Intro day 16

Philosophy 11: Introduction to Philosophy

Professor Michael Hicks

12 February 2014

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 1 / 8

Introductory

Administrative issues

Midterm: Friday

I Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA


Introductory


Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up now

I Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA


Introductory


Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notes

I No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA


Introductory


Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.

I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA


Introductory


Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA


The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?

I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?





I We can predict where they’ll all end up.

I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.



Determinism










Determinism










Determinism








Scaling up: what changes?I More complex laws

I More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism








Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditions

I Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism








Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacy

I Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism








Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism









Determinism









DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states

I Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge








DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction

I Divine Foreknowledge








DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge








DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge




Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacy

I Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains

What about non-deterministic laws?

I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any

better




Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction

I Basic problem still remains



better




Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains



better







better





What about non-deterministic laws?I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministic

I If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be anybetter





What about non-deterministic laws?I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any

better


Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategy

I Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.

F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity

I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?




The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom

I Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,a confusion.



Necessity






The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.



Necessity







a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.


Necessity









Necessity









Necessity









NecessityI Everyone believes in it.

I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.








NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])

I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.








NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])

I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.








NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])

I Necessity is opposed to chance.








NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.








NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.




Compatibilism, continued

Freedom

I Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism

I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?




FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do

I Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism







FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraint

I Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism







FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism








Compatibilism








CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural laws

I So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom







CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem

I There is no other idea of freedom







CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom















The problem of free willI Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?

I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?






The problem of free willI Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessity

I Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?






The problem of free willI Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?


Incompatibilism

How to dispute compatibilism

Rationalism

I Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?I We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle hereI But is there, really?

The experience of freedom

I What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlementI If there is an experience that gives us an idea of incompatibilist freedom, we

will have found the problemI Does incompatibilism entail libertarianism?

Searle is a “hard determinist” (incompatibilist anti-libertarian)


Incompatibilism


RationalismI Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?

I We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle hereI But is there, really?






Incompatibilism


RationalismI Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?I We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle here

I But is there, really?






Incompatibilism


RationalismI Do we “intuit” that we are free in an incompatibilist sense?I We certainly intuit that there is a puzzle hereI But is there, really?






Incompatibilism








Incompatibilism



The experience of freedomI What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlement

I If there is an experience that gives us an idea of incompatibilist freedom, wewill have found the problem

I Does incompatibilism entail libertarianism?



Incompatibilism



The experience of freedomI What we need to do is investigate our feeling of puzzlementI If there is an experience that gives us an idea of incompatibilist freedom, we

will have found the problem

I Does incompatibilism entail libertarianism?



Incompatibilism







Incompatibilism







Incompatibilism

Searlean DeterminismsPsychological determinism

I Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he doesI We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) are

mere rationalizationsI Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims are

rationalizationsI Is Hume a psychological determinist?I Psychological determinism is false (91)

Physical determinism

I The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes)matters.

I But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic?I Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason

avoids the problem.

Models of causation

I Top-down story: mental states (e.g., decisions) cause physical events (e.g.,hand-movings)

I Bottom-up story: physical states (e.g., neural processes) explain mental states(e.g., decisions)

I Searle: top-down causal stories can always be replaced with bottom-level onlycausal stories.

I This is why determinism is inescapable


Incompatibilism


I Hypnosis victim claims to have reasons for doing what he does

I We can predict in advance that he’d do it; his reason claims (we think) aremere rationalizations

I Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims arerationalizations

I Is Hume a psychological determinist?I Psychological determinism is false (91)




avoids the problem.

Models of causation






Incompatibilism



mere rationalizations

I Psychological determinism is the claim that all reason claims arerationalizations





avoids the problem.

Models of causation






Incompatibilism




rationalizations





avoids the problem.

Models of causation






Incompatibilism




rationalizationsI Is Hume a psychological determinist?

I Psychological determinism is false (91)Physical determinism



avoids the problem.

Models of causation






Incompatibilism








avoids the problem.

Models of causation






Incompatibilism








avoids the problem.Models of causation






Incompatibilism





Physical determinismI The argument against psychological determinism is that reason (sometimes)

matters.








Incompatibilism






matters.I But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic?

I Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reasonavoids the problem.

Models of causation






Incompatibilism






matters.I But is reason deterministic or anti-deterministic?I Searle argues that there is no good reason to think the invocation of reason

avoids the problem.

Models of causation






Incompatibilism













Incompatibilism













Incompatibilism













Incompatibilism













Incompatibilism











I This is why determinism is inescapableProf. Hicks Phil 11 February 12 8 / 8

Intro day 16

Education

problem small scale

closed box

open book

initial conditionsprof

study guide

open handwritten notesprof

complex lawsprof

typed text