JCMS- Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 49 Issue 2 2011 [Doi 10.1111%2Fj.1468-5965.2010.02144.x] ANA E. JUNCOS -- Europeanization by Decree the Case of Police Reform in Bosnia

7/30/2019 JCMS- Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 49 Issue 2 2011 [Doi 10.1111%2Fj.1468-5965.2010.02144.x] A…

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/jcms-journal-of-common-market-studies-volume-49-issue-2-2011-doi-1011112fj1468-596520100… 1/23

Europeanization by Decree? The Case of PoliceReform in Bosnia* jcms_2144 367..390

ANA E. JUNCOS

University of Bristol

Abstract

Police reform demonstrated the fragility of the transition process in Bosnia and the

limitations of the prospect of European Union membership. To the two mechanisms

of conditionality and socialization commonly mentioned in the Europeanization

literature, this article adds a third – external imposition – which is specific to the case

of Bosnia. The fact that the High Representative resorted to coercive measures in

order to implement European conditions needs to be accounted for in any explanation

of Bosnia’s Europeanization. In the case of police restructuring, conditionality was

monopolized by the High Representative and socialization did not take place because

the reforms were not perceived as legitimate by at least one of the parties. Domestic

factors, including the complex governance system introduced by the Dayton Agree-ment and recalcitrant nationalist elites, also hindered the Europeanization process in

Bosnia.

Introduction

Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) has lagged behindthe expectations of international officials and European Union (EU)

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the workshop ‘Values vs Security? The Future Choicefor the EU and its Neighbours’, Maastricht University, 5–6 June 2008. The author would like to express hergratitude to the participants of this workshop, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Dave Allen, Alex Prichard and theanonymous referees for their invaluable comments. She would also like to thank several EU officials fortheir time and assistance during her fieldwork. For reasons of confidentiality, their names and institutionalaffiliations are not mentioned in the article. Responsibility for any errors and omissions lies with the authoralone.

JCMS 2011 Volume 49. Number 2. pp. 367–389

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02144.x

© 2011 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 MainStreet, Malden, MA 02148, USA



policy-makers for almost a decade. The high hopes of 2003, when the Fea-

sibility Study was published, have been dashed by the slow pace of reform inthe country, particularly regarding police and constitutional reform. After theresurgence of strong nationalist discourse from the ethnic parties, the currentsituation in Bosnia is not encouraging. More than 15 years after the end of thewar, the country is still a long way from being a functioning state. In October2008, former High Representative Paddy Ashdown and former United Statesnegotiator Richard Holbrooke warned of Bosnia being at the brink of col-lapse. They even went on to accuse the EU of not having a coherent strategyand ‘proclaiming progress where it [had] not been achieved’, which weak-ened both the EU’s influence in the country and the influence of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) (Ashdown and Holbrooke, 2008). Similarcriticisms followed the failure of the EU-sponsored constitutional talks, theso-called ‘Butmir Process’, in the autumn of 2009 (Whitman and Juncos,2010, p. 191).

The EU’s efforts to promote police restructuring in Bosnia constitute anexcellent case to test the power and limitations of the incentive of EUmembership for candidate countries and to examine the Europeanization

process in Bosnia. The failure to promote police reform in Bosnia can beexplained by reference to the EU’s strategy (conditions, rewards, credibilityand legitimacy) and domestic obstacles to compliance with EU conditionality.Portrayed as one among other ‘technical’ reforms to be undertaken by thecountry before the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement(SAA), police reform proved more of a political issue than previouslyacknowledged by the European Commission. Analysing police reform showsthe inherent difficulties in promoting reforms in areas that touch upon coreattributes of state sovereignty. Police reform placed high domestic political

costs on Bosnian Serb elites as it threatened the very survival of RepublikaSrpska.

The article begins with an overview of the political system that emergedafter the war and its implications for EU conditionality. It then goes on todiscuss two models in the general literature that seek to explain compliancewith EU norms and rules: conditionality and socialization, and the conditionsunder which they can operate, such as timing, rewards, credibility and so on.To these two mechanisms, this article adds a third – external imposition –

which is specific to the case of Bosnia since here the High Representative hasthe power to impose legislation and remove Bosnian officials from publicoffice. The ensuing section sketches the process of police reform in Bosniaand efforts by the international community to impose a single and centralizedpolice structure. It then assesses what role each of the three mechanisms(external imposition, conditionality and socialization) played in the process

368 ANA E. JUNCOS

© 2011 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd



of reform of the Bosnian police forces. As will be shown, the High Repre-

sentative led the reform process and persuaded the Commission and otherEU actors to support what were very strict conditions. Conditionality was notsuccessful because rewards were perceived as weak and distant, while theadoption costs for the domestic illiberal elites were extremely high. More-over, the credibility of the EU was undermined by inconsistencies in the EU’sdiscourse and its inflexible conditions. Socialization was also unsuccessful asthere was no time for persuasion and attempts to frame the reform in termsof ‘European standards’ failed. Last, but by no means least, domestic factorsalso contributed to the EU’s failure in Bosnia. The consociational modelestablished by the Dayton Agreement with its multiple veto points, as well asrecalcitrant nationalist elites, hindered EU-led reforms in the country.

I. Europeanization: The Case of Bosnia

Arguably, the process of the Europeanization of Bosnia is rather differentfrom the one which took place in the central and eastern European countriesfor several reasons. Like other former communist countries, Bosnia had to

overcome a ‘triple transition’ process (Offe, 1991, p. 871): the first transform-ing statehood and nationhood after the dissolution of the Yugoslav FederalRepublic; a second from communism to liberal democracy; and a third froma planned socialist economy to a free market. However, in the case of Bosnia,one could add a quadruple transition: from war to peace. The latter aspectmakes this process a very difficult one since national reconciliation andconsensus among the local parties are still extremely fragile. The extensiveintervention of the international community, with the High Representative atits fore, also constitutes a particular feature that distinguishes Bosnia fromany other EU candidates. The complexity of the governance structure and thenumber of veto players makes its ‘return to Europe’ ever more difficult. Witha very weak central government, the real power lies at the Entity level: theSerbian majority Republika Srpska and the Muslim–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lack of consensus among the ethnic groups thatfought the 1992–95 war explains the extreme decentralization of this power-sharing model sanctioned by the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995). Integrationinto the EU represents one of the few issues where there is an agreement

among all the political parties; the question of how to actually get there is,however, more problematic.1

1 As far as the population is concerned, in March 2008, 79.9 per cent of the Bosnian population supportedEU integration (UNDP Bosnia, 2008, p. 18).

