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    Viewing cable 07TELAVIV64, SCENESETT ER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15

    If you are new to t hese pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to

    discuss t hem with others. See also t he FAQs

    Reference ID Date Classif icat ion Origin

    07T ELAVIV64 2007-01-08 16:04 SECRET Embassy Tel Aviv

    VZCZCXRO2156OO RUEHROVDE RUEHTV #0064/01 0081638ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 081638Z JAN 07FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIVTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8615

    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000064

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017TAGS: PRELPTERPGOVISKWBGSUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15

    VISIT TO ISRAEL

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

    1. (S) Madam Secretary, internal tensions among GOI leadershave intensified since your last visit and have reached thepoint that there appears to be little coordination or evendialogue among the key decision makers. Therefore, we willneed to be sensitive to perceptions that we are favoring onefaction over another. The divisions at the top here are part

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    of an increasingly gloomy public mood, with a new corruptionallegations making headlines virtually daily, and a growingsense of political failure despite Israel's strong economyand a sustained success rate in thwarting suicide attacks.Prime Minister Olmert's approval ratings were only 23 percentin the latest poll, and Israeli interlocutors across thepolitical spectrum are speaking openly of a crisis of publicconfidence in the country's leadership at a time whenIsraelis feel an urgent need for strong leadership to facethe threats from Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah.

    OPTIMISM ERODING----------------

    2. (S) The year 2007 has started off badly for Israelis.The good feeling generated by PM Olmert's long-delayedDecember 23 summit meeting with Abu Mazen quickly dissipatedunder the weight of reports of a new settlement in the JordanValley (now suspended by Peretz), continued Qassam rocketattacks on Sderot and neighboring kibbutzim, foot-dragging onboth sides in implementing the transfer of tax revenues, lackof progress on the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and theunpleasant atmospherics of the January 4 Olmert-Mubaraksummit, which was overshadowed by a botched IDF daylight raidin the center of Ramallah in which four Palestinians werekilled.

    3. (S) The Ramallah operation, which was authorized by theIDF's West Bank commander without informing the Minister ofDefense, served as a stark reminder of the lack ofcoordination between Israel's military and its civilianleadership. When it comes to Israel's strategy for dealingwith Palestinians, it increasingly seems that military ismilitary, civilian is civilian and never the twain shallmeet! Despite Olmert's belated embrace of Abu Mazen as apeace partner, there is growing concern that moderate Arabwillingness to maintain the embargo on Hamas may be eroding,and that Fatah may fail to muster the popular support it willneed to depose Hamas, whether at the ballot box or in thestreets. Meanwhile, the upcoming release of the results ofthe Winograd Commission's investigation of the Lebanon warhangs like a sword of Damocles over the heads of Olmert,Defense Minister Peretz, and IDF Chief of General StaffHalutz. Peretz and Halutz have both publicly stated thatthey will resign if the Commission holds them responsible forserious errors in the conduct of the war, but Olmert has

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    refrained from public comments. Olmert is also awaiting theresults of several separate investigations involvingcorruption allegations, any one of which could further damagehim severely, if not force his resignation.

    4. (S) While Israeli anxiety over a possible dramatic shiftof U.S. policy as a result of the Iraq Study Group's reporthas been allayed by statements by you and the President,there continues to be deep uneasiness here that theBaker-Hamilton recommendations reflect the shape of things to

    come in U.S. policy. Israelis recognize that U.S. publicsupport for the Iraq war is eroding and are following withinterest the President's upcoming articulation of therevamped policy, but they are deeply concerned thatIsraeli-Palestinian issues not become linked in Americanminds to creating a more propitious regional environment forwhatever steps we decide to take to address the deterioratingsituation in Iraq.

    5. (S) Iran's nuclear program continues to cause greatanxiety in Israel. Given their history, Israelis across thepolitical spectrum take very seriously Ahmadinejad's threatsto wipe Israel off the map. Olmert has been quite clear inhis public comments that Israel cannot tolerate anuclear-armed Iran, a position stated even more emphaticallyby opposition leader Netanyahu, who compares today's Iran toNazi Germany in 1938. Despite the worst-case assessments ofIsraeli intelligence, however, there is a range of viewsabout what action Israel should take. The MFA and some ofthe think tank Iran experts appear increasingly inclined tostate that military action must be a last resort and aretaking a new interests in other forms of pressure, includingbut not limited to sanctions, that could force Iran toabandon its military nuclear program. The IDF, however,srikes us as more inclined than ever to look toward amilitary strike, whether launched by Israel or by us, as theonly way to destroy or even delay Iran's plans. Thoughtful

    TEL AVIV 00000064 002 OF 003

    Israeli analysts point out that even if a nuclear-armed Irandid not immediately launch a strike on the Israeli heartland,the very fact that Iran possesses nuclear weapons wouldcompletely transform the Middle East strategic environment inways that would make Israel's long-term survival as a

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    democratic Jewish state increasingly problematic. Thatconcern is most intensively reflected in open talk by thosewho say they do not want their children and grandchildrengrowing up in an Israel threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.

