Information Security Systems > Security Aspects of Open Source Software Sander Temme.

Information Security Systems

> Security Aspects of Open Source Software

Sander Temme <[email protected]>

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Thales Core Businesses

Aerospace

30%

Security

30%

Defense

40%

68,000 employees€12.7 B annual revenuesPresence in 50 countries

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Thales ISS Solutions

Payments security

Network encryption

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Data encryption

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Your Presenter

• Member, Apache Software Foundation• Contributor, Apache HTTP Server• Sales Engineer & Consultant• Open Source Integration Expert

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Agenda

• Open Source Software• Security Process • Security Implications• Development Model

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Three Questions

• How does open source respond when security problems occur?

• How does the open source development process affect software quality?

• Is open source software more susceptible to security problems?

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About Open Source

• Closed Source Microsoft, Adobe, Oracle, Symantec, Check Point, …

• Open Source Apache, Debian, FreeBSD, Mozilla, Python, FSF, …

• Hybrid Red Hat, Springsource, Sun, Apple, SugarCRM, …

• Inclusion Oracle, IBM, Apple, Sun, Cisco, NetApp, …

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Open Source Is Not…

• Freeware• Trialware• Shareware• Abandonware (hopefully)• Public Domain

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Where is Open Source Used

• Server side• Operating Systems• Application Stack• Web Facing In the line of fire

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Defacements in 2007

40%

14%

13%

9%

7%

4%

4%

4%

6%

Admin Credentials

Share Misconfiguration

File Inclusion

Other Service

SQL Injection

Web Server Intrusion

Bug exploit

DNS

Other or Unknown

Source: http://www.zone-h.org/news/id/4686

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Open Source Myths

• Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow

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Open Source Myths

• Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow

• Open Source is Communist!

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Open Source Myths

• Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow

• Open Source is Communist!• Bad guys have the code, too!

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Open Source Myths

• Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow

• Open Source is Communist!• Bad guys have the code, too!• Open Source is more secure than Closed

Source

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Open Source Software Security

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Example: Apache

• #1 Web Server• Non-profit Foundation• Contributors Sun, IBM, Novell, Springsource, Red Hat, Google Many individual contributors

• http://httpd.apache.org• Many packagers

http://people.apache.org/~coar/mlists.html

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Apache is Secure

• Very few vulnerabilities reported• No critical vulnerabilities in 2.2.x• Upgrade to any new release [email protected]

• Default installation locked down But it doesn’t do a whole lot

http://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities-oval.xml

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Apache Security Process

• Report security problems to [email protected]

• Real vulnerabilities are assigned CVE number

• Vulnerabilities are classified, fixed• New httpd version released

http://httpd.apache.org/security_report.htmlhttp://cve.mitre.org/http://httpd.apache.org/security/impact_levels.html

[email protected]

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Security Implications

• Developed by programmers• Provenance?• Liabilities?• Support?

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Developed by Programmers

• Not security experts• Get it running

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Database Privileges

Wordpress: GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON databasename.* TO "wordpressusername"@"hostname” IDENTIFIED BY "password";

Joomla 1.5: GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON Joomla.* TO nobody@localhost IDENTIFIED BY 'password';

Drupal: SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, CREATE, DROP, INDEX, ALTER, CREATE TEMPORARY TABLES, LOCK TABLES

Gallery 2: mysql gallery2 -uroot -e"GRANT ALL ON gallery2.* TO username@localhost IDENTIFIED BY 'password'”;

Bugzilla: GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, INDEX, ALTER, CREATE, LOCK TABLES, CREATE TEMPORARY TABLES, DROP, REFERENCES ON bugs.* TO bugs@localhost IDENTIFIED BY '$db_pass';

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Provenance

• Source Integrity• Intellectual Property• Apache: Digital signatures Committer License Agreement Patent Grant

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Liabilities

• Open Source No warranty

• Closed Source No warranty

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Support

• Often community based You can be part of it

• Visible to the world Don’t post confidential information!

• Support contracts available From third party companies

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urity OPEN DEVELOPMENT

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Open Development

• Mailing lists• Source code changes• Releases• Bus Factor

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Mailing Lists

• All communication by e-mail• Several lists announce@<project>.apache.org users@<project>.apache.org dev@<project>.apache.org cvs@<project>.apache.org

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Code Changes: Transparency

• Source history available• Every modification posted• Instant code review• Etiquette

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Bus Factor

• Development Community• Project Survival• Closed Source Equivalent Vendor out of business Product end-of-life

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Tips

• Get on announce mailinglist• Check out community• Get involved

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Conclusion

• Open Source responds proactively to security issues

• Open Development encourages clean and secure code

• Security Issues are universal and not specific to Open or Closed Source Software

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urity QUESTIONS?