Hearing Transcript - 20 August 2003 Morning

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 20 August 2003 Morning

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Hearing Transcripts

1 Wednesday, 20th August 20032 (10.30 am)3 LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.4 Yes, Mr Dingemans.

5 SIR KEVIN REGINALD TEBBIT (called)6 Examined by MR DINGEMANS7 MR DINGEMANS: Can you give his Lordship your full name?8 A. Kevin Reginald Tebbit.9 Q. What is your occupation?10 A. I am the Permanent Undersecretary of State at the11 Ministry of Defence.12 Q. What does that involve as a role?13 A. As a role, it means that I am in charge of all the civil14 servants in the department. I am the principal adviser15 to the Defence Secretary on all matters of policy of16 administration and finance.17 Q. How long have you been the Permanent Secretary?

18 A. Since July 1998.19 Q. So you were the Permanent Secretary at the time that the20 dossier was being produced?21 A. I was indeed.22 Q. Did you, yourself, have any direct role in the23 production of the dossier?24 A. Not personally. My staff obviously did. I had some25 discussions with my policy director, who was a member of

11 the Joint Intelligence Committee. I am aware of its2 role. I am a former member of the Joint Intelligence3 Committee, both from my days as a diplomat, where I was4 19 years in the Foreign Office and at the end of that5 period was a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee,6 and as a head of an intelligence agency, GCHQ. So7 I have some knowledge of the operations of the system8 but I was not personally involved in the dossier.9 Q. Can you just help his Lordship with what is the role of10 the JIC?11 A. Well, the Joint Intelligence Committee is a group of12 senior officials drawn from the Intelligence Services,13 the heads of those Services and the Ministry of Defence14 and the Foreign Office, whose job it is to make15 judgments in respect of intelligence assessments, mainly16 prepared by the assessment staff, based, themselves, on17 a whole host of analysts and advisers, some in the18 Defence Intelligence Services, some in the other three19 intelligence agencies.20 Q. At the time that the dossier was being produced were you21 aware of any concerns being expressed by members of the22 DIS? First of all, what is the DIS?23 A. The Defence Intelligence Services.24 Q. Were you aware of any concerns expressed by members of25 the DIS about the way the dossier was put together?

21 A. I was not at the time.2 LORD HUTTON: May I ask you: they are all civil servants in3 the Ministry of Defence, are they?4 A. Yes, they are.


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5 MR DINGEMANS: Perhaps I could just ask you --6 A. May I correct myself? Excuse me. There are also some7 military officers seconded into that as well; we operate8 in a joint environment.9 Q. Can I ask you to look at a document at MoD/4/11, which10 is a document we have seen before. This is a letter

11 dated 8th July 2003 and it was written to DCDI, who is12 Mr Howard. It relates to concerns in paragraph 2:13 "Your records will show that as probably the most14 senior and experienced intelligence community official15 working on WMD, I was so concerned about the manner in16 which intelligence assessments for which I had some17 responsibility were being presented in the dossier that18 I was moved to write formally to your predecessor19 Tony Cragg..."20 Who was Tony Cragg? What was he doing at the time?21 A. He was the predecessor of Martin Howard as Deputy Chief22 of Defence Intelligence.23 Q. He would have reported directly to you or through

24 someone else to you?25 A. He would have reported to the Chief of Defence

31 Intelligence, who in this area would probably have2 reported to me if he felt the need to do so.3 Q. But you were not aware of this at the time?4 A. Not at the time. I think they resolved that issue5 within the intelligence community without the need to6 bring it to my attention.7 LORD HUTTON: On a very minor point, Sir Kevin, is it the8 Defence Intelligence Service or the Defence Intelligence9 Staff. I think we have had two versions of the DIS.

10 A. I think it is the Defence Intelligence Staff. It is not11 a separate service. It is not equatable to the other12 three.13 LORD HUTTON: So Defence Intelligence Staff. Thank you very14 much.15 MR DINGEMANS: Can I just take you to a comment that16 Dr Kelly is recorded as saying? This is SJW/1/59. This17 is, so that you know where it is coming, an extract of18 a tape recording made by Ms Watts of what Dr Kelly was19 saying some time around May time. If we go to the20 bottom of that, you can see Ms Watts says:21 "So it wasn't as if there were lots of people saying22 don't put it in don't put it in, it's just it was in23 there and was seized upon -- rather than No.1024 specifically going against?"25 She is talking here about the 45 minutes claim.

41 Dr Kelly is recorded as saying this:2 "There were lots of people saying that -- I mean it3 was an interesting week before the dossier was put out4 because there were so many things in there that people5 were saying, well we're not so sure about that or in6 fact they were happy with it being in but not expressed7 the way that it was, because the wordsmithing is8 actually quite important and the intelligence community9 are a pretty cautious lot on the whole but once you get10 people putting it/presenting it for public consumption


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11 of course they use different words. I don't think12 they're being wilfully dishonest I think they just think13 that's the way the public will appreciate it best. I'm14 sure you have the same problem as a journalist don't15 you, sometimes you've got to put things into words that16 the public will understand."

17 First of all, you have obviously had experience of18 people who work within the intelligence agencies. The19 concept of wordsmithing and precision with expression,20 is that something you recognise from your own21 experience?22 A. Yes, I do. It is, of course, very unusual for23 intelligence assessments to be put into the public24 domain. This was a matter of vital national interest25 which justified a different approach in the judgment of

51 the Government. But intelligence community officials2 are very cautious over the language they use.

3 Q. And we have seen some of the comments or drafting4 suggestions that I think Mr Campbell put to Mr Scarlett,5 and some of which he accepted, some of which he6 rejected. We saw that yesterday.7 Can I just take you, very briefly, to some comments8 that were made by DIS officers. That is CAB/3/79. This9 is a letter of 19th September. If we scroll down a wee10 bit you can see that the first change is:11 "Suggest change to 'procured controlled materials12 for potential use in the production of CBW programmes'.13 "Rationale: language."14 If one continues towards the penultimate entry:15 "Delete the word 'partially'. It was operational.

16 Rationale: It was operational."17 That is the level of wordsmithing, if I can adopt18 Dr Kelly's phrase or reported phrase, that you might19 expect from intelligence officers, is that right?20 A. It is a very large community consisting of a very large21 number of experts, often in very narrow fields. And it22 is very normal, in the usual process of producing23 refined intelligence assessments, for this sort of24 dialogue to go on, all the time.25 Q. Can I then take you to the broadcast on 29th May? First

61 of all, were you aware whether or not notice of the2 broadcast was given to the Ministry of Defence?3 A. I am aware of the issue.4 Q. But you had no personal involvement with that?5 A. No. My involvement, obviously, is simply in what was6 reported to me by those involved at the time.7 Q. Right. After the broadcast had been made, you produced8 a request that the matter be looked into; is that right?9 A. Yes, I see what you mean. Yes, it was not quite so10 direct as that. I had a conversation with David Omand11 in the Cabinet Office first.12 Q. When was that?13 A. Probably the day before I wrote my minute to14 Martin Howard.15 Q. Right. So can I take you to your minute, MoD/1/15?16 A. Yes.


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17 Q. This is a document dated 4th June 2003. If we scroll18 down to MoD/1/16, at the top you can see this is from19 you. You say:20 "As we discussed, DCDI may be the best person to21 handle this..."22 And, going back, who is this memo to?

23 A. The Chief of Defence Intelligence.24 Q. Right. Going down the page, this is headed "WMD:25 Leaks", is that right?

71 A. That is correct.2 Q. You say:3 "We spoke about this in the margins of the Chief of4 Staff meeting this morning."5 A. Yes.6 Q. "There is clearly an intense level of high level concern7 about leaks or unauthorised statements made to8 journalists."

9 You say you discussed this with Sir David Omand last10 night and you would be grateful if the following action11 is taken. What action did you propose to be taken?12 A. The action which is set out in the minute.13 Q. Which is?14 A. To remind staff of their obligations and to seek to15 establish whether there are any suspicions of individual16 members of the Defence Intelligence Staff being17 responsible for leaks. I mean, I have to say, as I said18 in the minute, that I had no specific reason to suspect19 members of the Defence Intelligence Staff, but they had20 come under suspicion because the broadcast was by21 Andrew Gilligan, who was known to have contacts in the

22 Ministry of Defence, as a specialist; and therefore, as23 it were, people were looking towards my department and24 I wanted to make absolutely certain we did all that was25 reasonable to manage that and establish whether there

81 were any concerns.2 LORD HUTTON: Did you say that Mr Gilligan was known to have3 contacts? Was that contacts who were authorised to4 speak to him by the Ministry of Defence?5 A. No, unauthorised.6 LORD HUTTON: Unauthorised?7 A. Yes.8 MR DINGEMANS: How did you know he had unauthorised9 contacts?10 A. Because of the stories that had appeared in the past.11 Q. Which were accurate?12 A. Which were not always accurate.13 Q. If an inaccurate story appears, he might not have had14 any contacts.15 A. He may or he may not have had.16 Q. But this was the reason for your concern, as it were?17 A. He was known to have contacts within the Ministry of18 Defence.19 Q. Can I take you to 5th June 2003, which is MoD/1/17?20 Just before that, you say that very certainly, "He was21 known to have contacts". It rather suggests you know22 something else.


