so, when namarupa ceases to exist (i.e., when a person dies), they do not exist anywhere in a material form .

. . . just as when aflute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound; and when the sound comes into existence, it does not come from any such store, and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the cardinal or intermediate points of the compass; and when it has ceased, it exists nowhere in a stored up state ... in exactly the same way, all the elements of being, both those with form and those without form, come into existence after having been non-existent; and having come into existence, pass away.

At Visuddhimagga XIX, I'l he echoes what was said by Vasubandhu: "Of karma there is no doer; nor is there somebody to experience its results. It is nothing but bare states that come to pass." If there is no karla, or doer, there is no moral responsibility for any act, good or evil. In consequence, the entire edifice of Buddhist ethics falls. This, in turn, raises very difficult issues relating to Buddhist religious beliefs and metaphysics. There is unanimity among all students of Buddhism, irrespective of their sectarian affiliation, that there is a law of karma and punarjanma (rebirth). It is karma that explains the phenomena of suffering and inequality. The karmas, or actions, of an individual in this life mature in the subsequent births or rebirths. Thus, the doctrines of karma and punarjanma (rebirth) are inseparably linked. If there be no soul or transmigrating entity that takes rebirth, who bears or enjoys the consequences or fruits of karma?

In the Devadutta-sutta of the MaJjhimanikaya (3.178-179)14 the Buddha claims that with his celestial eye he sees "creatures


in the act of passing hence and of reappearing elsewhere, creatures lowly or debonair, fair or foul to view, happy or unhappy, ... they fare according to their past." Those who had done good deeds are either born in states of bliss in heaven or as human beings ... creatures given to evil in act, at the body's dissolution became ghosts, animals or are born in purgatory.

In the Cfila-Kamma-Vibhanga-sutta of the MaJjhimanikiiya (3.203-206), the Buddha specifically identifies certain actions as leading, after death, to rebirth in purgatory, or among human beings, or in heaven. For example, violence and murder, etc., lead to rebirth in hell, or as a human being for a brief period, or as a human constantly ailing, poor, or of low social status, etc. Likewise, in the Maha-Kamma-vibhanga-sutta of the Maihimanikiiya (3.207-215), the Buddha identifies the states of existence attained by various living individuals after death with reference to their karma, viz., purgatory, heaven, etc.

On the other hand, the Buddha speaks of pratZtya-samutpada, conditioned genesis. The Samyuttanikaya l5 (2.64-65) states that "The body ... is not yours, nor does it belong to others. It should be regarded as former karma effected through what has been willed and felt. ... "

Again, ignorance produces samkharas (samskiiras) avijJapaccavya samkhara (Vinayapitaka 16 1.1 and Samyuttanikaya 17 (2.1-2, 43,65). In the Maihimanikaya18 (1.54) the Buddha explains that the samkharas are the karmic formations of body, speech and thought or mind. In brief, the samskiiras are the psychic roots or substrates of consciousness ..

At the same time, the Buddha denounces as erroneous those who believe in an eternal soul (eternalists) or that nothing exists after death (annihilationists). In the BrahmaJala-sutta of the Dzghanikiiya (1.34-35) the Buddha speaks of annihilationists who aver: "Since ... the soul has form, mind, space, ideas, etc., is built up of the four elements ... it is cut off, destroyed, on the dissolution of the body, and does not continue after death; and then ... the soul is completely annihilated." In the same sutta (lAO) the Buddha rejects as erroneous the view of certain recluses and brahmins who are eternalists, that is, who believe that the soul and the world are eternal and arise without cause. In the Samyuttanikiiya (2.19-21) he observes:


"Who so says, 'He who does (a deed) is he who experiences (i~s results) .is thereby saying that from .the b~ing's beginnmg sufferIng was wrought by (the bemg) hImself-this amounts to the Eternity view. Who so says 'One does (a deed), another experiences (the result)' is thereby saying that when a being is smitten by feeling, the suffering was wrought by another-this amounts to the Annihilation . " VIew.

The Buddha claims to avoid both these "dead ends." In the Samyuttanikaya 19 (4.400-401) the Buddha explains

his view with greater clarity:

"If I, Ananda, on being asked by the Wanderer Vacchagotta, if th~re is a Self, should have answered that there is a Self, this, Ananda, would have been a siding-in with those recluses and brahmal)s who are Eternalists (sasstavadins). If I, Ananda, on being asked by the Wanderer Vacchagotta, if there is not a Self, should have answered that there IS not a Self, this, Ananda, would have been siding-in with those recluses and brahmal)s who are Annihilationists (uccheda-va zns . d· )"

In the Samyuttanikaya20 (1.134-35) it is said:

'Being' why does thou harp upon that word? 'Mong false opinions, Mara has thou strayed Mere bundle of conditioned factors, this! No 'being' can be here discerned to be, For just as, when the parts are rightly set, The word 'chariot' ariseth (in our mind) So doth our usage covenant us to say, 'A being' when the aggregates are those.

In other order words, the term sattva, being, is only a conventional designation for impermanent aggregates.

Again, at Samyuttanikaya21 XXII 22(1), the Buddha explains the burden and the bearer of the burden; the five attachment groups (skandhas) are the burden, the pudgala (individual) is the carrier of the I:{urden. Again, Samyutta22 XII 61.8 likens the self to a monkey jumping from branch of a tree to another:


"As a monkey faring through jungle and wood catches hold of a bough and, having let it go, takes hold of another, even so that which is called thought and mind and consciousness this by night and day dissolves as one thing and reappears even as another."

At Sainyuttanikaya23 XXII 85(6), thebhik~u Yam aka understands the teaching of the Buddha thus:

"In so far as a brother has destroyed the asavas (impurities), he is broken up and perishes when the body breaks up, he becomes not after death."

Sariputta calls this papakam diHhigatam (evil heresy). He explains:

"Surely the Bhagavat would not say 'A brother who has destroyed the iisavas is broken up and perishes when the body breaks up, he becomes not after death.' "24

Buddhagho~a says at Visuddhimagga25 XVII.II3 that a man who is confused about these things (rebirth, death and round of births) ... does not consider that "every where the aggregates break-up at death," but thinks that a being dies, and his individuality (consciousness) is transferred to another body.26 The same text27 (XVIII 29) observes: "To say 'the living entity persists' is to fall short of the truth; to say 'It is annihilated' is to outrun the truth."

The logical implications of the absence of atma, ego, pudgala, are set out with great clarity in the Milindapafiha. 28 King Milinda asks Nagasena:

"Bhante Nagasena, if there is no ego to be found ... who keeps the precepts, who arpl~es .himself to medi~atio?, who realises the frUlt of the disCIplme (path) that IS NIrvana, who destroys life, who commIts immorality, who tells lies, who drinks intoxicating liquor, who commits the five crimes that constitute proximate karma? (As there is no personal responsibility for such lapses) there is no merit, there is no demerit; there is no one who does or causes to be done meritorious or demeritorious deeds; good and evil deeds can have no fruit or result!"


In reply, N~gasel!a esta~lishes that the person called Nagasena cannot be identified wIth the several components of his body: hair, nails, teeth, skin, bones, blood, form, sensation perception, consciousness, etc. He could as, well have bee~ called Nagasena, Surasena, Virasena or Sihasena. He also cites the analogy of a chariot: a chariot cannot be identified with its components: pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, etc. Nagasena impresses upon the king that the word "chariot" "is but a way of coun~,ing, term, appellation, convenient desigl!ation .... " and that In exactly the same way ... Nagasena IS but a way of counting, term, appellation; convenient designation, mere name for the hair of my head, hair of my body ... brain of the head, form, sensation, perception, predispositions and Consciousness. But in the absolute sense there is no Ego (self) here to be found .... " Nagasena explains at Milindapanha 40:

"Just so, 0 king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self consciousness."

The Sainyuttanikaya30 (III 3.1.5) explains the concept of rebirth lucidly:

He whose conduct in body, speech and thought is bad, "at the breaking up of the body after dying he arises in the abyss, the bad bourn, the downfall." On the other hand, a person whose conduct in body, speech and thought is good "at the breaking up of the body after dying, he arises in a good bourn in a heavenly world .... "

Milindapanha31 46 reiterates the position: "Just so, great king, deeds, good or evil, are done by this name and form and another is reborn. But that other is not entirely released from its deeds (karma)." The Mahavastu32 (III 65) states:

"From what cause is a thing born (jayati)? From what cause does a thing endure? From what cause is it broken up? From what cause is it reconstituted?" The Buddha replies, " ... It is because of ignorance, craving and karma; that is why ... a thing is born . . . . It endures because of the karma of life (ayuljkarma) and of the sustenance it gets .... It is broken up because of the decay of life, of karma, and because of the deprivation of sustenance .... It is reconsti-


tuted through the non-elimination of ignorance and because of sUbjection to craving and so it has maturing karma."33

The controversy regarding the non-existence of pudgala, soul, is set out with great clarity in the Kathiivatthu34 (1.1.158) in the question and answers between a Theravadin and Puggalavadin. In brief, the Puggalavadin maintains that the soul of a deceased person transmigrates from this world to another and vice versa, that it cannot be said that the soul in each transmigrating journey is identical with the other, nor can it be said that they are both identical and different. The Theravadin avers that, if they be identical there will be no destruction of life, and concludes that while karmas mature, it is wrong to say that the transmigrating soul is the same. Kathiivatthu 1.1.170 sums up:

"At the dissolution of each aggregate, If then the 'person' doth disintegrate, Lo! by the Buddha shunned, the Nihilistic creed. At the dissolution of each aggregate, If then the 'soul' doth not dIsintegrate, Eternal, like Nibbana, were the soul indeed."

While the Buddha repudiated any belief in an immutable and abiding soul, he also rejected the view that there was no consciousness principle apart from the material body, or that consciousness was only a function of material aggregates. This is conclusively established by the phenomenon of memory of previous births or past incarnations. In the Anguttaranikaya35

(V.IIL23) the Buddha teaches that one can, through self concentration, call to mind one's various temporary states in a previous existence, such as one birth, two births, three, four ... a thousand or a hundred thousand births, and about one's name, family, caste, mode of earning livelihood, age, etc. This is reaffirmed in another passage in the Anguttaranikaya36 (X.IIL21) wherein it is averred that through yoga " ... he calleth to mind the various appearances and forins of his previous births .... "

The Visuddimagga37 (XI 371) also speaks of acquiring insight into repeated births through developing concentration and (XI 372) of desiring to obtain rebirth in the Brahma world.


It is important to note that all the Buddhist schools unani_ mously repudiated the materialism of the Carvakas, who maintained that consciousness was merely a product of the combina_ tion of physical elements (mahabhiltas) and thCat consciousness ceases absolutely when the physical constituent elements disintegrate. It would be erroneous to interpret the andtman theory of the Buddhists in a manner which will lead to their doctrines being identified with those of Carvakas.

To sum up, the Buddha denied the existence of any eternal, unchanging self or soul. He also repudiated the belief that there is no self or conscious entity after death. The whole existence both material and "spiritual" has been aptly compared to the current of a river (nadi soto viya),38 which is constantly changing and yet continuous. This was entirely in keeping with the doctrine of dependent origination (pratitya samutapdda), inasmuch as everything in this universe including the conscious self is, at any moment of time, in the process of continuous change. In other words, there does not exist a continuous, abiding unchanging personal entity: the pudgala of the Buddhists, like dharmas or material categories, is always in a state of flux; only the rate of change differs and is not always patently manifest.

The biological phenomenon of metamorphosis in the case of butterflies and frogs from the time of their birth to the stage of adulthood provides vivid examples of physical changes in an individua1.39 Similar, though less pronounced, changes are also visible not only in the physical characteristics of human beings, but also in their personality, their mental and moral make-up. At birth, the personalities of children are not distinguishable; they have physical differences in their shape, colour, size, weight, etc., but their personality or character as a function of moral and mental nature, are undeveloped, dormant and apparently similar. As they grow, their personality differences, and hence their individuality, manifest themselves. In fact, it can be said that growth means changes in physical and mental characteristics; as a person grows, his personality characteristics, and hence his individuality, become more pronounced, and passion, anger, greed, detachment, fear, courage, etc., exhibit themselves in varying degrees in different individuals. In other words, as a being grows, his body and character undergo


change and progressively become more marked and individualized. So, while an individual is undergoing continuous changes of personality, physical, mental and moral, there is a continuity of each personality in his own memory and in the perception of his fellow beings. It is this individuality of an existent being which is a surviving sub-stratum ''pudgala,'' but which is perishable and which ceases to exist in nirva.Q.a ..

Thus, pudgala, self or consciousness undergoes changes in an individual body from the time of birth, in childhood, growth, maturity and death. This pudgala is the suk:;ama sarira of the Yoga school. It is the bhutatman of the Maitri UPani~ad. It is this pudgala that transmigrates at death and undergoes rebirth (punarjanma) in accordance with one's deeds. It is this pudgala40 that is the storehouse of memory and of accumulated karmas. It is on the sundering of the bonds of the tr~1Ja (craving for existence) that binds the skandhas, elements of consciousness, together that a person attains nirva.Q.a. There are weighty grounds for arriving at this conclusion.

The Mahavagga (1. 2. 3) of the Vinayapitaka says that the supreme happiness is attainable by eliminating or driving out (vinayo) the concept or notion (mana) "I am" (asmi): the ego, or ahainkara. The Alagaddupamasutta of the Majjhimanikaya (1. 22) (P.T. Society text, p. 139) says that a bhik~u is emancipated when he abandons (pahZno) the concept of ego (asmi mano). The context leaves no room for doubt that in this sutta (text, p. 135) the Buddha is speaking of the individual self when he describes the six wrong views (ditthitthanani) concerning rupa, vedana, etc., thus: etam mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso me atta ("this is mine," "I am this," "this is my self.") The emphasis is on the ego or the individual self as distinct from the impersonal, universal self. This is further clear from the same sutta (text, p. 138): Attani va bhikkhave satilattaniyam-me ti assasati: "If there is recollection of a self, this is: 'the self is myself.' " Notice that the emphasis is on the self of mine and not on the self which could mean both the great, impersonal, universal self, the paramatman, and the individual self, atman or atma. The Chachakka sutta of the MaJjhimanikaya (III.148) (text, p. 284) makes it clear that the rise or origination of the individual self (sakkayasamudaya) leads to consciousness of individuality: etam mam, eso 'ham asmi, eso me atta. It is reiterated in the same sutta that the absence of the sense of

128 JIARS VOL. 7 NO.2

selfhood n'etam mam, etc., suppresses the individual self (saskiiyanirodhagamini) .

The Dhammapada draws a distinction between the great self and a self. Dhammapada 160 and 380 say that the self is the lord of the self (atta hiattiino natho) and the self is the bourn of the self (atta hi attano gati). Dhammanada 379 avers that the self stimulates and controls the self (attana codayattanam pativase attamattana). What does not exist eternally is an individual self. As the Samyuttanikaya (III. 130) says, "There is nowhere to be found in the Khandas, 'I am.' "

Harivarman (3rd Century A.D.), in the Satyasiddhisastra41

(34-35), discusses the pudgala controversy in the Buddhist schools, and defines atman as an integration of five aggregates: "Action and fruition are all possible when the five aggregates are at work in succession." He warns, "If the soul is nominal, simply none would incur the sin in killing a cow." He also emphasises (ibid., 84) that "the sense of T is activity (injita), etc.; wherein exists the sense of 'I,' therein is activity, the mind's act ... abode of greed. What is manifested is termed abode of greed."

Vasubandhu, who, in the Pudgalaviniscaya of Abhidharmakosa, had mounted a massive attack on the doctrine of atman, recognised that total denial of a self would lead to erosion of responsibility for karmas,42 and absence of belief in a conditioned self (samvrtim) would lead the tender child of moral merit to perish.43 He recognises that the Buddha did not deny the existence of an empirical self (bhuta prajnaptikalJ). He continues: obscured by ignorance, the empirical 9r conditioned self is wandering about in the cycle of existence.44 Further, the collection of skandhas or elements called sattva (conditioned or empirical self), wanders about on account of the force of craving.45 Vasubandhu goes on to explain the dangerous implications of a belief in a permanent self or ego. He says that the idea of a self is followed by the idea of "mine."46 Again: "Further, where the idea of mine has taken firm hold, there arises bondage to all that is deemed mine and takes a person further away from liberation."47

Kamalaslla, in his panjika on Tattavasamgraha48 3338 of Santarak~ita, explains the concept of no-soul as appertaining to egotism:


.... All these afflictions-love, hate and the rest-have their root in wrong notions of the soul, as has been found through positive and negative concomitance; ... if ... a soul existed, there would be constant appearance of the afflictions of love, etc. ... they (the afflictiOns) really proceed from the wrong notion of the soul. For instance, unless one has the notion ofT, ... he cannot have the idea of anything being conducive to bringing pleasure to himself, and he cannot be attached to it as his 'own'; hatred also towards anything does not appear unless one recognises that it is conduCIve to bringing pain to himself; because there can be no hatred against what is not harmful to what is his own, or against what removes the harm.

He goes on to add that the notion of the "soul" produces notion of "one's own" and love for one's own, and this produces hatred and the rest, and

from this positive and negative concomitance, it is clearly known to all men ... that all these afflictions-love, etc.have their root in the notion of 'one's own', which proceeds from the notion of one's self or soul.

S3.ntarak~ita (3438-3494) observes "It is only when there are notions of 'I' and 'Mine' that the whole mass of afflictions becomes operative .... " KamalasIla explains that the doctrine of no soul is the sole destroyer of afflictions that are the source of "birth and rebirth." He adds that there is liberation on the cessation of the "I" notion. He observes the notion of "soul" is the very root of the "I" notion and that "So long as the mind is beset with the 'I-notion', the series of birth and rebirth does not cease .... "

Again, how can there be an accumulation of previous karmas without a corpus in which they accumulate? This corpus is the empirical self, siJ)vjama sarfra, which is anitya and disintegrates on attainment of nirv3.l)a. The conception of nirv3.l)a, in turn, provides a clear indication of the nature of consciousness, atma or soul in Buddhism. For example, Milindapanha 321-322 likens nirv3.l)a to a wish-fulfilling tree, which satisfies all desires, causes delight and is full of lustre; to clarified butter, which is beautiful in colour, and has a pleasant odor and taste.

This description of nirv3.l)a conceives it as a positive entity


and not as a nothingness. According to the schools of the Hlnayana, nirvar:ia is an asamskrta dharma, an unconditioned category which has an objective existence and which can be obtained by following the path (marga). NirvaQ.a consists of two such categories: pratisamkhyanyrodha and apratisamkhyanirodha. Buddhagho!?a recognises that nirvaQ.a can be attained by intense discipline: " ... it cannot be non-existent, as it is realisable by transcendental intuition, born of unremitting and unflagging perseverance .... " KamalasIla, at Tattvasamgraha panjikii 2748-2749, explains pratisamkhyanirodha as the dissociation (of the principle of consciousness) from iisravas or kle.sas (impurities). The Mahayanist schools only emphasised dharma sunyatii, the non-existence of any material categories besides pudgala sunyata. Still, they also accept the concept of nirvaQ.a as terminating the transmigrating process. In brief, nirvaQ.a necessarily implies belief in an entity which obtains emancipation and, until such consummation, it continues to subsist.

The doctrine of anatmavada, in short, only taught the unreality of an ego, self-consciousness, jiva, ahamkara, a personal entity as distinct from an undifferentiated consciousness, a nirgur;,a atma. It is the jiva that transmigrates. This alone permits a harmonious interpretation of the Buddha's teaching about self, atma, without compromising the doctrine of personal responsibility for one's karmas.

The dilemma of the clash between religious belief in karma and retributive rebirth, which was the foundation of Buddhist ethics, and the doctrine of anatta as elaborated by the adherents of the Abhidharma, drove the Buddhist philosophers to invent new concepts, more precisely, new terminology; these were essentially a euphemistic variant of the pudgala doctrine they had repudiated.

The Sthaviravadins adopted the concept of bhavanga,49

factor of existence, the link in the chain of transmigration and rebirth. The Sarvastivadins or Vaibha!?ikas speak of avijnapati, unmanifested hidden power, also called prapti; a force having the quality of adhesion, or binding the skandhas. The SammitIyas evolved the concept of cittaviprayukta, an undifferentiated dharma, so called because it is dissociated from differentiating thought. This cittaviprayukta was also deemed to be indestructible (aviprar;,asa). The Sautrantikas postulated sarvabijaka, which


possesses all seeds of causation and birth, each seed being a su~macitta. It was also called ekarasa skandha, that is, that which makes all skandhas one unified or integrated entity. It is also called mulantika skandha, that is which is the base of all aggregates.

All these new concepts or terms, bhavanga, cittaviprayukta, avijiwpti, prapti, sarvabijaka, etc., were, in my opinion, semantic inventions or coining of new terminology to provide a carrier of karmas at the death of an individual. Their function was essentially similar to that of the pudgala of the Sarvastivadins and the su~ama sarira, karmar;,a sarira, or linga deha of the Brahmanical schools. This, however, they could not admit on sectarian grounds. Conze has summarised the position in this respect succinctly and graphically:

All these theoretical contributions were attempts to combine the doctrine of 'not self' with the almost instinctive belief in a 'self' empirical or true. The climax of this combination of the uncombinable is reached in such conceptual monstrosities as the 'store-consciousness' (alaya-vijiiana) of Asariga and a minority of Yoga car ins, which performs all the functions of a 'self' in a theory which almost vociferously proclaims the non-existence of such a 'self'.

A conclusive confirmation of the Buddhist belief in a transmigrating entity after death and which "suffers" the consequences of its karmas is to be found in the exposition of the Buddhist beliefs by the early Chinese Buddhists and in the practices current among the people of Buddhists lands at present.

The pre-Buddhist Chinese did not believe in karma and rebirth, but by the 4th-5th century A.D., the Chinese philosopher Hui-yuan could write, in his Spirit Does not Perish,50 that the differences among individuals, i.e., diversity, in the universe, can be explained on the basis of the doctrine of karma and of the mysterious transmigration of skandhas after death. The Sadddharma-smrtyupasthiina-sutra,51 translated into the Chinese in the 6th century A.D., also asserts an intermediate state of the soul after a man's death and before his soul is reincarnated.

The post-mortem practices in vogue in Buddhist lands at present are evidently founded on a belief in the existence of a


transmigrating soul. These practices are similar to those of the sraddha ceremonies observed by the Hindus in India, who believe in the existence of an atma, or soul. Thus, in Thailand,52 gifts are presented, sermons preached and C chants uttered to benefit the spirit of the deceased; the religious services are believed to improve the status of a soul in its next birth, and a minimum of seven days must elapse before it can take rebirth. Likewise, in Burma,53 the death and funeral ceremonies-recitation of paritta and dana (charity)-have the same objective in view. The relatives of the deceased also seek to transfer their merit to the soul. It is also believed that the soul of the deceased remains near its house for five to seven days after the funeral. The Tibetans54 also believe that the soul of a deceased exists in the state of "middle being"-intermediate state, antarabhavafor up to 49 days; prayers are offered and rites performed to secure a good rebirth for it.

NOTES

l. Shwe Zan Aung, Compedium of Philosophy (London, 1956) Introductory Essay, p. 7.

2. The Contemporary Review, XXIX, 1877 "On Niroa'I}£L and in the Buddhist Doctrine of Groups, the Sankharas, Karma and the Paths," pp. 249-70. Quoted by L.A. De Silva, The Problem of Self in Buddhism and Christianity (London, 1979), p. 37.

3. Na tvatratma va atmiyam 4. sunyamadhyatmakam, sunyam bahiragatam 5. asti karma, asti viPaka~, karakasti nopabbhyate 6. Yatha rupadinyeva samastani samuditani ksiramiti udakamiti va prajiiapyate

tatha skandha eva samasta~ pudgala iti prajiiapyante iti siddham 7. tassa ca napi atitabhavato idha sankanti athi, napi tato hetum vina idha

patubhavo 8. tadetam napi purimabhava idhagatam, napi tato kamma-sankhara napi-vi

syadhihetum vina patubhutam ti veditabbam 9. etha ca santana-bandhato nathi ekata napi nanata 10. S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Delhi, 1975) Vol. I, pp.

88 and 123. He points out that all the sense functions and the body are rooted in consciousness, and therefore that viiiiiana (consciousness) is not a part of namarupa

11. H.C. Warren, Buddhism in Translations (New Yark, 1963) p. 184. Also see P. Maung Tin, The Path of Purity (London, 1931) 3 Vols.

12. Warren, pp. 185-186. 13. P. Maung Tin, Pt. III, pp. 726-727.


14. Lord Chalmers, Further Dialogues of the Buddha (London, 1927) Vol. II. See also Anguttaranikiiya 3.4.6, Devadutasuttam, in Devadutavagga.

15. E. Conze (ed.), Buddhist Texts Through the Ages (London, 1954), p. 66. See also Oldenberg, Vinayapitaka (London; 1969).

16. Conze, pp. 66-67. 17. Conze;p. 67. 18. Coomaraswamy & Horner, The Living Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha

(Bombay, 1956) p. 172. 19. Coomaraswamy & Horner, p. 176. 20. Kinnu Satta ti paccesi miiraditti gatam nu te II suddltasankhiira PU!I:Jo yam

nagidha sattu palaMati II Yathii hi angasamMiirii II hoti saddo ratlw iti II evam khandesu santesu II hoti satta ti sammuti II Leon Feer (ed.), The Sainyuttanikiiya, V.IO, 1884; tr. by C.A.F. Rhys Davids, The Kindred Savings (P.T.S., London, 1917).

21. Leon Feer (ed.) ibid., 1890. 22. Seyyathiipi bhikkhave makkato ariififie pavane caramano sakham ga"ywti

tam muficitva afifiam ganhati II Evam eva klto bhikkhave yad idam vuccati cettam iti pi mana iti pi vififiiinam iti pi I I II rattiya ca divasassa ca iififiad uppajjati afiiwm niru}jhati II Leon Feer (ed.), 1888. Coomaraswamy & Horner (tr.), p. 197.

23. Yathii kM!'iisavo bhikkhu Kayassa Medii ucchijjati vinassati na hate param mararzii ii. II

24 .... na hi Bhagava evam vadedvya KMrziisavo bhikku Kayassa Meda ucchijjati vinassati na holi param mararzii ti. Ibid., XXII, 85 (7).

25. Kathan pana yo etesu vimuyhati ... C'Utiya tiiva vimulho, sabbattha khandhanam bhedo mararam ti cutim aga"ywnto, satto marati; sattassa dehantarasan kamanan ti iidini vikappeti H.C. Warren &.D.D. Kosambi (ed.), Visuddhimagga of Buddhagho~a (Harvard, 1950).

26. See also P. Maung Tin, Pt. III, p. 650. 27. . .. sassato satta ti ganhanto oliyatinama; ucchijjati ti ga"ywnto atidhiivati

nama. The translation is that of S.Z. Aung, Compedium of Philosophy (P.T.S., London, 1910).

28. Atho kho Milindo raja ayasmantam Nagasenam etad-avoca Sace bhante Niigasena puggalo no palabbhati .... ko sflam rakkhati ko Mavanam anuyufijati ko maggaphala nibbanani saccikarotti, ko paTfam hanati, flO adinnam adiyati, ko kiimesu micchii carati, ko musa Marati, ko ma}jam pivati, ko pafica-nantariya Iwmmam karoti tasma na-tt/!i kusalam, na-tthi akusalam; na tti kusala kusalanam kammanam katta va karestii va natthi sukatadukkatanam kammanam phalam vipako II

29. Evam eva kho mahiiraja dhamma santoti sandahati, afiiio uppajjati m1110 nirujjhati apubbarh acarimain viya sandahati, lena na ca so no ca. afino pacchima vinnanasangham gacchatfti.

30. So kiiyena doccaritam carata (?) vacaya duccaritam caritva, rnanasa duccaritarn cm1tvii kiiyassa Meda pararn rnararzii apayarn duggatim vinipatam uppajjati so kiiyena .... succaritain caritva vacaya succaritain caritvii manasii succaritarn caritvd kayassa Medii param rnara1}ll suggatirn suggarn lokam uppajjati.

31. Evam eva kho mahdr(tja imina ndrnarupera karnrnain karoti subhanarn va pdpakarn vii tena kamrnena afifiam ndmaruparn patisandahati, lasrna na rnutto papa kohi karnmeMti. Trenckner (ed.), p. 46 & 72; tr. T.W. Rhys Davids, II-2-6.


32. J.J. Jones (tr.) (P.T.S., London, 1956). 33. Karmam cilsyablwvati pakvam 34. S.Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids (tr.), Kathavatthu or Points of Contro_

versy (P.T.S., London, 1915) (1) Th. (Theravadin): Does (a person or soul) run on (or transmigrate)

from this world to another and from another to this world? (2) P. (Puggalavadin): Yes. (3) Th.: Is it the identical sou! who transmigrates from this world to

another and from another to this world? (4) P.: Nay, that cannot be truly said.