EUROPEANIZATION BY DECREE? 369




Although the Dayton Agreement ended one of the most violent conflicts

Europe has seen in the 20th century, it did so by sanctioning the ethniccleansing that had taken place during the war, with the creation of twoethnic-based Entities. The Dayton Peace Agreement was designed as thelesser evil, with the hope that one day it would serve to overcome actualpartition on the ground. Bosnian Serbs (and to a certain extent, Croats) agreedto Dayton because of the high degree of decentralization offered by the plan,which effectively recognized a state (the Republika Srpska) within anotherstate, plus the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The internationalcommunity hoped that nationalist politics would progressively fade away andthat a more ‘western-style’ party system would develop to replace them.However, 15 years later, political life in Bosnia is essentially led by the samenationalist elites that were responsible for the war and ethnic politics stilldominate political competition. The last local elections in October 2008confirmed this fact ( Euroactiv, 2008).

For the ruling nationalist elites, EU integration imposes high adoptioncosts because it undermines their power base, entirely built on ethnic identity.Any move towards a more centralized system is seen as a threat by Bosnia

Serbs and Croats who would be outnumbered by Bosniaks at the state level.While these illiberal nationalist elites remain in control of the nationalparliament, compliance with EU conditionality will remain limited, asdemonstrated by previous research on central and eastern Europeancountries (see Kelley, 2004; Vachudova, 2005).

Another consequence of the Dayton Agreement was the establishment of a highly decentralized (and dysfunctional) state, based on the principles of power-sharing. According to this consociational model, each ethnic group isrepresented within the legislative and executive institutions at the state level

and retains a veto power (Lijphart, 1977). Although this model ensures peacein the short term, it makes functional governance very difficult as any ethnicgroup can oppose decisions that threaten their vital interests. Only continuedintervention by the international community, supported by a strong militaryforce and the OHR, has brought about some institutional reforms in a contextof domestic political impasse. Some progress has been made with the estab-lishment of a common currency and a central bank, a common customssystem, a state border agency, the reform of the judiciary, intelligence and

defence, and the establishment of several other state institutions. However,these reforms have been a time-consuming process and the result of stronginternational pressure, and have come at the price of reducing local ownershipand responsibility. In sum, today the Dayton Agreement seems outdated; itsshortcomings affect the daily functioning of the state, and they generateenormous expenditure.

370 ANA E. JUNCOS




When it comes to EU integration, Bosnia suffers from the same problems

as other Western Balkan countries: the legacies of war and ethnic conflict,high levels of corruption and organized crime. However, the specific con-sociational model makes European integration a more complex process inBosnia because of the number of veto players. The EU not only has tonegotiate with the state-level government, but also with the three ‘constituentpeoples’. The weakness of state institutions also raises problems in terms of the effective implementation of policies.

The Commission has expressed concerns about these problems in severalreports and has insisted that Bosnia should become a self-sustaining state, ‘foronly with self-sustaining states (not Entities or local authorities) can the EUconduct negotiations or sustain contractual bilateral relations’ (Commission,2002, pp. 3–4). Although this might implicitly suggest a preference for a morecentralized state, the Commission’s reports have not put forward any specificmodel for Bosnia, apart from periodic references to the need for ‘morefunctional and affordable State structures which support the process of European integration’ and constitutional reform (Commission, 2008a, p. 8;see also 2009a, p. 29). The process of constitutional reform has, however,

stagnated after the failure of constitutional talks at the end of 2009. Widedisagreements remain among the main ethnic parties as to what kind of stateBosnia needs. While Bosnian Serbs would like to see minimal centralizationand ensure the autonomy of Republika Srpska, for Bosniaks the goalwould be to establish a unitary single state, with Bosnian Croats favouring athree-Entity state model.

II. Explaining Europeanization: Mechanisms, Conditions and Actors

The aim of the article is to test claims made in studies of Europeanization inrelation to the mechanisms that explain compliance and adaptation in candi-date countries. These claims will be examined in relation to the case of policereform in Bosnia.2 There are two main models, themselves not mutuallyexclusive, that have been devised in order to explain the way in which the EUexercises influence on candidate countries in the process of the adoption of EU policies: conditionality and socialization (Checkel, 2001; Noutcheva,2007; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005). The litera-

ture on Europeanization and conflict resolution has also identified similar

2 There are many definitions of the term ‘Europeanization’ in the literature, not all of them compatible.Given the early stages of the process in Bosnia, here ‘Europeanization’ is understood as a top-down processreferring to ‘domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership’(Featherstone, 2003, p. 7).





mechanisms accounting for the EU’s role in the promotion of peace in its

neighbourhood (Noutcheva et al., 2004; Tocci, 2007). Let us discuss thesetwo mechanisms in more detail.

From a rationalist perspective, conditionality appears as the main mecha-nism facilitating the adoption of the acquis communautaire. It follows a logicof consequences (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 162). According to Judith Kelley(2004, p. 37), conditionality is ‘the use of positive incentives to alter a state’sbehaviour’. Compliance by candidate countries results from a cost–benefitcalculus: the rewards expected from complying with the EU conditions(i.e., EU membership) are perceived as outweighing the cost of compliance.This literature also demonstrates the impact of conditionality on the equilib-rium between different domestic actors. EU conditionality might empowercertain domestic actors, thus increasing their bargaining power by offeringthem resources or legitimacy (Risse et al., 2001).

According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005, pp. 12–17),different factors help explain the actual impact of conditionality. First,the more determinate the conditions, the more likely rule adoption wouldbe. Second, rule adoption will also increase with the size and speed of

the rewards. Third, EU threats and rewards must be credible in order forconditionality to work. Consistency of EU policies across candidate coun-tries and internal consensus among EU actors seem to be crucial elementsin this regard. In the case of cross-conditionality (conditionality from otherinternational actors), consistency with EU criteria will also increase thelikelihood of rule adoption. Finally, the size of adoption costs and thenumber of veto players at the domestic level also help explain the power of conditionality.