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23 A. Well, many of these were authorised. We have a large24 number of press staff in the three services, as well as25 in the centre, who are regularly contacted by

91 Andrew Gilligan, but there may have been others who were

2 not formally authorised to speak, as we have seen.3 Q. The note of 5th June 2003. What is this document, if4 one scrolls down?5 A. This is the response sent by Martin Howard to his heads6 of department --7 Q. Right.8 A. -- his directors, as a result of my minute to his boss.9 Q. And effectively identifying that your concerns should be10 brought to everyone's attention; is that fair?11 A. Yes. Yes.12 Q. And he said this, in the second line:13 "The fact remains, however, that Mr Gilligan is the14 Defence Correspondent of the Today Programme and, as

15 I know to my own personal cost, he has a large number of16 source in MoD and in the Armed Forces. This, combined17 with the MoD reputation as a 'leaky' department means18 that unfairly or not, the finger is being pointed at MoD19 and DIS in particular."20 Can you help us a little with the reputation of the21 Ministry of Defence in this respect?22 A. Yes. I do not enjoy this experience but it is a large23 department with three armed forces, three armed24 services, and there have from time to time been25 suggestions of rivalry of putting information into the

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1 public domain to support one particular interest against2 another; something which I deplore, the Chief of Defence3 Staff deplores and so does the Secretary of State.4 Q. Right. That is the 4th and 5th June. Do you hear5 anything further relating to this story until we come to6 18th June?7 A. Not, I think, until 18th June.8 By the way, I should perhaps emphasise, as I did say9 in my statement, that one of my duties is to ensure that10 any breaches of security, leaks or unauthorised dealings11 with journalists are indeed investigated and appropriate12 action taken. I mean, this is a fundamental13 responsibility of a head of a department.14 Q. Yes.15 A. Not exclusive to me but to any head of a Civil Service16 department. I am sorry.17 Q. What happens on 18th June? I think we have been told in18 the evidence before that there is a conversation between19 Mr Lamb and Mr Howard at a reception on 17th June.20 A. Yes, and Mr Howard mentioned to me -- I think he simply21 came into my office and did not --22 Q. What date was this?23 A. I think this was on the 18th -- and said that Dr Kelly24 had spoken to Andrew Gilligan recently, according to the25 Foreign Office.

111 Q. What did you do about that?


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2 A. Well, I agreed with Mr Howard that there should be3 a discussion with Dr Kelly to establish what contacts4 indeed were going on.5 Q. Was this the first time you had heard Dr Kelly's name?6 A. Yes, I think it was. I have to say, at the time I did7 not pay too much attention to it and I did not link it

8 to the particular issue of the dossier; and neither did9 those who spoke to me about it.10 Q. The dossier; you mean the broadcast --11 A. The Andrew Gilligan story.12 Q. Broadcast?13 A. Broadcast.14 Q. Did you know, at this time, that Dr Kelly had been15 authorised to speak to journalists as part of his job16 description? Can I take you to MoD/3/14? That is made17 a little clearer. This is his assessment to March 2003.18 This is the latest one we have. If we go down:19 "Statement of your Roles and Responsibilities."20 You can see at about the second paragraph in he is

21 an:22 "Adviser to Proliferation Arms Control Secretariat,23 MoD and Non-proliferation Department, FCO on Iraq's24 chemical and biological weapons capabilities, UNMOVIC25 [which is a UN role]."

121 It also says:2 "Communicating Iraq issues to the media and3 institutions."4 This is headed "DSTL" and we have heard from5 Mr Hatfield he was actually employed by DSTL, with6 a line manager in the Ministry of Defence, that is

7 Dr Wells, paid for by the Foreign and Commonwealth8 Office for reasons that have been given in evidence.9 Did you know about his authorised media contacts?10 A. No, not in detail at all, no. I mean I would not have11 been aware of these personal details or anything like12 that.13 Q. And the DSTL's relationship with the Ministry of14 Defence; perhaps you can explain it very shortly for us15 all.16 A. It is an agency of the Ministry of Defence.17 Q. What does that mean?18 A. The Defence Scientific and Technical Laboratory. That19 means it has a large degree of devolved responsibility20 for the management of its staff. It has a greater21 degree of devolved responsibility than most parts of the22 department. It was formed recently when the old Defence23 Evaluation and Research Agency, which had been a trading24 fund, that is to say it charged for its services, which25 puts it at further arm's length from the main

131 department, was divided into two. One part, the major2 part, was privatised and is now called QinetiQ, with3 a Q, and the smaller part was kept within the department4 but still, as it were, on a self-contained basis, called5 DSTL.6 Q. Did DSTL report either directly or indirectly to you?7 A. No, it reported essentially to the Chief Scientific


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8 Adviser.9 Q. And that is another reporting route, is that right?10 A. Yes. I mean, he is Permanent Secretary equivalent, but11 I expect ultimately I am the head of department but12 there are four high level people in the department of13 that grade.

14 Q. So the Chief Scientific Officer would not report to you?15 A. He is pretty well autonomous but he does have certain16 responsibilities to me, yes.17 Q. Can I just ask you a bit about the relationship of18 contacts with the media and the Open Government Code,19 which I think you have been warned you were going to be20 asked some questions about?21 A. I am not terribly familiar with it, but ...22 Q. Perhaps I can just ask you this: you may know there was23 a Code of Practice issued in May 1994 by the Government,24 as part of the then Citizens Charter initiatives?25 A. Yes.

141 Q. And that there was a second edition issued in 1997 of2 the Open Government Code. Did you have any3 consideration about the relationship between that Code4 and the internal procedures relating to contact with5 journalists that the Ministry of Defence had drawn up?6 We have seen them with Mr Hatfield. Basically, they7 suggest you cannot have any contact unless it has been8 authorised first by the Government.9 A. Yes, broadly speaking that is correct. Open Government10 does mean that we are more open with information, but it11 does not mean that people are free to have contacts with12 journalists without authorisation. That obviously is

13 a rule which is flexible to a degree, depending on14 whether people in their job descriptions are expected to15 deal with the media on a regular basis; and clearly16 there is a degree of flexibility allowed in terms of17 what constitutes a follow up conversation authorised but18 does not need a separate authorisation for each contact.19 But, broadly speaking, civil servants still are20 under an obligation to keep the confidences that they21 become privy to in the course of their work as part of22 the trust between Ministers and civil servants, and the23 efficiency of administration which depends on that. And24 there is still a duty not to disclose information which25 breaches that obligation, unless authorised to do so.

151 Q. Can I just go a little bit further with that? If it is2 part of your job description, and I have taken you to3 Dr Kelly's job description which shows contact with the4 media, part of the Code, it is part 5 of the guidance,5 and the reason you were given notice of this was so you6 should have a chance to read through it. It says this:7 "Officials should not omit information merely8 because disclosure could lead to political embarrassment9 or administrative inconvenience."10 If Dr Kelly's contacts with the media were11 authorised, if he had unhelpful views, as they might be12 considered, on weapons of mass destruction or mobile13 trailers in Iraq, is it right that he was entitled to


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14 communicate those views with the media?15 A. He would still to need to be authorised to discuss those16 issues. If he was challenging Government policy in any17 area, that would be a completely different matter. In18 terms of expert briefings Dr Kelly, I know, was given19 quite a latitude in order to give them; and I became

20 aware, when his name had come forward, that he had21 rather more dealings with the media than would be normal22 for a civil servant and an official. I have to say,23 I think that was taken into account in deciding what to24 do when he had written his letter of 30th June.25 Q. Just to finish off on that point, if he was entitled to

161 brief the media on an expert basis, his opinion, right2 or wrong -- let us just keep with the mobile3 laboratories if we may, that they did not have anything4 to do with biological weapons, I think he thought they5 were to do with hydrogen production. Whether he is

6 right or wrong on that, would he have been entitled, as7 you understand it, to share that with the media?8 A. Not without authorisation, no.9 Q. And is this also fair: that you are unlikely to10 authorise him to say something that you do not11 necessarily agree with then?12 A. (Pause). I would not have put it as an issue of that13 kind. I would not have thought that there was a regime14 that rigid because I would not be monitoring everything15 an individual who had authority to talk to the press was16 doing or saying. But clearly there is a distinction to17 be drawn between briefings on technical issues, which we18 encourage certain people to give, such as Dr Kelly, and

19 briefings on matters of sensitive issues, including20 policy issues, which are in a different -- there is21 obviously a grey area between these two. It may be that22 Dr Kelly was operating, to some extent, in that grey23 area.24 Q. But just on the mobile laboratories, that is not25 a policy issue, whether they were or were not related to

171 production of chemical weapons. It is not a policy2 issue, is it?3 A. It is not a policy issue but it was an issue on which4 a judgment had not been made. A number of individuals5 would be involved in making that judgment. And this was6 a judgment of rather important consequence; and one does7 not agree that that information can simply be disclosed8 willy-nilly. As I say, there is an obligation of9 confidentiality towards an employer, which is not10 necessarily the same as Official Secrets Act or security11 matters. That confidentiality is very strong; and the12 legislation that you refer to does not override that13 obligation of confidentiality towards an employer.14 I think most people would understand that.15 Q. Right. Can I then move on? We have had 18th June and16 your conversation with Mr Howard. What happened as17 a result of that conversation? You understood there was18 going to be an interview with Dr Kelly, is that right?19 A. Yes, a conversation with Dr Kelly about the nature of


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20 his contacts with the press.21 Q. To find that out. Do you know whether that conversation22 took place?23 A. I know it was due to take place and was then postponed24 and then was overtaken by the interview that was25 conducted in respect of his letter of 30th June.