Th.: Then is it a different soul who transmigrates? P.: Nay, that cannot be truly said. Th.: Then is it both identical and also a different soul who transmigrates .... ? P.: Nay, that cannot truly be said. Th.: Then is it both identical and also a different soul who transmigrates .... P.: Nay, that cannot truly be said. Th.: Then is it neither identical soul nor yet a different soul who transmigrates .... ? P.: Nay, that cannot be said. Th:: Is it the identical, a different, both identical and also different, neither identical nor different soul, who transmigrates? P.: Nay, that cannot be said .... Th.: Surely if the identical soul, without (becoming) different, transmigrates when deceasing hence to another world, there will then be no dying; destruction of life will cease to take place. There is action (karma); there is action's effect; there is the result of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the very same (person) transmigrates-this is wrong.

35. Hare (tr.), The Book of the Gradual Savings (P.T.S., London, 1934) Part III.

36. Woodward (tr.), The Book of the Gradual Savings (P.T.S., London, 1934) Pt. V.

37. P. Maung Tin, p. 429. 38. Quoted from S.Z. Aung, p. 8 39. In the case of a butterfly, it is first an egg, then a caterpillar, there

after a pupa (chrysalis) and finally a butterfly. Likewise, a frog passes through following changes from the time of its birth: larva, tadpole with gills, tadpole with a tail acting as a sucker, tadpole with hind legs, tadpole with forelegs when the tail disappears, and finally frog. After reaching adulthood, both are relatively stable, but gradually undergo the aging process, and are therefore in a continuous process of change. In fact, even inanimate objects are also always in a state of flux.

40. This concept has been explained in Tibetan Buddhism, wherein the enduring and transmigrating spiritual entity is called Rgyud gcig-tu-gyur-pa or Ekotibhiiva. Ekotibhava means the continued connection of one with another


without break or division. A vry'iiiina (consciousness) existing from eternity has undergone numberless transmigrations. In all its births, it has run through an unbroken line of existence until it enters nirv;ll)a. As S.C. Das explains, " ... every being (sattva) is the reembodiment of its own resultant sattva, of which the origin is lost in eternity." Sarat Chandra Das, Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow (Calcutta, 1965) (reprint) pp. 84-85.

41. N. Aiyaswami Sastri (ed. & tr.), Satyasiddhisiistra (Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1975).

42. BhramSam Karmaniim 43. Bhramsam kuialapotasya. 44. avidyiinivaTTfiiniim sattviiniim sandhiivatiim sansaratiim. 45. Sattviikhyalf skandhasamudiiyastr!fTfopiidiinalf sansarati. 46. iitmani ca satyiitmfyam bhavati 47. Evamesam dr4hatariitmiitmfya sneha parigiihita bandhaniiniim mok!jo durfb

havet 48. G. Jha: Tattvasamgraha of Siintarak!jita with Commentary of KamalaHla. 2

Vols. (Gaekwad Oriental Series, 1937---':39). 49. E. Conze: Buddhist Thought in India (1962), p. 132 terms it "life con

tinuum." 50. Richard H. Robinson: Early Miidhyamikii in India and China (1967) pp.

99-108. Hui-Yuan observes " ... the Buddhist doctrine of karmic inheritance from previous lives decides one's intelligence, and the body is only adopted after the karmic forces have selected it."

51. E. Conze, Buddhist Texts Through the Ages (London, 1954) p. 283. 52. Kenneth E. Wells, Thai Buddhism: Its Rites and Activities (Bangkok,

1960) p. 213. 53. Melford E. Spiro: Buddhism and Society (New York, 1970) p. 253. 54. Evans Wentz (ed.), Bardo Thodol: The Tibetan Book of the Dead (Lon

don, 1957) pp. 6,39 ff. S.C. Das, ibid., p. 89. L.A. Waddell, Lamaism, or the Buddhism of Tibet (New York, 1974) (reprint) pp. 488-494.

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International Advisory Board of Editors E.L. Fackenheim, University of Toronto j Majid Fakhry, American University of Beirnt j Kenneth K. Inada, State University of New York at Buffalo j John Macquarrie, Oxford University j Hajime Nakamura, University of Tokyo j P.T. Raju, College of Wooster j Martin Versfeld, University of Cape Town j R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, Hebrew University of lernsalem.

The organ of no single institution or sectarian school, philosophical or religious, the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION provides a medium for the exposition, development, and criticism of important philosophical insights and theories relevant to religion in any of its varied forms. It also provides a forum for critical, constructive, and interpretative consideration of religion from an objective philosophical point of view. Articles, symposia, discussions, extensive book reviews, notes, and news in this journal are intended to serve the interests of a wide range of thoughtfull readers, especially teachers and students of philosophy, philosophical theology and religious thought ..

Some articles in recent volumes: M.J. Ferreira, A Common Defense of Theistic Belief· Some Critical Considerations. F. Sontag, New Minority Religions as Heresies. J. Runzo, Omniscience and Freedom for Evil.

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Giuseppe Tucci (1894-1984)

by Luciano Petech

Now and then some towering personalities appear, who leave their mark in more than one field of research, with equal intensity and equally lasting influence. One such man was Professor Giuseppe Tucci.

Tucci was born at Macerata in Central Italy on June 5th, 1894. He received a good humanistic education, and until the end of his long life he maintained an uncommon mastery of Latin and Greek, although he seldom chose to show it. He was a precocious boy and at the age of 17 he published his first article, a study of Latin inscriptions found near his native town. Already at that time he felt the attraction of Oriental thought. He graduated fwm the University of Rome and almost at once

. showed himself to be quite at home in such widely different fields as Avestic, Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan. His main interest lay, and alwa.ys remained, in subjects connected with philosophy and religion, although later he developed also a penchant for historical studies. His life and work can be roughly divided into five periods.

1) After having taken an honorable part in the First World War as a subaltern in the Italian army, he started an untiring publishing activity, which lasted with few breaks until his last years of life. At first he seemed to feel his way in several directions, being attracted mainly by Chinese philosophy. His translation of Mencius (1921) and his history of early Chinese philosophy (1922) can still be read with some profit. Then he turned increasingly to Indian studies, being chiefly interested in Mahayana Buddhism.

2) This trend was confirmed and became paramount when in 1925 he went to India, where he taught Italian language and literature at the universities of Shantiniketan and

137

138 JIABS VOL. 7 NO. 2

Calcutta. His long stay in India, which lasted till 1930, brought to full maturation his scientific personality and gave him that intimate knowledge not only of religious and literary texts, but also of the living spirituality among the common people, acquired in the course of his rambles on foot and by boat in the lower Ganges valley. He was in close contact with Rabindranath Tagore, of whose friendship he was particularly proud. The result of his Indian years was a series of accurate and philologically impeccable editions of Mahayana texts, with constant use of the Tibetan and Chinese translations to correct and complete corrupted or lacunous Sanskrit manuscripts. At the same time he never neglected another task, that of making Eastern thought better known in his country; we may only mention his little book on Buddhism (1926), a fine but perhaps premature effort. His growing fame was acknowledged at home; in 1929 he became one of the· first members of the newly-founded Academy of Italy, and upon his return home he was given in 1931 the chair of Chinese at the Oriental Institute in Naples, from where he was soon called to the University of Rome as professor of Religions and Philosophies of India and the Far East; he taught there till his final retirement in 1969.

3) During his stay in India he had already made two trips (1928,1930) to Ladakh, Rupshu and Lahul; a third followed in 1931. In this way he came to be deeply interested in Tibetan studies, which till then had been afield reserved to academic scholars or else to explorers with mainly geographical interests. He was the first to combine both qualities. After his return from India he dedicated himself with characteristic energy to the task of organizing, with private and public means, a series of expeditions in the Himalayas. This was the Tibetan period in his life, lasting approximately from 1932 to 1950. As he felt his activity somewhat cramped in the rather rigid frame of the university, in February 1933 he founded the Italian Institute for the Middle and Far East (IsMEO), intended to be a center for research and cultural exchanges with Asia. Four missions to Tibet followed with a regular biennial cadence: 1933 and 1935 to Western, 1937 and 1939 to Central Tibet; their aim was the artistic exploration of those countries. The second World War interrupted the series of expeditions, but not his scholarly activity, although he had to go through a rather difficult and un-

GIUSEPPE TUCCI 139

pleasant period. As soon as things became settled, he resumed his activity in the field, culminating with his mission to Lhasa and to various temples and monasteries of Central Tibet (1948). It was his last opportunity; shortly afterwards the integration of Tibet into the Chinese republic put an end to any possibility of further missions.

In Tibet Tucci felt at home. Tibetans accepted him warmly, marveling at a Western traveler who would hold disputations with learned lamas in their own language on difficult points of religion. On the other side, it was characteristic of Tucci's enormous capacity for work that the years between each mission were utilized for writing and publishing his fascinating travel accounts, and for making available at once the scientific results obtained; they were mostly included in the seven volumes of the series Indo-Tibetica (1932-1941). The enforced rest at the end of the war gave him the leisure for compiling his magnum opus, Tibetan Painted Scrolls (1949); in spite of its unpretentious title, it is a real summa of the art, literature, religion and history of Tibet. It was a landmark in Tibetological studies. But even after this great effort he never quit this field, where he remained active till almost the end.

4) The new circumstances compelled Tucci to look for another field for his never-abating activity, and he found it in Nepal, mainly in border areas inhabited by Tibetans. His two missions in that region (1952 and 1954) started a trend of research which was almost at once taken up and continued by his pupils Raniero Gnoli and Luciano Petech. In this period he also produced some works of synthesis on a large scale, such as his history of Indian philosophy and his monograph on the theory and practice. of the maQ.<;lala.

5) The Nepalese period was rather short, perhaps because of the relatively limited scope of this field. Soon, starting from the connections between Tibet and U<;l<;liyana (Swat), the home of Padmasambhava, he turned to the absorbing problems concerning the interacting cultures in the areas on both sides of the present Pakistan-Afghanistan border. In 1955 he carried out a preliminary survey of possible sites for excavation in Swat, selecting with an almost uncanny archaeological flair the most promising ones: Mingora and Udegram. This was the start for a rapidly increasing activity, carried out through a special Cen-


ter for Studies and Excavations in Asia, set up within the IsMEO under Tucci's overall control. For many years, till he was well over eighty, he went out year after year to direct personally in the field the various enterprises oflhe Center, which extended gradually to other sites in Pakistan, and then to Afghanistan (1957) and Iran (1959). Restoration work was also undertaken, for which a highly specialized team was organized (e.g., restoration of Persepolis; rehabilitation of the main buildings in the historical center of Isfahan). Tucci was everywhere, organizing, directing, inspiring. Another important step was the creation, due to his initiative, of the National Museum of Oriental Art in Rome, to which the archaeological collections of the IsMEO were entrusted on deposit. It is to be deeply regretted that later political events in Afghanistan and Iran interrupted excavations in these two countries.

Publication of the excavation and conservation results was of course left to the archaeologists who collaborated with Tucci, while he himself slowly receded into the background. He remained active till his last days, chiefly in preparing revised editions of older works that had been long out of print, but also working at a new study (Eros and Thanatos in India) that was interrupted by his death. Of course, he realized the limits imposed upon him by advancing o~d age·; in 1978 he retired from active work, relinquishing the presidency of the IsMEO. But even as honorary president he continued to follow the work of his successors, and his advice was taken on every major issue. Two years ago an untoward accident (a broken femur badly set) confined him to his home at San Polo dei Cavalieri, in the hills north of Rome, where he was devotedly tended by his wife; and there he died on the 5th of April, 1984.

Tucci's scientific achievements were recognized all over the world and brought him many acknowledgements. He was doctor h.c. of the universities of Kolozsvar (now Cluj), Delhi, Louvain, Teheran and Kathmandu; member of many academies and learned societies in Europe, Asia and America; recipient of the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for international understanding (1978) and of the Bazan Award for history (1979). He accepted all honours, but remained superior to them and never spoke on this theme. Being always attracted by philosophical thought and above all by Buddhism, he understood and respected

GIUSEPPE TUCCI 141

the numinous element in all creeds and in all countries. As a teacher, he gave university lectures that were absorbing and stimulating. But he did not lay great store upon academic teaching, and the best portion of his formative work with his pupils was done in the course of personal encounters in his home; he opened to them a liberal access to his amazingly rich library, which he later donated to the IsMEO.

Italy and the learned world at large have lost with him a ' great scholar, an inspiring force in many directions of research, and above all a man who was intensely human, in the best and highest meaning of the word.

A complete bibliography of Tucci's books and articles down to 1970, compiled by the present author, is found in G. Tucci, Opera Minora, Rome 1972. It was continued down to 1974 in the preface to Gurunijamaiijarika: studi in onore di Giuseppe Tucci, Naples 1974. A complete and final bibliography is being compiled by the IsMEO. A select list of Tucci's most significant contributions to research (excluding travel accounts, etc.) is appended below.

Scritti De Mencio, Lanciano, 1921. Storia della filosofia cinese antica, Bologna, 1922. Linee di una storia del materialismo indiano, in Memorie del

l'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1923 and 1929 (partly reprinted in Opera Minora).

Il buddhismo, Foligno, 1926. Pre-Diitnaga Buddhist texts on logic from Chinese sources,

Baroda, 1929. On some aspects of the doctrines of Maitreya [nathaJ and Asanga,

Calcutta, 1930. The Nyayamukha of Dinnaga, being the oldest Buddhist text on

logic after Chinese and Tibetan texts, Heidelberg, 1930. (with Vidushekhara Bhattacharya), Madhyantavibhiigasu-

trabhii~ya-t'ika of Sthiramati, London, 1932. The Abhisamayalankiiraloka of Haribhadra, Baroda, 1932. Indo-Tibetica, 7 vols., Roma, 1932-194l. Forme dello spirito asiatico, Milano, 1940. Asia religiosa; Roma, 1946. Illibro tibetano dei morti, Milano, 1949 (revised edition, Tor

ino 1977).


Tibetan Painted Scrolls, 2 vols. and a portfolio, Roma, 1949 (reprinted Kyoto 1981).

Teoria e practica del mar.uj,ala, Milano, 1949 (reprinted Roma 1969; English translation London, 1961, repr. 1969).

Tibetan folksongs from the district of Gyantse, Ascona, 1949 (revised and increased edition, Ascona 1966). .

The tombs of the Tibetan kings, Roma, 1950. Minor Buddhist Texts, I-III, Roma 1956, 1958, 1971. Preliminary report on two scientific expeditions to Nepal, Roma,

1956. . Storia della filosofia india'l'J,a, Bari, 1957 (reprinted Bari

1977). Tibet, Paese delle Nevi, Novara, 1967 (English translation,

London 1967; French translation, Paris 1967). Il Trono del Diamante, Bari, 1967. Die Religionen Tibets, in G. Tucci and W. Heissig, Die Reli

gionen Tibets und der Mongolei, Stuttgart 1970 (French translation, Paris, 1973; Italian translation, Roma, 1976; English translation, London, 1980).

Opera Minora, 2 vols., Roma, 1972. Deb t'er dmar po gsar ma, Tibetan chronicle by bSod nams grags

pa, Roma, 1971. . Tibet ("Archaeologia Mundi"), French, English and German

editions, Geneva, 1973. On Swat, the Dards and connected problems, in East and West

27 (1977), pp. 9-85.

Kokan Shiren and Muso Soseki: "Chineseness" vs. "] apaneseness" in Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century Japan

by David Pollack

The establishment in Kamakura in the early thirteenth century of the large Zen temples and monasteries built on the Chinese model and headed by t;migre Chinese monks is usually interpreted as inaugurating a· very Chinese organization on Japanese soil. Indeed, we tend to think of the entire Zen institution in Japan-more specifically, the Rinzai-dominated gozan that began in the Kamakura temples-as a monolithic entity whose content and form were entirely Chinese, enforced by stern Chinese masters upon their Sinicized Japanese students. This is, however, a picture of the Zen establishment that does not stand up well under closer scrutiny. Even among the emigre Chinese monks themselves there were some who, like Ming-chi Ch'u-chun (1261-1336, arrived inJapan in 1330 with Chu-hsien Fan-hsien) during his short six-year stay in Japan until his death, appear to have become quite Japanese in their thinking. I-shan I-ning (1247-'-1317, arrived in Japan 1299) even wrote poetry about such Japanese personalities as Kobo Daishi (Kukai) and Shotoku Taishi. The other extreme is represented by the Chinese monk Wu-an P'u-ning (d. 1276), who returned embittered after only five years in Japan to the China he felt he should never have left.

We also can distinguish between the Japanese monks who made the difficult voyage to China to study, often remaining there a decade or more before returning, and those who, for various reasons, never left Japan. The Zen monk J akushitsu Genko (1290-1367), for example, spent the years 1321-1326 in China. Born a Fujiwara, Jakushitsu was sent to study at Nan-

143


zenji in Kyoto under I-shan from 1317 until his departure for China. One mode of his "Zen" poetry is authentically grouchy, the equivalent in verse of a master's shout or a rap on the pupil's head; his "Poem to show to my pupils" offers a good example of this tone:

To do Zen you've got to be so tough . That body and mind become tempered like forged steel! Look at all the Patriarchs who came before youWhich of them ever fooled around like this?! I

And yet, this same monk, widely admired for his "Chinese" qualities, was capable of writing poetry in Chinese that reads for all the world like contemporary Japanese verse rather than Chinese:

A monk comes knocking at my brushwood gate Wanting to discuss weighty matters of great Zen import; Excuse this mountain priest, too lazy to open his mouth, But warblers are singing all over the blossom-strewn vil-

lage.2

Except for the fact the J akushitsu's warbler is an uguisu rather than a hototogisu ("cuckoo"), the final trope might have been based on atomo no Tabito's poem in the Man'y8shu (1437):

T achibana no . Hanachiruzato no Hototogisu Kataomoshitsutsu Naku hi shi zo 8ku

The days are many . When I, like the cuckoo In the village Strewn with orange blossoms Cry over unrequited love.

I intend to explore further in this essay the significant differences in the "Chineseness" and "J a paneseness" of two wellknown Japanese Zen monks, Kokan Shiren and Muso Soseki, who are among the large group of Japanese Zen monks that never went to China.

Perhaps no other Japanese Zen monk of the fourteenth century was as familiar with Sung Chinese neo-Confucian philosophy as Kokan Shiren (1278-1346). While his mentor Enni Ben'en (1202-1280) is thought to have been the first to bring the study of neo-Confucianism from China to Japan, it was

"CHINESENESS" vs. "jAPANESENESS" 145

Kokan, followirig in Enni's line to become abbot of TOfukuji in the south of Kyoto in 1332, who studied most closely and tellingly the implications of neo-Confucian thought for Japanese Buddhism.

Few either in Japan or China embodied as did Kokan the dictum of the Chinese philosopher Ch'eng I (1033-1107) that "a student must first of all learn to doubt."3 Kokan was widely read not only in Buddhism but also in Chinese classics and poetry, and the broad range of commentary on these. His collected works, the Saihokushu, contains his opinions on poetry and poets, as well as on the anecdotal body of critical opinion concerning the practice and theory of poetry that is known in Chinese as shih-hua O. shiwa).4 In his comments, Kokan adopted from the very outset the rational scepticism of the early Chinese philosopher Wang Ch'ung (27-100?), whose Lun Heng, or "Opinions Weighed in the Balance," Kokan adopted as the model for his own T'ung Heng (TsukO, "Received Opinion Weighed in the Balance"). Kokan began his very first essay in poetic criticism with a direct attack upon Chinese received wisdom:

It has long been held that the Duke of Chou wrote only two poems, "Ch'i-hsiao" and "Ch'i-yiieh"; that Confucius did not compose any of the Book of Odes, but merely compiled the poems; and that people after the Han and Wei dynasties wrote so much poetry because they were frivolous. These things are not true. 5

Kokan gave as his reasons for these opinions that it was highly unlikely anyone would have written only two poems in his lifetime, so that the Duke of Chou clearly had to have written more; that no one could have edited the Odes so well had he not himself been a poet; and that while there may indeed have been frivolous poets after the Han and Wei, certainly not all the poets during that long span were frivolous. These may not seem like terribly weighty arguments to us today, but to anyone familiar with the terms of Chinese literary criticism, his comments reveal a habit of thinking plainly and sensibly about subjects that often occasioned a great deal of silly hair-splitting in China. When it came to suggesting just what could have happened to all those poems by the Duke of Chou and Confucius,


Kokan's suggestion that they perished in the infamous bookburnings conducted by the first Ch'in emperor, Shih-huang-ti, seems at once lame and likely.

Having set this tone of rational scepticism-a stance that no Japanese had adopted so clearly toward China before, it should be noted-Xokan turned to his most important point insofar as poetic theory is concerned: the primacy of li, or "innate principle," as a critical concept to which all other critical considerations were subordinate:

Sung dynasty critical theories of poetry are not exhaustive in emphasizing such terms as "plain" (p'u),a "antique" (ku),b "even" (p'ing)C and "bland" (tan)d while belittling such terms as "unusual" (ch'i),e "artificial" (kung),f "dynamic" (hao)g and "beautiful" (li).h Poetry need not be "antique" or "bland" in its diction any more than it need be "unusual" or "artificial"-it need only accord with innate principle (li).1 Ancient poetry is generally of a pure nature, and so is closer to being "plain" and "antique." From the Middle Period on [i.e., the Six Dynasties], however, poetry came to contain emotions that the poets were not actually feeling when they wrote, so that their works are closer to being "unusual" and "artificial." From time to time, a Sage has given voice to feelings of protest in poetry, and in so doing has given new life to true emotions. How then are we to be constrained by such terms as these? Such men merely wrote in accordance with li, and so there are ancient poems that are "plain" without being true, and true poems today that are not "plain." How could we evaluate everything on the basis of terms like these?6

Rather than rehearse here separately each of Kokan's attacks on what he clearly considered to be the critical deficiencies of his mainland mentors, I shall turn to the very last of these essays in poetic criticism, in which Kokan expressed his own ideas concerning the composition of poetry. Rather than beginning with rules and regulations, Kokan advocated rather what he called the "purity" and "wholesomeness" of the young, child, innate qualities that, once developed, could later be polished, with practice, to maturity:

I have some pupils (Ch. t'ung; J. warabe) who fool about, joke, chaff, and won't recite their lessons. When I prod and


scold them to write poetry, they say "but we don't know the rules of tone and meter." When I tell them to forget the rules and just write out lines with the correct number of syllables, they grumble and complain. But I do not become upset, and, m spite of themselves, they present me with some lines. TheIr poems may be halting, uneven, doltish and clumsy, and sometimes make no sense at all; but still, they are often filled with a self-possessed purity and wholesomeness that make me marvel. Again, when I would have them study calligraphy, they complain, saying "But we don't know the techniques or styles." So I tell them to forget about techniques and styles, and simply try to make theIr characters looK like the models. As usual, they grumble and complain, but I do not get upset and, in spite of themselves, they present me with a few sheets of calligraphy. Their characters may look like twisted worms or like crows flapping wildly about, and sometimes don't even resemble characters at all; but still, the strokes often have a purity and a wholesomeness that astonish me. For these reasons, I can only sigh that those who would study such arts as poetry or calligraphy only do themselves harm by concentrating on such notions as "artifice" or "unusualness." They never attain to the realm of actual creation this way, and only end by making empty distinctions. That these children can be so frightfully untutored and yet have something essentially pure and wholesome within them results from their simple natures. Thus, I have come to the conclusion that if a student of poetry does not have the purity of a child, he cannot speak of "poetry"; and if one who studies calligraphy does not know the purity of a child's brushstrokes, he cannot speak of "calligraphy." And this applies not only to these two arts: the very Way [Tao] is no different. In studying anything, one must first establish a pure and wholesome mind and then improve it with practice. Only in this way will he easily achieve his goaP

Kokan's priorities are clearly original, and would probably have seemed wrong-headed from the point of view of contemporary Chinese criticism, if not actually eccentric. His preference for the state of untutored, childlike innocence is a familiar Taoist one, of course, found in the ancient philosophical texts of the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu. It also seems, oddly enough, to echo certain tendencies in contemporary Japanese critical attitudes, of the sort that had earlier led Kamo no Chomei, in


explaining the new "yugen style" of waka poetry, to comment that he "would like to compare this style to the speech of a lovely child, awkward and without any clear perception, but lovable in all its helplessness and worth listening to."S While it is not clear that such a sentiment ought necessarily to be credited to any particularly Japanese mode of thought, we might recall that even Murasaki's Genji had found it desirable to train childish innocence to a state of maturity rather than attempt to impose impossible standards upon the already mature.

At any rate, the clear preference in Sung dynasty critical texts for the "awkward" or "clumsy" (cho~ over clever contrivance, related or not to Taoist thought, or for the "bland" or "withered" over the "beautiful," is rejected in Kokan'sview as irrelevant: poetry must simply accord with li or "innate principle." Nor was Kokan content merely to theorize about such things, for we find him putting his theory into practice in the form of hundreds of small poems that focus sharply on individual objects. These poems follow a Chinese genre, popular during the Sung, known as yung-wu shih (eibutsushi, or "poems about objects"). As was the case with many Sung poets who wrote in this genre, Kokan seems to have been attempting through these poems to arrive at a more profound insight into the operation of li by attending as closely as possible to its individual manifestations in "objects" or "things" (wu).k Consider, for example, the minute focus in "Evening Stroll in a Summer Garden":

My room so miserable with heat and mosquitoes I can't do zazen,

I kill the time pacing the gravel paths, hands behind my back; .

Nothing in the inner garden-something catches my eyeI look more closely: a single strand of spider web

stretches across the path ... 9

Again and again in these poems, Kokan insists on the second look, the closer attention that provides the basis for new and more profound perceptions. Thus, Kokan's concentration in "Beginning' of Autumn" is actually a form of meditation that provides him with novel insight into the nature of the season in aural terms:


The heat's full intensity hasn't abated one whit, So whence comes this feeling of coolness? Taking my time, I concentrate and listen-there it is again: Falling paulownia leaves and chirping crickets join in a

. new sound. 10

It is very Japanese to fret, as Kokan does, over the failure of the Chinese agricultural calendar to accord properly with the J apanese seasonal markers; again and again, we are confronted by autumns that begin without cool weather, springs that start without plum blossoms. In order to account for these discrepancies (which, we should note, are essentially gaps between Chinese norms and Japanese realities), the poet must discover some less superficial, more essential indication of the new season. In this case, it lies not in the weather, or even in the fact that leaves are falling or crickets chirping-presumably they have been doing so since late summer. Rather, it is in the new way that these sounds have combined that the poet senses the deepest meaning of the arrival of an otherwise imperceptible autumn. To Kokan, such perceptions were always the result of the state of deep concentration (samadhi) that came from zazen meditation:

To escape the heat I sleep upstairs Where a slight coolness grows in the night: A frog's croak echoes in a stone basin, Moonlight casts patterns through bamboo blinds; Accepting every sight and sound that's offered, The more detached, the more I see and hear: This time of night is so truly still . I no longer notIce the mosquitoes buzzing round my

ears.II

Kokan's practice of Zen meditation set in these terms is very like the neo-Confucian meditation practice of ko-wu, I known most popularly to Westerners in the story of the Ming philosopher Wang Yang-ming's attempt to arrive at a more profound understanding of the nature of bamboo by sitting in meditation before a clump for several days. Wang eventually became ill from exhaustion. His failure in this attempt finally led him to reject such a practice in favor of another formula-


tion, and illustrates the nature of the difference between neoConfucian and Zen meditation. Kokan's poetry reflects his Understanding of the neo-Confucian reinterpretation of the Buddhist dialectic of Void and Phenomenal Reality, which is represented by the complementary technical terms kam and shikin as this dialectic was integrated into the revised framework of a supreme moral universal organizing principle, li,and its manifold expression in "things," wu.

Kokan's philosophical and literary priorities, eccentric as they may appear from the Chinese point of view, often come as a breath of fresh air to anyone familiar with the loosely and often unquestioningly used terms of traditional Chinese literary criticism. His Chinese scholarship seems all the more remarkable when we consider that he never went to China.· In 1300, at the age of twenty-two, Kokan began to make initial preparations for "the journey south," as travel to China was often called, prompted by an acute sense of shame that "only the most mediocre Japanese monks were going to China" and determined "to let them know that there are men in J apan."12 Kokan had been constitutionally weak since birth, however. and given the rigors of the voyage across the sea, decided at the last moment to stay in Japan to look after his aged mother-an unusually Chinese sort of filial piety, and curious especially in a Zen monk. Several of Kokan's disciples would later make the voyage, however. Shokai Reiken (1315-1386), one of the best known, returned from a stay of twelve years, having studied under the most famous Chinese Zen masters of the day, to report that in all those years, he had never found a Chinese master the equal of Kokan. 13 Shokai's evaluation may be discounted as loyal exaggeration, and there is no question that loyalty to one's Zen master in Japan (as contrasted, for example, with filial piety toward a parent) was a matter of supreme importance in the Japanese temple world. 14 Still, Shokai's assertion is only an early example of numerous statements to come from Japanese monks who, in increasing numbers, were failing to find what they had gone to China to seek. To be sure, the omission of the expected pilgrimage to China was less common in Kokan's day than it was to be from the middle of the fourteenth century onward.