How does conditionality work in practice? In the process of enlargement,

the EU sets the conditions that the countries need to fulfil in order to becomeEU members. The power of conditionality is based on the ‘asymmetricalinterdependence’ between the EU and the candidate countries – that is, thedegree of dependence of the candidate countries on the EU for their economicsurvival (Vachudova, 2005). EU institutions acting as gatekeepers decidewhen those countries have fulfilled these criteria and whether they are readyto move to the next stage (Grabbe, 2001, p. 1020). The process of enlargementtakes place following the benchmarks set by the Commission in different

documents – in the case of the Western Balkans, the Annual Reports of theStabilization and Association Process and the European Partnerships. Com-pliance is also monitored in the regular reports produced by the Commission.This monitoring means that the enlargement process follows a merit-basedapproach (Vachudova, 2005, pp. 112–13); yet, political considerations havealso played a part in this process.

372 ANA E. JUNCOS




Socialization or social learning, the second main model in the literature,

has been used as an alternative or complementary model to explain rulecompliance. It follows a logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 2001). In theabsence of material incentives, actors internalize EU rules and norms becausethey perceive them as appropriate and legitimate. Socialization takes placethrough arguing and persuasion and might lead in the long term to changesin interests and identities. Participation in common institutions, such as EUcandidate countries meetings, might facilitate socialization processes,although socialization often remains circumscribed to domestic elites anddoes not involve larger sections of the population, especially in the pre-accession phase. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005, pp. 18–20) identifythree factors that encroach upon the EU’s persuasive power: the legitimacy of the rules, the identification of the candidate country with the EU and domesticresonance (i.e., whether EU norms are compatible or ‘fit’ with domesticrules).3 While socialization and internalization of EU rules are long-termprocesses, one can expect that they will lead to genuine compliance. Condi-tionality, especially if it is seen as an imposed and illegitimate demand, mightlead to behavioural compliance, but might raise issues of sustainability of the

reforms in the medium and long term.However, conditionality and socialization might not be sufficient to explain

compliance with EU conditions in the case of Bosnia. Because of its status asa semi-protectorate, direct external imposition needs to be accounted for in theprocess of Europeanization of Bosnia – at least for as long as the post of HighRepresentative is maintained. In the case of central and eastern Europeancountries, the power of attraction of the EU and conditionality can be seen asthe main factors explaining adaptational pressures during the pre-accessionperiod, combined with different degrees of socialization and learning. While

highly coercive, EU conditionality can only to a certain extent push reforms incandidate countries. This was the case in central and eastern Europe wheresome illiberal government elites such as the Slovak government of VladimirMeciar refused to adopt EU reforms. These countries ultimately retain theirnational sovereignty and it is up to them to adopt and implement the reformsadvocated by the EU. In Bosnia, the High Representative through the Bonnpowers can impose legislation or remove non-compliant politicians – some-thing that has no precedent in other EU candidate countries.4

3 Other constructivist work has emphasized the role of the social context in explaining compliance withinternational institutions’ conditionality (see, e.g., Epstein, 2008).4 In December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council (the intergovernmental body in charge of the peaceprocess in Bosnia) welcomed the intention of the High Representative to use its final authority in theimplementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement ‘by making binding decisions, ashe judges necessary, [and] other measures’, which may include removing obstructionist local politiciansfrom office (Peace Implementation Council, 1997).





According to its own website, the High Representative ‘is working with

the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the internationalcommunity to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peacefuland viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institu-tions’ (OHR, 2007). Since 1999, the High Representative has championedEuropean integration and pursued this objective through the implementationof its annual mission plans. Even though the Commission has publiclyrejected the use of the Bonn powers in the implementation of any of the EU conditions, the role of the High Representative, particularly in theearly stages of the Bosnian accession process, cannot simply be dismissed.Through direct and indirect intervention, the High Representative hasbeen one of the most important drivers in the process of integration of Bosnia.

This also leads us to another question: which are the main actors involvedin this process? While the Commission, the Council (including individualMember States) and the acceding national governments have often beensingled out in the literature as the main actors in the process of Europeaniza-tion of the central and eastern European countries, in the case of Bosnia, the

picture is much more complicated. Together with the aforementioned actors,other EU actors such as the High Representative for the Common Foreignand Security Policy (CFSP), the EU Special Representative (EUSR), a policemission and a military operation have been involved in the process of Europeanization of Bosnia. Because of the security implications, these CFSPactors have been involved and have also supported the European integrationprocess, also increasing the potential for inconsistencies in the EU’s message(Noutcheva, 2006, p. 4).

The case of the EUSR is particularly interesting and requires some clari-

fication. The EUSR in Bosnia was nominated in 2002, but the appointeewas also double-hatted as High Representative. Thus, at first sight, it isdifficult to distinguish when this person is acting as EUSR or as HighRepresentative. Yet in the minds of many Bosnian elites and citizens, anduntil Paddy Ashdown left the position on 30 January 2006, the incumbentwas acting in his role as High Representative ‘90 per cent of the time’.5

Things changed with the reinforcement of the EUSR staff and the closureof some OHR departments which took place during Christian Schwarz-

Schilling’s and then Miroslav Lajcák’s term in office (the latter taking uphis post on 1 July 2007). In March 2009, Valentin Inzko was appointed asthe new High Representative/EUSR in Bosnia.

5 Confidential interviews with EU and Bosnian officials, Sarajevo, 2005.

374 ANA E. JUNCOS




The next section briefly summarizes the international efforts at promoting

the restructuring of police forces in Bosnia. While it started as a technicalproject improving the training and performance of police officers and orga-nizations, it later moved towards reform aimed at strengthening the state’scapacity. At first, the EU pointed at the deficiencies of Bosnian police forcesas something the country should tackle in an effort to rationalize its admin-istrative capacity. However, the reform took an entirely different turn whenthe High Representative tried to impose a single structure model and linkedthat reform to Bosnia’s European membership.

III. Police Reform in Bosnia

After the war, police forces were structured along ethnic lines and operatedonly in the territory dominated by that ethnic group. Many of the policeofficers were suspected of having participated in the commission of warcrimes or war-racketeering activities. Police forces were also generally per-ceived to be political instruments in the service of their respective ethnicgroups. The Dayton Agreement endorsed the decentralization of police forces

by assigning this competence to the Entities. No police force was establishedat the state level. In total, 13 police forces were to be active in the country: onein Republika Srpska, one in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, onepolice force in each of the ten cantons of the Federation and one more in theBrcko district.