181 Q. Can you tell us why it was postponed?2 A. It was postponed because my Director General of Security3 wondered, at one point, whether Mr Gilligan's testimony4 to the Foreign Affairs Committee had raised a quite5 separate issue of a leak of information from a top6 secret document.7 Q. We have heard this in evidence. Mr Gilligan reported in8 about February that he had been shown a document on the9 links between Al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein.10 A. You have just given me the very example I was thinking11 of when I said not all of his contacts were authorised.

12 Q. Are you suggesting Dr Kelly had anything to do with13 that?14 A. No, I am not. I am saying that question was resolved15 and removed from my question of Dr Kelly.16 Q. So it is now clear that Dr Kelly was not involved in17 that?18 A. Absolutely clear; but it did, I understand, cause19 a delay in the process of that conversation.20 Q. When you are talking about the fact that Mr Gilligan had21 contacts within the Ministry of Defence, that is rather22 proved by the document that was referred to in February.23 A. If it was the Ministry of Defence, that is true.24 Q. Sorry. If it was the Ministry of Defence.

25 A. I am not accepting that it was, but ... if it were, it

191 would have been an unauthorised contact.2 Q. Right. That explains a postponement of the interview.3 You then said it was overtaken by the interview which4 did take place, is that right?5 A. That is correct, I think.6 Q. We know that Dr Kelly writes a letter on 30th June at7 MoD/1/19. If we scroll down, it is addressed to his8 line manager; and he talks about the controversy over9 the past month and the other details. I am not going to10 take you through the whole of that letter. When did you11 become aware of that letter?12 A. On, I think, the Thursday afternoon. That would be the13 3rd.14 Q. Thursday, 3rd July?15 A. Yes.16 Q. Right. Did you see the letter on Thursday, 3rd July?17 A. It was shown to me, yes, on Thursday, 3rd July by18 Mr Howard.19 Q. And what was your discussion with Mr Howard?20 A. My discussion was that this was an extremely unwelcome21 and serious issue. I did not enjoy receiving the letter22 or seeing the letter at all; and I realised that we23 would have to take rapid action to deal with the24 problem.25 Q. Right. What action did you envisage being taken?


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201 A. I envisaged, at the outset, that I would, first,2 establish whether there was a disciplinary issue here to3 be investigated, that would require the formal4 initiation of disciplinary procedures. And, secondly,

5 whether and to what effect this had a bearing on, you6 know, a major issue of the day, that is to say the7 criticism of the Government that had been levelled of8 interference in the intelligence judgments and the case9 for going to war. So I realised there was a very major10 issue to be dealt with.11 Q. Right. So what did you suggest ought to be done?12 A. Well, I felt that it was important for it to be dealt13 with through our personnel management process, in the14 first instance, and that it should be handled by my15 personnel director, Mr Hatfield, partly because if there16 was a disciplinary case to be raised I would be, myself,17 part of that process, as an appeal authority. And

18 I also wanted to ensure that it was looked at and19 appraised as coolly as possible, not by people who were20 themselves caught up in the intense political issues of21 the moment.22 Q. So that is why we have the interview on 4th July with23 Dr Wells but with Mr Hatfield as well; is that right?24 A. Well, an interview essentially conducted by Mr Hatfield,25 with Dr Wells present. And I had discussed this with

211 the Secretary of State, Geoff Hoon, before the interview2 took place.3 Q. Can you tell us what contact you had with the Secretary

4 of State, Mr Hoon?5 A. Well, I saw him that evening, on the 3rd, because I felt6 it sufficiently important for me to report it to him.7 Q. In the Ministry of Defence?8 A. In the Ministry of Defence.9 Q. Tell us what was said?10 A. Well, I did not use Dr Kelly's name at that stage.11 Q. Right. Is there any reason why you did not?12 A. Yes, there is. Because at that stage I was not quite13 sure what we were dealing with, whether this was indeed14 a very serious disciplinary offence or whether this was15 an indiscretion from somebody who clearly did have much16 greater latitude in dealing with the press, rightly or17 wrongly, approved or not, than was normal. Either way,18 it was clearly going to have a huge bearing on, as19 I say, one of the biggest issues of the day, the20 allegation that the Government in general, and21 Alastair Campbell in particular, had interfered in the22 presentation of intelligence information to strengthen23 the case for war, one of the gravest charges that could24 be raised.25 But in discussing this with the Secretary of State,

221 I gave my view that it was first necessary to establish2 whether there was a disciplinary case to be answered.3 LORD HUTTON: At that stage, what did you consider might be4 the line of demarcation between an indiscretion and


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5 a serious disciplinary matter, Sir Kevin, in the light6 of Dr Kelly's letter?7 A. Well, firstly I did not know whether the letter was the8 whole story.9 LORD HUTTON: I appreciate that, yes.10 A. So I did not know whether any security information

11 covered by the Official Secrets Act had, indeed, been12 passed. On the face of it, it had not, but I needed to13 have that established. I also needed to establish14 whether there was a serious criticism of Government15 policy here or whether, as I say, what Dr Kelly had said16 was, as he had reported it, indiscretions but points17 which did not damage the security of the state or breach18 fundamental confidences with the Government.19 On the face of it, the letter suggested that20 Dr Kelly had done little more than he might have said at21 a sort of conference that he would have been authorised22 to participate in, in the International Institute for23 Strategic Studies, in the Royal United Services

24 Institute, in Chatham House, in those sorts of25 organisations. But it was clearly very important to

231 establish precisely what had happened.2 LORD HUTTON: Thank you.3 MR DINGEMANS: And what was Mr Hoon's view, at this stage?4 A. I think Mr Hoon was very concerned about the5 finalisation of the Foreign Affairs Committee report6 into -- based really on Andrew Gilligan's allegations;7 and he was very concerned that information should be8 brought to light to correct, as it were, the public9 record, and that we should not be seen to be covering it

10 up, since it was highly relevant to the Inquiry that the11 Foreign Affairs Committee was conducting. My view was12 this was absolutely right and proper but we did first13 need to establish whether there was a disciplinary issue14 here.15 Q. Mr Campbell told us yesterday that he had had16 a discussion, I think the next day, with Mr Hoon, who,17 he said, his initial reaction was this was a very18 serious disciplinary matter, but he mentioned something19 that Mr Campbell recorded as a plea bargain, although20 Mr Campbell said that might be misinterpreted. Did you21 have any discussions with Mr Hoon that --22 A. No, I was unaware of that.23 Q. You were unaware of that. So effectively on the24 Thursday night you leave Mr Hoon having said: this needs25 to be pursued by way of disciplinary proceedings?

241 A. Yes, not necessarily by means of disciplinary2 proceedings. We first needed to establish whether there3 was a disciplinary case to be answered. Before I saw4 the Secretary of State I had already alerted Mr Hatfield5 to the need for him to do this. I confirmed to him6 through my private secretary, after my discussion with7 Mr Hoon.8 Q. You have seen the letter of 30th June. There is nothing9 in that letter, is there, which suggests that Dr Kelly,10 at that stage, was happy for his name to be put into the


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11 public domain?12 A. The letter did not address that question.13 Q. No, okay.14 A. But it did say -- I am sorry, I correct myself. The15 letter did touch on that issue, because Dr Kelly said16 that the reason that he had written the letter, the

17 reason he had come forward was because a colleague of18 his at RUSI, in fact I think he meant Chatham House, had19 recognised that some of the things that Andrew Gilligan20 had said to the Foreign Affairs Committee sounded like21 Kelly's views and had told him so. So, it is the case22 that, in that context, Dr Kelly expected the possibility23 that he would be recognised to exist.24 LORD HUTTON: I think perhaps you should just refer to --25 MR DINGEMANS: Yes, MoD/1/21.

251 LORD HUTTON: -- the last page of the letter, Sir Kevin,2 just in relation to the points you have been asked.

3 MR DINGEMANS: At the third paragraph where he says:4 "I did not even consider that I was the 'source' ...5 until a friend in RUSI ..."6 You think that is in Chatham House; I am not sure7 much turns on the distinction.8 A. Nothing turns on the distinction.9 Q. "... said that I should look at the 'Oral Evidence10 provided to the Foreign Affairs Committee' on 19th June11 because she recognised that some comments were the sort12 that I would make about Iraq's chemical and biological13 capacity".14 That is what you refer to. Over the page at15 MoD/1/22:

16 "I hope this letter helps unravel at least a small17 part of the '45 minute story'. It was a difficult18 decision to make to write to you because I realise that19 suspicion falls on me because of my long association20 with Iraq's WMD programme investigation and the21 acknowledgment that I know Andrew Gilligan."22 A. Yes.23 Q. Those are the two passages that might impact on that?24 A. Yes.25 Q. But nothing express, and you point out that it is not

261 addressing this issue, about him consenting for his name2 to be made public at this stage, a recognition that3 others might have identified him in the past.4 A. Yes, indeed.5 Q. Can I then turn to the interview and take you to6 MoD/1/24? This is the note of the interview with7 Dr Kelly that took place, as we can see from the top, at8 about 11.30 on Friday, 4th July, and it ends at about9 1.15.10 It begins, as we have heard, by explaining that the11 letter had serious implications, and those were breaches12 of normal standards of Civil Service behaviour. And his13 unauthorised discussion appeared to be directly relevant14 to the controversy surrounding the allegations made by15 Mr Gilligan.16 We can see the notes of the interview. I do not