It comes as no surprise to learn that the Japanese monks

"CHINESENESS" vs. ']APANESENESS" 151

who did go to China and stay there for any length of time appear relatively less eccentric in their acquired tastes, and more conventionally "Chinese." For example, those immediate or near contemporaries of Kokan who lived in China for a significant length of time~one thinks especially of monks like Sesson Yubai, Betsugen Enshi, Ryuzan Tokken, Chugan Engetsu and Zekkai Chushin as only the most famous examples among many-wrote poetry that was more consistently "Chinese" than that written by monks who never left Japan. The Chinese scholarship of Japanese monks who had studied in China was generally held in high esteem by their Japanese colleagues. For all their attainments, however, even these more Sinified monks were viewed with something less than complete enthusiasm by the Chinese, as witness, for example, the Chinese Ch'an monk Ju-Ian's astonished and somewhat backhanded admiration, in a colophon dated 1403 written for the collected poems of Zekkai Chushin, that his very talented Japanese colleague's poetry should "bear no trace of Japanese."15 The Chinese were undoubtedly flattered that "barbarians" could learn to ape Chinese culture with a fair degree of success, and the Japanese back home were always gratified by whatever compliments they could prevail upon the Chinese literati to write for them. But to the degree that such Japanese monks were able to appear Chinese, they interest us here less than the Zen monks who remained in Japan and never attempted to conceal their essential J apaneseness. That even their colleagues in Japan seemed to feel that Japanese should act like Japanese is suggested in a humorous poem by Gido Shushin (1325-88), entitled "Watching a Crow Bathe" (we should keep in mind here that the Zen monk, in his shapeless black robe, was often likened both in poetry and in painting to a black crow):

I've watched you bathe for quite some time, old crow, And it's going to take some doing to get you white as a gull; Why not just stay your usual pitch-black self And avoid giving other birds grounds for suspicion? l()

If we want to understand the role that the Zen monks played within. the broader cultural context of the relationship of the Zen establishment to the rest of Japan, rather than merely the


degree to which they were familiar with Chinese theory and practice, then it is to these Japanese monks who never went to China that we must turn.

Kokan Shiren became famous as a scholar of Buddhist history, and is still best known for his history of the religion in Japan, the Genko ShakushO of 1322. Kokan stated in his introduction to the work that he was shamed into writing it by the surprise expressed by the Chinese emigre monk I-shan I-ning that there was still no such history inJapan. Kokan began study' with this Chinese monk soon after the latter's arrival inJapan in 1299, sent to Japan as an official envoy by the Yuan government, which was aware, on the evidence of the large numbers of monks flocking to China, that Japan thought of itself as a Buddhist country.

Kokan and I-shan appear to have gotten on well, and it was Kokan who eventually composed the best-known biographical account of I-shan's life. From this account, the world was to learn that I-shan was at least as devoted to literary pursuits as he was to the practice of Zen:

The Master was of an infinitely gentle and compassionate nature. Other Zen masters in our time have tended to be severe and strict, as befits their religious duties, and did not spare the rod. The Master, however, sat alone in his chair and did not permit visits. Newly arrived from abroad, his comings and goings were irregular. If others insisted on coming to him for instruction, it was not his style of Zen to probe for hidden meanings, but merely to keep them busy about the temple ("garden," en). There are many who often toy with secuIar wntings to the detriment of the Zen life. The Master, however, desired to promote logical principles (li) in order to set doubts asiae. Since hIS spoken Japanese was poor, he spent his days and nights poring over the most minute aspects of temple correspondence, dashing off replies in his harmonious and graceful style .. He was widely versed not only in the texts of the Buddhist canon, but also in the writings of the Confucian and Taoist philosophers, classical and vernacular fiction, and even the sorts of tales told by story-tellers.!7

At about the same time that Kokan began his studies with Ishan, another young monk, Muso Soseki (1275-1351), also made his way to Engakuji Temple in Kamakura, attracted by reports of the fame of the newly-arrived Chinese Zen master.

"CHINESENESS" vs. "]APANESENESS" 153

Like Kokan, Muso was born into the aristocracy, an important indication of the religious atmosphere in the Kyoto Zen temples of their day, for the children of the aristocracy were usually exposed to Tendai and Shingon Buddhism long before they embarked upon the study of Zen.IS Five years before Muso came to Kamakura, his teacher, a great favorite of the young man's, suffered a stroke that left him, as Muso was to write later, "unable to write even a single character," a perception that speaks for the strength of Muso's early literary orientation. The shock of this event drove Muso into a period of asceticism that finally ended in the Zen monasteries of Kamakura, where he became one of approximately forty Japanese that I-shan accepted as students after weeding out the numerous candidates by means of an examination in Chinese versification.

The ability to write Chinese well was undoubtedly a requisite for study with the emigre Chinese Zen masters, for the common written language had to serve as the sole medium of

. communication between the master and his pupils. The custom of what was called hitsuwa, or "brush talk," had already long been in use between Chinese and Japanese, the usual verbal give-and-take of Zen training carried out in writing instead. As the Ch'an monk Ming-chi Ch'u-chiin wrote in a poem to his Japanese patron atomo Sadamune,

I came ten thousand leagues across the sea to these shores Knowing nothing of the language that you speak; All I could make out as a babble of "ba-ba-ba," Couldn't catch more than a lot of "ri-ri-ri!"19

With brush and ink as a substitute for the spoken word, Mingchi continued,

To communicate my feelings, I took up a brush to say what was on the tip of my tongue,

And you caught my ideas by listening to my words with your eyes.

I-shan's method of selecting his students is the first known example of a Chinese monk's actually setting would-be students examinations in Chinese poetry, a practice long established in the Chinese civil-service examinations. Muso was one of only two candidates that I-shan placed in what he called his "top


grade" of students, for his facility in Chinese poetry one can only presume. It was not long, however, before Muso began to evince difficulties with his practice of Zen, and by 1303 he was in serious distress over what he took to be I-shan's stern and inhumane insistence on maintaining the unyielding style of Zen, often called the "pure Sung style," preferred in the Kamakura Zen monasteries, all of which were founded by Chinese masters. The Zen practiced in those monasteries could scarcely be called "pure" any more than Ch'an Buddhism as it was practiced in China was free of elements from T'ien-t'ai and Pure Land Buddhism. In comparison with the styles of Zen that were developing within the Kyoto temples patronized by the court nobility, however, the Zen of Kamakura did probably seem harshly alien to the Japanese of Muso's day, so that "Chinese" would seem a more appropriate label for it than "Sung." In view of Kokan's later evaluation of I-shan's "gentle and compassionate" nature, it may be that the Chinese monk had simply not yet lived in Japan long enough to have had the sharp corners of his alienness smoothed down, and so seemed needlessly abrasive.

Whatever the case, when Muso eventually came to I-shan for encouragement and answers to his questions, the Chinese monk only responded, in the best Ch'an manner, "There is no word, no Law, that I can give you." Muso begged for "compassion, some expedient," but I-shan only responded "No compassion! No expedients!"20 This dramatic episode reveals a side of I-shan we do not find in Kokan's biography, but is supported in other anecdotal material. On one occasion of the traditional lecture to the assembled monks of the temple on the festival of the Ninth Day of the Ninth Month, for example, I-shan, as was the custom, prefaced his talk with a poem suited to the occasion, full of traditional Chinese imagery. After I-shan had recited his poem

There suddenly appeared a monk who objected, "You aren't talking about Zen Buddhism! You're only talking about literary matters!" "Blind fool," retorted I-shan, "It is you who do not see the Way! I recite my poetry for those who can understand it!"2!

Muso was never to resort to the traditional Zen style of


refusal, paradox, shouts and blows. Rather, his own Zen was affable, chatty, simple and accommodating, qualities that would help draw Japan's new Ashikaga rulers to him. These were provincial warriors, without much sophistication in matters of Buddhism, but with great aspirations to aristocratic culture, and ready to learn. 22 The distinction Kokan drew between the demeanor of I -shan and the sterner Zen monks of his day would have applied as well to Muso, the many extant statues and portraits of whom reveal a gentle-looking man of extremely courtly bearing, almost comical with his long face and pointed dome, and looking as though he could not harm a fly, in contrast to the serious, awesome, and even ferocious faces that so often glower on such likenesses.

In no mood for blows or riddles from I-shan, Muso turned in his distress to the more congenial Zen style of the Japanese monk Koho Kennichi (1241-1316), who was then in residence at Kamakura. Koho, as we might have expected, was also born into the aristocracy-in fact, he is thought to have been a son of Emperor Go-Daigo. Like Muso, too, Koho had never been to China. Perhaps it was because of their similar backgrounds that they to seem to have gotten along well; whatever the case, in 1306 Muso was given Koho's seal in confirmation of his enlightenment.

Tamamura Takeji has interpreted Muso's failure under the tutelage of I-shan as an inability to deal with Zen in its "Chinese" form.23We have already seen, however, that I-shan's style, as abrasively alien as it may have seemed to Muso, was scarcely free of all sorts of admixtures, from esoteric Buddhism to Neo-Confucianism. In fact, I-shan's style was eventually to prove congenial enough to courtly Japanese sensibilities that in 1313 he became the first Chinese monk invited to head any of the Kyoto Zen temples patronized by the aristocracy, in this case, Nanzenji. Nor did I-shan's style, apparently quite traditionally "Zen" according to the following anecdote, appear to frighten Muso's teacher Koho, whose encounter with I-shan in 1299 is recorded in the Japanese monk's biography:

I-shan was placed in charge of Kenchoji [in Kamakura]. One day Koho went to pay him a visit. I-shan asked him, "What sort of instruction do you usually give your pupils?" Koho reflied, "In my cave the colors of the mountains are beautifu in any season. The sounds of all the creeks be-


yond the clouds are cold!" I-shan asked, "Doesn't that sort of thing dazzle people these days?" Koho replied, "It increases the value of the Treasury of the Eye of the True Law [Shobogenzo]!" I-shan shouted "Chieh!" [katsu, a traditional Zen shout, here indicating approval]; Koho shouted back. After they had drunk some tea, I-shan asked, "Is the grass sweet to the water-buffalo?" Koho replied, "It's slept its fill, the sun is setting, but I can't get it to go back home." I-shan said, "It just !leeds a sharp whipping!" Thereupon, Koho roared, put hIS head down and butted I-shan, bowling him over. I-shan laughed uproariously.24

For all of this very Zen-like behavior-shouts, enigmatic statements and the like-we have seen that Kokan's description of 1-shan lingers-approvingly, we might imagine-on I-shan's familiarity with the practice of a broad range of literature. Yet, even with his penchant for setting his pupils to meditating on poems instead of koans, I-shan was far from being the most literary of the Chinese masters in Japan. Koho Kennichi's own master, for example, Wu-hsueh Tsu-yuan, who came to Japan in 1279, is reported to have attained enlightenment when he was twelve years old upon hearing lines of poetry, a fitting start for the man usually considered the founder of the most literary Zen line in all Japan.25

Koho was well trained in the native literary arts as a young man, and left a number of waka poems still known today because of their inclusion in such imperial anthologies as the Fugashu and Shinzoku Kokin Wakashu. His waka poems were also compiled in a private collection by the well-known fifteenthcentury waka poet Kazan'in Nagachika (Koun). His poems, far from monkish, follow in the tradition of earlier non-Zen poetmonks like Saigyo, Noin, Jakuren and the like, thoroughly of their time in diction and allusion. Some of his poems, such as the following, express an un-courtier-like familiarity with meditation in isolated mountain retreats:

Ware dani mo Sebashi to omou Kusa no io ni N akaba sashiiru Mine no shiragumo

The white clouds On the mountain-tops Poke halfway into this thatched hut I had thought too cramped Even for myself. 26


Other poems, however, seem quite at home within the estab~ lished modes of court poetry:

Yo mo sugara Kokoro no.yukue Tazunereba Kino no sora ni Tobu tori no ato

. If you would inquire Where my heart goes In the depth of night: Where are the traces of bird's flight Through yesterday's sky?27

This poem belongs to what Fujiwara Teika had called the soku, or "distantly related," style, in which the last two lines do not seem easily related to or to follow logically from the first three. Koho instilled a taste for this kind of poetry in his pupil Muso Soseki. Like Koho, Muso wrote-perhaps more significantly, did not care that others knew that he wrote-waka poetry. Like his teacher's, Muso's poetry was also collected in the Fiigashii and in a private collection. Both men were so well known as renga (linked-verse) poets that the famous renga theorist Nijo Yoshimoto, who included several of Muso's renga stanzas in his Tsukubashii of 1356, wrote of them as "composing renga night and day."28 Such proclivities for the native literary arts were undoubtedly instrumental in commending Muso to Emperors Go-Daigo, Kogon and Komyo, to influential courtiers like Reizei Tamesuke and Nijo Yoshimoto, and to powerful military leaders like the Ashikaga brothers, Taka'uji and Tadayoshi.

This point has been overlooked by scholars who have tried to account for Muso's eventual success, after a few false starts, as the single most important figure in the political history of the gozan establishment. He devoted himself to the task of making Zen accessible and meaningful to the ascendant Ashikagas, at the same time guaranteeing the perpetuation of the established temple system under his own line during the difficult transitional period after the split of the court into northern and southern factions in 1331. One doubts that the Ashikagas, going out frequently to meet with Muso at Saihoji in the western outskirts of Kyoto to exchange waka poems with him and be pleasantly instructed in a not terribly rigorous Zen, would have bothered to spend as much time with any monk who persisted in bewildering them with alien and uncongenial Chinese poetry

158 JIARS VOL. 7 NO.2

and thorny, uncomfortable Zen riddles. Of course, it seems equally unlikely that any Zen monk who wrote only waka and renga poetry could ever have cut much of a figure within the Zen temple world of the time, as many were in fact to do in the fifteenth century.

When we consider his background, it is not surprising that Muso's waka poetry should seem more polished and erudite than his poems in Chinese, and in fact appear more in touch with tradition, with their up-to-date language and frequent allusion to earlier waka poems. Even his Chines~ poems often seem to reflect waka traditions rather than Chinese. In the headnote to one waka poem, for instance, Muso noted that "For some years [1320-23], I lived in a retreat I built at Yokosuka, on the Miura Peninsula in Sagami Province where the sea meets the land":

Hikishio no Ura tozakaru Oto wa shite Higata mo miezu Tatsugasumi kana

There is a sound As the tide draws far out Into the bay, But I cannot see the tidal flatsMist has covered them. 29

It is interesting to compare this waka poem with lines of a Chinese poem that Muso wrote at about this time, for the Chinese poem seems to follow less from any Chinese tradition than from the one within which a waka like this could have been composed:

I thought that with a hide tough as bark I could live beyond the waves of the world,

But busy mouths that could melt iron followed me everywhere,

And just when I had muted my emotions to the hues of pale mist,

My sweet, dark dreams were shattered by the sound of the evening tide going out ... 30 .

Muso appears to have been referring in both poems to a period of political danger in his career following his resignation as abbot of Nanzenji-a position delicately balanced between the two feuding Imperial factions-and his return to the Kama-


kura area. While keeping himself as distant as possible from the sort of political involvement that might prove fatal to his career, however, Muso was not exactly living in isolation. Among several other important guests Muso received at his Yokosuka retreat Hakusen-an ("Moored Boat Retreat") in the summer of 1321 was Reizei Tamesuke (1263-1328), Teika's great-grandson and, after the success in 1291 of the famous· lawsuit brought before the Kamakura authorities by his mother, the nun Abutsu, the literary heir of Teika's legacy. Muso wrote the following rather conventional poem upon seeing Tamesuke to his boat:

Kari ni sumu Iori tazunete Tou hito 0

Arujigao nite Mata okurinuru

Putting on the face Of someone who owns the place, Again I see off A visitor who has come calling At this temporary dwelling. 3 !

Tamesuke's reply is, if anything, even more conventional than Muso's poem, with its stale image of tears and the play on the name of Muso's retreat:

Tokaranu Kyo no funaji no Wakare ni mo Ukabiyasuki wa N amida narikeri

Although the paths Our boats take at today's parting Are not so very distant, It is because of our tears That they float so readily.

In spite of his earlier troubles with I-shan and a well-known episode of "false enlightenment" in 1304 at the age of 30, Muso seems to have become a focal point for students attracted by his particular style of Zen, much to his dismay. In 1311, Muso built a retreat called Ryusan-an; hounded by would-be students, however, he abandoned it in 1312 to live at Jokyoji, at the time headed by Koho. Musoleft there for Mino province the following year to lodge at Eihoji (the "mountain designation" of which was Kokeizan, "Tiger Valley Mountain"), again in order to escape the hordes of students who had arrived to seek him out. "I hid myself at the Keizan Temple in Mino, and even though it was so deep in the mountains that there was not even a real road of any sort to the spot, much to my annoyance people kept calling to study Zen with me":

160

Yo no usa ni Kaetaru yama no Sabishisa 0

Towanu zo hito no N asakenarikeru

JIABS VOL. 7 NO.2

I t would be merciful of people Not to come calling and disturb The loneliness of these mountains To which I have returned From the sorrows of this world. 32

This poem is an allusive variation (honkadori) on a famous poem by the poet-priest Saigyo:

Tou hito mo Omoitaetaru Yamazato no Sabishisa nakuba Sumiukaramashi

If it were not for the loneliness Of this mountain village Where people have given up call

mg on me, It would probably be Wretched to live here.

Muso here follows the long native poetic tradition of the hermit-priest, for whom any dwelling at all merely reflects the impermanence of life on earth; the true significance of life lies rather in something other than these structures, built on one's journey only to be abandoned without attachment. As Muso wrote in a Chinese poem on the same topic,

A drifter my whole life, I never saved a thing: The clouds in the mountains and moon in the creeks have

been my carpets; East to West, I trod along this narrow path in vainIt wasn't in the dwellings along the way.33

The waka poem he wrote subsequently "upon abandoning the hermitage I had built in Shimizu in Min,o province" reflects even more accurately than this Chinese poem the traditional language of the waka tradition that was Muso's source for such a subject:

Ikutabi ka Kakusumi sutete Idetsuramu Sadamenaki yo ni M usubu kariio

How many times Have I left abandoned, Living hidden away like this, A temporary dwelling built In an uncertain world?34

In the imagery of Muso's poetry, as in Saigyo's, it is the "path"


of Buddhism that one followed as one "returned home" to one's original nature that was important, and not the temporary stopping places along the Way. In a waka poem that takes its title from the Zen saying "To put one foot after the other is to follow the Way," Muso makes clear that the "road home" is not to be interpreted as taking any particular topographical direction:

Furusato to Sadamuru kata no Naki toki wa Izuku ni yuku mo I eji narikeri

At those times When I ·cannot decide the way Back where I came from Anywhere I go Becomes the road home.35

The sharp contrast between these conventional poetic attitudes.of other-worldliness and noninvolvement in the affairs of this world on the one hand, and on the other of Muso's extraordinary gregariousness, so well attested in the historical records as well as in poems to and from important people like Reizei Tamesuke, requires that we ask how Muso was able to reconcile the contradiction. As with many other problems of apparent contradictions in Buddhist theory and practice, one possible approach to this problem lies in the province of what was known as "expedient measures" (hob en) , a technical term used especially in Tendai Buddhism. Muso always claimed that he was only unwillingly involved in the writing of poetry, as had been so many Zen monks before him, especially Chinese masters like I-shan and Wu-hsueh. This pursuit, which had been condemned in Buddhist texts centuries earlier as "wild words and ornate speech," Muso thought of as only one "expedient" among many that served to lure others toward the practice of religion. Perha,~the best-known rationalization for the use of "expedient measures" to this end is found in the "parable of the burning house" of the Lotus Sidra (Saddharma-pu1'}rf,arlka; Myoho Renge Kyo), in which a man resorts to promises of rich gifts in order to lure unconcerned children from a burning house and so save their lives. The use of expedient means thus implies an awareness of different levels of audience; someone mature enough to fully realize his perilous situation does not require the lures required by the still immature. In this sense, Muso's poetry speaks directly to the needs of his as-yet-benighted secu-


lar counterparts among the warrior and noble classes. To his own Zen students, however, Muso delivered stern warnings to forebear from such parlous distractions and to stick to their meditation mats. In his most famous statement on the subject, Muso divided his pupils into three grades:

Those who have zealously cast off all worldly ties and singlemindedly pursue enlightenment to the exclusion of all else-these are my first grade. Those whose Zen practice is not pure and who cultivate a taste for scholarship-these are my middle grade. Those who are blind to their own spirituality and are fond of any drivel of the Patriarchsthese are my lowest grade. Then there are those who, besotted with poetry, conceive of their vocation as a literary one-these are shaven-headed laymen, not worthy of inclusion in even the lowest grade. Nay, they are stuffed with food and stupid with sleep, vagrant time-passers I call frocked bums! The ancients had another name for them: "robed ricebags." They are not monks, and are certainly no disciples of mme!36

This division into three grades seems to reflect I-shan's own division of his students into three groups depending, apparently, upon their aptitude for Chinese poetry. But this system of ranking had even earlier precedent in China. The Ch'an monk Ta-hui Tsung-kao (1089-1163), for example, wrote in 1127 that the monk Fa-hsiu "divided students into three grades" according to the following test:

On a snowy day, the top grade are found seated in meditation; the middle grade are grinding ink and wetting brushes to write poems about the snow; and the third grade are sitting around the fire eating and talking. 37

Muso also borrowed Ta-hui's unusual term, "the technique of calling to the maid," for the poems he used as "expedient measures" to attract others' attention. The Chinese expression referred to a poem about a woman who frequently called out to her maid to do this or do that, not because she actually required attention, but because she wanted some means of indicating her presence to her lover.

Muso was inevitably the target of frequent criticism from contemporaries. Shuho Myocho (1282-1328), founder of the

"CHINESENESS" vs. ',]APANESENESS" 163

important non-gozan "atokan;' (Daitokuji-Myeshinji) line of Zen, for example, complained that Muse seemed to have more in common with Tendai and Shingon Buddhism than he did ~ith Zen.39 And indeed, Muse's experience with I-shan suggests that his inability to deal with the stark contradictions of the more traditional Zen style brought from China is the crux, with his ascendency to power in the gozan, of an important change in the Japanese interpretation of Zen. The problem of "styles" is particularly vexing insofar as it tends to be dependent on personalities; and yet, it is from the inevitable occasional, if blurred, vision of human personalities that emerge from behind the anonymity of dry historical record that we often seem to find our best understanding of the shifting directions of human institutions.

Muse's response seems to represent the truly native Japanese pattern reasserting itself in the historical process of assimilation and adaptation of what was felt instinctively to be alien. Muse's style can be summed up by the word "mediation," or, more specifically, the reduction of the tensions created by the clash of cultural values. Perhaps we might locate the deepest function of ancient wakan dialectic in the wa element's native Japanese reading of yawarageru, "to soften, mollify," the bringing of two things into "harmony," the reduction of tension by accommodation.40 On the surface, this problem appeared to Muse's contemporaries, and so to later historians, as the contradiction of an unacceptably "Japanese" devotion to verbiage, especially to poetry, in the person of someone theoretically committed to the ancient Zen formula of "no reliance upon the written word." But it seems more sensible to locate the truly Japanese pattern precisely in the equation of that which was ineffably profound (kokoro), whether in religion or poetry, with its expression in words (kotoba), whether those of religion (i.e., dhiirani, mystical incantation) or of waka poetry. That this equation is fundamental to the Japanese pattern can be seen in Muju Ichien's Shasekishu of 1283.41 Muju, who represents the very different style of a different time, was someone of whom less "Chineseness" was expected, and so his loquacious anecdotes and gossip, told in the manner of a born storyteller, were not regarded as a failing, even though he was a Zen monk of the gozan Jufukuji in Kamakura and Tofukuji in Kyoto. The


Shasekishu incorporates, from its preface on, a strong attempt to provide a theoretical basis in earlier Chinese works, already well-accepted in Japan, for a reconciliation between a stark and very un-J apanese silenc-e on the one hand, arid the poetry and story-telling that Buddhist doctrine had labelled "sins of the mouth" on the other. Muju found this theoretical basis precisely where earlier poets and monks had for over four centuries, in the T'ang poet Po Chii-i's fervent defense of "wild words and ornate speech to serve the cause of praising the Buddha's Law in worlds to come with the effect of turning the Wheel of the Law."

When Muso wrote waka in what the Tendai monk Shinkei was to call a century later the Zen-like soku mode of "distantly related verse" that came into fashion around 1200, we find that he was as adept at bleaching the phenomenal landscape of illusory "color" and reducing it to its essential "void" as any Shinkokinshu poet:

Kurenu yori Y ube no iro wa Sakidachite Kikage suzushiki T anikawa no mizu

The colors of the evening Were gone, before the darkening sky Could be touched with crimson, In the waters of a mountain stream, In the cool shade of trees.42

Yet he did not seem to have been particularly pleased that, as a Zen monk, he was, if only by the exigencies of form alone, expected to equate this congenial aesthetic vision with the Zen mode of viewing reality, as we see in the following poem in Chinese:

Autumn's colors drop from the branches in masses of falling leaves

As cold clouds bring rain into the crannies of the mountains ...

Everyone was born with the same sort of eyes: Why must mine see this as a Zen koan?43

Muso clearly felt it more congenial to explore the implications of this metaphysic-one he seems to have felt to be very J apanese-in native rather than in alien terms.

Kokan Shiren, appearing to reach out toward China,

"CHINESENESS" vs. ']APANESENESS" 165

found it somehow lacking and insufficiently "rational"; the more we read of his explorations in Chinese thought and letters, the more we feel his fundamental ambivalence toward China. The same ambivalence can be sensed when we read his biography of the Chinese monk I-shan; we are never really sure whether Kokan is praising or condemning I-shan's gentleness where there ought to have been sternness, his silence where there should have been guidance, his poetasting where others usually insisted upon koans. There may, in fact, be some argumentas to the integrity of the text, the original of which disappeared in a fire at Tofukuii in 1393, according to a colophon dated 1407. But this very ambiguity accords so well with Kokan's general view of everything else Chinese that we sense in the end that this warping of his portrait's perspective can be attributed to the superimposition of Chinese spectacles upon Japanese vision. Kokan was, in fact, much less ambiguous with those among his Japanese colleagues who did not seem to him to act sufficiently like Zen monks. We feel the chill of his scorn, for example, for what he cleverly derided as "kana monks,"o a fine three-level pun that can be translated as "false name" monks while implying also that Zen monks like Muso had abandoned the proper world of Chinese learning for frivolous fame in the courts of Japanese cursive (kana) writing. 44 The word also carries heavy implications of Tendai Buddhism, for the term Kokan uses is the technical word used in the Tendai sandai dialectic to mean "provisional reality," and so implies a willingness to accept the superficial world of phenomenal illusion as absolute Reality, and an unwillingness to see it, as Zen insists, as Void. Kokan aimed his attack at monks who, like Muso, he thought were more involved in Tendai and Shingon than in Zen.

Muso, to the contrary, found the Chinese master I-shan altogether too alien: his Chinese poem cited above seems to be saying, Why must he insist on seeing everything as Zen riddles when I see a beautiful Japanese sunset? Muso's attitude is reflected, by and large, in his entire line, the largest and most important in the gozan in the century that followed. But even a Japanese as Sinicized as Muso's younger contemporary Chugan Engetsu (1300-75) could feel the uncomfortable tug between the outward "Chinese" forms of his life and something undeni-


ably Japanese within. A poem by Chugan sums up the problem as it must have appeared to many a Japanese Zen monk:

The older I get, the more I detest affectation-In fact, every now and then, I like the pretty things

of the world! Giving in to my true nature, I open the window onto

the small pond, And, chin on fist, gaze into the infinity beyond: Blown by the breeze, butterflies flit through sweet-smelling

grasses, Dragonflies everywhere rest on open lotus flowers-If the "cold and tasteless" in these seem so sweet to me, What am I doing living in a Zen temple!45

NOTES

1. TaishO ShinshU Daizokyo (Tokyo: 1969), vol. 81, p. 104b. 2. Ibid., p. 105b. 3. Erh-Ch'eng Ch'ilan-shu (Ssu-pu Ts'ung-k'an), Wai-shu, 11 :2b. 4. Uemura Kanko, Gown Bungaku Zenshil (GBZS) (Kyoto: Shibunkaku,

1980 reprint), vol. 1, pp. 228-241. 5. Ibid., p. 228. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., p. 241. 8. MumyoshO (Tokyo: Nihon Koten Bungaku Taikei [NKBT], 1965), vol.

65, p. 87. 9. GBZS, vol. 1, p. 95. 10. Ibid., p. 96. 11. Ibid., p. 74. 12. Zoku Gunsho Ruijil (Tokyo: Kangeikai, 1926), 9b: 463a. See also Ma

kita Tairyo, "Zekkai Chushin to Minso to no kosho," Zengaku Kenkyil, LVII (1970), p. 167.

13. GBZS, vol. 2, pp. 1237-1238. 14. As it apparently was not in China. Japanese have periodically raised

the question of the alien quality of Chinese thought that emphasized hsiao or "filial piety" over what the Japanese prized as chil (chung, loyalty to one's superior), never terribly important in neo-Confucian thought. For example, the eccentric kokugakusha scholar Masugi Kaido, in the second novel of Yukio Mishima's tetralogy The Sea of Fertility, Homba (Runaway Horses), makes precisely this distinction between alien Chinese Buddhist and Confucian thought and native Japanese.

