1 IS VEIL PIERCING REALLY THE MESS THAT COMMENTATORS THINK IT IS? Ioanna Mesimeri Advocate 1. INTRODUCTION In appropriate cases, the judiciary or the legislature have decided to disregard the principle of corporate personality in order to ‘look behind the corporate person to its real controllers’ 1 and so to reallocate liability among shareholders and corporations 2 . This situation is commonly known as ‘piercing’ or ‘lifting’ the corporate veil and it occurs in an attempt of the courts to focus on the reality of the company instead of its structural form 3 . The doctrine of veil piercing ‘has been generally assumed to exist in all common law jurisdictions’ 4 but without a well-articulated basis. The courts, though, instead of producing comprehensive doctrines as to when the veil should be lifted, they have tended to use some unhelpful metaphors when describing the process of the doctrine 5 . Particularly, they stated that the corporate veil will be lifted when the company is ‘a mere cloak or sham’ 6 , ‘a mere device’ 7 , ‘a mere channel’ 8 , ‘a mask’ 9 , or ‘a façade concealing the real facts’ 10 . Thus, the absence of a certain principle to veil piercing, ‘has been the subject of intense scrutiny by both judges and scholars’ as it has provoked many issues that need to be examined at theoretical, doctrinal and empirical levels 11 . In this regard, the very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] 12 has introduced a new approach at the concept of veil. However, it is debated whether Prest represents ‘a fresh start to this sometimes vexed area of corporate law’ 13 or if it enhances even more the controversy and complexity of the veil piercing approach. 1 Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd (1986) 5 N.S.W.L.R. 254 at 264. 2 Mohamed F. Khimji and Christopher C. Nicholls ‘Corporate Veil Piercing and Allocation of Liability: Diagnosis and Prognosis’ (2015) 30 B.F.L.R. 211 3 Tan Cheng-Han, ‘Veil piercing - a fresh start’ (2015) J.B.L. 1 4 Prest v Petrodel [2013] UKSC 34; [2013] 3 W.L.R. 1 at [80], per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC 5 Ibid (n 3) 6 Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] 1 Ch. 935 CA at 961, 965 and 969. 7 Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 W.L.R. 832 Ch D at 836 8 Ibid (n 6) 9 Ibid (n 7) 10 Woolfson v Strathclyde RC 1978 S.C. (H.L.) 90 HL at 96; Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] 2 W.L.R. 657 CA (Civ Div) at 759; Win Line (UK) Ltd v Masterpart (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1999] 2 S.L.R.(R) 24 at [39] 11 Ibid (n 2) 12 Prest v Petrodel [2013] UKSC 34; [2013] 3 W.L.R. 1 13 Ibid (n 3)
24
Embed
IS VEIL PIERCING REALLY THE MESS THAT COMMENTATORS THINK …
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
1
IS VEIL PIERCING REALLY THE MESS THAT COMMENTATORS THINK IT IS?
Ioanna Mesimeri Advocate
1. INTRODUCTION
In appropriate cases, the judiciary or the legislature have decided to disregard the principle of
corporate personality in order to ‘look behind the corporate person to its real controllers’1 and so to
reallocate liability among shareholders and corporations2. This situation is commonly known as
‘piercing’ or ‘lifting’ the corporate veil and it occurs in an attempt of the courts to focus on the reality
of the company instead of its structural form3. The doctrine of veil piercing ‘has been generally
assumed to exist in all common law jurisdictions’4 but without a well-articulated basis. The courts,
though, instead of producing comprehensive doctrines as to when the veil should be lifted, they have
tended to use some unhelpful metaphors when describing the process of the doctrine5. Particularly,
they stated that the corporate veil will be lifted when the company is ‘a mere cloak or sham’6, ‘a mere
device’7, ‘a mere channel’8, ‘a mask’9, or ‘a façade concealing the real facts’10. Thus, the absence of a
certain principle to veil piercing, ‘has been the subject of intense scrutiny by both judges and scholars’
as it has provoked many issues that need to be examined at theoretical, doctrinal and empirical
levels11. In this regard, the very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd
[2013]12 has introduced a new approach at the concept of veil. However, it is debated whether Prest
represents ‘a fresh start to this sometimes vexed area of corporate law’13 or if it enhances even more
the controversy and complexity of the veil piercing approach.
