Indias Strategic Nuclear and Missile Programmes · made by Indian defence entities and by Indias neighbours might erode this commitment. Air-launched supersonic dual-capable cruise

India’s Strategic Nuclear and Missile Programmes A baseline study for non-proliferation compliance Public Release

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Abstract

India is a de facto nuclear weapons power which has achieved its core aims of developing modern strategic weapons technology. It also has a substantial civil nuclear and space enterprise. The objective of this report is to examine the separation between civil and military activities in India, highlighting areas of concern in India’s efforts to join nuclear governance measures. The report utilises a wide range of open sources to examine the relationships and linkages between entities and individuals in India. Open sources used include the full range of scientific research literature, social media, legal tenders, regional traditional media sources, and defence journalism. The main findings of this report are that beyond the narrow US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement and subsequent Indian separation plan, there remains a high degree of connection between civil and military activity, especially in nuclear and missile sectors. In the last decade, the US among other civil nuclear providers have intensified efforts to resume trade in nuclear goods with India, and it is likely that India’s strategic weapons programmes have benefitted from technology and assistance acquired through civil trade channels. For a variety of reasons, India is likely to continue to resist accepting additional non-proliferation commitments and obligations, including in relation to safeguards and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In this context, there is a clear risk that strategic trade with India will enhance its nuclear weapons latency and enable it to push for a third ‘breakout’ of nuclear weapons.

The Restricted version of the report includes the full range of entity profiles sorted by Governmental department, major and minor industry suppliers, and entities conducted dual-use research of concern. An accompanying data file in table format provides a collated record of identifying information such as phone numbers, fax numbers, addresses and key individual names. To find out more about the restricted version of this report, please contact the Project Alpha team (kcl-

[email protected]) The Public version of this report includes the key findings, contextual overview, and informational charts.

Executive Summary

India has a mature but poorly separated civil and strategic space and nuclear programme. In the context of India’s efforts to reengage with the international community, including nuclear governance and markets, India has accepted limited non-proliferation commitments, including with regards to export controls. However, India’s nuclear self-determination as well as its interests in keeping its future options open will likely prevent the country from agreeing to other non-proliferation commitments, such the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). With this context, this report highlights that international trade and other cooperation with India is contributing to India’s strategic programmes both directly and indirectly. Separation of civil and military activities

India has a substantial nuclear and space capability. This includes a mature space and ballistic missile capability, a novel and ambitious nuclear fuel cycle, and a capable indigenous industry to support both.

The weak separation of civil and strategic nuclear assets is of great concern. India’s three-stage nuclear programme includes fast-breeder reactors, which are on paper at least, capable of creating plutonium suitable for use in nuclear weapons (depending on the fissile material loaded). Second stage Fast Breeder Reactors have not been submitted to IAEA safeguards.

Furthermore, the supply of uranium from other countries allows India to burn this safeguarded fuel in their safeguarded facilities whilst using their sizeable natural uranium resources to breed plutonium and produce weapons-grade uranium for an expansion of their nuclear arsenal.

It is difficult to assess the degree to which India has sought to separate its defence-specific missile programme and space rocketry programme. It is the case that the defence-specific missile programme is of maturity and no longer requires Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) assistance, but basic and applied research continues, and Department of Space operated space assets are used by the Indian Armed Forces for navigation, communications, and reconnaissance. Military and space programmes also share indigenous supply chains.

Defence-relevant technology research, design and development are conducted by a range of military and civil entities. A weak distinction between defence-related civil research and genuine civilian-purpose only research complicates observation of Indian strategic entities. For example, many private civil research institutions in India cooperate closely with strategic weapons entities in the defence sector at the same time as cooperating internationally with civil entities abroad on topics, research, and items that may have defence value.

This study especially highlights the use of informal forums such as the High Energy Materials Society of India or Indian National Society for Aerospace and Related Mechanisms as potential spaces for Indian strategic weapons scientists to meet and exchange ideas with foreign scientists. It is important, however, to also note that the frequent meeting of ISRO and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) scientists is typical of India’s science and technology context which still relies on state vision.

Engagement with international actors committed to non-proliferation

India is attempting to join formal international nuclear governance arrangements. Historically, its non-aligned stance has rendered it resistant to unconditional acceptance of the international norms and rules for non-proliferation. Instead, as it approaches these non-proliferation regime institutions it has opted for partial engagement, selectively choosing to co-opt the rules of export control organisations, claiming to embrace the norms of

prohibitory agreements (such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) by implementation its measures (a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing), but not taking the legally binding step of formally entering such arrangements.

This unclear separation should raise concerns about the unwitting/witting assistance of foreign entities when engaging with Indian entities who are stakeholders in the strategic weapons programme.

Illicit procurement of dual-use items intended for use in the Indian strategic weapons programme is a dimension of activity difficult to assess. Nonetheless, this study confirms that such behaviour has occurred in the past and may have waned in recent years as indigenous capabilities increase and India’s ability to procure items from abroad has increased

Future dimensions of India’s latent nuclear power

Continued modernization of nuclear weapons and development of ‘technology demonstrators’ will increase the number of policy options open to India’s leadership regarding their nuclear weapons arsenal. Academic speculation that India is exploring a nuclear counterforce strategy as part of a two-front grand strategy will be predicated on future technologies. Indian advances in supersonic and hypersonic missiles, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and command and control (C2) assets enable a conventional/nuclear counterforce option. One plausible explanation is that India is seeking to develop its own tactical nuclear weapon arsenal to match Pakistan’s (and potentially China’s) tactical nuclear capabilities, but despite speculation there has been no public confirmation.

India remains publicly committed to its original ‘No First Use’ policy and massive retaliation in response to any nuclear attack irrespective of yield, but technological advancements made by Indian defence entities and by India’s neighbours might erode this commitment. Air-launched supersonic dual-capable cruise missiles are of particular concern, as they might be used to provide options for graduated escalation.

This report highlights that new nuclear weapons systems to be adopted by the Indian Armed Forces will weaken the political control of the nuclear weapon. This will heighten nuclear risk whilst simultaneously enhancing India’s credible deterrence. Systems that will do this are the Agni V, and submarine-launched missiles, which necessitate the premating of the nuclear warhead to delivery vehicle. Traditionally, these components have been kept separately and under different agency control. This merits greater public attention.

India’s commitment to international non-proliferation

As part of the bargain to secure the US nuclear deal and subsequent Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver, India has in the last decade changed its long-standing opposition to many of the central elements of the non-proliferation regime

India has taken steps to improve its non-proliferation record. It has recently (April 2017) synchronised its export control lists with that of the Wassenaar Agreement and the Australia Group. Indian export controls are well grounded in domestic laws such as the ‘WMD Act 2005’ and ‘Atomic Energy Act 1962’ and have regulatory bodies for the issuance and denial of licences. Indian controls have gradually adopted international recognised ‘best practices’ for sensitive items

India has not signed the CTBT and likely continues to produce fissile material for weapons purposes. India is unlikely to accept any such restraint on its nuclear weapon program until and unless it is linked to some regional agreement including China and Pakistan.

Table of Contents (Public Report)

Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 3

Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 4

Scope of the Report .......................................................................................................... 7 Criteria for Inclusion ................................................................................................................. 8 Sources and Methods ............................................................................................................... 9

Caveat about ‘dual-use’ research of concern ............................................................................... 10 Caveat about strategic weapons systems analysis ....................................................................... 11

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 12

Part 1: India’s Strategic Status ........................................................................................ 13 1. Overview of India’s Strategic Programmes .......................................................................... 13

India’s Nuclear Programme .......................................................................................................... 13 Table 1: Indian Missiles ................................................................................................................. 17 India’s Delivery Systems ................................................................................................................ 19 India’s Air Defence and Ballistic Missile Defence Programme ..................................................... 22 Differences in Historical Entity Lists .............................................................................................. 22 Strategic Weapons Stakeholders .................................................................................................. 24

2. Separation of Civil and Strategic Nuclear Facilities in India ................................................... 26 India and Safeguards: A Difficult History ...................................................................................... 26 Table 4: UK-India Research Cooperation Involving BARC and IGCAR ........................................... 32

Facilities List ........................................................................................................................... 34 Table 5: List of Indian Nuclear Facilities ........................................................................................ 35

3. India’s Engagement with Nuclear Governance ..................................................................... 38 India’s Nuclear Self Determination ............................................................................................... 38 India and Export Controls ............................................................................................................. 39 Outlook ......................................................................................................................................... 42

Key entities involved in India’s strategic nuclear and missile sectors ............................... 43 N.B. the restricted version of this report is around 250 pages in length and contains profiles of 243 entities.

Scope of the Report

Since the US lifted sanctions on India in 2001, and the gradual normalisation of relations, exhaustive research on the full-scope of India’s strategic weapons ecosystem has waned. Scholarly work on India’s unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle has continued1, especially in light of India’s bid to join the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG), but this remained disconnected from general defence affairs commentary. This report revitalises research done on India’s strategic weapons complex, seeking to update, expand and replace work done up to 2003. This report is part of Project Alpha’s ‘Alpha-in-Depth’ series. Alpha-in-Depth monographs produce wide profiles of a country’s strategic weapons sector, defence establishments, dual-use civil science and technology establishments, procurement apparatus, and identify key areas of concern. These reports are intended to be used as baseline studies for future investigations, proliferation-sensitive flagging, and to inform future efforts to engage proliferating countries. The use of the term ‘strategic’ is complicated by its use in Indian discourse to refer to national programmes of importance, which include research items such as solar energy panels, in addition to classical ‘strategic weapons’. For the purpose of this paper, the term ‘strategic programme’ refers to projects, entities, and suppliers involved in the development, production and operation of India’s strategic weapon systems. Indian strategic weapons systems are thought to comprise a full triad of delivery systems: air-dropped, submarine-launched missiles, and ground-launched missiles. Due to rising concern that India will seek to compete with Pakistan’s nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, the Indian cruise missile programme has been included. Furthermore, a perceptible Indian drive to develop and deploy new defence capabilities in reaction to advances in Pakistani and Chinese strategic weapons has warranted the inclusion of anti-air missiles which can intercept cruise missiles, and general advances in sonar and airspace detection systems. It is worth mentioning a paper written by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs categorised Indian nuclear facilities as civilian (safeguarded), civilian (unsafeguarded) and military as per the 2006 Separation Plan.2 This paper utilises ‘strategic’ in the nuclear facility context to refer to both civilian (unsafeguarded) and military nuclear facilities, which is also the definition used in India’s separation plan. A similar relationship between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) on the separation of civil space rocket programmes and military missile programmes can be observed. This paper seeks to explore the relationship and provide information on the same. The first sub-group of this broad effort are the Government of India entities, in particular the Strategic Forces Command, Defence Research Development Organization, and Department of

1 Eg. Mansoor Ahmed, ‘India’s Nuclear Exceptionalism: Fissile Materials, Fuel Cycles, and Safeguards’, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (May 2017), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/India%27s%20Nuclear%20Exceptionalism.pdf 2 Kalman Robertson and John Carlson, ‘The Three Overlapping Streams of India’s Nuclear Program’, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (April 2016), http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/thethreesoverlappingtreamsofindiasnuclearpowerprograms.pdf

Atomic Energy subsidiaries. Also included in this section, is the Department of Space’s list of entities that are perceived as having contributed to the missile programme. The second sub-group consists of the dual-use research organisations, primarily consisting of government and private initiative universities and research institutes who contribute personnel to the strategic programme, both through alumni and through on-going sustained research cooperation. The third sub-group consists of public sector, public-private, or private sector industries who supply the strategic programme in full. Entities in this category are listed public-sector undertakings, joint ventures or domestic suppliers. Foreign suppliers are mentioned wherever their activity has concurred with Indian strategic weapons programmes.

