IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN ... … · 1/7/2019 · 4 MOIS and MOIC. 3 In addition to the other cases cited, other courts have also recognized the wisdom

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

NORTHERN DIVISION

ALYSSON MILLS, IN HER CAPACITY PLAINTIFF

AS RECEIVER FOR ARTHUR LAMAR

ADAMS AND MADISON TIMBER

PROPERTIES, LLC,

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:19-cv-196-CWR-FKB

BANKPLUS; BANKPLUS WEALTH

MANAGEMENT, LLC; GEE GEE

PATRIDGE, VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF

OPERATING OFFICER OF BANKPLUS;

STEWART PATRIDGE; JASON COWGILL;

MARTIN MURPHREE; MUTUAL OF

OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY; and

MUTUAL OF OMAHA INVESTOR

SERVICES, INC. DEFENDANTS

MUTUAL OF OMAHA INVESTOR SERVICES, INC.

AND MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY’S

JOINT REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTIONS TO DISMISS1

Submitted by:

Kelly D. Simpkins (MSB #9028)

Walter D. Willson (MSB #7291)

WELLS MARBLE & HURST, PLLC

300 Concourse Boulevard, Suite 200

Ridgeland, Mississippi 39157

Post Office Box 131

Jackson, Mississippi 39205-0131

Telephone: 601-605-6900

Facsimile: 601-605-6901

[email protected]

[email protected]

1 Mutual of Omaha Investor Services, Inc. (“MOIS”) and Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company (“MOIC”)

file this their joint reply solely for the sake of judicial economy.

Case 3:19-cv-00196-CWR-FKB Document 65 Filed 07/01/19 Page 1 of 21

mailto:[email protected]


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I. THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO BARS THE RECEIVER’S

CLAIMS.

The Receiver confuses the issue of standing with the affirmative defense of in pari delicto.

Rogers v. McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2008)(“We agree that in pari delicto is an

affirmative defense….”); see also Ogle v. Bennett, 2012 WL 2567139, at *5 n.5 (N.D.

Tex.)(recognizing that in Fifth Circuit in pari delicto operates as an affirmative defense to a claim’s

merit but does not preclude receiver’s standing to bring a claim) Indeed, cases cited and quoted

by the Receiver address the issue of standing and not the affirmative defense of in pari delicto.

See, e.g., Rotstain v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 2015 WL 13034513, at *9 (N.D. Tex.)(addressing

standing to bring tort claims and in pari delicto not pled or discussed); Official Standards Investors

Committee v. Greenberg Traurig (“OSIC”), LLP, 2014 WL 12572881, at *4 (N.D.

Tex.)(addresses whether standing is barred by doctrine of in pari delicto).

Neither the Fifth Circuit nor Mississippi Courts have held that the doctrine of in pari delicto

never applies to tort claims brought by a receiver. The Receiver quotes Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., 666 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 2012) for this unfounded claim. However, when she quotes Jones,

she does not complete the sentence, leaving off an important phrase. In Jones, the Fifth Circuit

actually said, “application of in pari delicto would undermine one of the primary purposes of the

receivership established in this case, and would thus be inconsistent with the purposes of the

doctrine” Id. at 966. (emphasis to show omitted portions) The Fifth Circuit went on to recognize

that, “application of the doctrine ‘depends upon the peculiar facts and equities of the case, and the

answer usually given is that which it is thought would serve better public policy.’” Id. (quoting

Lewis v. Davis, 199 S.W. 2d 146, 151 (Tex. 1947)). Other district courts in the Fifth Circuit have

recognized that receivers are not entitled to a blanket exception to application of in pari delicto,

even in one of the cases relied upon by the receiver. See, e.g., Janvey v. Adams & Reese, LLP,


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2013 WL 12320921, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Tex.)(noting that “public policy calculus might differ based

on the particular claim pursued” and citing Knauer); Ogle, 2012 WL 2567139, at *3, n.5

(distinguishing Knauer from case at hand because Knauer did not involve fraudulent transfer

claims)

Applicability of in pari delicto is “controlled by state common law.” Jones, 666 F.3d at

965. While the Mississippi Courts have recognized that the doctrine may be set aside in instances

“where the paramount public interest demands it,” the exceptions are narrow. For example, in

Rideout v. Mars, 54 So. 801, 802 (Miss. 1911), “the interest of the general public” was the

prohibition against rebating premiums so as not to allow discrimination in favor of certain

individuals in the same class. Or, as in Noxubee Cty. Hardware Co. v. City of Macon, 43 So. 304,

305 (Miss. 1907) where the public interest involved §109 of the Mississippi constitution which

prohibits public officers or members of the legislature from having an interest in any contract with

governmental entities. As the court stated:

The state cares nothing about Holberg or Horton, or their concerns. The state cares

everything that the salutary principle of public policy embodied in this section 109

shall be faithfully and fearlessly carried out, so as to prevent graft of every possible

sort, and secure the honest and clean administration of municipal affairs.

Id. Here, the interest involves private parties who were cheated by Adams and Madison Timber

Properties, LLC (“MTP”). But if fraud between private parties is always a matter of “public

interest”, then the doctrine of in pari delicto would never apply. And this is especially so when

the parties sought to be held liable received absolutely no benefit from the conduct at issue, nor

had any actual knowledge that the alleged conduct/acts were being undertaken. The Mississippi

Courts draw a line and look for matters that affect the “general public” and not just private matters


3

involving persons who are otherwise part of the public. 2 The benefit to the Receiver should not

completely trample upon fairness and equity to MOIS and MOIC.

The Receiver claims that MOIS and MOIC did not explain why they believe this Court

should look to opinions in the Seventh Circuit, New York or South Carolina for guidance.