1 Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd (1986) 5 N.S.W.L.R. 254 at 264. 2 Mohamed F. Khimji and Christopher C. Nicholls ‘Corporate Veil Piercing and Allocation of Liability: Diagnosis and Prognosis’ (2015) 30 B.F.L.R. 211 3 Tan Cheng-Han, ‘Veil piercing - a fresh start’ (2015) J.B.L. 1 4 Prest v Petrodel [2013] UKSC 34; [2013] 3 W.L.R. 1 at [80], per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC 5 Ibid (n 3) 6 Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] 1 Ch. 935 CA at 961, 965 and 969. 7 Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 W.L.R. 832 Ch D at 836 8 Ibid (n 6) 9 Ibid (n 7) 10 Woolfson v Strathclyde RC 1978 S.C. (H.L.) 90 HL at 96; Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] 2 W.L.R. 657 CA (Civ Div) at 759; Win Line (UK) Ltd v Masterpart (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1999] 2 S.L.R.(R) 24 at [39] 11 Ibid (n 2) 12 Prest v Petrodel [2013] UKSC 34; [2013] 3 W.L.R. 1 13 Ibid (n 3)
2
This essay will critically evaluate the validity of the statement made by John H. Matheson, that veil
piercing is ‘generally recognized by both courts and commentators an incomprehensible mess’14. The
most appropriate way to do that is by analysing the process of veil piercing in chronological order15.
For that purpose, this essay will be divided into two sections, the law before and the law after the
leading case of Prest. The first section will provide information on how the concept of corporate veil
started to exist and it will then analyse the judicial and statutory provisions of lifting the veil as these
have been occurred before 2013. In this timeframe, it will also be considered the tortious liability in
terms of veil piercing. The second section will focus on the very famous case of Prest. It will discuss in
detail the facts of the case and evaluate the two principles that have been arisen from the judgments;
the concealment and evasion principles. That section will then criticise the commentary and cases
following the Prest and finally, it will provide and evaluate the suggested frameworks for preserving
veil piercing. Those frameworks have been proposed by academics who are against the existing
situation of veil piercing. Therefore, the argument as to whether or not the concept of veil piercing
can indeed be considered messy will be demonstrated through the whole analysis of the document
by providing critiques for the situation and operation of the veil lifting before and after Prest.
2. THE LAW BEFOR PREST
2.1. Judicial provisions or grounds for lifting the veil before 2013
The very first thing that is needed to be clarified in order to understand the term ‘veil piercing’ is the
meaning of the principle which is commonly known as the ‘veil of incorporation’. This principle
indicates that a company is a separate legal personality completely distinct from its members and it
was firmly established in the case of Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] 16 ‘which has been
described, as recently as 1986, as the corner-stone of modern company law’17. In that case, Salomon,
a sole trader, transferred his business into a company (Salomon Ltd.) incorporated by himself and his
family18. The price from the transfer was paid to Salomon in £10,000 debentures (secured against the
14 John H. Matheson, ‘The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context’ (2009) 87 NCLRev 1091, 1095 15 Alan Dignam and John Lowry, Company Law (9th edn, OUP 2016) 32 16 Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 17 Lynn Gallagher and Peter Ziegler, ‘Lifting the corporate veil in the pursuit of justice’ (1990) J.B.L. 1990 292, 303 18 Ibid (n 16)
3
business assets), £20,000 in £1 shares and £9,000 cash19. Thus, Mr Salomon was the main shareholder
with 20001 shares as his family was holding only the remaining six shares20. When the company
subsequently collapsed and went into liquidation, Salomon, who was also one of the secured creditor
because of the debentures, made a claim against the other creditors21. The liquidator alleged that
company was a sham because, in fact, ‘the company and Mr. Salomon were one and the same or
alternatively, that the company carried on business on Salomon's behalf’22. The Court of Appeal (CA),
stating the company to be a myth as it had been incorporated against the intention of the Companies
Act 186223. On appeal, though, the House of Lords held that the company was not fake and that the
corporation’s debts were not Salomon’s debts because these two were two distinct legal entities and
so a company ‘must be treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities
appropriate to itself’24.
Since the Salomon case, the principle of separate legal entity ‘has been followed as an
uncompromising precedent’25 in many later cases such as Macaura v Northern Assurance Co.26, Lee v
Lee’s Air Farming Limited27, and the Farrar case28. Therefore, the ‘legal fiction’ of corporate veil affirms
that a company is a legal entity distinct and independent from the personalities of its shareholders29
and so, it has different duties or liabilities from those of its shareholders who are only liable for their
capital contributions, referred to as ‘limited liability’30. This doctrine enables individuals to pursue
their financial purpose as a single unit, without disclosure to liabilities or risks in one’s own capacity31.