Criteria for Inclusion

Two indicators of complicity were used. First, entities were assessed based on publicly accessible information on their activity. The content of their activity was then assessed on whether it fit Indian national prerogatives about strategic priorities. Some of these have been outlined below. Second, entities were assessed based on their relationships. Entities with strong, sustained and currently active relationships with entities known to be directly involved in the design, development, or operation of India’s strategic weapons belong to the highest category. On the other end of the scale, are entities with context-specific relationships such as irregular contracts or relatively few people with low degrees of connection. Entities with activity content that was entirely dual-use but with no visible indicators of strategic activity or relationships were not included, but may have occasionally been referenced.

Activity of a strategic nature

Defence Nuclear Dual-use

High explosives work suitable for nuclear final package

Unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle, inter alia:

Special and exotic steels, especially maraging steel

Nuclear capable and dual-capable missiles, including missiles billed as conventional platforms (eg. cruise missiles)

Natural atomic minerals extraction

Composite materials

High specification defence materials

Uranium enrichment Solid state electronics

Support systems (including ground transportation, road and rail)

Fuel fabrication Inertial sensors

Ballistic missile defence Fuel reprocessing Satellites (especially navigation, and imaging)

Air defence (must be suitable for countering cruise missiles)

Fissile material storage Solid propellant for space programme

Preparation for nuclear warfighting (including EMI/EMP resistance)

Fissile material metallurgy of any kind

Space science education of use to a military missile programme

Aircraft research and development, especially of subsystems related to missiles (eg. ring-laser gyroscopes)

Associated physics package components activity (eg. neutron initiator, beryllium reflector)

Space technology of direct benefit to missile programmes if transferred

Heavy water production, especially when including tritium extraction

Deliberate exclusions

Defence Nuclear Dual-use

Chemical/biological defence Theoretical physics, cosmic physics

Advanced computing (except where previous allegations are known)

Conventional weapons Fusion power projects Liquid propellant research for space programme

DRDO research unrelated to weapons (eg. food, avalanches)

Nuclear/radiological safety, environmental safety studies

Sources and Methods

This in-depth study draws on a range of publicly accessible information: academic publications, internal newsletters, contracts and tenders, newspaper reports, press releases (especially Memorandums of Understanding), and US and Japanese designated entity lists. This open-source information has been collated to produce profile entries for entities identified as having contributed to or constituent of the Indian strategic industry. Scholarly academic work such as Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Bomb; George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation; and Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: Secret Story of India’s Quest to be a Nuclear Power, offered background and contextual information. For scientific information, the US Department of Defence produced ‘Militarily Critical Technologies List’ and the Department of Energy’s Annex 3 Handbook were also used for reference. Key difficulties with producing this study were that India’s strategic weapons programme is understandably shrouded in secrecy, incorporates and draws on the support of hundreds of entities, and is the subject of intense foreign speculation. Nonetheless, it is a major source of national pride. Disclosures by public sector personnel are typically forthright in their technological accomplishments, and the key individuals and entities behind them. Generally, India’s strategic programmes are demonstrably more transparent than other proliferation hard-cases, and as such rendered so much detail that this study’s chief difficulty was in processing data acquired and determining entities of sufficient complicity as to be worth inclusion in this report. The approach to identifying Indian entities was layered in three ways: 1) We intended to identify and highlight new entities in the strategic industries involved in research using Elsevier, the academic journal indexer and search engine. To do so, we employed two methods: content (based on what activities they were we first collected an initial list composed of Indian entities of proliferation concern identified in the Federal Register 1998 (November 16) issue on the ‘Dual Use Export Control Sanctions’ imposing new sanctions on Indian and Pakistani entities; and relationships (based on the frequency and strength of research cooperation made visible by joint publications). The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) identified a total of 116 Indian entities as part of the country’s strategic nuclear and missile programmes. From this, 40 of them were identified as having an open research footprint on Elsevier.

Using keyword searches for key nuclear and missile technologies, Elsevier was queried to produce a new list of entities with published research relating to strategic programme activity. Between the years 1973 and 2016, the total number of entities was put at around 1000 entities, of whom around 100 were identified as being of higher concern. Many of the entities identified by publicly available research footprints were also entities designated in the 1998 rule. New entity nodes were identified using relationship analysis. Elsevier’s Scopus query engine provided a large quantity of relational data which forms some of the content for entity profile sections on Domestic and Foreign collaborations. For instance, new entities that had research collaborations with designated entities were assessed by the content and included on those merits. 2) To substantiate and investigate these new connections, we drew on publicly accessible Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) newsletters, contract and tender listings, DRDO science and technology publications (including conference proceeding papers such as from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), and Indian newspapers reporting on strategic issues to identify key technologies, investments and interests for the Indian strategic establishment as a whole. In particular, research content and relationship information was drawn from the personnel profiles given for recently promoted/awarded DRDO staff in the DRDO monthly newsletter. This internal but publicly accessible newsletter provided a rich source of insider-track information on DRDO projects, subsystems, and component research/development and manufacturing. Additionally, the ‘Technology Focus’ bimonthly publication highlighted DRDO achievements and technologies indigenously developed. This content highlighted R&D of high interest, and key technological challenges that the DRDO has experienced. Where possible, keyword searching and indexing were automated. The DRDO’s Research Board’s public information on contracts with research institutions also yielded significant information about the direction and importance of certain technologies to DRDO programmes. These have been included in entities’ profile content under Research Topics and Domestic Collaborations. 3) Our information was then corroborated with secondary sources on India’s strategic industries. In particular, IHS Jane’s CBRN Assessments Centre, the Federation of American Scientists, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, the Wisconsin Project, the World Nuclear Association, and the Institute for Science and International Security, provided cues, leads, and context for our work. A list of key facilities was developed from their efforts and from older versions of the DRDO Address Book, newspaper clippings, the US Bureau of Export Administration entity list, and commercial satellite imagery.

Caveat about ‘dual-use’ research of concern

This study acknowledges that practically almost every technology can be applied to weapons purposes if chosen to do so. Inclusion of an institute in this report as conducting ‘dual use research of concern’ is based on three criteria: a) content (has research with a military application been done there), b) relational data (how much do we know about that entity’s relationships with the missile and nuclear complexes? Are those relationships at an institutional level, or smaller down to departments or individuals), c) explicit collaboration (do the missile and nuclear complexes openly acknowledge collaboration?). It should nonetheless be noted that experts will have different views about the level of concern with each aspect.

Caveat about strategic weapons systems analysis

This study acknowledges that there is considerable difficulty with analysing India’s nuclear force capabilities and systems. Beyond the Sagarika, Prithvi, Agni and unspecified air-dropped nuclear bombs, it is unknown as to what new platforms the Indian nuclear weapons programme may choose. For instance, the BrahMos cruise missile, developed jointly between the DRDO and Russian company NPO Mashinostroyenia, has come under speculation as being a potential tactical nuclear weapon. Counter-claims to this speculation are based on two pillars. First, India would not violate the Missile Technology Control Regime agreement3, of which it is a member (as is Russia). Second, India would respond with massive retaliation irrespective of strategic or tactical yields4, negating analysis suggesting India is shifting towards tactical nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, this study opts to err on sceptical, and includes the Brahmos and Nirbhay as potential delivery vehicles.

3 Argument made by Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘India’s Nuclear Force Structure 2025’, Carnegie Endowment (30 June 2016) 4 ‘Massive retaliation’ first enunciated by the Government of India in January 2003. Statement by Shyam Saran, convenor of the National Security Advisory Board: “India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective.”, cited in, ‘Strike by even a midget nuke will invite massive response, India warns Pak’, The Times of India (30 April 2013), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Strike-by-even-a-midget-nuke-will-invite-massive-response-India-warns-Pak/articleshow/19793847.cms

Introduction

India is a unique case in the international governance of strategic weapons. It is one of four states outside the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with other non-members being Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and South Sudan. India is also an operational nuclear-weapons power and has been subject to, sanctions and technology restrictions as a proliferator state. India’s long pursuit of an indigenous civil nuclear programme gave rise to an indigenous military nuclear capability. Yet despite being a non-NPT member, in 2008 India was granted a NSG ‘clean waiver’, exempting India from the requirement to have full-scope international safeguards in order to receive civil nuclear cooperation. For this paper, strategic programmes have been demarcated as those involved in the research, design, development, production, and operation of strategic-level weapons. Strategic weapons refer to nuclear weapons that can be reliably delivered to targets of high value (usually population centres). Because strategic weapons are complex scientific projects, they require a wide ecosystem of dedicated defence entities, scientific laboratories, supporting industry, and civilian research. This study has four objectives.

First, it seeks to identify and characterise the range of defence and dual-use entities involved in India’s strategic nuclear and missile programmes.

Second, it seeks to identify relationships between Indian entities among themselves and with international collaborators. Both the unwitting and knowing assistance of international entities on strategic weapons-relevant research with Indian entities is of concern.

Third, this paper seeks to offer a baseline profile of Indian entities at risk of proliferating to others.

In the context of these other objectives, this paper seeks to draw conclusions about India’s desire to join nuclear governance mechanisms, including the NSG.

These objectives have policy relevance. As India seeks to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, international scrutiny will be directed to the intentions and capabilities of India’s strategic sectors. The close entanglement of civil and military sector in India, complicates efforts to maintain a clear distinction between civil and strategic weapons-related activity. For instance, opacity regarding India’s nuclear programme’s second stage of fast breeder reactors and their potential to breed special fissionable plutonium for nuclear weapons is a clear and present proliferation danger. Similarly, previous proliferation cooperation between Indian defence entities and the space programme has evolved into an ambiguous separation between missile and civil space programmes. The defence-related dimensions of the space programme, space research, and contributing entities have not yet been clearly resolved. Given that the separation of civil and military nuclear facilities is an unspoken criterion for the acceptance of a non-NPT member into the NSG, wide-reaching and deep scrutiny is called for.

Part 1: India’s Strategic Status

1. Overview of India’s Strategic Programmes

India’s Nuclear Programme

India has a substantial nuclear infrastructure driven by the country’s need for nuclear energy and its need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. India’s nuclear programme is semi-opaque with many of its facilities dispersed across the country and closely guarded. The programme, however, also employs a large number of scientists and engineers, many of whom operate the country’s civil energy programme which has 21 operational reactors in 7 nuclear power plant sites. The civil energy programme in early 2016 produced less than 7 GWe, compared to the country’s total capacity of 300GWe (210 GWe from fossil fuels, 40 GWe from hydro, and 43 GWe from renewables) with nuclear accounting for approximately 2.3% of total.5 The proportion of energy generated by nuclear means is projected to rise, with government plans intending to generate up to 9% of the country’s power by nuclear power. Nonetheless, this figure remains a low contribution to the nation’s increasing energy consumption requirements. India has embraced the three-stage nuclear power programme, envisaged by Homi Bhabha. The first stage utilises pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR) consuming natural uranium with heavy water as a moderator and generating plutonium-239. The second stage utilises fast breeder reactors (FBR) either consuming mixed oxide (MOX) fuel made from recovered plutonium-239 from the first stage to breed additional plutonium-239 from uranium-238 in the MOX fuel load, or consuming a thorium blanket-plutonium core to breed uranium-233.6 The third stage, still in the feasibility cycle, utilises advanced heavy water reactors (AWHR) burning a mixed blanket of thorium-232 and uranium-233. India also recently announced ambitious plans to build an additional 10 power reactors as part of this fuel cycle by adding a further 7000 GW of electricity from PHWRs.7

Historical orientation India’s nuclear programme has its origins in the heyday of the ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative of the 1950s, during which India received the CIRUS research reactor from Canada. Institutionally, the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) created by the Atomic Energy Act 1948 and envisioned by PM Jawaharlal Nehru to explore scientific research in “highly specialised ways”. Most commentators agree that the civil and defence aspects of the Indian nuclear programme cannot be disentangled. As the CIRUS reactor deal was implemented before the existence of a formal international atomic energy regime, little to no safeguards agreed informally (with an expectation of re-negotiation when the IAEA was founded) by the bilateral partners were implemented. As a result, plutonium produced as a by-product of the CIRUS reactor was unsafeguarded and could offer a technological option for a nuclear explosive. One historical estimate places the requisite amount of plutonium accrued for one weapon (5-10kg) to have been achieved by 1965, with a suitable stockpile amassed by 1967.8

