Philosophy 11: Introduction to Philosophy Professor Michael Hicks 10 February 2014 Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 1/7
Philosophy 11: Introduction to Philosophy
Professor Michael Hicks
10 February 2014
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 1 / 7
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free Will
I Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: Friday
I Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8
I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: Friday
I Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: Friday
I Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: Friday
I Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up now
I Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notes
I No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.
I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7
Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free WillI Hume, Enquiry §8I Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: FridayI Study Guide up nowI Open book, open hand-written notesI No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.I No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 2 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
I Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists
2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
I Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body
3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
I Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
I Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
I Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)
I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason candisclose (independent of experience)
F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)
F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)
F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes1 A thinking thing exists2 I am not my body3 I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricismI Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)I Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)F Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)F Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)F Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
I In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims wehave a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 3 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.
I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?I More complex laws
I More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditions
I Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacy
I Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
I Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states
I Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction
I Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in orout).
I We can predict where they’ll all end up.I What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?I More complex lawsI More ignorance about initial conditionsI Epistemological indeterminacyI Potentially non-deterministic laws
DeterminismI Initial state and laws of nature yield all other statesI Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodictionI Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 4 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacy
I Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains
What about non-deterministic laws?
I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any
better
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction
I Basic problem still remains
What about non-deterministic laws?
I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any
better
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains
What about non-deterministic laws?
I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any
better
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains
What about non-deterministic laws?
I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any
better
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains
What about non-deterministic laws?I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministic
I If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be anybetter
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7
The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacyI Precludes perfect prediction/retrodictionI Basic problem still remains
What about non-deterministic laws?I Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministicI If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any
better
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 5 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
I Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
I Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,a confusion.
F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
I Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
NecessityI Everyone believes in it.
I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])
I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])
I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])
I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategyI Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedomI Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.F It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
I If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turnout that freedom is compatible with necessity.
NecessityI Everyone believes in it.I Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])I Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])I Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])I Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 6 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
Freedom
I Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
I Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraint
I Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
I Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
I So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
I There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
I Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free willI Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?
I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free willI Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessity
I Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7
Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
FreedomI Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to doI Freedom is a lack of constraintI Is constraint necessity? No.
CompatibilismI Our psychological states are subject to natural lawsI So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problemI There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free willI Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?I “Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessityI Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks Phil 11 February 10 7 / 7