Hence, under that principle, ‘a company can own property, execute contracts, raise debt, make
investments and assume other rights and obligations, independent of its members’32. Furthermore,
19 Ibid 20 Ibid 21 Ibid 22 Ibid (n 17) 23 Ibid (n 16) 24 Ibid per Lord Halsbury L.C. 25 Marc Moore, 'A Temple Built on Faulty Foundations: Piercing the Corporate Veil and the Legacy of Salomon v Salomon' (2006) JBL 180 26 Macaura v Northern Assurance Co. (1925) AC 619 27 Lee v Lee's Air Farming Limited (1961) AC 12 28 Farrar v Farrars Ltd., (1888) 40 ChD 395 29 Murray A. Pickering, 'The Company as a Separate Legal Entity' (1968) 31 Mod. L. Rev. 481. 30 P.W. Ireland, 'The Rise of the Limited Liability Company' (1984) 12 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 239. 31 Ayton Ltd. v Popely (2005) EWHC 810 (Ch) 32 John Lowry and Arad Reisberg, Pettet's Company Law: Company Law and Corporate Finance (4th edn, Pearson 2012).
4
veil of incorporation facilitates legal course as corporations can prosecute and be prosecuted on their
own name33. Lastly and importantly, the separate legal personality enables company to survive after
the death of its shareholders34.
However, soon after Salomon decision, the human ingenuity started applying the veil of incorporation
‘blatantly as a cloak for fraud or improper conduct’35. Therefore, it was required for the Courts ‘to
break through or lift the corporate veil and look at the persons behind the company who are the real
beneficiaries of the corporate fiction’36. In the case of United States v Milwaukee Refrigeration Transit
Company, it was correctly stated that ‘[a] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general
rule—but when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud or defend crime the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons’37. Through a
detailed discussion of many decisions following Salomon, it undoubtedly became obvious that there
were important reasons why corporate veil should be lifted in particular cases38. First of all,
notwithstanding a company is considered a legal person, it is impossible to be always treated ‘like any
other independent person’ as Lord Halsbury affirmed in Salomon case 39. For instance, a company is
unable to perpetrate a crime or a tort which needs evidence of mens rea if the courts do not ignore
the separate personality and define the purpose of the directors and shareholders40. Moreover, by
obeying strictly to that principle, there is the possibility to have a misleading or unfair consequence
‘if interested parties can “hide” behind the shield of limited liability’41. And somehow like that, judicial
discretion and legislative action started permitting the veil of incorporation to be disregarded when
some unfairness or illegality is purposed or would occurred42.
Two well-known examples of the first cases that have triggered the ‘façade’ exception of Salomon are
found in Gilford Motor Co v Horne (1933) and in Jones v Lipman (1962). In Gilford, the defendant who
33 Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. Ltd. v Hawkins, (1859) 4 Hurl & N 87. 34 Re Noel Tedman Holdings Pty Ltd. (1967) Qdr 561 35 Lifting of the Corporate Veil (LawTeacher, November 2013) <https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/business-law/article-on-lifting-of-the-law-essays.php> accessed 38 November 2017 36 Ibid 37 United States v Milwaukee Refrigeration Transit Company 142 F.247 (1906) 38 Pickering, “The Company as a Separate Legal Entity” (1968) 31 M.L.R. 481, 482 39 Ibid (n 16) Lord Halsbury, supra n. 10. 40 Lennard's Carrying Company Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1915] A.C. 705 41 Kahn-Freund, ‘Some Reflections on Company Law Reform’ (1944) 7 M.L.R. 54 42 Ibid (n 17) 294
After the decision of the CA in Adams, the courts ‘changed their attitude and strengthened the
Salomon principle’ by narrowing their capacity to ‘dislodge the corporate veil’64 into three
circumstances: firstly, where a company is a single economic unit (in construing a statute/document);
secondly, where the company is classed as a façade hiding the true facts; and thirdly, where it can be
proved that the company is an agent of its shareholders65. Before Adams, the process for establishing
whether a group of companies was a single economic entity was unclear and slightly vague66. This was
illustrated above in the decisions of DHN and Woolfson. Since the case of Adams, the courts have
made it clear that in order to remove the corporate veil of the subsidiary, it is required ‘in addition to
a holding company’s control over the policy structure of its subsidiary, the finding of a façade [..] in
relation to the incorporation of the subsidiary company’67. A façade is found in circumstances where
a company operates for illegitimate or fraudulent purposes68. Examples of that circumstance were
given above in Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne (1933) and Jones v Lipman (1962).