The process of reform of the Bosnian police forces was initiated by theUnited Nations International Police Task Force with a focus on improving thestandards of Bosnian policing. When the EU Police Mission (EUPM) took over in 2003, the emphasis, particularly since 2005, was placed on reform atthe macro level in order to deal with the structural problems that affectedBosnian police forces: financial viability, fragmentation of police forces andlack of independence from the political level. These issues, compromising thelocal sustainability of the police forces, became particularly important asinternational actors started to prepare an exit strategy.

The need for further reform of the police forces was hinted at in severalreports by the European Commission. The 2002 and 2003 Progress Reportmentioned the multiple deficiencies in the area of policing, but in terms of

structural police reform only noted the challenge of ‘inter-Entity, inter-serviceand inter-agency co-operation’ and the need for ‘political commitment to thefinancial sustainability of police forces’. The Feasibility Study, the last stagebefore the signing of an SAA, outlined some of the problems affecting thepolice forces in Bosnia (Commission, 2003, pp. 25–6):





[T]he complexity of the existing multiple police forces increases costs

and complicates co-ordination and effectiveness. Police co-operation hasimproved [. . .] but numerous operational difficulties persist: police forces

in one Entity have no right of ‘hot pursuit’ into another; there is no central

data base, different Entity forces use different information systems. Costs

are high because of duplication in areas such as training and equipment.

Financial and technical constraints limit crime fighting abilities.

The Feasibility Study urged Bosnian authorities to ‘proceed with structuralpolice reform with a view to rationalising police services’ (Commission,2003). Although the report pointed to the need to enhance state-level institu-tions, it left some room for manoeuvre as to how to achieve such ‘rational-ization’. In order to better assess the needs and problems of the Bosnianpolice forces, the European Commission funded a financial, organizationaland administrative assessment, which reported in June 2004 (ICMPD and TCTeam Consult, 2004). This functional review noted that Bosnian law enforce-ment agencies ‘deliver basic public security services of acceptable quality’and that ‘[t]he percentage of solved crimes of around 60% is quite high’(ICMPD and TC Team Consult, 2004, p. 6). There were several issues,

however, that required special attention, such as the need for a clear modern-ization strategy, modern equipment and appropriate training. Other problemsnoted in the Feasibility Study, such as politicization, overstaffing and lack of financial sustainability, were also mentioned in this report. As for the orga-nizational structure of the police forces, the functional review identified threepossible options going forward: a single structure in the form of a nationalpolice that favoured a ‘top-down’ approach with clear command structures; asecond model with two Entity police forces (plus the Brcko District policeand the border and intelligence state-level agencies); a third, ‘bottom-up’

model, based on the cantonal police forces, Republika Srpska police, plusBrcko District police, and the border and intelligence state-level agencies(ICMPD and TC Team Consult, 2004, p. 12).

According to the report: ‘All three models feature both advantages anddisadvantages. The evaluation and final choice depend on the weight givento the different criteria like top down or bottom up, product orientation,integration in local/regional communities, rationality, distance to today’srealities, etc.’ (ICMPD and TC Team Consult, 2004, p. 12). Whatever the

organizational structure adopted, the functional review continued, the mostimportant issue was to ensure political consensus and local ownership of thereform. As put in the report: ‘Local ownership is more important than aperfect solution on paper’ (ICMPD and TC Team Consult, 2004, p. 135). Amonth later, ignoring this recommendation (and the three models outlinedabove), the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, using the Bonn powers,

376 ANA E. JUNCOS




established a Police Restructuring Commission with the objective of pro-

posing ‘a single structure of policing for Bosnia and Herzegovina underthe overall political oversight of a ministry or ministries in the Council of Ministers’ (OHR, 2004). The new model proposed by the Police Restructur-ing Commission was based on a two-tiered system with legislative, budgetcompetencies and supervisory powers vested at the state level.

The High Representative could not use its powers to impose such reformbecause this new model departed from the division of powers laid out in theDayton Agreement and, therefore, any move in such direction required theapproval of the Entities. The High Representative needed a new type of power: the power of EU membership. However, even though the Commissionhad pointed in previous reports to the inefficiencies in the functioning of theBosnian police forces, it had never demanded any particular path for therestructuring process, but had left the issue to be decided by the local parties.Yet the Commission was soon to embrace these principles as their own andincorporated ‘police reform’ among the required conditions to be fulfilledbefore the signing of an SAA. The three principles, which were later outlinedby the European Commission in several documents, were: first, all legislative

and budgetary competences vested at state level; second, no political inter-ference with operational policing; and third, functional police areas deter-mined by technical policing criteria. These principles became known as the‘European Principles’.

On 5 October 2005, after ten months of difficult negotiations led by theHigh Representative, the Republika Srpska National Assembly voted infavour of an ‘Agreement on the Restructuring of Police Structures’, whichwas also adopted by the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-govina and the State Parliament. This step allowed the Commission to

recommend the opening of negotiations of an SAA with Bosnia – a recom-mendation that was endorsed by the Member States. The Council Con-clusions however warned that the EU would carefully monitor the implemen-tation of the political agreement. A Directorate for the Implementation of Police Restructuring was established soon thereafter to work on the prepara-tion of an Action Plan. Yet it was not until October 2007, after a two-yearstalemate, a showdown with the High Representative and another unfavour-able annual report by the European Commission that the parties agreed to sign

a new political declaration on police reform. The House of Peoples (the upperhouse in the Bosnian Parliament) passed the police reform legislation on 16April 2008. The SAA between Bosnia and the EU was finally signed on16 June 2008.

The laws adopted in April 2008 envisage the establishment of several newstate-level police co-ordination bodies. However, the structure of the police





forces will not be affected until a new constitution for the country has been

agreed by the political parties. Thus, after years of political wrangling, the EUhas only obtained an agreement to increase the number of institutions dealingwith policing in the country – contrary to its original aim of administrativerationalization – and a vague political commitment dependent upon theoutcome of future constitutional reforms, which may turn out to be even moresensitive than police restructuring.

IV. Explaining (Non)compliance in Bosnia

The previous account gives an idea of the limitations of the prospects of EU membership in bringing forward reforms. This section assesses the abilityof each of the above mechanisms to explain police reform in Bosnia. It alsodraws attention to the role of domestic factors facilitating and/or hinderingthe Europeanization process.

