Hearing Transcript - 22 September 2003 Morning

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 22 September 2003 Morning

1/50


2/50

5 9th July the MoD press office confirmed to a journalist6 the identity of the person who had come forward,7 Dr Kelly. Were you aware, on 9th July, that the MoD8 press office was adopting an approach under which it was9 proposing to confirm the identity of the individual if10 the correct name was put?

11 A. Yes, I was. I had had a conversation earlier that day12 with Sir Kevin Tebbit, the Permanent Secretary, in which13 he had set out to me the concerns that he had as far as14 the press office were concerned, in particular that15 individual press officers should not be seen to be lying16 to journalists, and that it was better that they should,17 if the right name was put to them, acknowledge the fact.18 He was also very concerned that there was a risk to19 other members of staff, other officials, and he did not20 want anything said by the press office to lead21 journalists in the direction of the wrong official.22 Q. It has been suggested in certain quarters that your23 previous evidence to this Inquiry in relation to this

24 matter may have been inaccurate, so perhaps we should25 take a moment to look at that.

31 You gave oral evidence to the Inquiry on2 27th August. Prior to that, had you provided to3 the Inquiry a written statement?4 A. Yes, I had.5 Q. Do you have a copy of that statement?6 A. Yes, I do.7 Q. When did you write that statement?8 A. It was shortly before my previous appearance. I was9 required to submit it 24 hours in advance.

10 Q. Could I ask you, please, to read aloud paragraphs 25, 2611 and 27 of that statement?12 A. Paragraph 25 begins:13 "On the morning of Wednesday 9th July,14 Jonathan Powell suggested that I should write again to15 Mr Davies but this time with Dr Kelly's name.16 I discussed this view with the MoD's Director of News,17 Pam Teare, and other officials. An alternative approach18 would have been to dispute Mr Davies' point about source19 protection and repeat the offer in my previous letter.20 I concluded, however, that we were more likely to obtain21 a sensible response if we gave the name to the BBC so22 that the Governors and senior management could establish23 whether they had been told the truth by Mr Gilligan. My24 office contacted Mr Davies' secretary in advance to25 ensure that the letter was sent directly to a fax in his

41 own office and that the BBC understood that this letter2 would not be released to the press. Copies sent to the3 very limited number of Whitehall recipients were marked4 accordingly.5 "26. During the course of Wednesday 9th July the6 Permanent Secretary told me how the Ministry of Defence7 press office would deal with press enquiries trying to8 identify the official referred to in the Ministry of9 Defence statement. The decision to confirm the name of10 Dr Kelly if it was put to the MoD directly was to avoid


3/50

11 any suggestion that we were in any way misleading12 journalists. We did not want anyone to claim that we13 had been less than straightforward in our dealing with14 them, not least in the light of the FAC's conclusion15 that Andrew Gilligan's alleged contact should be16 thoroughly investigated.

17 "27. I did not brief Dr Kelly's name to any18 journalists, neither was I aware of any strategy to do19 so. The defensive question and answer material prepared20 to help the MoD press office respond to possible press21 enquiries was not put to me for approval and I did not22 see it at the time."23 Q. Thank you. Are those the paragraphs of your statement24 which relate to the events of Wednesday 9th July?25 A. Yes, they are.

51 Q. You refer there to a conversation with Sir Kevin. Do2 you recall when during 9th July that conversation took

3 place?4 A. To the best of my recollection it took place immediately5 before the press meeting that has been referred to.6 Sir Kevin, quite frequently -- his office is close to7 mine -- will come in first thing in the morning, put his8 head around the door and if he wants to raise matters9 with me, he will do so. He is -- these are not in the10 nature of formal meetings but if there are matters he11 wants to clear with me, to check with me, then it is12 a very regular practice. It happens, I would say, more13 often than not on the days when we are both in the14 office together.15 Q. Can we have on the screen the transcript for

16 27th August, at page 73?17 LORD HUTTON: Has Mr Hoon a copy?18 A. I have it, my Lord.19 LORD HUTTON: I think if you read out any particular passage20 you want to put to Mr Hoon.21 MR LLOYD-JONES: I am sorry, I was not aware it was not22 scanned in.23 LORD HUTTON: Of course. That is quite understandable.24 MR LLOYD-JONES: Could I read the passage then Secretary of25 State?

61 LORD HUTTON: Read it as fully as you wish so that everyone2 can understand the context.3 MR LLOYD-JONES: Thank you, I will do that. At page 73 we4 find my Lord putting this -- one should perhaps go back5 to line 6:6 "Lord Hutton: Just going back to the question and7 answer material. I appreciate you say you did not see8 this material --9 "Answer: No, my Lord.10 "Lord Hutton: -- but Ms Pam Teare said that one of11 the factors that influenced I think her and others in12 preparing this material was that the press might suggest13 the names of other MoD officials or persons from the14 Government as being the source and the view was taken15 that it would be unfair if that were not denied in case16 suspicion fell on the wrong people. I appreciate you


4/50

17 say you were not concerned with that aspect but what is18 your view on that, Secretary of State?"19 The answer which was given was:20 "Answer: Well, I was aware of certainly21 Sir Kevin Tebbit raised that with me. He was very22 concerned that other officials might come under

23 investigation by journalists; and indeed I think it is24 right that one did find a journalist in his garden25 approaching his children."

71 You go on to make the point it would be wrong to ask2 press officers to deceive journalists and that would not3 be appropriate.4 That conversation with Sir Kevin, Secretary of5 State, does that refer to the same conversation to which6 you have just referred or to a different conversation?7 A. I am fairly confident that it took place immediately8 before the press meeting.

9 Q. So that passage in your evidence, in the first phase,10 refers to the same meeting, does it?11 A. Yes.12 Q. What did Sir Kevin say on that occasion?13 A. In the meeting -- essentially he was setting out14 something that had been previously agreed, that is the15 night before, as I have understood the evidence, that in16 the Q and A was a reference to the fact that if17 a journalist approached the press office with the right18 name, then that name would be confirmed by press19 officers; and so essentially what Kevin was doing that20 morning was just checking with me essentially that21 I agreed to that approach.

22 Q. Did you approve of that course?23 A. Yes, I did. We equally had a brief discussion about the24 options that were available. Clearly, there were three.25 The press officer could either have told a flat lie to

81 journalists, which would not have been appropriate; they2 could have confirmed it, as we agreed they should; or3 they could have obfuscated, they could have said: no4 comment.5 It was certainly my very strong view, and I think it6 has been confirmed by journalists who have given7 evidence to the Inquiry, that no comment was tantamount8 to admitting the name in question was the right name.9 Therefore it seemed to Sir Kevin, it was his view and it10 was certainly my view, that this was the best and most11 straightforward way of dealing with journalists who had12 identified correctly the name of the person who had come13 forward.14 Q. Did you see any reason to change the approach which had15 been adopted?16 A. No, I did not.17 Q. Did you say so to Sir Kevin?18 A. I agreed with Sir Kevin. I confirmed the approach that19 had been previously outlined.20 Q. Were you the shown the Q and A brief at that time?21 A. No, I was not.22 Q. Did you have any other conversations that day with


5/50

23 Sir Kevin on the subject of the approach that was being24 followed by the press office?25 A. There might have been further conversation with Kevin.

91 I attended with him a service to commemorate the

2 conclusion of the Korean War. To the best of my3 recollection we might have discussed it once more. But4 it was only in the nature of, in effect, confirming the5 decision we had previously agreed on.6 Q. On that occasion were you shown the Q and A brief?7 A. No, I was not.8 Q. Did you speak with anyone else during that day,9 9th July, about the approach that was being followed by10 the press office at this time?11 A. Well, I have referred already to the press briefing12 meeting. That is a regular meeting that occurs in my13 office first thing in the morning. I have checked my14 diary for that day; it was scheduled to last from 9

15 until 9.15. I had another meeting that day at 9.15.16 Towards the end of that meeting there was a further17 very brief discussion of the practice that Pam Teare,18 who was present at the meeting, was recommending for the19 press office, which was that -- consistent with what20 I had previously agreed with Sir Kevin -- if21 a journalist came forward with the right name then it22 would be confirmed by the press office. There was23 a discussion about the rationale for that; I suspect24 largely for the benefit of my special adviser,25 Richard Taylor, who had only learned about the fact that

10

1 someone had come forward the previous evening when he2 had watched the news. So there was some discussion,3 really, about the underlying rationale, confirming what4 had previously been decided.5 Q. Could you tell us who was present at the meeting?6 A. I was, Pam Teare, Richard Taylor, my principal private7 secretary.8 Q. Were you shown the Q and A brief on that occasion?9 A. No, I was not.10 Q. How long did the discussion of the approach taken by the11 press office last?12 A. It could only have been a matter of minutes. Normally13 we would look at the extract of press cuttings that is14 delivered each day around the Ministry of Defence to see15 whether there were any issues that we had to deal with.16 We had a much longer discussion, as I previously17 indicated, about whether, in fact, to incorporate18 Dr Kelly's name in a further letter to Mr Davies.19 I would say that the discussion of the rationale20 underlying the approach of the press office probably21 took a couple of minutes at the end of the meeting.22 I can recall that everyone was anxious to finish the23 meeting because I had another meeting scheduled for24 9.15. It is the kind of occasion on which private25 secretaries put their head around the door to indicate

111 that you should be moving things along.