Accordingly, Slade LJ, the judge whose judgment demonstrated the above circumstances, stated that:
[We] do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift the corporate
veil as against a defendant company which is the member of a corporate group
merely because the corporate structure has been used so as to ensure that the legal
liability (if any) in respect of particular future activities of the group (and
correspondingly the risk of enforcement of that liability) will fall on another member
of the group rather than the defendant company. Whether or not this is desirable,
the right to use a corporate structure in this way is inherent in our corporate law.69
Obviously, the decision in Adams restricted importantly the courts’ capability to pierce the veil of
incorporation. It could be reasonably supported that ‘gone are the wild and crazy days when the CA
would lift the veil’ in order to reach justice irrespective the legal efficiency of the corporate structure,
64 Corentin Kerhuel, ‘The corporate personality and the possibility to lift the veil’ (LegaVox, 18 February 2009) <https://www.legavox.fr/blog/corentin-kerhuel/corporate-personality-possibility-lift-veil-230.htm> accessed 3 December 2017 65 Ibid (n 15) 35 66 Ibid (n 64) 67 Stephen Griffin, Company Law fundamental principles (4th edn, Longman 2005) 68 Ibid (n 64) 69 Ibid (n 56) per Slade L.J. at 1026
found in Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods (1998) where the court established that a director is
not personally liable for a negligent misstatement if there is no ‘reasonable reliance by claimant on
an assumption of personal responsibility by individual so as to create a special relationship between
them’93. A more relaxed approach was given in MCA Records Inc v. Charly Records Ltd. (No. 5) (2003)
where it was stated that an individual will be found liable for a wrongful act if his involvement or
participation ‘go beyond the exercise of constitutional control’94. Thus the provisions in commercial
tort are under construction and their difference with the personal injury torts lies upon the absent of
the use of duty of care and the negligent misstatement.
2.3 Statutory provisions for lifting the veil
Apart from the judiciary, statutory provisions have also dealt with the very controversial issue of veil
piercing. For example, there are numerous taxation provisions adopted in order to ignore the distinct
entities in the group and prevent tax avoidance which is usually aimed through the transferring of
assets and liabilities between the groups95. Moreover, section 16(2) of the Companies Act 2006
bestows corporate personality to companies96. The Act, however, can discard corporate personality
and enforce liability on those behind the veil if any of its provisions are infringed97. After Salomon
case, the Parliament introduced an offence of ‘fraudulent trading’98. Section 993 of the Company Act
2006 contains the criminal offence of fraudulent trading and ss213-215 of Insolvency Act 1986
contains the civil provisions which are those used to pierce the corporate veil99.
Section 213 states that when a company ends up and it seems that any of the company’s business has
been performed with the intention to defraud creditors, or for any other deceitful purpose, the court
may demand any person who consciously contributed in the sham to make such input to the
corporation's assets as the court thinks appropriate100. This provision was operated difficulty in
93 Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods (1998) UKHL 17 94 MCA Records Inc v. Charly Records Ltd. (No. 5) (2003) 95 Ibid (n 15) 30 96 Chrispas Nyombi, ‘Lifting the veil of incorporation under common law and statute’ (2013) 56 IJLMA 66, 73 97 Ibid 98 Ibid (n 15) 30 99 Ibid 100 Insolvency Act 1986, Section 213
11
practice101 as there was the probability to arise a criminal charge too102. For that reason, the courts
established the standard for intent quite high103. As the court elucidated in Re Patrick and Lyon Ltd
(1933), this required evidencing ‘actual dishonesty, involving, according to current notions of fair
trading among commercial men, real moral blame’104. But due to the difficulty in reaching this
standard, s214 was added in the Insolvency Act 1986 to cope with what is identified as ‘wrongful
trading’105. Section 214 established that there is no necessity to show dishonesty106. This provision
was named ‘wrongful trading’ and provides that a reasonable director could recognise when company
was about to wind up and so to stop business at this point107. If a director insisted to run the business
after this point, he jeopardised having to contribute to the company’s debts108. The is illustrated in
the case of Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd (No 2) (1989)109. The difference here is that s213
refers to anyone involved in the company while s214 covers only directors110. Limited liability of the
directors may be indirectly affected in small companies where directors are also members of the
corporation and in parent companies where directors are performed as a shadow director111.