5 Figures from, World Nuclear Association: Country Profiles, India, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx 6 Some commentators might describe the first plutonium-uranium-238 core as a ‘military mode’ because it produces additional plutonium-239, and the second thorium-plutonium core as a ‘civilian mode’; see: Alexander Glaser and M.V. Ramana, ‘Weapon-Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor’, Science and Global Security 15:85-105 (2007) 7 Narendra Modi ,“Boost to transform domestic nuclear industry”, 17 May 2017. Available online at: http://www.narendramodi.in/boost-to-transform-domestic-nuclear-industry--535463 (Accessed 24/05/207) 8 Itty Abraham, The Making of Indian Atomic Bomb, p. 123

India tested its first nuclear explosive device in July 1974. The ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE) ‘Smiling Buddha’ was given the go ahead by PM Indira Gandhi. Preparation work in the Thar desert n Rajasthan state, the Pokhran site, and metallurgical work was conducted by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) with non-nuclear components of the nuclear device (such as conventional explosive lens for implosion-style device ) completed by the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). Raja Ramanna, Director of BARC at the time, oversaw all necessary weaponisation work. India initiated a second series of five nuclear tests, Pokhran II, on the 11 May to 13 May 1998. Government press at the time described the tests as overt weapons tests. It is purported that the tests were two-stage thermonuclear weapons, with small yield experiments. The estimated yields are purported to be Shakti I (45 kt), Shakti II (15 kt), Shakti III (0.3 kt), Shakti IV (0.5 kt), Shakti V (0.2 kt).9 It has also been purported that the tests established the viability of small physics package designs to be mounted on aircraft-delivered bombs or missiles. Pokhran II was prepared by the 58 Engineering Regiment of the Indian Army, with DRDO engineering inputs. It was overseen by A.P.J. K. Abdul Kalam (Director DRDO), R. Chidambaram (Head AEC/DAE), and Anil Kakodkar (Director BARC). Sanctions had been imposed in 1997 by the United States, a year prior to the 1998 tests, and included the designation onto the Bureau of Export Administration’s Entity List of four Indian organizations with "an unacceptable risk of diversion to developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or missiles used to deliver those weapons". Further sanctions following Pokhran II test were levied on over 200 Indian entities, some of whom with no link to strategic weapons. Sanctions were relaxed in 2000, with many of those entities with no links removed, leaving entities the US Government believed to be linked to the nuclear and missile programmes in India. Those entities are this study’s baseline. Sanctions were again relieved in 2001 under the Bush administration’s rapprochement with India, leaving a core group of missile laboratories and their supporting entities, core Department of Atomic Energy sub-entities, and some defence industries. In 2010, greater rapprochement led to the removal of virtually all sanctions in 2011 as nine entities in DRDO, and ISRO were removed. On 18 July 2005, PM Manmohan Singh and US President George W Bush made a joint statement signalling their willingness to cooperate on civil nuclear energy. Following the ‘India-US Joint Statement’, PM Manmohan Singh announced the ‘Separation Plan’ in 2006 outlining the government’s intention to declare separated civilian and military nuclear programmes. As a result, the NSG issued the ‘clean waiver’ for India permitting nuclear supply from foreign suppliers to India. In 2009, India concluded a continuous safeguards agreement with the IAEA10, and submitting certain facilities to international safeguards.11 This, however, excluded a large number of facilities and implied a division of civilian and military-use facilities that was not originally written into the IAEA agreement.12 The facilities in India’s completely indigenous nuclear fuel cycle are now described.

9 Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts, p. 226 10 ‘Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities’, IAEA INFCIRC/754 (29 May 2009) 11 Most up-to-date, ‘Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities: Addition to the List of Facilities Subject to Safeguards’, IAEA INFCIRC/754/Add.7 (5 February 2015) 12 Kalman Robertson and John Carlson, ‘The Three Overlapping Streams of India’s Nuclear Program’, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (April 2016), http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/thethreesoverlappingtreamsofindiasnuclearpowerprograms.pdf

Uranium mining and milling India operates a number of uranium mines and associated mills through the Uranium Corporation of India (UCIL), mostly located in the Singhbun Thrust Belt area in Jharkhand state but with recent expansion over the last ten years in Andhra Pradesh, Telengana, Karnataka, and Meghalaya states. Indian uranium mines have operated since 1967, and according to collated open source data, uranium mills may produce around 730 tonnes per year of uranium peroxide (yellowcake).13 New uranium deposits, notably at Tumalpalle, offer India a potential pipeline of natural uranium supply but extraction in the near term will not match current consumption.

Imports of foreign fissile material While India does have vast uranium reserves, the deficit between potential natural resources to be exploited and current extraction capacity has resulted in India seeking uranium imports from the international market. Canada (April 2015) and Australia (November 2015) have concluded bilateral agreements with India to supply uranium. Canada pledged for Cameco Corporation to supply 3,220 metric tonnes over five years. In January 2009, India concluded an agreement with Kazakhstan in (expired 2014) for the joint extraction of uranium in Kazakhstan and the supply of outputs to India. India concluded a contract with Russian company JSC TVEL in 2009 for the supply of uranium dioxide and low-enriched uranium. In 2015, an agreement was made with Kazakhstan for the supply of 5,000 tonnes over five years. Between the years 2008-2014, foreign imports tallied as Kazakhstan (2,100t), Russia (2,058t), and France (300t). In 2015-2016, the tallies were from Russian (345t) and Canada (250t).14 Foreign fissile material is used in India’s safeguarded reactors and ease India’s energy consumption burden. Alleviating the supply of uranium through foreign supply provides India with the flexibility to use its naturally sourced uranium for military purposes as required. However, it is difficult to ascertain how much locally sourced uranium is utilised in this manner. A December 2014 estimate stated that 40% of safeguarded reactors operated on imported uranium, with the rest relying on natural uranium reserves in India.15

Uranium conversion India primarily undertakes work to convert uranium peroxide to the uranium hexafluoride at Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad. Conversion is undertaken at the Uranium Oxide Plant, and the “New” Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant. The Uranium Oxide Plant has an estimated output of 450t/yr. Additional uranium conversion activity occurs at the Indian Rare Metals Plant (RMP; also known as: Rattehali Rare Metals Plant) where uranium hexafluoride outputs are fed into nearby cascade halls for enrichment

Uranium enrichment Uranium hexafluoride feedstock is enriched at two key locations, with a future third potentially to being construction in the near future. The two operational facilities at the Rare Metals Plant (RMP) and a small pilot facility at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) give India a modest capability to enrich uranium. The output capacity of these facilities are unknown. Construction at the RMP facility for an alleged second cascade hall would potentially double India’s existing capacity. The

13 See Facilities list. 14 All data from IHS Jane’s CBRN Assessments, ‘India: Production Capability; (25 April 2017) 15 World Nuclear Association, Country Profile: India, Nuclear reactors deployed in India, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx

RMP facility provides highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for use in the Arihant-class naval reactors but has excess capacity after meeting naval reactor needs. Construction of a third facility, which has yet to begin, at the ‘Challakere complex’ in Karnataka will include a new ‘Special Material Enrichment Facility’ which will not be safeguarded and will produce enriched uranium for military and civilian purposes. The Challakere complex also includes a variety of DRDO laboratories, including a large airstrip for UAV research, and allotments for private research institutions such as the Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore.

Fuel fabrication Fuel fabrication primarily occurs at the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad at the following plants: the Enriched Uranium Fuel Fabrication Plant (estimated 24t/yr of low-enriched uranium), the Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (subdivided into Pelletizing and Assembly, output of 300t of heavy metal for the PHWR), the PHWR Fuel Assembly (Block A) (300t/yr heavy metal), and the PHWR Fuel Fabrication Facility at a new Kota complex.

Reactor operations India operates 25 commercial power reactors, five research reactors, two scale-up reactors, and two to three naval reactors. Future plans include up to six commercial power reactor expansions. Refer to the Facilities List on page 38.

Reprocessing Fuel reprocessing is carried out primarily at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre facilities. Thesea are the Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Processing plant (PREFRE), the Kalpakkam Spent Fuel Reprocessing plant (KARP) and the Plutonium Seperation Plant at the BARC Trombay complex. Two additional facilities servicing the FBR projects are joint operated by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research. These are the pilot-scale CORAL Reprocessing Plant and the Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant.

Physics package preparation work Physics package preparation work for India’s nuclear weapons occurs at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. Plutonium and uranium metallurgy and other physics work, such as neutron initiator production, occurs at the BARC Trombay complex. Special fissile material is obtained through the unsafeguarded parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, using separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Beryllium machining for the neutron reflectors/tampers occur at BARC’s Vashi complex. Integration of the physics package with associated weapon components (the casing, fuze, and safety mechanism) for the final package is conducted by joint BARC-DRDO teams responsible to Strategic Forces Command in Jagdalpur. Some of the DRDO integration teams have been identified in this report. Finally, final packages are mated with delivery vehicles under the Strategic Forces Command. Since the early period, it has been reported that other weapons components, such as high explosive lens, Permissive Action Link (PAL) safety mechanisms, warhead fuzes and casings are produced by DRDO subsidiaries. It is likely that BARC research and development involvement in high energy materials is directed towards improving the reliability and composition of high explosives utilised in nuclear warheads.

Table 1: Indian Missiles

Reference Names Type Payload (kg)

Propulsion Range category Range (km) Date of induction Principal laboratories

Notes

Project Devil Surface to air missile

1st solid, 2nd liquid Short range

Research project terminated in 1980

DRDL Based off the SA-2 Guideline (Soviet SAM), precursor for the Prithvi

Project Valiant Surface to surface missile

Three-stage liquid Intercontinental

Research project terminated in 1974

DRDL Precursor for the Prithvi

Prithvi I (SS-150) Surface to surface tactical missile 500 - 1000

1st solid, 2nd liquid Short range

1994 DRDL, BDL

Prithvi II (SS-250) Surface to surface tactical missile 500 - 1000

1st solid, 2nd liquid Short range

2003 DRDL, BDL

Prithvi III (SS-350), Dhanush

Sea-launched surface to surface tactical missile

250 - 1000

1st solid, 2nd liquid Short range

2004 DRDL, BDL

Agni-TD Surface to surface strategic missile

1000 1st solid, 2nd liquid Medium range 1500 First test May 1989 DRDL, BDL First stage solid fuel rocket motor is taken from the SLV-3, 'Technology

Demonstrator'

Agni I Surface to surface strategic missile

1000 Single-stage solid Short range 700 2004 DRDL, BDL

Agni II Surface to surface strategic missile

1000 Two-stage solid Medium range 2000 - 3000 1999 DRDL, RCI, BDL

Agni III Surface to surface strategic missile

1000 Two-stage solid Intermediate range 3500 - 5000 2011 ASL, RCI, BDL

Agni IV, Agni II Prime

Surface to surface strategic missile

1000 Two-stage solid Intermediate range 3000 - 4000 2014 ASL, RCI, BDL

Agni V Surface to surface strategic missile

1000 Three-stage solid Intercontinental 8000 - 1000 Undergoing pre-induction user trials

ASL, RCI, BDL

Agni VI Surface to surface strategic missile

1000 Three-stage/four-stage solid Intercontinental 8000 Under development ASL, RCI

K-15 Sagarika Submarine launched ballistic missile

500 Two-stage solid Short range 750 Integrated with INS Arihant c. 2013

ASL, RCI, BDL

K-4 Submarine launched ballistic missile

2500 Two-stage solid Intermediate range 3500 Test fired March 2014 ASL, RCI

K-5 Submarine launched ballistic missile

Two-stage/three-stage Intermediate range

Under development ASL, RCI

Shaurya, Shourya Hypersonic surface to surface tactical missile

1000 Two-stage solid Tactical 750 - 1900 September 2011 ASL, RCI

Pralay Surface to surface tactical missile

Unknown Unknown

Under development Unknown Approved in March 2015

Prahaar Surface to surface tactical missile 200 Single stage solid Tactical 150 - 350 Test fired July 2011 DRDL Export version called 'Pragati'

Nirbhay Subsonic cruise missile, land attack

1st solid, 2nd turbofan Long range cruise 1000 - 1500 Latest trial

(unsuccessful) December 2016

ADE, DRDL

BrahMos I Block I (PJ-10)

Supersonic cruise missile, anti-ship

200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 December 2010 BAPL, DRDL

BrahMos I Block II Supersonic cruise missile, land attack

200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 2010 BAPL, DRDL Both surface and ship launched variants

NB: Date of induction has been used rather than date of first test because the date of induction reflects when the missile was accepted into service, even though there is a considerable time difference between induction and operational deployment.