    LIVNI RISING------------

    6. (C) FM Tzipi Livni is frustrated by Olmert's continuedrefusal to coordinate closely, and -- perhaps with an eye on

    polls showing her popularity at over double the level of thePrime Minister -- suggested to a Ha'aretz interviewer in lateDecember that she would challenge Olmert for the primeministership if he continued not to give her his fullbacking. In the same interview, Livni provided an outline ofher thinking, but not a detailed plan, on the way ahead withthe Arabs, including negotiating an interim agreement withthe Palestinians in which the separation barrier would serveas the border, and refusing to engage with Syria unless Asadtakes steps to end support for terrorism and distanceshimself from Iran. Livni's policy adviser has confirmed tous that she has engaged in her own discrete discussions withPalestinians, but very much in an exploratory mode. Livnitold Senators Kerry and Dodd that she doubted that a finalstatus agreement could be reached with Abu Mazen, andtherefore the emphasis should be on reforming Fatah so thatit could beat Hamas at the polls. MFA officials tell us thatLivni is also focused on the need to keep Hamas isolated.She and her senior staff have repeatedly expressed concernthat some EU member-states are wobbly on this point.Meanwhile, Livni is keenly aware that unlike Olmert, she haslittle to fear from the Winograd Commission report (nor isshe tainted by the corruption allegations that dog Olmert).Her incipient bid to take Olmert's place could become moreserious once the report's preliminary conclusions arereleased next month.

    SHIFTING VIEWS ON SYRIA-----------------------

    7. (S) Olmert and Livni agree that negotiations with Syriawould be a trap that Damascus would use to end theinternational pressure on it and to gain a freer hand inLebanon. While they see public relations downsides todismissing Syrian peace overtures out of hand, they continueto insist that no negotiations will be possible until Syria

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    reduces its support for terrorism and/or takes direct stepsto secure the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas andHizballah. Olmert and Livni are supported in that view byMossad chief Dagan, who takes a dim view of Syrianintentions. A significant part of the securityestablishment, however, appears to be reaching the conclusionthat it is in Israel's interest to test Asad's intentions --possibly through the use of a back channel contact -- and toseek to wean him away from Tehran. They are joined in thatview by Defense Minister Peretz, much of the Labor Party and

    the Israeli left, who argue that Israel cannot afford torefuse to at least explore Asad's offer to negotiate, oftencomparing that stance to Golda Meir's much-criticizeddecision to spurn Sadat's offer to negotiate, which then ledto the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Press reports January 5 statedthat the defense establishment had recommended to Olmert thathe open an exploratory channel to Damascus in two months, atimeline reportedly linked to the completion of reviews ofU.S. policy toward Iraq and the Middle East, as well as toclearer indications of Abu Mazen's intentions andcapabilities vis a vis Hamas.

    PERETZ-OLMERT TENSIONS----------------------

    8. (C) According to leaks from a recent Labor Partyleadership meeting, Amir Peretz said that he feels completelydisconnected from Olmert. Ever since Peretz' telephoneconversation with Abu Mazen which infuriated Olmert, the tworeportedly barely speak to each other. Television newsreports on January 4 trumpeted rumors that Olmert had decidedto remove Peretz as Defense Minister and replace him withformer Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has already announcedplans to challenge Peretz for the Labor Party's leadership inlate May primaries. Even though the Prime Minister's Officealmost immediately denied the reports, there is little doubthere that someone in the PMO was behind them. While much ofthe Labor Party feels that Peretz has been a failure, both asDefense Minister and as Party Secretary General, and Peretz'popularity with the general public has hit rock bottom, Labor

    TEL AVIV 00000064 003 OF 003

    members widely condemned the media trial balloon, which theysaw as an unacceptable attempt by Olmert's advisers to

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    Viewing cable 07T ELAVIV1114, CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WIT H OPPOSITION LEADER

    If you are new to t hese pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to

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    Ref erenceID Date Classif icat ion Origin

    07TELAVIV1114 2007-04-18 06:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tel Aviv

    VZCZCXRO8870OO RUEHROVDE RUEHTV #1114/01 1080655ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 180655Z APR 07FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIVTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0564

    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001114

    SIPDIS

    CODELSIPDIS

    H PLEASE PASS TO REPRESENTATIVE ACKERMAN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017TAGS: PRELPGOVKNNPEFINIRKPALISSUBJECT: CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION LEADERBINYAMIN NETANYAHU: ECONOMIC SQUEEZE ON IRAN AND HAMAS;SCENARIOS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT; RIGHT OF RETURN AS ACIDTEST OF ARAB INTENTIONS

    REF: TEL AVIV 1086

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

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    1. (C) Summary. Representative Gary Ackerman (D, New York),Chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee ofthe House International Relations Committee, accompanied bythe Ambassador, met with Opposition Leader Binyamin Netanyahuat the Knesset April 11. The discussion covered Netanyahu'sideas on how to pressure Iran in order to block its nuclearprogram and topple President Ahmadinejad; Netanyahu's viewson dealing with the Palestinians; his critique of PrimeMinister Olmert's handling of the Second Lebanon War; andNetanyahu's analysis of Israel's domestic political

    situation. On Iran, Netanyahu advocated intensified financialpressures, including a U.S.-led divestment effort focusedlargely on European companies that invest in Iran, as thebest way to topple Ahmadinejad. On the Palestinians,Netanyahu did not object to supporting President Abbas butsaid Israel and the U.S. should first focus more on"strangling" Hamas. Netanyahu asserted that Israel'smishandling of the Lebanon war had strengthened Israel'senemies. He predicted that Olmert would not be able to stayin power much longer, then described several differentmechanisms for forming a new government. Netanyahu expressedconfidence that the Israeli public recognized that he hadbeen right, that unilateral withdrawals were a mistake, and

    that the priority now must be stopping Iran. Netanyahu notedthat he thought dropping the "right of return" was the acidtest of Arab intentions and insisted that he would neverallow a single Palestinian refugee to return to Israel. EndSummary.

