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School of Distance Education
SKT1C04- INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS
(SANSKRIT-GENERAL)
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS
(SKT1C04)
STUDY MATERIAL
I SEMESTER
CORE COURSE
MA SANSKRIT (GENERAL)
(2019 Admission onwards)
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT
SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
CALICUT UNIVERSITY- P.O
MALAPPURAM- 673635, KERALA
190204
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School of Distance Education
SKT1C04- INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS
(SANSKRIT-GENERAL)
SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT STUDY MATERIAL FIRST SEMESTER
MA SANSKRIT GENERAL (2019 ADMISSION ONWARDS)
CORE COURSE:
SKT1C04 - INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS : THEORIES AND
CONCEPTS
Prepared by:
Dr. ARUN JAGANATHAN V R
GUEST LECTURER DEPARTMENT OF SAHITYA
SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF SANSKRIT KALADY, ERNAKULAM
Scrutinized By:
Dr.MINI.T PROFESSOR
DEPARTMENT OF SAHITYA SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF
SANSKRIT
KALADY, ERNAKULAM
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MA Sanskrit General – StudyMaterial
SKT 1CO4 : Indian Philosophical Traditions: Theories and
Concepts
Unit One – Epistemology
Indian epistemology or the theory of knowledge attempts to
provide a rational basis for
an intelligible discourse on matters of common, everyday
experience, on the one hand, and in
concentrating on the subject of cognition, it attempts to offer
insights into the real, that is,
essential, nature of this subject, the being who cognizes. In
this sense, the concern with
epistemology in Indian philosophy may be said to represent a
philosophy of being and knowing
involving, thereby, the metaphysical concern implicit in
epistemology, where the subject-object
distinction in the case of knowledge of the subject breaks
down.
By third century, different schools established with their
fundamental ontological,
metaphysical and epistemological theories clearly summarized in
their respective basic works.
The basic ideas contained therein, which were compiled by the
different thinkers into a system of
thought, were certainly older. The commentators to these basic
works elaborated the fundamental
points from within their own tradition in order to make them
understandable to the uninitiated,
whilst at the same time defending the tradition against attacks
from opponents. It is significant to
note that the commentators took the first opportunity to mention
the means or instruments of
cognition accepted by the school, because this epistemological
concern set the framework within
which the ontology and the metaphysics were established.
Each school accepted a fixed number of means of cognition and,
for the major schools of
Indian philosophy, the number ranges from one to six. So, for
example, the materialist accepts
only sense perception as the most important and reliable means
of cognition, the Buddhists and
the Vaiśeṣika school accept inference as well, the Sāṁkhya
school accepts verbal testimony or
scriptural authority in addition to these two, with the Nyāya
school accepting four means by
granting, in addition to the three, ›comparison‹ also as a means
of valid cognition, etc. The
enumeration of the means of cognition accepted by a school,
although traditional, is not merely
arbitrary. Reasons are supplied by the commentators to show why
the specific number and nature
of the instruments of knowledge are adequate for the school in
question, thereby preempting any
criticism by an opponent for being irrational.
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Some important conditions of Indian Philosophy can be summarized
into four points: (a)
the knowledge which one means of cognition furnishes must be new
and not attainable by any
other means; (b) one means of cognition may aid another in
furnishing knowledge, but the means
of cognition in question should not be reducible to another—so,
e.g., when perception aids
inference, as in inferring fire by seeing only the smoke in the
distance, the knowledge gained
here cannot be reduced to the cognition supplied by perception
(of the smoke) alone; (c) the
knowledge obtained by one means of cognition should not be
contradicted by another means of
cognition; and (d) the accepted means of cognition should appeal
to reason, a condition that
applies especially to verbal testimony or scriptural authority
as a means of cognition, in which
case the knowledge concerning the revealed truth must appear
probable and be
made intelligible in terms of human experience, otherwise such a
means of cognition would fail
in its intention.