To sum up the aforementioned, there is no doubt that the law before Prest was confusing and
controversial. Although the decision in Adams gave a more specific approach on when the veil should
be lifted, ambiguities and divided opinions were still occurring112. Under statute, it was noticed a less
controversial approach in terms of lifting the corporate veil but ‘there has been little in terms of
development on the statutory exception to the corporate personality doctrine’113. Therefore, the
challenges of yesteryear remained, ‘common law exceptions to the corporate personality doctrine
[were] slowly being developed by courts while statutory exceptions [had] remained largely
101 Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 14) (2003) 102 Ibid (n 15) 31 103 Ibid 104 Re Patrick and Lyon Ltd (1933) Ch 786 105 Ibid (n 15) 31 106 Ibid 107 Ibid 108 Ibid 109 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd (No 2) [1989] 5 BCC 569 110 Ibid (n 15) 31 111 Ibid 112 Ibid (n 93) 113 Ibid
12
unchanged’114. It was, thus, time for a new era in the company law in order to eliminate that
controversy. This derived with the decision in Prest.
3. THE LAW AFTER PREST
3.1 Facts and the Principles
The leading case of Prest is about a disagreement regarding the allocation of matrimonial assets. Mr
Prest was the only owner of numerous offshore companies which each had legal title to determined
properties115. At the divorce procedures, Mrs Prest required to get a transfer of many of these
properties116. At the first hearing in the family court, it was held by Moylan LJ that despite the absence
of a general principle, the corporate veil could be pierced under s.24(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act
1973 and so Mr Prest was ordered to transfer an amount of properties to Mrs Prest117. On appeal to
the Court of Appeal, it was concluded that the Family Division was not competent to decide under the
particular act for the distribution of the companies’ assets owned by one party to the marriage118. The
Act did not grant to the courts a broader realm to disregard the company’s separate personality than
it was obtainable at common law119. Per se, without justification to lift the veil at common law, Mrs
Prest’s demand could not obtained120. Mrs Prest appealed then to the Supreme Court121. The appeal
was allowed on the ground that the properties were held in trust for Mrs Prest by the company and
not by allowing to pierce the corporate veil122.
It is interesting here to mention the thought of Lord Neuberger regarding the doctrine that is available
to courts, without statutory power, to lift the corporate veil:
It is […] clear from the cases and academic articles that the law relating to the
doctrine is unsatisfactory and confused. Those cases and articles appear to me to
suggest that (i) there is not a single instance in this jurisdiction where the doctrine
has been invoked properly and successfully, (ii) there is doubt as to whether the
doctrine should exist, and (iii) it is impossible to discern any coherent approach,
applicable principles, or defined limitations to the doctrine123.
The aforementioned statement clearly illustrates that the judges themselves realise and recognise the
ambiguity and controversy which appear in company law cases involving veil piercing. Since the judges
cannot demonstrate a clear view regarding the particular issue and instead they resort to assumptions
like the above, it seems that veil piercing may be indeed the mess that commentators think it is.
In that case, the leading judgment regarding the piercing of veil was delivered by Lord Sumption who
claimed that the law concerning the situations in which it would be permitted for the courts to lift the
veil was identified by ‘inadequate reasoning’124. According to Lord Sumption, English law has no
general principle of lifting the veil but it has a range of particular principles that lead to the same
outcome in some cases125. Moreover, he asserted that the conclusion in Adams case, namely that
some dishonesty by the company member is needed in order to pierce the veil, was not adequate to
be employed and ensure justice in similar cases126. He continued by observing that ‘[t]he difficulty is
to identify what is a relevant wrongdoing’ and that ‘[r]eferences to a “facade” or “sham” beg too
many questions to provide a satisfactory answer’127. In this regard, his Lordship suggested ‘two distinct
principles’ which can appropriately be named the ‘concealment principle’ and the ‘evasion
principle’128.