    2. (U) House Middle East and South Asia SubcommitteeChairman Gary Ackerman, accompanied by the Ambassador, PolCouns, Subcommittee Staff Director David Adams, and Staffmember Howard Diamond called on Opposition and Likud PartyLeader Binyamin Netanyahu at the Knesset April 11. Netanyahuwas joined by foreign policy adviser Dore Gold and MFA NorthAmerican Department Congressional liaison Eyal Sela.

    Toppling Ahmadinejad--------------------

    3. (C) Representative Ackerman told Netanyahu that in hismeeting the day before with Egyptian President Mubarak, hehad asked Mubarak if military action were necessary toprevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, should thestrike be carried out by the U.S. or Israel? Mubarak hadresponded that if it came to that, the U.S. should do it and

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    Israel should stay out. Netanyahu said he took Mubarak'spoint, but commented that he thought the Iranian regime, orat least President Ahmadinejad, could be toppled by economicpressure, including a divestment campaign. Noting thateconomic sanctions lose their effect over time, but can bepowerful in the short term. The goal should be to encourageAhmadinejad's political rivals to remove him from power.Afterward, if the pressure could be maintained it might bepossible to bring down the entire Iranian regime, but thatwould also entail identifying alternative leaders. The idea

    was to use economic pressure to create a public sense ofregime failure. Netanyahu said he had consulted with notedhistorian Bernard Lewis, who believed that Iran would be lessdangerous once Ahmadinejad was removed.

    4. (C) Netanyahu said there were three bills in Congressdesigned to divest U.S. pension funds from investing in about300, mostly European, companies currently doing business inIran. Divestment would immediately bring down the creditratings of these companies, thus forcing them to respond.Netanyahu urged Congress to support the divestmentlegislation, adding that he also planned to use a visit tothe U.S. to raise the issue with Wall Street fund managers.

    His approach was to tie in Darfur to expand the scope ofanti-genocide divestment and link it to U.S. policy goals.Netanyahu said he was unsure that financial pressures wouldbe enough to stop Iran's nuclear program, but he wasconfident they would succeed in bringing down Ahmadinejad.He commended Dore Gold's efforts to put Ahmadinejad on agenocide watch list as part of a broader effort todelegitimize the Iranian President. Asked about the qualityof U.S. and Israeli intelligence on Iran, Netanyahu said hisnightmare was that we had missed part of the Iranian program.He added that if the current intelligence was correct, itwould take Iran a few more years to develop a nuclear weapon.He agreed with Ambassador Jones' assessment that

    TEL AVIV 00001114 002 OF 003

    Ahmadinejad's announcement of a breakthrough in Iran'scentrifuge program was probably exaggerated. It would becritical, Netanyahu stressed, to target companies investingin Iran's energy sector.

    Bring Down Hamas

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    ----------------

    5. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked Netanyahu for his views onPalestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Netanyahu said Abbaswas a "nice man who means well," but he added that Israel andthe U.S. should focus on "bringing down Hamas" through an"economic squeeze." Netanyahu asserted that eight monthsago, the Hamas government had been on the brink of collapse,but had become stronger because Israel became weaker as aresult of the Lebanon war. Without elaborating, Netanyahu

    said it would be easier to weaken Hamas than to strengthenAbbas.

    6. (C) Netanyahu commented that Shimon Peres had admitted tohim that the Oslo process had been based on a mistakeneconomic premise, and as a result European and U.S.assistance to the Palestinians had gone to create a bloatedbureaucracy, with PA employees looking to the internationalcommunity to meet their payroll. Netanyahu predicted thatPalestinians would vote for Abbas if they believe that he candeliver the money. He suggested putting in place an"economic squeeze with an address," so that Hamas wouldreceive the popular blame. Asked if Fatah knew how to

    conduct an election campaign, Netanyahu said the Palestinianpatronage system should be forced to collapse, which wouldhave an immediate impact since the entire Palestinian economywas based on graft and patronage. Instead, he asserted, theopposite was happening. Hamas was also handling the prisonerrelease issue well since they had created the impression thatHamas was in control of the process and "sticking it to theIsraelis."

    7. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked if Abbas would survivepolitically. Netanyahu said he was unsure, since politicswere stressful, especially Palestinian politics. The policy,he added, should be to starve the NUG. If any money isgiven, it should go directly to Abbas. Netanyahu said it wasnot clear the GOI has a policy, there was a general climateof weakness.

