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Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013
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Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Dec 17, 2015

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Page 1: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Human Rights:Philosophical Defenses, Cont.

Spring 2013

Page 2: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Ecce Homo

Page 3: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.
Page 4: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.
Page 5: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

One formulation of the Categorical Imperative

“Act so that you use humanity in your person, as well as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end, never merely as a

means.”(G 4:429)

Page 6: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Key pointBy treating somebody merely as

a means, I disregard capacity to value

Which is a capacity I have myself

Therefore I would disregard myself

But as agent I am committed to valuing myself

Page 7: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Objection

• that I value certain things only permits inference that I must value my having the capacity to value, my partaking of humanity

– you must value your having capacity to value, or your partaking of humanity

Page 8: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Continued

• I must value capacity to value, or to set ends, insofar as it is a capacity I possess

– you must value capacity insofar as it is a capacity you possess

Page 9: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Continued

• I do not need to value your capacity to value, and vice versa

–neither you nor I must value capacity to value per se

• no contradiction if I am using you as a means to ends that have value because I have conferred it upon them

Page 10: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Kant’s response

Kant: “But you are now drawing an arbitrary distinction – between your capacity to value and mine.”

Page 11: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Kant’s response

Kant: “But you are now drawing an arbitrary distinction – between your capacity to value and mine.”

“That may well be true – but your goal is to offer an inconsistency argument – and that you have not offered.”

Kant: (…)

Page 12: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

What Kant’s argument shows • shows how you become

intelligible to me as agent

• how I come to see your actions as more than mere events – realize that, in a fundamental way, we are alike

• But does not show I am inconsistent when not treating you as an end

Page 13: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism about Human Rights: the Most We Can Hope for?”

• Position Cohen rejects: that JM leads to SM

Page 14: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism about Human Rights: the Most We Can Hope for?”

• Substantive minimalism about human rights: human rights only prohibit violations of negative rights

• Justificatory minimalism: justification for human rights must not assume any specific religious or philosophical viewpoints or ideologies

• Position Cohen rejects: that JM leads to SM

Page 15: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Cohen rejects this view:

“If you want a universally acceptable justification of human rights, you only get very few rights – only negative rights.”

Cohen claims instead:

“There is a universally acceptable justification of human rights that delivers a list of rights not limited to negative rights.”

Page 16: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Ignatieff – Cohen

• Ignatieff: substantive minimalism is best we can hope for because of justificatory minimalism

• Cohen: justificatory minimalism allows us to hope for more than substantive minimalism

• “hope” because it’s about what vision one may have, not about what’s realistic

Page 17: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Cohen’s justificatory minimalism: not skeptical, not emprical

“free-standing”, “un-foundational”

does not rely on thick religious or philosophical foundations

and is not at their intersection

Page 18: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Thereby addresses charge that human rights are Western construct – relying too much on

liberal view of the person that conceived of individual as an autonomous decision-maker

Page 19: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Cohen’s proposal

• Human rights norms are norms associated with idea of membership or inclusion in society

Page 20: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Cohen’s proposal

• Human rights norms are norms associated with idea of membership or inclusion in society

• Membership: one is member if one’s interests are being given due consideration – are taken into account by a country’s basic institutions

Page 21: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Cohen’s proposal

• Human rights norms are norms associated with idea of membership or inclusion in society

• Membership: one is member if one’s interests are being given due consideration – are taken into account by a country’s basic institutions

• Disagreements about human rights become disagreements about what is required for such inclusion

Page 22: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

His proposal • requires specific argument for precisely what rights would pass this test

• But many more than on Ignatieff’s view – if we are expected to abide by society’s rules, there are basic goods society must provide for us in return

• beyond respect for negative rights

• Slavery, torture, threat of arbitrary arrests, but also poor health, lack of education, and absence of sufficient economic means undermine membership

Page 23: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Human rights = membership rights

Page 24: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

“Fresh elaborations of traditions”

• unfoundational view of human rights not simply “read off” intersection of traditions

• still, approach will gain plausibility from “fresh elaborations” of religious or philosophical traditions that support it

• after all, view must nonetheless speak to religious and philosophical traditions to be acceptable

Page 25: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Case study: Confucianism

• Point is not that we find ideas about rights/human rights somewhere in Confucianism

• Instead: central ideas of Confucianism can be represented in such a way as to support a conception of human rights

Page 26: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Relationships

• Confucianism: particular duties arise from one's situation in relation to others

• individual stands in different relationships: as a junior in relation to parents and elders, and as a senior in relation to younger siblings, students, and others

Page 27: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

juniors owe their seniors reverence

seniors have duties of benevolence and concern toward juniors

Page 28: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.
Page 29: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Goal of Confucianism: social harmony

• results from every individual knowing his or her place in social order, and playing his or her part well

Page 30: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Hall of Supreme Harmony, Beijing

Page 31: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Confucianism

Basic human rights: conditions for fulfilling obligations associated with human

relationship

Page 32: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Slavery, torture, threat of arbitrary arrests, but also poor health, lack of education, and absence of sufficient economic means undermine ability to fulfill obligations

Page 33: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Continued

• If human worth depends on one’s ability to fulfill one’s obligations, then one can expect of others to create conditions under which one can do so

• Officials have obligations, such as peace and security – this too includes human rights

Page 34: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Here human rights enter into ethical framework that thinks of human beings centrally as

embedded into social relations rather than fundamentally as autonomous beings

Page 35: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Crucial:

point is not that we “find” human rights in Confucianism

there is way of elaborating on central tenets of Confucianism that integrates human rights

human rights do not require liberal view of personhood

Page 36: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

“Asian values debate” – the values at issue

• Predisposition towards single-party (even authoritarian) rule over pluralist democracy

• Preference for social harmony rather than dissent

• Concern with socio-economic well-being instead of human rights

• Preference for the welfare and collective well-being of the community over individual rights

• Loyalty and respect towards all forms of authority including parents, teachers and government

Page 37: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Case Study: Islam • Human beings must understand

God’s law from within historical situations

• There is no compulsion in religion – so not only societal leadership must be free to seek to interpret God’s law

• And finally, a diversity of religious communities is part of the natural human condition

Page 38: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

“We do things differently around here”

• argument often rests on attribution of unanimity that does not exist

• In case of egregious human right violations: no “we” on whose behalf anybody could speak

• victims have complaints that are intelligible to us and on whose behalf we can speak up

Page 39: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

What if “victims” agree with the practices? – Scanlon

• “But even if the victims did take the view that they have no rights against what is is done to them (…) couldn’t they be wrong in thinking this?”

• “[W]hich is the more objectionable form of cultural superiority, to refuse to aid a victim on the ground that “they live like that – they don’t recognize rights as we know them,” or to attempt to protect the defenseless even when they themselves feel that suffering is their lot and they have no basis to complain of it?” (P 119)

Page 40: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Which is more objectionable form of cultural superiority?

(1) to refuse to aid a victim on the ground that “they live like that – they don’t recognize rights as we know them,”

(2) or to attempt to protect the defenseless even when they themselves feel that suffering is their lot and they have no basis to complain of it?

Often aid: (2) is more problematic, whereas (1) seems like an enlightened attitude

But: (1) can easily be the more objectionable form of cultural superiority – because people can be brainwashed

Page 41: Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013.

Must apply with extreme caution

• False consciousness: people have been persuaded to support a regime that is to somebody else’s benefit

• Brain washing -- severe Manipulation

• Population itself, once through the transition, would presumably approve