However, MOIS and MOIC did explain the reason. First, as discussed above, district court cases

in the Fifth Circuit have acknowledged that the affirmative defense of in pari delicto may be

applicable depending upon the facts of the case. Second, MOIS and MOIC explained that the Fifth

Circuit found its footing on this issue in Scholes, a Seventh Circuit case. Or, as the Fifth Circuit

put it, Scholes v. Lehmann is “the leading case” addressing this issue. Janvey v. Democratic

Senatorial Campaign Comm., Inc., 712 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2013). The Fifth Circuit also

“endorsed Scholes limitation” of allowing the Receiver to redress only injuries to the entity in

receivership. Sec. v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., - - - F.3d - - -, 2019 WL 2496901, at *5. Thus, there

is no reason to expect that the Fifth Circuit which relied heavily upon Scholes, would not recognize

the same fencing as the Seventh Circuit did in Knauer.

Another reason to follow Knauer and its progeny is that it provides sound, fair and

equitable reasoning for when the doctrine should apply. It is important to note that the Receiver

does not deny that she has failed to plead that MOIS and MOIC benefited in any manner from the

fraudulent scheme of Adams, Kelly and MTP. Furthermore, she does not deny that her sole basis

for claiming liability against MOIS and MOIC arises out of vicarious liability for the alleged acts

of Patridge and Murphree. The Receiver does not plead a claim of fraudulent transfer against

2 The Receiver also cites Morrissey v. Bologna, 123 So. 2d 537 (Miss. 1960) for her proposition. However,

in Morrissey, the Court had applied in pari delicto in an earlier case between two parties that entered into

an illegal contract. Id. at 297. But Morrissey was not a suit about that earlier case. Instead, it involved a

different Plaintiff who was not in pari delicto with anybody. Id. at 297-98.


4

MOIS and MOIC. 3 In addition to the other cases cited, other courts have also recognized the

wisdom of Knauer and that the affirmative defense of in pari delicto could apply to a receiver’s

tort claims. See, e.g., Fine v. Sovereign Bank, 634 F. Supp. 2d 126, 142-45 (D. Mass.

2008)(recognizing the potential application of Knauer); Bell v. Kaplan, 2016 WL 815303, at *4

(W.D.N.C.)(distinguishing case before it from Knauer on the ground that “receiver’s claims

against Kaplan are not merely passive, derivative, or related to the supervision of others.”);

Moecker v. Bank of America, N.A., 2013 WL 12159056, at *6 (N.D. Fla.)(having adopted Knauer

for standing analysis then recognized that application of in pari delicto to receiver’s claims

depends on whether plaintiff’s guilt is far less in degree and whether doctrine would be contrary

to public policy); Zayed v. Associated Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 4635789 at *3 (D. Minn.)(“courts

routinely apply in pari delicto to bar actions where … receiver asserts a claim for tort damages

from entities that derive no benefit from the embezzlements, but they were allegedly partly to

blame for their occurrence.”)(quoting Knauer v. Johnathan Roberts Fin. Grp., Inc., 348 F.3d 230,

236 (7th Cir. 2003)).

Finally, the Receiver fails to address MOIS and MOIC’s separate argument that the Estate

of Adams’ claims are barred by in pari delicto. [Dkt. #47, p. 6] The failure to separately address

it is essentially conceding the correctness of MOIS and MOIC’s position. But even if there is no

such concession, the Fifth Circuit is clear that it does make a difference. See, e.g., Jones, 666 F.3d

at 966 (recognizing that individual wrongdoer Wahab could stand in pari delicto even if

corporation might not).

3 The cases relied upon by the Receiver involve instances where there is a separate tort, such as conversion

or legal malpractice, and not limited to a claim of liability solely through agents or vicarious liability.


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II. MOIS AND MOIC ARE NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE

ALLEGED ACTS OF PATRIDGE AND MURPHREE.

The Receiver does not dispute MOIS and MOIC’s contention that proper application of

vicarious liability requires analysis of the precise conduct at issue. The Receiver completely

ignores the argument that Patridge and Murphree alleged acts were in furtherance of their own

interests and not the interests of either MOIS and MOIC. She concedes on the issue of apparent

authority, offering no rebuttal to the argument that she pled no facts from which the Court could

infer that MOIS and MOIC that would allow Adams and MTP to claim that they believed Patridge

and Murphree were acting with apparent authority. Instead, the Receiver defends her conclusory

allegations by doubling down and repeating the same conclusory allegations.

First she argues that she need not plead “actual backing” and that “apparent backing”

satisfies the pleading requirements. But, “apparent” means something is “seemingly true but not

necessarily so.” In other words, it is the right word to use if one is basing an allegation upon

speculation and conjecture, as the Receiver does here. The Receiver attempts to tie the “apparent

backing” to the “numerous red flags” she identified in her Complaint. However, in her response

she does not dispute that the Complaint only pleads those red flags as to BankPlus.

The Receiver’s next argument is that “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to show that

Patridge and Murphree acted within the scope of their employment with Mutual of Omaha.” [Dkt

# 54, p. 8] For reasons related to the weakness of her claim for negligent retention and supervision,

the Receiver has now begun (for the first time) to identify Patridge and Murphree as “employees.”

She does not identify them as employees anywhere in the Complaint; rather she refers to them as

“registered representatives” and “perhaps ordinary agents.” But the mere fact that they were for a

limited period of time registered representatives of MOIS and agents with a certificate of authority


6

to sell for MOIC (something they possessed with numerous other companies)4, does not amount

to pleading facts from which the Court can infer that they were acting in the course and scope of

their agency when allegedly selling away for MTP. She does not plead that MOIS and MOIC

received any benefit from sales for MTP (because it is clear they did not) and nowhere in her

response does she dispute that Patridge and Murphree were selling for their own benefit and not

for the benefit of MOIS and MOIC.