Chugan Engetsu (1300-1375) offers a fine object lesson in what might happen to a gown monk who was perceived as disloyal to his own line. Chugan had" studied in Kamakura for several years with the Chinese Soto monk

"CHINESENESS" vs. ''jAPANESENESS'' 167

Tung-ming Hui-Jih (of the only Sow hne besides that of Dogen, one that became part of the Rinzai-dominated gown). Leaving for China in 1325, Chilgan spent a year, from 1330-1331, studying with the famous Chinese Ch'an master Tung-yang Te-hui. Upon returning to Kamakura in 1339, Chilgan had a·falling-out with Tung-ming and announced that he intended to follow Tung-yang's line instead. As a result, he was immediately ostracized by the Kamakura monks, one of whom even set upon Chilgan with a sword. As long afterward as 1362 a monk fired an arrow at Chilgan, causing him to suffer a nervous breakdown so severe that he had to resign his post as abbot of Kenninji. See Tamamura Takeji's biography of Chilgan in Gozan Bungaku Shinshu (hereafter CBSS) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971), vol. 4, pp. 1205ff; and his interesting article on Chilgan as "heretic," "Zenshil ni okeru itan no mondai," in his Nihon Zenshilshi Henshil (Kyoto, Shibunkaku, 1981), vol. 2 (part 1), pp. 373-745.

15. Makita Tairyo, "Zekkai Chilshin to Minso to no koshO ... ," pp. 175 and 178. For Sung Lien's equally backhanded compliment to J orin Ryosa, who accompanied Zekkai to China in 1368, see Ito Sho, RinkO ChOsho, (Kyoto: Sogo Shiryokan, 1838) 2/1:34a-35a:

16. GBZS, vol. 2, p. 1351. 17. TaishO ShinshuDaizokyo, vol. 80, pp. 332b-c; GBZS, vol. 1, pp. 221-

22. 18. See Tamamura Takeji, Muso Kokushi (Kyoto, Sara Shobo, 1977), pp.

6-10, 14, 16ff. See also TaishO Shinshu Daizokyo, vol. 80, p. 498b-c on Muso's Tendai and Shingon background.

19. GBZS, vol. 3, p. 2026. 20. TaishO Shinshil Daizokyo, vol. 80, p. 498c. 21. Dai Nippon Bukkyo Zensho (Tokyo: Nippon Bukkyo Zensho Kankokai,

1956), vol. 95, p. 429. 22. Tamamura, Muso Kokushi, pp. 12lff. The question of Muso's dilu

tion of Zen practice, and of his competency in general, is summarized in English in Akamatsu Toshihide and Philip Yampolsky, "Muromachi Zen and the gozan system," in Hall and Toyoda, eds., Japan in the Muromachi Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 322:....329.

23. Tamamura, Muso Kokushi, pp. 20ff. 24. TaishO Shinshil Daizokyo, vol. 80, p. 283a. 25. Ibid., p. 244a, and Dai Nippon Bukkyo Zensho, vol. 95, p. 388, contain

these lines of poetry. For Wu-hsiieh's position in the history of gozan literature, see Tamamura Takeji, Gozan Shiso (Nihon no Zen Coroku, vol. 8) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1978); a glance at chart F3 at the end ofthe·book will serve to illustrate the size of Wu-hsiieh's faction in Japan.

26. Filgashil, 1747. 27. Ibid., 2065 .. 28. Tsukuba Mondo (NKBT), vol. 66, p. 82; Yoshimoto was explaining in

this section the affinity between renga and Buddhism. 29. Gunsho Ru~'il, 15:360b. 30. TaishO Shinshil Daizokyo, vol. 80, p. 477a. 31. Gunsho Ruijo, 15:362b. 32. Ibid.

168 JIABS VOL.? NO.2

33. Taisho Shinshil Daizokyo, vol. 80, p. 456e. 34. Fftgashil, 1783 .. 35. Ibid., 2053. 36. Taisho Shim/HI Daizokyo, vol. 80, p. 503e. See also Tamamura, Muso

Kokushi, p. 19 and p. 23, note 3. 37. Ibid., p. 108. 38. Ibid., p. 102; loku Gunsho Ruijil, 96:529a. 39. Akamatsu and Yampolsky, "Muromachi Zen ... ", pp. 322-24. 40. See, for example, Haga Koshiro, Higashiyama Eunka (Tokyo:

Hanawa Shobo, 1962), p. 201, for a discussion of the chanoyu (tea ceremony) as an "artistically softened" (geijutsuteki ni yawarageta) derivative of the sarei tea ceremony practiced within the Zen temples. It is clear from the headings of this section-"The nature of the chanoyu as a 'wa' art," "The 'wa' of the concept of the clwnoyu"-that Haga means more by 'wa' than merely "Japanese."

41. Shasekish'il (NKBT, vol. 85), p. 58, note 9 and p. 509, n. 3; also pp. 218-220. The equation of waka with Shingon dhiiranf can be found on pp. 222-225 and p. 513, n. 42.

42. Gunsho Ruijil, 15:361b. 43. Taisho Shins/HI Daizokyo, vol. 80, p. 480e. 44. GElS, vol. 1, p. 235. 45. GElS, vol. 2, p. 902.

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1~he Rasavahinz and the Sahassavatthu: A comparison

by Telwatte Rahula

The Rasaviihini (abbreviated as Rv.) is a non-canonical Buddhist work belonging to the pakara?1a (Skt. prakarary,a) class of the Pilli literature. The title, translated as "Stream of Delights," I is appropriate, for it endeavours to produce the taste of the nectar of the Dhamma. Ancient teachers of Sri· Lanka maintain that the work is called Rasaviihinibecause it produces the essence of the Dhamma and of material accomplishment (attha).~ The preamble invites "good men" (sujanii) to listen to it, as it is "indeed delightful" (abhimudiivahii). The text, consisting of 32 bhary,aVaraS,3 aims to produce this delight through one hundred and three simple narratives concerning monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen of the past, historical or otherwise, who either attained to mundane and spiritual happiness or became subject to various misfortunes as the result of their deeds.

The text is divided into two major parts. The first part, called jambudipuppattivatthu; contains forty stories originating in J ambudIpa; the second part, called Sihaladipuppattivatthu, embodies sixty-three stories of similar character originating in the island of SIhala.4 Although characters and events in some stories in each part extend to the country of origin assigned to the other, the division seems to be a reasonable one. Each part is again divided into chapters (vaggas). This division, however, is not based on any strict plan, as themes of the stories in all chapters seem to overlap. There are four chapters in the first part, and six in the second. Each chapter contains ten stories. Three additional stories, followed by the colophon, are given at the end of the tenth chapter. The colophon claims that the work was completed unhiu'dered by any obstacle.

This is, however, not an original work. The proem clearly

169


states that the entire text is a revision of an earlier Pali work by the Elder named Ratthapala, "a mine of the virtues of moral conduct," who was an inmate of the Guttavarpka5 monastic residence of the Great Monastery in Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka. The Pali compilation was found to be corrupt throughout (sabbam akula7(t) with repetitions and such other defects; and the Rv. is th~ result of an attempt to remove these defects from that popular work. The proem does not mention the name of that compilation, but informs us that it was, in its turn, merely a Pali translation of ancient stories which had been narrated by arhants and recorded in Sinhala. We know nothing about that old Sinh ala collection of stories which, if it ever existed in the form of a book, is now lost. The Pali translation of the Elder Ratthapala, on the other hand, is supposed to be the work known as the Sahassavatthu Atthakathii.

Our knowledge of the Sahassavatthu Atthakathii is based mainly on the few references to it found in the Mahiiva7(tSa Tzkii. 6

Some details in the Mahiiva7(tsa TiM, quoted from the Sahassavatthu Atthakathii, are found in the second part of the Rv. in toto. 7 This work bearing the name Atthakathii is generally considered to be very old work, and, in any case, the Mahiiva7(tsa Tzka is assigned to about the 8th or 9th century A.C.H A Pali work bearing the name Sahassavatthuppakara1Ja is extant, and that text includes some of the details which the Mahiiva7(tsa Tzka quotes from the Sahassavatthu Atthakathii. The very fact that this work embodies 93 stories, 92 of which are found in the Rv., enhances the view that the Elder Ratthapala's compilation was the authority which the Mahiiva7(tsa Tzka refers to by the name of Sahassavatthu Atthakathii.

The author of the Rv., the Elder Vedeha (l3th century), does not mention this work by name. The Sahassavatthuppakara1Ja (abbreviated as SV.)9 does not mention the author's name. The Sv. is generally thought to be the basis of the Rv. Ven. Buddhadatta, who edited the text, is convinced that it undoubtedly is the prototype of the Rv. A number of other scholars, beginning with Hugh Neville, do think that the Sv. represents the prototype of the RV.IO It can, of course, be argued that the Sv., like Ratthapala's compilation, professes to follow the tradition of Sinhala commentaries and the expositions of the teachers (szhalatthakathiinaya7(t ga1Jhitvacariyavadaii ca).1 1 A

THE RASAVAHINi AND THE SAHASSAVATTHU 171

monk of the Great Monastery like the Elder Ratthapala is the most likely person to have had access to these traditions and lores.

Presentation of the stories in the Sv. is not uniform, and the subject-matter is not arranged in any proper order. This confirms the Elder Vedeha's statement regarding the confused character of the original. The text apparently has nine chapters, but after the fourth, chapters are not numbered; and the last two groups, with ten stories in each, are not called chapters at all. Four stories in the first chapter have verses, and the gatha in the first story is followed by a short commentary. This feature does not appear again. The second and third chapters have no verses at all, and among the stories from no. 53 to no. 95, only one story (no. 87) contains any verse. The fourth chapter introduces an altogether new format. The first seven stories (nos. 31-37) begin and end with a versified outline of the narrative which follows. Nos. 38, 39, and the next (no. 40 in the Sv., but the text does not count it as a separate entity) begin in the same style, but omit the repetition at the end. Again, the first story in this chapter has the phrase "tar[L yatha'nusuyate" after the introductory verse, but nos. 32-35 and 38 have "tar[L kathar[L ti ce?" instead. The story of King KakavaI)I)a Tissa ends as the "ninth," disregarding the independent story of VeJusumana within it. As for the tenth story, to be expected in its natural sequence, the reader is referred to the Mhv. The historical accounts connected with the great national hero, unnecessarily disrupted by no. 41, continues through nos. 42-45. One would not expect to find the story of King Dutthagamani, for it was already mentioned at the end of the fourth chapter (p. 89), but no. 46 narrates it "briefly" (sar[Lkhepena). Then follows the sentence: "The story of the royal prince Sali should be known exactly in the way it is told in the Mahavar[Lsa." This one sentence is called "Saliraja-kumara-vatthu dutiyar[L." The next story, which is either the third from no. 46 or the ninth from no. 41, is mysteriously called the "fifth." Another chapter has eleven stories (nos. 67-75), but the last one has already appeared as no. 41.12

Internal inconsistencies of a more serious character are also noticed. Some stories bear different names in the beginning and at the end. The Buddheniya vatthu (no. 7) becomes


Buddheniyyamaka-vatthu at the end. Duggatitthiya vatthu (no. 33) turns to be the story of Dhamma. After the introductory verse in this story, there occurs the curious sentence: ''yatha Dhammaya vatthu, tatka janitabbaJ!l." This would lead one to believe that the author is referring to another story, but in fact the story called Duggatitthiya vatthu is none other than the story of Dhamma. Story no. 68 has the title Yakkhassa palayita vatthu in the beginning, but concludes ·as the Sarar;,agamana-vatthu. Often, the heading is long, but is shortened at the end of the story. Proper names sometimes vary within a story. Kakaval)l)a Tissa (no. 39) is thus referred to as Kakaval)l)a Abhaya, and Ratthapala (no. 55) becomes Ratthika. RupadevI's story speaks of Rupavat! (no. 31). The story of Amba the Minister, recorded twice (nos. 41 & 75), also contains some minor variations between the two narratives. There are two stories called Tissadahara-samar;,erassa vatthu (nos. 80 & 81), and another two stories (nos. 9 & 69) are called Micckaditthikassa vatthu.

The language of the Sv. is full of peculiarities that do not conform to the standard Pali grammar. These usages are thought to reflect the Sinhala influence, which was only natural in light of the fact that the text translates Sinhala narratives. Such sinhalized Pali forms are discussed by scholars.13 One interesting example of direct Sinhala influence is found in the sentence: "Senagutto Nandiyassa taJ!l datva attano bhagineyyam akasi."14 The word bkagineyya (sister'S son) is employed to mean "son in-law" under the influence of the Sinhala bar;,a, which stands for both meanings. On page 134, we find pulila-rukkhe, for which the Rv. has pipphali-rukkhe, and the Saddharmalanki'iraya has pulila-gaseka. The word pulila does not seem to be a legitimate Pali word recorded anywhere else.

A text in such confusion needs to be revised, and the Rv. may be the result of an attempt to edit and improve the Sv. Numerous passages in the Sv. show an unmistakable resemblance with the relevant portions of the Rv. This leads us to believe that the Elder Vedeha is reproducing the same material, with editorial touches here and there. However, much can be said against this suggestion. Many prose passages in the two texts are very similar, but the Rv. not only reproduces a grammatically better sentence but also adds details, poetical elaborations, and various comments that go a long way beyond the


limits of a mere edition. If the Sv: is the original work that Vedeha thera treats in this manner, he could well have said so in his proem. What he has said is that he is planning to free the original from defects such as repetitions. He does not tell us that it would be elaborated, too. The text has anakular[l karissami, not varJr.wyissami or any other expressions to that effect. I:; And where are those "repetitions" in the Sv.? We find one story repeated in toto (nos. 41 & 75), and King Dutthagamal)I's story is once mentioned merely by name, whereas it is recorded "briefly" as no. 46. There are no repetitions in the present Sv. to justify any revision from this point of view. It is true that the Rv. is not the only work of its kind, and we do have a number of other post-canonical works which are based on already existing texts. This is especially true in the case of the var[lsakathas, such as the Dzpavar[lsa, Mahavar[lsa, Thiipavar[lsa, and Hatthavanagallavihara-var[lsa, etc. Notwithstanding the unfortunate fact that earlier works in Sinh ala and Pali on which these books are based are not available at present, it is well known that they are not mere editions of the early works. The writers of these revised works have usually extended their "reproductions" wherever they thought more details were necessary, while freely drawing upon the commentaries and other relevant sources. The Rv. may be included in this class of works, though not exactly a chronicle, 16 and its close connection with the chronicles becomes particularly considerable in the second part. 17 Is it, then, not the most natural thing for the Elder Vedeha to use these very same sources while revising the Sv. and provide more details where the Sv. was found deficient? This possibility gains further weight from the Saratthadipzka Rasavahinz TiM explanation of the phrase punaruttadidosehi as abyapitatibyapitapunaruttadidosehi tar[l sabbar[l pubbe katar[l akular[l hutva thitar[l. But of primary importance is what the author himself has said, and he has not actually said anything about providing great detail. If the Elder Ratthapala's work known to Vedeha thera was the same as the present Sv., I am inclined to think that he would have stated in more precise manner the kind of improvements he planned to introduce. III It should also be remembered that the Sv. does not contain the crucial account of Prince Sali, as the Mahavar[lsa Tika says it did. Dr. Rahula, writing about 30 years ago, concluded that the question whether the Sv. is the same


text as mentioned in the Mahavarrzsa Tzka or "whether these MSS. represent an abridged form of the original Sahassavatthu cannot be decided, unless and until some more MSS. are consulted."19 Ven. Buddhadatta could obtain only one more Ms. for his editions, but as to this point, viz., referring to the Mahavarrzsa for the story of Prince Sali, it confirms the other MSS.

Further, the verses in the Rv. represent a completely independent tradition. It is true that the Sv. has less than 35 verses excluding the proem and certain repetitions, whereas the Rv. has over a thousand gathas interspersed throughout the narratives. Even where one can reasonably expect the Rv. to follow the Sv., we do not find in the former similarity enough to suggest any considerable borrowing from the latter. The preamble of the Sv. is very different from that of the Rv., and the only line the two texts have in common is tarrz sU1'}atha samahita, which is anything but peculiar to any PaIi text. The three verses in story no. 4 of the Sv. certainly contain a few lines which appear in the Rv., but lines such as addasarrz virajarrz buddharrz are. very frequently found in the Apadana and other similar works.~() It is inexplicable why the Elder Vedeha, who quotes from various other sources, does not consider the gathas in the Sv. worthy of attention.

Poetical descriptions of persons, places and events in the Rv. can be independent improvements on the original, but material differences between the two versions of the same story are too many to be entirely ignored. Some of these differences, such as an increased figure, may well be explained away as a "natural growth" in an age of grotesque exaggeration. Thus, King Mahasena in the Sv. story (no. 23) offers daily alms to 2000 monks, whereas in the Rv. we find him far more generous, feeding 10,000 monks daily. In another Sv. story (no. 67), a culprit is condemned to death the second time he is caught, but according to the Rv., he is pardoned three times. On the other hand, considerable differences between the two versions of many narratives point to a third original source. These variances in the Sv. become all the more interesting when one finds that the Sinhala work called Saddharmalankiiraya (abbreviated Sdhl.), generally believed to be an enlarged translation of the Rv., sometimes corroborates the Sv.

The Sdhpl is a popular religious work of the mediaeval


Sinhalaliterature. Its author is the Elder Dharmaklrti III, also know as Devarak~itaJayabahu. According to the Saddharmaratnakaraya, his first name was Devarak~ita, and J ayabahu the name taken on becoming a mahathera. Dharmak"irti was a title taken upon his becoming saTfZgharaja. Like Vedeha thera, this learned monk also belonged to the Araiiiiavasi chapter. In the Pali colophon to the Sdhl., the author says that he had already written three other books (NikayasaTfZgraha, Balavatara-saiiiiaka, and Jinabodhavali). The work was written toward the close of the 14th century. It has 24 chapters, written in a mixed Sinhala style full of Sanskrit tatsama words. The first three chapters do not concern us here, as they deal with such matters as the preaching of the Dhamma, and the bodhisattva's career. But the next 21 chapters are directly related to the Rv. The author does not mention the Rv. or Vedeha thera anywhere in the Sdhl., but the 103 stories of the Rv. are presented here with much additional information and many embellishments. Moreover, the verses appearing in the Rv. narratives are given together with a Sinhala translation thereof. The order of the Sdhl. stories agrees with neither that of the Rv., nor of the Sv., but the work is at least as well organized as the Rv. Vedeha thera includes 10 stories in every chapter, but his successor limits each chapter to 5 narratives. The lengths of the chapters vary; and the author reckons that the work embodies no less than 146 stories (ek siya susalisak pamar;,a vastu-katha).22

The view that the Sdhl. is based on the Rv. can be supported by a variety of internal evidence. The work begins with the same verse in salutation to the Buddha as found in the Rv. The stories usually agree with the Rv. versions, and with a few exceptions, the gathas of the Rv. are also included in the Sdhl. Although the subject-matter is described as "the noble teaching expounded by the Enlightened One" (budun visin vadarar;,a ladda VU saddharmaya), the author twice compares his work to "a flow of the delight of nectar" (amrta-rasa-dharavak),23 which reminds us of the name Rasavahini. The division of the stories into two parts, as in the Rv., is not recognized in the beginning of the Sdhl., but after narrating 41 stories of J ambudlpa origin (jambudvipotpanna), the author proposes to record the stories of Sri Lankan origin (lanka-dv'ipotpanna).24 The text gives only nine gathas in the Devaputra vastu (pp. 292-6), but it refers to


"the twenty verses given above" (yathokta gatha vissen), which is exactly the number of gathas appearing in that particular story in the Rv. In the story of Saddheyya, the Rv. has 24 verses, and the SdhL, too, specifically mentions that the original narrative contained 24 verses. This is particularly noteworthy, consider_ ing the fact that the Sdhl. story quotes no more than nine verses that show a few important variations when compared with the Rv. Similarly, the 38 verses quoted in the Rv. story of Uttara the novice, borrowed from the Apadana, are referred to in the Sdhl. (p. 205) as "the thirty-eight gathas beginning with Sumedho nama sambuddho, etc.," even though this first verse is not fully quoted in the Sdhl. narrative.

Nevertheless, with regard to certain details the Sdhl. also preserves the traces of an ancient tradition not wholly incorporated in the Rv. We note that all the three works have DhammasOl)Qaka's story as the first in the collection, and that, strangely enough, they all end with the story of Danta the house-holder. The Sdhl., of course, has the additional Maitreya-vastu, which is not a story like others. Apart from this, the order of presentation is not similar, although the Rv. and Sdhl. agree in a few individual cases. I give the table of stories below. The titles are from the Rv.

N arne of the vatthu Number in Rv. Sv. Sdhl. Dhammasol)Qaka 1 1 1 Migal uddaka 2 4 3 Tinnarp jananarp 3 6 21 Buddheniya 4 7 39 Ahigul)thika 5 9 18 Saral)atthera 6 10 4 Vessamitta 7 11 2 Mahamandhatu 8 17 6 Buddhavammaval)ijaka 9 26 5 RupadevI 10 31 33 Nandiraja 11 37 11 Afifiataramanussa 12 38 32 Visamalomakumara 13 48 34 KaficanadevI 14 59 15 Vyaggha 15 62 22 Phalakakhal)Qadinna 16 63 23

THE RASA V AHINi AND THE SAHASSA VATTHU 177

N arne of the vatthu Number in Rv. Sv. Sdhl. Corasahaya 17 64 24 Maruttabrahma.Q.a 18 65 26 Paniyadinna 19 66 25 Sahayassa pariccattajivitaka 20 67 27 Yakkhavancita 21 68 16 Micchadit thika 22 69 17 Pada pithika 23 70 19 U ttarasama.Q.era 24 71 12 Kavlrapattana 25 73 20 Coraghataka 26 76 7 Saddhopasaka 27 83 9 Kapa.Q.a 28 84 29 Devaputta 29 87 30 SIvalitthera 30 14 8 Mahasenaraja 31 23 31 Su va.Q..Q.atilaka 32 27 38 Kapa.Q.a 33 34 14 Indaguttatthera 34 49 35 Sakhamalapujika 35 13 Moriyabrahma.Q.a 36 28 Putta 37 21 37 Tebhatika-madhuva.Q.ijaka 38 94 36 BodhirajadhIta 39 60 41 KU.Q.<;lalI 40 80 40 Migapotaka 41 2 45 Dhammasuta-upasika 42 3 43 Ku<;l<;larajjavasitthera 43 5 44 Arannaka-Maha-abhayatthera 44 8 46 Sirinaga 45 12 86 Saddhatissa -mahamacca 46 13 68 Sama.Q.agama 47 15 47 Abhayatthera 48 18 76 Naga 49 19 48 Vatthulapabbata 50 20 72 Uttaroliya 51 22 49 Tambasumanatthera 52 24 71 Puvapabbatavasl Tissatthera 53 25 50 Culatissa 54 28 65 Tissa 55 29 69


N arne of the vatthu Number in Rv. Sv. Sdhl. Ariyagalatissa 56 30 75 Gamadarkika 57 32 78 Dhamma 58 33 79 Kincisarigha 59 35 80 Saddhasumana 60 36 42 Kaka 61 50 74 KakavaI).I).atissaraja 62 39 51 Du t thagamaI).l -abha ya -maharaj a 63 46 52 Nandimitta 64 16 53 Suranimmala 65 42 54 MahasoI).a 66 43 55 Gothaimbara 67 44 56 Theraputtabhaya 68 57 BharaI).a 69 58 VeJusurnana 70 40 59 Khanjadeva 71 60 Phussadeva 72 61 Labhiyavasabha 73 62 Dathasena 74 63 Mahanela 75 45 64 Salirajakumara 76 47 66 Culanagatthera 77 52 70 MeghavaI).I).a 78 53 73 Dhammadinna 79 54 77 Ranhikaputta 80 55 82 Silutta 81 56 84 Nesada 82 57 83 Hema 83 58 85 KaI).asigala 84 61 88 N andivaI).ijaka 85 72 91 Nakula 86 74 67 Ambamacca 87 41 & 75 87 Vanara 88 89 J ayampatika 89 89 92 Davaputta or Rukkhadevata 90 87 93 Culagalla 91 77 96 PaI).Qarariga 92 78 94 Dubbitthi-Mahatissa 93 79 95 Gola-upasaka 94 82 98 TissasamaI).era 95 81 97


N dme of the vatthu Putabhattadayika Dutiya-jayampatika Sarp.ghadattatthera Afifiatarakumarika Tissamahanagatthera Mahallika Paiicasatabhikkhu Danta-kutumbika

Number in Rv. Sv. 96 85 97 86 98 88 99 90 100 91 101 92 102 93 103 95

Sdhl. 99 90 81 100 101 102 103 104

The Sv. has one story (P hussadevatthera, no. 51) not found in the Rv. or Sdhl., although this famous Elder is mentioned several times in the Pali literature.25 The Sdhl. also embodies one major narrative, i.e., the Padmavati-vastu, not included in the other two works. The Rv. and Sdhl. have two separate stories of Devaputta (the second one is known as Rukkhadevatavatthu also, but the Rv. introduces the story as Devaputta-vatthu), whereas the Sv. has only one brief version. Now the no. 87 in the Rv. and Sdhl. are identical, and this story of Amba the minister is the one which is. repeated in the Sv. Altogether, there are nine stories (Rv. nos. 35, 36, 68, 69, 71-4, and 88) missing in the Sv. In the Sv. and Rv., nos. 11,31,37,40,47, and 87 tally. Further, nos. 2, 14,28,29,34,42-44,49,82,88, and 99-103 of the Rv. appear in the Sdhl. as nos. 3, 15,29, 30, 35, 43-45,48, 83, 89, and 100-104. Story no. 89 is identical in the Sv. and Rv., but the Sdhl. calls it Dutiyaj·ayampatika-vastu.

Some details found in the Sv. are either missing in the Rv. and Sdhl. altogether, or preserved in one text only. Referring to the agitation caused in Sakka's abode by DhammasollI).Qaka's entering the forest, the Sv. says that the golden projection on the side of the Vejayanta palace was shaken. In the Sv. story, again, Dhammasol).Qaka while contemplating his self-sacrifice observes that the tears shed by one being weeping for the beloved, such as parents, exceed the water in the four great oceans. In no. 6, the naga himself announces that the condemned man can cure the queen. Buddheni (no. 7) has accumulated merit at the time of SikhI Buddha, and her parents, who were alive until she became mature, were eager to have her married. The King attempts to kidnap her, motivated by his desire to earn merit through her, and the thieves lie in wait for her in a nimb forest. The snake charmer in story no. 9 attempts


to capture a nagaraja lying in his abode, and the golden flower which the man sells brings a hundred thousand (coins). In story no. 10, the younger sister's ornaments are inherited from her mother; and her husband shows no interest in visiting her elder brother. SIvalI (no. 14) is said to have renounced homelife on the seventh day at the conclusion of the great almsgiving ceremony celebrating his birth. In story no. 17, Mandhatu is called the "ninth king," and when he falls down from heaven, his

. eldest son comes to greet him. In the Nandiraja-vatthu (no. 37) the senagutta tests Nandiya before his marriage. Indagutta the Elder (no. 49) becomes an arhant by means of the meditational topic of sarp,ghiinussati. Marutta the brahman (no. 65) marries after his return from Takkasila, and, following the attempt on his life, his relatives advise him not to nourish the assassin. In story no. 66, we are told that the good-hearted man notifies the gatekeeper when he arrives at the hall by the city gate. Though Vassakara is mentioned in the story of Uttara the novice (no. 71), it is the king who sentences the novice after he has been forcibly implicated by the thieves. A verse beginning with na pita na ca te mata, etc., is attributed to Uttara in this story. The Mahiivarp,satthakathii is referred to in the story of Dhammasoka.26 The Sv. is often terse and lacking in poetical charm, but some of its descriptions, e.g., the lotus pond mentioned on page 11, are unique. Such details are not found in the Rv. and Sdhl.

On the other hand, the Sdhl. confirms some other information given in the Sv. Thus, in the story of Naridiraja, the householder's name is given as Vedeha in the Sv. and Sdhl., but the Rv. omits this significant name. Another story in these two works preserves the name Sumana the merchant, whereas the Rv. version speaks of a "householder." In the story of King Asoka, the Sv. and Sdhl. mention the marvellous sword that kills enemies even at a distance of hundreds of leagues, but the Rv. is silent on thi~ feature. Such details, admittedly, do not affect the main body of the narratives. Nevertheless, they indicate the possibility that the Sdhl. author had access to an authority other than the Rv. This would explain at least some of the additional information contained in the Sdhl. A good example of this is found in the story of the snake charmer. The Sv. (p. 16) gives no detail of the thupa enshrining the bodily relics of Kassapa Buddha. The Rv. preserves a greater part of

THE RASAVA.HINJ AND THE SAHASSAVATTHU 181

the traditional description of it, but refers to Setavya city in a very general way only. The Sdhl., on the other hand, mentions the country of KasI and the garden having the same name as the city of Setavya. This information, as seen in the ancient Buddhist tradition, was most probably included in the original passage describing the thupa.