6/50

2 Q. Did you agree with the approach that was being taken by3 the press office?4 A. Yes, I did.5 Q. Now, in your oral evidence -- again I am afraid we6 cannot see it on the screen, but it is page 100 to 1017 of your evidence on 27th August. Perhaps I can take the

8 same course and read that, just to put this in context.9 You were asked by my learned friend Mr Dingemans10 about evidence that Mr Taylor, your special adviser, had11 confirmed the name of Dr Kelly to journalists. You said12 that you were not specifically aware of that at the time13 but that you had learned that had happened, you had14 learned since that that had happened. You were asked15 what was your view of that. You said:16 "Well, I assume that that was consistent with the17 question and answer process that had been agreed within18 the department. I do not think it occurred in any19 earlier timeframe."20 Then Mr Dingemans asked you:

21 "The question and answers material that your special22 adviser knows about but you did not?"23 This is the passage I want to ask you about.24 A. Hmm, hmm.25 Q. Your answer:

121 "I did not see the question and answer, but I was2 obviously aware of the advice that I had received that3 if the right name was given to an MoD press officer they4 should confirm it. I am not suggesting -- I am not5 suggesting, for a moment, that I was not aware of that;6 and obviously my special adviser would have been aware

7 of it as well."8 Was that answer correct?9 A. Yes, it was.10 Q. Why did you consider, at the time, that it was right for11 the Ministry of Defence to confirm the name of the12 person who had come forward if it was put?13 A. Because otherwise having considered the two other14 options that seemed to be available, neither of the15 other two options I regarded as being satisfactory. One16 was to lie; the other would undoubtedly have involved17 considerable difficulties for press officers trying to18 maintain a no comment policy, a no comment policy which19 I know from experience of dealing with journalists they20 would simply have regarded as some sort of confirmation.21 I think, my Lord, it was Mr Blitz who said just that in22 his evidence to the Inquiry.23 Q. With the benefit of hindsight do you still consider that24 it was the right thing to do?25 A. Yes, I do.

131 Q. Could I ask you now to cast your mind back to the2 previous day, the 8th July.3 On 8th July, the day that the press statement was4 released, had you formed any view as to the likelihood5 of Dr Kelly's name being discovered by the press had the6 Ministry of Defence not issued the press statement?7 A. Yes. As I think I gave evidence on the last occasion,


7/50

8 my Lord, it was a consistent view of all of those who9 had to deal with this problem that sooner rather than10 later Dr Kelly's name would emerge. Right from the11 beginning when Dr Kelly in his letter indicated why he12 had come forward, he said that it was because13 a colleague had identified his words in the version that

14 Andrew Gilligan gave to the Foreign Affairs Committee,15 that those words were so distinctive, so associated with16 Dr Kelly, that she mentioned it to him. And given that17 if one person could identify Dr Kelly's views in the18 mouth of Andrew Gilligan, then it would hardly be19 surprising if others did the same. And the way in which20 these things worked, I think everyone assumed that21 sooner rather than later Dr Kelly's name would emerge.22 Q. Were you told anything by your officials as to whether23 Dr Kelly had been given any warning or advice as to the24 likelihood of his identity becoming public?25 A. Certainly on the Friday, in the course of the first

141 interview with Richard Hatfield I had understood --2 I had been told that Richard Hatfield had made it very3 clear that it was very likely that his name would emerge4 and that Dr Kelly -- I think the word used -- had5 accepted that.6 Q. Was anything reported to you about the press office7 contacts with Dr Kelly?8 A. On the Friday, I know from the evidence that they would9 have prepared routinely a question and answer brief to10 deal with the possibility that the name might emerge11 over the weekend. I certainly recall having discussions12 over the weekend about what we would do if a Sunday

13 newspaper, for example, discovered that Dr Kelly had14 come forward.15 Q. My question was directed rather to whether anything had16 been reported to you about contacts made by the press17 office with Dr Kelly to advise him?18 A. Well, that happened on the Tuesday, on 8th July, that as19 the press statement was being drafted and prepared the20 press office contacted Dr Kelly, I think it was21 Kate Wilson, to warn him of the likelihood that he would22 be approached by members of the press and that he should23 take appropriate action. I think she suggested to him24 that it might be sensible for a short period for him to25 find somewhere else to live in order to avoid unwelcome

151 attention from the press.2 Q. Did you ask any of your officials to report to you on3 Dr Kelly's welfare?4 A. Yes, I did. I regularly asked my private secretary to5 ensure that someone was in contact with Dr Kelly. He6 reported to me that Bryan Wells, who was formally7 Dr Kelly's line manager -- but I was very -- I was given8 a very clear impression that the two men got on well9 together and Bryan Wells was taking a personal interest10 in Dr Kelly's welfare; even to the extent, I am not11 quite sure when I was told this but I was well aware12 that Mr Wells had cancelled a trip to the United States13 in order to remain in the United Kingdom precisely to


8/50

14 fulfil that function.15 I felt that there was, in my case, a balance to be16 struck in taking an interest in Dr Kelly's welfare but17 at the same time not interfering in what was a personnel18 process. I did not want anyone to suggest there was19 political interference in the decisions and the

20 approaches being taken by those responsible for21 individual personnel matters.22 Q. Turning, then, to another matter, Secretary of State.23 On 10th July you received a letter from24 Mr Donald Anderson stating that the FAC wished Dr Kelly25 to give evidence. We know that in due course you took

161 a decision that Dr Kelly should give evidence both to2 the FAC and the ISC. Do you recall the matters in3 respect of which Mr Anderson wanted Dr Kelly to give4 evidence?5 A. Essentially as I would have expected. Mr Anderson was

6 concerned about the fact that the Committee had7 previously heard evidence from both Mr Campbell and8 Mr Gilligan and they were concerned about what light9 potentially Dr Kelly might throw on that. So the letter10 from Donald Anderson was couched in those terms. It was11 in the context of their previous findings and12 deliberations.13 Q. Yes. Could we have on the screen, please, MoD/1/73?14 This is the letter of 10th July from Mr Anderson to you.15 If we could scroll down, please. We see there:16 "You will wish to know that the Clerk is writing to17 Dr Kelly today, inviting him to appear before the18 Committee to give oral evidence in public on Tuesday

19 15 July, on questions directly relevant to the20 Committee's report published earlier this week, arising21 from the MoD statement of 9 July."22 Could we have on the screen, please, MoD/1/82.23 Again, if we scroll down to the final paragraph of24 the first page we see this:25 "Although the FAC has now completed its own inquiry,

171 I can understand why you also wish to see Dr Kelly.2 I am prepared to agree to this on the clear3 understanding that Dr Kelly will be questioned only on4 those matters which are directly relevant to the5 evidence that you were given by Andrew Gilligan, and not6 on the wider issue of Iraqi WMD and the preparation of7 the dossier. Dr Kelly was not involved in the process8 of drawing up the intelligence parts of the dossier."9 Secretary of State, why did you make that10 stipulation limiting the scope of evidence?11 A. In a sense it begins from the original letter from12 Mr Anderson, which indicated that he wanted to ask13 Dr Kelly questions arising out of the report that the14 FAC had concluded.15 I think a second factor was that obviously the issue16 for Dr Kelly and the Committee was what had taken place17 between Dr Kelly and Andrew Gilligan. He was the only18 person in a position to give evidence of that kind; and19 it seemed right, consistent with what Donald Anderson


9/50

20 had asked me, that that limitation should be there.21 I also had in mind, because it was contained in the22 original evidence -- sorry, in the original submission23 from Sir Kevin Tebbit, I had in mind that it was likely,24 at that stage, that Dr Kelly would be giving evidence to25 two different Committees on the same day; and therefore

181 limiting the amount of time picked up, in a sense, the2 point that Kevin Tebbit had made that I should have3 regard to the man, that is, that he should not be4 subject to two back-to-back inquiries that were of the5 usual length. The usual length, in my experience of an6 appearance before a Parliamentary Committee, is in the7 order of 2 and a half hours. It would not seem to me to8 be right to subject someone to two back-to-back two and9 a half hour sessions.10 Q. What was Mr Anderson's reply?11 A. Well, what he said in his reply was:

12 "I share your clear understanding of the scope and13 duration of the questioning."14 Indeed, having looked at this letter since, he could15 have said: I reluctantly accept, or: I am bound by your16 request. What he actually said was that he shared my17 view. I took that to mean that he agreed entirely with18 the approach that I had taken.19 MR LLOYD-JONES: Secretary of State, thank you very much.20 LORD HUTTON: Thank you, Mr Lloyd-Jones.21 Mr Gompertz.22 Cross-examination by MR GOMPERTZ23 Q. Secretary of State, apart from the Walter Mitty slur for24 which Mr Tom Kelly has made an unreserved apology, is

25 there anything at all which you feel that the Government

191 or the Ministry of Defence have done wrong in relation2 to the matters with which this Inquiry is concerned?3 A. Having followed your cross-examination carefully, over4 several days, I can see that there may be judgments5 about the precise timing of particular decisions, the6 precise point at which those decisions had an effect,7 which are within what I would describe as the reasonable8 range of judgments that people can take when confronted9 with these situations. But if you mean were any of10 those outside those reasonable range of judgments, so11 far out as to be wrong, then I would say not.12 Q. So no systemic failure by the MoD or anything of that13 kind?14 A. No, I do not believe so.15 Q. Merely errors of judgment made by individuals in16 relation to minor matters?17 A. In fact I did not say errors of judgment, no. In fact,18 I was at pains to avoid saying that. I said in any19 given situation when people exercise their judgment20 there are reasonable judgments they can take. They may21 not necessarily always take the same judgment. That22 does not mean because they differ that they are errors.23 Q. So no errors, in effect?24 A. What I am saying is that there are -- there is the25 possibility that different people, with the benefit of


10/50

201 hindsight, might have judged that the decisions could2 have been taken slightly differently. What I would be3 at pains to emphasise is I do not believe this would4 have had any material effect.