BrahMos I Block III Supersonic cruise missile, mountain warfare

200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 April 2016 BAPL, DRDL

BrahMos-S Supersonic cruise missile, submarine launch

200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 First test fire March 2013

BAPL, DRDL

BrahMos-A Supersonic cruise missile, air-launch

300 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 Test fire March 2017 BAPL, DRDL

BrahMos-NG, BrahMos-M

Supersonic cruise missile 200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290

BAPL, DRDL Next Generation' line of upgrades for all launch and target

configurations

BrahMos-ER Supersonic cruise missile 200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Medium range cruise

450 - 600 First test March 2017 BAPL, DRDL Extended Range'

BrahMos-II (K) Hypersonic cruise missile

1st solid, 2nd scramjet Unknown

Under development BAPL, DRDL

LRCM Supersonic cruise missile

1st solid, 2nd turbofan, 3rd ramjet

Long range cruise 1000 Under development ADE, DRDL

Akash MRSAM Surface to air missile 60 Ramjet Medium range SAM

25 Indian Army: May 2015

DRDL, BEL, BDL

Barak-8 LRSAM Surface to air missile 60 Two-stage pulse rocket Long range SAM 70 - 90 July 2016 IAI (Israel), DRDO, BDL

Barak-8ER Surface to air missile 60 Two-stage pulse rocket Beyond visual range SAm

180 Under development IAI (Israel), DRDO, BDL

Maitri SRSAM/QRSAM

Surface to air missile

Unknown Short range SAM 15 - 30 Under development DRDL, MBDA (European)

SFDR, Akash-II Hypersonic surface to air missile

Ramjet Unknown

Under development Unknown Solid Fuel Ducted Ramjet'

Prithvi Air Defence (PAD), Praduyumma

Exo-atmospheric interceptor

1st solid, 2nd liquid Exo-atmospheric 50 - 80 First test November 2008

ASL, RCI, HEMRL

Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV)

Exo-atmospheric interceptor

Two-stage solid Exo-atmospheric

First test April 2014 ASL, RCI, HEMRL

Advanced Air Defence (AAD),

Ashwin

Endo-atmospheric interceptor

Single-stage solid Endo-atmospheric 150 - 200 First test December 2007

ASL, RCI, HEMRL

India’s Delivery Systems

India operates a functional ‘nuclear triad’ of air-delivered systems, ground-launched systems, and submarine-launched systems. India maintains its nuclear deterrent in a credible deterrence posture designed to deter neighbouring Pakistan and China. The submarine leg of the triad is designed to deter China, as Pakistan is adequately covered by air-delivery assets and ground-launched missiles.

Nuclear weapons decision making Indian nuclear weapons are kept under tight political control. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) is the apex organization determining all priorities for budgets, resources, strategy, policy, and operational command. The NCA) consists of a Political Council and an Executive Council. The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister and is the only body in India capable of authorising weapons release to operational commands. The Executive Council provides advice and implements decisions taken by the Political Council. The Political Council consists of the Prime Minister and civilian ministers in Defence, External Affairs, Home, and Finance. Clear division between political and military control is entrenched into Indian nuclear decision making with civilian authorisation the only acceptable recourse to launching nuclear weapons. The commands of the Nuclear Command Authority are executed by Strategic Forces Command (SFC) a tri-service military command with HQ Strategic Forces Command chaired by a commander-in-chief of three-star rank. Strategic Forces Command was created in 2003. It has been traditionally thought that the nuclear warheads and delivery systems are kept de-mated, and although components might be co-located the authorities responsible for them are dispersed between Strategic Forces Command, DRDO and Department of Atomic Energy sub-units. In this manner, civilian personnel would be embedded into the command and control system of India’s nuclear weapons. Emergency command in the event of NCA decapitation is unknown, and other delegatory arrangements are not declared policy. Nonetheless, Strategic Forces Command is a well-resourced nuclear command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Some significant developments in nuclear doctrine and policy are reflected in the most recent doctrinal paper for the Indian Armed Forces, the 2nd Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces, from the HQ Integrated Defence Staff at the Ministry of Defence.16 Notably, the nuclear deterrent was described as ‘credible deterrent’ with language excluding previous usage of ‘minimum’ and stating that the SFC controls “all of India’s nuclear warheads and delivery systems”. This may be indicative of the necessity to keep warhead and delivery system mated in the Agni V, which is canister launched. More broadly, this suggests that the successful development of technologies for the nuclear triad will lead to an expansion in the arsenal of nuclear warheads in tandem with the increase in delivery systems. The 2017 Joint Doctrine also reaffirms ‘no first use’, civilian authorisation, and dispersed arsenal structure to ensure retaliation.17

Aircraft-delivery systems India’s nuclear deterrent was technically possible by the late 1970s using air-dropped bombs. However, it is unclear precisely when this technical capacity was rolled out as an operational capability. As late as 1988, this air-delivery leg was the sole nuclear weapons delivery system after

16 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff Ministry of Defence, 2nd Edition Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces (April 2017) 17 Fn. 12, p. 37

which ground-launched missiles were technically feasible. The air-led is designed to be credible through wide dispersal across the country, using rapidly assembled de-mated warheads and delivery systems. In 1994, allegedly this system was tested for the first time using a specially designed gravity bomb. Whilst the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre was responsible for the manufacture and maintenance of the physics packages, DRDO scientists and engineers from Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory, Explosives Research and Development Laboratory (now High Energy Materials Research Laboratory) and Armament Research and Development Establishment designed and manufactured the bomb casing, implosion explosives and airburst fuse. The initial delivery system was purported to be the SEPECAT Jaguar which India sought to acquire in 1978. As an interim measure, India borrowed 18 Jaguars from the UK Royal Air Force in 1979. The first Indian-owned Jaguar was delivered in March 1981. It is unclear if the Jaguar was ever utilised as a delivery vehicle in this period with a possible lack of political clearance.18 By the 1990s, the air delivery leg also included the Mirage 2000 which, like the existing Jaguars, were modified to carry the air-dropped weapon. Since then Indian Jaguars have undergone lethality, avionics and engine upgrades, but they may have been surpassed by other nuclear-capable strike fighters. Upgrade work is carried out by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Other nuclear-capable strike fighters in the Indian Air Force include the Mirage 2000H, first delivered to India in 1985, and the Sukhoi 30 Mk1, delivered to India in 2002. In 2010, it was reported by local media that Strategic Forces Command sought to acquire 40 Sukhoi 30 Mk1s for its own integrated command. Other upgrades to the Sukhoi 30 Mk1 batch included weapons integration of the supersonic BrahMos I. Upgrade work was carried out by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. It is likely that the aircraft of choice for weapons delivery has shifted to the more able Sukhoi 30s.

Ground-launched systems The Agni Technology Demonstrator (AGNI-TD) was tested in 1989 and subsequently led to the development of the Agni I and Agni II medium range to intermediate range missiles. These were inducted into Indian Army service post-1998 Pokhran II tests around 2002, with the Agni II being in actual operational service around 2005. The Prithvi short range missile was inducted into Indian Army service in 1994 but it is unknown if warhead design work had achieved a package small enough to fit onto the Prithvi. The Prithvi was inducted into Strategic Forces Command in 2003 and is used as a delivery system. During this time, survivability of ground systems was achieved by using road-mobile and rail-mobile launchers but missiles and warheads were kept in de-mated states. Currently, Agni I – IV systems are deployed in service with future Agni V having been tested successfully with developed integration systems. There is speculation at the Agni V has not been tested to its maximum range; it is clearly an intermediate range capable missile but the Agni V also has the ambiguous potential to be an intercontinental ballistic missile. The Agni IV was inducted into Strategic Forces Command by at latest September 2016.19 It is unknown whether production schedules for the Agni IV and Agni V are keeping up with operational demands. Notably, the Agni V missile is designed to be launched from a canister-transport system necessitating the mating of the warhead to the missile and storage of the complete system for up to ten years (so long as the canister is in use). It is uncertain as to how this will affect political control of nuclear warheads via the NCA and SFC.

18 Jane’s Strategic Weapons, Issue 54 (January 2011), p. 59 19 Assessment by IHS Jane’s CBRN Assessments Centre

Submarine-launched systems The Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project initiated in 1990 came to fruition with the completion of the first vessel, INS Arihant, in 2009. The Arihant-class nuclear power ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is a 112m long underwater vessel armed with four vertical launch tubes, capable of carrying 12 K-15 missiles or 4 K-4 missiles. The K-15 Sagarika missile is a submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM) with a purported range of around 750km with a 500kg payload, subsequently increasing range with lighter payloads. The K-4 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) will offer a range of over 3,500km enabling India’s SSBNs to strike potentially Chinese targets from further out at sea. The K-4 was successfully tested in April 2016 leaving production scale-up as the remaining challenge to operationalisation. At the time of publication, only one VLF communications facility supports the submarine leg of the triad, located at INS Kattaboman. An additional VLF/ELF communications facility will be constructed at the SSBN purpose-built naval base, INS Varsha, currently under construction.

Dual-capable cruise missiles It is unclear whether India will seek to arm its cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. India has two principal dual-capable cruise missiles, the Brahmos and the Nirbhay, which could be utilised as delivery vehicles for nuclear payloads. The BrahMos was developed in a joint venture between DRDO and NPO Mashinostroyenia originally as an anti-ship supersonic missile. It has been reconfigured for ground launch anti-land and an air-launch version. The air-launch version, BrahMos-A, is of concern as 40 of the Indian Air Force Sukhoi 30 Mk1s are to be modified to fire it. It is plausible these are new delivery vehicles for tactical nuclear weapons, but equally plausible they would be used as prompt conventional strike systems. India defence laboratories are working on the Nirbhay which has suffered from flight malfunctions during testing. The Nirbhay is designed to complement the BrahMos by offering a longer-range capability, albeit at subsonic velocity. The BrahMos has a range of around 300km, whilst the Nirbhay is within the range of 1000-1500km.

Future systems Future developments for ground launch ballistic missiles include multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV)/multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV); and longer range intercontinental ballistic missiles (the Agni VI and Suryra projects). The K-5 is a future SLBM touted to have a maximum range of 6,000 km, enabling India’s SSBNs to launch from greater safety. BrahMos Aerospace is building a new hypersonic missile, the Brahmos II, it will be built from a new aeroframe but otherwise there are few solid details. There is speculation about a new cruise missile, the ‘long range cruise missile’ with three motor stages, including a supersonic boost phase for the final attack path.

