Hearing Transcript - 27 August 2003 Morning

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 27 August 2003 Morning

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Hearing Transcripts

1 Wednesday, 27th August 20032 (10.30 am)3 LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.4 Yes, Mr Dingemans.

5 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, the Secretary of State for Defence.6 LORD HUTTON: Thank you.7 MR GEOFF HOON (called)8 Examined by MR DINGEMANS9 MR DINGEMANS: Could you tell his Lordship your full name.10 A. I am Geoffrey William Hoon.11 Q. And you are Secretary of State for Defence?12 A. Yes, I am.13 Q. When were you appointed Secretary of State for Defence?14 A. In October 1999.15 Q. Did you have any involvement in the drafting of the16 dossier that was published by the Government on17 24th September 2002?

18 A. I saw two drafts of the dossier in the week beginning19 16th September 2002, relatively late stage in the20 process of the drafting, and I did not offer any21 comments or suggest any changes to it.22 Q. Were you aware of the Defence Intelligence Staff23 involvement with the drafting of the dossier?24 A. I knew that there would have been from within the25 Ministry of Defence participation by the DIS in the

11 preparation, but I was not aware of what specific2 contribution they had made.3 Q. Were you aware of any unhappiness expressed by members

4 of the DIS with the dossier, either before or after5 publication?6 A. Not at the time, not before publication. Very much7 later, preparation for evidence that I gave to the ISC,8 I was aware that two officials had expressed some9 concern about certain language used in the dossier.10 I think it is important that I emphasise that this was11 of a linguistic kind. The debate was whether particular12 intelligence "indicated" or "suggested" or "showed"13 a particular conclusion. So it was a very technical14 discussion by individuals in DIS; perhaps, not15 surprisingly, very expert people trying to ensure that16 the language was absolutely precise.

17 Q. If I show you MoD/4/6, is this the memo to which I think18 you have just referred to? It is a memo dated19 18th July 2003. It should come up on your screen:20 "The ISC is likely to probe the Secretary of State21 and the former CDI [Chief of Defence Intelligence] about22 the process through which the members of the DIS can23 express concerns..."24 Is that the document to which you were referring?25 A. Yes, it is. It is part of the preparation I received

21 for giving evidence to the ISC in July.2 Q. At MoD/4/9 we see the concerns reported to you, I think,

3 as part of the annex to the briefing note; is that4 right? (Pause). Do you recognise that?


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5 A. I do not specifically recognise it, but it appears to6 refer to the general issue that I have just set out,7 yes.8 Q. And you had no other involvement with the dossier9 itself?10 A. No.

11 Q. Can I then turn to a lunch that we have heard from12 Ms Watts that Dr Kelly reported having with you in13 about April time. Did you, in fact, have lunch with14 Dr Kelly at any time?15 A. No, I did not. It is my practice from time to time to16 eat in the Old War Office Building canteen. That was17 particularly the case in the course of the conflict18 because I was there long periods of the time and19 throughout weekends. When I am there, I routinely talk20 to members of the armed forces but also obviously to21 officials.22 On this particular occasion I had lunch with23 a private secretary from my private office. At the end

24 of lunch we were approached by an official, I did not25 know who it was. We talked about Iraq. We discussed

31 the Government policy, which the official said he2 strongly supported; and it was not a formal occasion in3 any sense at all. It was the kind of conversation that4 I had routinely with people in the Ministry of Defence.5 I did not know that it was Dr Kelly at the time.6 I only realised that it was Dr Kelly when, after his7 death, I visited his wife and daughters and one of the8 daughters reminded me of this meeting and this occasion.9 And I immediately realised, of course, that it was

10 Dr Kelly.11 Q. He is said to have said to Ms Watts that you remarked12 that there was a "mosaic of evidence" being built up.13 Does that ring any bells?14 A. I do not recall using the specific word "mosaic"15 although I clearly could have done because I think that16 is consistent with the way in which I have described the17 intelligence picture as far as Iraq under Saddam Hussein18 was concerned.19 I have been in this position for almost four years.20 Before that I was briefly in the Foreign Office, with,21 for a period of time, responsibility for the22 Middle East. Therefore I have been seeing intelligence

23 material in relation to Iraq now for well over24 four years. And it is my view of that intelligence that25 it is cumulative, that it builds up to a picture.