    Lebanon War Failures--------------------

    8. (C) Turning to the Second Lebanon War, Netanyahu said theproblem was not the war's goals but rather the disconnectbetween goals and methods. If the IDF had used a flanking

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    move by a superior ground force, it could have won easily.Instead, Israel "dripped troops into their gunsights," anapproach he termed "stupid." The top leadership had lacked asense of military maneuver. In addition, they had beenafraid to take military casualties, but instead got manycivilian casualties. If Olmert had mobilized the reserves inten days, seized ground, destroyed Hizballah in southernLebanon, and then withdrawn, he would be a hero today.Instead, Netanyahu predicted, Olmert will not lastpolitically. Olmert's current public support levels of three

    percent were unsustainable.

    A New Government?-----------------

    9. (C) Netanyahu said the pressure on Olmert wasaccumulating as a result of corruption investigations as wellas the impending release of the Winograd Commission's interimreport. Olmert could be pushed out as a result of arebellion within the Kadima Party. Kadima members arerealizing they cannot allow Olmert to stay in power, butKadima itself might collapse since it was a "fake party."Netanyahu described several options, including Kadima

    replacing Olmert, a new coalition formed in the Knesset, orNetanyahu's preferred option, new elections. New elections,he stated, are supported by sixty-five percent of the public.Netanyahu insisted he was in no rush since he was "enjoyingthe time with his family" and rebuilding the Likud Party.Likud was reaching thousands of new supporters, includingmany highly educated professionals and high techentrepreneurs, through the internet.

    10. (C) Netanyahu asserted there was a growing sense in thepublic that he had been right in the last election.

    TEL AVIV 00001114 003 OF 003

    Unilateral "retreats" (i.e. such as the withdrawals from Gazaand southern Lebanon) were the wrong way to go. Israel hadallowed an Iranian enclave to establish itself in Gaza.Syria was arming itself for the first time in 20 years,Hizballah had rearmed since the war, and Gaza was beingturned into a bunker. Egypt was not doing on a twelve milefront along the Gaza border what Jordan was doing on a150-mile front. The way out was to stop Iran, thereby

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    dealing with the octopus, not just its tentacles.

    Right of Return the Acid Test-----------------------------

    11. (C) Netanyahu stated that a return to the 1967 bordersand dividing Jerusalem was not a solution since furtherwithdrawals would only whet the appetite of radical Islam.Ackerman asked if the Palestinians would accept peace basedon the 1967 lines. Netanyahu said he would not agree to such

    a withdrawal since the 1967 lines were indefensible, but headded that the "right of return" was the real acid test ofArab intentions. Instead of Israel making more step-by-stepconcessions, Israel should insist that further concessions belinked to reciprocal steps toward peace. The Palestiniansmust drop the right of return and accept Israel's right toexist. The Arab initiative did not meet this standard sinceit keeps the right of return open. Israel will only have apeace partner when the Palestinians drop the right of return.Asked whether Israel could accept case by case exceptions,Netanyahu insisted not one refugee could ever return. Israel,after all, was not asking for the right of Jews to return toBaghdad or Cairo.

    12. (C) Netanyahu said UNSCR 242 was not a bad formula sinceit did not specify precisely from which territories Israelwould withdraw. After the withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon,there was deep disillusionment among Israelis about theprinciple of land for peace. Even the noted Israeli leftistwriter AB Yehoshua had said in a recent interview that hedespaired about peace because the Arabs wanted all of Israel.From 1948 to 1967, the conflict had not been about occupiedterritories, but that point had been obscured by "effectivepropaganda." The root of the conflict was an Arab desire todestroy Israel, which had now become part of the largerambitions of radical Islam.

    13. (C) The 1967 borders were not the solution since Israelwas the only force blocking radical Islam's agenda ofoverrunning Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu proposed thatIsrael offer to work with the Saudis against Iran. If Iranwas not stopped, there would be no agreement with thePalestinians, and the peace treaties with Jordan and Egyptwould come under tremendous pressure. There could be nodeterrence against "crazies" such as Ahmadinejad. Netanyahuadvised Congress to expedite the legislative effort for

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    divestment. If that did not work, we could reconsider otheroptions. Congressman Ackerman said that if Netanyahu came toWashington, he would hold a hearing on divestment.

    14. (U) CODEL Ackerman did not have the opportunity to clearthis message.

    ********************************************* ********************

    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    You can also access this site through the State Department'sClassified SIPRNET website.********************************************* ********************JONES

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    Help us extend and def end this work

    Viewing cable 07T ELAVIV2280, APHSCT T OWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITH

    If you are new to t hese pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to

    discuss t hem with others. See also t he FAQs

    Reference ID Date Classif icat ion Origin

    07TELAVIV2280 2007-07-26 13:01 SECRET Embassy Tel Aviv

    VZCZCXRO3230PP RUEHROVDE RUEHTV #2280/01 2071352ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 261352Z JUL 07FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIVTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2487

    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002280

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND.

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017TAGS: PTERPRELKNNPKWBGEFINIRISSUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITHMOSSAD DIRECTOR DAGAN

    Classified By: Charge d'affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (B/D).