Some thinkers like Ramanuja says that, error should be seen
rather as a lack of
knowledge. In other words, there is no error as such and one
should speak, instead, of a failure in
cognition to distinguish the positive features of an object from
the negative ones. Some others
like that of Saiva siddanta say that error is the cognition of
an object as something other than
what it is. A rope seen as a snake entails an affirmation of
qualities which in fact can only be
denied of the object. Sankara the upholder of Advaita holds the
view that finally one cannot
adequately explain or account for how an object is erroneously
cognized. How a rope comes to
be seen as a snake, for example, cannot be determined. In error
there is some kind of reality that
exists as long as the error obtains, which is why one may be
afraid of the so-called snake. Some
kind of relative truth has to ascribed to such a cognition, just
as in a dream water can quench
thirst, and seeing a rope as a snake can cause fear, a certain
validity obtains as long as one
remains in error.
Jainism accepts that theoretically there can be an infinite
number of standpoints and
perspectives, although seven have come be traditional. One Jaina
thinker says that these are the
only logical possibilities if one combines the following
possible statements about any object of
inquiry: a statement can be either positive, or negative, or
neutral (i.e., indescribable, namely that
an object cannot be described adequately from all viewpoints at
once). The conclusion, then, is
that the theory of manifoldness in Jainism takes all cases into
consideration when talking about
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an object. Basically it is a simple theory which avoids making
one-sided (ekānta), absolutistic
judgements and statements about any object of enquiry. This is
to say that an object or any theme
of discussion should be approached, according to Jainism, from
various perspectives and
standpoints. Depending on the point of view an observation may
be, for example, both correct
and incorrect, as with the colour of an object depending on the
light, or with a person who can be
both father and son at the same time. The basic point is simple:
depending on the standpoint or
perspective a particular view or statement can be both true and
false at the same time: someone
can be both a father and a son at the same time, namely, with
respect to a particular person, i.e.,
depending on the standpoint.
Unit Two – Ontology
All Indian philosophical traditions are deeply engaged with
ontology, the study of being,
since clarity about the nature of reality is at the heart of
three intimately connected goals:
knowledge, proper conduct and liberation from the continued
suffering that is part of all human
existence. The formulation of a list of ontological categories,
a classification of reality by
division into several fundamental objective kinds, however, is
less widespread. There is little
room for a doctrine of distinct, if related, ontological
categories in a philosophical school that
takes reality as one; even less if that one lies beyond
description. If the phenomenal world is but
illusory appearance, as, for example, in the Vedanta of Sankara,
then a determination of kinds of
entities does not recommend itself as a means to adequate
analysis of the world. Even the
Sankhya tradition’s realism reduces the world to an evolution
from two fundamental entities,
spirit and matter. Categories make sense within the context of a
pluralistic realism, an analysis of
the world that finds it to be composed of a multiplicity of real
entities. Such a view is found to
some extent in Jaina philosophy, but is primarily defended and
developed in the Nyaya -
Vaisesika school.
The Nyaya - Vaisesika categories are seven: substance, quality,
motion, universal,
particular, inherence and not-being. While all are understood as
real entities and objects of
knowledge, substance is most fundamental as each of the others
in some way depends on
substance. Substances are nine: earth, water, fire, air, ether,
time, space, self and mind. The first
four are atomic: they may combine to form macroscopic substance,
such as a clay pot, but in in
composite form they are indestructible atoms, as are the last
two. Ether, time and space, likewise
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indestructible, are unitary and pervade all. In its irreducible
parts, all substance is eternal; every
composite whole is a destructible substance.
The Nyaya metaphysics recognizes sixteen padarthas or categories
and includes all six
categories of the Vaisesika in the second one of them, called
prameya. These sixteen categories
are pramana (valid means of knowledge), prameya (objects of
valid knowledge), samsaya
(doubt), prayojana (aim), drishanta (example), siddhanta
(conclusion), avayava (members of
syllogism), tarka (hypothetical reasoning), nirnaya
(settlement), vada (discussion), jalpa
(wrangling), vitanda (cavilling), hetvabhasa (fallacy), chala
(quibbling), jati (sophisticated
refutation) and nigrahasthana (point of defeat. Nyaya
epistemology
The Nyaya epistemology considers knowledge (jnana) or cognition
(buddhi) as apprehension
(upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhava).