India’s Air Defence and Ballistic Missile Defence Programme

India’s air defence programme has been demarcated by this report as of interest because of neighbouring China and Pakistan’s cruise missile inventory. Infrequent but notable mentions that Indian air defence capabilities will counter the full range of air threats, including cruise missiles, emphasise Indian strategic awareness of cruise missiles being used as nuclear delivery vehicles. India’s air defence programme is layered with a range of surface-to-air missile systems (SAM) of indigenous design, foreign joint venture effort, or foreign supply. The indigenous Akash SAM is a medium range missile paired with the Rajendra 3D radar system capable of intercepting cruise missiles. The MRSAM (Barak-8) is a joint Israel-India venture for a system out to 100km, with potential range upgrades (Barak-8ER/LRSAM). India’s Armed Forces also have a variety of other SAM assets, predominantly supplied from Russia. India’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme has been tested several times since the ‘Programme AD’ had been announced in 2006 but has yet to be inducted into service. India’s BMD system consists of a long-range tracking radar (the Swordfish LRTR derived from Israeli Green Pine radar), an exo-atmospheric interceptor (the Prithvi Air Defence Vehicle (PAD)/Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) also known as Praduyumna) and an endo-atmospheric interceptor (the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) also known as Ashwin). Phase 1 of the system has been developed pending further user trials, and Phase 2 has been initiated consisting of high-velocity interceptors designed to counter intermediate ballistic missiles. The missile interceptors are codenamed AD-1 and AD-2. In addition to the long-range radar system (an indigenous recreation of Israel’s Elta GreenPine radar), the BMD will be linked into geo-stationary satellites operated by the Indian Space Research Organization.

Differences in Historical Entity Lists

Indian entities have been designated at various times under differing conditions. India was first internationally sanctioned in 1974 following the ‘Smiling Buddha’ test, causing a break in Soviet and Canadian nuclear cooperation. US cessation of economic aid was then followed by the US passage of the ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act’ (NNPA), a key piece of legislation that grounded sanctions in 1998. Because the 1974 sanctions did not entail targeted sanctions against entities, this period is not covered here. Instead, this section will aim to outline the differences in entity listings between 1997 and 2017. Differences in entity listings are indicative of which entities were considered key actors, auxiliary, or unrelated to India’s nuclear and missile programme. These differences are useful for establishing a baseline of complicity for this study. 1997 Beginning in May-June 1997, the US Bureau for Export Administration began placing entities deemed to have "an unacceptable risk of diversion to developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or missiles used to deliver those weapons" to the Supplement No.4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations (the Entity List). Four Indian entities were specifically named: the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Bharat Electronics Ltd, Indian Rare Earth, and Indira Gandhi Centre for Advanced Research.20

20 Bureau of Export Administration, ‘Revisions to Export Administration Regulations: Additions to the Entity List’, Federal Register 62:125 (30 June 1997), 62 FR 35334, pp. 35334-35335; Bureau of Export Administration, ‘Revisions to Export Administration Regulations: Addition of Bharat Electronics, Ltd. (aka Baharat Electronics, Ltd.) India, to Entity List’, Federal Register 62:95 (16 May 1997), 62 FR 26922, pp. 26922-26923; Bureau of

1998 Following the Pokhran II tests, in November 1998 Indian entities were designated en masse under Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (“Glenn Amendment”) which prohibited all US Economic and military assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as defined by the Treat y for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) that carries out a nuclear explosion. The Bureau of Export Administration added “certain Indian and Pakistani government, parastatal, and private entities determined to be involved in nuclear or missile activities. In addition, Indian and Pakistani military entities are added to the Entity List in order to supplement the list.”21 Three files added in a 16 November revision clarified the entity list subdividing Indian and Pakistani entities among the governmental, parastatal, and private distinctions and delineating between entities believed to be related to nuclear and missile activities, or military activities. However, many of the 116 entities listed as engaged in nuclear or missile activities were clearly engaged in other defence research (ie. the Defence Food Research Laboratory). 2000 In late 1999, the Clinton administration made a decision to more tightly focus the sanctions on those Indian entities which “make direct and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and items that can contribute to such programs” removing 51 entities thought to be sufficiently unrelated.22 Entities which remained on this list form the baseline of this report. In this period, Indian and Pakistani entities were moved from the entity list to Appendix A and Appendix B respectively. 2001 Opting to strengthen strategic relations, the Bush administration moved to reconcile with India over sanctions. Sanctions were lifted on the vast majority of remaining entities by August 2001, leaving a small number of entities related to guided missile development, unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle, and a number of ISRO entities involved with propulsion and launch vehicle research.23

Export Administration, ‘Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Additions to Entity List: National Development Centre, Pakistan; and Indian Rare Earths, Ltd., India’, Federal Register 62:125 (30 June 1997), 62 FR 35335, pp. 35335 21 Bureau of Export Administration, ‘Revisions to Export Administration Regulations: Additions to the Entity List’, Federal Register 63:233 (19 November 1998), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-11-19/pdf/98-30877.pdf 22 Bureau of Export Administration, ‘Export Administration Regulations Entity List: Removal of Entities, Revision in License Policy, and Reformat of List’, Federal Register 65:53 (17 March 2000) 65 FR 14444, pp. 14444 – 14452, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/03/17/00-6653/export-administration-regulations-entity-list-removal-of-entities-revision-in-license-policy-and 23 Executive Office of the President, ‘Waiver of Nuclear-Related Sanctions on India and Pakistan’, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Federal Register 66:191 (2 October 2001), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-10-02/pdf/01-24721.pdf; Bureau of Export Administration, ‘India and Pakistan: Lifting of Sanctions, Removal of Indian and Pakistani Entities, and Revision in License Review Policy’, Federal Register 66:190 (1 October 2001) 66 FR 500089, pp. 50089-50093, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-10-01/pdf/01-24648.pdf

2005 As part of the July 2005 ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’ between the US and India, the US de-listed six entities, three of which were safeguarded nuclear power generating plants, and the othet three were ISRO entities pertaining to civil space research.24 2011 Following complete rapprochement with India, the US de-listed DRDO missile-related entities and ISRO propulsion and launch vehicle entities. These holdouts were public sector undertaking Bharat Dynamics Ltd, DRDO Armament Research and Development Organisation (ARDE), Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), the Missile Research and Development Complex (MC), and Solid State Physics Laboratory (SSPL). On the ISRO side, these were the Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre (LPSC), Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant (SPROB), Sriharikota Space Centre [now Satish Dhawan Space Centre], and Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC).25 Presently, only three Department of Atomic Energy entities, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Indira Gandhi Atomic Research Centre and Indian Rare Earths, pertaining to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities, nuclear reactors not under safeguards, and related fuel reprocessing, enrichment, heavy water production and ammonia plant facilities, are maintained on the entity list.

Strategic Weapons Stakeholders

This study’s primary objective is to detail the extent of the strategic weapons programme, and to identify the range of stakeholders in it. One extract from the profile of a recently promoted DRDO scientist is revealing26:

“As project director, he led a team towards successful development of missile launch platforms for Agni 1, 2, and 3. He has been instrumental in devising innovative schemes/solutions and establishing effective interfaces among all stakeholders through continuous interaction with various organisations like Indian Railways, ISRO, CSIR, leading industry partners, academia, and users for development of various critical ground support systems required for operationalisation and development of long-range strategic missile weapon systems.”

This study found that the core entities involved in the operation of strategic weapons, the fissile material pits, final packages, and/or delivery systems were the lowest category of entity in this study. Entities involved in the development of missiles were likewise fairly low. The second largest section comprised of dual-use research entities in materials, electronics, aerospace, vehicular engineering, propulsion, etc, which were typically found to have made contributions in some manner to India’s strategic weapons. The next category were laboratories involved in the development of auxiliary systems/technologies, typically including vehicles; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Suppliers were sorted as major or minor contributors, resulting in relatively few key Indian domestic industry actors who were core major suppliers generally trusted with the high specification engineering required. Minor suppliers to strategic

24 Bureau of Industry and Security, ‘Removal of License Requirements for Exports and Reexports to India of Items Controlled Unilaterally for Nuclear Non-proliferation Reasons and Removal of Certain Indian Entities From the Entity List’, Federal Register 70:167 (30 August 2005) 70 FR 51251, pp. 51251-51252, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2005-08-30/pdf/05-17241.pdf 25 Industry and Security Bureau, ‘U.S.-India Bilateral Understanding: Revisions to U.S. Export and Reexport Controls Under the Export Administration Regulations’, Federal Register 76:16 (25 January 2011) 76 FR 4228, pp. 4228-4231, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/01/25/2011-1471/us-india-bilateral-understanding-revisions-to-us-export-and-reexport-controls-under-the-export 26 DRDO Newsletter (December 2014), p. 18

programmes were the largest category, and given the paucity of information on their contributions and the infrequency of their supply, the scale of their input was difficult to assess. Finally, operation of the country’s unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle was restricted to Department of Atomic Energy entities. This ‘Alpha in Depth’ tallies:

6 entities as directly operating strategic weapons (not including separately Army, Navy and Air Force units, instead counting them as one entity under Strategic Forces Command)

16 entities as directly responsible for strategic weapons development

33 entities as contributing to auxiliary systems/technologies for strategic weapons

13 entities as participating in an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle

57 entities as contributing dual-use research of concern

18 entities as major suppliers of strategic weapons entities and projects, largely with direct military use items

99 entities as minor suppliers to strategic weapons entities and projects, often with dual-use items

Bringing to a total of 243 entities examined for this report. These entities are examined in turn in part 2 of this report. Before examining these it is helpful to examine two issues in greater depth. The first relates to the separation of the civil and military aspects of India’s strategic programs. The second is India’s efforts to join the nuclear governance regimes.

2. Separation of Civil and Strategic Nuclear Facilities in India

Following the 2007 US/India nuclear deal, India submitted to the IAEA a separation plan to split its civil and strategic nuclear facilities. This could have brought to an end five decades of difficulty regarding the safeguards status of India nuclear facilities. However, in practice, separation between India’s civil and strategic programmes is limited. The purpose of this section is to track the history of India’s separation of civil and military nuclear facilities and to provide insight into the separation of India’s facilities as it is formalised today.

India and Safeguards: A Difficult History

The safeguards status of India’s nuclear fuel cycle has been a contentious issue for at least six decades. Following Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech at the United Nations in 1953, Canada proceeded to offer to India a research reactor before international safeguards had been designed. While the reactor was subject to a peaceful uses pledge, no arrangements were put in place to ensure that fissile material from the reactor was not diverted. This was partly because the fuel for the reactor was to be produced in India. However, after it became apparent that Indian-produced fuel of suitable quality would not be ready in time for use in the reactor, Canada stepped in to provide the first fuel load. Soon after this, India sought tenders for construction of a power reactor. Part of the terms and conditions was that India should be allowed to construct indigenous clones of the facility. By this point, supplier states had coordinated to include safeguards on supplied facilities. However, the safeguards would be applicable only to the Canadian-constructed reactor and not to any future indigenously produced facilities. Despite being involved in its design, India opted not to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and later conducted a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. It used indigenously-produced uranium fuel that had been irradiated at the CIRUS reactor and reprocessed. The reactor also used heavy water produced in the United States as a moderator. Following press reports ahead of the explosion, both the US and Canada wrote to India to indicate that they would view the use of material from CIRUS in an explosion as a non-peaceful end use that would thus violate the terms of sale. India, for its part, held the line that the test was peaceful in nature. As could be expected, the explosive test resulted in international tensions and helped to generate momentum in the refinement of non-proliferation controls. The United States conducted a review of its non-proliferation policy and devised a non-proliferation strategy that would, among other actions, see the US try to coordinate with other suppliers to strengthen rules on nuclear supply (what would become the Nuclear Suppliers Group). Other states were sympathetic to the need to restrain supply. Canada immediately suspended nuclear cooperation and in 1976 adopted a policy requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. Primarily because of French objections, the NSG would not adopt such a condition until the 1990s because, the French believed, such a criterion imposed a de facto NPT requirement of nuclear cooperation at a time when the French view was that the NPT was a discriminatory instrument.

US nuclear cooperation with India could not be so easily halted. The US had supplied the Tarapur reactor on the basis of 25 years of assured fuel supply. The US would thus have to breach its contract to if it was to suspend the supply. Instead, the US sought to leverage the supply of fuel for Tarapur to persuade India not to conduct further nuclear explosions. By 1978, however, the US congress had taken up the issue of nuclear cooperation with non-NPT states and had adopted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. This act would require the United States to suspend cooperation with states not

accepting full-scope safeguards. President Carter, who campaigned on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation signed the act in 1978. The Soviet Union stepped in to provide fuel for the reactor in the 1980s. However, after the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed to the requirement for full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply in the early 1990s after discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme, this cooperation also ended. India’s own supplies of uranium are limited and thus, by the mid-1990s, India’s nuclear program was already substantially isolated from the international marketplace – no doubt partly driving India’s exploration of novel nuclear technology. India could still procure dual-use items. After India conducted further nuclear tests in 1998, even this ability to acquire dual-use items eroded.