5 Q. Your stance when you gave evidence on 27th August was6 that it would have been quite wrong to make Dr Kelly's7 name public, wholly inappropriate to do so, until you8 were sure that he was the single source of Mr Gilligan's9 material.10 A. I believe, and I still believe, that it would have been11 wrong to volunteer his name without having that12 confidence.13 Q. You made that point, I think I am right in saying, on14 a review of your evidence on the previous occasion, no15 fewer than eight times.16 A. Well, that does not surprise me. I have not counted17 them but it was something that was firmly in my mind.

18 Q. And you never were sure that he was Mr Gilligan's single19 source until after his death, were you?20 A. I said that on the last occasion.21 Q. Yes. Would you like, then, to look at TVP/3/238 which22 will come up on your screen, which is the text of an23 interview which you had with Mr Peter Sissons after24 Dr Kelly had died.25 A. Yes.

211 Q. Do you want to find the paper copy?2 A. Yes, please, if I may. Yes, I have it. Thank you.3 Q. What you said in answer to Mr Sissons' allegation that

4 your Department and you personally outed Dr Kelly as the5 probable mole was that that was simply not right, as6 evidence from the Department will show you followed very7 carefully established MoD procedures and that certainly,8 as far as you personally were concerned, "We protected9 his anonymity".10 Is that right?11 A. That is what I said, certainly.12 Q. Was what you said to Mr Sissons correct?13 A. Yes.14 Q. You, personally, named Dr Kelly in a letter to the BBC,15 did you not?16 A. In a private letter to the Chairman of the Governors,17 yes.18 Q. Yes. Do you want to look at that, or not?19 A. I am fairly familiar with it.20 Q. It is MoD/1/71.21 A. Yes. Yes.22 Q. Was that protecting Dr Kelly's anonymity, Mr Hoon?23 A. I think writing a letter in confidence to the Chairman24 of the BBC, having taken some trouble to ensure that it25 was only seen by Mr Davies, is protecting his anonymity,

221 yes.2 Q. Whose idea was it that you should embark on this3 strategy with the BBC?4 A. There had been some considerable discussions, over


11/50

5 a number of days, about the best way to identify whether6 or not, first of all, Dr Kelly was Andrew Gilligan's7 primary source, and whether the BBC would acknowledge8 that fact.9 Q. Yes. Whose idea was it that this strategy should be10 implemented?

11 A. Well, I think we had had a number of discussions. I had12 certainly had them over the weekend with13 Alastair Campbell. I had discussed it, again, with him14 on the Monday evening. Although I was not present at15 the meeting on Tuesday that took place in the Cabinet16 Office, I assume that it was discussed there as well17 because on the Wednesday morning, as I have just given18 evidence, I had a message from Jonathan Powell, which19 I took to be on behalf of the Prime Minister, saying20 that it was now appropriate, as far as they were21 concerned, that I could privately mention to22 Gavyn Davies that the person who had come forward was,23 in fact, Dr Kelly.

24 Q. I am not concerned with the dispute between the25 Government and the BBC, although it may be that others

231 will be. All I want to ask you is the question that2 I have already put: do you consider that this tactic was3 protecting Dr Kelly's anonymity?4 A. I could see no reason why, in a confidential letter sent5 to the Chairman of the BBC, that this would result in6 Dr Kelly's name being widely known. Indeed, having7 looked at the evidence, I do not think it did.8 Q. Can we go back, please, to TVP/3/238, the interview with9 Mr Sissons? You see, you were asked this question, were

10 you not, by Mr Sissons about halfway down the page:11 "Whose idea was it to name him in the letter to the12 BBC which was subsequently leaked?"13 You answered:14 "As I say there was a careful procedure within the15 MoD, the procedures of the MoD were scrupulously16 followed. And it was, at an appropriate stage, judged17 that given the prospect of the name of Dr Kelly being18 revealed in any event, that it was better to invite the19 BBC to comment, rather than to allow there to be the20 kind of chase by the media that we've seen all too often21 in these kinds of circumstances. Again, these are22 matters for the inquiry."23 The first question I ask you about that is: what are24 these careful procedures of the MoD which were25 scrupulously followed?

241 A. Well, there were personnel procedures. As I indicated2 to the Inquiry before, it was my judgment that those3 were best left in the hands of those responsible,4 ultimately the Permanent Secretary. He delegated the5 responsibility of interviewing Dr Kelly to the personnel6 director, Richard Hatfield.7 I have read his evidence. It confirms it is8 consistent with what I was told at the time. He looked9 at this matter, first of all, on the basis of whether or10 not there was a disciplinary issue. Having decided that


12/50

11 there was not, he then conducted a further interview12 with Dr Kelly. As I understand it, that is consistent13 with Ministry of Defence personnel procedures.14 Q. There are no procedures for naming civil servants, are15 there?16 A. I did not name Dr Kelly other than in a private letter

17 to --18 Q. That is not the question I asked you, Mr Hoon. I am19 very sorry to interrupt you.20 There are no procedures for naming civil servants,21 are there?22 A. Well, I think that is not the fairest way of putting23 this issue. The issue is whether the procedures were24 followed. The procedures, as I have indicated, were25 followed. Since I did not name Dr Kelly other than in

251 relation to the letter that I wrote privately to2 Gavyn Davies, I am not sure where your question takes

3 us.4 Q. Well, let us see. What I suggest to you is that there5 was a deliberate Government strategy to leak Dr Kelly's6 name into the public arena without appearing to do so,7 by a combination of the press statement, the question8 and answer material, the Prime Minister's official9 spokesman press briefing and other leaks which appear to10 have taken place to the press. That is what I suggest.11 A. Well, you have put that point to a number of witnesses;12 they have all denied it; and I deny it.13 Q. His name was leaked, was it not?14 A. Not by me.15 Q. No?

16 A. No.17 Q. Because, let us just finish with this document on18 TVP/3 --19 A. I apologise for interrupting you. But the suggestion20 you are making is there is some evidence that I leaked21 it. Perhaps you would indicate where it is so that22 I can comment on it.23 Q. We will come to that in just a moment.24 What I am going to ask you next is this, Mr Hoon.25 You say about two-thirds of the way down that document:

261 "I'm not aware that his name was leaked. It was2 certainly not leaked by me, and I assure ['you' it must3 be] that we made great efforts to ensure Dr Kelly's4 anonymity."5 A. That is right, yes.6 Q. What efforts did you make or did the MoD make to ensure7 Dr Kelly's anonymity?8 A. Well, first of all, the knowledge of his name was9 limited to a very small number of people within the10 Ministry of Defence. I gave evidence on the last11 occasion that I was not told of his name until the12 Friday evening in a conversation with the Permanent13 Secretary. I did not tell my own special adviser until14 Wednesday 9th July. He learned about it from a news15 bulletin the previous evening. My principal private16 secretary did not tell other members of the office of


13/50

17 what had occurred.18 My office removed all identifying details from the19 copy of Dr Kelly's letter faxed to my constituency20 office on Friday 4th July because I did not have21 a secure line in my constituency office.22 Before we sent the private letter to Gavyn Davies we

23 assured there was a fax line immediately available to24 him, again to ensure the letter did not fall into other25 hands.

271 The press statement did not contain details about2 the name of Dr Kelly. Despite efforts by a number of3 journalists to require the press office to identify him4 by name, that was resisted.5 A whole series of steps were taken to protect6 Dr Kelly's anonymity.7 Q. Would you like to look at the press statement which was8 issued? MoD/1/67, please.

9 A. Could you give me the date, it assists me in finding10 the --11 Q. It was issued on 8th July at 5.45 pm.12 A. Thank you. Yes. I have it there, yes.13 Q. First of all, there is the obvious point in line 1, it14 was stated that the person was an individual working in15 the MoD; right?16 A. Yes.17 Q. Then if you go to the third paragraph:18 "The individual is an expert on WMD who has advised19 Ministers on WMD and whose contribution to the dossier20 of September 2002 was to contribute towards drafts of21 historical accounts of UN inspections."

22 That is a pretty limited class of persons, is it23 not?24 A. It is obviously a limited class. Whether it is "pretty25 limited" I think depends on how much information you

281 have at the time about Dr Kelly. It seems to me clear2 that those journalists who had had contact with Dr Kelly3 would have thought that this was referring to him.4 Those journalists who had not had contact with Dr Kelly,5 I doubt this would have assisted them.6 Q. This was a press statement, was it not?7 A. Yes, it was.8 Q. So journalists were going to receive it, obviously. And9 they were going to follow the leads given in it, were10 they not?11 A. I have no doubt that journalists throughout this period12 were trying to identify who was the source of13 Andrew Gilligan when he had his conversations, yes.14 Q. In your desire to protect Dr Kelly's anonymity at all15 times, did you consider that this press statement might16 alert journalists?17 A. I did not consider that it would alert journalists in18 the sense you are suggesting. It certainly inevitably19 meant that their interest in this matter would be20 heightened, yes.21 Q. I mean, for example, we have evidence from22 Mr Norton-Taylor of the Guardian. He said that it


14/50

23 whetted his appetite, which I have no doubt is24 substantial.25 Did that occur to you?