External Imposition

At first glance, the role of the High Representative appears crucial as a drivingforce in the process of integration of Bosnia into the EU. Arguably, most of the reforms adopted by Bosnia in the last few years have been, in one way oranother, the result of indirect pressure or direct imposition by the HighRepresentative. Between 1998 and 2005 inclusive, the High Representativeimposed 286 laws or amendments of laws and removed 119 officials frompublic office (Parish, 2007, p. 15). In the words of Majstorovic (2007, p. 629):‘[T]he HRs [High Representatives] have removed officials, decided onnational insignia, laws and terms under which BiH [Bosnia] was to join the

EU and have constructed and defined what entering the EU meant andentailed for the state of BiH’. The High Representative has not only guidedthe process of Europeanization in Bosnia, but has also used this process tolegitimize the use of coercive powers in order to promote reforms in thecountry.

Police reform, perhaps one of the most important steps towards post-warnormalization in Bosnia, became the most important goal for the then HighRepresentative, Paddy Ashdown, when he took office (Muehlmann, 2007,p. 56). Since 2004, the High Representative has set the agenda of reform with

the establishment of the Police Restructuring Commission and arguablyco-opted the pre-existing process and actors (Parish, 2007, p. 18). As previ-ously mentioned, he could not just impose this reform, yet he did not hesitateto resort to indirect and direct pressure on Bosnian elites, and in particularBosnian Serb elites, in order to push his proposals forward.

378 ANA E. JUNCOS




Ashdown put indirect pressure on Bosnian parties using EU membership

as the core incentive. He also then persuaded the European Commission andother EU actors to back up his model of police reform (Muehlmann, 2007,p. 57). As mentioned above, the previous functional review funded by theEuropean Commission did not favour any particular model, but insteadargued that the important thing was to reach consensus and to promote localownership. The European Commission’s position, however, unexpectedlychanged during the discussions of the Police Restructuring Commission. Thethen Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, was persuaded byAshdown to give his support to the ‘Concept Paper’, which outlined the mainfeatures of a single structure of policing and constituted the basis for thediscussions of the Police Restructuring Commission.6 In November 2004, ina letter to the local authorities, Patten publicly endorsed the principle that allcompetencies for law enforcement needed to be transferred to the state level.He also affirmed that exclusive legislative competencies and a single budgethad to remain at the state level and that the size, number and shape of policeregions should be decided according to effective policing criteria and notpolitical considerations (PRC, 2004, p. 195). In a letter dated 13 December

2004, the Head of the Delegation of the European Commission, MichaelHumphreys, reiterated these principles.

Ashdown realized that these recommendations were not enough and there-fore convinced the Commission to include the adoption of the police reformas a precondition to signing the SAA – a condition that was not explicitlymentioned in the previous Feasibility Study. Then, the three ‘European’principles were publicly endorsed by the Commissioner for Enlargement, OlliRehn, in his letter of 21 February 2005 and became a mantra repeated by EUand international officials. With the same determination, Bosnian Serbs

rejected the principles and, in particular, the crossing of the boundary lineseparating the Entities and the transfer of exclusive police competences to thestate level.

In a more direct demonstration of his authority, the High Representativeused the Bonn powers to threaten Bosnian Serb leaders. Although not directlyrelated to police reform, between June and December 2004, Ashdownremoved more than 60 Serbs from public office for obstructing co-operationwith the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),

but without clear evidence or trial. After the failure of police reform negotia-tions in the summer of 2005, Ashdown also took punitive measures againstthe main Serbian party for alleged corruption charges and targeted the party’sfunds (Muehlmann, 2007, p. 48). When Christian Schwarz-Schilling took the

6 Confidential interview with a former senior EU official, Brussels, September 2009.





post, he opted for a more hands-off approach, openly renouncing the use of

the Bonn powers. After a year and a half without progress, his successor,Lajcák, had to return to the use of the Bonn powers. However, by then, theinstitution had been irremediably damaged by the failures of Ashdown’shyper-interventionism and Schwarz-Schilling’s passivity (Parish, 2007,p. 18).

Lajcák’s decision to change the functioning of the legislative and execu-tive bodies, modifying the majority necessary to pass a decision, was aimedat disciplining the Bosnian Serbs, often responsible for the obstruction of thework of central Bosnian institutions and also for the deadlock in policereform. This decision arguably led to ‘the most serious political crisis sincethe Dayton agreement brought the Bosnian war to an end in November 1995’(Chandler, 2007, p. 1). In the context of the looming independence of Kosovo,the decision prompted a strong Bosnian Serb reaction and the resignationof the Bosnian Serb State Prime Minister Nikola Spiric. In sum, Lajcák’sdecision backfired and highlighted the dangers of interventionism. Moreover,by associating the EU with this top-down process of reform, it damaged theEU’s conditionality and the image of the EU in the country.7

In the short term, direct and indirect intervention by the High Represen-tative might explain the agreement reached in October 2005 and the laws onpolice reform passed in 2008. However, as with the implementation of the 5October agreement, the sustainability of the reforms has proven difficult toachieve. The Bosnian Serbs were cajoled to agree on this issue and short-termbehavioural compliance might have only been a temporary concession to theHigh Representative and the EU. Local politicians knew that they could stillevade the original agreement during the implementation process, especiallysince it was linked to the talks on constitutional reform. In fact, in its latest

assessment, the European Commission noted that ‘limited progress’ hadbeen made in this area (Commission, 2009b, p. 59). As expected, externalimposition without internalization of the reforms does not lead to sustainablecompliance.

Conditionality

Conditionality has also been a very important factor in police reform, espe-cially from the moment it was used by the High Representative to promote a

specific model of reform. Once the Commission expressed its support for thePolice Restructuring Commission and put the three ‘European Principles’ on

7 Approval ratings of the EU were relatively low among all three ethnic groups in March 2008: 47.9 percent among Bosniaks, 49.4 pr cent among Croats and 38.5 per cent among Serbs (UNDP Bosnia, 2008,Annex, p. 11).