This view is further supported by Sdhl. stories like the Saddheyya-vastu and its unique sequel, Padmavati-vastu, which is completely missing in the other two works. The verses in the Saddheyya-vastu are not strictly compatible with those in the Rv. counterpart, and with regard to the other episode, the source remains a greater mystery. The story of Pad(u)mavaU is wellknown in the ancient Buddhist tradition, 27 and the concluding verse of the Saddheyya-vastu, with its reference to LajadayIdevI-this verse appears in the Rv. also--makes its presence quite in order. The whole account exactly follows the usual style in prose passages with Pali verses and the Sinhala translation thereof. The Elder Dharmaklrti appears to quote the verses, conclusion and all, from his original source, for he acknowledgesthem in the usual phrase: "Therefore, it is said" (ese heyin kiyana ladZ).28 Vedeha thera had no reason to omit this popular story, and one cannot assume that it was dropped by later copyists, for the prologue gives the precise number of 40 stories to be included in the jambudipuppattivatthu. It is interesting to note that in the Sdhl. this story is followed by the Nandiraja-vastu. Now both the Sdhl. and Rv. versions of this tale refer to the 500 paccekabuddhas as the sons of PadumavatI, but the Sv. is silent on this point. It is possible that the original work, being a mass of folk-lore, had these three stories together, but the Elder Vedeha, retaining the reference to the 500 paccekabuddhas, omitted the story of their origin. However this may be, this would show the relative independence exercised by the three texts drawing materials from one and the same source.

The view that the present Sv. is probably an abridged form of the original Sahassavatthu Atthakatha is forwarded by some scholars. Dr. Rahula's comments on this point have already been referred to. Sirimal Ranavella, another Sri Lankan, has also pointed out this possibility.29 The question cannot be set" tled without further research, particularly focussed on more MSS. of the Sv., but one peculiar feature of the present Sv.


should be mentioned in this connection. This is, as already mentioned above, the lack of verses in the Sv. Excluding a number of repetitions in the fourth chapter, the entire work has less than 35 verses. It is hard to reconcile this feature with the well-established tradition of the Indian story-teller. Prose passages in the iikhyiinas are usually interspersed with verses that either continue the story or emphasize certain points already raised in the narrative. This format of the traditional iikhyiina type is traced as far back as the Rgvedic period.30 Buddhist stories Uatakas, avadiinas, etc.) are representative of this literary species. 31 Hence, it is most probable that these narratives were Qriginally intermixed with verses. No less than 72 out of 93 stories in the Sv. are entirely in prose, with no trace of any versification at all. It cann'ot be suggested that versified passages belonging to these stories were not known to Ratthapala thera. The Sv. is definitely later than the third century A.C., as it mentions King Sirinaga of Sri Lanka. By this time the stories of Uttara and SIvalI were well-known from the Apadiina. The SZhalavatthuppakararJa is older than the SV.,32 and even this text has some stories which are narrated entirely in verse. Of special importance is the story of Phussadevatthera, common to both these texts. In the Sv. it is given in prose, but the SZhalavatthuppakararJa presents the same story in a more elegant style, giving 51 giithiis in the course of narration. Why, then, does the Sv. not produce any verse in stories like the Phussadeva and DutthagiimarJz vatthus? The reason, probably, is the obvious length of the narratives. King Dutthagamal).I's is the longest narrative in the Rv. The Sv. author refers to the Mhv. at the point where, as in the Rv. and the Sdhl., one expects to find the story of the great national hero. He treats the second longest story, the Siiliriijakumiiravatthu, in the same way. Immediately before the reference to Prince Sali there appears what is actually a mere fragment of the Dutthagamil).I saga, presented here as DutthagiimarJz raiiiio vatthu. This vatthu begins, unlike any other in the text, with the word paccha, indicating the character of an extract from the middle of a larger narrative. The author himself admits that the story is given only "in brief." More revealing is the illogical number assigned to it. This means one of the two alternatives: either the last five stories of the chapter embodying the stories of the great warriors are missing, or the present work is a

THE RASAVA.HINi AND THE SAHASSAVATTHU 183

summary of the Sahassavatthu Afthakathii with no proper arrangement. Since it is not suggested that the Sv. has a lacuna, the second alternative seems to be the case.

NOTES

l. This paper is largely based on part of the Introduction to my Ph.D. thesis: An edition of the Rasavahini-J ambudipuppattivathu, together with an English translation, submitted at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. The English rendering of the name Rasavahini is mine.

2. dhammamatarasa7[! loke vahanti Rasavahini, colophon, v. 2a-b .. 3. batti7[!sabhary,avarehi nirrhita Raiavahini, ibid., v. 3a-b. A bhary,avara (recit

al) "usually consists of eight thousand syllables." Encyclopedia of Buddhism, ii, p. 690A. But Prof. Jayawickrama says that it is "usually reckoned as 6000 syllables." Thilpava7[!sa (PTS), p. 39 n. 47. The first Sinhala edition of the Rv. has 298 pp. with an average of 35 lines per page, 21 syllables per line. This probably means that one bhary,avara of the Rv. consists of more than 6000 but less than 8000 syllables.

4. According to the Saratthadipika, the text was also called Satavatthu. This, however, does not mean that it should contain exactly one hundred stories and no more.

5. Otherwise not known. Malalasekera refers to this as Ta7[!guttava7[!ka. Pali literature of Ceylon, p. 224; DPPN, i. p. 985.

6. For these references, see: DPPN, ii, p. 1083; Walpola Rahula, History of Buddhism in Ceylon, Intro., xxix.

7. Rahula, HBC., Intro., xxix. 8. ibid. Geiger's view that it belongs to the 12th century A.C. is refuted by

Malalasekera, who gives the approximate date as "the seventh or eighth century." Pali Literature of Ceylon, p. 144. But see DPPN, ii. p. 798. when he says that it was probably written in the ninth century A.C.

9. Sahassavatthuppakarary,a by Yen. Rarrhapala of Guttava1'fka Pirivery,a in Anuradhapura, edited by Aggamahapandita Buddhadatta Nayaka Thera, Colombo, 1959, xxxi pp. 200.

10. Rahula, HBC., Intro., xxvii. 11. Sv. 1. All references to the Sv. are from Ven. Buddhadatta's edition

in Sinhala script. No other edition of this text is available, although Ven. Buddhadatta mentions about two earlier attempts to prepare a romanized edition.

12. These points are, in the main, already discussed by Dr. Rahula. See HBC., Introd., xxxi-xxxiii. I have attempted to add more details, while giving my own examples as far as possible.

13. HBC., Intro., xxx-xxxi; Sv., Intro., xi-xii. 14. Sv. p. 74. 15. cf. panpury,ry,a7[! anakula7[!, Thilpava7[!sa, p. 147. 16. Buddhadatta, Pali Sahityaya, p. 398.


17. Source relations among these works, particularly between the lvl.alul_ va,!!sa and the Rv., are an important issue. Except for story no. 38, the first part of the Rv. has nothing to do with the Mhv. or any other chronicle. It must be remembered, however, that ail Pali chronicles in Sri Lanka claim to draw upon an ancient Sinhala tradition.

18. Consider, for example, the Elder Vacissara's statement at the beginning of the Thi1pava,!!sa.: YCl.mul ca. magadhaniruttikato pi thiipa- vaY(WJ viruddlwn_ ayasaddasamakulo sol Vattabbam eva ca balmll! pi yato na vuttam- tasrnii alum! puna pi VaT!!.mrn imar!! vadamill TI!llpaVar!!.la, p. 147. Even the Nhv. admits its dependence on the "tradition" (sutito ca upagata/!!).

19. HBC., Intro., xxix. 20. There are two giltluls common to the two texts. In the Rv. they both

occur in the second part. Dr. Rahula has quoted these two verses. HBC., Intro., xxxvii.

21. Various editions of this very popular religious work exist. The one used in this study is the Saddlwrmillai!kilmya (Illustrated), edited by Ven. Pandit K. Sri Gnanavimala Thera, Colombo, 1954, xii pp. 796.

22. Sdhl. p. 793. 23. ibid., p. 30 & p. 793. 24. ibid., p. 399. 25. Part of his story is given at Visuddhimagga 263, and JA. iv. 490 & vi.

30 mention his name. These references are from DPPN., ii, p. 258. Dr. Rahula gives further references from the Sa/nantap(lsildikil, Sara.I·a/!!, and also from the Sinhala work Saddharmamtrulkaraya. HBC., Intro., xxxiii. The story is found also in the SfhalavatthupjJakarCl1.!, pp. 20-26.

26. The Rv. and Sdhl. refer to the Mhv. This fact in itself seems to indicate the appearance of the existent Sv. at a date later than the MaMval!!sa rikil, unless there existed another work by the name ofMahava,!!.>a A!!hakatlul.

27. DPPN., ii, pp. 135. 28. Sdhl. pp. 168-83. 29. AitiMsika lekhana sar!!gmhaya, no. 2, 1962, p. 2. 30. Winternitz, M., A Histmy oj'lndian Literature, i. p. 100ff. 31. See H. Oldenberg's article: "Akhyana type and the Jatakas," in jour

nal of the Pali Text Society, 1910-12, p. 19ff. 32. SfhalavatthuppakarCl1.Ul, edited by Ven. A.P. Bucldhadatta Nayaka

Thera, Colombo, 1959, Introduction.

A Study of the Theories of Yiivad-bhiivikatii and Yathiivad-bhiivikatii in the Abhidharma-samuccaya

by Ah-yueh Yeh

The Abhidharma-samuccaya (AS),l one of the basic texts of the Yogacaravijfianavada, is called the "Mahayana Abhidharma" of Asariga,2 since it consists of a number of quotations and explanations from Abhidharma and Mahayana texts, organized and explained systematically according to the theories of the Bodhisattva-pitaka (pu-sa-tsang)a or Vaipulya (great extension, fangkung)b Dharma.

It is well-known that the vaipulya mentioned in many Buddhist texts3 is one of nine or twelve kinds of Dharma comprising the Buddha's teaching. Of course, this vaipulya is not itself Abhidharma. Still, the term vaipulya appears many times in the Dharma-viniscaya (Dh V) chapter in AS; Asariga enumerates its synonyms as vaidalya (splitting all obstacles, kuang-p'ouC), vaitulya (incomparable, wu-Pid ) and bodhisattva-paramita-pitaka (pu-sapo-ro-mi-to-tsang;),4 and explains their meanings in various ways. Why he does this is an interesting question for me; after reading their meanings, I find that this Vaipulya-Dharma, which explains the nily,svabhavata of all dharmas, possesses the characteristics of the seven mahattvas,5 which can effect the salvation of all beings and purification of all countries without concern for personal emancipation. In the same Dh V chapter, I also find the two important technical terms yavad-6bhavikata (bh.) (as far as actually being, chin-so-yu-shingf) and yathavad-bh. (exactly as actually being, ru-so-yu-shingg). They are also mentioned in the Saindhinirmocana-siitra (SNS)1 and Yogacara-bhiimi (YCbh).8

Therefore, I think that Asariga may want to use these two terms from the SNS and YCbh to show that the AS is in the

185


group of Mahayana-vaipulya-dharmas; the main purpose of the AS may be to show that bodhisattvas of the Y ogacara should have the pure mind of anatman and tathata to effect the purification and welfare of all people and countries. In any case, these two terms, which contain all dharmas and dharmatas, have been discussed by many scholarsY In this paper, I will try to compare the theories of these two terms from the viewpoint of the AS.

I. The Categories of yavad-bh. and yathiivad-bh.

The YCbh vol. 7710 and SNS vol. 3 explain the meanings of samatha and vipasyana in diverse ways. Both texts deal with relations among the four object-elements (alambana-vastus)ll of samatha and vipasyana meditation. They also explain that bodhisattvas should know meanings in ten ways. Among these, the first is yavad-bh. and the second yathavad-bh. The categories are as follows:

1. yavad-bh.: The limit of all kinds of purity and impurity. The "all" means the five skandhas, the six inside bases (ayatanas) and the six outside ayatanas.

2. yathavad-bh.: The tathatas of all pure and impure dharmas; the seven tathatas. 12

These two texts do not mention the relation of the yavad-bh. and yathavad-bh. with the object of the limits of the entity (vastuparayantalambana), although this relation is discussed in the YCbh vol. 26 and AS. Therefore, in SNS, these two technical terms are used as ways of understanding meanings, while in YCbh vol. 26, they are the objects of meditation, and in AS they refer to jneya dharmas. Futhermore, the categories also have some differences.

They are:

THEORIES IN THE ABHIDHARMA-SAMUCCAYA 187

texts yavad-bh. yathiivad-bh.

YCbh 5 skandhas (all sainkrtas) meditative object (tattvata-vol. dhiitu and ayatana (all dharmas) tathata)

26 4 aryiHatya (A-S) (all jneya- Yuktitva (4 yuktis)13 vastus)

AS 5 skandhas 4 A-S, 16 akiiras, tathata, 18 dhiitus anitya-sainskara (s.), 12 ayatanas du~kha s. ---------------

animitta

From this classification, we find that Asanga, in AS, recomposes the categories from SNS and YCbh. Most notably, he puts the Four Noble Truths (A-S), which in YCbh vol. 26 belong to the yavad-bh., under yathiivad-bh. In YCbh vol. 36,14 yathiivad-bh. is the truth of dharmas; yavad-bh. the totality of dharmas, and both together the "meaning of truth" (tattvartha). Hien-yan-shenchio-lun (HYL,h)IS deals with the terms chin-so-chih-i,i ru-so-chihi) (vol. 5), chin-chu-so-yu,k and ru-chu-so-yu,l (vol. 6). The categories can be considered the same as in SNS.

II. The Meanings of yavad-bh. and yathiivad-bh.

If Asanga is the author of both YCbh vol. 26 and AS, why does he put the four A-S in the yavad-bh. in YCbh vol. 26, and then include them under yathiivad-bh. in AS? If the yavad-bh. only means the empirical, or sainvrtti, and yathiivad-bh. only means absolute, or paramartha,16 how can the four A-S be included under both? In other words, if the four A-S have both meanings, why cannot yavad-bh. and yathiivad-bh~ individually or mutually have both meanings? This is an important problem. In order to solve the problem, one should first study their meanmgs.

Yavat means "as far as"; yathiivat means rightly, suitably, exactly. Bhiivika means actually being17 or existing. Edgerton's


Dictionary, p. 443, states that yathiivad-bh. is true or full actualization, the state of coming to be truly actualized as the thing is or should be. Yiivad-bh. is found in neither Edgerton's nor Williams' dictionary. Hsuan-tsangm translates it by chin-so-yu-hsinn ;

chino means "as far as." Dr. Takasaki's SRGV, p. 173, translates them by "being as far as" and "being as it is." They also might be translated by "as far as actually being" and "exactly as actually being."

Ru-so-yu-hsing and chin-so-yu-hsing appear 17 times with dif-· ferent meanings in the YCbh. In YCbh vol. 67 (TTP 30, p .. 668c), these two terms are used to mean practice (bhavanii, hsiu-· hsingp). The same passage also appears in HTL (TTP 31, p. 556c). Hsuan-tsang sometimes uses chin-so-yu-hsing, ru-so-yuhsing,q and chin-so-chih-ir for his translations. In Fu-hsin-lun,s (TTP 31, p. 802a), they appear as ru-lian-hsiu,t ru-li-hsiu, U rulian-chih,v and ru-li-chih,w which are translated by paramiirtha. In the Uttaratantra, Ratnamati translates them as ru-su-hsiu-hsing,x and pen-hsiu-hsing.Y There, yiivad-bh. is the tathiigata-garbha-astitva, 18 and bhiivikata is not bhiivanii, but has some relation with bhiivana (hsiu-hsing). Therefore, Prof. Vi explains that bhiivika means to accomplish, must accomplish, or be accomplished. For this reason, he contends that it means the same as hsiuhsingZ• 19 In other words, without practice (bhavana), no one can accomplish his ultimate aim. I think this "practice" may be considered the first key to the problem mentioned above. Anyway, the meaning of the "bhiivikata" is diversification; when the prefix yavad or yathiivad combines with it, its meaning or character will vary somewhat.

III. The characteristics of yavad-bh. and yathiivad-bh.

Secondly, one should investigate the characteristics of yavad-bh. and yathiivad-bh. As mentioned above, yavad-bh., signifying the five skandhas, eighteen dhiitus and twelve ayatanas, known collectively as the Three Dharmas (dh.), occupies the first large part (Lakyar;,a-samuccaya) of the AS; the yathiivad-bh., signifying the four A-S, tathata, etc., occupies the last large part (ViniScaya-samuccaya) of AS. Therefore, the theories of these terms can be said to be the theories of the whole AS.20 It is well


known that the Three Dharmas· and Four A-S, which have various meanings, categories and characteristics, have been discussed in early Buddhism, Abhidharma and Mahayana Buddhism. Asanga's selection of the two for the two main sections of the AS is appropriate. Also important in Buddhism is the theory of anatman, which opposes the theory of atman, the absolute, eternal core of the personality. These Three Dh. and Four A-S have, of course, the same purpose, that is, to maintain the theory of anatman.

l. As Regards the Skandhas: The positing of the five skandhas is a way to show that there is neither an absolute personality nor an eternal soul in any person, but Asanga, in the AS, mentions that the five skandhas manifest the five aspects of the atma-vastu. 21 Among them, the first atma-vastu is the rupa-s., which contains the body (deha, the six internal organs) and property22 (parigraha, the six external objects). The second atma-vastu is the vedana-s., which has the character of enjoyment. The third atma-vastu is the sainjyna-s, which has the character of expressing or putting in words. The fourth atma-vastu is the sainskara-s., which has the character of performing rightly and wrongly. The fifth, atma-sva-vastu, is the vijnana-s., which has the character of supporting the body, property, etc. Therefore, the ASbh explains that the first four aspects are vastus of atman, but the fifth is its own vastu, the character of the atman itself.

The fifth is the principal atma-vastu; the other four are the subordinate atma-vastus. But this principal atman is not the absolute, eternal atman. It is the vijnana-s., which contains the qualities of citta, manas and v~·nana. These three are synonymous, 23

and have the characteristic of being dependently originated (pratztya-samutpada). In the AS, Asanga explains that citta is the alaya-vijnana that possesses all seeds, because it is completely saturated by the impressions of the skandhas, dhatus and ayatanas. This alaya-vijnana24 also is called the mature-consciousness (vipaka-vijnana) and the appropriative-consciousness (adana-vijnana) by which one can collect impressions.

As regards the manas, Asanga explains that it has two aspects. The one, the kli~(amanas, always depends on the alayavijnana, for it grasps it and thinks of it as Self (atman, aham) with the four impure mentals. The other is the mind of imme-

190 JIABS VOL. 7 NO.2·

diate-disappearance-consciousness, which will be the supporter of the appearances of the consciousnesses. These two are also mentioned in YCbh, MSS and AbK.25 As regards the Vijiiana, Asanga explains the six consciousnesses, whicn individually depend on their own sense-9rgans to recognize their own objects. Therefore, variousknowledges and activities occur in the world. Thus, this world is not created by the absolute, the Atman or Brahman.

2. As Regards the Ayatanas26 and Dhatus: According to the Vijiianavadin, all representations or enjoyments of the six COll

sciousnesses are the income (aya) through the six sense-organs and their contact with the six objects. For this reason, these six sense-organs and six objects are called the twelve ayatanas. In addition, these twelve function in holding (dhararJa) the past and present enjoyments of the six consciousnesses by serving as the asraya (basis, or support) and alambana (object) of these six. At the same time, as the Kuei-chiaa27 says, the six consciousnesses also can hold themselves, thus showing that their characteristics are not lost. Thus, these eighteen together are called the eighteen dhatus, because "holding" (dhararJa) is the meaning of dhatu. However, dhatu has other meanings, such as gotra, bija, hetu, etc., mentioned in the MSS and MAV.28 Asanga, in the AS, enumerates four meanings: 1. sarva-dharma-bijartha, 2. svalak:;arJa-dhararJartha, 3. karya-kararJa-bhava-dhararJartha, 4. sarvaprakara-dharma-samgraha-dhararJartha.29 Among them, the first represents the meaning of bija, and the other three are the meanings of dhararJa, which applies not only to adana-vijiiana, but also to eighteen dhatus.

3. The Relations o/Three Dharmas and Tathatiis: Although the five skandhas, eighteen dhatus, or twelve ayatanas individually have their special characteristics, they have very close relations, which are mentioned30 in the Adhidharma-mahavibha~a-sastra (AMBS, a-pi-ti-mo ta-pipo-sa-lunbb), AbK, PSP and AS. They are as follows:

(1) The rupa-skandha(s.) contains ten ayatanas, ten dhatus and one part of the dharma-dhatu;

(2) The vedana-s.; (3) samfiia-s.; (4) samskara-s. and avijnapti-[rupaJ (u-piao-seCC)"d belong to

the dharma-dhatu; (5) The vijiiana-s. contains six vijniina-dhatus, and the

THEORIES IN THEABHIDHARMA-SAMUCCAYA 191

mano-dhatu (seven citta-dhatus) and the mana-ayatana. Therefore, in these texts, only rupa-s., dharma-dhiitu and

mana-ayatana are classified as the Three Dharmas, which represent all dharmas by the relations among the five skandhas, eighteen dhatus and twelve ayatanas. All the dharmas mentioned above are classified into two groups: (1) samskrta-dharmas, which are included in the skandhas only, and (2) asamskrtacdharmas are included only in the dharma-dhatu. Therefore, it can be said that all dharmas, samskrta or asamskrta, are included in these Three Dharmas. Asanga in the AS enumerates the eight kinds of asamskrta-dharmas. They are:

(1) kusala-dharma-tathata (shanla-chen-judd ) ,

(2) akusala-dharma-tathata (pu-shanla-shen-juee), (3) avyakrta-dharma-tathata (wu-chila chen-juff), (4) akiiSa (hsii-k'unggg), (5) apratisamkhya-nirodha (fei-tse-me-[chen-ju]hh), (6) pratisamkhya-nirodha (tse-me[ -chenj'u ]ii), (7) aniiijya (pu-tunJi), (8) samjiia-vedayita-nirodha (hsiang-so-mekk ).

The MahiSasaka (hua-ti-pu ll ) enumerates the nine32 kinds of asamskrta. The difference between them is that Asanga, I believe, adds the samjiia-vedayita-nirodha instead of the margangatathata and pratitya-samutpada-tathata. About the meanings of the tathatas, he especially explains that the kusala-dharma-tathata is the anatman, the synonym of sunyata, animitta, bhilta-koti, paramartha and dharma-dhiitu, which are also mentioned33 in the MA V, MSS, etc.

Now, this is the second key to the problem, because from the above statements, we find that yavad-bh. has both samskrta and asamskrta characteristics, which contain the three tathatas. Thus, tathata is related to both characteristics, and if some entity has the characteristics of tathata, it can belong to either category. In YCbh voL 26, the four A-S are included in yavadbh.; in AS they are included in yathavad-bh. Thus, the four A-S may be considered to have some connection with the characteristic of tathata.

Further, Asanga moves the four A-S from yavad-bh. to yathavad-bh., and he removes marganga-tathata, one of the four A-S, from the group of tathatas which belong to dharma-dhiitu, the side of yavad-bh. Therefore, it can be said that Asanga pays special attention to the practical marga (path, taumm ) on the side

192 JIABS VOL 7 NO.2

of yathiivad-bh., because without practicing the marga of a bodhisattva, one cannot attain tathata, the pure consciousness, etc. I think this is the main reason why Asanga included the four A-S under yathiivad-bh.

4. The Relation of Tathata and the Four A-S. The last large part of the AS is theViniscaya-samuccaya (VS), in which the first chapter, the Satya-viniscaya, details the four A-S, i.e.,dulJhka-s., samudaya-s., nirodha-s., and marga-s., in many ways. My concern here, though, is only to study which tathatas appear in what satya and with what meanings.

As regards the nirodha-satya, Asanga explains it from different aspects, such as lalu;arJa, gambhirya, samv'!ti, paramartha, etc. Among them, we can find "tathata"34 twice in the explanation of the lalu;arJa aspect:

(1) "[The characteristic of nirodha] which is the support of nirodha, or the destroying (nirodhaka), or the nature of nirodha, is the non-production of the troubles in the noble path in tath-ata."

(2) "Higher than object, the elements of the evil depravities are destroyed in tathata."

In the ASbh, we find spelled out some meanings of tathata that are implied in the AS.

(1) In marga-s., for the explanation of darsana-marga: "This wisdom of the similarity of supported and supporting (samasamalambyalambana-.Jru'ina), means that by it the tathata of the non-existence of the grasped and grasping is penetrated (tena grahya-grahakabhiiva-tathata-prativedhat)." (TTP 31 p. 735a, ASbh, p. 76/20-21)

(2) For the explanation of the dharmajnana-lu;anti of dulJkha, one of the sixteen .Jnana-ks.$anti: "Tathata is distinctly perceiving in the continuation of dulJkha-s. Transcendental wisdom, the nature of right view (sam yakdT~ti) is produced; when the opinion of suffering is destroyed, the 28 evil propensities in the triple universe are destroyed." (TTP 31, p. 735a, ASbh, p. 77/3-5)

(3) For the explanation of the grasped, known as the dharma-lu;anti1'nana, and the grasper, known as anvayalu;antijnana: The ASbh explains that the path of the transcendental world has two objects: tathata and


samyag-jiu'ina. The explanation of tathata is: "Tathatais the object of the path of dharma-jiiana-pak!;a." (AS p. 671 1-2, ASbh. p. 77/12, TTP 31 pp. 682c, 735b)

(4) For the explanation of vyapin, a synonym of vajropamasamadhi: "Pervading means supporting tathata as the general character of all known things." (TTP 31, p. 742c, ASbh p. 93112)

(5) The nirantarasraya-pravrtti contains three kinds: l. cittasraya-pravrtti (p.), 2. margasraya-p., 3. dauJtulyasraya-p. The explanation of the first is: "The mind-basis in revolution (cittasraya-parivrtti) is dharmata; because of taking away the all accidental impurities (agantukopaklefa) from the pure innate mind (cittasya prakrtiprabhasvara), it is called evolution, and this is the meaning of tathata in revolution (tathata-parivrtti)." (TTP 31 p. 742c, ASbh p. 93115-17)

From the above statements, we find that Asanga puts tathata in nirodha-s. only twice, and without defining its meanings, whereas in the ASbh several of tathata's meanings and characteristics are discussed. Asanga does not hold that duMha-s. is the samnivefa-tathata (ta.) (i-chi-chen-junn), samudaya-s. the mithyapratipatti-tao (hsieh-hsing-chen-juoo) , nirodha-s. the vifuddhi-ta. (ch'ingching-chen-juPP) , marga-so the samyak-pratipatti-ta. (cheng-hsingchen-juqq). These are the four tathatas of the famous Seven Tathatas which are mentioned in the SNS, YCbh, MA V, MSA,35 etc. Anyway, the reasons Asanga does not do that, I believe, are:

(1) In the chapter on the Three Dharmas, he has already expounded the meanings of the kufala-tathata. 36

(2) In the chapter on the dul],kha-s., he has explained tathata's synonyms, anatman and funyata, as meanings of the general characteristics of dul],kha. 37

(3) He has included the four A-S under yatMvad-bh., using detailed explanations that can replace the explanations of samnivefa-tathata, etc.

(4) At the end of the Satya-samuccaya, he contends that the sixteen akaras of the four satyas can belong to the ordinary world or the transcendental world. 38

However, Asanga asserts the value of tathata and the four A-S as being closely related for the person who does his best to


study rightly the Vaipulya-Dharma and practice the path of the bodhisattva, finally attaining the asraya-p. The explanations of tathata and the asraya-p., given in the ASbh, are similar to those in the MA V and MSA;39 all three texts expound theories of the Pure Innate Mind and the accidental defilement. In any case, Asariga also insists in the AS that there are three kinds of asraya-p. The ASbh comments that the first, cittasraya-p.,4o means the tathatasraya-p., and the third, dau~tulya-p., means the alayavijiiana's revolution. The second, margasraya-p., connects the first and third, and is related to the right practice of samatha and vipasyana without which one can neither destroy the impure defilements, nor arrive at the transcendental world. In other words, without the margasraya-p., the cittasraya-p. and dau~tulyasraya-p. cannot succeed. Therefore, it can be said that the meaning of the margasraya-p. is related to the first key to the problem mentioned above.

IV. Theories of Anatman

1. The Definition of Sunyata. For attaining the asraya-p. and enjoying a peaceful life, it is important that we remember the theories of anatman, which is synonymous with sunyata. A famous definition of sunyata, which is given in the YCbh,41 MAV,42 and RGV,43 also is quoted in ASH for the explanation of the characteristics of sunyata, one of the four akaras of the dul],kha-s.