Knowledge may be valid or invalid. The Naiyayikas (the Nyaya
scholars) accepted four valid
means (pramana) of obtaining valid knowledge (prama) –
perception (pratyaksha), inference
(anumana), comparison (upamana) and verbal testimony
(Sabda).
Invalid knowledge includes memory (smriti), doubt (samsaya),
error (viparyaya) and
hypothetical reasoning (tarka). Perception
Pratyaksha (perception) occupies the foremost position in the
Nyaya epistemology.
Purusa and Prakrti stand at the apex of Creation arises from
these two principles coming
together. Purusa is bewitched by Prakrti and Prakrti is only too
eager to oblige by displaying her
charms. The 1st product of creation is Mahat. Mahat is the
highest principle; it is the intellect or
Buddhi. From Mahat, arises Ego (Ahamkara) and then the mind
(Manas.) Subsequently the 5
sense organs (Jnanendriyas,) 5 organs of action (Karmendriyas,)
5 objects of the senses
(Tanmatras) and 5 gross elements (Pancabhutas) are created. This
is creation. In dissolution, the
process is reversed. We have accounted for 23 Tattvas here. The
other two are Purusa and
Avyakta, together forming the 25 Tattvas. It is this enumeration
that earned the appellation
Sankhya for this philosophical system.
The world is said to be unreal because it exists in the middle
but not in the
beginning and the end. It is indeed not possible for non-
existence to come into existence or for
existence to become non- existence. Therefore, when things are
seen to exist in the middle and
not in the beginning and end, it can mean that things are non-
existent because they were not
there yesterday and will not be there tomorrow, or it can mean
that it was always there, and that
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its coming into existence is merely a seeming, and that this
seeming of things coming to be is
false. The latter alone is the Advaitic truth, and the former is
the falsity of superficiality that
Advaita negates.
Unit III: Psychical apparatus in Indian Philosophy
The place of mind in the philosophical systems of India. That
mind is of subtle physical
nature and that self is postulated as higher than mind in the
hierarchy is being pointed out. Mind
can be man's own friend to elevate him or his foe debasing him.
An integrated approach
extending beyond the mind in psychiatric care is suggested.
Scientific and technological
advances do not necessarily preclude a transcendent (spiritual)
dimension to the total care.
Unit IV: - Semantic tools of Pūrvamīmāṃsā
Most schools of Indian philosophy have an atomistic view of
meaning and the meaning-
bearing linguistic unit. This means that a sentence is put
together by combining words and words
are put together by combining morphemic elements like stems,
roots, and affixes. The same
applies to meaning. The word-meaning may be viewed as a fusion
of the meanings of stems,
roots, and affixes, and the meaning of a sentence may be viewed
as a fusion of the meanings of
its constituent words. Beyond this generality, different schools
have specific proposals. The
tradition of Prabhakara Mimamsa proposes that the words of a
sentence already convey
contextualized inter-connected meanings (anvitabhidhana) and
that the sentence-meaning is not
different from a simple addition of these inherently
inter-connected word-meanings. On the other
hand, the Naiyayikas and the Bhatta Mimamsakas propose that
words of a sentence taken by
themselves convey only uncontextualized unconnected meanings,
and that these
uncontextualized word-meanings are subsequently brought into a
contextualized association with
each other (abhihitanvaya). Therefore, the sentence-meaning is
different from word-meanings,
and is communicated through the concatenation (samsiarga) of
words, rather than by the words
themselves. This is also the view of the early grammarians like
Katyayana and Patanjali.
The term artha in Sanskrit is used to denote the notion of
meaning. However, the
meaning of this term ranges from a real object in the external
world referred to by the word to a
mere concept of an object which may or may not correspond to
anything in the external world.
The differences regarding what meaning is are argued out by the
philosophical schools
of Nyaya, Vaissṣika, Mimamsa, various schools of Buddhism,
Sanskrit grammar, and poetics.
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Among these schools, the schools of Nyaya, Vaiseisika, and
Mimamsa have realist
ontologies. Mimamsā focuses mainly on interpreting the Vedic
scriptures. Buddhist thinkers
generally pointed to language as depicting a false picture of
reality. Sanskrit grammarians were
more interested in language and communication than in ontology,
while Sanskrit poetics focused
on the poetic dimensions of meaning. The tradition of Prabhakara
Mimamsa proposes that the
words of a sentence already convey contextualized
inter-connected meanings (anvitabhidhana)
and that the sentence-meaning is not different from a simple
addition of these inherently inter-
connected word-meanings.