    1. (S) SUMMARY: Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to thePresident for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AFHSC),

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    met Mossad Director Meir Dagan on July 12 for a generaldiscussion of regional security threats. On the Iraniannuclear program, Dagan proved surprisingly optimistic aboutthe effects of United Nations Security Council (UNSC)resolutions and their impact on Iranian elites. On mostother fronts, however, Dagan expressed deep skepticismregarding any near-term solutions. Dagan believes that theSyrians were emboldened by the Second Lebanon War, and arguedfor a concerted international effort to enforce UNSCresolutions in Lebanon as a means of removing Syria from

    Iranian influence. In Dagan's personal opinion, presentattempts to prop up the government of Prime Minister SalamFayyad will fail, and "an entirely new approach" with thePalestinians is required. Dagan and Townsend surveyedpolitical developments in North Africa, Turkey, and the Gulf,and shared concerns about Pakistan's ability to withstand thechallenge of Islamic radicals. END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------------Financial Sanctions Offer Hope on Iran--------------------------------------

    2. (S) Mossad Director Meir Dagan began his two-hour meeting

    with Townsend by expressing satisfaction with sanctionsagainst Iran. Dagan said UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747caught the Iranians off-guard, and were having an impact onthe Iranian elite and financial community. The resolutionshad been particularly successful through their indirectconsequences, explained Dagan, by stigmatizing Iranianbusinesses and discouraging risk-averse Europeans from beingconnected with Iran. Dagan praised ongoing GOI-USGcooperation on this front, and added that domestic economicproblems were creating additional pressure on the regime.

    3. (S) With regard to their nuclear program, Dagan said theIranians are attempting to convey a "false presentation" thatthey have mastered the uranium enrichment process. Thereality is that they are not there yet, said Dagan, and theyare paying a heavy political price (sanctions) for somethingthey have yet to achieve. Dagan noted growing antipathy inRussia towards Iran and its nuclear program, and said theIranians were shocked by Russian statements accusing them ofsupporting terrorism against the United States. In Dagan'sview, there is no ideological conflict within the Iranianleadership (all wish to see the destruction of Israel), butthere is a growing divide on tactics with some supporting a

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    retaliatory position against the West and others favoring newpolicies of moderation. Recognizing the growing strength ofthe moderate camp, Dagan said that the militant followers ofPresident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are now trying to targetsupporters of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as spies.

    --------------------------------------------- -Gulf States Await Action (From Others) on Iran--------------------------------------------- -

    4. (S) According to Dagan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the GulfStates all fear Iran, but want someone else "to do the jobfor them." Townsend and Dagan discussed the current state ofaffairs in the Saudi royal court, where the Mossad Chiefaccused Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal of playing a "verynegative role." He also pointed to the recent visit of theSaudi King Abdullah to Jordan as a historical first andturning point for relations between the two countries.Townsend agreed, and said that the Saudi king has a sense ofurgency on the political front. Dagan characterized Qatar as"a real problem," and accused Sheikh Hamid of "annoyingeveryone." In his view, Qatar is trying to play all sides --Syria, Iran, Hamas -- in an effort to achieve security and

    some degree of independence. "I think you should remove yourbases from there...seriously," said Dagan. "They haveconfidence only because of the U.S. presence." Daganpredicted, with some humor, that al-Jazeera would be the nextcause of war in the Middle East as some Arab leaders(specifically Saudi Arabia) are willing to take drastic stepsto shut down the channel, and hold Sheikh Hamid personallyresponsible for its provocations.

    ----------------------------Syria Taking Dangerous Risks----------------------------

    TEL AVIV 00002280 002 OF 003

    5. (S) Dagan echoed other reports that Syria expects anIsraeli attack this summer, and has raised its level ofreadiness. Despite the fact that Israel has no intention ofattacking, said Dagan, the Syrians are likely to retaliateover even the smallest incident, which could lead to quickescalation. Dagan believes that Syria's strategic alliance

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    with Iran and Hizballah has not changed, and that Assad viewsthese policies as both "successful and just." There is atendency to assume that Syria can be separated from Iran,said Dagan, and that this offers the key to weakeningHizballah. Dagan argued that the opposite is true: byenforcing UN resolutions on Lebanon and increasing efforts todisarm Hizballah, the international community can remove theglue that binds Iran and Syria. Enforcing the resolutionswould put additional pressure on Assad, who fears being triedfor the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri

    above all else. The advantage of such an approach, continuedDagan, is that the legal ground is already in place foraction by the UNSC. This credible threat could sufficientlyfrighten Syria away from Iran and towards more natural alliesin the Arab League.

    ---------------------------------------------Deep Pessimism on Relations With Palestinians---------------------------------------------

    6. (S) Departing from official GOI policy, Dagan expressedhis personal opinion that after more than a decade of tryingto reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians,

    "nothing will be achieved." Only Israeli military operationsagainst Hamas in the West Bank prevent them from expandingcontrol beyond Gaza, lamented Dagan, without which Fatahwould fall within one month and Abbas would join his"mysteriously wealthy" son in Qatar. Offering what hebelieved to be a conservative estimate, Dagan said that USD 6billion had been invested in the Palestinian Authority since1994. "What did it accomplish, other than adding a few morepeople to the Fortune 500?" asked Dagan. Although heexpressed his personal faith in Salam Fayyad, Dagan said thatthe Palestinian Prime Minister had no power base. Fatah as aparty would have to completely reorganize itself in order toregain credibility, argued Dagan, but instead they have

    turned once again to the "old guard." The Mossad Chiefsuggested that a completely new approach was required, butdid not provide Townsend any additional details.