An analogous view has been implemented in Singapore in Tjong Very Sumito v Chan Sing En, where it
was stated that:
Courts will, in exceptional cases, be willing to pierce the corporate veil to impose
personal liability on the company’s controllers. While there is as yet no single test
to determine whether the corporate veil should be pierced in any particular case,
there are, in general, two justifications for doing so at common law — first, where
the evidence shows that the company is not in fact a separate entity; and second,
123 Ibid 124 Prest v Petrodel [2013] UKSC 34 per Lord Sumption at 19 125 Ibid 126 Ibid 127 Ibid at 28 128 Ibid
14
where the corporate form has been abused to further an improper purpose.129
In Lord Sumption’s view, the concealment principle did not involve true veil-piercing while the evasion
principle did involve130. Particularly, the Lord specified that:
The concealment principle is legally banal and does not involve piercing the
corporate veil at all. It is that the interposition of a company or perhaps several
companies so as to conceal the identity of the real actors will not deter the courts
from identifying them, assuming that their identity is legally relevant. In these
cases, the court is not disregarding the “facade”, but only looking behind it to
discover the facts which the corporate structure is concealing.131
He then continued by explaining the notion of the evasion principle which is completely different
from the aforementioned one:
It is that the court may disregard the corporate veil if there is a legal right against
the person in control of it which exists independently of the company’s
involvement, and a company is interposed so that the separate legal personality of
the company will defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement. Many cases will fall
into both categories, but in some circumstances the difference between them may
be critical. This may be illustrated by reference to those cases in which the court
has been thought, rightly or wrongly, to have pierced the corporate veil.132
After submitting the two principles, Lord Sumption concluded that lifting the corporate veil should be
considered as a remedy of last resort and that it should be enforced only where there is no other,
more conventional legal mechanism to implement133. The Lord ‘attempted to fundamentally restate
the law on piercing the corporate veil [but] he did not entirely succeed in doing so due to the only
hesitant acceptance by his peers’134. The uncertainties observed by the other judges appeared to take
two directions – that the test seemed too narrow to cope with corporate abuses; or that it contained
129 Tjong Very Sumito and others v Chan Sing En and others [2012] SGHC 125 130 Ibid (n 124) per Lord Sumption at 28 131 Ibid (n 124) per Lord Sumption at 28 132 Ibid 133 Ibid at 35 134 Alexander Schall, ‘The New Law of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the UK’ (2016) 13 ECFR 549, 562
15
an extent of discretion which interpreted into unneeded precariousness135. Under the first camp,
Baroness Hale doubted the probability of neatly categorising all the cases involving the default of the
separate legal entity of a company into two classifications of concealment and evasion. He then
expressed a much broader opinion which suggests that individuals who control limited companies
should not be entitled to ‘take unconscionable advantage of the people with whom they do
business’136. Lords Clarke and Mance seemed to have similar concerns. Although they claimed that it
will be difficult and rare to occur circumstances where the veil will be lifted outside the spectrum of
evasion, they agreed as to the dangerousness ‘to seek to foreclose all possible future situations’ that
may exist137.
Under the second camp, Lord Walker did not seem to approve Lord Sumption’s narrow notion of veil-
lifting as ‘evasion’138. He argued that veil lifting was not a coherent doctrine or rule of law, but merely
a label defining situations where a rule of law creates obvious exceptions to the principle of separate
legal entity139. On the other hand, Lord Neuberger did expressly support Lord Sumption’s test of veil
lifting140. Although, his own point of view seemed to be more affiliated with Lord Walker’s than with
Baroness Hale’s141. His judgment focused on discussing ‘his initially strong attraction to the argument
that the veil-piercing doctrine should be given a quietus’142. Academic views and contradictive
observations critical to the consistency of veil lifting doctrine were canvassed, containing the famous
statement made by Easterbrook and Fischel, ‘that veil-piercing is akin to lightning’, namely ‘rare,
severe and unprincipled’143. Eventually, though, Lord Neuberger was convinced to maintain veil lifting
in the way expressed by Lord Sumption, namely as a ‘potentially valuable judicial tool to undo
wrongdoing in some cases, where no other principle is available’144. Therefore, even Prest is
considered the leading case for lifting the veil today, it appears that the judges of the case itself had
135 Zhong Xing Tan, ‘New Era of Corporate Veil-Piercing: Concealed Cracks and Evaded Issues’
(2016) 28 SAcLJ 209, 213 136 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] 3 WLR 1at 91 137 Ibid at [100], [102] and [103] 138 Ibid at [106] 139 Ibid 140 Ibid at [81] 141 Ibid (n 135) 214 142 Ibid (n 140) 143 Frank H Easterbook & Daniel R Fischel, ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ (1985) 52 ChiLRev 89 144 Ibid (n 136) at 80
16
not agreed in a single principle for lifting the veil and even more interesting is the fact that some of
the judges did not agree at all with the idea of veil piercing.
3.2 Cases and Commentary following Prest
Unsurprisingly, only few cases have dealt with the scope of lifting the corporate veil after the limited
concept of the doctrine given in Prest145. Solicitors have noticed that judges are now extremely
cautious of seeking to lift the veil due to the strict criteria determined in Prest146. They are, however,
more willing to enforce other methods, such as concepts of agency and the law of agency, secure in
the knowledge that these mechanisms do not constitute an assault for the corporate façade147.