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17 propose to take you through that.18 Can I then take you to MoD/1/32, which is at the19 tail end of another set of notes made of the same20 meeting, and just take you to the summing-up of the21 meeting. At the bottom of the page, paragraph 17:22 "Hatfield summed up. There appeared to be

23 consistencies between parts of Gilligan's testimony to24 the Foreign Affairs Committee, and what Kelly says that25 he said to Mr Gilligan. In particular, the meeting was

271 set up at Gilligan's initiative, and Kelly had2 acknowledged ..."3 And those particular consistencies were identified.4 Then:5 "But there were significant discrepancies6 identified. In particular, Kelly denied having any7 knowledge of the '45 minutes claim' until after the8 Dossier was published, and denied having any knowledge

9 of the process by which that assessment was included; he10 also denied giving any opinion that the evidence that11 Uranium had been sought from Niger was based on12 unreliable information. In addition, Kelly was not of13 the view that Iraq had not been able to weaponise CBW.14 There were other, minor inconsistencies..."15 Over the page:16 "Hatfield said that overall, his judgment was that17 if there were a single source for Gilligan's18 information, then it was not Kelly. Kelly's words may19 have been part of the background to Gilligan's stories,20 but on the basis of what he had testified, he was21 satisfied that Kelly was not the source of the most

22 significant allegations."23 I read that out just to put you back in the position24 you were in on Friday, 4th July. You were not present25 at the interview?

281 A. I was not present at the interview. Can you just2 refresh my memory as to the date of that particular3 record?4 Q. If we go back to MoD/1/30 --5 A. Right.6 Q. -- that is 4th July; but it appears to be appended to7 MoD/1/28, which is the 7th July, the Monday.8 A. Yes.9 Q. But the earlier note, the one I started with, MoD/1/24,10 appears to be dated 4th July. We have not worked out11 its distribution yet.12 So what I wanted to come to was, first of all, what13 did you know on the evening of 4th July, after the14 interview?15 A. Yes -- the point I make is I am not sure I had seen that16 particular document on the afternoon of the 4th July,17 but I did see Mr Hatfield and had a conversation with18 him about the results of these -- of his meeting.19 The first point is that he divided his discussions20 into two parts. The first part was to deal with any21 disciplinary issues. He concluded that although22 Dr Kelly had been extremely unwise in talking to


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23 Andrew Gilligan without authorisation and covering the24 ground and allowing himself to cover the ground that had25 been covered, there nevertheless was not sufficient

291 cause for a formal disciplinary process to be initiated.

2 And essentially, by the end of that first half of the3 interview, he told me that a line had been drawn under4 the disciplinary aspect. That was his judgment. He was5 entitled to make that judgment as the personnel6 director, and I was prepared to accept that judgment.7 Q. So --8 A. That was the first conclusion from the meeting.9 Q. Can I just, before you go on, establish: you did not see10 that note that I have shown you on the evening of11 4th July?12 A. I do not think so.13 Q. But does that accord generally --14 A. Broadly speaking, yes.

15 Q. -- with what Mr Hatfield was telling you?16 A. Broadly speaking, yes.17 Q. He says: disciplinary side of it is finished,18 effectively.19 A. Correct.20 Q. Then he turned to the second aspect of the interview?21 A. Which was an attempt to establish whether this was22 indeed the single anonymous source, where he felt that23 there were similarities but sufficient discrepancies for24 him not to feel that it could have been the source on25 the basis that if Dr Kelly was indeed reporting

30

1 accurately what had happened, there are too many2 differences between Kelly's account and Gilligan's3 account for it to be the same event.4 Q. What was your reaction to that proposition?5 A. I confess that I was sceptical because it did seem to me6 that a meeting that took place on 22nd May, at a central7 London hotel, with somebody who clearly was very8 familiar with a lot of the material covered in9 Andrew Gilligan's broadcast, even though he was not10 a member of the intelligence community, it did seem to11 me unlikely that there was another separate source who12 also met Andrew Gilligan at a central London hotel at13 about the same time and was the real source for the14 story. Otherwise it seemed to me, by and large, that15 Andrew Gilligan would have had two sources for his story16 rather than one; and since he claimed only one single17 anonymous source, it seemed to me unlikely that this was18 not the explanation for Andrew Gilligan's story, if19 I can put it that way.20 Nevertheless, on detail there were significant21 discrepancies, not just about what Dr Kelly said he had22 said and what Andrew Gilligan had reported his source as23 having said, but also some sort of rather objective24 circumstances which seemed to be different, like when25 they first met each other, how long they had known each

311 other, the length of the meeting, the particular nature


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2 of the source that Gilligan was quoting.3 So, in detail, Mr Hatfield found it difficult to4 reconcile these issues. I was more sceptical and5 I thought this probably was indeed the explanation for6 Gilligan's story.7 Q. Because you were not necessarily prepared to accept that

8 all Dr Kelly had said in the interview was reported to9 you?10 A. That was not the fundamental point at the time. The11 fundamental point at the time was it just seemed to be12 implausible there would be several meetings of sources13 of this kind in central London hotels shortly before the14 broadcast.15 Q. Did you discuss the report that was made to you by16 Mr Hatfield with Mr Hoon?17 A. I cannot recall when I next spoke to Mr Hoon precisely.18 I thought it was probably not until the following Monday19 morning. I may be wrong there. I would certainly have20 informed his office. Whether I did it personally to

21 him, I really cannot recall, but I certainly would have22 put it through his private secretary in the letter that23 I wrote as a result of this interview, where I broadly24 accepted that Mr Hatfield's doubts were ones which25 I could not possibly ignore. I was not the man

321 conducting the interview; I had asked him to do this.2 He doubted whether this was the source, as did Dr Wells,3 and therefore I felt obliged to convey his concerns in4 my minute.5 Q. On 4th July, after that conversation, you write6 a letter. Can I take you to that? That is MoD/1/34.

7 Who is this letter to?8 A. This is to Sir David Omand.9 Q. Right. Why do you write to Sir David Omand?10 A. Because he is the Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet11 Office who is responsible for security and intelligence12 matters.13 Q. Right. And you, if we scroll down, report that an14 official in the MoD I think has volunteered he has had15 a discussion with Andrew Gilligan on 22nd May. You say:16 "He is an FCO official seconded to the MoD's17 Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, with a long18 history of authorised dealing with the press in the19 course of his duties, though not in this case."20 You relate the interview --21 A. Yes.22 Q. -- and point out similarities. Over the page, to23 page 35. Halfway down page 35 you identify three24 possibilities. What were those?25 A. These are the ones essentially, actually, that Dr Kelly

331 himself had volunteered in his letter, that Gilligan had2 embellished this official's meeting with him but that he3 is the single anonymous source; that Andrew Gilligan's4 source is someone else; or thirdly, that there is no one5 source and it is in fact a hotch-potch of comments from6 numerous individuals and articles.7 Q. I think you also had a conversation before you sent the


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8 letter with Sir David Omand, is that right?9 A. I warned him that it was coming, yes.10 Q. Can I take you to CAB/1/10 because someone appears to11 have written on your letter, in manuscript, just above12 the text, that it was missing something. It says:13 "This is missing one salient point. The official

14 confirmed that he had met Gilligan in a hotel, as15 covered in The Mail on Sunday article by Gilligan."16 Do you recognise whose handwriting that is?17 A. No, I do not.18 Q. I infer that must have been information you provided19 orally before the letter had been sent over.20 A. That is quite possible.21 Q. Once you have sent the letter over on 4th July, do you22 take any further action that day --23 LORD HUTTON: Just before we proceed, may I ask you,24 Sir Kevin, in that letter you say "an official in the25 MoD", you do not name Dr Kelly. Was there any

341 particular reason for that?2 A. I was still, at that stage, quite concerned to avoid3 leaks. I did not want Dr Kelly's name to be bandied4 around. It does not mean to say I suspected David Omand5 to be the sort of person who would -- it was just6 a general sort of discretion.7 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Why did you not -- obvious reasons for8 it -- perhaps you could just state why you did not want9 Dr Kelly's name bandied around.10 A. To be honest, my Lord, I thought this was such an11 intense matter, as well as a very important matter, that12 it seemed to me that it was necessary to try to control

13 the process to some degree, out of consideration for14 Dr Kelly, frankly.15 LORD HUTTON: Yes.16 MR DINGEMANS: It seems, from the recollections we have from17 Sir David Manning and Jonathan Powell that when they met18 on the evening of 4th July, which we know is the Friday,19 to discuss your letter coming in and then the letter20 when it has arrived that they probably knew, I think21 their evidence was, the name Dr Kelly. If they did know22 that, do you know how they had got hold of the name?23 A. I am not sure that they did know the name Dr Kelly.24 I could have mentioned it to David Omand on the25 telephone, it is possible that I may have mentioned it

351 to him privately.2 Q. The next day, I think it was the weekend and you were3 not proposing to come into work?4 A. I do not usually come into work but it is not unknown.5 Q. You read an article in The Times. Can I take you to6 that, CAB/1/487?7 A. Yes.8 Q. This is an article by Mr Baldwin in The Times. It9 provides some further details of the source for the10 bitterly contested allegations that Downing Street11 "sexed up" its dossier.12 A. Yes.13 Q. Said to have been provided by BBC insiders, namely that


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14 he is a "military expert now based in Iraq". Did you15 read that?16 A. Yes, I did.17 Q. On Saturday morning?18 A. Indeed.19 Q. What did you do, as a result of that?