380 ANA E. JUNCOS




the table, the EU ‘carrot’ became a very important instrument to induce

compliance. From early 2005, the European Commission, the High Repre-sentative for CFSP and EU Member States joined forces with Paddy Ashdownto convince the Bosnian authorities of the merits of this reform. For instance,in October 2004, Javier Solana, EU High representative for CFSP, stated:‘[Y]ou must be guided by what is needed for effective law enforcement,not by politics – in the modern world we cannot afford anything less’ (ICG,2005, p. 7). The main arguments used were that, first, it would reduce thecurrent financial burden, then at almost 9.2 per cent of the public budget(Wisler, 2007, p. 264); and second, it would increase the efficiency of policeforces and reduce corruption and political interference in police issues. Allvery ‘rational’ arguments. As Gergana Noutcheva (2007, p. 7) put it: ‘[T]heEU [. . .] pragmatically appealed to the common sense of domestic politicalleaders, trying to make them see the virtues of undertaking the reformsthemselves rather than presenting the reforms as a sacrifice they have toaccept in order to be admitted to the club’.8

Notwithstanding the benefits of membership, the issue at stake in Bosniacannot be underestimated. The monopoly of force is one of the defining

elements of the Weberian state. Control over police issues therefore is morethan a technical matter, especially if we take into account that not even 15years ago, the three constituent peoples of Bosnia were fighting the bloodiestwar in post-World War II Europe. Efforts by EU officials and EUPM policeexperts to portray police reform as a technical question have understandablynot been successful. The domestic costs of compliance are prohibitivelyhigh for Bosnian Serbs, and they are strongly opposed to two of the three‘European Principles’: the establishment of functional police areas accordingto technical criteria if it involves crossing the border line separating the

Entities; and the transfer of all legislative and budgetary competencies tothe state level because that would reduce the political control of the Entityover police issues. The benefit of the long-term prospect of integrationpromised by the EU (in ten years, according to the most optimistic accounts)does not outweigh the costs that reform would entail: a centralization of theBosnian state and erosion of the Entities’ powers. As the Prime Minister of theRepublika Srpska Mirolad Dodik put it, if Serbs had to choose between EUmembership and the existence of the Republika Srpska, they would choose

the latter (Gromes, 2007, p. 20). Alternative options, like becoming part of aGreater Serbia may also seem more attractive to elites from the RepublikaSrpska.

8 Reforms in Bosnia also pursue a security agenda: a strong and sustainable state with an efficient policeforce would be better suited to fighting organized crime. By consolidating the state structures, the EUis trying to prevent threats associated with failing states.





During the course of the police reform negotiations, the EU also failed to

offer other short- or medium-term benefits that could have been used asan incentive – for instance, more economic assistance or visa facilitation/ liberalization. Current economic assistance (approximately €50 million peryear), as recognized by EU officials, does not amount to a significant contri-bution. For its part, the EU only agreed to visa facilitation for some targetgroups in 2008, while, at the time of writing, a date for visa liberalization

is still to be agreed.9 Aside from positive conditionality, the EU has alsoresorted to negative conditionality, not by imposing direct negative measures(sanctions), but indirect ones, such as delaying the signing of the SAA.However, this strategy has not been very successful either.

As far as the determinacy of EU conditions and norms is concerned,a number of things should be noted here. While the Feasibility Study wasrather vague, the three ‘European Principles’ were much more detailedin what the EU expected from the Bosnian authorities regarding policerestructuring. Thus, in this case, determinacy increased over time. Never-theless, and by contrast to what would be expected from a rationalist per-spective, compliance did not increase (cf. Noutcheva, 2006, pp. 14–15).

One could even argue that such detailed conditions made agreement onpolice reform much more difficult and led to the entrenchment of theBosnian Serb position, on the one hand, and that of the international com-munity, on the other. By setting such inflexible conditions, later espousedby the Commission, the actions of the High Representative led to a four-year stalemate in the process of reform that benefited no one. Even thoughthe EU officially maintained the image of unity, in private there were somedisagreements and, ultimately, the international community gave up.10 Withtime, the implementation of the three principles was watered down to save

face (Muehlmann, 2007, pp. 48–52). This also negatively affected the cred-ibility of the EU.

The credibility of conditionality is also linked to the capability of theEU to withhold rewards and, ultimately, the prospect of membership(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 14). In this regard, some localpoliticians believe that security and political considerations matter more thanthe fulfilment of EU conditions. EU threats that Bosnia will be isolated or willnot progress towards enlargement are simply not credible as local politicians

are well aware of how important Bosnia’s peace and stability are for EUMember States. Vachudova makes the further argument that what is at stake

9 The European Commission proposed visa-free travel for Bosnian citizens in May 2010. It is expected thatthe European Parliament and the Council of the European Union will adopt this proposal after the generalelections in October 2010.10 Confidential interview with a former senior EU official, Brussels, September 2009.

382 ANA E. JUNCOS




for the EU in the Balkans is the fact that the enlargement process is inter-

twined with the building of an effective foreign policy through buildingregional security. If the EU cannot succeed in pacifying its own backyard, itmay have to relinquish its global ambitions (Vachudova, 2005, pp. 247–8).

The EU has also been quite inconsistent with the way it has treatedcountries in the region and this has also affected the credibility of the normspromoted by the EU. For many Bosnians, the fact that the EU signed an SAAwith Serbia before it did with Bosnia, despite the persistent failure of Serbiato comply with EU conditions, suggested that political considerationsmattered more than compliance with EU conditions. Instead of a meritocraticapproach, politics prevails, discouraging some countries from adoptingthe necessary reforms. According to Haris Silajdzic, the Bosniak chairpersonof the Bosnian state presidency: ‘Although the practice of the EU is to insiston fulfilment of all the requirements needed for deepening relations withpotential Member States, this act shows that Serbia enjoys some benefitslike no other country’. He therefore accused the EU of ‘double standards’( EUobserver , 2008).

Finally, the fact that the EU’s position was perceived as biased, favour-

ing one of the parties over the others, also negatively affected condi-tionality. EU conditionality empowered Bosnian Muslim demands forcentralization of the state and the abolition of the Entity structure. Yet, theBosnian political system, where each of the ethnic groups can veto a deci-sion against their vital interests, meant that empowering one party was notenough to promote reforms in the country. The EU needed the consent of all the parties. However, the EU has not provided sufficient reassurance tothe Bosnian Serbs, who favoured the Entities’ survival, and Croats, whoprefer the regionalization of Bosnia or a three-Entity solution. As argued by

Gromes (2007, p. 26): ‘The more the EU backs the Bosniacs’ interests andneglects those of the other conflict parties, the more it approximates thepoint at which the Serbs and Croats’ positions tip over to an anti-integrationstance’.