291 A. I have just answered your question. I recognise that

2 the issuing of a statement was likely to lead to3 journalists wanting even more than they had previously4 to identify Andrew Gilligan's source. But there is5 clear evidence that journalists were already looking for6 Andrew Gilligan's source. I accept that this was bound7 to increase their enthusiasm for making that8 identification.9 Q. You also became aware, did you not, of what was said at10 two press briefings by the Prime Minister's official11 spokesman, Mr Tom Kelly, on 9th July?12 A. I became aware afterwards, yes.13 Q. Yes. I do not want to take up a lot of time looking at14 the documents, but since you have looked at them, would

15 you agree with me that amongst other bits of information16 given on that occasion was the fact that the person17 concerned was a technical expert? I can give you the18 reference if you --19 A. I think I have it, actually -- I have a record of the20 Lobby.21 Q. Thank you. A technical expert; right? Try CAB/1/220,22 if that helps you.23 A. Well, in any event, I am absolutely clear that I had no24 contact with anyone who was responsible for giving that25 briefing before it took place.

30

1 Q. Yes. I am putting to you a rather wider point at the2 moment, that the Government as a whole had decided on3 a strategy which would leak Dr Kelly's name into the4 public arena, with a view to him giving evidence before5 the FAC. Now, is that a strategy that you recognise or6 not?7 A. No, it is not; and indeed I do not believe that there is8 the slightest shred of evidence for that assertion.9 Q. Let us go back to the briefing by Mr Kelly on 9th July.10 He said the following things, did he not: that the11 person concerned was a technical expert?12 A. Yes.13 Q. That he worked for a variety of Government departments?14 A. He actually said for a "number", but yes.15 Q. Very well. That he was currently working for the16 Ministry of Defence?17 A. Yes.18 Q. That his salary was paid by another department?19 A. Yes.20 Q. That he was on secondment to the MoD?21 A. (Pause). I cannot actually see that, but I will take22 your word for it.23 Q. Thank you. That the nature of his work meant that he24 was more of a consultant than a secondee? (Pause). We25 can go to the passages if you are doubtful about them,

311 but I am trying to save time. Do you follow?


15/50

2 A. I do follow.3 Q. Are you happy with that or not?4 A. I cannot see it at the moment, but I will take that from5 you.6 Q. Thank you. And that there were only a few people who7 were paid a salary by this particular Department but

8 worked for other Departments?9 A. Perhaps you could refer me to specifically that part of10 it.11 Q. Yes. If you look at --12 LORD HUTTON: Can we have that on the screen? CAB/1/220.13 MR GOMPERTZ: Certainly, my Lord. 220.14 A. Could you give me the date of that?15 Q. Yes, of course. It is 9th July.16 A. The morning Lobby briefing?17 Q. I am actually looking at the afternoon. There was18 information given at the morning one as well.19 A. Sorry, that is where my confusion arises.20 Q. I am so sorry. Page 220. CAB/1/220, bottom of the

21 page. I will not go through it all again. If you could22 just read the last three lines of 220; and then if we23 can go over to 221, please, to the top of the page.24 I think you will see that the matters that I have been25 putting are all there?

321 A. Hmm. There are two Lobby briefings in the course of2 each day and I was looking at the first one.3 Q. I understand. Do you see the point that was troubling4 you?5 A. Yes, I do. Thank you.6 Q. "... the PMOS said that providing this information [as

7 to who paid his salary] would make it easier to identify8 him given the fact that there were only a few people who9 were paid a salary by this particular Department but who10 worked for other Departments."11 Right?12 A. Hmm.13 Q. If you just go down the page on 221 --14 A. Sorry, this is what was confusing me. This was15 a question put to him. This was: "Asked why..."16 Q. Yes. "Asked why we were --17 A. Asked if he was paid by the FCO, the PMOS declined to18 answer the question on the grounds that he did not want19 to do anything which might identify who the person was.20 Q. Can we read it:21 "Asked why we were so reluctant to say which22 department paid his salary, the PMOS said that providing23 this information would make it easier to identify him24 [then these words] given the fact that there were only25 a few people who were paid a salary by this particular

331 Department but who worked for other Departments."2 Quite right he did not identify which Department it3 was which paid his salary, but there were only a few4 people who were paid a salary by that Department but who5 worked for other Departments. That is the point I am6 making. Do you follow?7 A. I do follow.


16/50


17/50

14 moment, was it not?15 A. Yes, it was.16 Q. Yes. So are you saying that what Mr Tom Kelly said on17 this occasion was without your knowledge in any shape or18 form?19 A. It was without my knowledge in any shape or form, yes.

20 Q. Let me ask you about the Q and A material which you have21 been asked about again this morning. What you are22 saying, as I understand it, is that on 9th July you did23 not actually see the Q and A material; have I understood24 correctly?25 A. That is absolutely right. I did not actually see it at

361 all.2 Q. It was never passed to you so that you held it in your3 hand or had it in front of you?4 A. That is right.5 Q. But that there was some discussion about some of the

6 content of it?7 A. One aspect of what was in the Q and A document, yes.8 Q. Yes. Do I understand that you have a copy of the9 transcript of your previous evidence in front of you?10 A. Yes, I do.11 Q. Because you were asked about one passage and one passage12 only where you dealt with the Q and A material on the13 previous occasion. I would like to ask you about the14 other two. Could you, please, turn to page 52 of the15 internal numbering?16 A. Yes.17 Q. You see at line 6 you are asked:18 "Question: Do you know whether or not Dr Kelly was

19 told about the draft Q and A material and the Q and A20 material as deployed?"21 A. Hmm.22 Q. You answer:23 "Answer: I do not, no." Then you go on to24 volunteer: "But can I make clear that I did not see25 either of these documents." That so far is consistent

371 with what you have said this morning. Then you go on:2 "They were not submitted to my office. That would not3 be something that I would normally deal with."4 What about, "They were not submitted to my office",5 Mr Hoon? Was that the whole truth?6 A. So far as I am aware, yes.7 Q. But they were in your office, you have just told us this8 morning.9 A. I do not think I have actually, no.10 Q. What, the Q and A material?11 A. I do not think I have said that they were in my office.12 Q. Well, they were discussed.13 A. That is not the same thing.14 Q. Oh, I see. Are you not aware of the evidence of15 Ms Pam Teare?16 A. Yes, I read her evidence very carefully.17 Q. That she probably had a copy with her.18 A. I think, with the greatest respect, that is a very bad19 point. I cannot anticipate what Ms Teare had with her


18/50

20 at the time. I gave you the evidence to the best of my21 knowledge and recollection. If I may say so, I thought22 that you seriously misled Pam Teare as to the facts23 before the Inquiry.24 Q. I do not seem to be doing very well, Mr Hoon, in your25 judgment.

381 A. You put to Pam Teare -- this is the point -- I think it2 is important. You put to Pam Teare that there was3 evidence in the Inquiry that there was a discussion4 about the Q and A. In fact, I have not been able to5 find any such evidence. I think you are probably6 referring to what Mr Richard Taylor said.7 Q. Yes, I was.8 A. Well, Richard Taylor said categorically that there was9 no such discussion.10 Q. I do not think so but let us --11 A. I can give you the quotation.

12 LORD HUTTON: I think we should look at the transcript of13 Mr Taylor's evidence. Do you have a reference to the14 part of his evidence, Mr Hoon, that you want to refer15 to?16 A. Well, it is at page 81 of Mr Taylor's evidence, my Lord.17 He said:18 "I would not call it a discussion of the Q and A19 material."20 LORD HUTTON: I think perhaps if you would like to read from21 line 2 of 81. Do you have that before you, Mr Gompertz?22 MR GOMPERTZ: I do my Lord, yes.23 LORD HUTTON: If you would like to read from line 2 of 81,24 Mr Hoon.

25 A. My Lord, I only have my notes. I do not have the

391 full --2 LORD HUTTON: I think you should.3 Do we have a spare copy of the transcript we could4 put before Mr Hoon?5 MR GOMPERTZ: I am sure we can provide one, my Lord. It may6 just take a moment.7 LORD HUTTON: Yes, certainly. (Pause).8 MR GOMPERTZ: I am afraid we cannot help, I am sorry about9 that.10 LORD HUTTON: If I may burden you, Mr Gompertz, would you11 like to read from line 2 of page 81, I think down to12 page 82 to about line 3, or further if you wish.13 MR GOMPERTZ: Certainly, my Lord. That is certainly one of14 the passages in mind. Line 2 on page 81 Mr Taylor was15 asked -- Mr Hoon now I think has a copy:16 "Although you have not been party to any of the17 discussions which led to the press statement --18 A. Can you remind me which line you are at?19 Q. Line 2, page 81:20 "Although you have not been party to any of the21 discussions which led to the press statement being22 issued, or indeed the Q and A material, was anything23 mentioned about the press statement at that morning24 meeting?25 "Answer: Not specifically about the press


19/50

401 statement.2 "Question: Was anything mentioned about the Q and A3 material?4 "Answer: At the end of a discussion on how to

5 follow up the letter to Mr Davies there was a brief6 discussion on what we should do if journalists were to7 ring and put the name directly to the Department of who8 the official was. I would not call it a discussion of9 the Q and A material. There was a discussion of one of10 the questions, which I have since learnt was in the11 Q and A material.12 "Question: Was there any discussion about the other13 questions in the Q and A material?14 "Answer: No, not --15 "Question: Was he a member of UNSCOM et cetera?16 "Answer: No, to the best of my recollection we only17 discussed the rationale for what to do if the name was

18 put directly to the Department.19 "Question: What was the debate or was there20 a debate or you were all of one view?21 "Answer: The Director of News outlined the approach22 which had been agreed the previous evening for use by23 the press office as the statement was published.24 "Question: Who did she say had agreed that?25 "Answer: She did not at the time say who had agreed

411 it. She was outlining material which she, as Director2 of News, and her press office were using. I, at the3 time, would have assumed it was written by her."