41 Intelligence tends not to be in the form of a large2 volume of material submitted at any one time. It is3 a series of individual sometimes pieces of information4 that build up into a picture. So actually "mosaic" is5 quite a good word to describe the picture that6 I perceived about Iraq's position in relation to weapons7 of mass destruction.8 Q. That appears to have been April. On 29th May

9 Mr Gilligan made his broadcast on the Today Programme.10 What was your reaction to that broadcast?


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11 A. Well, he had made what I considered to be a very serious12 charge against the Government, essentially that the13 Government was lying to Parliament and to the British14 people. And I took particular exception to that charge15 because of my responsibility for decisions affecting the16 lives of British servicemen and servicewomen. I was

17 also concerned that essentially the way in which this18 material was presented by the BBC meant that it was19 impossible for the public or Parliament to evaluate the20 standing, the knowledge, the experience, the background21 of Andrew Gilligan's anonymous source.22 Normally when assessing evidence it is possible to23 look at the source of the evidence to make a judgment as24 to whether that person has knowledge or experience25 sufficient to bring forward that particular piece of

51 information. By relying on an anonymous source that2 opportunity was denied to the public and denied to

3 Parliament.4 Q. Does that mean when the source was identified it became5 particularly important to identify what his6 qualifications were?7 A. Certainly that is part of the normal process by which8 evidence is evaluated, whether in court or in human9 relations.10 Q. We have been told about investigations that were carried11 out after the broadcast on 29th May. Were you aware of12 any of these investigations?13 A. No, I was not.14 Q. We know that Mr Gilligan gave evidence to the Foreign15 Affairs Committee on 19th June. Did you note his

16 evidence and reflect on that at all?17 A. Certainly it seemed to reflect the material that he had18 broadcast and the material that he had set out in an19 article in The Mail on Sunday. There was a particular20 emphasis, in the evidence that he gave to the Foreign21 Affairs Committee as against what he broadcast and22 wrote, on the source. He referred, in the Foreign23 Affairs Committee, continually to the fact that this is24 what his source had told him, rather than necessarily25 asserting that it was true.

61 Later I did look again at the transcript because on

2 the assumption that Mr Gilligan was telling the truth to3 the Committee, I was trying to see whether he gave any4 clear indication about the nature of the source and who5 that source might be.6 Q. You say later you looked again at the transcript. When7 was that, that you looked again?8 A. It was once Dr Kelly had come forward, because my9 concern throughout was to try to identify whether or not10 Dr Kelly was, in fact, Andrew Gilligan's single source.11 Q. Were you aware whether or not notice had been given to12 the Ministry of Defence about the proposed broadcast?13 A. I believe very strongly that notice was not given; and14 it was one aspect of my concern about the way in which

15 this material had been published by Mr Gilligan and the16 Today Programme that no proper opportunity was given to


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17 the Ministry of Defence to respond to it.18 LORD HUTTON: Was that to respond after the report had been19 broadcast or before it was broadcast?20 A. The concern, obviously, came after the broadcast because21 Mr Gilligan, and I think subsequently John Humphrys on22 the Today Programme, stated strongly that this had been

23 checked with the Ministry of Defence, the implication24 being that the Ministry of Defence had had the25 opportunity of responding to the allegations made by

71 Andrew Gilligan, and that was not the case.2 LORD HUTTON: Yes.3 A. And a record of contacts by journalists to the Ministry4 of Defence press office is kept. That did not show that5 Andrew Gilligan had informed the MoD press office at all6 of the nature of the broadcast that he was going to make7 on that Thursday morning; and that no effort, therefore,8 was made by Andrew Gilligan to apprise us of the nature

9 of the broadcast.10 LORD HUTTON: As regards apprising you of the nature of the11 broadcast, did you feel that the MoD should have been12 given notice of it before the report was broadcast, so13 it had the opportunity to point out to the BBC that the14 criticism was unfounded, or that your opportunity to15 reply should be in the Today Programme after the report16 had been broadcast?17 A. I personally believe that it would have given much18 better balance to the story that was broadcast if we had19 had the opportunity, at the time, to respond; so that --20 LORD HUTTON: "At the time"; you mean before it was21 broadcast?