Socialization

The latter issue is also important in terms of socialization, the third mecha-nism. It was obvious from the outset that persuasion by the EU would not be

very effective since the proposed reforms were not perceived as legitimate byat least one of the parties. As pointed out by Noutcheva (2007, p. 12), ‘whenthe legitimacy of EU conditions is openly questioned by political players inthe domestic context, one would expect them to assert more vigorously boththeir rational motives and distinctive identities in defiance of the EU’s





demands’. Even though the EU tried to back up their demands with arguments

based on the positive effects of the rationalization of the administrativecapacity and police services, and in terms of budgetary efficiency, thesearguments found no resonance among the local parties – at least not amongSerb nationalist parties.

The outcome of police reform had important political implications notonly for Bosnian Serbs, but also for Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats,leading to changes in the balance of power between the three ethnic groups.They all saw the reforms in terms of a domestic balance of power and not interms of efficiency or the effectiveness of the police forces. Hence, althoughBosnian Muslims publicly espoused the High Representative’s model, thereasons behind this support were not due to ‘appropriateness’, but becauseit advanced their long-term interests. Attempts to ‘separate policing frompolitics’ (Rehn, 2006) or ‘to get politics out of policing’ (PRC, 2004, p. 195)were doomed to failure because, as they probably should have realized,policing is inextricably linked to politics.

The inflexibility of the High Representative’s position, together withexcessive concern for meeting the deadlines,11 meant that there was not

enough time for persuasion and argument during the negotiations of such asensitive issue (Muehlmann, 2007, p. 51).12 As one Commission’s officialnoted, in the case of police reform, EU conditions were too demanding fromthe outset. By contrast, in the case of Nato-led defence reform, the reformprocess was more progressive and the deadlines were longer and that mightexplain why it was more successful.13 The EU often portrayed police reformas the only viable option, but did not bring other arguments to the table. Forexample, the EU could have persuaded Bosnian authorities that EU integra-tion would render some of the transfers of authority to the state level mean-

ingless. Bosnian Serbs might also benefit from this process as it would lead tothe disbandment of the OHR (Noutcheva, 2007, p. 16). Yet, there was neveran attempt to get this message across, and for the Bosnian Serbs and Croats,integration was exclusively perceived as strengthening the Bosnian (i.e.,Bosnian Muslim) state.

Moreover, references by the EU to ‘European standards’ were difficultto defend because there is no common model for policing in the EU, butthey vary from country to country. This created enormous problems for

the Commission who could not justify the three criteria by reference to an

11 The tenth anniversary of the Dayton Agreement was to be commemorated in December 2005 on a datethat coincided with Paddy Ashdown’s end of mandate. There was thus a lot of pressure to get thenegotiations of an SAA started before that date.12 Confidential interview with a former senior EU official, Brussels, September 2009.13 Confidential interview with a Commission official, Brussels, May 2007.

384 ANA E. JUNCOS




‘EU’ model as had been previously the case in other areas such as taxation

or customs.14 There are few EU Member States that comply with these threecriteria. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany and the Nether-lands have largely decentralized police forces, with some management andfunding responsibilities vested at the local level (Muehlmann, 2007, p. 57;Parish, 2007, p. 19). In many European states, such as Spain, Germany orSwitzerland, politics rather than ‘effective policing criteria’ determine thedelineation of police regions. For instance, in Germany, there are 16 regionscoinciding with the Länder ; in Switzerland, there are 26 cantonal policeforces; and in Spain, four regional police forces have been established inCatalonia, Galicia, the Basque Country and Navarra. The demand that policeregions cross the border line separating the Entities is not supported by‘European’ practice, and local politicians have referred to the diversity of models within the EU to reject the imposition of these principles. This alsoexplains why some EU officials and Member States have in private criticizedthe OHR/Commission conditions.15

In the area of justice, freedom and security (Chapter 24), the acquis

communautaire does not oblige candidate countries to adopt any specific

EU policing model, but only insists that ‘Member States need to be prop-erly equipped to adequately implement the growing framework of commonrules’ (Commission, 2008b). Nothing is said about a centralized state-levelpolice, exclusive competences for the state or that police regions should bedetermined by technical policing criteria. The acquis does not refer to ‘thebest European practice’ and hence does not provide a clear idea about whatthis might mean. According to the Commission’s website, it only requiresa ‘properly equipped’ policing system with ‘well-integrated administrativecapacity’ and a ‘professional, reliable and efficient police organisation’.

How this is achieved is up to each national government. As in other policyareas, the crucial issue for the Commission is to have an accountablepartner to ensure the adoption and implementation of the acquis. Theinternal reorganization of the state in order to meet this demand is usually,and therefore perhaps should remain, the preserve of the local parties.However, the Commission’s policy towards police reform in Bosniahas not respected this general principle, with the ensuing negativeconsequences.

14 This is not the first time that the Commission has found it difficult to identify which standards apply ina particular policy area. For instance, Sasse et al. (2004) found similar problems in the case of the EUregional policy.15 The same can be said of other EU conditions on an integrated public broadcasting system. Confidentialinterviews with Commission officials, November 2005 and May 2007.





Conclusions

Police reform has demonstrated the fragility of the transition process inBosnia and the limitations of the prospect of EU membership for compliance.In the case of Bosnia, conditionality and socialization alone cannot explainthe progress (or lack thereof) that the country has made towards Europeanintegration. The fact that the High Representative has had European inte-gration as one of its main objectives and that the individuals concernedhave resorted to coercive measures in order to implement this goal needs tobe accounted for in any explanation of Bosnia’s Europeanization. As the

power of the High Representative recedes, the power of conditionality andsocialization should become more evident. To date, conditionality has beenmonopolized by the High Representative and socialization has not takenplace in a context where there has not been enough space for dialogue andpersuasion.

EU actors have also shown a certain naïvety about how far negotiations onpolice reform could go. Encouraged by progress in other areas (indirecttaxation, defence and intelligence reform), the international community

believed that progress on police reform in the short term was both possibleand desirable. However, policing is not a technical issue, as has often beenstated by Commission or EUPM experts, but touches upon issues that are atthe heart of national sovereignty. Because of high domestic costs of compli-ance, endless attempts at separating ‘policing from politics’ found nobacking, even among moderate nationalists. Moreover, by supporting thecentralization of Bosnian police forces the EU was, intentionally or other-wise, supporting the claims of one party and came to be seen by the otherparties, particularly Bosnian Serbs, as biased. Although the EU tried to

reassure the Serbs that it was not taking part in the negotiations, it wasdifficult to get this message across in a context of increasing pressure towardsthe centralization of Bosnian institutions.