4 I think we can stop there. So Mr Taylor, I suggest,5 is making it clear that there was some discussion of one6 aspect of the Q and A material.7 A. What you have put to Ms Teare that I was complaining8 about, you put to her that we have some evidence to9 suggest that the Secretary of State saw the Q and A10 document. That was simply not right. There is no such11 evidence.12 Q. I think I asked her whether she could say whether you13 did see it.14 A. No, no, I am quoting you directly, Mr Gompertz.15 LORD HUTTON: Mr Hoon, I will look at the transcript.16 I have your point on this, yes.17 A. But I think, Mr Gompertz, if I may explain: you are not18 properly understanding the way in which a Q and A19 document works. A Q and A document is prepared for the20 use of press officers. It is not something that comes21 to my office. It is based on decisions that are taken22 by the Department as a whole as a guidance for press23 officers when they are answering questions put to them24 by journalists. If I may give you an example: at around25 this time we were taking a decision on which particular

421 training aircraft should be purchased for the Royal Air2 Force. Eventually a decision was taken on which3 aircraft we would choose. That would have been, I am4 sure -- I have never seen it, but I am sure that would


20/50

5 have been incorporated into a question and answer6 document, but I would not have needed to see the answer7 to the question which I am sure was likely to be the8 first question: which training aircraft has the Ministry9 of Defence decided to purchase? It would have then10 given the answer. But I would not have needed to see

11 that because in fact it was simply reflecting decisions12 previously taken by the Ministry of Defence, in exactly13 the same way that I take it that this question and14 answer document was reflecting the views taken in the15 Department.16 MR GOMPERTZ: Can I ask you now, then, to look at another17 passage in your evidence on the previous occasion?18 Page 69, line 17 is the question. Do you have that?19 A. Yes, I have.20 Q. I do not think I need read the question, in fact. But21 at line 22 you say this:22 "I did not see this Q and A and played no part in23 its preparation, so it is a little difficult for me to

24 comment about any underlying purpose."25 Is that an answer that you stand by?

431 A. Well, the Q and A had been prepared the night before.2 Q. Yes. So you do stand --3 A. Therefore I played no part in its preparation.4 Q. Even though there was discussion about it the following5 morning in your office?6 A. I was asked by the Permanent Secretary whether7 I confirmed the document that had been prepared the8 night before, as far as one small aspect of it was9 concerned, which was the decision to confirm Dr Kelly's

10 name if a journalist got it right, and I agreed to that.11 But that was the only issue that was raised with me by12 either the Permanent Secretary or indeed in the13 subsequent press briefing meeting.14 Q. So apart from those matters, you had no knowledge of the15 Q and A material being prepared in your Department at16 all?17 A. Not until I saw the Q and A document much later, no.18 Q. Did it occur to you that the material contained in the19 Q and A document might lead to the identification of20 Dr Kelly if the right questions were asked by21 journalists?22 A. Well, with the benefit of hindsight I can see that the23 answers to some of those questions might have assisted24 journalists in that process, yes.25 Q. But you did not, at the time, think to look through the

441 document in its entirety in order to continue your2 avowed intention of protecting Dr Kelly's identity at3 all times?4 A. Well, I have made clear on more than one occasion that5 this is a routine process entered into for the benefit6 of press officers answering questions put to them by7 journalists. It has never been my practice to go8 through the Q and As which I am sure are routinely9 prepared in relation to a whole range of subjects in the10 Ministry of Defence.


21/50

11 Q. Can I turn to another topic? I believe that you had12 a telephone conversation with Mr Alastair Campbell on13 the morning of Saturday 5th July.14 A. Yes, I did.15 Q. You told us about that, I think, on the previous16 occasion, as indeed Mr Campbell has given evidence about

17 it.18 Can you tell us who called who, please?19 A. I am confident that I called him.20 Q. Yes. For what purpose?21 A. I had seen a story in that morning's Times, written by22 Tom Baldwin, which seemed to indicate some greater23 knowledge of the identity of Andrew Gilligan's primary24 source than, for example, I had been able to glean from25 any evidence that Andrew Gilligan had given before the

451 Foreign Affairs Committee. So it seemed to me that2 Tom Baldwin had some information that was not readily

3 available otherwise.4 Q. Somehow Mr Campbell came to write in his diary the two5 words "plea bargain".6 A. Hmm.7 Q. How did that come about?8 A. Well, I cannot strictly answer that question but, as9 I indicated on the last occasion, we had a conversation10 about the process that I think I have already described11 to the Inquiry today; a process whereby initially there12 was a consideration of whether or not there were any13 disciplinary questions that Dr Kelly might face,14 followed by a recognition that having come forward15 voluntarily, apparently cooperating, that the matter

16 could be dealt with in a different light. And I believe17 what I told the Inquiry on the last occasion, and I18 stand by, is that that description might have led19 Mr Campbell to see this in terms of, journalistic20 shorthand, a plea bargain.21 Q. What Mr Campbell wrote in his diary, as I understand it,22 is this:23 "GH said his initial instinct was to throw the book24 at him but in fact there was a case for trying to get25 some kind of plea bargain."

461 Do you recognise that statement?2 A. Well, I have seen those words.3 Q. Well, do you recognise those words as words spoken by4 you during this telephone conversation?5 A. No, I do not. I indicated to the Inquiry on the last6 occasion that I recognised them as journalistic7 shorthand for rather a long explanation that I had given8 to Alastair about what had, by then, taken place.9 Q. You know perfectly well the meaning of the expression10 "plea bargain", do you not? Lord Hutton took you11 through it last time, did he not?12 A. He did.13 Q. And you know it anyway having practised at the bar14 yourself.15 A. I am well aware of it.16 Q. Yes. How could that expression, on your account of


22/50

17 matters, have any relevance to what you were discussing18 with Mr Campbell?19 A. As I indicated on the last occasion, Dr Kelly was coming20 forward, he volunteered, he appeared to be cooperating.21 That -- perhaps you would be best putting these matters22 to Mr Campbell, but that is an aspect, at any rate, of

23 what happens where there is a plea bargain, someone24 cooperates with the authorities.25 Q. What you are talking about, someone coming forward,

471 cooperating and so on, that is mitigation, is it not?2 There is no element of a bargain there.3 A. No, there is not; and I was at great pains to emphasise4 that there was no bargain; and indeed when you put that5 I think to Mr Hatfield, he said there was no bargain.6 Nothing followed from this conversation at all. There7 is no evidence at all anywhere that anyone entered into8 any kind of a bargain with Dr Kelly.

9 Q. The fact that he had come forward and said voluntarily10 what he had in his letter and then in the interview of11 4th July, those were matters in the past, were they not,12 when you were speaking to Mr Campbell?13 A. Well, to the best of my recollection, on the Saturday14 morning I was describing to him -- I was relaying to him15 second-hand conversations because I was describing to16 him what I had been told by the Permanent Secretary.17 Q. How could there be, I quote, "a case for trying to get18 some kind of plea bargain" in the future?19 A. Sorry, I do not follow that.20 Q. How could it be that you were saying that there was21 a case for trying to get some kind of plea bargain?

22 A. I was not.23 Q. Did you say anything that might have led Mr Campbell to24 write down words of that kind?25 A. Well, I think I have explained my understanding of this

481 exchange. I took Alastair Campbell through what had2 occurred up until then. I explained that Dr Kelly --3 I am not even sure, to be quite -- I am pretty confident4 I did not actually say it was Dr Kelly, I said "the5 official" or something of the kind. I have indicated6 previously, as far as I am concerned that that was his7 summary of the past. I do not understand that this was8 anything that was to be acted on for the future.9 Indeed, there is no evidence that anyone so acted.10 Q. Did you think that Dr Kelly ought to give evidence in11 front of the FAC?12 A. When I received a request from the Chairman of the13 Foreign Affairs Committee, I eventually concluded, with14 the benefit of the advice that I had received, that,15 yes, he should give evidence once his name was in the16 public domain, yes.17 Q. And if he gave evidence in front of the FAC contrary to18 the account which Mr Gilligan had given, that would19 assist the Government, would it not?20 A. I think it would assist everyone. I think it would have21 assisted --22 Q. Never mind everyone, what about the Government?