20 A. I decided that it was necessary to update my assessment21 over the weekend to suggest more strongly that this22 probably was, indeed, the source. The reason for that23 is, as I said before, one of the problems that24 Mr Hatfield faced was the status of the individual25 seemed to be so different from Andrew Gilligan's

361 reported source. Andrew Gilligan talked about an2 intelligence officer or somebody closely involved in the3 intelligence process. But here, essentially, was4 a description about an inspector.5 Q. Yes.

6 A. And that was a very different sort of person and it7 pointed very, very clearly towards the sort of8 individual that Dr Kelly was. It said "military", but9 that is also Ministry of Defence, Defence Intelligence10 sort of person. So it did seem to me to be very, very11 significant as a report.12 Also the timings, the idea that the person was13 probably in Iraq at that moment. Dr Kelly expected to14 be in Iraq at that moment and had actually been in Iraq,15 although he had returned. That seemed to me very16 significant, and the fact they had not been able to be17 in contact with him for a while seemed also to be very18 indicative.

19 I have to say, it also matched my concerns over20 Friday night/Saturday morning that I had not been21 sufficiently strong in my own judgments in my earlier22 letter that this did seem to be quite likely the23 explanation for Gilligan's story.24 Q. You mentioned the timings of Dr Kelly's trips to Iraq,25 the fact he was meant to be in Iraq and he had been in

371 Iraq. Did you know that on the Friday night, anything2 about Dr Kelly's background? I imagine when this came3 up to you, you thought, "Let us get his file out"; did4 you do something like that?5 A. I did not get his file out but I did take a close6 interest in him and asked for more details about him.7 I think I was told by Mr Howard that he had indeed been8 in Iraq. It was also, if I may say so, relevant on that9 Saturday morning that Mr Howard reported to me that10 a member of his staff had said to him: they have all but11 named him. In other words: this must be Dr Kelly.12 Q. Did you, at that stage, know of Dr Kelly's involvement13 with the dossier? Had Mr Howard shared that with you?14 A. No, and I still do not believe his involvement with the15 dossier was central.16 Q. Did you know, for example, that he had sent an e-mail on17 10th September talking about growth media? The18 importance of the e-mail, not necessarily his views on19 it, but it shows that he must have seen the dossier that


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20 we know to have existed on 5th September. Did anyone21 tell you about that at the time?22 A. No, but that would not have changed my view as to23 whether this was an official who was centrally involved24 in the compilation of the final version of the dossier,25 the essential intelligence judgments.

381 Q. But it would have enabled you to judge whether Dr Kelly2 knew that the 45 minutes claim was not in the3 5th September dossier. We also know he is involved in4 a meeting on 19th September, looking at the dossier, and5 I have shown you the drafting remarks produced after6 that meeting, where the 45 minutes claim is in the7 dossier. Did anyone share that information with you, at8 the time?9 A. Not at that time, no.10 Q. When did you first become aware of that information?11 A. The information that Dr Kelly had?

12 Q. At least seen the dossiers in the final stages and made13 comments on matters within his area of expertise.14 A. I think that was later. Remember, I was going, at that15 stage, mainly on what Dr Kelly himself had said in his16 letter about his involvement in the dossier.17 Q. I appreciate that, but I think you have already shared18 with us your concern that he was, in fact, the single19 source identified by Mr Gilligan.20 A. Yes, indeed. Well, let me put it this way: my concern21 or my sense that his meeting with Mr Gilligan provides22 the explanation to Mr Gilligan's story.23 Q. So you write a letter on 5th July. Can I take you to24 that? That is MoD/1/38. Who is this letter to?

25 A. The same person as before, David Omand.

391 Q. And you refer, if we scroll down, you can see there has2 been a further development, today's Times carries an3 article, you briefly summarise some points. You say4 that although he was not in Iraq at present, he was5 there recently and planning to visit again later this6 month in relation to the Iraq Survey Group.7 A. Correct.8 Q. Continuing over the page, many discrepancies remain:9 "We still cannot exclude the possibility that the10 main source or other sources are elsewhere. But it may11 be possible to explain and reconcile at least some of12 the mismatches."13 You explain why that might be.14 A. That is correct. You will see from the letter that the15 way I was looking at the mismatches over the 45 minute16 intelligence was not so much about Dr Kelly's17 involvement in the dossier, but was that as a weapons18 expert his own views on the capability of Iraqi systems,19 air delivered or ground launched, could have been taken20 by someone else, Andrew Gilligan, to have implied21 a criticism of the quality of the intelligence, even22 though the actual intelligence about the 45 minutes23 warning would not, as I understand it, have been shown24 to Dr Kelly.25 Q. That is because you get intelligence, and we have been


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401 told in releases so far that the intelligence appears to2 have come through an Iraqi military officer late3 in August, that is what the Government itself released.4 And Dr Kelly may have a view on whether or not that is

5 reliable intelligence, knowing what he knew about6 weapons systems?7 A. He may not have had a view about the reliability of the8 intelligence but he may well have had a view about the9 weapons systems themselves.10 Q. And whether or not the intelligence provided was right11 or wrong, as it were?12 A. I think he himself said he was not in a position to13 judge that.14 Q. You write this letter on 5th July. Do you have any15 further contacts?16 A. With?17 Q. Anyone over the weekend relating to Dr Kelly.

18 A. Yes, I spoke to Sir David Omand, I think, on two or19 three occasions.20 Q. Did you meet with him or speak on the telephone?21 A. No, I spoke on the telephone.22 Q. What was the gist of those conversations?23 A. Well, first, to tell him I was sending a further24 assessment in the light of my reflections overnight and25 the article in The Times by Baldwin.

411 He told me of the interest that the Prime Minister2 was showing in the information that was coming forward3 from my letters. I also had conversations with my

4 private secretary; indeed, in order to prepare that5 second minute I came into the office and had my private6 secretary there as well. My private secretary had been7 talking to the Defence Secretary's office and I knew8 that the Defence Secretary had been considering whether9 we should bring this to the attention of the BBC before10 the board of governors meeting over the weekend.11 Q. So your private secretary had spoken to Mr Hoon's12 private secretary?13 A. Yes, which is normal.14 Q. And the private secretary had relayed to you that15 Mr Hoon had considered whether or not the information16 ought to be shared with the BBC board of governors?17 A. Yes. I also had a conversation --18 Q. Sorry to interrupt. Did you speak directly yourself19 with Mr Hoon this weekend?20 A. Not over that weekend, no.21 Q. Did you get any other information about Mr Hoon's views22 over the weekend?23 A. No, I did not.24 Q. No-one else reported he had said X or Y or Z?25 A. No. I knew he was extremely concerned about us holding

421 on to this information with so much going on in both the2 BBC and the Foreign Affairs Committee finalising their3 report; but I knew no more than that, other than, as4 I say, what was reported to me by my private secretary,


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5 that he had been mulling over the question of: should6 this be made known to the chairman of the board of7 governors, not necessarily identifying Dr Kelly but the8 idea that somebody had come forward and that it did not9 correspond to Andrew Gilligan's report.10 There was also a conversation I had with Mr Hatfield

11 where --12 Q. This is on the Saturday or Sunday, or they all merge13 into one, as it were?14 A. They merge into one, but you asked me about my15 activities over the weekend.16 Q. Yes.17 A. I told Mr Hatfield the way things were shaping up it18 looked as if we would have to talk to Dr Kelly again, in19 the light of the Baldwin article and in the light of the20 need to try to pin down the facts even more clearly, if21 we possibly could.22 Q. Were you told by Sir David Omand anything of the23 Prime Minister's views?

24 A. Yes, I was. I was told by David Omand that the25 Prime Minister was following this very, very closely

431 indeed, that he was not minded to ask for any2 precipitate action but he did want to consider this3 carefully before taking further steps; but the4 implication was that he wanted to do something about it.5 Q. The implication?6 A. That he did want something done about this individual7 coming forward.8 Q. Right. So, is that the reason for the second interview,9 these discussions over the weekend?

10 A. The reason for the second interview was, I think,11 a collective view, which I held, which I think was held12 in No. 10, that in the light of the further information13 we had had from the press, it was necessary to talk to14 Dr Kelly again, yes. But I do not think there was any15 one particular individual saying: this must happen. But16 I think I put Mr Hatfield on notice that I suspected he17 would have to -- he would need a follow up interview.18 Q. Right. But at this stage does the situation still19 remain that the disciplinary side of proceedings has20 gone because of the judgment made by Mr Hatfield on21 Friday?22 A. Yes.23 Q. So this is really pursuing it, as it were, for the24 purposes of correcting the record with the BBC?25 A. No, not correcting the record with the BBC. I mean,

441 this was a massive issue. I do not think one can2 underestimate the importance of the charge levelled3 against the Government as perceived by Ministers, both4 my Minister, Geoff Hoon, and No. 10. You cannot level5 a more serious charge really than that the Government6 has interfered in the intelligence community's work to7 provide assessments on the case for war, particularly8 the allegation that the Government knew it to be false9 when it was put in and the idea that Alastair Campbell10 had done it. As I explained to you before, not only did


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11 I regard that as serious too, but as a former member of12 the intelligence community, an institution which13 I happen to believe the Joint Intelligence Committee is14 one of the best elements of our machinery, the need to15 clarify the truth was very, very strong.16 It is very difficult for Government to proceed and

17 be judged by the public on the basis of allegations from18 anonymous sources. If somebody comes forward and one19 has reason to suspect that is indeed the source or the20 explanation for the story, there is a very strong case21 for correcting, clarifying, amplifying the public22 record.23 Q. Perhaps I put it --24 A. So I did not regard this as just a matter of dealing25 with the BBC.