Te~u tasya abhaval]" anena nayena samanupasyana sunyata, . punal], te~u anyasya bhiival]" anena nayena yathiibhuta-jiiana

bhaval]" etad avatiira-sunyatocyate, yathiibhuta-jiianam aviparito 'rthah. (It is' non-existent in them-by this reason sunyata is rightly observed. Again, another thing is the existent in themby this reason, in accordance with truth, one knows it is existent. It is called "the entrance into sunyata"; the yathiibhuta-jiiana (knowing in accordance with truth) means noninversion).

In this definition, "te~u" (yatra),45 "tasya" (yat) and "anyasya" (avasi~ta) are the important pronouns. According to the explanation of Asariga, the "te~u" means the skandhas, dhatus and ayatanas: the "tasya" means the atman or atmiya of dharmas: the


"anyasya" means anatman. Therefore, in short, the eternal, permanent atman or atmiya of dharmas is the non-existence in the Three Dharmas, i.e., all dharmas: Through this reason, one rightly observes that there is sunyata. Anatman is the mode of existence of the Three Dharmas.

However, "atmano nastita anatmano'stita sati sunyata"46 (Sunyata means the existence of the atman's non-existence and the anatman's existence.) This concludes the definition of sunyata. In other words, the negative of the atman and the positive of the anatman are considered the characteristics of sunyata. When we compare this theory with MAV, YCbh and RGV, we find some differences: "avasi0ta" in the MA V implies the "abhutaparikalpa"47 hsu-wangjen-peirr ), the unreal imagination or the Creator of the phenomenal world. The YCbh48 indicates the prajiiapti-vadasraya (chia-yen-shuo-so-iss ). In the RGV,49 it represents the Buddha-dharma. In this AS, however, the "anya" represents anatman, the synonym of sunyata. Therefore, the "existence of the anatman" is similar to the "abhavasya bhava" (existence of the non-existent) in Maitreya's MA V.50

2. The Abandonment of AtmabhiniveSea. Anatman is also synonymous with tathata. It is not only the non-existence of atman, but also the existence of anatman. This is the peculiar theory of the AS, especially in the second part of the Three Dharmas chapter, where we find a long series of topics (60 prakaras) examined with reference to what (katham), how many (kati) and what for (kimartham ... pari~a). We find that the aim of this section is nothing but the insistence of the applicability of the theory of anatman throughout all the universe-this second part is treated under the title of Skandha-dhatu-ayatana-prakarabheda51 (the division of the aspects in the Three Dharmas), discussing the 60 topics (prakaras, from dravyamat to anuttara) that cover the whole universe. In other words, every kind of matter or non-matter, truth or untruth, etc., is contained in the 60 prakaras, but there is no eternal, permanent atman in any of them. Therefore, the purpose of discussing these prakaras is abandonment (tyajanartha) of the atmabhiniveSa (strong attachment to or false opinion about atman). But how many and what kinds of atmabhiniveSa should be abandoned? Of course, there are innumerable atmabhiniveSas to be abandoned; but, according to the theory of Asariga, we can divide all dharmas or the Three Dharmas into 60 pairs, in which we find 58 atmabhinive-


sas to be abandoned. (Three pairs, no. 34, atita, no. 35, anagata, no. 36, pratyutpanna, have the same purpose: to abandon the

·pravartakatman. ) The names of the 60 pairs (the 60 prakaras and 58 atmabhin

ivesa-tyajanas) are given in the table at the end of the paper. 3. The Anatman of theJneya, All Dharmas. Among these 60

prakaras, jneya and vijneya have important meanings. Although YCbh vol. 65 omits these two from the list of prakaras, Kui-chei puts these two between the asainskrta and alambana; altogether, he enumerates 60 prakaras from YCbh vol. 65 and 66.52 It seems that Kui-chei is interested in these two prakaras when he finds the list of 60 prakaras which are enumerated at the end of YCbh vol. 66. I am interested in these two prakaras, especially the ''jneya'' prakara. The jneya means an object or thing to be known. Its categories are wide and various. YCbh vol. 26 explains that the jneya-vastu (so-chih-shihtt) contains all from the asubha or maitri up to the marga-s. 53 In ASbh, the jneya sometimes represents the three dharmas,54 but there Asanga says "sarvain jneyam,"55 because, he explains, jneya has five categories, i.e., rupa, citta, caitaska, cittaviprayukta and asainskrta. All but the asainskrta are sainskrta. Thus, the sainskrta and asainskrta are contained in these five categories, which are also called the five dharmas or five vastus in the texts of Abhidarma and Vijiianavada.56 These texts mention that these five dharmas represent all dharmas. Therefore, Asanga discusses the relation of these five dharmas with the Three Dharmas to show that, altogether, they represent all dharmas, since he already has shown that the Three Dharmas contain all dharmas, in the chapter on the Three Dharmas. Their relations are:

(1) Rupa belongs to rupa-s., contains ten rupa-dhatus, ten rupayatanas and another rupa (avijnapti-rupa) which belongs to the dharma-dhatu and dharmayatana.

(2) Citta belongs to vijnana-s., contains the seven vijnanadhatus and the mana-ayatana.

(3) Caitasikas belong to the vedana-s., sainjna-s., and sainskara-s.; also, together they belong to the dharma-dhatu and dharmayatana.

(4) Citta-viprayuktas belong to sainskara-s.; also, one'part belongs to the dharma-dhatu and dharmayatana.

(5) The asainskrta belongs to the dharma-dhatu and dharmayatana.


AU dharmas can be pure or impure,57 when the citta or caitasika is impressed by pure faith or impure passion. Therefore, Asanga explains the jiieya-dharmas by 13 jiiiinas (from adhimukt~'iiiina to mahiirthajiiiina), because the jiieya-dharmas are the objects (gocaras) of the 13 jiiiinas. Furthermore, Asanga, in the Prativiniscayachapter, details the six kinds of jiieya (from bhriinti to abhriinti-ni~yanda). Among them, the bhriintyiisraya is the nature of the abhuta-parikalpa, and abhriintyasraya is tathata. 58.

Thus, the jiieya means all dharmas which contain pure and impure, etc. Asanga, in showing that there is no atman in any dharma, claims that the purpose of explainingjiieya is for abandoning adherence to jiiaka and pasyaka as the atman. However, when the 58 kinds of iitmiibhinivesa are destroyed, there is nothing but pure aniitman, tathata, appearing in the whole dharmadhiitu.

V. Conclusion.

As regards the problem of why Asanga includes the four Arya-satya (A-S) under yathiivad-bhiivikata (bh.), there are two keys: (1) the meaning of bhiivanii (practice) and miirgasraya-parivrtti, and (2) the relation of tathata to the Three Dharmas and Four A-S. I also respect Asanga's significant and scientific recomposition of the categories of yiivad-bh. and yathiivad-bh. Yiivad-bh. signifies the Three Dharmas (rupa-s., dharma-dhiitu and mana-iiyatana) , which contain all dharmas (sainskrta and asainskrta). Also, Asanga explains that the five skandhas have the five kinds of iitma-vastus. Among them, the iitma-sva-vastu, the vijiiiina-s., which has the characteristics of the alaya-vijfiana, iidiina-vijiiiina, manas and six vijiiiinas, proves that there is no eternal atman in any person. Yathiivad-bh. signifies the Four AS, tathata etc. In the chapter on duly,kha-s., we find the theory of aniitmanand sunyata, the synonyms of tathata; in the nirodha-s. chapter, we find the tathata which belongs to the dharma-dhiitu, on the side of yiivad-bh. Thus, tathata is related to both yiivad-bh. and yathiivad-bh. only by means of the practice and abandonment of the iitmiibhinivesa.

The theory of aniitman, the synonym of tathata and sunyata, is here different from that of the Madhyamika. Behind


this Vijiianavadin theory,' as always, is the notion that yavad-bh. and yathavad-bh. are to be realized so that one can practice the Vaipulya-Dharma and the bodhisattva's marga, for the sake of the peace of the world.

The Table of the .60 Prakaras and 58 AtmabhiniveSa-tyajanas

Prakaras AtmabhiniveSa-tyajanas.

I. Dravyamat Atma-clravya

2. Prajnaptimat Prajnaptimad-atma

3. Sarnvrtimat SamkleSa-nimittatma

4. Paramarthasat Vyavadana-nimittatma

5. Jneya J naka-pasyakatma

6. Vijneya Dr~~clyatma

7. Abhijneya Sanubhavatma

8. Rupin Rupyatma

9. Arftpin Arftpyatma

10. Sa-niclarsana Cak~u~attna

II. A-niclarsana Acak~usatma

12. Sapratigha Asarvagatatma

13. A-pratigha Sarvagatatma

14. Sasrava Asravayuktatma

IS. Anasrava Asrava-viyuktatma

16. Sarana RaJ?ayuktatma

17. AraJ?a RaJ?a-viyukatma

18. Sami~a Ami~ayuktatma

19. Nirami~a Ami~a-viyuktatma

20. Gredhasrita Greclhayuktatma

2-1. Nai~krari1yasrita Greclha-viyuktatma

22. Sari1skrta Anityatma

23. Asamskrta Nityatma

24. Laukika Atmani loka

25. Lokottara Kevalatma

26. Utpanna Asasvatatma

27. An-utpanna Sasvatatma

28. Grahaka Bhoktratma

29. Grahya Vi~ayatma

30. Bahir-mukha A vttaragatma

31. Antar-mukha Vitaragatma

32. Kli~ta KleSa yu tatma

33. Akli~~ KleSa-viyuktatma

34. Atlta Pravartakatma

35. Anagata Pravartakatma

36. Pratyutpanna Pravartakatma

THEORIES IN THE ABHIDHARiVIA-SAMUCCAYA 199

37. Kusala Dharma-yukUitma 38. Akusala Adharma-yuktatma

39. Avyakrta Dharmadharma-vimuktatma 40. Kama-pratisamyukta Kamavita-ragatma

41. Riipa-pratisamyukta Kamavita-ragatma

42. Ariipya-prati-samyukta Riipavita-ragatma

43. Saikp Mok~aprayuktatma

44. Asaik~a Muktatma

45. Naivasaik~a-nasaik~a Amuktatma

46. Darsana-prahaiavya Darsana-sampannatma

47. Bhavana-prahatavya Bhavana-sampannatma

48. Aprahatavya Siddhatina

49. Pratftya-samutpanna Ahetu-vi~ama-hetukatma

50. Pratya Atma-hetuka-dharma

51. Sabhaga-tatsabhaga Vijnana-yuktayuktatma

52. Upattam Deha-vasa-vartyatma

53.lndriya Atmadhipati

54. DuJ:lkhaduJ:lkhata DuJ:lkhitatma

55. Vipari~ama Sukhitatma 56. Samskara-duJ:lkhata AduJ:lkhasukhatma

57. Savipaka Skandhopani~epaka-pratisamdhayakauna

58. Ahara Ahara-sthitikatma

59. Sottara Atma-dravya-hlna

60. An-uttara Atma-dravyagra

5 Dharmas 3 Dharmas

1 ! riipa----...

kusala-dharma akusala-dharma avyakrta-dharma

akasa prati-samkhya-nir. aprati-sam khya-nir. anifijya

The Table of All Dharmas

12 Ayatanas 18 Dhatus

rlipa-a. sabda-a. gandha-a. rasa-a.

\ cak~ur-a.

srotra-a. ghral~a.

jihva-a. kaya-a.

mana-a.

/\. .--------------------" r'~------------, riIpa-dh. sabda-dh. gandha-dh. rasa-dh.

cak~ur-dh.

srotra-dh. ghral~a-clh.

jihva-dh. kaya-dh.

cak~ u r-vij fiana-dh. srou-a-vijllana-dh. ghral~a-vij llana-dh. jihva-vijfiana-dh. kaya-vijllana-dh.

mano-vijllana-dh.

flipa-s. vedana-s. samjfia-s. sall1skara-s. --v~jfiana.-s. , I I I

Five Skandhas

~ o o

'--~.

tJ:i Cfl

(3 t-:r Z o ~


NOTES

1. V.V. Gokhale, "Fragments from the Abhidharma-samuccaya of Asanga" (AS[G]) Royal Asiatic Society, N.S. ~ol. 23, 1947. Pralhad Pradhan, AbhidhaT'ma-samuc~aya (AS[p]), Santiniketan, 1950. Nathnal Tatia, Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhi14ya (ASbh), K.P.J.R. Institute, Patna, 1976. Ta-shen-a-pi-ta-mochi-lunuu and Ta-shen-a-pi-ta-mo-tsa-chi-lunvv both are translated by Hsuan-tsangWW-Taisho Tripitaka (TTPXX), vol. 31, no. 1605, 1606. .

2. Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, The Yogacara Idealism (Motilal Banarsidass, India, 1975), p. 31.

3. Abhidharma-mahii-vibhi14a-sastra (MVS, a-pi-ta-mo-ta-pi-po-sa-lunYY ), vol. 126, TTP, 27, pp. 659c-660a. Yogacara-bhilmi (YCbh, yu-chia-su-ti-lunZZ) volS. 25, 77, 81, 85, TTP 30, pp. 418b- , 723c, 753b, 773a. Etienne Lamotte, Saindhinirmocana-sutra (SNS) Paris, 1935, p. 89. Chieh-shen-mi-chingaaa- TTP 16, p. 698a. Hien-yang-chen-chiao-lun (HYL bbb) vol. 6, TTP 31, pp. 508e-509a. cf. Dr. Egaku Mayeda, A History of the Formation of Original Buddhist Texts, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 389-419.

4. The meaning of vaipulya is mentioned in AS[p] p. 7911-5. The relation of vaipulya with Bodhisattva-pitaka is dealt with at p. 79 114-15. The meaning and the relation of vaipulya with Bodhisattva-paramita-Pitaka are discussed at p. 83 114-18. The many meanings of vaipulya, such as the nilysbhava, etc., are explained at p. 83119 and p. 85. AS[g]p. 35. TTP 31, pp. 686a-687c, -688a.

5. ASbh, p. 96. This text notes that vaipulya, vaidalya and vaitulya are synonyms of Mahayana, and explains the "sapta-vidham mahattvam." Among them, (2) pratipatti, and (5) upayakallialya have the meanings of the Mahayanistic activities for self and others. "Sainsara-nirvar;a-prat4thanat" is the important meaning. The other meanings are noted at pp. 102-116. TTP 31, pp. 743c-744a, 746c-752c.

6. AS[p], p. 80116-20. This part is not in the original Sanskrit text; therefore, shin-so-yu-hsing"cc is retranslated as ~aya-bhavikata. Dr. Rahula, perhaps according to the AS[p], in his book, Le Compendium de la super-doctrine (Philosophie) (Abhidharma-samuccaya) d'Asanga, (AS[r]), Paris 1971, p. 134, translates it by "l'etat de destruction naturelle." They are mistakes, because shinddd means "destruction" or "as far as" !Javat). Here, "as far as" is correct. TTP 31, pp. 686c, 744c-745a ASbh, p. 98112. On pp. 90 & 91, theyathavadbh. means vipaSyana, i.e., "yavad-bhavikataya vicinoti, yathavadcbhavikataya-pravicinoti," two of the four vipaSyanas which are explained in YCbh 30, TTP 30, p. 451b. At YCbh 64 (TTP 30, p. 657c), they are called "yavad-bhavikata-vipasyana" and "yathavad-bhavikata-vipaSyana."

7. SNS, pp. 98-99, "yavatta," "yathavatta." TTP 16, p. 699c. 8. Karunesha Shukla, Sravakabhilmi of Acarya Asanga (Sbh[s]) (K.P. Jayas

wal Research Institute, Patna, 1973), pp. 195-196. Alex Wayman, Analysis of the Sravaka-bhumi Manuscript (Sbh[w]) University of California, 1961, pp. 86, 110,113. YCbh, vols. 26, 30, 34,36,43,45,64,67,74,77,78,85,93, TTP 30, pp. 427c, 451b, 452a, 475a, 486b, 529a, 657c, 668c, 709a, 725b, 773b, 775c, 777b, 789c, 833c.

9. Chigeo Kamata, "Ru-so-yu-hsingeee yathavad-bhavikata tofff chin-soyu-hsingggg yavad-bhavikata." (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies-JIBS) In-


dogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyuhhh 3-2, 1955, pp. 688-690. Jikido Takasaki, A. Study on the Ratna-gotra-vibhaga, (RGV[tJl.,. Serie Orientale Roma, 33, 1966, p. 30L Gadjin Nagao, "Amareru mono"lll JIBS, 16-2, pp. 23-27. Josho Nozawa, Taijo-bukkyo yuga-kiyo no kenkyuili Hozokan, Kyoto,J947, pp. 36,122. Gadjin Nagao, Chukan to yuishikikkk Yuwanami, Tokyo, 1978, pp. 33-36, 100. Noriaki Hakamaya: "On a Paragraph in the Dharma-viniscaya" JIBS 21-2, 1972, p. 4l.

10. YCbh vol. 77. (Identical in content to SNS vol. 3.) TTP 30, pp. 723c-729a. SNS, VIII (Chinese text, vol. 3), pp. 88-121, TTP 16 pp. 697b, 703b.

11. (1) Savikalpa-pratibimba (yujen-peih-ying-hsianglll) is the alambana-vastu of vipasyana. (2) Nirvikalpa-pratibimba (wu-fen-peih-ying-hsingmmm ) is the alambana-vastu of samathii. (3) Vastu-paryantata (su-pien-chinnn), and (4) Karya-parinispatti (so-tso-cheng-pangOOO ) are the alambana-vastu of samatha and vipasyana. These names are also dealt in YCbh vol. 26 and AS. Altogehter, they belong to the vyapyalambana (pen-man-so-yen PPP ), the first of the other four alambanas. The other three are: Carita-visodhana (ching-hsing-so-yenqqq), Kufalyalambana (shang-ch'iao-so-yenrrr), and Klesa-visodhanalambana (sheng-huo-so-yenSSS ).

12. (1) pravrtti-tathata (ta.), (2) lak:far:a-ta., (3) vijiiapti-ta., (4) sain1Jivesa-ta., (5) mithyapratipatti-ta., (6) visuddhi-ta., (7) samyakpratipatti-t. These seven tathatas are also mentioned in the Madhyanta-vibhiiga-bhii1ya (MA VB[n]), ed. by G. Nagao, Tokyo, 1964, p. 43; Mahayana-sutralankara (MSA) ed. by Sylvain Levi, Bibliotheque de l'licole des Hautes Etudes, t. 159, Paris, 1907, p. 168, and some other texts. Cf. my book, A. Study on the Vij·iiana-matra Theory from the Standpoint of the Three Natures as the Mulatattva (SVT) Yuishiki shiso no Kenkyuttt Tokyo, 1975, pp. 594-618. The term tathata is the synonym of tat/va in the MA VB.

13. (1) apek:fa-yukti, (2) kiirya-kiirar:a-y., (3) upapattisadhana-y., (4) dharmatay ... The "yukti" means connection, reason, argument, proof, etc. ... Cf. Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary (SED), Oxford, 1956, p. 853. The meaning of "reason" is the Chinese tao-liuuu .

14. Nalinaksha Dutt, Bodhisattva-bhumi (BSbh), K.P.J.R. Institute, Patna, 1966, p. 25. YCbh 36, TTP 30, p. 486b.

15. HYL, TTP, 31 pp. 502b, 556c. 16. E. Obermiller, in his The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salva

tion, Being a Manual of Buddhist Monism, (Acta Orientalia vol. IX, 1931), p. 138, uses "Absolute and Empirical" for the two terms. But Dr. Takasaki, in his RGV[t], p. 173, criticizes Obermiller's interpretation. Dr. Wayman, in his Sbh[w] p. 86, uses "phenomenon" for yavad-bh. and "noumenon" for yathiivad-bh.

17. Williams, SED, pp. 755, 843. 18. RGV[t], p. 173. TTP 31, p. 825a. 19. H. Vi, Hoshioron no kenkyuVVV , Yuwanami, Tokyo, 1960, pp. 115-116. 20. According to the Chinese version, the two parts of AS (7 volumes)

are: (1) pen-sujenWWW , vols. 1-3, (2) chyueh-tshejenxxx, vols. 3-7. 21. AS[p], p. 1113- ASbh, p. 1110- TTP 31, pp. 663a. 695a. The

"vastu" of the "atma-vastu" has many meanings, such as the matter, thing, place, subject, substance, foundation, etc. Cf. Williams, SED, p. 932; Macdonell: PSD, p. 274. Prof. S. Yoshimoto, "The Characteristics of Skandha-dhatu-


ayatana in Abhidharma-samuccaya" (JIBS, 27-1, 1978) p. 216, translates it by "i-ch'u"YYY. Kue-chei in his Cha-chi-lun-shu-chizzz (Wan-hsu-tsang-ching"aaa, 74, p. 317) adds "t'i"bbbb for its meaning.

22. ASbh p. 1/16-17 "deha-parigrahabhyam iti cakiur adfndriya-~a4kena ca ~a4akaro . ... " TTP 31, p. 695 "Shen-tse-wei-yen-teng-lu-ken, Chi-tse-wei-se-tenglu_ching"Cccc. The "parigraha" means property. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (BHSD), p. 321. The Chinese "chu"dddd means possession.

23. AS[g], p. 19112 AS[p]. p. 11/25 TTP 31, p. 666a. V. Bhattacharya, The Yogacara-bhumi of AcaryaAsmiga (YCbh), Calcutta, 1959, p. 11. TTP 30, p. 280b. S.B. Shastri, Paiicaskandha-prakara7Ja of Vasubandhu (PSP), Ceylon, 1969, p. 15. TTP 31, p. 849c. SNS. TTP 16, p. 692c. In my book, SVT, pp. 214-216, I have detailed the alaya-vijfiana's synonymy with the theories of some important texts.

24. ASbh, p. 11119-p. 13/20, TTP 31, p. 701b-702a explains the characteristics of alaya-vijfiana in detail and proves its existence by the eight aspects which are explained in YCbh vol. 51. TTP 30, pp. 579a-580. Chyileh-tingtsang-luneeee, TTP 30, pp. 1018c-1019a. N. Hakamaya, "Alaya-shiki-zon-zai no hachi-Ion-shio ni kansuru shio-bunken"ffff, Komazawa-dai Bu-kigggg no. 36, pp. 1-26.

25. AS[g], p. 19/14-17, TTP 31, p. 666a. YCbh, pp. 4,11. TTP, 30, pp. 279c, 280b. Mahayana-samgraha-sastra (MSS) (She-ta-chen-lunhhhh) Sasaki text, p. 6 cf. SVT, pp. 209-211. P. Pradham, Abhidharma-ko~a-bha~ya (AbK), Patna, 1967, p. 51, TTP 29, p. 4b.

26. The AS and many Vijfianavadin texts put the "dhatu" before the "ayatana," but sometimes "ayatana" before "dhatu." cf. Sh. Yoshimoto, ibid, p. 216. Naoya Funahashi, Chio-ki-yuichiki-shiso no kenkyuiiii , Tokyo, 1975, pp. 262-272.

27. Cha-chi-lun-shu-chi, ibid. p. 318. Sh. Yoshimoto, ibid., pp. 218-219, details many comparative meanings of dhatu from AbK, etc.

28. MSS, TPP 31, pp. 156-157, 324a, 406c. S. Yamaguchi, Madhyantavibhaga-?zka (MAVT), Tokyo, 1966, p. 210118.

29. AS[p], p. 15112-13, TTP 31, p. 666c. 30. Abhidharma-mahavibha~a-sastra (AMBS), (A-pi-ta-mo-ta-pi-po-sa-lun)JJJ),

vol. 197, TTP 27, p. 987b, AbKB, pp. 53-54, TTP 29, p. 4b. PSP, pp. 18-19, TTP 31, p. 850b, AS[p], pp. 12-13, TTP 31, p. 666a-b.

31. AS [p], p. 3117 omits this term, but ASbh, p. 4/4 says "samadanikam avijiiapti-rupam." This "avijiiapti-[rupaJ" appears in PSP p. 2 and AbK p. 30 in the explanation of rupa, and Abk, p. 50 and PSP, p. 16 explain that "avijiiapti[rupaJ" and asamskrta belong to dharmayatana and dharma-dhatu. TTP 29, pp. 3c-4c "Ju-shih-shau-teng-san, chi-wu-piao, wu-wei-mingfa, chi-fa-chiehkkkk." The meaning and translation of this "avijiiapti-[rupa}" are difficult. Dr. Alex Wayman, in "A Study of the Vedantic and Buddhist Theory of Nama-rupa," Indological and Buddhist Studies, Volume in Honour of Prof. ].W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday, Canberra, 1982, p. 62, uses "reticence" to render it. Dr. V.V. Gokhale, in his "What is Avijiiapti-rupa (concealed form of activity)," Proceedings of All-India Oriental Conference, 1937, pp. 623-629, uses "concealed form of activity." I have borrowed this in my paper "The Characteristics of


Vijiiana and V\jfi.apti on the Basis ofVasbandhu's Paiicaskandha-prakara9a," Annals of B.O.R. Institute; vol. LX, Poona, 1979, p. 178.

32. Yenya Teramoto & Tomotsuki Hiramatsu, Sokanwa-sanyak-taiko Ibu

shiu-rin-ranllll , Kokushio-kankokai, Tokyo, 1974, pp. 72-73. TTP, 49, p. 17a. Pu-tsu-i-lunmmmm, TTP, 49, p. 22a. This text has "nairatmya" instead of "aniii

jya." Kue-Chei, in the Ch'eng-wei~shih-lun-shu-chinnnn, vol. 2, TTP 43, p. 292a says that "nairatmya" (wu_WOOOOO), is mistaken. Mahasamghika has nine kinds of asarhskrta, which are different from those of the MahISasaka. Pu-chiPPPP:

Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun-lueh-shuqqqq, TTP 68, p. 25a puts a table of the comparalive asainskrta of Mahayana and Hlnayana. Wan-hsui-tsang-chinrrrr, vol. 83, p. 231. Sh. Yoshimoto, Abidaruma-shisossss, pp. 243-244.

33. ASbh, p. 14/9-15/4, MAV[n], p. 23, MAV[p], pp. 38-39, MSS, TTP 31, p. 406b. P. Ghosa, Satasahasrika-prajiiaparamita (SSP), Bibliotheca Indica 3, p. 1412. TTP 6, p. 413c, TTP 7, pp. 73c-74a, cf. SVT p. 269.

34. AS[p], p. 62/8-9 and p. 62/13-14, TTP 31 p. 681c. 35. SNS, p. 99, TTP 16, p. 699c, YCbh, TTP 30, p. 725b, MA VT, pp.

133-135, MSV[n], p. 43. TTP 31, p. 456c. In MAV "tattva" is a synonym of "tathata." MSA, p. 168. TTP 31, p. 653a-b. HYL. TTP 31, p. 493b. Fo-ti-ching-

luntttt, TTP 26, p. 323a. cf. SVT, pp. 594-612. 36. AS[p], pp. 12/20-13/5. TTP 31, p. 666a-b. ASbh, pp. 14/9-16, TTP

31, p. 702b. . 37. AS[p], pp. 40/10-4117. TTP 31, p. 67.5a-b. ASbh, pp. 81120-82.

TTP 31, p. 720b-c. 38. Ibid., p. 77114-21. TTP 31, p. 686a. 39. MSA, p. 88, TTP 31, pp. 622c-623a. MAV[n], p. 29. MAVT, p. 61.

TTP 31, p. 453a-b, p. 466b. 40. "cittasraya-parivrtti," ASbh, p. 93. "cittasaraya-pravrtti" etc. AS[p], p.

77. The difference between them is the "parivrtti" and "pravrtti." Triinsika and MAV use "parivrtti." MSA uses both of them, cf. SVT, pp. 226-231. Dr. Takasaki, "Ten_euuuu asraya-parivrtti to asraya-paravrtti .... " (Niho-bukkyogakkai-nenpovvvv, no. 25), pp. 89-90.

41. "yad yatra na bhavati, tat tena sunyam iti samanupa.syati, yat punar atrava

s4ta bhavati, tat sad ihast'iti yathabhiltam prajanati." YCbh, vol. 36. BSbh[w], p. 47. BSbh[d], p. 32/11-13, TTP, 30, pp. 488-489a.

42. MAV[n], p. 18. MAV[p], p. 9, TTP 31, pp. 451a, 464b. 43. RGV Oohnston text), p. 76. Dr. Vi, Hoshioron-kenkyuWWWW , p. 589.

Takasaki: RGV, pp. 301-302, not 59. 44. AS[p], p. 40110-12, TTP 31, p. 675a "he-teng-k'unh-hsianf!xxx ... pu

tien-tao-i."YYYY This "K'unh-hsiang"ZZZZ, sunyata-la~a1Ja is one la~a1Ja of the four common la~a1Jas which belong to the duJ:kha-satya.