    --------------------------------------Pakistan...and Other Regional Concerns--------------------------------------

    7. (S) Townsend and Dagan then embarked on an informal tourof the region, comparing notes on countries critical to

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    combating terrorism. Dagan characterized a Pakistan ruled byradical Islamists with a nuclear arsenal at their disposal ashis biggest nightmare. Al-Qaeda and other "Global Jihad"groups could not be relied upon to behave rationally once inpossession of nuclear weapons, said Dagan, as they do notcare about the well being of states or their image in themedia. "We have to keep (President Pervez) Musharaf inpower," said Dagan. In North Africa, Dagan contended thatQaddafi needs to be pushed more in order to put Libya on theright track. Qaddafi faces little domestic pressure, said

    Dagan, but has traditionally responded to outside threats andruns foreign policy based on his emotions. The only reasonQaddafi moderated his position to begin with, said Dagan, wasthat he feared that he was "in the crosshairs" for regimechange. Dagan viewed the situation in Algeria as moreserious, with the south of the country becoming increasinglydangerous and the leadership uncertain as it faces radicalIslamic forces. Morocco is coping better with these issues"in spite of the king," said Dagan, who appears to takelittle interest in governing. In Turkey, Dagan said thatIslamists there are not of the same cloth as others in theregion, but he does fear that they are slowly breaking downthe secular character of the state and could become more

    radical over time. Dagan argued that if the Turkish militaryreceived more direct support from the United States, it wouldbe better able to prevent the rise of Islamists.

    ********************************************* ********************Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    You can also access this site through the State Department'sClassified SIPRNET website.********************************************* ********************

    TEL AVIV 00002280 003 OF 003

    CRETZ

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    Viewing cab le 07TELAVIV2652, U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD

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    Reference ID Date Classif icat ion Origin

    07TELAVIV2652 2007-08-31 12:12 SECRET Embassy Tel Aviv

    VZCZCXRO5629PP RUEHROVDE RUEHTV #2652/01 2431245ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 311245Z AUG 07FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIVTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3082INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0817RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1007RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0441RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0434RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 002652

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017TAGS: PRELPTERMARRMASSKNNPUNSCPKIRIZZPJO, EG, RS, CH, LE, SY, ISSUBJECT: U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSADCHIEF MEIR DAGAN

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

    -------

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    SUMMARY-------

    1. (S) In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief MeirDagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support ofIsrael as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOUthat provides Israel with USD 30 billion in securityassistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment ofthe Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey, stressingIsrael's (a) concern for President Musharraf's well-being,

    (b) view that Iran can be forced to change its behavior, and(c) sense that Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon areunstable with unclear futures ahead of them. Dagan probedfor more detail about U.S. military assistance to the Gulfstates, and -- while signaling agreement with the U.S.approach to the Gulf states vis-a-vis Iran -- cautioned thatthey may not be able to absorb significant militaryassistance. Dagan reviewed Israel's five-pillar strategyconcerning Iran's nuclear program, stressed that Iran iseconomically vulnerable, and pressed for more activity withIran's minority groups aimed at regime change. Dagan urgedcaution in providing assistance to the Siniora government inLebanon, noting Syrian and Iranian efforts to topple the GOL.

    2. (S) Under Secretary Burns cited the MOU as tangibleevidence of the USG's commitment to Israel, and stressed thatthe U.S. would support all of its friends -- Arabs included-- in the Middle East, and will remain engaged in the regionfor the long term. He described U.S. efforts to support theMusharraf and Karzai governments as they face opposition fromAl-Qaeda and the Taliban, and explained that the GulfSecurity Dialogue is meant to bolster Gulf states facingthreats from Iran. The Under Secretary reviewed U.S. effortsto isolate Iran and increase pressure on it, stressing thatthe U.S. is currently focused on the diplomatic track. Heshared USG thinking about the Siniora government in Lebanon,

    and urged that the U.S. and Israel continue to consult onLebanon. END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------------------THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MOU AND ISRAEL'S QME--------------------------------------------

    3. (S) Dagan observed that the signing of the MOU onsecurity assistance could not have come at a better time, andstressed that Israel appreciated America's support. The

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    increase their own military defensive capabilities.Referring to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan warnedthat these countries would not be able to cope with theamount of weapons systems they intend to acquire: "They donot use the weapons effectively."

    6. (S) Dagan said that Jordan has successfully faced downthreats from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and that Egyptis struggling with the question of who will replace PresidentMubarak. He said he sees no hope for the Palestinians, and

    that Israel looks at Syria and Lebanon, and sees onlyinstability. Further afield, it looks at Turkey and seesIslamists gaining momentum there. The question, he asked, ishow long Turkey's military -- viewing itself as the defenderof Turkey's secular identity -- will remain quiet.