451 Q. What I meant was this was no longer disciplinary but2 this was correcting the BBC's story with the public

3 then, but it related to the BBC story and putting the4 matter right?5 A. Correct. But I think it had become a perception in the6 public mind of the behaviour of Government.7 Q. Can I take you to Sir David Omand's letter?8 LORD HUTTON: Just before we proceed, I think it is evident9 from what you have said, Sir Kevin, but so it is10 absolutely clear: when you refer to it being difficult11 for the public to decide the validity of a charge based12 on an anonymous source, from what you have just said --13 I make it clear I think it is quite apparent what you14 did say, but just for the sake of the -- your point is15 if the anonymous source ceases to be anonymous and is

16 known to the public and gives his account of what he17 said, that is a much more effective way of countering18 the charge based on the report which he had previously19 given?20 A. Indeed. And it is a matter of truth and credibility.21 LORD HUTTON: Yes.22 MR DINGEMANS: Sir David Omand wrote a letter to you over23 the weekend. Can I take you to MoD/1/41? It is24 a letter dated 5th July, which is the Saturday, but in25 fact appears to be dated, because of references --

461 misdated. It should have been 6th July. Nothing turns2 on that, you get it on 7th July.3 A. Correct.4 Q. Can we scroll down that? He says he has discussed the5 contents with Jonathan Powell, David Manning and6 John Scarlett. We have heard from Jonathan Powell and7 Sir David Manning and:8 "We recognised that at least part of the explanation9 ... could rest on the discussion he had had with the10 official who has now come forward."11 A. Yes.12 Q. "At the appropriate point it would incumbent upon us to13 inform the FAC (and the ISC) so that they were not14 placed in a false position. But we also noted your15 caveat about ... the discrepancies.16 "The Prime Minister asked for a deeper analysis of


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17 what the official has actually said."18 Towards the bottom of the page:19 "Your follow-up letter on Saturday has also been20 seen by the Prime Minister, who was grateful for the21 further information in it. He discussed the options22 with me on Sunday morning. I was able to pass on to him

23 the view of the Foreign Secretary ... against any24 immediate action with the FAC in advance of the25 publication of their report ... some member of the

471 Committee are now abroad."2 In fact, it appears from other records they were in3 Italy.4 A. It was in this sense I was trying rather inadequately to5 convey earlier, when I was trying to describe the6 Prime Minister's wishes.7 Q. "The Prime Minister concluded that notwithstanding the8 further circumstantial details ... he agreed with your

9 recommendation that there were still too many unknowns10 for us to approach the FAC now."11 A. Yes.12 Q. "But we may need to react quickly if the meeting of BBC13 Governors tonight or comment on the FAC Report."14 And the letter is copied.15 There is reference there to the FAC and the ISC.16 Were you party to any of the discussions about the FAC17 or the ISC?18 A. Not at that stage in any detail. I mean, I was aware of19 the Foreign Affairs Committee report emerging, but not20 as a central player. I mean this was not my21 department's responsibility, so I was only coming up to

22 speed on the FAC/ISC issues over that weekend.23 Q. Can I just take you, then, to something that we have24 been provided from Sir David Omand, which is CAB/11/5.25 This is a note he dated 21st July, so shortly after the

481 events but nearly contemporaneous with them.2 He says on 7th July that he was:3 "... pulled out of a lecture ... with a request to4 go straight to No. 10."5 At paragraph 3:6 "There was also a review of the weekend decision not7 to inform the FAC before the publication of their Report8 that Dr Kelly had come forward to say that he had met9 Mr Gilligan. Kevin Tebbit ran over the ground he had10 covered in his two letters... There was some11 questioning from the PM about what we knew about12 Dr Kelly, and whether we could find out more about his13 views. Kevin Tebbit agreed to report back.14 Kevin Tebbit warned that Dr Kelly was an expert on Iraqi15 WMD and if he was summoned to give evidence some of it16 might be uncomfortable on specifics such as the17 likelihood of there being weapons systems being ready18 for use within 45 minutes. But he believed from what he19 had said to Richard Hatfield that Dr Kelly had no doubts20 that there were Iraqi WMD programmes ... Kevin Tebbit21 also expressed the view that we would have to face up to22 the fact that Dr Kelly's name was likely to become


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23 public at some point soon, given the number of people he24 would have talked to. MoD were preparing contingency25 statements..."

491 Is that a fair reflection of discussions that took

2 place at the weekend?3 A. I have not actually seen this account before, but it4 corresponds pretty closely to my recollection. I mean,5 this is actually what I said at the meeting in the Prime6 Minister's Office on the Monday morning.7 Q. Right. So this is when there was questioning from the8 Prime Minister about what was known about Dr Kelly, is9 that right?10 A. Well, the meeting was primarily to discuss the Foreign11 Affairs Committee report.12 Q. Right.13 A. And then it moved on to discuss the issue of Dr Kelly.14 This is more or less what I said, I think, at that

15 meeting.16 Q. At the meeting on the 7th July?17 A. On the Monday morning.18 LORD HUTTON: Just before we move on, Mr Dingemans, may19 I ask you this, Sir Kevin: could we go back to that20 please, CAB/11/5?21 A. Yes, my Lord.22 LORD HUTTON: The note states that you warned that if23 Dr Kelly was summoned to give evidence, some of it might24 be uncomfortable on specifics such as the likelihood of25 there being weapons systems being ready for use within

50

1 45 minutes.2 How did you know that Dr Kelly's evidence on that3 point might be uncomfortable, on the 45 minutes point?4 A. Because in his letter to us and in his first interview,5 I think, with Mr Hatfield he had said that he was not6 aware of any Iraqi systems that could be readied for use7 in 45 minutes.8 LORD HUTTON: Yes.9 A. He was not aware, he said, of the intelligence report10 that had been the basis for the JIC's view that this11 should, nevertheless, be an important piece of12 information put into the dossier. Actually, it was13 quite an important piece of information for the Ministry14 of Defence, I might say, because if you are organising15 military operations you do not have to be 100 per cent16 certain about intelligence to pay careful attention to17 it, if it is that sort of thing. Anyway, I am sorry,18 I digress.19 The reason I mention this is in the context, which20 is not here in this report, that we were increasingly in21 danger, the Government were increasingly in danger of22 being vulnerable to the charge that it was suppressing,23 withholding, covering up very relevant information. The24 reason I mentioned this was to say that I believed that25 this information -- I recommended that this information

511 would need to come forward even though it was not


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2 comfortable for the Government. This is why I refer to3 it, because it was not all helpful. I was not4 suggesting that Dr Kelly's account was some windfall5 bonus for the Government. I felt it was just a very6 awkward development but one where there was a public7 interest for it to be brought forward.

8 If we had simply sat on the information with an9 expert like Dr Kelly saying this about the 45 minutes,10 we would be accused of a cover up.11 LORD HUTTON: Yes. So therefore your knowledge that12 Dr Kelly's evidence might be uncomfortable on this point13 was derived really from his own letter of 30th June and14 what he had said to Mr Hatfield?15 A. It was indeed, my Lord. It was said in the context of16 the need to come forward with this information, rather17 than to suppress it.18 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. I see. Thank you.19 MR DINGEMANS: At that meeting which we can see related20 there, there appears to have been, at the bottom of the

21 page, an agreement that the inconsistencies needed to be22 subject to a more forensic examination; is that right?23 A. Yes, correct.24 Q. Had you, at that stage, decided whether or not to25 reinterview him?

521 A. I had decided that there should be a further interview.2 Q. Right. Can I just --3 LORD HUTTON: This might be a convenient time, I think, to4 give the stenographers a break.5 (11.45 am)6 (Short Break)

7 (11.50 am)8 MR DINGEMANS: We are on the Monday morning, at the meeting9 in Downing Street. We have been told by other witnesses10 who is there. Was there anything else said by you about11 Dr Kelly's cooperation or role in relation to the12 forthcoming aspects of it?13 A. I may have said there that I believed it important that14 Dr Kelly should say what he believed to be the case, if15 we called him forward, which is why I mentioned his own16 view about systems that could be readied in 45 minutes.17 Q. Yes.18 A. I said there were still discrepancies, so that we still19 could not be 100 per cent certain that he was, indeed,20 the source, which was the reason for the further21 interview.22 I think it was collectively agreed that we should23 interview Dr Kelly again to seek to establish more24 details about his dealings with Andrew Gilligan in the25 hope of narrowing down the uncertainties that still

531 remained.2 Q. So although you had provisionally thought of3 reinterviewing him, that decision, as it were, was4 approved at that stage?5 A. Was confirmed. I think I had already put Mr Hatfield on6 notice that I expected there to be a need for a follow7 up interview during the weekend.