Unit V: - Kashmir Śaivisam and Indian Aesthetics
Almost all the major schools of Indian aesthetics were founded
by Kashmiri theoriticians
-the Alankara School by Bhamaha, Riti School by Vamana, Vakrokti
School by Kuntaka,
Dhvani School by Anandavardhana and Auchitya School by
Kshemendra. Though the concept of
Rasa was evolved by Bharata, and perhaps by thinkers even before
him, it was only the great
Abhinavagupta who perfected it as an integrating \theory basic
to the aesthetic philosophy of the
Indians. Nor was the contribution of those Kashmiri rhetoricians
any less important who
analysed, interpreted, elaborated and commented upon what the
original exponents propounded,
thus providing the building blocks on which the Indian aesthetic
thought stands today. Profound
thinkers like Udbhata, Bhatta Lollata, Shankuka, Bhatta Nayaka,
Bhatta Tauta, Rudrata,
Ruyyaka, Mahima Bhatta and others. The issues they raised, the
solutions they provided, the
views they propounded provided grist to the great intellectual
debates about the relation of
aesthetic object and aesthetic experience which raged throughout
India for quite a long time. To
understand the full significance of the art-ideas introduced by
the successive Kashmiri thinkers,
we shall have to look at them in the overall perspective of the
development of Indian aesthetical
thought. As we know, it is in the Natya Shastra, the legendary
Bharata’s monumental treatise on
dramaturgy, that we find the first systematic exposition of
Rasa-a concept central to Indian
aesthetic thinking. Supposed to have been written between the
2nd century BC and the 2nd
century AD, the Natya Shastra provides a deep insight into the
psychology of aesthetic
experience.
Among the earliest to address these questions was Bhatta Lollata
who lived in Kashmir in
the late 8th century or the early 9th. A contemporary of the
great Shaivite thinker Bhatta Kallata,
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Lollata approached those questions as a Mimansaka or grammarian.
His works have
unfortunately been lost, but from what we learn from the
Abhinava Bharati, Abhinavagupta’s
commentary on the Natya Shastra, Lolatta took only the
denotational sense of the word
nishpattih into consideration and interpreted it as causal
origination. Rasa, he said, is an effect of
which the vibhavas or the aesthetic object is the direct cause.
It resides in the original historical
character (Rama etc.) represented on the stage, as well as the
impersonating actor. The actor feels
himself as the represented historical personage during the
duration of the enactment but
remembers his real nature through the faculty of anusandhana or
recollection.
Abhinavagupta wrote Abhinavabharati, a commentary of Nāṭyaśāstra
of Bharata. For the
first time he brought a technical definition of rasa. As per
him, Rasa is the universal bliss of the
atman coloured by the emotional tone of a drama. Abhivangupta
introduced a ninth rasa
called Santam which denotes the peace or tranquillity. These
total nine rasas make the Navarasa.
Abhinavagupta’s work is almost unparalleled in Indian
intellectual history. Although, he is
labeled as a Saiva philosopher, his works comprises of various
currents of intellectual thinking
such as Aesthetics, dramaturgy, music, tantra, yoga, literary
criticism, devotional poetry,
cognitive science, emotions, philosophy of mind, language. His
works fall in various categories
such as commentaries, poems, manuals of religious rituals,
philosophy etc. His most important
work is Tantraloka, which is an encyclopedia of Tantra and
synthesis of the Trika system. Trika
System is another name of Kashmir Shavism and refers to
three-fold science of man and his
world. The supplementary work to Tantraloka is Tantrasara which
is a summary of the
Tantraloka. His commentary known as Abhinavabharati on Bharat
Muni’s Natyashastra forms an
essential part of the Indian discourse on poetry, drama, dance
and music. Other writings include
Pratyabhignya, which stands for identifying and not attaining.
Knowledge has always had a very
important place in the Indian society. There is an unusual sense
of humanity that exists in his
commentary on the Gita. He is a more egalitarian, which can be
observed in his works.
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