“Employee” is not synonymous with “agent.” Graves v. Tub, 281 F. Supp. 2d 886, 891

(N.D. Miss. 2003). The most “characteristic feature” of an agent is that he is engaged “primarily

to bring about business relations between his principal and third persons.” Id. (quoting First

Jackson’s Securities Corp. v. B.F. Goodrich, Co., 176 So. 2d 272, 278 (Miss. 1965). The Receiver

does not plead that the alleged acts of Patridge and Murphree brought about a relationship between

MOIS and MOIC and Adams and MTP. The Receiver does not even allege that it brought about

a relationship between any of MTP’s investors and MOIS and MOIC or the identity of any

investors who had a contractual relationship with MOIS and MOIC. Instead, she alleges that

“[d]efendants recruited new investors to Madison Timber.” (¶¶ 85, 88)(emphasis added)

Finally, the Receiver argues that two of the cases relied upon by MOIS and MOIC are

inapposite because of their procedural posture. This argument is without merit. FSC and Morgan,

as well as the other cases cited by MOIS and MOIC, are apposite because they recognize the

principle that federal and state courts are “reluctant to find broker-dealers vicariously liable for the

underhanded dealings of registered representatives in circumstances similar to the case sub judice.”

FSC Securities Corp. v. McCormack, 630 So. 2d 979, 985 (Miss. 1994). Regardless of the

4 See, e.g., https://www.mid.ms.gov/licensing-search/Agent-search-results.aspx?ID=206112 and Exhibit 1.

See Cox v. Richards, 761 Fed. Appx. 244, 248 (5th Cir. 2019) (district court may consider matters of public

record in 12(b)(6) motion).


https://www.mid.ms.gov/licensing-search/Agent-search-results.aspx?ID=206112

7

procedural posture for when the opinions were handed down, they still provide guidance as to what

facts should be pled from which the Court can reasonably infer the agents were acting in the course

and scope of their agency.

Even if Patridge and Murphree were employees, which they were not, the result would be

no different. In Akins v. Golden Triangle Planning and Dev. District, Inc., 34 So. 3d 575 (Miss.

2010), a builder brought a respondeat superior action against the defendant whose employee had

embezzled funds to be used to pay the builder for services performed for the defendant. The

employee’s duties included:

Enrolling the seven participating counties in the HOME PROGRAM; assisting

counties and municipalities in selecting eligible participants; advertising and

soliciting bids from third-party contractors to construct the houses; verifying that

the most competitive participants were awarded the bids; reviewing inspector

records certifying percentage of work completed on houses; and submitting

requests to the Mississippi Development Authority for disbursement of money to

counties and municipalities for payment to the contractors.

Id. at 575 (emphasis added). She then set up a shell corporation and began diverting/disbursing

the funds to the shell corporation. Although requesting disbursement of funds was one of her job

duties and an action in furtherance of her employer’s business, the court held that the obviously

dishonest manner in which she handled the funds could not be “actuated by a purpose to serve the

master.” Id. at 580. So too, Patridge and Murphree’s alleged selling away of unregistered

securities in violation of FINRA rules (and company rules) to achieve commissions that did not

flow through or benefit in any manner MOIS and MOIC could not be “actuated by a purpose to

serve the master.”

III. THE RECEIVER FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT

RETENTION AND SUPERVISION, RECKLESSNESS, GROSS

NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE.

The Receiver ignores MOIS and MOIC’s argument that they do not owe a duty to Adams

or MTP for retention and supervision. By failing to address the issue, she concedes and such is


8

dispositive of this count. The closest she comes to even arguing a duty period is in her section

regarding recklessness, gross negligence or negligence. But there, the Receiver devotes 3 pages

[Dkt #54, pp. 24-26] discussing duties she contends that banks owe under Mississippi law and then

makes an illogical leap to claim that “like BankPlus, all other defendants had a duty to use ordinary

care….” Her illogical leap is nothing more than a conclusory allegation.

The Receiver acknowledges that the claim for negligent retention and supervision is

dependent upon Patridge and Murphree being employees of MOIS and MOIC. The Receiver does

not deny that she did not plead that Patridge and Murphree are employees of MOIS and MOIC.

The Receiver certainly knows how to make such a claim, because she did so 8 times with regard

to BankPlus. (¶¶ 27, 50, 51, 52, 55, 68, 71) Despite not pleading it anywhere in her Complaint,

she claims that whether there was an employer-employee relationship is a question of fact not to

be determined on a motion to dismiss. That argument fails for three reasons. First, it cannot be

an issue of fact if it is not pled in the Complaint.5 Second, the Receiver cannot use discovery to

determine whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship. “A plaintiff armed with

nothing more than conclusions cannot unlock the door of discovery.” Doe v. Robertson, 751 F.3d

383, 393 (5th Cir. 2015). Third, the Receiver does not argue in her response much less plead in

her Complaint the ten balancing factors courts consider when determining whether a person is an

employee versus independent contractor. See, e.g., Woodring v. Robinson, 892 F.Supp. 2d 769,

776 (S.D. Miss. 2012)(citing ten balancing factors courts consider to determine if employee or

independent contractor).

5 And there would be no good faith basis to make such a claim in the Complaint, because they were

independent contractors.


9

The Receiver claims that she has met her pleading burden by alleging that MOIS and MOIC

“should have known of its agents’ incompetence or unfitness.”6 But such is merely a conclusory

allegation. The Receiver relies upon Janvey v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, for the proposition that she

need only allege wrongful acts by an employee in order to provide facts sufficient for a reasonable

inference for negligent retention and supervision. [Dkt #54, p. 28] Proskauer is inapposite because

it construes Texas law and there was an admitted employer-employee relationship. Moreover,

under Mississippi law there must be specific facts or evidence of constructive knowledge. See,

e.g. Holmes v. Campbell Properties, Inc., 47 So. 3d 721, 729 (Ct. App. 2010)(must have “specific

evidence of an employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of its employee’s dangerous or violent

tendencies”); Myles v. Domino Pizza, LLC, 2015 WL 2092689, at *4 (N.D. Miss.)(no facts from

which Court could infer because failed to plead facts such as (1) driver had a history of incompetent

driving, (2) driver failed internal screening procedures or (3) driver engages in course of conduct

that would have displayed incompetence).