23/50

23 A. I am including the Government in "everyone".24 Q. Right.25 A. The Government would have benefited; the BBC would have

491 benefited; and I think, most importantly, the public

2 would have benefited. And the point that I made right3 at the outset of my original evidence was that the4 difficulty with Andrew Gilligan's story was that we were5 not in a position to assess the nature, quality, status6 of his source. So that ultimately it was of benefit to7 everyone that he should give evidence once he had been8 identified.9 Q. Was this a benefit which you were referring to in your10 conversation with Mr Campbell, when you said there was11 a case for trying to get some kind of plea bargain?12 A. Perhaps I need to look at his diary in order to be sure13 about what you are saying. I have summarised, I think14 on more than one occasion, and I do not wish to try your

15 patience by repeating it, but these were16 Alastair Campbell's words, they were not my words; and17 the best I can do is to say that they were a summary of18 the description of the process that by then I was aware19 had taken place.20 Q. Because, of course, Dr Kelly did give evidence before21 both Committees.22 A. Eventually, yes.23 Q. With your encouragement?24 A. With my agreement.25 Q. Yes. In doing so, would this be right: that you

50

1 overruled the advice of Sir Kevin Tebbit that it was2 unnecessary for Dr Kelly to give evidence to the FAC as3 well as the ISC?4 A. I think that is a very simplistic description of5 a rather detailed process that took place. The advice6 that came from Kevin Tebbit relating to both requests,7 made by both Chairmen of both Committees, was, first of8 all, that it might be possible, in Kevin's view, that9 Dr Kelly should give evidence to the ISC in public.10 That was his thought. But by the time that I had11 received the advice, and by the time that I came to12 consider the advice, that option had already been13 withdrawn because it was judged inappropriate for the14 Government to suggest that the ISC should meet in15 public. In any event I doubted that the Chairman of the16 ISC would agree to that, since one of the main purposes17 of the ISC is to be able to hear matters in confidence.18 So once that had been withdrawn, that meant, in19 effect, that the only opportunity for Dr Kelly to give20 evidence was either in a closed session with the ISC,21 which I simply did not judge would be acceptable to my22 Parliamentary colleagues, or that he should give23 evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in public.24 And given that the Foreign Affairs Committee had25 made that request, and given that I recognised that this

511 would be a very significant Parliamentary and public row


24/50

2 if I refused it, it seemed to me right that I should3 accept the request made to me by the Chairman of the4 FAC.5 Q. So the answer to the question is that you did overrule6 Sir Kevin Tebbit's advice?7 A. I would not put it that way. Civil servants give advice

8 to Ministers, it is not always accepted.9 Q. Yes.10 A. It is part of the process of taking decisions.11 "Overrule" is -- perhaps it might be good for a headline12 but it does not describe the process that takes place in13 Government. No-one was suggesting Kevin Tebbit's advice14 was definitive. I considered it and I decided to take15 a different course.16 Q. And the limitations which you suggested should be put17 upon Dr Kelly's time before the Committee, and indeed18 the material which he should be asked about, they were19 for his benefit and not for any political reason; is20 that what you are saying?

21 A. I am certainly saying that was at the forefront of my22 mind, yes. Here is a man who has been asked to appear23 before two Parliamentary Committees to give evidence.24 It seemed to me right that that should be constrained to25 the issues that the inquiries were concerned with.

521 Q. Would it increase or decrease the stress on Dr Kelly to2 give evidence in public?3 A. (Pause). I can, from experience -- I recognise that4 giving evidence in public is always more demanding than5 giving evidence in private.6 Q. And with live television cover?

7 A. Well, that is a feature of modern Parliamentary8 proceedings.9 Q. Would it increase or decrease the stress?10 A. Again, I can see that televising a Parliamentary11 proceeding adds to the pressure.12 Q. So why was it that you were at one stage, and I must13 make it plain that this is not what was finally14 requested, but at one stage you were considering15 requesting that Dr Kelly should give his evidence in16 public to both Committees?17 A. Well, I was never, ever contemplating that; and18 I think -- I have seen your questioning before to19 previous witnesses on this subject; and again you are20 looking at a draft, a draft that came up from the21 Department, not anything that I ever prepared or acted22 upon. In fact, it would be fairer if you recognised23 that I changed that draft significantly.24 Q. So let us just see what the position was. Could you25 look at MoD/1 --

531 LORD HUTTON: Mr Gompertz, I am entirely in your hands.2 I have to consider the stenographers. Would you like to3 go on for a few minutes and finish this topic? It might4 be better.5 MR GOMPERTZ: I do not mind, my Lord. Whichever your6 Lordship prefers.7 LORD HUTTON: If it is not breaking in on a particular line,


25/50

8 I think perhaps we will rise for five minutes.9 MR GOMPERTZ: Very well.10 (11.32 am)11 (Short Break)12 (11.37 am)13 LORD HUTTON: Yes, Mr Gompertz.

14 MR GOMPERTZ: Your Lordship.15 Mr Hoon, can I just clarify what I was asking you16 about? If we can have MoD/1/77 on the screen, please.17 Do you have that?18 A. Yes, I have.19 Q. If you turn over to MoD/1/78, the second page of the20 memorandum, enclosed with that document are drafts of21 the letters, so Mr Watkins says, which the22 Defence Secretary proposes to send to Donald Anderson23 and Anne Taylor later today.24 And he invites comments. From what you said just25 before we had the adjournment, are you saying those

541 drafts were not produced at your instigation?2 A. They would have been produced in the Department for my3 consideration.4 Q. But did you have any knowledge of what was going into5 them?6 A. I obviously saw the drafts after they came to me, before7 I sent them to the persons they were addressed to; and8 in that process I made significant changes to the drafts9 in order to better reflect what I thought should occur.10 Q. Yes, but what I want to be clear about is that the11 material which was included in the drafts, are you12 saying that that was inserted by Mr Watkins or somebody

13 else in your staff without your knowledge?14 A. Well, drafts are routinely prepared elsewhere --15 Q. Yes.16 A. Sorry let me finish. Drafts are routinely prepared17 elsewhere in the Department. They would come up to my18 office. I would look at the drafts. If I accepted the19 draft, I would sign it and send it off. If I wanted to20 make changes, I would make changes; and that would be21 the letter that I agreed to that was then sent. This22 was precisely the process that occurred in relation to23 these drafts. The drafts were prepared elsewhere in the24 Ministry of Defence by officials. They were for me to25 consider. I considered them. I judged that it was

551 necessary to make changes and I made changes; and those2 are the letters that I sent.3 Q. Yes. So the idea of the hearings taking place in public4 you are saying was not yours?5 A. The idea of the ISC hearing taking place in public was6 not mine, no. I think it is clear from the evidence7 that it was Sir Kevin Tebbit's, but it was not an idea8 that was -- by the time that I came to send the letter9 to Ann Taylor, who is the Chairman of the ISC, it was10 not an option that was still in play; because by then my11 office had received advice this was not an appropriate12 course of action. In any event, even if I had not13 received that advice I, from experience of the ISC,


26/50

14 doubted whether they would meet in public.15 Q. Could I ask you to look at a letter which was sent?16 MoD/1/82. This was sent to Mr Anderson. Do you have17 that?18 A. Yes, I have.19 Q. In the paragraph nearest the bottom of the page you say:

20 "I am prepared to agree to this [him giving evidence21 this is] on the clear understanding that Dr Kelly will22 be questioned only on those matters which are directly23 relevant to the evidence that you were given by24 Andrew Gilligan, and not on the wider issue of Iraqi WMD25 and the preparation of the dossier."

561 Then over the page at MoD/1/83 you make the point2 about the ISC and wanting to limit the period of time3 which Dr Kelly should appear before the Committees for.4 A. Yes.5 Q. The limitation of the subject matter, which I read out

6 to you, was that for Dr Kelly's benefit?7 A. Well, if I may say so in the first place, if I could8 refer you back to MoD/1/73 and the request that came in9 from Donald Anderson. He said he was making the request10 for Dr Kelly to appear on questions: directly relevant11 to the Committee's report published earlier this week,12 arising from the MoD statement of 9th July. Therefore13 the qualification here entirely reflects the request14 that I had received from Donald Anderson.15 Q. Yes. So it was not for any political reason that you16 wanted to limit the scope of Dr Kelly's evidence?17 A. Well, I think I then went on -- if you compare it to the18 original draft, this was something that I added.

19 I indicated:20 "... Dr Kelly will have appeared earlier the same21 day before the ISC [which was our understanding at the22 time]. I hope that you will bear this in mind and not23 detain him for longer than about the same period of time24 indicated by the ISC. As he is not used to this degree25 of public exposure, Dr Kelly has asked if he could be

571 accompanied by a colleague."2 Again, something I added in out of concern for3 Dr Kelly's welfare.4 Q. Yes. The question I asked you was whether the5 limitation of the subject matter of questioning was for6 any political purpose?7 A. It was to ensure that the questions put to Dr Kelly were8 consistent with the requests that had been made by the9 Chairman of the Committee, which is to pursue matters10 relevant to their previously published report.11 Q. Because were you fearful, at all, that Dr Kelly might12 have some unpalatable views on some topics?13 A. I knew from the outset, for example, that Dr Kelly had14 some distinctive views about whether Saddam Hussein's15 regime was still manufacturing weapons of mass16 destruction. He judged there was only a 35 per cent17 likelihood that was the case. That was a distinctive18 view that had been recognised by a colleague, which19 prompted him to come forward in the first place.


27/50

20 Yes, I was aware that his views were not entirely21 consistent with those that, for example, had appeared in22 the dossier that had been published in September.23 Q. That was the reasoning why you wanted the questioning24 limited to the topics which you set out in your letter,25 was it not?