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8 Q. Right. Can I take you to CAB/11/6, the next page,9 because what that says, and I appreciate it is not your10 note but it is obviously the closest we have to a note11 of the meeting, at the top:12 "[Sir] Kevin Tebbit said that MoD were considering13 calling him back from a conference he was at in order to

14 talk to him again. He reiterated that Dr Kelly had come15 forward of his own volition, and that as far as MoD was16 concerned there was no question of any offence having17 been committed under the Official Secrets Act."18 That, I think, accorded with what you said about19 Mr Hatfield. But there is this sentence, and perhaps20 I could just underscore it and ask for your comment on21 it:22 "Dr Kelly's continued cooperation was therefore23 essential."24 Was that your understanding at the time?25 A. No, I am slightly puzzled by that sentence actually; and

541 I am at some disadvantage by being shown a document2 I have not seen before. I am glad the first part of the3 paragraph coincided precisely with what I just said.4 Q. It was not designed to be a memory test. We got this5 over the course of this week. As I have made clear, it6 is not your note, it is Sir David Omand's note, but7 obviously it relates to what you are said to have said.8 A. What I think I would have said, and what I did indeed9 write subsequent to this meeting when I returned to the10 Ministry of Defence, was that I believed it important11 that whatever Dr Kelly did was of his own volition and12 of his own free will, and that he was not being put

13 under duress to say or do anything that he did not14 believe.15 Q. So if Dr Kelly had been told, on Monday morning, "Would16 you rather stay at RAF Honnington or come back for17 another interview?", he would have been at liberty to18 say, "I will stay here, thank you"?19 A. I think I am entitled to give him a further degree of20 encouragement than that open ended invitation, we are21 his employer; but I would not have wanted to put views22 in his mouth that he did not believe to be true.23 LORD HUTTON: So your interpretation of that sentence:24 "Dr Kelly's continued cooperation was therefore25 essential", is that you had been saying that anything

551 that Dr Kelly did had to be with his consent and not2 because he was being forced to do it?3 A. I would not put it quite that strongly, my Lord.4 I think I would have said -- my own version of that5 thought would have been that it was important that6 Dr Kelly continued to cooperate voluntarily rather than7 have things thrust upon him.8 LORD HUTTON: Yes.9 MR DINGEMANS: Continued to cooperate voluntarily but with10 a strong steer from his employer?11 A. A strong steer from his employer; but if I may say so,12 at this stage I also felt, at this point, that it would13 possibly be in Dr Kelly's own interest for him to want


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14 to correct the public record, because on the basis of15 what he had written to us in his letter he was being16 misrepresented, in terms of comments he would have made17 on very much the political aspects of the issue rather18 than the technical aspects of the issue, and that he had19 an interest in clarifying the record himself.

20 Q. So Dr Kelly should have been made aware, when he was at21 RAF Honnington, that the return to London was not, as it22 were, a diktat from his employer but a strong23 suggestion?24 A. There was never any suggestion that reached me that25 Dr Kelly felt he was being put under duress and that he

561 was not cooperating voluntarily with what was going on,2 at any stage, I might say.3 Q. Can I take you to a document I think you have referred4 to. It is MoD/1/44. It is dated 8th July. We have5 heard earlier in the evidence that it was dictated,

6 I think, on 7th July.7 A. Correct.8 Q. Is this the document that you were referring to?9 A. Yes, it is.10 Q. And you are grateful for the minute of 7th July. Now,11 to put that in context, that enclosed the minutes of the12 meeting of 4th July?13 A. That is correct. And actually the analysis that14 Mr Hatfield had produced of the differences and15 discrepancies as well as the similarities of the two16 accounts.17 Q. You say:18 "What is now needed is a more intensive interview

19 with Kelly. The objective would be to establish what20 transpired between him and Gilligan, with a reliability21 that will stand up to the intense glare of public22 scrutiny. The core issue in this respect is whether it23 was Kelly who alleged that the 45 minute intelligence24 was inserted into the dossier against the wishes of the25 intelligence community and at the behest of the

571 Government in general and Alastair Campbell in2 particular."3 Can I just ask why that was the core issue?4 A. Because that was, I believe, the critical point.5 Q. Right.6 A. The rest of Dr Kelly's discussions with Andrew Gilligan7 were, I think, the sort of discussions that he would8 have had with any person who wanted a briefing on the9 nature of the weapons programmes. That was the damaging10 assertion.11 Q. You then also say that you believe, in paragraph 4, that12 the contacts must be pinned down as clearly as possible13 because of the continuing problem with the BBC and the14 FAC's recommendation that Gilligan's contacts should be15 investigated.16 A. Yes, it was only when I returned to the office after the17 meeting with the Prime Minister that I read that part of18 the Foreign Affairs Committee report which said that19 Gilligan's contact should indeed be investigated


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20 thoroughly, which was a further reason for us making21 sure that we did not sit on the information that we had.22 Q. That part of the Foreign Affairs Committee report which23 said that Mr Gilligan's contacts should be investigated24 thoroughly was also in the context of the earlier top25 secret document that I think you have referred to. They

581 had heard all the evidence of the circumstances in which2 that had come about.3 In that respect, did you understand the Foreign4 Affairs Committee to be intending that if you find the5 person who had given Mr Gilligan the top secret report6 in February 2003, he should be brought back before the7 Foreign Affairs Committee?8 A. Not particularly, not specifically, no. I just saw that9 as a further exhortation on the Government by an10 influential Committee of Parliament to ensure that it11 acted.

12 Q. That you made sure that all --13 A. I did not read anything specifically into it other than14 the statement that the Foreign Affairs Committee had15 made, but it was a very clear statement.16 Q. That these should be investigated but not necessarily17 brought back before the Foreign Affairs Committee?18 A. Not necessarily by them, but it could have meant that.19 After all, their hearing was essentially about20 Andrew Gilligan's allegations based, as it came down to21 it, on a single anonymous source. So the linkage was22 pretty direct.23 Q. Did you at this stage have any view about whether or not24 Dr Kelly's name should be made public?

25 A. I started from the premise that it was inevitable that

591 his name would become public at some stage. He had2 implied as much in his own letter.3 Q. We have seen the passages where he says someone at4 RUSI -- you think it may be Chatham House --5 A. Yes.6 Q. -- may have known him, and also that he thought that7 some suspicion might fall on him.8 A. Yes.9 Q. Is there not a difference between those two passages and10 actually giving the name out to the press?11 A. There is indeed, but there are many other elements in12 between the two points.13 As I say, the comment from a member of staff who did14 not know about this beforehand, having read The Times on15 Saturday, saying: they have all but named him, was also16 very significant. I have learnt subsequently actually,17 I did not know at the time, that knowledge that Dr Kelly18 had had meetings with Andrew Gilligan were becoming19 discussed at cocktail parties that officials in the20 Ministry of Defence were having. I only learnt that21 subsequently but it gives, I think, a flavour of the22 sort of environment.23 Q. I think you knew that at the time, did you not? That is24 how you got told on 18th June that --25 A. Sorry, I was talking about a different event. 18th June


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601 was Mr Lamb saying this.2 Q. Right.3 A. This was quite subsequently. I mean, after all of this4 had happened, a member of my staff came to say farewell

5 to me, a commodore who was the director of operational6 audit, and said to me, "Oh we knew all about this.7 I was at a cocktail party on the Tattershall Castle and8 it was talked about then". I said, "Really. What was9 the date?" He said it was 4th July. He did not say it10 straightaway, I asked him to check his diary. So11 knowledge that this sort of issue was around --12 I mention this. I was not aware of that fact. But the13 point is once somebody had come forward with a letter,14 once it was being discussed, the risk of it widening was15 always going to grow.16 Mr Hatfield told me that his discussions with17 Dr Kelly were always on the basis that it was almost

18 certain that this would come up, that it was virtually19 inevitable. He did not record it in those terms but20 those were his words to me. And Dr Kelly seemed to21 accept that.22 Q. You, against that background, say that you considered23 the following matters for the interview: key issues;24 judgment of the probability that Dr Kelly is in25 principle the source of the allegations; the willingness

611 of Dr Kelly to be associated with a public statement.2 A. Yes.3 Q. And your views about the robustness of the rest of his

4 position, including on Iraq's WMD programmes generally.5 That is over the page to 45.6 A. Hmm, hmm.7 Q. Why was the latter part relevant?8 A. Well, it was relevant. I mean, the Government had a --9 there is a difference between telling Dr Kelly what to10 say and knowing what it is that he is going to say. And11 this was a question of being aware of what it was that12 Dr Kelly would say about the rest of the issues.13 Q. If his views were particularly unhelpful or likely to be14 particularly unhelpful, perhaps not take the matter any15 further forward?16 A. No, not at all. We would have to live with it. But17 I think there is a difference between views which may18 criticise Government policy, which is something that no19 civil servant would do, and views which simply happen to20 be inconvenient but a specialist or expert may hold21 them. It was really a question of establishing his22 position on those things.23 Q. Back to issue (a) on page 44 at the bottom, if there had24 been a judgment that Dr Kelly was probably not the25 principal source of Mr Gilligan's allegations, what

621 would have been done then? The matter would have been2 taken no further forward, is that right?3 A. I think it is highly unlikely. I have to be honest in4 saying that I was not calculating that as having a high


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5 probability. If it had become evident he was not the6 source, then the issue would not have been taken7 further.8 LORD HUTTON: I beg your pardon, that the issue would not --9 A. Have been taken further.10 MR DINGEMANS: And Dr Kelly would have gone back to

11 RAF Honnington and matters would have continued.12 A. Remember, this was not a disciplinary process, this was13 a clarificatory process.14 Q. On the face of your letters it was also a voluntary15 process.16 A. It was a process -- if you look overleaf again you will17 see the sentence I wrote at the time.18 Q. At the bottom, in paragraph 5, you say you remain19 concerned to ensure Dr Kelly's rights are respected,20 that can be employment rights et cetera. You go on to21 say:22 "... it is important that he understands he is23 cooperating voluntarily."