The glaring deficiencies in the Receiver’s Complaint are highlighted by comparing the

Receiver’s Complaint to other cases where specific facts were actually pled and yet the Court

granted a motion to dismiss. See Cecil v. Smith, 2014 WL 1394360, at *3 (N.D. Miss.

2014)(granting motion to dismiss for insufficient facts even though plaintiff pled (1) that employer

did not require driver to comply with duties and prohibitions of regulations, (2) employer

encouraged driver to violate those regulations, (3) employer failed to maintain or improperly

6 The Receiver also claims that MOIS and MOIC “had a duty to supervise acts that the Individual

Defendants undertook within their offices”. [Doc. #54, p. 28] MOIS and MOIC have no duty to supervise

activities that take place within Patridge and Murphree’s own offices and the Receiver cites no cases that

would support such a claim. To the extent that the Receiver intends “their” to modify “BankPlus and

Mutual of Omaha,” such claim also fails. Every allegation regarding the alleged activities of Patridge and

Murphree are alleged in the Complaint to have happened at a BankPlus office and not an office of MOIS

and MOIC.


10

maintained records and documents pursuant to regulations, (4) employer did not investigate

driver’s competence, and (5) employer failed to take driver out of service); Gaddis v. Heggler,

2011 WL 2111801 (S.D. Miss.)(granting summary judgment even though plaintiff claimed that

co-owner of business did not prohibit talking on phone, knew it was dangerous to talk on phone

while driving, did not provide any safety training regarding deliveries, and owner called employee

cell phone while employee was on road).

The rule the Receiver proposes the Court adopt from Proskauer is essentially strict liability.

But in Holmes, the court recognized that mere occurrence of a wrongful act is not sufficient to

constitute a claim for negligent retention and supervision. Holmes, 47 So. 3d at 729. Belmont v.

MB Inv. Partners, Inc., like the instant action, involved a Ponzi scheme. There, investors brought

suit against the employer of an employee/officer who had defrauded investors through a Ponzi

scheme. In dismissing the claims for negligent retention and supervision, the Court stated:

While some (and perhaps all) of the MB directors were aware that Bloom was

running Northhills as a hedge fund outside of MB, nothing in Bloom’s conduct as

an employee of MB suggested that Bloom would use Northhills to defraud

investors. Nor could the MB directors have learned of the fraud without

considerable investigation, given Bloom’s success concealing the Ponzi-scheme

nature of Northhills for almost 10 years. For the same reasons, the Ponzi scheme

and the harm that it would cause the Northhills investors were not reasonably

foreseeable by the MB directors.

708 F. 3d 470, 492 (3rd Cir. 2013).

The Receiver fails to address in a meaningful manner MOIS and MOIC’s arguments

regarding causation. Instead, she merely repeats her conclusory allegations contained in the

Complaint. The Receiver’s allegations are in the same posture as the plaintiff’s allegations in

Holmes v. Securities Investor Prot. Corp., 112 Supreme Court 1311, 1318 (1992). Like in Holmes,

the Receivership Estates’ liabilities only exist as a function of the losses by third parties, the


11

investors. Since the injury the Receiver claims merely flows from the misfortunes visited upon

third parties, she fails to plead sufficient facts to establish proximate cause.

IV. THE RECEIVER HAS FAILED TO PLEAD FACTS SUFFICIENT TO

INFER THAT MOIS AND MOIC PARTICIPATED IN THE ALLEGED

CIVIL CONSPIRACY.

The purpose of Rule 8(a) is to (1) provide notice of circumstances which give rise to the

claim, and (2) set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of the claim or permit

inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 198 F.3d 161

(5th Cir. 1999). It requires particularity in the pleading and prohibits obscuring the pleading

requirements by pleading 47 paragraphs of “facts” against other defendants and then in a

conclusive fashion lumping in all the defendants with those claims. Such characterizes the

Receiver’s Complaint and in particular her claim of conspiracy as it pertains to MOIS and MOIC.

In order to satisfy Rule 8, a claim for civil conspiracy must at a minimum make sense. The

Receiver’s conspiracy claim against MOIS and MOIC does not make sense because the underlying

tort alleged for the second prong is recklessness, gross negligence or negligence and “negligent

retention and supervision against BankPlus and Mutual of Omaha.” [Dkt # 54, p. 17] In arguing

the claim for recklessness, gross negligence or negligence, the only duty which she claims MOIS

and MOIC breached is the duty of negligent retention and supervision. Thus, she is making the

implausible claim that MOIS and MOIC reached an agreement with Adams and Kelly that MOIS

and MOIC would negligently retain and supervise Patridge and Murphree.

For there to be such an agreement, MOIS and MOIC “must be aware of the fraud or

wrongful conduct at the beginning of the agreement.” Bradley v. Kelley Bros. Contractors, Inc.,

117 So. 3d 331, 339 (Ct. App. 2013). There are no facts pled by the Receiver from which the

Court could reasonably infer that MOIS and MOIC had agreed that they would participate in


12

defrauding MTP by retaining Patridge and Murphee and not providing supervision or oversight of

them. The Receiver argues that a conspiracy can be formed by a “mere tacit understanding.” But

even if it is formed by “tacit” understanding, it still requires “concurrence of intent.” Aetna Ins.

Co. v. Robertson, 94 So. 7, 22 (Miss. 1922). “Tacit” means “expressed or carried on without words

or speech.” Merriam-Webster online. Thus, a tacit understanding or agreement by one person

means that the other person must actually communicate some sort of plan or scheme to commit an

underlying tort to which the first person asserts by silence or an act. Stated differently, at least one

party must articulate the parameters of the conspiracy, to which the other party could tacitly agree

or accept. No such facts are alleged in the Complaint. Indeed, in the Receiver’s response, of the

approximately 40 paragraphs in the Complaint to which she refers regarding civil conspiracy, only

one of those paragraphs (¶ 78) refers to MOIS and MOIC and it is a conclusory allegation that

“Patridge and Murphree, as agents of Mutual of Omaha, substantially assisted Madison Timber’s

growth by recruiting new investors to Madison Timber.”