45. "yatra," ''Jat'' and "ava.s4ta" are mentioned in the texts of YCbh, etc. 46. AS[p], p. 40115, TTP 31, p. 675a, "Tz'u-wo-wu-hsing, wu-wo-yu-hsing

shih-wei-k'ung-hsing". aaaaa

47. MAV[n], p. 17 "hsu-wangjeu-pieh".bbbbb Nagao: "Amarerumono"cccccibid., p. 27, cf. SVT, pp. 383,424,426.


48. YCbh[d], p. 32115-16, TTP 30,p. 489a. 49. RGV, p. 76, TTP 31, p. 840a. 50. MAV[n], p. 22/23 [p], p. 36/15. 51. AS[p], p. 15/18 uses "vikalpa" (Chinese, kuang1en-peiddddd) , but

AS[r], p. 22, not 16, according to the AS[g], p. 29 uses "prakiirabheda" lfen-pei

chd_peieeeee). TTP 31, p. 672c. I agree with this. 52. YCbh, vol. 65. TTP 30, pp. 659a-662c, YCbh, vol. 66. TTP 30,

pp.666a-668a. The other texts are: YCbh, vol. 56. TTP 30, pp.()08a-609b.HYL. TTP 31, pp. 506a-507 a. Tsa-chi-lun-shu-chi,fffff Wan-hsu-tsang

chingggggg vol. 74, p. 386. 53. YCbh, vol. 26. TTP 30, p. 427b. Sbh[s], pp. 193-194. 54. ASbh, p. 6114 ''jJanca-skandhatmake jneye atmatmtya-svabhava ... "

TTP31 p. 698b. 55. AS[p], p. 16/15. TTP 31, p. 667b. "l-ch'ieh-chieh"shih-so-chih."hhhhh 56. AMVS, vol. 197. TTP 27, p. 987b. Sa-po-to-tsung-wu-shih-luniiiii

TTP28, p. 995c. A-pi-ta-mo-pin-lei-tsu-lunjilii TTP 26, pp.712c, 719c. A-pi-t'an

wu1a-hsing-ching.kkkkk TTP 28, p. 998c. YCbh vol. 100. TTP 30, p. 878c. HYL, TTP 31, p. 480 b. Chu-she-lun-shih-i-shu,llI11 TTP 29, p.325b. Nimitta,

naman, vikalpa, samyag-jnana, and tathata are also called the five dharmas or the five vastus. cf. SVT, pp. 576-589.

57. AS[p], p. 16. ASbh, p. 20. TTP 31, p. 667b, p. 705a. 58. AS[p], pp. 101122-102/2. TTP 31, p. 692c. ASbh, p. 136/17-19.TTP

31, p. 764a.

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Book Reviews

Alone with Others: An Existential Approach to Buddhism, by Stephen Batchelor: Foreword by John Blofeld. New York: Grove 'Press, 1985. 143 pages. Bibliography, Glossary.

The Way of Siddhartha: A Life of the Buddha, by David J. and Indrani Kalupahana. Boulder & London: Shambhala, 1982.238 pages.

Like the inheritors of other religious traditions, contemporary Buddhists have been forced to rethink deeply-rooted metaphysical and mythological assumptions in the light of the naturalistic conclusions that seem to emerge from the investigations of the dominant world-view of the modern world, that of science. Buddhist metaphysical assumptions, such as the reality of past and future lives, the existence of a universal moral principle such as karma and the possibility of a human being's eliminating all negative mental states, are at considerable variance with the conclusions of many modern people, who---for reasons well or ill-considered-tend to be skeptical or agnostic on such matters (not to mention on the very viability of metaphysics). Buddhist mythology, with Its largely hagiographical approach to human lives and its cosmological vision of countless and variously populated worlds and realms, tends-to generations raised on formand redaction-criticism, psychobiography and the cold eye of the telescope-to seem, quite often, like an exercise in science fiction.

Faced with their tradition's incongruence with "modernity" at a number of (though not all) crucial points, Buddhists, both Asian and Western, have adopted a variety of different strategies. These have ranged from a reassertion of tradition, metaphysics and mythology intact, on the grounds that Buddhism actually has a subtler and more penettating view of reality than science ever can provide; to claims that Buddhism-especially in its "original" form-actually is the scientific world-view and method (or democracy, or humanistic psychology, or any other modern shibboleth) in religious disguise. It is between the claim that Buddhism utterly transcends the problems posed by modernity and the claim that it is simply pre-modern modernity that most thoughtful contemporary Buddhists try to find their

208

REVIEWS 209

ground. The ground, however, is a difficult one to locate, for the quesion of how to view traditional religious metaphysics and mythology in the light of modernity is not easily answered: the extremes of dogmatic assertion or "explicit or implicit rejection are hard to avoid. (The last century of Christian theology, I think, bears the most eloquent witness to this fact, and Buddhists thinking through their own faith would do well to consider the various strategies adopted by Christians, who have been facing the problems posed by modernity longer, and with greater collective seriousness, than have Buddhists.)

The two books under review, one an "existential approach to Buddhism" and the other a "de-mythologized" novelization of the Buddha's life, are written by eminently "modern" Buddhists: the former by an Englishman who has become a bhik~u in the Tibetan tradition, the latter by a Sri Lankan scholar (collaborating with his wife) who is conversant with Western thought and teaches at an American University. Both works are re-presentations of aspects of the Buddhist tradition at least partially in the light of "modern" perspectives, and each points up both the promise and some of the problems inherent in such an enterprise.

Stephen Batchelor is not the first to apply to Buddhism the language and concepts of existentialism-he explicitly acknowledges Herbert V. Guenther as a forerunner-but he is the first, to my mind, to have done so in a really clear and compelling manner. The basic premise of Alone with Others is that "The survival of Buddhism depends upon the experiential rediscovery of its inmost spark, and the articulation of that experience in a language that speaks directly to the hopes and fears of present-day man" (p. 129). For Batchelor, the language that must be used is not that of one or the other of the Buddhist traditions, nor that of the detached s"cholar, but that derived from existentialism: "Today religious answers need to be freshly formulated from below, i.e., in the light of the present existential situation; they can no longer be imposed jTom above as though they were self-sufficient universal truths in themselves" (p. 43). Existentialism, for Batchelor, is not simply one among many Western philosophies, but a way of analyzing the human condition that goes to the very foundations of that condition, and thereby cuts across cultural boundaries. It is not just another theory about existence, but, rather, the analysis of existence that helps to formulate the categories in which theories about existence must be couched.


In his application of existentialism to Buddhism, Batchelor draws freely from Marcel and Heidegger, as well as from such existentially-oriented theologians as Tillich and Macquarrie. He begins his analysis by delineating "the two most fundamental dimensions of our existence: those of having and being: .. In terms of having, life is experienced as a horizontal expanse precipitating towards ever receding horizons; in terms of being; life is felt in its vertical depths as awesome, foreboding and silently mysterious" (p. 25). Nowadays, Batchelor claims, secular and material values are dominant, so "the urge to have creates an ever widening gulf from the awareness of who and what we are" (ibid.). Therefore, "The primary purpose of Dharma is to reestablish a consciousness of being" (ibid.). Batchelor reviews the legend of the Buddha's life and finds in it a paradigm of the necessary human shift from the having-mode to the beingmode, "a direct challenge to each one of us to respond to the deepest questions of our existence in fully actualizing the potentials of our innermost being" (p. 38).

After discussing the historically conditioned nature of Buddhism, the inadequacy of anyone Buddhist school to the task of "rediscovering" the essential Buddhist message, and the likelihood that existentialism provides perhaps the only "point of encounter where Buddhism and modern man can authentically encounter one another ~hile still retaining their individual distinctness" (p. 53). Batchelor resumes his existential analysis, presenting the two basic categories that guide his main discussion, being-alone and being-with: "These fundamental elements are revealed in the paradoxical characteristic of existence of always finding ourselves inescapably alone and at the same time inescapably together in a world with others" (p. 58). Being-alone and being-with simply describe the way we, as human beings, are; the way in which we respond to our individual and social natures will vary, but two basic options are open, inauthenticity and authenticity: "In inauthentic being-alone we flee from facing the totality of our existence [and from the facts of impermanence and death] through absorption in the particular entities of the world; in inauthentic being-with we ignore our essential relatedness to others through indulging in self-concern" (p. 91).

"In both these cases," Batchelor says, "the turning point from inauthenticity to authenticity is comprised of an experiential recognition and acceptance of the funamental character of our being which we have been evading and distorting" (ibid.), i.e., impermanence and death, our responsibility to others and,

REVIEWS

most broadly, our potential authentically to "be" fully human. In the realm of being-alone, the turning point comes when one recognizes one's own evasions and distortions of one's actual individual situation and takes upon oneself responsibility for achieving the "optimum mode of being." In Buddhism, especially in the Mahayana idiom out of which Batchelor is working, the optimum mode is Buddhahood, and the turn toward Buddhahood and the responsibilities it entails is, or course, . taking refuge. In the realm of being-with, the turning point comes when one rejects selfishness and takes upon oneself responsibility for assisting others in their conscious or unconscious quests for authenticity. In Buddhist terms, one develops equanimity, active concern (love and compassion) and active commitment (bodhicitta) toward others, based on the abandonment of selfconcern. (Sanskrit iitmagraha, Tibetan bdag 'dzin.)

Batchelor next analyzes the primary ways of effecting authentic being-alone and being-with. Authentic being-alone is effected primarily through wisdom, based on the recognition that "psychological disturbance increases in direct proportion to conceptual distortion" (p. 100). The three primary conceptual distortions are three of the traditional viparyiisas: "the apprehension of what is impermanent to be permanent; the apprehension of what is unsatisfactory to be satisfactory; and the apprehension of what is without self-identity to have a self-identity" (p. 101). The latter is the most fundamental, and it is only when we realize that our instinctive, anxiety-producing view of the world as divided into enclosed, independent entities is false that we engender wisdom, and thus the beginning of the end of anxiety.

Authentic being-with entails "ethics," what is usually described as the upiiya side of the Buddhist path, especially the perfections of giving, moral discipline, patience and enthusiasm, which serve, respectively, to alter our attitude from "centripetal" miserliness to "centrifugal" generosity, to restrain ourselves and act in an appropriate fashion, to combat anger, and to pursue zealously what is wholesome. Batchelor emphasizes that, since being-alone and being-with are absolutely fundamental to our being, the Mahayana is quite appropriate in its insistence that both prajna and upiiya be developed, for it is only if we "perfect" ourselves both individually and in relation to others that we may be said to have attained the optimum mode of being.

The optimum mode of being for the Buddhist tradition, as noted above, is Buddhahood, which, in Mahayana formulations, is considered to represent both the fulfilment of one's own aims

211


(svartha) and the fulfilment of the aims of others (anyartha). The symbols of this fulfilment are the "bodies" of the Buddha, the dharma-body and the form-body. When the latter is divided into sambhogakaya and nirmaQakaya, one can analyse the bodies existentially as follows: "The silent depths of personal experience (dharma-body). find progressive expression through ideas and words (enjoyment-body) and are finally embodied in actions (emanation-body)" (p.l19). Batchelor is quite emphatic in his insistence that "The true spirit of Buddhism is that of a humanized religion" (p. 124), and, thus, that the Buddha must be seen not as an ideal being with powers so far beyond the human as to be unapproachable, but, quite simply, as a man who attained and expressed the optimal mode of being of which humans are capable.

Overall, I find Batchelor's analysis clear and compelling, particularly within the limits he has set to his discussion. His analysis of the way in which Buddhism both poses and answers existential questions is convincing, and his plea for a return to Buddhism's experiential foundations is eloquent. Alone With Others is, simply, one of the best discussions of the existential import of Buddhism that I have read; it bears reading by both Buddhists and interested non-Buddhists alike, expecially those who grapple with existential problems in existential terms.

I do have some reservations, though. In the first place, Batchelor has-deliberately-Ieft out of his discussion a number of central Buddhist doctrines, including karma and rebirth, and he has consistenly downplayed the metaphysical implications of the doctrines he has discussed. Granted, Buddhism will be utterly hollow if its existential implications are ignored, but the fact that it has important existential implications does not mean that its metaphysics are not vital to it, too. Indeed, its metaphysics, including the doctrines of karma and rebirth, as well as the ideal of a total elimination of all negative mental states, have been central to most Buddhists at most times, and have helped to provide much of the context of Buddhism's "existential" significance. Articulation or vindication of Buddhist metaphysical and cosmological doctrines may be philosophically problematic, but it need not be seen as a hopeless task, to be abandoned with a shrug and the contention that the existential aspect is vital and the rest superfluous. I do not think that Batchelor is claiming this, but it is an irriplication that might be drawn from his work by the unwary or the metaphysically weary.

·Second, I wonder sometimes why Buddhists so often feel compelled to frame their discussions primarily in terms derived

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from one or the other Western perspective, i.e., by beginning with the Western perspective and then showing how Buddhism "fits" with it. The sounder approach, it seems to me, is for Buddhists to explore their own tradition as it has come down to them, drawing insights and lessons (and criticisms) from the West where possible. I realize that this often is difficult for those whose very cultural background is "modernism," but the extra effort requited to meet traditional Buddhism at least halfway seems worthwhile, given that (a) Western viewpoints-including existentialism-entail their own metaphysical presuppositions, and (b) aspects of the modern worldview are at least as philosophically problematic as those of traditional Buddhism. Again, I think Batchelor is less guilty on this score than many (indeed, he actually derives some of his existential categories from Buddhism), but one hopes that he and other Buddhists will continue seriously to attempt to interpret the world primarily through Buddhist categories, and only secondarily through non-Buddhist categories that may help them to understand Buddhism.

David]. and Indrani Kalupahana's The Way ofSiddhartha is an attempt to present in novel form a "demythologized" life of the Buddha, one derived entirely from the early nikayalagama literature, without any reliance on such later, more hagiographical sources as the Jatakas, Mahavastu and Lalitavistara. The scholarly pioneer of this sort of approach is Ed ward J. Thomas, in The Life of the Buddha as Legend and History (followed more recently by Andre Bareau), but the Kalupahanas make explicit acknowledgement of two more recent influences: Martin Wickremasinghe's Sinhala novel, Bavataranaya, and Bhikku NaI)amoIi's chronological presentation of translations of relevant biographical material from the nikayas, The Life of the Buddha. Bavatarayana contained a number of "inaccuracies" and "glaring misinterpretations," however, so the Kalupahanas have attempted to combine Wickremasinghe's imaginative format with NaI)amoli's accuracy.

The result is a book that is both entertaining and informative. Synthesizing a vast amount of canonical material, the Kalupahanas present a version of the Buddha's life whose chronology is at least as convincing as that of any other. The chronology, of course, is most problematic for the years of the Buddha's "ministry," and the Kalupahanas frankly admit that no sequence can ever be established with certainty; they merely have presented a sequence that is plausible and representative of the geographical area covered by the Buddha.

The Buddha presented by the Kalupahanas is earnest and


thoughtful, growing dissatisfied with the world of his day for a combination of social and philosophical reasons. He agonizes over his decision to renounce society, even discussing it with his wife. Finally, after years of travail, he overcomes ignorance and various temptations, and gains insight into the nature of reality. After his enlightenment, he launches a forty-five-year career of itinerant teaching, proclaiming throughout northeast India a Dharma that is clear, coherent, comprehensive and-perhaps most uniquely and importantly-empirically verifiable. The Kalupahanas' Buddha is an attractive figure: reasonable, kind, skillful, acute. This is not surprising: this is the view of the Buddha we get in virtually all texts that describe him. Since the outlines of the Buddha's character and life are well known, and the Kalupahanas generally adhere to them, I will not rehearse them here, but simply indicate what I think the book's strong and weak points to be.

The book's single greatest strength is its integration into a novelistic format of a considerable amount of philosophical materia!' The Kalupahanas have skillfully woven in with their account of the Buddha's wanderings and meetings most of the important philosophical points made in the 5uttas, from such obvious items as the four noble truths, the three marks of existence and the twelve links of dependent origination, to more specialized matters, such as the question of the Buddha's omniscience, the various types of knowledge, and Buddhist theories of truth, as well as the Buddha's views on social classes, private property and the proper conduct of government. In their choice of material for inclusion, the Kalupahanas follow closely in the tradition inaugurated by the late K.N. Jayatilleke, who portrayed the Buddha as a proto-empiricist, as concerned with the problem of verification as a modern logical positivist, and differing from the logical positivist only in his admission of ESP. as a legitimate source of knowledge (which, in turn, revealed the reality of karma, rebirth and nirvana). This view of the Buddha's philosophical approach is not uncontested, but it is at least as compelling as alternative explanations, and certainly is a version of the Buddha to which Westerners are likely to respond easily.

My criticisms concern two matters: the Kalupahanas' version of the Buddha's attitude toward women and their expurgation from their life of the Buddha of virtually all mythological references. The Kalupahanas generally are careful in their endnotes to indicate the textual sources from which they have derived a particular account, yet very little of their version of the

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Buddha's encounters with women (especially his wife) is thus well-documented. Their Buddha, quite simply, is a feminist; affectionate and considerate toward his independent wife, Yasod-

. hara, to the point of discussing with her his wish to 'renounce the world; motivated, in his renunciation, by a concern for the longterm benefit of his wife and child; and reluctant to institute a bhikkun'i sangha only because he fears the social disruption such a move might entail. That the Buddha had some egalitarian attitudes can be documented; that he' specifically and selfconsciously extended that attitute toward women is, I think, questionable. One would like to think that the Buddha saw through the sexism of his day as acutely as he saw through philosophical confusions, but there simply is too little evidence: the best we can probably conclude from the texts is that he was ambivalent toward women, ambivalence itself marking a considerable advance over the attitudes of most of his contemporaries. I respect the Kalupahanas' concern with excising "later" Buddhist elements from the Buddha's story; I wish they had been as careful to keep out of their account 20th-century values that it would be reassuring to believe the Buddha held, butthat we have no evidence he actually did hold.

Further, while I do understand and appreciate the Kalupahanas' attempts at demythologization, I am not entirely comfortable with them. What is most striking, I think, is the elimination of virtually all mythological patterns from the Buddha's thought. No Mara attempts to tempt or terrify the Buddha on the eve of his enlightenment, no Brahma Sahampati dissuades him from remaining in the bliss of nirvaI]a. It is true that there is no canonical evidence for the story of Mara's assault under the bod hi tree (although Sutta-nipata iii, 2 is suggestive), but Mara is a factor in many canonical texts, while Brahma Sahampati clearly has a role in canonical accounts of the Buddha's decision to teach. What is important here is not so much particular incidents as the more general problem raised by attempts at de-mythologization: we may live in a religiously de-mythologized world, but that does not mean the that Buddha-for all his clarity and rationality--clid. Indeed, to the degree that such beings as Mara and Brahma were accepted parts of the ancient Indian landscape, there is no reason to think that the Buddha might not, in fact, have experienced his conflicts and resolutions in part through "encounters" with them. Again, it is one thing to eliminate "mythological" elements added by later traditions of Buddhist hagiography; it is another to eliminate mythological elements that even the earliest texts indicate may have formed part


of the mental furniture of the Buddha and his contemporaries. Not only is there nb reason to think that the Buddha had totally dispensed with the mythology of his day, but there is no reason why he should have: mythology is an appropriate way of both experiencing and symbolizing complex human dramas of the sort undergone by the Buddha.

These objections aside, The Way of Siddhartha is an engaging and rich exposition of the Buddha's life, one that might, with a few caveats, profitably be used as an introduction to early Buddhism. Indeed, though I think that Alone With Others and The Way of Siddhartha raise-without answering-important questions about how contemporary Buddhists do or might interpret their metaphysical and mythological assumptions, they are clear and aticulate works, whose authors deserve our thanksboth for enriching our understanding of the Buddhist tradition and for forcing us to think seriously about how the tradition best can be understood by people living in the midst of that land of no-land, "Modernity."

Roger Jackson

The Buddha, by Michael Carrithers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. pp. x+ 102. Map, Bibliography & Index. Softcover $3.95.

Michael Carrithers' short study of the Buddha's life and thought is one of the recent volumes in Oxford University Press's generally well received Past Masters series. The series aims to make available to the general reader brief non-technical introductions to the life and thought of significant individuals in humanity'S past. It is an important series in two respects: first because it is less culturally blinkered than other such efforts, taking some account of the contributions of non-Western thinkers to the intellectual development of mankind, and second because it finds a place in the intellectual mainstream for those who have generally been considered "religious" thinkers and therefore banished to the intellectual borderlands. The series already has volumes on Jesus, Muhammad and Confucius and this volume on the Buddha is a welcome addition.

Dr. Carrithers says that he intends to try and show what the Buddha has to offer to contemporary Western thought and cul-

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ture, and to do this by writing a biography of the man. In taking this approach Carrithers is following the tradition in which the life of the Buddha is seen as a dramatic representation of the central truths of Buddhist doctrine and therefore as a very appropriate method of communicating those truths. He does not, however, simply retail the legendary accounts of the tradition, accounts that show little or no interest in distinguishing between what is historical and what is philosophically interesting. Instead he uses those legendary accounts and brings them together with the data the dispassionate historian can gather about the Buddha's life, and in so doing illuminates the historical and cultural context within which the Buddha lived and thought while still preserving some tincture of the significance given to the historical individual by the tradition. This is no easy tightrope to walk but Carrithers is, for the most part, successful in preserving his balance.

The Buddha has four major chapters, each relating to a significant;, part of the Buddha's life. The first, "Early Life and Renunciation," locates the Buddha by outlining what we know of life and thought in the Gangetic plain in the sixth century B.C., stressing the burgeoning urban civilization of that time. Carrithers provides an excellent capsule account of the varr.w system (pp. 14-17) and the Buddha's response to it, and outlines the importance of ~he renouncers, those mendicants who rejected the structures of their society as part of a quest for salvation.

The second chapter, "To the Awakening," decribes the Buddha's quest for salvation and is used by Carrithers as a framework for the exposition of basic Buddhist soteriological praxis. This means, of course, meditative practice. Some extremely complex issues are passed over rather lightly here (especially that of the function of the more advanced concentrative states) but that is inevitable in a book 6f this type and Carrithers is careful to indicate throughout his text that there are many probleIl)s with which he does not intend to deal. There is, perhaps, a little too much stress on the radically empiricist nature of the Buddha's method (see especially pp. 38-39)-a stress which is probably the result of excessive exposure to the influential philosophizing of K.N. Jayatilleke's disciples-and not enough emphasis on the importance of constructive philosophical analysis at a very early stage of the Buddhist tradition. But, in the context of the book as a whole, this is not a major problem. Carrithers' exposition of the basic dynamics of the Buddhist noself theory (pp. 41-46)-always the biggest problem for the novice coming to Buddhism-is especially lucid and useful.


In the third chapter, "The Awakening," Carrithers provides the reader with expositions of some of the central categories of Buddhist doctrine structured around the four truths; he includesdiscussion of the five aggregates, dependent co-origination and the eightfold path, and the ultimate soteriological goal, NirvaI.la itself. His expositions have the very unusual (for this field of scholarship) characteristic of being both accurate and interesting; above all he stresses the intimate link in Buddhist· thought between dispassionate philosophical description-discussion of the way things are-and compassionate soteriological action. He also points out here, as throughout the work, that the Buddha's analysis of the human condition and the conduct prescribed to deal with that condition can in fact be seen to have a great deal to offer to Western cultures, both intellectually and existentially.

In his final chapter, "The Mission and the Death," Carrithers outlines the Buddha's post-enlightenment preaching career and links some of the elements perceptible in this career to the future of Buddhism as a world religion, describing the relevance of Buddhism for the ordinary man and showing how ethics is related to philosophical theory. For this reviewer this is the weakest part of the book: there are some exceedingly odd remarks (p. 80) stressing Buddhism's tolerance and contrasting it with "missionary religions such as Christianity and Islam," and others (p. 95) suggesting that cultural relativism is now a gener- . ally accepted theory in the West and was integral to the Buddhist view of "the varieties of culture." In fact, of course, Buddhism has historically been and continues to be a major (and very successful) missionary religion, and one which has frequently exhibited a degree of intellectual imperialism comparable to anything in Christianity or Islam. Also, Buddhist intellectuals have not, for the most part espoused relativism in any of its forms, and it is probably only among anthropologists in the West that any but the most innocuous forms of cultural relativism are taken to have intellectual plausibiliy.

But these are minor caveats. For the most part The Buddha is a lucid, accurate and interesting presentation of the Buddha's life and thought, one which would be ideal for use as an introductory text for undergraduates in American universities and from which even that peculiarly American academic animal, the professional Buddhologist, can learn something. We have cause to be grateful to Dr. Carrithers and it is strongly to be hoped that his work has wide circulation.

Paul Griffiths

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Buddhist and Western Psychology, ed. Nathan Katz. Boulder, Colorado: Prajna Press, 1983. xi+271 pp., index, softcover, $15.95.

In his introduction to this volume, a companion to the same editor's c61.lection Buddhist and Western Philosophy [Delhi: Stirling 1981], Professor Katz claims that the collection of essays he has brought together is "about psychology, not ab9ut 'Buddhism'" (p. x) and gives concrete expression to his claim by dedicating the book to the late Rune E.A. johansson, one of the comparatively few Western psychologists with a respectable historical and philological understanding of Buddhism. Unfortunately, the collection does not, for the most part, fulfill its promise; the dangers in using this kind of cross~cultural approach to explore any discipline are those of superficiality and eclecticism, and the results, all too often, are methodological and conceptual confusion. Hard questions need to be asked: are the standard psychological theories of the West really usefully applicable to Buddhist theory? Do we actually learn anything about either psychology or Buddhism by juxtaposing, say, jung and Yogacara without fully exploring their basic conceptual and cultural differences? This not to say that the cross-cultural method is invalid or useless, simply that it needs to be exercised with great care and methodological sophistication, a care and sophistication that is not evident in most of the pieces in this collection.

The volume opens with a brief introduction by Chogyam Trungpa in which we are told that the missing element in Western psychology is "the acknowledgement of the primacy of immediate experience" (p. 7). It is nowhere made conceptually clear just what "immediate experience" is, much less how, other than by practising Buddhist meditation, Western psychologists might acknowledge its primacy. Such language is likely to do no more than contribute to the prejudice of many Western psychological theorists that Buddhism is simply a set of esoteric disciplines.

The substance of the book is divided into four sections: "Psychological Implications of Pali Buddhism" (sIx essays); "Psychological Implications of japanese Buddhism" (three essays); "Psychological Implications of San~krit Buddhism" (two essays); and "Psychological Implications of Tibetan Buddhism" (two es-says). ~

The first essay, written by Rune E.A. Johansson shortly before his death in 1981, uses the Freudian concept of the defense mechanism to explore and clarify material from the Nikiiyas concerning various types of psychological and behavioural error (dosa) and to suggest that the central Buddhist idea of iisava-


"inflow"·-can be profitably understood using a modified Freudian interpretive framework. He concludes by suggesting arice again-as previously in his Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism-that "inflation" (p. 23) might be an appropriate translation for ilsava.

George R. Elder's essay entitled "Psychological Observations on the 'Life of the Buddha'" is actually a neo-Jungian analysis of one section of the Nidanakathii, a fifth-century Sinhalese text. Throughout Elder's analysis cosmology is psychologised arid dramatic narrative of external events is personalised and internalised. His hermeneutical method seems to consist in the presupposition that every event referred to by the text which, for one reason or another, is judged by Western historians to be non-historical, must therefore be interpreted as pointing to some (more or less) profound psychological meaning. The rather distressing lack ofa clearly enunciated hermeneutic means that Elder appears to have no problem with-even to delight in-offering contradictory interpretations of the same event, and to use as a hermeneutical framework a philosophy (that of Jung) which is at many key points simply not compatible with the doctrines of the tradition which he claims to be treating.

Jan T. Ergardt offers an analysis of the concept of mind (citta) in the Majjhima Nikaya, and applies Jungian categories to the results he obtains. Ergardt's analysis of the Pali material is, on the whole, careful and thorough; it is perhaps a direct result of the profound obscurity of the Jungian conceptual framework which Ergardt uses to interpret this material that it is difficult to say exactly what his thesis is: it remains questionable whether either a Jungian therapist or a Buddhist scholar can learn anything from this piece.

Peter Masefield's study "Mind/Cosmos Maps in the Pali Nikayas" presents a powerful and persuasive plea for a re-evaluation of the significance of the links between cosmology and psychology in the Pali literature. H~ stresses that nibbana is described in cosmological terms-as a place-just as often as in psychological terms-as a state of mind-and that this is to be expected given the thought-world of India at the tirr.ie of early Buddhism. While agreeing with this major thesis, there are many points of detail upon which this reviewer would take issue with Masefield. To note just two: it's not at all clear that the formless jhiinas are consistently viewed in the Nikayas simply as modifications of the fourth jhiina of form, as Masefield states on p. 79; there is in fact considerable evidence that they-and the nirodha-samapatti to which they lead-are represented in some

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strata of the Nikiiyas as independent of the meditations of form and indeed as independently soteriologicaHy valid. Second, it is almost certainly wrong to sugesst "the existence of an atta equivalent to Upani~adic Atman"; for example, the Alagaddupamasutta suggests otherwise (see K.R. Norman's paper, "A Note on Atta in the Alagaddiipamasutta" [in Studies in Indian Philosophy, L.D. Series 84, Ahmedabad, 1981. pages 19-29] for some discussion). But these are points which cannot be discussed at length in a review. Masefield's essay is valuable simply because it re-appraises an aspect of the psychology of the Nikiiyas which is too often undervalued. Work along these lines could be pursued by a close study of the connotations of the term loka in this literature, a word whose meaning Masefield takes for granted in this paper but whose macrocosmiclmicrocosmic bivalence might actually provide further support for some of the positions he takes.