For civil matters, the decision of Mrs Justice Rose in Pennyfeathers Limited v Pennyfeathers Property
Company Limited [2013] is probably the most helpful in the area148. That case concerns the planned
residential improvement of a parcel of farmland149. Here, Rose J implemented both the evasion and
concealment principles so as to prevent the investors of the company from sheltering behind the
company150. It has been claimed that Pennyfeathers is possibly a better sample of facts giving effect
to the principle of veil piercing ‘than it is a helpful analysis of the law’151. However, Wibberley and Di
Gioia stated that ‘Rose J’s reading of Prest is questionable’ and ‘it is also questionable whether this is
a case that actually sees the correct application of the concealment principle’152.
A slightly rarer application of the principle is found in the case of Antonio Gramsci Shipping
Corporation v Lembergs [2013] which concerned a dispute over jurisdiction153. In that case, the
principle in Prest constituted just ‘a fallback policy argument’ on the court’s view154. Nonetheless, the
comments of CA provided useful explanation on the appropriate interpretation of Prest155 and
145 James Wibberley and Michelle Di Gioia ‘Lifting, Piercing And Sidestepping The Corporate Vei’ <http://www.guildhallchambers.co.uk/uploadedFiles/PiercingtheCorporate%20Veil.JW,MDG.pdf> accessed 4 December 2017 146 Ibid 147 Ibid 148 Pennyfeathers Limited v Pennyfeathers Property Company Limited [2013] EWHC 3530 149 Ibid 150 Ibid 151 Ibid (n 145) 152 Ibid (n 145) 153 Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corporation v Lembergs [2013] EWCA Civ 730 154 Ibid (n 145) 155 Ibid (n 153) at 65
17
examined the probability of extending the principle156. Lord Beat, though, explained that at least for
the time being, expansions of the doctrine will be difficult to occur157.
It is also worth noting here the leading judgment of LJ Treacy in Regina v Peter Sale [2013]158. LJ Treacy
summarised the doctrine in Prest and explained that the particular case is not ‘coming within the
evasion principle referred to at paragraph 28 of Prest’159 but it ‘falls within the concealment
principle’160. Despite the aforementioned argument of Lord Mance that it is yet difficult to extent the
Prest doctrine, it appears that the judgment in R v Peter Sale had slightly extended the concealment
principle by ‘allowing it to be applied where an individual and company act in tandem’ and when that
exists, ‘the individual will not be able to disavow payments received by the company’161.
While the aforementioned cases have somehow applied the evasion and concealment principles, in
Akzo Nobel N.V v Competition Commission (2013) the court refused to limit its considerations to
concealment and evasion as just two of the judges in Prest appeared to be agreed with that two-
principle veil piercing exception162. Particularly, it has been noted that ‘a majority of the Supreme
Court, whilst endorsing Lord Sumption's analysis, did not wholly exclude the possibility that
exceptions may also be made in other unspecified but rare circumstances’163 and for that reason the
judges of that case found it reasonable not to follow the narrow doctrine of Prest. Obviously, the
above statement indicates that it is difficult for the law after Prest to be developed in a consistent
manner because cases usually involve exceptional circumstances.
As Dignam and Lowry stated, the Prest case has two sides, on the one hand, it is a significant case in
establishing the limited situations in which veil piercing may exist in future; but on the other hand,
the judgments of Newberger and Sumption leave the impression that ‘veil lifting has never occurred
or at least not to their satisfaction, despite the reality of its presence in the case law over the last
156 Ibid at 66 157 Ibid 158 Regina v Peter Sale [2013] EWCV Civ 1306 159 Ibid at 39 160 Ibid at 40 161 Ibid (n 145) 162 Akzo Nobel N.V v Competition Commission (2013) CAT 13 163 Ibid at 95
18
century’164. Thus the arrival of Prest introduced much debate165. Some, having realised the new era of
veil lifting as ‘a remedy of last resort’, have recommended ‘various causes of action premised on direct
legal relationships between corporate controllers and plaintiffs, whether in contract, tort, unjust
enrichment, agency or accessorial liability’166. In the meantime, some others have been more sceptical
that conservative private law mechanisms would prove efficient in all circumstances167.