The Receiver relies upon Midwest Feeders, Inc. v. Bank of Franklin (“Midwest I”), 114 F.

Supp. 3d 419 (S. D. Miss. 2015), pointing out that the Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss

the claim for civil conspiracy. [Dkt # 54, p. 12] Midwest I is an example of the kind of specificity

that must be pled but that is lacking in the Receiver’s Complaint as to MOIS and MOIC. There,

Midwest Feeders alleged (1) a close relationship between a bank customer (Rawls) and bank

officers who had supervisory authority at the bank, (2) that Rawls had deposited over $85 million

dollars in 6 months at the bank, (3) the bank failed to follow its own policies and procedures for

investigating such amounts over a short period of time and (4) Rawls had invoked his Fifth

Amendment rights when questioned as to whether he gave anything of value to any employee,

officer or director of the bank. Id. at 429-439. Such details regarding a conspiracy between


13

Adams and Kelly and MOIS and MOIC to negligently retain and supervise Patridge and Murphree

are lacking. Despite such allegations in Midwest I, the Court later granted summary judgment to

the bank on the civil conspiracy claim. The Court’s description of the plaintiff’s allegations of

civil conspiracy, aptly describes the Receiver’s allegations herein:

Like an unidentified sound in the night, Midwest’s argument beckons wild

assumptions about hidden schemes skulking beneath a shadow of the facts. But to

accept the conspiracy theory advanced by Midwest Feeders would require the fact-

finder to pile inference upon inference, namely that McGee knew of Rawls’

fraudulent scheme, that he agreed to conspire with Rawls and that he acted on

behalf of the Bank of Franklin in furtherance of that agreement.

Midwest Feeders, Inc. v. Bank of Franklin (“Midwest II”), 2017 WL 216715, at *9 (N.D. Miss.

2017).

The Receiver mischaracterizes MOIS and MOIC’s arguments in her footnote 34. MOIS

and MOIC argued that she did not plead facts to establish any of the elements of civil conspiracy

against MOIS and MOIC, including an agreement to commit an underlying tort. Civil conspiracy

as a matter of law cannot be established by “should have known” because there must be an

agreement. Even a “tacit” understanding means there must be an understanding of an agreement

to commit some sort of wrong. An agreement as to the scheme is required, even if not as to all the

details. Bradley, 117 So. 3d at 339. Thus, the Receiver must state non-conclusory facts that MOIS

and MOIC were not only aware of Adams and Kelly’s scheme but also agreed to participate. This

she fails to do.

V. THE RECEIVER FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR AIDING AND

ABETTING.

The Mississippi Supreme Court has never recognized a civil cause of action for aiding and

abetting. See Pikes v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 815, 822 (N.D. Miss. 2011); see also

Expro Americas, LLC v. Walters, 179 So. 3d 1010, 1025 (Miss. 2015) (King, J., dissenting)


14

(amended complaint offers no additional claims besides “aiding and abetting a breach of the duty

of loyalty, and it offers no caselaw to show that such a ‘claim’ actually exists”). But even if this

Court does make an Erie guess that Mississippi would recognize such a cause of action, which the

Court is not obligated to do, the Receiver has failed to state a claim against MOIS and MOIC for

aiding and abetting.

The Receiver first argues that “Defendants” knew Adams was the manager of MTP and

Wayne Kelly was one of MTP’s principals. Nowhere in her Complaint though does she allege

facts from which the Court could infer MOIS and MOIC had such knowledge. But even if they

did have such knowledge, knowing that Adams was manager and Kelly a principal does not

constitute knowing they were committing fraud. And, neither does recruitment of investors to

MTP. The Complaint does not allege that MOIS and MOIC had actually recruited investors to

MTP, but even if they did, that allegation alone is not sufficient to establish any of the elements of

aiding and abetting.

The Receiver mischaracterizes Official Stanford Inv’rs Comm. v. Breazeale Sachse and

Wilson LLP, 2015 WL 13740747 (N.D. Tex.) for the proposition that pleading mere referral of

clients is sufficient to support a reasonable inference of substantial assistance. There, in contrast

to the instant action, the receiver alleged sufficient facts such as: a partner at a law firm issued a

false legal opinion and omitted key information in order to mislead Louisiana’s Office of Financial

Institutions (“OFI”); the attorney prepared another legal report that falsely represented that an

ERISA fiduciary could hold the fraudulent CDs for the Plan; that defendants knew there was a

lack of sufficient security for the investments and yet continued to assist in establishing trust

production offices; and one of the defendants delivered “fraudulent ghost-written letters from

Antiguan regulators to OFI.” There are no comparable allegations pled against MOIS and MOIC.


15

The Receiver admits that her Complaint does not allege that MOIS and MOIC had

knowledge of Adams and Kelly’s fraudulent scheme as she does with BankPlus. Instead, she

argues that this element is met based upon red flags and knowledge of “unrealistic rates of return.”

[Dkt #54, p. 21] This argument fails for three reasons.

First, the red flags to which the Receiver refers are alleged as to BankPlus and not as to

MOIS and MOIC. Second, the Receiver fails to address the cases cited by MOIS and MOIC that

recognize red flags alone are not sufficient to constitute knowledge of the others breach of duty.

Third, Proskauer did not state that knowledge of unrealistic rates of return alone satisfies the

knowledge requirement for aiding and abetting. In Proskauer, the attorney whose conduct was at

issue was assisting the corporate entity in responding to an SEC investigation. He knew that one

of the bases for the SEC’s belief that Stanford was a fraudulent scheme was the unrealistic rate of

return on the products because that information was provided to him. Moreover, the attorney was

“armed with knowledge of Stanford’s scheme, [and] nevertheless corresponded with the SEC and

made a number of misrepresentations of fact and law that obstructed the investigation. Plaintiffs

also alleged that Sjoblom was involved in hiding the SEC investigation from Stanford’s auditors.