581 A. On the contrary, the issue about the extent to which2 Dr Kelly was free to speak his mind had been considered.3 I have to say I did not know this at the time, but it4 had been considered in the preparation that he was given5 for his appearance before the Committee. And he was --6 having read it, he was told that he would be free to7 speak his mind.8 Q. And Mr Anderson, on MoD/1/84, was pliant to your9 request, was he not?10 A. He said:11 "I share your clear understanding of the scope and

12 duration of the questioning..."13 Yes.14 I have to say that chairmen of Select Committees do15 not always agree to requests made by Secretaries of16 State in these circumstances, nor would I necessarily17 expect them to. But I think it was -- as I indicated to18 the Inquiry earlier, the fact he used the words19 "I share" I think indicated his entire acceptance that20 I was asking for a proper definition of the areas on21 which Dr Kelly should give evidence.22 Q. Did you consider the Osmotherly rules before you agreed23 to Dr Kelly giving evidence?24 A. I am aware of those rules, yes; and I was aware at the

25 time.

591 Q. Did you consider them on this occasion?2 A. I did not go through them in detail but I understand the3 essential principle underlying them, yes.4 Q. Did you, in particular, consider the principle5 underlying rule 72 that evidence can be given in closed6 session in certain circumstances?7 A. Yes, of course, and that does happen in certain8 circumstances.9 Q. Why not advise that?10 A. Because those circumstances normally relate to security11 considerations. They normally turn upon evidence,12 particularly as far as the Defence Select Committee is13 concerned, where essentially we are briefing Members of14 Parliament on matters that are sensitive on security15 grounds.16 Q. The Osmotherly rules are also concerned, are they not,17 with a situation where a Select Committee might be18 dealing with what, in effect, are matters of discipline?19 A. I can certainly see that that is a possibility; but20 I did not judge that these were matters of discipline,21 at this stage.22 Q. Did you know that the question of disciplinary23 proceedings against Dr Kelly had been expressly left24 open in Mr Hatfield's letter to him?25 A. Well, I think that is pitching it rather high.


28/50

601 Essentially, the point was that if new information arose2 it could be gone back to, but, I mean, that would be3 a -- that would be the case in any disciplinary4 proceedings. Essentially the disciplinary proceedings

5 had been brought to a close; and that was done actually6 quite early on in these events, in the middle of the7 hearing on 4th July.8 Q. Can I go on to another topic? We have heard from9 Mr Hatfield that he considered the support provided by10 the MoD for Dr Kelly was "outstanding". Do you agree11 with that?12 A. I certainly think that every reasonable step was taken13 to ensure that Dr Kelly was properly supported, yes.14 Q. So you did not think it was necessary to get Dr Kelly's15 consent before his name was released?16 A. The Ministry of Defence did not release his name.17 Q. Well, they did. In answer to a specific question in the

18 Q and A material his name was confirmed as being19 correct.20 A. Well, that is not quite the same as releasing it, is it?21 Q. I do not want to argue semantics with you, Mr Hoon. But22 did you consider that he should be told that this23 strategy was going to be adopted?24 A. Again, there was no strategy; but I was well aware that25 Dr Kelly anticipated that his name would become public.

611 It was something that he had understood. It had been2 explained to him on the Friday; it was something that,3 as I understand it, was explained to him again on the

4 Monday. Indeed, on the Monday a draft press statement5 was shown to him. On the Tuesday, a press statement was6 read over to him, and I think Richard Hatfield's7 evidence is "paragraph by paragraph". And he consented8 to that detail paragraph by paragraph.9 So there cannot be any doubt that on the Tuesday10 evening Dr Kelly was well aware that there was every11 likelihood of his name becoming public, which, in fact,12 is what happened through the assiduous efforts of13 journalists.14 Q. Yes. What I asked you was whether you thought he ought15 to be consulted to see whether he consented to his name16 being given in response to questions put by journalists17 following the Q and A material?18 A. I think the key time for all of these events is the19 point at which the press statement was issued. At that20 point great efforts were made to ensure that Dr Kelly21 was aware what was likely to follow, which was that his22 name would be revealed publicly. As a result of the23 efforts made by journalists, something that he accepted24 on the Friday, he accepted again on the Monday and25 something that he was specifically taken through on the

621 Tuesday afternoon; something which he himself2 acknowledged would happen --3 Q. Let me put the question the other way round then: did4 anybody ever inform Dr Kelly that the Q and A technique


29/50

5 was going to be deployed?6 A. No.7 Q. Did you not think that that was desirable?8 A. Not in the context of someone who had been entirely9 accepting of the fact that his name would become public,10 who had had it explained to him repeatedly that it was

11 highly likely that his name would become public, who was12 taken through the press statement paragraph by13 paragraph, who had advice from the press office of the14 consequences, as happened, once journalists became aware15 of his name; who himself acknowledged the fact that it16 was likely his name would become public quite soon.17 Q. You are aware, are you, that on 8th July Mr Hatfield18 wrote to Sir Kevin Tebbit a memorandum in which he said19 that he had told Dr Kelly:20 "I said that I did not think that it would be21 necessary to reveal his name or to go into detail beyond22 indicating that the account given to us did not match23 Gilligan's [FAC] account, at least initially."

24 If you want the reference, it is MoD/1/54, letter or25 memoranda of 8th July.

631 A. I do not think I saw that at the time, but I have seen2 it since.3 Q. So that was, on the face of it, Dr Kelly's frame of mind4 on that date, was it not? That it would not be5 necessary to reveal his name. That is how it had been6 left at the end of the interview on 7th July.7 A. And that is consistent with the approach that the8 Ministry of Defence took. The Ministry of Defence did9 not reveal his name. They confirmed it once

10 a journalist had correctly identified it.11 Q. But on that very day, 8th July, the Q and A material was12 being drafted and the press statement was being issued,13 with the inevitable consequence that he would be14 identified.15 A. Well, he was taken through the press statement16 carefully; warnings were given by a press officer as to17 the consequences; it was suggested that he should take18 appropriate action; and he made it quite clear that he19 was well aware that his name would come into the public20 domain, in his words "quite soon". Those were words21 that he used to Mrs Kelly, that she gave in her evidence22 as they sat and watched what I take to be the 7 o'clock23 Channel 4 bulletin. What she said was: I knew then he24 was aware that his name would be in the public domain25 quite soon. So he recognised that fact on the Tuesday

641 evening.2 Q. Do you think there was any need to warn Dr Kelly that3 publication of his name was about to take place?4 A. Efforts were made to warn him both on the Tuesday5 evening when the press statement was made and indeed on6 the Wednesday evening after the name had been confirmed,7 yes.8 Q. So, Dr Kelly, we have heard, was in his garden when the9 news came to him via Mr Rufford, the journalist, and10 left very soon thereafter from his home in a great


30/50

11 hurry.12 A. Yes.13 Q. Does that, to your mind, indicate that he had been well14 prepared for an impending media storm?15 A. Well, it indicates that the day before he had been16 warned of what was likely to follow, which is that once

17 the press statement had been issued this would, I think18 I used the word earlier, heighten journalists' interest19 in it. It is also clear that he received a call at20 around that time, around the time he was visited by21 Nick Rufford, I assume indicating again that he should22 have regard to his own position as far as the23 journalists were concerned. So he was warned24 categorically, as I understand it, both on the day25 before when the press notice was issued and, indeed,

651 again after it had been confirmed.2 Q. Yes. We have heard that there was no contact whatever

3 from your press office to Dr Kelly on the day that the4 name was confirmed until he, Dr Kelly, telephoned the5 press office at about 8 o'clock.6 A. Hmm -- I do not think that is --7 Q. Is that outstanding support?8 A. I do not think your presumption is quite right, if you9 will forgive me for saying so.10 Q. You tell me why it is wrong then.11 A. Because Mrs Kelly said in her evidence that: the MoD12 press office had just rung to say we ought to leave the13 house and quickly so we could not be followed by the14 press. That call occurred, in my view, at around the15 time or shortly after that Nick Rufford had visited,

16 quite a long time before Dr Kelly himself called17 Kate Wilson.18 Q. I do not want to debate the evidence with you.19 A. It is the evidence of Mrs Kelly.20 Q. Yes. And you have no doubt borne in mind the evidence21 of Mrs Wilson about this matter.22 A. Well, I think Mrs Wilson was referring to a different23 call.24 Q. I follow. So you think that the support given by the25 MoD with regard to the way in which Dr Kelly was

661 informed and kept informed of what was happening was2 first class, do you?3 A. I believe that the right steps were taken, both by those4 concerned with Dr Kelly's welfare, directly Mr Wells,5 who as line manager had that responsibility, as well as6 by the press office informing him at appropriate stages7 of what was to take place.8 Q. Yes.9 One final matter: the drafts of the dossier. Could10 they not have been used in the month of July to defeat11 the suggestion made by Mr Gilligan in his broadcast?12 A. And how would that have been achieved?13 Q. By making them public, to show that the dossier had not14 been embellished.15 A. I am not at all sure that that makes sense, if you16 forgive me for saying so.


31/50

17 Q. Well, do you mean you do not understand the question?18 A. I understand the question, but I do not understand why19 the question is being put because it does not seem to be20 based on anything particularly sensible by way of21 explanation.22 Q. Let me try to put some sense into it for you then. If

23 the object of putting Dr Kelly's name in the public24 domain was to defeat the suggestion that the dossier had25 been embellished by way of his evidence before the FAC,

671 why not publish the earlier drafts?2 A. Well, because there are a number of things in that3 question that I disagree with. There was no objective4 of putting Dr Kelly's name into the public domain. That5 was not our objective. The question of the dossier and6 Dr Kelly's involvement in that was set out by him in his7 letter, which I read very carefully. A carefully8 drafted letter, long, detailed, in which he indicated

9 his role in the preparation of the dossier, which10 I think, to the best of my recollection, was to do with11 the historical parts of the explanation of12 Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass13 destruction.14 It was a very clear account of his involvement. As15 I say, I am puzzled as to why you think publishing16 successive drafts would have helped the Government's17 processes.18 MR GOMPERTZ: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Hoon.19 A. Thank you very much.20 Cross-examination by MR CALDECOTT21 MR CALDECOTT: One for your Lordship and one for Mr Hoon.