    7. (S) If Israel's neighborhood were not unstable enough,Dagan observed, it did not help that Russia is playing a"very negative role" in the region. He observed that all ofthese challenges have to be addressed globally -- they couldnot be dealt with individually. Returning to Jordan as anexample, he noted that the more than one million Iraqirefugees in Jordan were changing Jordanian society, and

    forcing it into a new relationship with Saudi Arabia. Thisis evidenced by Saudi King Abdullah's recent visit to Jordan,which implies greater understanding between the Jordaniansand the Saudis.

    ----------------------------------------DISCUSSION OF THE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE----------------------------------------

    8. (S) Turning to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagansaid that enhancing the capabilities of the Gulf states "isthe right direction to go," especially as they are afraid ofIran. Such a U.S. commitment will be a stabilizing factor in

    the region. Dagan clarified that he would not oppose U.S.security assistance to America's Arab partners. He expressedconcern, nevertheless, about the current policies of thosepartners -- especially with regards to Syria and Iran. Daganadded that if those countries must choose between buyingdefensive systems from the U.S. or France, then he wouldprefer they buy systems from the U.S., as this would bringthem closer to the U.S.

    9. (S) Dagan observed that the challenge facing the U.S. now

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    is how to unite the Gulf states under a shared policy, andpointed to Qatar as the weakest link in the chain, trying toplay all sides. Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S.is trying to get Qatar and its neighbors to look at issuesfrom a regional perspective, and to focus on threats in aunified way. Acting PM Assistant Secretary Mull expressedunderstanding for Israel's frustration with how the regionlooked, but stressed nevertheless that if America did notengage the Gulf states through the GSD, the situation wouldbecome much worse. It is critical to get the Gulf states

    focused on the Iran threat, and to adopt a regional approachto countering it. Encouraging and supporting theircounterproliferation efforts would be crucial. Dagan said heagreed with this approach, stressing that the threat ofradical Islam is real.

    --------------------------------------------- ----IRAN: DAGAN REVIEWS ISRAEL'S FIVE PILLAR STRATEGY--------------------------------------------- ----

    10. (S) Dagan led discussion on Iran by pointing out that theU.S. and Israel have different timetables concerning whenIran is likely to acquire a nuclear capability. He clarified

    that the Israel Atomic Energy Commission's (IAEC) timetableis purely technical in nature, while the Mossad's considersother factors, including the regime's determination tosucceed. While Dagan acknowledged that there is still timeto "resolve" the Iran nuclear crisis, he stressed that Iranis making a great effort to achieve a nuclear capability:"The threat is obvious, even if we have a differenttimetable. If we want to postpone their acquisition of a

    TEL AVIV 00002652 003 OF 005

    nuclear capability, then we have to invest time and effort

    ourselves."

    11. (S) Dagan described how the Israeli strategy consists offive pillars:

    A) Political Approach: Dagan praised efforts to bring Iranbefore the UNSC, and signaled his agreement with the pursuitof a third sanctions resolution. He acknowledged thatpressure on Iran is building up, but said this approach alonewill not resolve the crisis. He stressed that the timetable

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    for political action is different than the nuclear project'stimetable.

    B) Covert Measures: Dagan and the Under Secretary agreed notto discuss this approach in the larger group setting.

    C) Counterproliferation: Dagan underscored the need toprevent know-how and technology from making their way toIran, and said that more can be done in this area.

    D) Sanctions: Dagan said that the biggest successes had sofar been in this area. Three Iranian banks are on the vergeof collapse. The financial sanctions are having a nationwideimpact. Iran's regime can no longer just deal with thebankers themselves.

    E) Force Regime Change: Dagan said that more should be doneto foment regime change in Iran, possibly with the support ofstudent democracy movements, and ethnic groups (e.g., Azeris,Kurds, Baluchs) opposed to the ruling regime.

    12. (S) Dagan clarified that the U.S., Israel and like-mindedcountries must push on all five pillars at the same time.

    Some are bearing fruit now; others would bear fruit in duetime, especially if more attention were placed on them.Dagan urged more attention on regime change, asserting thatmore could be done to develop the identities of ethnicminorities in Iran. He said he was sure that Israel and theU.S. could "change the ruling regime in Iran, and itsattitude towards backing terror regimes." He added, "Wecould also get them to delay their nuclear project. Irancould become a normal state."

    13. (S) Dagan stressed that Iran has weak spots that can beexploited. According to his information, unemploymentexceeds 30 percent nationwide, with some towns and villages

    experiencing 50 percent unemployment, especially among 17-30year olds. Inflation averages more than 40 percent, andpeople are criticizing the government for investing in andsponsoring Hamas, saying that they government should investin Iran itself. "The economy is hurting," he said, "and thisis provoking a real crisis among Iran's leaders." He addedthat Iran's minorities are "raising their heads, and aretempted to resort to violence."

    14. (S) Dagan suggested that more could be done to get the

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    Europeans to take a tougher stand against Iran. UnderSecretary Burns agreed, and suggested that Israel could help

    SIPDISby reaching out to the Europeans. Dagan said that Israel isalready doing this, and would continue to do so. Daganreiterated the need to strike at Iran's heart by engagingwith its people directly. Voice of America (VOA) broadcastsare important, but more radio transmissions in Farsi areneeded. Coordination with the Gulf states is helpful, but

    the U.S. should also coordinate with Azerbaijan and countriesto the north of Iran, to put pressure on Iran. Russia, hesaid, would be annoyed, but it would be fitting, as Russiaappears bent on showing the U.S. that it cannot act globallywithout considering Russia.