Plaintiffs allege that Sjoblom continued to assist in obstructing regulatory investigations into

Stanford’s misconduct after his move to Proskauer.” Id. at *1. Here, the Receiver does not allege

in her Complaint that MOIS and MOIC had knowledge of MTP’s rates of return much less any

other facts specific to MOIS and MOIC from which the Court could infer knowledge.

The Receiver’s argument regarding MOIS and MOIC can be distilled down to this: MOIS

and MOIC knew or should have known because they were in an advantageous position to discover

MTP was a fraud but did nothing to investigate it. [Dkt # 54, p. 22] This allegation does not meet

any of the elements of aiding and abetting. See Litson-Greunber v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 7:09-


16

cv-056-0, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexus 117749, at *5-8 (N.D. Tex. December 16, 2009)(allegation the

defendant knew or should have known insufficient to state a claim for aiding and abetting.)7

VI. MOIS IS NOT AN ALTER EGO OF MOIC WHO SHOULD BE DISMISSED

FROM THIS ACTION.

The Receiver does not dispute that the only grounds for her subjecting MOIC to liability is

through the doctrine of alter ego. The Receiver argues that the question of the alter ego is always

an issue of fact to be reserved for trial, that the 10 non-exclusive factors for piercing the corporate

veil do not apply, and she has pled sufficient facts to state a claim. Each of her arguments fail.

It is not true that alter ego is always an issue of fact to be reserved for the trier of fact. If

that was so, then the court in the case she relies so heavily upon, Jordan v. Maxfield and Oberton

Holdings, LLC, 173 F. Supp. 3d 355, 360 (S.D. Miss. 2016), committed reversible error when it

dismissed one of the defendants for whom the sole basis of liability was alter ego. The Receiver

relies upon Flores v. Bodden, a Fifth Circuit case for said proposition, but there the Fifth Circuit

was applying Texas law. 488 Fed. App’x 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2012). As will be discussed, Courts

in Mississippi do not always consider it to be an issue of fact and often grant motions to dismiss

claims of alter ego. This is because the Mississippi Supreme Court has made it “exceedingly

difficult” for a plaintiff to apply the doctrine of alter ego, which is reserved for “factual

circumstances which are clearly extraordinary.” Foamex, L.P. v. Superior Products Sales, Inc.,

361 F. Supp. 2d 576, 578 (N.D. Miss. 2005)

The Receiver argues that the “10 non-exclusive factors” are irrelevant and the Court should

instead look to a three-pronged test in Gray Edgewater Landing, Inc. It is true that both state and

7 The Receiver also points out to the Court that she has a separate claim for negligent retention and

supervision. She fails to address much less distinguish the three cases cited by MOIS and MOIC that hold

that inadequate supervision cannot constitute substantial assistance under a claim for aiding and abetting.

[Dkt. #47, p. 14]


17

federal courts often use the doctrines of piercing the corporate veil and alter ego interchangeably.

The Mississippi Supreme Court, though, in Buchanan deemed the 10 factors as “instructive on the

alter ego theory.” Buchanan v. Ameristar Casino Vicksburg, Inc., 957 So. 2d 969, 977 (Miss.

2007). But the real issue before the Court, whether the Court considers the 10 factors or the three-

pronged test, is whether the Receiver has stated facts sufficient from which the Court can infer

application of the doctrine of alter ego. Regardless of the factors considered by the Court, the

Receiver has failed to plead any facts from which the Court could infer the MOIS is an alter ego

of MOIC.

The Receiver argues “[t]he complaint explains that MOIC ‘authorized or directed’ the acts

of MOIS and its agents; it is therefore reasonable to infer that Adams and Madison Timber looked

to MOIC for performance.” The first part of the statement is nothing more than a conclusory

allegation. See Lee v. Ability Ins. Co., 2013 WL 2491067, at *4 (S.D. Miss.)(allegation that

defendants “act as the alter egos and/or agents of each other. … is plainly insufficient” to state a

claim, granting motion to dismiss). Moreover, it is not reasonable to infer from such a conclusory

allegation that Adams and MTP “looked to MOIC for performance.” Performance of what? The

three prong test the Receiver proposes the Court utilize requires examination of “frustration of

contractual expectations.” There is no allegation in the Complaint whatsoever that MOIS or

MOIC had any contractual relationship with Adams and MTP and there is no breach of contract

claim in the Complaint.

Plaintiff does not plead any facts from which the Court could infer a flagrant disregard of

corporate formalities. In Jordan, the court was confronted with a lawsuit where an alleged

tortfeasor, M&O, had sold a defective product and became the subject of regulatory complaints,

claims and lawsuits. In order to avoid liability, the owners dissolved M&O, distributed its profits


18

to equal owners Zucker and Bronstein, and left only $350,000 in a fund to pay anticipated claims.

Zucker then set up a new company, Assemble, LLC, to carry on M&O’s business free from

liabilities. Id. at 358.

In Jordan, the court found that the complaint had alleged facts sufficient to apply alter ego

with regard to Zucker but not Bronstein. The Court found that Assemble was defendant Zucker’s

alter ego because he used its revenues for his personal legal defense fund in a regulatory proceeding

and attachments incorporated into the complaint suggested a comingling of corporate with

personal assets as well as a unity of interest between Assemble and Zucker. Jordan, 173 F. Supp.

3d at 361. With regard to Bronstein, the court found otherwise even though the complaint pled

that he used M&O as an alter ego by dissolving M&O, by allowing insurance policies to be

cancelled, and by leaving an inadequate claim fund. Despite such pleading, this Court found “that

the complaint lacks allegations describing with particularity how Bronstein used M&O as an alter

ego or otherwise participated in the fraudulent scheme.” Id. at 362. The Court further recognized

that a pleading based “on information and belief” is not adequate to state a claim. Also lacking

were any allegations with particularity as to “how Bronstein failed to observe corporate formalities,

comingled corporate and personal assets or was the decision-maker behind the company’s actions

among other possibilities.”8 Id.