Novel fuel cycles India is a country rich in thorium but not uranium. Thorium is not in itself fissile but it is fertile, which means it can be made fissile through bombardment of neutrons. Throughout the nuclear age there has been interest in thorium, particularly for the day when uranium runs out. While the rest of the international community have considered this a longer-term concern, for India it has been a key driving factor because of its international isolation and limited indigenous uranium. As a result of this, and in order to take advantage of the resources it has to hand, Indian scientists have long purposed a three-phase fuel cycle. This fuel cycle is summarised in the diagram below. The three phases are as follows:

1. Transformation of natural uranium from plutonium239 in Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR)

2. Transformation of thorium to uranium233 in Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) fuelled by plutonium239

3. Burn up of uranium233 using Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWR) India has substantial experience with construction and operation of pressurised heavy water reactors having constructed a fleet of such reactors after Canada supplied the RAPPs reactor in 1960x. However, India, like most other countries in the world, has little experience of operating a thorium fuel cycle. As such India’s pursuit of the thorium fuel cycle must be considered highly ambitious and highly risky. Nonetheless, the benefits of success in this endeavour could be significant. Not only would India be able to utilise its rich resources of thorium to satisfy its energy needs, but it would secure a first-movers advantage should the world eventually begin to shift towards use of thorium in the nuclear fuel cycle. The US/India deal and India’s Separation Plan In July 2005, following years of nuclear isolation, the US Bush administration and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached an agreement on the resumption of civil nuclear cooperation. The motivations of each side varied with India desiring civil nuclear cooperation to meet its energy needs and the United States seeking to strengthen its relationship with India. An agreement between the two parties was reached necessitating India embark on a programme to separate its civil and strategic nuclear programme in exchange for the US easing export control requirements and championing an exemption at the NSG for a waiver to the requirement for full-scope safeguards. In order to fulfil the agreement, the United States embarked upon a programme of diplomatic outreach and engagement. In parallel, India prepared a plan to separate its civil and strategic programme.

The provisions for the separation plan as submitted to the IAEA on 25 July 2008 included the following: India would make subject to safeguards the following 14 of the 22 facilities that it had at the time; India would not offer its Fast Breeder Reactors for safeguards; all future thermal reactors would be put under safeguards; India would shut down the CIRUS reactor; and India would offer certain other fuel cycle facilities for safeguards.

Table 2: India’s Thermal Reactor Safeguards Status as Detailed in INFCIRC/73127

No Facility Year offered for safeguards

1 TAPS 1 2006

2 TAPS 2 2006

3 RAPS 1 2006

4 RAPS 2 2006

5 KK 1 2006

6 KK 2 2006

7 RAPS 5 2007

8 RAPS 6 2008

9 RAPS 3 2010

10 RAPS 4 2010

11 KAPS 1 2012

12 KAPS 2 2012

13 NAPS 1 2014

14 NAPS 2 2014

The other fuel cycle facilities to be placed under safeguards included:

Uranium Oxide Plant (Block A)

Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Palletizing) Block A

Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Assembly) Block A

Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant

Enriched Fuel Fabrication Plant

Gadolinia Facility

Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (for certain campaigns)

Tarapur and Rajashtan ‘Away from Reactors’ spent fuel storage pools Additionally, the following research facilities were declared as civil:

Tata Institute of Fundamental research

Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre

Sara Institute of Nuclear Physics

Institute of Plasma Research

Institute of Mathematics Science

27 INFCIRC731 Communication dated 25 July 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of India concerning a document entitled "Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's separation Plan"

Institute of Physics

Tata Memorial Centre

Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology

Harish Chandra Research Institute In defining the scope of safeguards, the overarching criterion would be a judgement whether subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on India’s national security. Facilities included on civilian list were those that, after separation, would no longer be engaged in activities of strategic significance. However, a facility would be excluded from the civilian list if it was located in a larger hub of strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that it may not be normally engaged in activities of strategic significance. A civilian facility would therefore, be on that India has determined to have no bearing to the strategic programme. The separation plan also expressly recognises that India has a military nuclear programme that would not be hampered by the provision of IAEA controls. A large number of facilities remain outside of safeguards. These facilities have enabled modest Indian expansion of the nuclear arsenal over the last decade. While not directly affected by the separation plan, it is likely that India’s weapons programme has benefited from the NSG exemption in a number of ways. First, it is likely that India has been able to utilise indigenous uranium for military purposes that would otherwise have been required to satisfy India’s civil nuclear needs. Second, it is likely that India’s military programme has been able to acquire dual-use goods and other assistance from the international marketplace which would hitherto have been prohibited. Third, as set out later in the report, India strategic research institutes – most notably the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) have benefited from ‘civil’ nuclear cooperation despite the fact that these facilities were not declared as civil under the separation plan like other Indian research facilities. It is likely that indirect contributions have supported auxiliary processes of strategic weapons development and production. This report observes a divide between civil and military nuclear scientists, typically meaning that nuclear scientists in BARC restricted to the civil programme rarely cross over to military affairs. However, this is difficult to quantify, and as such an entity-level of analysis, laxity regarding nuclear cooperation should raise concerns. The separation plan also makes no mention of India’s uranium enrichment programme, which officials in New Delhi have hitherto not formally acknowledged. India is thought to have a modest enrichment capability possibly intended to supply its submarine reactor programme as well as contribute to the nuclear weapons programme, which is thought to be principally plutonium based. India has also resisted calls for it to subject its thorium fuel cycle to safeguards and three-phase fuel cycle. Firstly, this bars any nuclear cooperation on the thorium aspects of the nuclear programme. However, it also meant that India could, if it so desired, use material from the thorium fuel cycle for military purposes. India’s primary rationale for not offering this programme for safeguards is that it wishes to protect the commercial confidentialities of what could be a unique nuclear fuel cycle technology. However, India might have another vested interest: it’s likely that some quantity of natural or depleted uranium could be placed in the breeder blanket of the fast reactors in place of thorium with the objective of quickly producing large quantities of weapons-usable plutonium. Coming from the breeder blanket rather than the reactor fuel, such plutonium would have a relatively low level of fission products and would thus be relatively easy to handle. India’s three phase fuel cycle could thus provide India a substantial surge capability to produce fissile material for weapons purposes.

Implications of India’s separation of nuclear facilities

India’s separation plan resulted in a nominal separation of its civil and military nuclear programme. However, the true degree of separation is somewhat limited and it is likely that India’s military programs have benefited as a result. Perhaps the most significant contribution to India’s military programme has been through what can be considered an offset – that is, uranium mined in India has been freed up for use in India’s military programs where it would hitherto have been required for India’s civil power programme. However, the potential contribution of internationally-acquired dual-use goods as well as research cooperation should be understated. The offset problem is particularly problematic because India is thought to continue to produce fissile material for military purposes. Under the separation plan, India expressed its willingness to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). However, negotiations over such a treaty continue to be blocked in the Conference on Disarmament. Additionally, Pakistan, which is blocking the negotiations points to the fact that India’s programme, can benefit from the offset issue introduced through the NSG exemption – an exemption which has not been made for Pakistan. Whether or not one accepts Pakistan’s arguments that the NSG exemption is destabilising, a fissile material production race in South Asia is underway. Both Pakistan and India will seek to maximise production of fissile material to fulfil their burgeoning civil power programmes, although more so on the Indian side, and produce sufficient special fissile material to satisfy the expansion of their strategic weapons programmes. Racing for fissile material surplus now is desirable as it hedges against the future possibility that restraint is imposed, possibly through the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. This leads to the question of whether the carrot of civil nuclear cooperation could be used as a lever to secure a moratorium on production of military-related fissile material in South Asia. It seems likely that this is one of the outcomes that Pakistan desires. It is not clear, however, whether both states are ready to reach such an agreement. Moreover, India would doubtless feel that it has no incentive to agree to such a moratorium given that it already has its NSG exemption. Overall, while the waiver does offer benefits to numerous parties and to India’s population, it might ultimately be concluded that the waiver is contributing India’s military programs and to the destabilising situation in South Asia.

Managing the risks of trading with India Given the relatively poor delineation between civil and military activities in India, there is a clear risk that trade and research cooperation could directly or indirectly aid India’s military programs. The various lists of designated entities have in the past provided industry with a way of ensuring that exports were not directly intended for military activities. However, in recent years these sanctions have been removed whilst the range of entities involved in strategic weapons activity has grown. The primary approach for risk management would be for potential exporters to rely on the judgement of export control authorities. However, given that export licence issuance for India is generally perceived as permissive, this would not fully avoid the potential risk that goods supplied would contribute to nuclear weapons programmes. Table 3 below shows US export licence refusals per year for items controlled by the MTCR or NSG and other regimes. It is clear that there has been a substantial decline in denied licences suggesting either greater laxity in approach on the part of the issuing authorities or a decline in strategic weapons entities seeking goods from abroad.

This report found signs that scientific cooperation between Western institutions and Indian strategic entities has steadily risen since 2008. For example, the UK government has sponsored a dozen research projects with the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), a pivotal player in the development and continued operation of India’s nuclear weapons. BARC has previously been subject to multilateral sanctions over a sustained period. This cooperation has occurred after the 2008 normalisation process and has focused on civil power topics of nuclear safety, proliferation-resistance and waste disposal. Nonetheless, the findings of this report should raise concerns about the longer-term risks of nuclear assistance to strategic weapons entities. UK-India research projects involving BARC are detailed in the table overleaf. Given the tight entanglement of civil and military entities in India’s defence, space and nuclear sectors, it is likely that exports of dual-use and strategic items, and research cooperation with Indian entities is indirectly aiding the country’s nuclear weapon programme.

Table 3: US Export Licence Denials to India

Table 4: UK-India Research Cooperation Involving BARC and IGCAR

Number Title Description 1 Sustainability and proliferation

resistance assessment of open cycle thorium-fuelled nuclear energy (University of Cambridge and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)

This project sought to characterize the nuclear sustainability and proliferation resistance of a ‘once through’ thorium nuclear fuel cycle and to devise an assessment criteria for this purpose. A three-stage approach would be taken: 1) review of proliferation resistance and sustainability assessment methodologies, 2) review of proposed open cycle thorium fuelled nuclear reactor designs, including review of fuel composition and design, and 3) assessment of designs against a newly developed sustainability and proliferation resistance criteria. The results would be published.28

2 Irradiation effects on flow localisation in zirconium alloys

This project sought to understand the damage caused by radiation to nuclear fuel cladding which can limit fuel burn up. The research was designed to take advantage of the fact that the UK and India each had facilities that could use different mechanisms to model such damage. Comparative analysis of the results could then take place. The proposal noted that Indian scientists would also learn how to undertake advanced electron back scatter diffraction (EBSD) and synchrotron x-ray diffraction experiments.29

3 Indo-UK civil nuclear collaboration on damage and radiation effects in amorphous material

This project sought to develop collaboration around the study of radiation damage processes in nuclear waste glasses and glass composite materials. UK collaborators will contribute in two principal areas: provision of expertise in application of X-ray spectroscopy methods to radiation damaged materials and application of advanced analytical electron microscopy to glass and glass composite characterisation. Indian collaborators will bring many years of expertise in preparation and characterisation of radionuclide-containing nuclear glasses by electron spin and positron annihilation spectroscopies.

4 Characterisation of the atomic-scale structure of yttria-based particles in strengthened steels

The project sought to study the potential of utilising Oxide Dispersion Strengthened alloys in place of structural steels in the construction of high temperature (Gen IV) reactors. The proposal noted that: These alloys offer much improved performance than more conventional structural steels at the temperatures above 600 C that will be experienced in these new reactor designs. However, there are a number of issues that are very poorly understood in these alloys.