24 A. That is what I said at the time.25 Q. "There is also the different angle that in the event

631 that it becomes evident that he may have divulged2 classified or privileged information contrary to the3 position so far, proceedings would need to be stopped4 immediately to avoid prejudicing any case..."5 A. That is always the case. That was a generic statement6 really. This was not a statement that was supposed to7 hold anything further over Dr Kelly. I was always8 conscious it would be wrong to put someone in a position9 of coming forward with information and then that he

10 might find himself in a more serious situation in11 a disciplinary context. As I say, that was a generic12 statement rather than an expectation.13 Q. Were you aware of any other views to the effect that14 Dr Kelly ought to be given a security style interview?15 A. No, I was not actually. I have heard about it since.16 Q. Can I take you to the reference, it is CAB/1/46. It is17 a memo dictated by John Scarlett on 7th July, so the18 Monday. He says:19 "I agree with your letter of Saturday that the20 finger points strongly at David Kelly ... I have been21 through the transcripts. I attach copies of [pages].22 If he could have referred to any corroborating23 information Mr Gilligan would have done so. If this is24 true, Dr Kelly is not telling the whole story.25 "Gilligan must have got the 45 minutes single

641 intelligence report item from somewhere, presumably2 Dr Kelly. Conclusion: Dr Kelly needs a proper security3 style interview in which all these inconsistencies are4 thrashed out."5 I mean, there is no term of art, is there, "security6 style interview" it just means no doubt a fairly7 intensive grilling, is that right?8 A. I was not aware of this exchange. It would not have9 affected the way I was handling the case.10 Q. Did Dr Kelly get a proper security style interview, as


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11 far as you know?12 A. (Pause). That is rather an interesting question. It is13 not one of the yes or no answers that I can provide.14 I believe that Mr Hatfield was hugely experienced; he15 had been the policy director of the Ministry of Defence16 for four years before he became the personnel director.

17 It is a very, very large department of around 85 to18 90,000 people and I trusted his judgment, integrity and19 thoroughness entirely. He also, on the second20 interview, was accompanied by two people, another one21 was Martin Howard, again whose judgment and forensic22 skills I respect. I do not know whether that is23 a security style interview. I tend to believe that24 people cooperate and say things better if they are able25 to think and talk in a more relaxed environment.

651 Q. You see, the reason I asked the question is simply this:2 if you are cooperating, as you were keen to stress that

3 Dr Kelly should be made aware that he was cooperating,4 it is difficult to imagine someone volunteering to take5 part in a security style interview.6 A. As I say, that minute had no effect on the way I handled7 the case.8 Q. Which is why I asked whether you understood Dr Kelly to9 have got a security style interview.10 A. I think he got as thorough an examination as could have11 been achieved. There were two interviews. I do not12 think we would have got further with a third interview.13 Q. Can I take you to 7th July and the meeting itself? This14 is MoD/1/46. This is just the beginning of the note.15 You have seen the note before, but I hope to orientate

16 you quickly through it:17 "Hatfield started by saying that he wanted the18 meeting to cover two issues. The first was to follow up19 the discrepancies between Gilligan's account of the20 meeting with his source, and Kelly's account of his21 meeting with Gilligan. The second issue was that MoD22 may wish to make a public statement, and he wished to23 discuss that with Kelly. The meeting was structured to24 follow Hatfield's comparative analysis circulated..."25 That is an analysis where Dr Kelly's claim, what

661 Mr Gilligan had said, and directing it through there.2 That is the beginning of the interview.3 It is not clear from that, nor indeed anything4 Dr Wells had told us about calling Dr Kelly back for5 interview, that either Dr Wells understood or Dr Kelly6 understood that Dr Kelly was here entirely voluntarily7 and could, in fact, be at RAF Honnington. Do you agree8 that it is not clear on the document that he, Dr Kelly,9 is being told that?10 A. No, I did not think that it needed to be clear on the11 document. I mean, the understanding was that Dr Kelly12 was content with the process.13 Q. Whose understanding was that?14 A. Well, I think if you will recall, Dr Kelly actually said15 that at the Foreign Affairs Committee during his hearing16 subsequently.


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17 Q. We will come to some of his evidence.18 A. I am not trying to be glib. There was never any sense19 that I had throughout this whole process, from any of20 the individuals who were conducting the direct21 discussions with Dr Kelly, that he was feeling unhappy22 about the arrangements and the procedures that were in

23 train.24 Q. If I can continue on through pages 47, 48, 49 and on to25 page 50. There is no way, obviously, you can have seen

671 that, but the gist of the procedure there is that2 Mr Hatfield is taking him through a whole series of3 questions about Dr Kelly's views, about Mr Gilligan as4 the source.5 A. Yes.6 Q. You have seen that minute before?7 A. Yes, indeed.8 Q. Can I then take you to the bottom at page 50, which

9 appears to be the reference to the publicity. It says10 this:11 "Hatfield said that it was likely that the12 department would need to make some public statement on13 Kelly's involvement with Gilligan. He passed Kelly14 a draft press release and Kelly confirmed that he was15 content with its terms. Hatfield said that although16 Kelly was not named in the press release his identity17 may become known in due course. Kelly replied that he18 acknowledge this: in his letter of 30th June he had said19 that a friend at RUSI had alerted him to the possibility20 of his being considered as Gilligan's source."21 A. Correct.

22 Q. That does not appear to be the most unequivocal consent23 to your name being put into the public arena, is that24 fair?25 A. I think it is relatively clear, an acknowledgment, it

681 seemed to me quite strong. I cannot comment on2 precisely how the conversation went, but the report3 I had from Mr Hatfield subsequently, and you may wish to4 question Mr Hatfield about this yourself in more detail,5 was that the whole conversation was on the understanding6 that it was almost inevitable that this would be made7 public and that there would need to be a statement. The8 acknowledgment in that context, of course, was much --9 would have been stronger.10 Q. That is the meeting that takes place on 7th July. Did11 you have any discussions with Mr Hoon about it?12 LORD HUTTON: Just before you proceed. We have heard some13 evidence that Dr Kelly had asked that his name not be14 released immediately, so that he could alert his wife15 and family to the prospect that his name would come into16 the public arena. Had you heard anything to that17 effect, Sir Kevin?18 A. I was not specifically aware of that, my Lord.19 LORD HUTTON: No.20 A. I can understand why that may be so, but I was not aware21 of that particular piece of information.22 LORD HUTTON: Yes, thank you.


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23 Mr Dingemans.24 MR DINGEMANS: Did you have any discussions with Mr Hoon on25 Monday, 7th July?

691 A. I did at the beginning of the day.

2 Q. Right. That was before you attended the meeting at the3 Prime Minister's Office; is that right?4 A. Indeed, indeed.5 Q. What was the effect of those discussions?6 A. I think it was very brief and it added nothing or7 subtracted nothing from the discussion we have had so8 far. It was about 15 minutes, I think. Simply that,9 you know, I thought this was likely to be the source but10 we still could not be sure. It provided, certainly, it11 seemed to me, the explanation for Gilligan's story; that12 disciplinary issues were now passed but there was13 a question of how to clarify the public record, the14 reasons for doing so. But it was all very briefly.

15 Q. The interview takes place, we know, in the afternoon.16 You were briefed after the interview; is that right?17 A. Yes.18 Q. Was any decision then taken about press releases or19 anything?20 A. No, no decisions about press releases at that stage.21 I mean, Mr Hatfield had told me that, as I say, he had22 made it clear to Dr Kelly that a public statement on his23 meeting would almost certainly be needed and that24 Dr Kelly would need to be prepared to stand by his25 account.

70

1 Q. Is that how it concludes on Monday, 7th July?2 A. On the evening I reported the outcome of the interview3 to Sir David Omand, and I think Jonathan Powell, that4 while it seemed increasingly likely that Dr Kelly's5 meeting provided the explanation for the Gilligan story,6 I think there was a phrase that I thought that was quite7 important coming from Mr Hatfield, that I think Dr Kelly8 said, "I may have been led on", or something of that9 kind. We still could not be absolutely certain because10 Dr Kelly still argued that he did not think he could be11 the source.12 Q. Right.13 A. Equally, I said that or we agreed that concern that we14 would be accused of covering up the relevant information15 was growing each day that time passed, if we held on to16 it any longer. So we were sort of handling a problem of17 timing. On the one hand, trying to be as clear as we18 could about the nature of this information from19 Dr Kelly; on the other hand, each day that passed,20 greater risk that the Government would be accused of21 covering up vital information. At that stage, No. 1022 asked us to send over draft press releases. I did not23 believe we were ready at that stage to make a press24 statement but I think sent two draft statements across,25 one short, one long, but designed essentially to keep

711 the discussion going but not to actually issue a press


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2 release at that point.3 LORD HUTTON: But if, on Dr Kelly's account, he had not told4 Mr Gilligan that the Government had inserted the5 45 minutes claim and that the Government knew that that6 claim was probably false, so that in fact the gist of7 what he was saying was to refute Mr Gilligan's report,

8 how could the Government be criticised for covering up9 that matter? Because it was basically in favour of the10 Government's viewpoint.11 A. My Lord, perhaps I did not make

Hearing Transcript - 20 August 2003 Morning

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