The Receiver also fails to plead any facts regarding “a demonstration of fraud or other

equivalent malfeasance on the part of the corporate shareholder.” That is, there are no facts

regarding fraud or other equivalent misfeasance on the part of MOIC.9 But the Complaint states

no claim of fraud against MOIC or MOIS. Moreover, the third prong requires facts to be alleged

8 By considering these issues, the Court did not limit itself to the three Gray factors. 9 As will be discussed, MOIC is not even a shareholder of MOIS. But the Receiver makes no allegations

against MOIS for fraud and argues “neither fraud nor scienter are elements of the Receiver’s claims.” [Dkt

# 54, p. 4]


19

where the Court could infer fraud by MOIS to avoid corporate liabilities. No such allegations have

been pled.

Courts have consistently dismissed alter ego claims even where the complaint pled far more

facts than the Receiver’s single conclusory allegation. See, e.g., Foamex, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 577

(finding that corporation not alter ego of shareholder even though first two prongs met (by allowing

corporate entity to have “very large debt”, shareholder undertook to personally pay some of debts

with personal checks, and particular factual allegations regarding disregard of corporate

formalities) because case was merely breach of contract case); C.A. Jones, Inc. v. Diversify

Labored Support, LLC, 2016 WL 11484168, at *1 (S.D. Miss.)(granting 12(b)(6) motion on alter

ego even though complaint alleged shareholder transferred first corporation’s business to separate

LLC, that separate LLC was created in effort to avoid creditors, that plaintiff’s contractual

expectations were frustrated by diversion of contracts and revenue to a separate LLC, and that

shareholders used new LLC assets to pay personal expenses and to avoid creditors); Swift Fin.

Corp. v. Bath Planet of Miss., LLC, 2016 WL 3180291, at *3 (S.D. Miss.)(refusing to apply alter

ego because it can only be applied to a corporation’s shareholders); Meek v. Gold Coast Skydivers,

Inc., 2016 WL 81812, at *5 (S.D. Miss.)(finding that allegations of common president and

operating indistinguishably as regards the entity’s assets, revenue and like were not sufficient to

state a claim); Huntley v. C.L. Medical SARL, 2015 WL 5521796, at *9 (S.D. Miss.)(“inferences

and supposition from companies’ shared ownership without having provided sufficient evidence”

warranted dismissal); Lee, 2013 WL 2491067, at *2 (dismissed claim for alter ego even though

complaint pled that all employees had been transferred from one corporation to another, the same

CEO in both companies, and companies restructured to share cost among affiliated companies).

In each of the aforementioned cases, much more was pled and yet the claim of alter ego was


20

dismissed. One need only compare those cases to the bald conclusory allegation of the Receiver

to see that no claim has been stated for alter ego.

Finally, as this Court has pointed out, “alter ego liability can be extended only to a

corporation’s shareholders ….” Swift, 2016 WL 3180291, at *2 (quoting EDW Investments, LLC

v. Barnett, 149 So. 3d 489, 492 (Miss. 2014)). The Receiver did not allege that MOIC is a

shareholder of MOIS. MOIS is wholly owned by Mutual of Omaha Holdings, Inc. See

https://brokercheck.FINRA.org/firm/summary/611numbergeneralinfoSection and Dkt. #’s 55 and

56.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Mutual of Omaha Investor Services, Inc. and

Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company move the Court to dismiss all claims against them with

prejudice, or, in the alternative, partial dismissal.10

This, the 1st day of July, 2019. Respectfully submitted,

MUTUAL OF OMAHA INVESTOR SERVICES, INC. AND MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY By: s/ Kelly D. Simpkins Kelly D. Simpkins (MSB #9028) Walter D. Willson (MSB #7291) Its Attorneys OF COUNSEL: WELLS MARBLE & HURST, PLLC 300 Concourse Boulevard, Suite 200 Ridgeland, Mississippi 39157 Post Office Box 131 Jackson, Mississippi 39205-0131 Telephone: 601-605-6900; Facsimile: 601-605-6901 [email protected]; [email protected]

10 The Receiver argues that if the Complaint is not properly pled, the Court’s only recourse is to allow her to amend her Complaint. However, such is not automatically a right and in many of the cases cited herein, the courts have denied leave to amend the original complaint. Leave to amend should be denied because the Receiver offers no substantive response to MOIS and MOIC’s motion and offers no additional facts that she could have pled with more particularity. In such circumstances, courts are not hesitant to deny requests to amend.


https://brokercheck.finra.org/firm/summary/611numbergeneralinfoSection



1

Angie Gillespie

From: MID Public Records Center <[email protected]>Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2019 3:26 PMTo: Angie GillespieSubject: Public Records Request :: W000488-062719

Attachments: Stewart_Patridge_Sircon_Record.pdf --- Please respond above this line ---

The files you requested are attached. Please let us know if you need anything else.

To monitor the progress or update this request please log into the Public Records Center.

Case 3:19-cv-00196-CWR-FKB Document 65-1 Filed 07/01/19 Page 1 of 8

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DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

10-07-2013V

oluntaryS

urrender

LifeInactive

09-01-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive09-01-2009

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

JohnA

ldenLife

InsuranceC

ompany

41-099975265080

7700152Inactive

07-16-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive12-05-2011

07-16-2013C

anceled

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

JohnH

ancockLife

InsuranceC

ompany

04-141466065099

7700239Inactive

12-31-2009

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

12-31-2009V

oluntaryS

urrender

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

09-28-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

LifeInactive

09-28-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

JohnH

ancockLife

InsuranceC

ompany

(U.S

.A.)

