Philosophy 11: Introduction to Philosophy Professor Michael Hicks 5 February 2014 Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 1/8
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Philosophy 11: Introduction to Philosophy
Professor Michael Hicks
5 February 2014
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 1 / 8
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the Person
I Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);I Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;I Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”
Midterm: next Friday
Study Guide will go up this weekend
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 2 / 8
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the PersonI Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);
I Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;I Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”
Midterm: next Friday
Study Guide will go up this weekend
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 2 / 8
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the PersonI Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);I Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;
I Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”
Midterm: next Friday
Study Guide will go up this weekend
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 2 / 8
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the PersonI Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);I Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;I Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”
Midterm: next Friday
Study Guide will go up this weekend
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 2 / 8
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the PersonI Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);I Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;I Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”
Midterm: next Friday
Study Guide will go up this weekend
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 2 / 8
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the PersonI Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);I Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;I Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”
Midterm: next Friday
Study Guide will go up this weekend
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 2 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitative
I Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identity
I Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 3 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitativeI Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”
I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identity
I Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 3 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitativeI Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identity
I Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 3 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitativeI Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identity
I Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 3 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitativeI Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identityI Proportion (mountain)
I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 3 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitativeI Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identityI Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)
I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 3 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitativeI Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identityI Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)
I sympathy of ends (organism)
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 3 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitativeI Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”I That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identityI Proportion (mountain)I Gradualness (erosion)I Common purpose (ship)I sympathy of ends (organism)
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 3 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,cause-and-effect
I Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
I Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
I Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
I Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)
I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’tcause my ideas
Role of memory
I Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
I Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
I Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideas
I But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting it
I What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in theappropriate causal relationship.
I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.
I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?I Am I the same person I was last week?
I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriatelycausally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.
I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.
I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?I Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effectI Resemblance (via memory)I More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memoryI Memory displays causal relations amongst ideasI But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting itI What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.I Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?I Am I the same person I was last week?I Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.I Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 4 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”
I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysis
I Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or therelationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.
I Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.
Our question, then: how to decide between Cartesianism andanti-Cartesianism?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 5 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”
I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together toform a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).
I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when wethink solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysis
I Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or therelationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.
I Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.
Our question, then: how to decide between Cartesianism andanti-Cartesianism?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 5 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).
I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when wethink solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysis
I Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or therelationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.
I Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.
Our question, then: how to decide between Cartesianism andanti-Cartesianism?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 5 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysis
I Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or therelationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.
I Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.
Our question, then: how to decide between Cartesianism andanti-Cartesianism?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 5 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysis
I Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or therelationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.
I Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.
Our question, then: how to decide between Cartesianism andanti-Cartesianism?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 5 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysisI Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or the
relationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.
I Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.
Our question, then: how to decide between Cartesianism andanti-Cartesianism?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 5 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysisI Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or the
relationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.I Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.
Our question, then: how to decide between Cartesianism andanti-Cartesianism?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 5 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”I “two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”I Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).I Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysisI Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or the
relationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.I Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.
Our question, then: how to decide between Cartesianism andanti-Cartesianism?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 5 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in God
I Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tall
I Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be taller
I Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircut
I Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letter
I Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectively
I More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be taller
I But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.
I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What wepredicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
I Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mindthat is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian replyI Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mind
that is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysicallymisleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian replyI Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mind
that is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysically
misleading.
I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objectionConsider the following kinds of speech:
I Joe believes in GodI Joe is 6 ft. tallI Joe wants to be tallerI Joe intends to get a haircutI Joe is writing a letterI Joe wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”I The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectivelyI More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be tallerI But this gets harder and harder.I This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicateof minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian replyI Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mind
that is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”I Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysically
misleading.I But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 6 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
I In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.What about the subject?
I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?
Two examples
I Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?
Two examples
I Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?
Two examples
I Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”I “The” implies just one
I With what right, “the”?
Two examples
I Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?
Two examples
I Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?
Two examples
I Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?
Two examplesI Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unison
I momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?
Two examplesI Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?
Two examplesI Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?
Two examplesI Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!
I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and PredicatesI In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?I In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”I “The” implies just oneI With what right, “the”?
Two examplesI Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unisonI momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just onethinking thing
I The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!I For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 7 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary life
I Meditation is a solitary activityI “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?
I surface : table :: mind : personI So, surface : table :: body : person as well.I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,
but because person is.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 8 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary lifeI Meditation is a solitary activity
I “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?
I surface : table :: mind : personI So, surface : table :: body : person as well.I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,
but because person is.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 8 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary lifeI Meditation is a solitary activityI “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.
I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, wecan ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?
I surface : table :: mind : personI So, surface : table :: body : person as well.I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,
but because person is.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 8 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary lifeI Meditation is a solitary activityI “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?
I surface : table :: mind : personI So, surface : table :: body : person as well.I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,
but because person is.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 8 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary lifeI Meditation is a solitary activityI “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?
I surface : table :: mind : personI So, surface : table :: body : person as well.I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,
but because person is.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 8 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary lifeI Meditation is a solitary activityI “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?I surface : table :: mind : person
I So, surface : table :: body : person as well.I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,
but because person is.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 8 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary lifeI Meditation is a solitary activityI “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?I surface : table :: mind : personI So, surface : table :: body : person as well.
I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,but because person is.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 8 / 8
Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary lifeI Meditation is a solitary activityI “I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.I Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?I surface : table :: mind : personI So, surface : table :: body : person as well.I No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,
but because person is.
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 5 8 / 8
Related Documents