5 Validation and verification for critical heat flux and CFD

This project sought to validate computational fluid dynamics (CFD) codes, used to simulate fluid flows in nuclear reactors, against good measurements made in suitable experimental rigs. The experiments were conducted at BARC which has excellent experimental facilities. The results are intended to help provide better validated CFD models to improve the ability to assess new nuclear reactors’ abilities to meet ever higher economic and safety criteria.

6 Thermal hydraulics for boiling and passive systems

This project sought to develop a better understanding of where the transition between water coolant and steam occurs in water-cooled nuclear reactor operations, and developing better techniques to predict this. New nuclear power reactors for energy generation will almost certainly be water-cooled. The project used experimental measurements of boiling systems conducted at BARC in India.

7 Transferability of small-scale specimen data to large-scale component fracture assessment

This project sought to assess tests that had been performed on reactor grade piping components of the Indian Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) to examine their structural integrity. One of the inputs to demonstrating structural integrity is a fracture mechanics assessment to demonstrate defect tolerance. The R6 procedure, which contains a hierarchy of assessment approaches, is the UK nuclear industry standard. However, a difficulty in using the higher level methods is demonstrating transferability of fracture parameters determined from specimens to application at component level. A large number of tests of PHWR piping components had been performed

28 http://gow.epSource.ac.uk/NGBOViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/I018425/1 29 http://gow.epSource.ac.uk/NGBOViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/I012346/1

on straight pipes and elbows, with a variety of cracks and loadings. These tests were assessed using a range of defect assessment approaches to demonstrate transferability for practical piping components.

8 Fundamental properties of thoria-based mixed oxides

This project sought to use advanced materials simulation techniques to investigate the behaviour of thorium dioxide based materials when irradiated in a nuclear reactor. Comparison with experimental data was also performed, both using pre-existing data and new data being developed by collaborators in India. This work will aid development of better predictive capability to establish that fuel being irradiated in a civil reactor will behave in a manner consistent with its design criteria, which is required to rapidly develop experience in the use of thorium based fuels for civil power generation. There is an interest in using a thorium dioxide fuel approach as there are concerns that uranium reserves are not sufficient to facilitate a large scale international nuclear new build.

9 Management of nuclear risk issues: environmental, financial and safety (NREFS)

This project sought to evaluate mitigation options following a possible large-scale nuclear accident in the future. The research used data on post-accident contamination and doses from the Chernobyl accident and hew data from the Fukushima incident. Mitigation was then considered in four national contexts: Ukraine/Belarus, Japan, India and the UK using a variety of decision-making techniques. Subsequently scenario-based multi-criteria decision analysis was used to investigate differences between recommendations from the objective methods and decisions taken on the ground. Recommendations were developed from the various methods.

10 Atomistic modelling and experimental verification of vitrified matrices for waste encapsulation

This project sought to develop computer models of the radiation induced structural changes in the encapsulation materials over long time scales. Principal materials investigated were borosilicate and iron phosphate glasses, for which experimental verification of the computer models were performed. The outcomes from this work were to be used to make predictions to enable engineers to choose the best materials for long time structural integrity of encapsulated spent nuclear waste.

11 11. DMW-Creep: Influence of Inhomogeneity on Creep of Dissimilar Metal Welds

This project sought to improve understanding of the characteristics of welded joints between austenitic stainless steels and ferrtic steels that are widely used in many nuclear power plants. In the steam generator circuit of sodium cooled fast breeder reactors stainless steel pipes are required to join with ferritic steel pipes. The welds are dissimilar metal welds and incorporate a nickel alloy pipe insertion . Premature creep failure is encountered in such joints. This project aimed to model and test the effects of metallurgical and structural aspects of welds, develop material models and develop reliable methods to monitor the material, in order to improve understanding of the operating life of the weld.

Facilities List

India operates a full independent nuclear fuel cycle. These facilities are listed below with their general locations and operating entities where possible. Data has been collated from the IAEA Power Reactor Information System; IAEA Research Reactor Database; IAEA Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System; ‘List of Facilities Subject to Safeguards Under India’s Safeguards Agreement’ INFCIRC/754/Add.7 (February 2015); ‘Separation Plan’ INFCIRC/731 (July 2008); David Albright and Susan Basu, ‘Separating Indian Military and Civilian Nuclear Facilities’, Institute for Science and International Security (19 December 2005); and IHS Jane’s CBRN Assessment’s Centre.

Table 5: List of Indian Nuclear Facilities

Facilities State Facility Type Operator Output Status Year Operational Safeguards Notes

Jaduguda Jharkhand U Mining UCIL 2500t/day Active 1967 No

Bhatin Jharkhand U Mining UCIL

Active 1967 No

Narwapahar Jharkhand U Mining UCIL

Active 1995 No

Bagjata Jharkhand U Mining UCIL

Active 2008 No

Turamdih Jharkhand U Mining UCIL 3000-4500t/day Active 2003 No

Baduhurang Jharkhand U Mining UCIL

Active 2007 No

Mohuldih Jharkhand U Mining UCIL

Active 2012 No

Tummalapalle 1 Andhra Pradesh U Mining UCIL

Active 2012 No

Tummalapalle 2 Andhra Pradesh U Mining UCIL

Active 2017 (projected) No

Lambapur-Peddagattu Telengana U Mining UCIL 130t/yr (U) Future 2024 No

Gogi Karnataka U Mining UCIL 130t/yr (U) Future 2020 No

KPM Meghalaya U Mining UCIL 340t/yr (U) Future 2022 No

Jaduguda Jharkhand U Milling UCIL 200t/yr (U) Active 1968 No

Turamdih Jharkhand U Milling UCIL 190t/yr (U) Active 2008 No

Tumalpalle Andhra Pradesh U Milling UCIL 220-330t/yr (U) Active 2015 No

Kanampalle Andhra Pradesh U Milling UCIL

Future 2017 No

Seripally/Mallapuram Telengana U Milling UCIL

Future 2024 No

Diggi/Sadiapur Karnataka U Milling UCIL

Future 2020 No

Mawthabah Meghalaya U Milling UCIL

Future 2022 No

Uranium Oxide Plant Hyderabad U Conversion NFC 450t/yr Active

Yes

Uranium Fuel Assembly Plant ("New") Hyderabad Fuel Fabrication

NFC

Active

No

Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant ("New") Hyderabad U Conversion NFC 24t/yr (LEU) Active

Yes

Enriched Fuel Fabrication Plant Hyderabad Fuel Fabrication

NFC Active

Yes

Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Pelletizing) Hyderabad Fuel Fabrication

NFC 335t/yr Active

Yes

Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Assembly) Hyderabad Fuel Fabrication

NFC 300t/yr Active

Yes

PHWR Fuel Assembly (Block A) Hyderabad Fuel Fabrication

NFC 300t/yr (HM) Active

Yes

Gadolina Facility Hyderabad Zirconium NFC

Active

Yes

New Zirconium Fabrication Plant (NZFP) Hyderabad Zirconium NFC

Active

No

New Zirconium Sponge Plant (NZSP) Hyderabad Zirconium NFC

Active

No

Zirconium Fabrication Plant (ZFP) Hyderabad Zirconium NFC

Active

No

Zirconium Sponge Plant, Palaykayal (NFC-II) Tamilnadu Zirconium NFC

Active

No

PHWR Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF) Kota Fuel Fabrication

NFC

Active

No

Zirconium Fabrication Facility (ZFF) Kota Zirconium NFC

Active

No

Trombay Fuel Fabrication Maharashtra Fuel Fabrication

--

Active

No

Uranium Metals Plant, Trombay Maharashtra Fuel Fabrication

--

Active

No

Tarapur Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility Maharashtra Fuel Fabrication

BARC MOX Active

No

Rare Materials Plant (RMP) Site 1 Karnataka U Enrichment BARC/IREL 60-100kg/yr (WGU)

Active

No

Rare Materials Plant (RMP) Site 2 Karnataka U Enrichment BARC/IREL

Future

No

Special Material Enrichment Facility (SMEF), Challakere

Karnataka U Enrichment BARC

Future

No

Uranium Enrichment Plant, Trombay Maharashtra U Enrichment BARC

Active

No

TAPS-1 Tarapur Maharashtra BWR NPCIL 160 MWe Active 1969 Yes General Electric built

TAPS-2 Tarapur Maharashtra BWR NPCIL 160 MWe Active 1969 Yes General Electric built

TAPS-3 Tarapur Maharashtra PHWR NPCIL 540 MWe Active August 2006 No General Electric built

TAPS-4 Tarapur Maharashtra PHWR NPCIL 540 MWe Active September 2005 No General Electric built

MAPS-1 Madras, Kalpakkam Tamilnadu PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1983 No General Electric built

MAPS-2 Madras, Kalpakkam Tamilnadu PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1985 No

NAPS-1 Narora Uttar Pradesh PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1991 Yes

NAPS-2 Narora Uttar Pradesh PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1992 Yes

KAPS-1 Kakrapur Gujarat PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1993 Yes

KAPS-2 Kakrapur Gujarat PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1995 Yes

KAPS-3 Kakrapur Gujarat PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Future November 2017 No

KAPS-4 Kakrapur Gujarat PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Future 2018 No

KAIGA-1 Kaiga Karnataka PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1999 No

KAIGA-2 Kaiga Karnataka PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 2000 No

KAIGA-3 Kaiga Karnataka PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active February 2007 No

KAIGA-4 Kaiga Karnataka PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active November 2010 No

RAPS-1 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 100 MWe Active 1973 Yes

RAPS-2 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 200 MWe Active 1981 Yes

RAPS-3 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1999 Yes

RAPS-4 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 2000 Yes

RAPS-5 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active November 2009 Yes

RAPS-6 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active January 2010 Yes

RAPS-7 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 700 MWe Future

No

RAPS-8 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 700 MWe Future

No

KK-1 Kundankulam Tamilnadu PWR NPCIL 1000 MWe Active December 2014 Yes VVER built

KK-2 Kundankulam Tamilnadu PWR NPCIL 1000 MWe Active April 2017 Yes VVER built

KK-3 Kundankulam Tamilnadu PWR NPCIL 1000 MWe Future Future No VVER built

KK-4 Kundankulam Tamilnadu PWR NPCIL 1000 MWe Future Future No VVER built

Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), Kalpakkam

Tamilnadu FBR BHAVINI 500 MWe Future May 2017 No Scale-up reactor

Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) Maharashtra HWR BARC 300 MWe Future 2017 No Scale-up reactor

INS Arihant Reactor Naval Reactor PWR BARC 80-100 MWt Active August 2013 No HEU

INS Aridhaman Reactor Naval Reactor PWR BARC 80-100 MWt Future

No HEU

3rd SSBN Reactor Naval Reactor PWR BARC 80-100 MWt Future

No HEU

Kalpakkam Spent Fuel Reprocessing (KARP) Tamilnadu Reprocessing BARC PUREX Active 1997 No

Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE-1)

Maharashtra Reprocessing BARC PUREX Active 1977 No

Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE-2)

Maharashtra Reprocessing BARC PUREX Active

No

CORAL Reprocessing Plant, Kalpakkam Tamilnadu Reprocessing IGCAR 12kg/yr Active

No

Plutonium Seperation Plant, BARC Maharashtra Reprocessing BARC 400-700kg total (PUREX)

Active

No

Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (FRFRP), Kalpakkam

Tamilnadu Reprocessing IGCAR

Active

No

Rajasthan Away from Reactor Dry Spent Fuel Storage

Rajasthan Fuel storage NPCIL

Active

No

Tarapur Away from Reactor Wet Spent Fuel Storage

Tarapur Fuel storage -- 275t spent fuel total

Active

Yes

Tarapur Dry Spent Fuel Storage Tarapur Fuel storage -- 20t total Active

Yes

Unspecified PHWR Fuel Storage

Fuel storage -- 2500-3600t spent fuel total

Active

No

CIRUS Maharashtra HWR BARC

Inactive July 1960 No Research reactor, original source of plutonium

DHRUVA Maharashtra HWR BARC

Active August 1985 No Research reactor

PURNIMA Maharashtra LWR (U-233) BARC

Inactive May 19782 No Three variants of research reactor, PURNIMA-I was a pulsed fast reactor