01-023334665838

8300057Inactive

03-24-2012

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive01-01-2010

03-24-2012C

anceled

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

LincolnN

ationalLifeInsurance

Com

pany,The

35-047230065676

7700308Inactive

12-31-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

07-17-200810-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

LifeInactive

07-17-200810-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive07-17-2008

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

MetLife

InvestorsInsurance

Com

pany43-1236042

935138100161

Inactive12-31-2013


06-27-2019In

divid

ualIn

form

ation

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Page

4of7

Nam

e:P

AT

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US

AC

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ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

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DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

06-27-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

LifeInactive

06-27-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive06-27-2009

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

MetLife

InvestorsU

SA

InsuranceC

ompany

54-069664461050

7700322Inactive

12-31-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

06-27-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

LifeInactive

06-27-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive06-27-2009

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Metropolitan

LifeInsurance

Com

pany13-5581829

659787700289

Inactive12-31-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

07-08-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

LifeInactive

07-08-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive07-08-2009

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

MutualofO

maha

InsuranceC

ompany

47-024651171412

7700325Inactive

08-16-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive07-08-2011

08-16-2013C

anceled

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Nationw

ideLife

InsuranceC

ompany

31-415683066869

7700354Inactive

02-29-2012

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive12-04-2009

02-29-2012V

oluntaryS

urrender

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

New

York

LifeInsurance

andA

nnuityC

orporation13-3044743

915968100015

Inactive08-25-2011

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

08-25-2011C

anceled

LifeInactive

06-24-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive06-24-2009

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

LifeInactive

07-30-200806-01-2009

Canceled

Variable

Contracts

Inactive07-30-2008

06-01-2009C

anceled

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Om

ahaInsurance

Com

pany20-5873230

131001100020

Inactive08-16-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-17-2012

08-16-2013C

anceled

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Pacific

LifeInsurance

Com

pany95-1079000

674667700363

Inactive12-31-2013


06-27-2019In

divid

ualIn

form

ation

Inq

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Page

5of7

Nam

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AT

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PO

INT

ME

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TY

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ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive07-07-2011

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

12-01-2010C

anceled

LifeInactive

07-25-200810-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive07-25-2008

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Protective

LifeInsurance

Com

pany63-0169720

681367700457

Inactive08-19-2011

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

08-19-2011C

anceled

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

09-24-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

LifeInactive

09-24-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive09-24-2009

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Pruco

LifeInsurance

Com

pany22-1944557

792277700492

Inactive12-31-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive09-17-2013

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

No

LOA

Inactive10-17-2011

09-11-2013V

oluntaryS

urrender

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

09-06-2011V

oluntaryS

urrender

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

06-26-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

LifeInactive

06-26-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive06-26-2009

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

PrudentialA

nnuitiesLife

Assurance

Corporation

06-124128886630

7700216Inactive

09-06-2011

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

09-06-2011V

oluntaryS

urrender

LifeInactive

06-26-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive06-26-2009

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

PrudentialInsurance

Com

panyofA

merica,T

he22-1211670

682417700494

Inactive09-06-2011

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

09-06-2011V

oluntaryS

urrender

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

06-26-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

LifeInactive

06-26-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive06-26-2009

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

RiverS

ourceLife

InsuranceC

ompany

41-082383265005

7700229Inactive

11-22-2011

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive02-24-2010

11-22-2011C

anceled

LifeInactive

03-05-200906-01-2009

Canceled

Variable

Contracts

Inactive03-05-2009

06-01-2009C

anceled

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Standard

InsuranceC

ompany

93-024299069019

8900045Inactive

12-31-2013


06-27-2019In

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ualIn

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6of7

Nam

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AP

PO

INT

ME

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TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

07-26-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

LifeInactive

07-26-200910-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive07-26-2009

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

SunA

merica

Annuity

andLife

Assurance

Com

pany86-0198983

609417700101

Inactive10-15-2012

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive12-22-2010

10-15-2012C

anceled

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Sym

etraLife

InsuranceC

ompany

91-074214768608

7700381Inactive

12-31-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive08-04-2011

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

TalcottR

esolutionLife

andA

nnuityInsurance

Com

pany39-1052598

711537700270

Inactive12-31-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive02-28-2012

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

10-03-2011C

anceled

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

08-04-200810-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive08-04-2008

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

TalcottR

esolutionLife

InsuranceC

ompany

06-097414888072

7900004Inactive

02-22-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive11-07-2011

02-22-2013C

anceled

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

10-03-2011C

anceled

Accidentand

Health

(Life)Inactive

08-04-200810-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

Variable

Contracts

Inactive08-04-2008

10-27-2009P

LMA

Data

Conversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Tim

eInsurance

Com

pany39-0658730

694777700399

Inactive12-31-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive04-11-2013

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Transam

ericaLife

InsuranceC

ompany

39-098978186231

7900054Inactive

12-31-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive10-27-2009

12-31-2013F

ailureto

Renew

LifeInactive

07-30-200810-27-2009

PLM

AD

ataC

onversion

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

AIC

IDL

ICE

NS

EN

UM

BE

RS

TA

TU

SE

FF

EC

TIV

ED

AT

E

Transam

ericaO

ccidentalLifeInsurance

Com

pany95-1060502

671217700329

Inactive10-01-2008

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

LifeInactive

07-30-200810-01-2008

Canceled

Variable

Contracts

Inactive07-30-2008

10-01-2008C

anceled


06-27-2019In

divid

ualIn

form

ation

Inq

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Page

7of7

State

Of:

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CO

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United

ofOm

ahaLife

InsuranceC

ompany

47-032211169868

7700453Inactive

08-16-2013

AP

PO

INT

ME

NT

TY

PE

ST

AT

US

AC

TIV

ED

AT

ET

ER

MIN

AT

ION

DA

TE

TE

RM

INA

TIO

NR

EA

SO

N

No

LOA

Inactive07-08-2011

08-16-2013C

anceled

CO

MP

AN

YE

INN

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