    15. (S) Under Secretary Burns stressed that the USG isfocused on Iran not only because of its nuclear program, butalso because it supports terrorism and Shiite militias inIraq. The U.S. approach is currently focused on thediplomatic track and increasing pressure on Iran throughsanctions. Work in the UNSC helps to define the Iraniannuclear threat as one that affects international security,

    and not just that of Israel. While UNSC members Russia,China and Qatar will water down efforts to increase pressureon Iran, it is still worthwhile to push for a third sanctionsresolution. In the meantime, the U.S. will encourage theEuropeans, Japan and South Korea to implement unilateralsanctions against Iran outside the UNSC framework. The U.S.

    TEL AVIV 00002652 004 OF 005

    will continue to encourage banks and financial institutionsto slow down their operations in Iran and financially isolateit. Regarding military pressure, the Under Secretary noted

    that the U.S. has deployed 1-2 carrier battle groups in theGulf over the last six months, and that President Bush hasstated that he will interrupt Iran's activity in Iraq. Asfor outreach to the Iranian people, the VOA is nowbroadcasting programs in Farsi, and the USG is trying to getmore Iranian students to visit the U.S. to promotepeople-to-people relations.

    -----------------------------------------PAKISTAN: ISRAEL WORRIED ABOUT MUSHARRAF

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    -----------------------------------------

    16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf islosing control, and that some of his coalition partners couldthreaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, iswhether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role inaddition to his role as president. If not, he will haveproblems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase inthe number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wonderedwhether he will survive the next few years. Under Secretary

    Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance inAmerican foreign policy since September 11. The U.S. iscommitted to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Talibanand Al-Qaeda activity. The USG will continue to supportPakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost hismilitary defensive capabilities. At the same time, the U.S.is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with eachother militarily. Turning to India, Under Secretary Burnsnoted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, andthat the USG is working effectively to reduce tensionsbetween India and Pakistan.

    -----------------------------

    LEBANON: DAGAN URGES CAUTION-----------------------------

    17. (S) Dagan urged caution with respect to Lebanon, notingthat the results of efforts there to bolster the Sinioragovernment would impact Syria and Iraq. The U.S. and Israel,he said, are on the edge of achieving something in Lebanon,and so cannot afford to drop their guard. What is necessaryis finding the right way to support PM Siniora. "He is acourageous man," Dagan said. Syria, Iran and Hizballah areworking hard against him. Dagan noted that much of what isanimating the leadership of Lebanon to take on Syria ispersonal: "Hariri, Jumblat and others had their parents

    executed by the Syrians." This anti-Syrian sentiment hasforged an alliance based on personal and national interests.Siniora has worked well with the situation, but Dagansuggested that the odds are against him. Under SecretaryBurns replied that the U.S. is trying to give PM Siniora asmuch support as possible, and that we would continue toconsult closely with Israel on Lebanon. He noted that hewould return to Israel in October.

    --------------------

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    MEETING PARTICIPANTS--------------------

    18, (SBU) Accompanying Under Secretary Burns in the meetingwere:-- Ambassador Richard H. Jones-- Acting PM Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull-- Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for InternationalSecurity Affairs Mary Beth Long-- NEA/IPA Deputy Director Nicole Shampaine

    -- Embassy Tel Aviv Counselor for Political Research-- Embassy Tel Aviv Political-Military Officer (notetaker)

    19. (SBU) Accompanying Mossad Chief Meir Dagan in the meetingwere:-- Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Salai Meridor-- Advisor to Foreign Minister Livni Omer Caspi-- Two unidentified Mossad officials

    20. (U) Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns cleared on thiscable.

    ********************************************* ********************

    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    TEL AVIV 00002652 005 OF 005

    You can also access this site through the State Department'sClassified SIPRNET website.********************************************* ********************JONES

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    Viewing cable 09T ELAVIV457, CODEL CARDIN DISCUSSES IRAN, SYRIA, PALESTINIANS,

    If you are new to t hese pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to

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    Reference ID Date Classif icat ion Origin

    09TELAVIV457 2009-02-26 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tel Aviv

    VZCZCXRO3204PP RUEHROVDE RUEHTV #0457/01 0571219ZNY CCCCC ZZHP 261219Z FEB 09FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIVTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0661INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000457

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019TAGS: PRELPGOVKPALISIRSYSUBJECT: CODEL CARDIN DISCUSSES IRAN, SYRIA, PALESTINIANS,AND ISRAEL ELECTION WITH BENJAMIN NETANYAHU

    Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

    1. (C) SUMMARY During their trip to Israel, CODEL Cardindiscussed Iran, Syria, Israel-Palestinian negotiations, andthe Israeli elections with Likud Party leader and candidatefor Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu described anuclear Iran as the greatest threat facing Israel, and urgedstrong economic sanctions backed by a viable military optionto confront a problem that he said threatened the region andcould prove a "tipping point" in world history. Describinghis approach to "economic peace" with the Palestinians,Netanyahu suggested he would cut through bureaucratic

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