Mokusen Miyuki's essay-"The Ideational Content of the Buddha's Enlightenment as Selbstverwirklichung"-is hard to make sense of. To interpret him charitably, Miyuki seems to suggest thatJung's concepts of self-realization and individuation provide heuristically useful models for understanding the standard canonical accounts of the Buddha's enlightenment. This may be so, but it can scarcely be said that Miyuki demonstrates it in his study; instead; isolated sections of Buddhist texts are filtered by Miyuki through a fine mesh of orthodox Jungian concepts in such a way that the philosophical meaning(s) granted to the texts by the traditions in which they have their life and meaning are almost always completely obscured. To take just one example: Miyuki appears to think that the Buddha's realization of the truth of the paticca-samuppiida formula during his enlightenment is i) a numinous experience (p. 96) and ii) " ... the innate urge of the Self to realize itself' (p. 105). Such conclusions illustrate the absurdities to which the comparative method can lead when not balanced by careful historical, philological and philosophical scholarship.

The concluding piece in the section on Pali Buddhism is M.W. Padmasiri de Silva's "Emotions and Therapy: Three Paradigmatic Zones," originally presented as an inaugural lecture at the University of Peradeniya in 1981. This is a careful and illu-

. minating study of the Theravadin view of the nature of emotions and of the proper therapeutic approaches to them. De Silva contrasts the Buddhist therapeutic approach, stressing introspective attention, with the two standard "Western" approaches: the behaviouristic and psychoanalytic. Professor de


Silva handles his materials-Buddhist and Western-with care and sensitivity, and thus sheds a good deal of light on the problems inherent in any theory of the emotions, Western or Eastern.

Akihisa Kondo brings together Y ogadira psychology with the ideas of Karen Horney in his piece on "Illusion and Human Suffering"; while both Horney and the Yogacara are interesting in their own right it is not clear that either is illuminated by this study. It is also unclear why this piece is included in the section on Japanese Buddhism since the only Buddhist ideas to which the author refers are standard Indian ones.

Steven Heine ambitiously contrasts psychoanalysis, Dagen and existentialism in "The Meaning of Death in Psychoanalysis, Existential Phenomenology, and Dagen Zen." More specifically, he analyzes Freud, Heidegger, Sartre and Dagen on death in fifteen pages. Despite the brevity and necessary superficiality of his discussion, Heine's piece does benefit from its methodological sophistication and does point the way forward for further work in this area.

The section on Japanese Buddhism concludes with a revised version of Richard J. DeMartino's impressionistic study of "The Human Situation and Zen Buddhism," a piece which, according to its author, (p. 192) was first written in 1957 and appeared in print in 1960. Even in its revised form DeMartino's study now has little more than historical interest and it is difficult to see why it was chosen for inclusion in this volume.

The section on the psychological implications of "Sanskrit Buddhism" opens with a comparision of the paradigmatically Madhyamaka prasanga "therapeutic argumentation" (p. 200) and the Western "double-bind" analysis of schizophrenia. This study, by Gustavo Benavides, is so condensed that it is difficult to assess: it remains unclear to this reviewer, for example, that either Nagarjuna or the Western double-bind theorists offer any solutions to the logical/psychological problems they discuss, and still less clear that those who hold the philosophical (non)-views of the Prasangika Madhyamaka (evidently Benavides is amoung them) have any business writing about them, since to do so is merely to intensify the double-bind in which their unfortunate readers necessarily find themselves.

Stephen Kaplan offers a piece on Yogacara epistemology and holographic psychology. He analyzes the Yogacarin discussion of the perceptual process-involving the trisvabhava theory-using Karl Pribram's holographic psychology. Perceptual

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images are likened to holographic images: fabricated, without form and without location. This is how Kaplan understands the notion of parikalpita-svabhava, the nature of existents as constructed by the mind. In this study-it seems that the interpretive framework used to discuss Yogacara actually does illuminate it; the idea of a hologram is a useful tool for coming to an understanding of Yogacarin epistemology of perception. The major drawback, though, is the author's extremely cavalier treatment of some extremely problematic philosophical issues: the causal theory and the identity thesis do not exhaust the philosophical options where perception is concerned, and they are not in any case discussed with the rigour that they deserve.

The volume concludes with two pieces on the psychological implications of Tibetan Buddhism. Herbert Guenther discusses rdzogs-chen and Daseinsanalyse with his usual unfathomable profundity; enough has been written by now about Professor Guenther's translation methods and literary style to make further discussion otiose. All that need be said is that this piece, like most of Guenther's work, will speak ony to the narrow circle of his aficionados.

The volume's editor, Nathan Katz, concludes the collection with a study of the "feminine" in tantric hagiography and in Jungian psychology. Katz is clearly more aware than most of his fellow cOritributors of the problems involved in applying J ungian categories to Buddhism-or Buddhist categories to Jungian theory-and claims that he simply wants to develop dialogue between the systems rather than to undertake the interpretation of one through the categories of another (pp. 242-3). This methodological point is well taken, and Katz's careful comparison of the Jungian anima with the tantric <;lakin! embodies his method well. There do indeed appear to be profound and significant parallels between these two sets of symbols, and a full discussion of the reasons for this is one of the more profitable avenues along which cross-cultural psychological theory could beneficially proceed.

This collection, then, has its moments: perhaps the best pieces are those by Masefield, De Silva and Katz himself. But it remains unclear whether the volume makes any significant contribution to either psychological theory or the history of Buddhism; even the groundwork in this field has not yet been done.

Paul Griffiths


A Lamp for the Path and Commentary, by Atisa, translated and annotated by Richard Sherburne, S.]. London and Boston: AI-' len & Unwin, 1983. Foreword by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Introduction, Translation of Root Text, Translation of Commentary, Appendices, Glossary, Bibliography, Index xiii + 226 pages.

Dr. Sherburne's translation of Atisa's famous Bodhipathapradipa (BPP) and its autocommentary is certainly a welcome addition to the field of Buddhist studies in general, and to the study of Tibet's lam rim literature in particular.

It is obvious from Atisa's own remarks that even by his time the extent and complexity of Mahayana exegesis was becoming too vast for the ordinary monk or lay practitioner. That there was a great need for a short synthetic work like the BPP is evident from its immediate popularity (both in Tibet and in India). Its success came from the fact that it presented in a systematic and concise way the most important and relevant points of Mahayana doctrine, in a format suitable for practice. At the same time, it avoided the kind of extensive dialectics that were all too popular at the time. In fact, Atisa mentions repeatedly that the time has come to concentrate, not on logic, but on the guru's advice:

So throwaway your texts on argumentation Which make inference supreme And cultiv.ate the (Guru-) tradition's counsel (p. 145)

Hence, the work can be seen as a practical guide to the Mahayana, and the fact that it was held in very high esteem is attested by the hundreds of texts for which it served as a model and inspiration. The BPP spawned one of the largest and most pervasive genres of native Tibetan literature, the lam rim (Stages of the Path). It is in fact the inspiration for Tsong kha pa's Lam rim chen mo (The Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path), an amazing synthetic work which is itself the source and inspiration of hundreds of other smaller works, even to this day. Hence, the appearance of the BPP with its Commentary in Dr. Sherburne's English translation is a truly important and key step toward the understanding of the lam rim literature as a whole.

Dr. Sherburrie's translation is on the whole quite accurate and very readable. There are a few points however with which I take exception. His translation in verse 5 of the lines:

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Rang rgyud gtogs pa'i sdug bsngal gyis gang zhig gzhan gyi sdug bsngal kun yang dag zad par kun nas 'dod

"reads:

One who wholly seeks a complete end To the suffering of others because . Their suffering belongs to his own (conscious) stream.

225

The last line of the translation can be misleading. It is not that the being of highest scope (being described here) actually takes the suffering of others into his own mind-stream, but that he empathizes with their suffering (and desires its elimination) "because of the suffering which he himself experiences," which is to say that realizing that all beings suffer as he/she does, the bodhisattva seeks an end to all suffering in a way that disregards the poundary of self and other.

The terminology in the translation might also be more standardized. For example, on pp. 27-28 we see use of both the words "worship of" ("worship of body-offerings," "worship of faith," "worship of praise") and the words "worship with" ("worship with ordinary things," "worship with pleasing objects"). But it must be remembered that the particle gyi has more usages than merely "possession." In this particular case, the translation "worship of" is misleading; after all it is not body offerings, faith or praise that are being worshipped. Instead, it is the Buddha who is being worshipped with these. It seems that Dr. Sherburne in fact realizes this point (he uses with in a number of cases, as stated above). One might have wished that the translation consistently read "worship with," however.

Dr. Sherburne's annotations do an excellent job of identifying almost all of the works and passages cited. They however are almost exclusively just that,providing little elucidation of sometimes obscure passages. Since even the Commentary is quite terse, however, this might easily have made the annotations more extensive than the text. Hence, Dr. Sherburne's approach is understandable.

Finally, let me bring up a few doctrinal points on whose interpretation I must disagree. Dr. Sherburne states that the tathagatagarbha ("Buddha-nature") "would be rejected by strict Madhyamika as holding to a position of reality" (p. 81). Granted that the Madhyamikas do not accept a Cittamatra interpretation


of the theory of "Buddha-nature." Nonetheless, both Prasangikas and Svatantrikas have a very developed and extensive literature expounding their own theory of the tathagatagarbha. In fact, one of the main Indian works on the subject, Asanga's commentary to the Uttaratantra, is held by many scholars to be a Prasangika work.

Dr. Sherburne devotes extensive notes to the subject of NirvaI;1a (p. 156 and p. 198) but his explanations do not correlate with any that I have seen in my own study of the Tibetan commentaries of the Abhisamyalankara and Sputartha (where the topic of NirvaI)a is discussed at the very outset). For example, Dr. Sherburne seems to indicate that "NirvaI)a with remainder" belongs to the sravaka, that "NirvaI)a without remainder" belongs to the pratyekabuddha and that "Non-abiding Nirval}.a" (or, in his terminology, "deferred NirvaI).a") belongs to the bodhisattva. Instead, texts like Tsong kha pa's gSer phreng and Rong ston pa's Tzka are quite clear: "Nirvana with remainder" and "Nirvana without remainder" can both belong either to sravakas or to pratyekabuddhas. In the former, the Arhant still possesses his five skandhas, which remain because of karma accumulated previous to his attainment of Arhantship. In the latter, the Arhant has exhausted this karma, his body has died. "Non-abiding NirvaI)a," they state, exlusively refers to Buddhahood itself.

Be that as it may, since these doctrinal points do not directly bear on the text, they do not detract from Dr. Sherburne's chief task, the translation of this very important work. All in all, supplemented with two very useful appendices on the system of initiations, and an excellent glossary and bibliography, Dr. Sherburne's translation must be recognized both as a schol~rly rigorous work and, as was the original in eleventh century Tibet, a superb introduction to the Mahayana for the novice.

Jose 1. Cabez6n

Religious Festivals in South India and Sri Lanka (Studies on Religion in South India and Sri Lanka, Vol. 1) Edited and prefaced by Guy R. Welbon and Glenn E. Yocum. New Delhi: Manohar 1982, pp. xi-341, including Index.

Some readers will be disappointed in the treatment given Hindu festivals by the 12 authors whose papers are contained in

REVIEWS 227

this·volume. Those who have witnessed South Indian festivals will catch only occasional glimpses of the grand ritual performances and the milling crowds they surely associate with their experience. A majority of the papers are written by historians of religion a:~d reflect a perspective on religion which is quite different from the exoteric meaning and experience of the crowd. True to their profession, these'researchers turn to texts and learned priestly informants whose apprehension and comprehension of what is going on at a festival can be remarkably different than that of the other participants. Another source of disappointment lies in the fact that the papers were written and presented over a decade ago, at the 1971 meeting of the workshop of the Conference on Religion on South India. Thus, even the anthropological papers miss the sense of "anti-structure" that social anthropologist and theorist Victor Turner, writing in the 1970's, has suggested characterizes such festivities.

The twelve papers in the collection can be roughly divided into two groups: those which deal with the prescriptive, textual aspects of a festival, and those which take a more descriptive stance, viewing the festival as an on-going performance. In the former group are two papers which concentrate on calendrical aspects. of festival cycles and three papers on temple conventions (iigama texts) spt::cifying rituals appropriate for certain dates and commemorations. In the latter group of more descriptive papers there are papers which discuss the relationships between myth (or text) and theatrical and artistic modes of expression as these combine to create a festival drama. Also in this category are three papers which explore the relationships of festival and society.

The papers themselves tend to be rather technical. The one common theme running through all the papers is the importance of the chronometric cyclicality of festivals. The first paper, Karen L. Merrey's "The Hindu Festival Calendar," provides an excellent introduction, as well as background reference, to this theme. It is a detailed account of both the solar and lunar calendrical systems. Fred Clothey's paper, "Chronometry, Cosmology and the Festival Calendar in the Murukan Cult," tries to demon-

. strate that the festival calendar integrates cosmic and ecological time as well as the sequence in a god's career, which he calls commemorative time. The three papers emphasizing the agamic conventions of specific groups of temples-H. Daniel Smith's "Festivals in the Pancaratra Literature," James Martin's "The Cycle of Festivals at Parthasarathi Temple," (both on Vaiglava systems) and J. Bruce Long's "Mahasivaratri: The Saiva Festival


of Repentance"-describe how particular rituals are allocated to the calendrical cycle. The number of such rituals is impressive; for the Parthasarathi temple there were "festivals" on 345 days in a year, and in other temples, Martin says, the figure is much higher. One question raised by such a high figure is what is meant by "festival" in this context; if all of these are equally "festivals" for the Brahman officiates, why are only some of these occasions considered "festivals" by the rest of society?

The more descriptive papers tend also to be more eclectic. Guy Welbon's paper "The CaJ;.Qala's Song" concentrates on a ritual enactment of a text in which an untouchable pilgrim is confronted by a demon (brahmariikshasa) before and after gaining merit from his pilgrimage. The drama, only a small part of the festival, and not even witnessed by the temple higher-ups, is nonetheless quintessential of what many temple festivals are all about, the public reenactment of a ritual drama. Clifford R. Jones' "Ka!am E!uttu: Art and Ritual in Kerala" is about similar sorts of drama in which, additionally, elaborate colored powder drawings are made. His analysis concerns the history of the artistic conventions of the drawing, but also suggests a vast realm of further study to be done on the dramatic aspects of these rituals. Glenn E. Yocum's "An-ke!iya: A Literary-Historical Approach" demonstrates the value of comparative study of the relationship between mythic narrative and ritual enactment. He brings to bear a wealth of tradition from around Sri Lanka and throughout Tamil Nadu on a Sinhalese game played in honor of Pattini, the goddess of both fertility and smallpox.

Suzanne Hanchett's paper, "The Festive Interlude: Some Anthropological Observations," Jane M. Christian's paper, "The End is the Beginning: A Festival Chain in Andhra Pradesh," and Donald K. Swearer's paper, "The Kataragama and Kandy Asa!a Peraharas: Juxtaposing Religious Elements in Sri Lanka," all emphasize that many aspects of festivals belong to the community. While Hanchett's paper stresses that festivals are composed of elements which are continually negotiated by different factions of the community, Christian's paper emphasizes how the multiplicity of meanings in festival events represent different social contingents. Swearer characterizes Sri Lankan festivals as national religious celebrations wherein both Buddhism and Hinduism are subsumed in a broader sense of community spirit.

One paper, Dennis Hudson's "Two Citra Festivals in Madurai," stands above the rest in being able to bring all of these aspects of festival together. Through myth and ritual, esoteric

REVIEWS 229

doctrine and popular lore, textual authority and modern practice, Vai~Q.ava and Saiva traditions are wedded-literally-in a grand pageant: the marriage of Siva to Vi~Q.u's sister, MInak~I. Hudson suggests that this was accomplished historically when the Telugu king Tirumala Nayaka merged two temple traditions into a common myth to elicit the loyalty of certain segments of society after the fall of Vijayanagar. Thus, despite the calendrical cyclicity and a wealth of temple convention-indeed, by cl"ever use of the illusion of these elements-festivals are at once things in time and out of it, reflective of both past structure, immediate structure and cosmic structure, as well as "anti-structure," the structure of rebellion against petrified conventions.

Peter Claus

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III. NOTES AND NEWS

7th Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

We are pleased to announce that the 7th Conference of the lABS will be held at Centro San Domenico, Bologna, Italy, July 8-13, 1985, under the auspices of the University of Bologna and numerous sponsoring Italian Cultural Institutions.

The Honorary President for the Conference is Professor Oscar Botto (University of Torino, Italy); the President is Professor Andre Bareau (College de France, Paris, France); the Chairperson of the Organizing Committee is Professor Luigi Heilmann (University of Bologna, Italy); and the Local Secretary for the Conference is Professor Amalia Pezzali (University of Bologna, Italy).- .

Arrival of the participants will be on the afternoon of Sunday, the 7th of July, and departure will be on the morning of Sunday, the 14th of July. An application form for hotel accommodations will be included in the 2nd circular. It will also be possible to have University College accommodations.

Participants from abroad are requested to pay the registration fees in US Dollars. Before April 30, 1985 the fee will be US$150· per person. After May 1, 1985, the fee will be US$200 per person. Italian participants are requested to pay the corresponding amount, respecting the same dates, in Italian Lira. Registration fees cannot be refunded. A fifty percent discount will be allowed for students who are able to produce documentation from their professors on their scholarly ability.

The following sessions will be included in the 7th Conference: Ancient Indian Buddhism, Mahayana Buddhism, Late Indian Buddhism, Sri Lanka and South-East Asian Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism, Japanese and Korean Buddhism. There will be panels on special topics such as: Buddhist Art, Iconography, Archaeology, Anthropology, Logic and Epistemology, Bibliography, Current religious trends, and others according to th.e proposals of participants. Four morning plenary sessions are also scheduled.

230

NOTES AND NEWS 231

Anyone who wishes to present a paper is requested to send an abstract of not more than 300 words to the Local Secretary by the end of March, 1985.

The Proceedings of the Conference will be published by the Organizing Committee. The price of the Proceedings is included in the registration fee.

A visit to Ravenna and Bologna is offered to the 'participants by the Organizing Committee and all the sponsors.!

The registration form may be obtained from the Local Secretary, Professor Amalia Pezzali, Via Bertini 4,40127 Bologna, Italy.

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L.M. Joshi: a Brief Communication

I write this short communication while still reverberating with the shock and sorrow at the death of our mutual friend, Lalmani Joshi. His untimely departure is an immeasurable loss to us all, not only personally but also professionally.

As many of you may know, he had just returned to India after three years of visiting professorships at Amherst and Haverford Colleges. He was in a very happy frame of mind in that he was going to take up a very distinguished newly created Chair Of Buddhist Studies affiliated with the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies at Saranath. This chair had been created especially for him by the Government of India's Ministry of Education, in view of the central contribution he could make from that vantage to Indian scholarship's systematic recovery of many of its greatest "Shastric" treasures from the great Tibetan language storehouse, the bsTan-'gyur. This wise and creative move by the Ministry was tragically frustrated by Lalmani's sudden death.

Lalmani's last work of this life was to return to Patiala in June to pay his farewells to the University and Center of Religious Studies where he had spent so many productive years. He also packed up his extensive Buddhist Studies library, perhaps the best such library in India. He shipped the many crates of these books to Saranath, went to Delhi to join his family, and suffered the intestinal attack that proved fatal before ever reaching Saranath. I would like to know how many of you feel as I do that we should all join in an effort to establish a fund that could purchase his library from his bereaved family and establish the collection in a memorial building or room at the Central Institute.in Saranath. I think it would be the best way to fulfill his intention and carryon his own life's work. It could be connected with our international effort to support the Gal Ministry of Education in maintaining the chair they had established, naming it after Lalmani, and filling it with another scholar who would continue in such a direction of research, translation, and publication.

I have not at this stage thought through the mechanics of collection, negotiation with the Gal Ministry and with the Central Institute, and with Mrs. Joshi, so it is too early to begin contributing just yet. But I would like at this time to know what support there is for the idea and what suggestions for its execution.

Robert A. F, Thurman

232

I.A.B.S., INC. TREASURER'S REPORT (8/6/83-8/6/84)

CURRENT ASSETS:

Checking· Business Savings 91 Day CD 30 Mo. CD

Income: (All sources) Dues, contributions, ads,

subscriptions* Reimbursements 1

Interest

On hand 8/2/83

Total Funds

Expenses:

Balance as of 8/6/842

CURRENT LIABILITIES:3

JIABS, VII, #1 Ries Graphics 3,500.00 Thomson-Shore 2,500.00

Expenses:

JIABS, VI, #1, 2 Ries Graphics 6,304.77 Thomson-Shore 4,079.47 Copyrights 20.00

IUOAS '83 Dues 50.00

VI CIABS Travel Power 1,992.78 R. Haggarty3 100.00 Telephones 24.95

233

1,925.93 523.83

2,759.85 1,019.83

$6,231.92

10,716.56

8,825.53 1,366.38

524.65 $10,716.56

9,520.85

$20,237.41

14,005.49

10,404.24

2,117.73

$ 6,231.92

$ 6,231.92

$ 6,000.00

$14,005.49


South Asian Dept. Wp Training Stationery,

postage Offprint mail Journal mail Duplicating

Academia Books

Miscellaneous

50.00

625.00 70.16

·377.97 30.00

80.00

(Bank charges, postage, petty cash, . typewriter repairs, etc.)

1,153.13

200.39

EXPLANATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS

$14,005.49

Reimbursements: the bulk of these reimbursements represent conversion from excess yen grants or funds into dollars, and repayment to the treasury ($194.80 by BDM, and $71.58 by RH). Dr. Upasak, to whom we had sent a check for $1100.00 representing UNESCO's grant, returned that check and was paid, instead, from the funds being collected at the Vlth CIABS - primarily in yen.

2 This balance does not include the yen funds collected by Dr. Yuyama and not yet forwarded to the treasurer of the lABS.

3 Please .note that the difference between our current liabilities and our current assets is so miniscule as to be very troublesome.

* This total includes the contributions of $200.00 (to the JIABS by the Rev. Chang Sheng-yen) and $5.00 by Prof. S. Ichimura. Also a journal ad (1;2 page) by Brian Galloway, and the ad in v. VI, #1 placed by Chemical and Allied Products Export Promotion Council of Calcutta.

** We still have some members whose payments worked out to some fraction of their dues for later years. We now charge $20.00 for all back membership (back subscription) fees.

TREASURER'S REPORT 235

TREASURER'S REPORT SUPPLEMENT

MEMBERSHIP PAYMENT DISTRIBUTION (Excluding Life and Founder Members - 30)

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 FULL 103** 200** 48** 7 ** 1 SUBSID. 11 28 6 2 STUDENT 4 4 2 INST. 12 39 18 SUBS. 3 6 30 1

The treasurer wishes to express the gratitude of the following recipients of the Japan Society for Promotion of Sciences sub-vention:

Prof. AL. Basham Drs. Robert and Beatrice Miller Prof. A K. N arain Prof. A Pezzali

and Rena Haggarty

yen 150,000 250,000 150,000

150,00

100,000

OBITUARY

John Brough (1917-1984) ,I

Friends and colleagues of Dr. John Brough, the late Professor of Sanskrit at the Universities of London and Cambridge, mourn the passinK of one of the most eminent scholars of our generation. Brough's interests were wide-ranging, and his contributions covered a broad expanse of fields, from Sanskrit literature, Indian linguistics and Nepalese folk tales, to Central Asian history and Chinese Buddhist texts.

Early in his career, Brough made his mark in Indian and Sanskrit literature with the publication of such pioneering articles as "Legends of Khotan and Nepal" (BSOAS 12 [1948]), and his primer, Selections from Classical Sanskrit Literature (London: Luzac and Co., 1951). Branching out into still more technical areas of Sanskrit, Brough examined Indian philosophy of language in the light of modern linguistic theory in such pioneering articles as "Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians" (Transactions of the Philological Society, 1951) and "Some Indian Theories of Meaning" (TPS, 1953); in recognition of their status as classics in the field, Fritz Staal reprinted both in his A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1972). Brough also brought Tibetan and Chinese materials to bear on treatments of questions in Sanskrit and Buddhist studies. In one of his most well known articles, "Thus Have I Heard ... " (BSOAS 13 [1950]), Brough challenged this most sancrosanct translation of the opening line of Buddhist siitras, proposing instead the translation, "Thus have I heard at one time," following the Tibetan punctuation.

Brough also became known as a specialist in Prakrit dialectology, and especially in GandharI Prakrit. In "The Language of the Buddhist Sanskrit Texts" (BSOAS 16-2 [1954]), his review of Franklin Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, Brough warned of the danger of treating Nepalese orthographic idiosyncracies as authentic dialectical forms of Buddhist Sanskrit. Perhaps Brough's singularly most important contribution to Buddhist studies and Indology was his

236

OBITUARY 237

monumental The Gandharf Dharmapada (London: Oxford University Press, 1962). His masterful edition of the Central Asian fragments of this important text, with detailed notes on the Pali and Prakrit parallels, provided definitive evidence concerning the phonetic and semantic features of the GandharI language.

In later years, Brough turned to Chinese sources with ever greater frequency. In his "Comments on Third-Century Shanshan and the History of Buddhism" (BSOAS 28 [1965]), Brough drew upon Chinese and Kharo~thl evidence to detail the importance of Northwest India, and especially Gandhara, in the transmission of Buddhism to central and east Asia. Brough's writing frequently displayed the acerbic wit and dry humor for which he was so well known in person, making his articles provocative and entertaining, as well as informative. In his "The Chinese Pseudo-Translation of Arya-siira's Jatakamala" (Asia Major 11 [1964-5]), for example, Brough waggishly examined the ludicrous attempt of two Sung-dynasty Chinese translators, who knew no Sanskrit grammar and only a few Sanskrit words, to render Arya-siira's ornate kavya into their native language, and the disastrous results ensuing therefrom. Returning to one of his earlier loves, Brough examined references in Chinese materials to earlier Sanskrit grammarians in his "I-ching on the Sanskrit Grammarians" (BSOAS 36 [1973]). Late in his career, Brough used Chinese renderings of Buddhist texts to ferret out the underlying Prakrit forms as, for example, in his "Buddhist Chinese Etymological Notes" (BSOAS 38 [1975]), and "The Arapacana Syllabary in the Old Lalita-vistara" (BSOAS 40 [1977]).

I had the privilege of being Professor Brough's student and, later, colleague at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and benefitted greatly from his extraordinary range of knowledge in Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit, Tibetan, and Chinese. He was extremely generous in providing the younger scholars whose work he supervised with copious notes and comments on their research. In so doing, he offered them ever-new critical insight into the vast area of Oriental studies and was himself a paragon of the cross-cultural, multilanguage orientation so necessary for serious work in the field. The world of Buddhist and Indological scholarship has lost a


truly eminent scholar and conscientious teacher; his contributions, however, will continue to inspire new generations of students long after his passing.

Padmanabh S. J aini

Professor Rod Bucknell

Studies in Religion

The University of Queensland

St. Lucia, Queensland

AUSTRALIA

Mr. Jose 1. Cabez6n

SeraJe Monastery, House 32

P.O. Bylakuppe

Distt. Mysore

Karnataka

INDIA

Professor Peter Claus

Dept. of Anthropology

University of California

Berkeley, CA 94720

Professor Richard Gombrich

The Oriental Institute

The University of Oxford

Pusey Lane

Oxford, OXI 2LE

ENGLAND

Professor Paul J. Griffiths

Dept. of South Asian Languages

and Civilizations

Foster Hall, East 59th St.

University of Chicago

Chicago, IL 60637

Dr. Peter Harvey

Poplar Cottage

Nevilles Cross Bank

Durham City

Durham DHI 4JN

ENGLAND

Professor Jeffrey Hopkins

Dept. of Religious Studies

Cocke Hall

University of Virginia

Charlottesville, VA 22903

CONTRIBUTORS

Professor Roger Jackson

Dept. of Far Eastern Languages

and Literature

3070 Frieze Building

University of Michigan

Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Professor Padmanabh S. Jaini

Dept. of South and Southeast Asian Studies

University of California

Berkeley, CA 94720

Mr. Y. Krishan

C 11155 Dr. Zakir Hussain Marg

Bapa Nagar

New Delhi 110 003

INDIA

Dr. Luciano Petech

Via Corvisieri 4

00162 Roma

ITALY

Professor David Pollack

Dept .. of Foreign Languages, Literatures

and Linguistics

University of Rochester

Rochester, NY 14627 .

Professor Telwatte Rahula

Dept. of Comparative Religion

McGill University

Montreal

CANADA

Professor Robert A.F. Thurman

Dept. of Philosophy and Religion

Amherst College

Amherst, MA 01002

Dr. Ah-Yueh Yeh

62-5, Chang-shing St.

Taipei

TAIWAN

239

JIABS 7-2

Documents

sammavimuttiright liberation

buddhist path

sammasankapparight aspiration

sammaajivaright livelihood

sammavacaright speech

sammakammantaright action

sammanaljaright insight

sammavayamaright effort