22 (Handed).23 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.24 MR CALDECOTT: Secretary of State, that file may not be25 entirely complete but I think it has most of the

681 documents I shall be referring to in it.2 A. Thank you.3 Q. You would receive, would you not, final JIC assessments4 as part of your ministerial briefing?5 A. Yes -- when you say as part of my ministerial briefing,6 I would receive them routinely.7 Q. You receive them shortly after they become final?8 A. I confess I never checked the dates, but I assume so,9 yes.10 Q. They have a very high security rating, do they not, JIC11 assessments?12 A. Yes.13 Q. Am I right they are above top secret?14 A. Yes.15 Q. And they only have a code word, is that right?16 A. Yes. Yes, I think this is public knowledge.17 Q. You would have received and read, would you, the final18 JIC assessment of 9th September?19 A. Yes.20 Q. I think your evidence is that you subsequently also21 received and read two drafts of the dossier in the week22 before publication.


32/50


33/50

2 Mr Gilligan's allegations of only a few days earlier?3 A. I was, yes.4 Q. Can I just remind you, please, it is CAB/1/238, as to5 what the Prime Minister said in response to6 Mr Duncan-Smith. It is the first page, I think, in7 your bundle.

8 A. Thank you.9 Q. It may be the second page. It is 238, the second page,10 I want to refer to. At the top of the page you will see11 a sentence starting:12 "In particular..."13 He there deals with the 6.07 broadcast and the14 suggestion of insertion.15 A. Yes.16 Q. Which we know is very vigorously challenged:17 "... the claim that the readiness of Saddam to use18 weapons within 45 minutes of an order to use them was a19 point inserted in the dossier at the behest of No. 10 is20 completely and totally untrue."

21 A. Hmm.22 Q. I want to draw your attention to the next sentence,23 which goes on to deal with something rather different:24 "Furthermore, the allegation that the 45 minute25 claim provoked disquiet among the intelligence

721 community, which disagreed with its inclusion in the2 dossier -- I have discussed it, as I said, with the3 Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee -- is also4 completely and totally untrue. Instead of hearing from5 one or many anonymous sources, I suggest that if people6 have any evidence, they actually produce it."

7 A. Hmm.8 Q. If you kindly, please, just go over the page to9 a further statement by the Prime Minister at the top of10 page, CAB/1/239:11 "I have already said that we will produce all the12 evidence for the Intelligence and Security Committee.13 I really think that that is the sensible and right way14 to proceed. It can then come to a considered judgment15 and I will publish the report. I repeat that all the16 allegations that have been made are completely without17 any substance."18 Do you agree with me, Mr Hoon, that if any evidence19 subsequently emerged that there had been disquiet within20 the intelligence community that the House of Commons21 would have had to have been informed immediately?22 A. Yes.23 Q. Do you also agree that any members of the Intelligence24 and Security Committee listening to that statement by25 the Prime Minister would be confident that they would be

731 getting all evidence which might be relevant to those2 issues?3 A. Well, I would just emphasise the qualification which the4 Prime Minister made at the outset where he said "which5 disagreed with its inclusion in the dossier".6 Q. Well, can we just read it again? I am not going to7 debate it endlessly but going back to 238:


34/50

8 "Furthermore, the allegation that the 45 minute9 claim provoked disquiet among the intelligence10 community, which disagreed with its inclusion in the11 dossier ... is also completely and totally untrue."12 I suggest that anybody listening to that would13 conclude (a) they did not agree with its inclusion and

14 (b) they expressed no disquiet about it.15 A. I think that is a literal interpretation of those words,16 yes.17 Q. It is a fair interpretation, is it not? Because it is18 important that the public, who effectively he is19 addressing through Parliament here, it is important to20 understand how they would interpret it?21 A. Yes.22 Q. Also, no doubt, you would have been interested in the23 conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Committee when they24 were published on 7th July.25 A. Yes, I was. Yes.

741 Q. And you will have read them?2 A. I certainly read the conclusions on 7th July, yes.3 Q. Can I, please, draw your attention to paragraph 86 of4 that report at FAC/3/31. I think I am right in saying5 these conclusions are all listed compendiously at the6 end. We get it here in its individual section.7 A. Yes, I have that.8 Q. It is towards the end of that conclusion, in9 paragraph 86 at the bottom of the page:10 "We further conclude that, in the absence of11 reliable evidence that intelligence personnel have12 either complained about or sought to distance themselves

13 from the content of the dossier, allegations of14 politically inspired meddling cannot credibly be15 established."16 A. Hmm.17 Q. Do you see that?18 A. Yes, I do.19 Q. It is clear, is it not, therefore, that the Foreign20 Affairs Committee were under the impression, at least,21 that there was no reliable evidence of any such22 distancing by the intelligence community from the23 45 minute claim as it appeared in the dossier?24 A. Yes.25 Q. That was published on 7th July. Can we move forward

751 only 11 days, please, to a memo to you from Mr Howard,2 DCDI, of 18th July. MoD/4/6.3 A. It does not appear to have its accompanying --4 Q. I am very sorry. Perhaps you better use the screen. If5 it is not there, that s my mistake.6 A. It is there. It only seems to be part of the document,7 as I recall it, but I will --8 Q. It has some three pages with some annexures. You do not9 have the speaking note, I am not going to ask you about10 that. It is just the main memo.11 A. I have that here. I am simply indicating to you that it12 is not the whole document.13 Q. This is a briefing memo from Mr Howard, DCDI. You have


35/50

14 the opening page?15 A. Yes.16 Q. We can see from paragraph 1 that he is addressing the17 question of: how should we respond to the Intelligence18 Security Committee if the issue of the procedure whereby19 DIS members can complain about the misuse of

20 intelligence arises.21 A. Hmm.22 Q. But also the question of whether it was in fact used at23 the time of the September dossier. So it is a double24 question that he is addressing. I think I can take this25 quite shortly. If one looks at paragraph 5 on MoD/4/7,

761 the next page, please --2 A. Yes.3 Q. -- about halfway into that paragraph:4 "In the course of this debate [this is the debate5 about the dossier] two individuals in DIST (one of whom

6 is still in post and one of whom has retired) raised in7 writing some specific concerns about the precise wording8 on issues relevant to their areas of expertise."9 You will see two lines down:10 "I attach copies of the relevant minutes."11 In fact it is right to say that Mr Howard was12 against your producing those minutes, was he not, to the13 ISC, and he was against you telling the ISC who the14 authors were?15 A. Yes.16 Q. But I am more interested in why you accepted that advice17 than what the advice was. Did you read those minutes?18 A. Yes, I did.

19 Q. Can we look, please, at the first one which is MoD/22/1?20 You would have known that minute was from Dr Jones,21 branch head of the Science and Technological Directorate22 at DIS.23 A. When you say I would have known, I saw the name at the24 foot of the page. I did not know Dr Jones.25 Q. Do you see on MoD/22/2 there is a redaction. That would

771 have his title, would it not, as well as his name?2 A. I think so, yes.3 Q. If you read paragraph 1, in the fourth line, it is4 perfectly obvious, is it not, that he is a branch head:5 "It is my understanding that some of the6 intelligence has not been made available to my branch."7 Do you see?8 A. Yes.9 Q. It is also obvious, is it not, that this is not10 a customary exchange between analysts. I mean, you will11 see it is addressed to the Deputy Chief of Defence12 Intelligence at the top of the distribution list.13 A. I have to say that I probably was not in a position to14 make that judgment; but for the sake of accuracy, I took15 this, in fact, to be exactly what you have just16 described. This was an exchange in relation to some17 rather detailed points about the language that should be18 used in the dossier. I think we went through this on19 the last occasion that I gave evidence.


36/50

20 I took this to be a series of very technical but21 equally precise suggestions as to the precise language22 that should be used in the dossier. I did not take it23 in any other way.24 Q. But you would agree, would you not, that the precise25 language in the dossier is very important when there is

781 an allegation about sexing up the 45 minutes claim and2 transformation at the heart of political debate at the3 time?4 A. I agree; and indeed I would not have wanted to do5 anything to discourage that kind of debate amongst6 experts knowledgeable about their subject.7 Q. Did you notice the date on this document,8 19th September? That in fact was the day before the9 drafts were finalised on the 20th, is it not?10 A. I cannot give evidence about the date on which it was11 finalised; but I accept that it was close to the date of

12 publication.13 Q. Can we look at numbered paragraph 3, please? We know he14 is speaking here for his branch and not merely himself:15 "We have a number of questions in our minds relating16 to the intelligence on the military plans for the use of17 chemical and biological weapons, particularly about the18 times mentioned and the failure to differentiate between19 the two types of weapon."20 So far as the times mentioned, that could only be21 a reference to the 45 minute claim, could it not, in the22 context of CBW?23 A. That is certainly a possible interpretation.24 Q. Can I just show you the other minute? This is even

25 later. This minute is 20th September. I do not know

791 whether you were aware of this, but the closing time for2 JIC member comments was 3 o'clock on 19th September

Hearing Transcript - 22 September 2003 Morning

Documents