KAMINI Tamilnadu LWR (U-233) BARC/IGCAR

Active May 1972 No Research reactor

ASPARA Maharashtra LWR (U-233) BARC

Inactive 1956 No Undergoing conversion

Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) Tamilnadu FBR IGCAR

Active October 1985 No Research reactor

Compact High Temperature Reactor (CHTR), Trombay

Maharashtra HTR BARC

Active

No Research reactor utilising U-233 + Th fuel

Indian High Temperature Reactor (IHTR) Maharashtra HTR BARC

Future

No Research reactor

Accelerator Driven Subcritical System (ADSS) Maharashtra ADS (Thorium) BARC

Future

No Research reactor for R&D for thorium fuel

PRP-1 Reactor, Kalpakkam Tamilnadu PWR BARC 80-100 MWt Active September 2006 No Land-based reactor for training and orientation

HWP Hazira Gujarat D2O2 Plant HWB 80t/yr Active February 1991 Yes

HWP Thal-Vaishet Maharashtra D2O2 Plant HWB 78t/yr Active 1985 Yes

HWP Tuticorin Tamilnadu D2O2 Plant HWB 49t/yr Active 1978 Yes

HWP Baroda Gujarat D2O2 Plant HWB 17t/yr Active 1975 No

HWP Kota Rajasthan D2O2 Plant HWB 85t/yr Active April 1985 No

HWP Manuguru Telangana D2O2 Plant HWB 185t/yr Active December 1991 No

HWP Talcher Odisha D2O2 Plant HWB 62t/yr Active March 1985 No

Pokhran test range Rajasthan Test range BARC/Indian Army

Inactive 1974 No

3. India’s Engagement with Nuclear Governance

India’s interactions with international export control regimes and nuclear governance agreements are best characterised as partial engagement. India has traditionally opposed the NPT and perceived it as inadequate, citing non-proliferation and disarmament sequencing issues, and has sought to pursue its own brand of self-determination and proliferation management. Since the US-India nuclear deal, this has changed. India is now a participating member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and remains an outlier to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). India has applied to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an export control regime that some claim include the criterion, that all NSG members must also be adherents to the NPT.30 India has not engaged with either Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) or Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Given that native Indian strategic discourse appears to focus on Indian freedom of nuclear decision making, Indian accession to either of those agreements remains unlikely. This mixed bag of partial engagement has complicated international efforts to work with India on non-proliferation, and will continue to plague Indian ambitions for international recognition and acceptance. As a result, the outlook for Indian integration into formal agreements appears to remain contingent on the strategic priorities of constituent members rather than India’s unconditional adoption of nuclear non-proliferation agreements. This renders India’s future in international nuclear governance as uncertain, and warranting close attention in the short-to-medium term.

India’s Nuclear Self Determination

Since 2007, India’s role in nuclear governance evolved substantially. This was instigated by the US/India nuclear agreement and the 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group exemption to the requirement of full-scope safeguards as previous sections outlined. In the decade that has followed, India has taken a number of steps to engage in global nuclear commerce and governance. In addition to separating its civil and strategic nuclear programs as set out in Part 1 Section 2, this includes:

Concluding nuclear cooperation agreements with 10 states and agreements for the supply of uranium and technology. It is notable that despite this, construction of foreign supplied reactors in India is at considerable risk. This was first partly a result of India’s uncertain nuclear liability laws but more recently is a result of the financial difficulties of Toshiba.

Aligning its lists to those of the export control regimes. However, consistent with the concept of Indian nuclear self-determination, India has opted to align its lists while using an entirely different approach to export control lists than any other state. The list, known as SCOMET is a unique Indian instrument. SCOMET has evolved over time and where it has been previously out of sync with the lists of the export control regimes, it has taken positive steps towards alignment.

India applied and was accepted into the Missile Technology Control Regime and applied to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It took part in the Obama Administration’s Nuclear Security Summit Process.

30 There is some ambiguity about whether there is a formal criteria for membership. INFCIRC 539 Rev 6 state that “factors taken into account for participation include… adherence to one or more treaties, such as the NPT”. However, the phrase “taken into account” implies that the listed criteria are not absolute. In practice, the NSG membership can choose to interpret or change its criteria however it wishes. INFCIRC 539 Rev 6. Available online at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc539r6.pdf (accessed 16 June 2017)

However, there are significant steps that India has not taken nor has been required to take to receive the concessions made to it:

India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India is currently implementing a moratorium on nuclear testing. However, it is far from clear whether this moratorium will be observed in the medium-to long term if the strategic environment shifts drastically.

India has not committed to end production of fissile material for use in weapons programs. Indeed, it is possible that India has been able to take advantage of the civil nuclear agreement with the US to expand its production of fissile material for weapons purposes. This is evidently undesirable given the difficult regional issues that India faces.

India and Export Controls

Given India’s substantial nuclear strategic capability, it is important for India to implement strong export controls. In addition to being a de-facto nuclear weapons state, India is a capable producer of dual-use goods and there have been instances where India-produced goods have reached programmes of proliferation concern.31 The extent of India’s production of dual-use goods is demonstrated in Table 6 (overleaf) which is based on research undertaken by Project Alpha into the global manufacturing base for many dual-use goods. India’s approach is based upon the SCOMET List. The SCOMET list structure has in the past been different from that of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which is used as the structure of the control lists of the majority of other countries that implement export controls, including those of the EU. In April 2017, the SCOMET list was synchronised with Wassenaar Agreement and the Australia Group lists. As suggested in the previous section, this unusual alignment is likely to make lives difficult for multinational corporations which often must classify their products against the control lists in all relevant territories.

31 For example, see “Valves to Arak”, Proliferation Case Study Series, Project Alpha. Available online at: http://projectalpha.eu/proliferation-case-study-series-valves-for-arak/ (Accessed 16 June 2017)

Table 6: Commercial Dual-use manufacturers outside of the NSG

Table 7: Comparison of SCOMET and EU Control List

Category SCOMET Categories EU Categories

0 Nuclear materials, nuclear-related other materials, equipment and technology

Nuclear materials, facilities and equipment

1 Toxic chemical agents and other chemicals

Special materials and related equipment

2 Micro-organisms, toxins Materials processing

3 Materials, Materials Processing Equipment and related technologies

Electronics

4 Nuclear-related other equipment and technology, not controlled under Category 0

Computers

5 Aerospace systems, equipment, including production and test equipment, related technology and specially designed components and accessories therefore.

Telecommunications and “information security”

6 Munitions List Sensors and lasers

7 Electronics, computers, and information technology including information security

Navigation and avionics

8 Special Materials and Related Equipment, Material Processing, Electronics, Computers, Telecommunications, Information Security, Sensors and Lasers, Navigation and Avionics, Marine, Aerospace and Propulsion

Marine

9 Aerospace and propulsion

Outlook

India’s participation in trade of nuclear goods is set to increase, but its future role in the international nuclear governance, or its degree of involvement remains uncertain. Certain sequencing conditions exist: First, India will seek to join nuclear governance arrangements as though it was a party to the NPT. As India is a nuclear possessor state from outside the Treaty, and it remains highly unlikely it will accede to the Treaty through nuclear rollback, the admission of India to nuclear governance institutions would certainly include concessions on this criterion. Second, India’s selective engagement with non-proliferation agreements might indicate the Government of India’s priorities to fulfil its nuclear supply needs whilst maintaining relatively unhindered nuclear decision making freedom. India’s non-engagement with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is indicative of this strategic priority. Selective engagement with nuclear governance institutions and agreements, such as the NPT and CTBT, should cast doubt on the sincerity of India’s commitment to non-proliferation. An Indian commitment to non-proliferation should be consistent and impartial. The danger of normalising India’s de facto military nuclear power is undermining international agreements that have sought wide bases of support from Member States and as a result obtained substantive legitimacy. Nonetheless, the potential inclusion of India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group for the purposes of securing its nuclear goods supply line may in turn also secure India’s industrial base from export of sensitive nuclear and missile goods to other countries. Third, with a view to commercial risk, foreign investment in India’s nuclear power infrastructure is likely to have uncertain yields. Tracing the history of US nuclear trade with India since NSG exemption in 2008 does not readily indicate profit, suggesting a strategic calculation as the underpinning factor. This does not bode well for future foreign investment in India’s nuclear power infrastructure, especially considering the relatively small national share of power production that is expected to be derived from nuclear power (as of 2016, it has been 2.3% of the country’s net power generation). Obstacles such as India’s civil nuclear liability laws have been partly resolved, but a long-term view of risk in the region suggests that any reorientation of India’s strategic nuclear apparatus to a more aggressive posture, such as the significant expansion of the nuclear weapons arsenal, will endanger commercial cooperation. As such, near term analysis of profit must be wary of longer term risks. Fourth, India’s application to the NSG has drawn sharp opposition from Pakistan and China, and the rebuff of India’s bid will constitute a set-back for Indian aims at international acceptance of its nuclear programme. For future US administrations, balance will have to be struck between strategic priorities to enhance India’s position as a partner, whilst respecting the criteria of non-proliferation arrangements. This will become increasingly difficult in the face of regional antagonisms between India and Pakistan, and China.

Government of India (GOI)

Prime Minister's Office

Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

Atomic Minerals Directorate for

Exploration and Research (AMD)

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre

(BARC)

Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research

(IGCAR)

Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced

Technology (RRCAT)

Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC)

Nuclear Power Corporation of India

(NPCIL)

Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd

(BHAVINI)

Indian Rare Earths Ltd (IREL

Uranium Corporation of India Ltd (UCIL)

Electronics Corporation of India Ltd (ECIL)

Department of Space (DS)

Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)

Antrix Corporation

Semiconductor Complex Laboratory

(SCL)

Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)

Strategic Forces Command (SFC)

Indian Army Missile Troops

Indian Air Force

Indian NavyEastern Naval

Command

Ministry of Defence (MOD)

Department of Defence Research and Development (DDR&D)

Defence Research and Development

Organization (DRDO)

Defence Instute of Advanced Technology

(DIAT-DU)

Department of Defence Production

(DDPMOD)

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL)

Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL)

Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL)

BEML Ltd (BEML)

Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL)

Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd (MIDHANI)

Indian Navy (IN)

Directorate of Naval Design (Submarine

Design Group) (DND-SDG)

Advanced Technology Vessel Management

Boards (joint with BARC)

INS Varsha Naval Base

INS Kattabomman

Ministry of Electronics and Information

Technology(MEITY)

Ministry of Science and Technology (MST)

International Advanced Research Centre for

Powder Metallurgy and New Materials (ARCI)

Council for Scientific and Industrial Research

(CSIR)

National Aerospace Laboratory (NAL)

National Chemical Laboratory (NCL)

National Metallurgical Laboratory (NML)

Central Glass and Ceramic Research Institute (CGCRI)

Central Manufacturing Technology Institute

(CMTI)

Ministry of Railways

Indian Railways

University of Mumbai

Indian Institute of Science (IISc)

National Institutes of Technology (NIT)

Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT)

University of Hyderabad

University of Delhi

Jadavpur University BIT Mesra High Energy Society of India

Larsen and Toubro

Godrej and Boyce

Walchandnagar Industries

Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd

Domestic dual-use industry

BrahMos Aerospace Pvt Ltd (BAPL)

BrahMos Aerospace Thiruvananthapuram Ltd (BATL)

Tata Group

Other dual-use research entities

Key entities involved in India’s strategic nuclear and missile sectors

Government entity involved in strategic weapons activity

State owned public sector undertaking

Dual-use research civil institute

Private sector entity

Dual-use research entity of concern

Government joint venture

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