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Philosophy 11: Introduction to Philosophy Professor Michael Hicks 10 February 2014 Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 1/7
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Page 1: Intro day 15

Philosophy 11: Introduction to Philosophy

Professor Michael Hicks

10 February 2014

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 1 / 7

Page 2: Intro day 15

Introductory

Administrative issues

Theme for this week: Free Will

I Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science

Midterm: Friday

I Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7

Page 3: Intro day 15

Introductory

Administrative issues

Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8

I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science

Midterm: Friday

I Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7

Page 4: Intro day 15

Introductory

Administrative issues

Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science

Midterm: Friday

I Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7

Page 5: Intro day 15

Introductory

Administrative issues

Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science

Midterm: Friday

I Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7

Page 6: Intro day 15

Introductory

Administrative issues

Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science

Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up now

I Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7

Page 7: Intro day 15

Introductory

Administrative issues

Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science

Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notes

I No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7

Page 8: Intro day 15

Introductory

Administrative issues

Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science

Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.

I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7

Page 9: Intro day 15

Introductory

Administrative issues

Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science

Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7

Page 10: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes

1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricism

I Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)

F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 11: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists

2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricism

I Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)

F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 12: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body

3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricism

I Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)

F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 13: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricism

I Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)

F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 14: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricism

I Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)

F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 15: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)

I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason candisclose (independent of experience)

F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 16: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)

F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 17: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)

F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 18: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)

F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 19: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 20: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 21: Intro day 15

The Story up to Now

Rationalism and Empiricism

Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free

The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can

disclose (independent of experience)F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)

I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.

Empiricism is one way of solving the problem

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7

Page 22: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?

I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 23: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.

I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?

I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 24: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?

I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 25: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?

I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 26: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?I More complex laws

I More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 27: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditions

I Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 28: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacy

I Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 29: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 30: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

Determinism

I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 31: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states

I Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 32: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction

I Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 33: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 34: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Determinism as a problem

Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).

I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.

Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws

DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge

Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7

Page 35: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacy

I Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains

What about non-deterministic laws?

I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any

better

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7

Page 36: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction

I Basic problem still remains

What about non-deterministic laws?

I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any

better

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7

Page 37: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains

What about non-deterministic laws?

I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any

better

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7

Page 38: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains

What about non-deterministic laws?

I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any

better

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7

Page 39: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains

What about non-deterministic laws?I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministic

I If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be anybetter

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7

Page 40: Intro day 15

The Problem of Free Will

Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside

Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains

What about non-deterministic laws?I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any

better

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7

Page 41: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategy

I Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.

F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity

I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 42: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom

I Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,a confusion.

F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity

I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 43: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.

F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity

I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 44: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity

I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 45: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity

I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 46: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

Necessity

I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 47: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

NecessityI Everyone believes in it.

I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 48: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])

I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 49: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])

I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 50: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])

I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 51: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 52: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Hume’s Compatibilism

The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,

a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.

I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.

NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.

If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7

Page 53: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

Freedom

I Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism

I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 54: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do

I Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism

I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 55: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraint

I Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism

I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 56: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism

I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 57: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

Compatibilism

I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 58: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural laws

I So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 59: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem

I There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 60: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 61: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free will

I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 62: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free willI Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?

I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 63: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free willI Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessity

I Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7

Page 64: Intro day 15

Humean Compatibilism

Compatibilism, continued

FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.

CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom

The problem of free willI Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?

Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7