Much of the commentary has also concentrated on Lord Sumption’s test for veil lifting and the two
distinct principles of evasion and concealment168. The worth asking question here that should be
addressed is whether the particular test is certain and workable169. Again the opinions are divided. On
the one side, it has been argued that the particular reformulated test ‘will increase certainty for all
concerned using the corporate form’170. On the other hand, however, the coherence and clarity of the
test itself has been criticised. Hannigan supported that the distinction among evasion and
concealment ‘is difficult to apply consistently and objectively’ as ‘[c] oncealment is inherent in many
evasion cases - indeed, evasion is commonly achieved through concealment’171. The view of Gencor
and Trustor is also interesting here as they pointed out that either by using the evasion or
concealment principle, the overall intention of the interposed company was ‘to frustrate enforcement
measures against the interposed company's controllers by concealing the whereabouts of the secret
profits/misappropriated funds’172. Lord Sumption’s purpose of the evasion principle was that the veil
could has been lifted in order to deprive the related controllers from the illegal benefits that they
would alternatively have gained by interposing the corporations in question. Therefore, it is obvious
that ‘any blurring of the lines between the concealment and evasion principles would certainly
undermine the workability of Lord Sumption's test’, whereas, even supposing a level of clarity and
workability, scholars and academics contrast as to whether the test is correctly formulated as a matter
164 Ibid (n 15) 41 165 Ibid (n 135) 215 166 William Day, ‘Skirting around the Issue: The Corporate Veil after Prestv Petrodel’ [2014] LMCLQ
269
167 Ibid (n 135) 215 168 Ibid 169 Ibid 170 Hans Tjio, ‘Lifting the Veil on Piercing the Veil’ [2014] LMCLQ 19, 23 171 Brenda Hannigan, ‘Wedded to Salomon: Evasion, Concealment and Confusion on Piercing the
Veil of the One-man Company’ (2013) 50 Irish Jurist 11, 34 172Ibid 33
19
of principle173.
4. CONCLUSION
By taking everything into consideration, the obvious conclusion to be drawn is that veil piercing is
indeed the mess that commentators think. The most recent amendment in law of veil lifting is the
leading case of Prest which has not actually altered the law. Some scholars have declared that the
doctrine in Prest is to be ‘welcomed’174 as it recognises both: that the principle in Salomon ‘remains a
cornerstone of UK company law’175; and that in the meantime, there are also circumstances in which
the veil should be lifted so as to grant a remedy. While the decision in Prest does clarify that corporate
veil will only be lifted when there has been evasion of liabilities and when no other remedy in law can
offer an appropriate remedy, it does not provide the exact circumstances in which the veil piercing
may still occurred. At the same time, it is fair to admit that it is anyway impossible to categorize those
specific circumstances of the cases. Each case involves its own distinct facts which makes it difficult
to formulate it under a particular model of treatment. After all, it seems that the court simply
repeated the dogmatism approach that the corporate veil could be lifted only in very rare
circumstances. Thus, the only thing that the decision in Prest achieved, is to contribute even more to
the ambiguities surrounding veil piercing. It is therefore well argued that the so broad and
controversial commentary which follows the debate regarding veil piercing and then the case of Prest
creates an unnecessary mess and a useless confusion. The only thing that should be considered in
such cases is that ‘the jurisdiction for veil-piercing need not descend into a state of anarchy merely
because there is no single principle that defines the circumstances for its operation’176. Any trial to
limit the jurisdiction to vague definitions and principles will always prove to be frustrating and
pointless177. Relatively, the jurisdiction is correctly outlined as a discretion ‘which reflects the latitude
needed to respond to the myriad forms by which “abuse” may assume’178. As every case which
involves veil lifting is mainly a request to the court to sustain a policy competing with those underlying
173 Ibid (n 135) 216
174 E Roxburgh, 'Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd: Cold Comfort for Mrs Prest in Scotland' (2013) 32 SLT 223, 225 175JHY Chan, 'Should “Reverse Piercing” of the Corporate Veil be Introduced in English Law' (2014) 35 Comp Law 163 176 Pey Woan LEE, ‘The Enigma of Veil-Piercing’ (2015) 26 IntlCCLR 28, 38 177 Ibid 178 Ibid
20
the distinct corporate personality, ‘clarity and coherence is only achieved by directly addressing the
interests at stake, rather than by applying a set of fixed rules’179.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
179 Ibid
21
Legislation
1. Insolvency Act 1986
Cases
1. Adams v Cape Industries Plc (1990) Ch 443
2. Akzo Nobel N.V v Competition Commission (2013) CAT 13
3. Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corporation v Lembergs [2013] EWCA Civ 730
4. Ayton Ltd. v Popely (2005) EWHC 810 (Ch)
5. Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525
6. Connelly v RTZ Corp (1998) [1998] AC 854
7. Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd [1993] BCLC 480