After years of slow progress, the EU now has an opportunity to redirect theprocess of Europeanization in Bosnia. The power of the High Representativeseems to have been progressively eroded by recent events surrounding policereform. Yet, despite the bitter lessons of the police reform, there remains thetemptation to link constitutional reform to EU candidate status (see Commis-sion, 2009a, p. 29).The EU should, however, realize that it is time to leave the

Bosnians to decide on crucial issues such as constitutional reform. No timepressures or strict conditions should be imposed by the EU on this highlysensitive reform. Even though integration into the EU will still remain apainful process, it is up to Bosnian politicians to assume the responsibility forboth impasse and progress.

386 ANA E. JUNCOS




Correspondence:

Ana E. JuncosSchool of Sociology, Politics and International Studies

University of Bristol

4 Priory Road

Bristol BS8 1TY, UK

Tel +44(0)1179288829

email [email protected]

References

Ashdown, P. and Holbrooke, R. (2008) ‘A Bosnian Powder Keg’. The Guardian, 22

October.

Chandler, D. (2007) ‘Introduction: Inside the Bosnian Crisis’. Journal of Intervention

and Statebuilding, Vol. 1 (Special Supplement), pp. 1–10.

Checkel, J. (2001) ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’.

International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 553–88.

Commission of the European Communities (2002) ‘The stabilization and associa-

tion process for south east Europe: first annual report’. COM (2002) 163 final,

4 April.Commission of the European Communities (2003) ‘Report from the Commission to

the Council on the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a

Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union’. COM (2003)

692 final, 18 November.

Commission of the European Communities (2008a) ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008

progress report’. COM (2008) 674, 5 November.

Commission of the European Communities (2008b) ‘Enlargement: how does

a country join the EU?’ Available at: «http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/

enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/

negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm».Commission of the European Communities (2009a) ‘Enlargement strategy and main

challenges, 2009–2010’. COM (2009) 533, 14 October.

Commission of the European Communities (2009b) ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009

progress report’. COM (2009) 1338, 14 October.

Epstein, R.A. (2008) ‘The Social Context in Conditionality: Internationalizing

Finance in Postcommunist Europe’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 15,

No. 6, pp. 880–98.

EUobserver (2008) ‘Bosnia Angered by Signing of EU–Serbia Deal’. EUobserver ,

30 April. Euroactiv (2008) ‘Bosnia Vote Marks Nationalist Surge’. Euroactiv, 6

October.

Featherstone, K. (2003) ‘Introduction: In the Name of “Europe” ’. In Featherstone,

K. and Radaelli, C. (eds) The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford

University Press).





Grabbe, H. (2001) ‘How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Condition-

ality, Diffusion and Diversity’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 6,pp. 1013–31.

Gromes, T. (2007) ‘The Perspective of European Integration and Conflict Transfor-

mation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Paper presented at the Sixth Pan-European

Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations, Turin, 12–15

September.

International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and TC Team

Consult (2004) Final Assessment Report: Financial, Organisational and

Administrative Assessment of the BiH Police Forces and the State Border

Service, Sarajevo, 30 June (Vienna: ICMPD/TC Team Consult).International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005) ‘Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No

Progress, No EU’. Europe Report 164, 6 September (Brussels: ICG).

Kelley, J. (2004) Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

Majstorovic, D. (2007) ‘Construction of Europeanization in the High Representa-

tive’s Discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Discourse Society, Vol. 18, No. 5,

pp. 627–51.

March, J. and Olsen, J. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basisof Politics (New York: Free Press).

Muehlmann, T. (2007) ‘Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Problems

of Internationally-Led Security Sector Reform’. Journal of Intervention and

Statebuilding, Vol. 1 (Special Supplement), pp. 37–65.

Noutcheva, G. (2006) ‘EU Conditionality, State Sovereignty and the Compliance

Patterns of Balkan States’. Paper presented at the Third Pan-European Conference

on EU Politics, ECPR, Istanbul, 21–23 September.

Noutcheva, G. (2007) ‘Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the

EU’s Normative Power in the Western Balkans’. Working Paper 274 (Brussels:Centre for European Policy Studies).

Noutcheva, G., Tocci, N., Coppieters, B., Kovziridze, T., Emerson, M. and

Huysseune, M. (2004) ‘Europeanization and Secessionist Conflicts: Concepts

and Theories’. Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 3,

No. 1, pp. 1–12.

Offe, C. (1991) ‘Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing

the Triple Transition in East Central Europe’. Social Research, Vol. 58, No. 4,

pp. 865–92.

Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative (OHR) (2004)

‘Decision Establishing the Police Restructuring Commission’, 5 July. Available

at: «http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rule-of-law-pillar/prc/».

Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative (OHR) (2007)

‘OHR Introduction’. Available at: «http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.

asp?content_id=38519».

388 ANA E. JUNCOS




Parish, M.T. (2007) ‘The Demise of the Dayton Protectorate’. Journal of Intervention

and Statebuilding, Vol. 1 (Special Supplement), pp. 11–23.Peace Implementation Council (1997) ‘Bonn Conclusions’, 10 December. Available

at: «http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182#11».

Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) (2004) ‘Final Report on the Work of the

Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 31 December.

Available at: «http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rule-of-law-pillar/prc/».

Rehn, O. (2006) ‘Europe’s Next Frontiers’. Speech at the European Policy Centre,

Brussels, 10 October.

Risse, T., Green Cowles, M. and Carporaso, J. (eds) (2001) Transforming Europe:

Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).Sasse, G., Hugues, J. and Gordon, C. (2004) Europeanization and Regionalization

in EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe (London: Palgrave

Macmillan).

Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds) (2005) The Europeanization of Central

and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

Tocci, N. (2007) The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard

(London/New York: Routledge).

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Bosnia (2008) Early Warning

System: First Quarterly Report (Sarajevo: UNDP).

Vachudova, M. (2005) Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integrationafter Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Whitman, R.G. and Juncos, A.E. (2010) ‘European Union’s Relations with the Wider

Europe’. JCMS Annual Review of the European Union, Vol. 48, pp. 183–204.

Wisler, D. (2007) ‘The International Civilian Police Mission in Bosnia and

Herzegovina: From Democratization to Nation-Building’. Police Practice and

Research, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 253–68.



JCMS- Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 49 Issue 2 2011 [Doi 10.1111%2Fj.1468-5965.2010.02144.x] ANA E. JUNCOS -- Europeanization by Decree the Case of Police Reform in Bosnia

Documents