22 A. Before it was broadcast. But then it would have23 appeared, presumably, in the broadcast to the effect24 that the Ministry of Defence did not accept the25 allegations made by Andrew Gilligan and the Today

81 Programme.2 LORD HUTTON: Yes.3 MR DINGEMANS: We know on 28th June that Mr Bradshaw goes on4 to the Today Programme. This is CAB/1/378. He speaks5 with Mr Humphrys about whether or not notice is given.6 We have seen this in the past. I think you have seen at7 least extracts of the broadcasts.

8 A. I actually heard the broadcast at the time.9 Q. You heard the broadcast. He follows it up with a letter10 at CAB/1/389. That is responded to; you can see his11 letter to Mr Sambrook which is dated 28th June, after12 his interview. Were you party to any of this13 letter-writing at this stage?14 A. I was not party to that particular letter but, from15 memory, I believe that Mr Sambrook responded and in his16 response stated that there had been contact with the17 Ministry of Defence press office alerting the Ministry18 of Defence press office to -- as a result of that,19 I then wrote to Richard Sambrook indicating that this20 was not true and that I hoped that he and the BBC would

21 correct that fact.22 Q. We see at CAB/1/390 Mr Sambrook's letter of 29th June


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23 suggesting that there had been contact, and you can see24 that coming up on the screen.25 A. Yes, I have seen that.

91 Q. Mr Bradshaw writes a follow up letter. But you write

2 a letter at CAB/1/403.3 A. I think 2nd July.4 Q. Yes. And in terms of the dispute with the BBC, we have5 seen that effectively Mr Campbell has written on6 26th June and he has got a response on 27th June which7 he considered did not address the issues. He goes on to8 Channel 4 on 27th June and strongly reaffirms that.9 On 28th June Mr Bradshaw takes up, as it were,10 a slightly different tack in relation to the absence of11 notice; and you join in with that after Mr Sambrook's12 reply of 30th June that we have just looked at.13 Was this part of a letter-writing campaign or14 anything that was being orchestrated against the BBC at

15 this stage?16 A. It was certainly not orchestrated. I joined in because17 I felt that Richard Sambrook was stating something that18 I knew, from the records kept in the Ministry of19 Defence, was wrong.20 Q. Did you have any discussions with Mr Campbell about your21 proposed letter-writing?22 A. I spoke to him, I think it was immediately after the23 interview involving Ben Bradshaw, I think on a Saturday24 morning, essentially to make the point that I am just25 making to you now, that there was a record in the

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1 Ministry of Defence press office. That record did not2 appear to bear out what John Humphrys had been saying.3 Q. I think there was further correspondence with4 Mr Sambrook. We see his reply to you at CAB/1/401.5 A. 3rd July?6 Q. Yes. And we can see a fairly short letter saying:7 clearly your version of what happened differs from ours.8 I take that seriously and will look again. I think you9 write on 4th July at CAB/1/408, is that right?10 A. I have a letter dated 3rd July. So I wrote almost11 immediately in response.12 Q. Right. Effectively picking up those points.13 A. If I may say that my concern, essentially, here was

14 twofold. One, that I did not believe that15 Andrew Gilligan was necessarily reliably informing the16 world about what had happened in relation to his17 contacts with the Ministry of Defence press office.18 I was also concerned that he was not necessarily19 reliably informing his manager, Richard Sambrook, as to20 what had taken place.21 Q. And you wanted to bring that to Mr Sambrook's attention?22 A. I did.23 Q. On 3rd July, whilst this correspondence is being24 exchanged, did you hear anything relating to Dr Kelly?25 A. It was on the evening of the -- the late afternoon, in

111 the first place, on 3rd July that I was told that an


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2 official had come forward. I apologise for my3 hesitation but I did not hear anything in relation to4 Dr Kelly at that stage because no-one at that stage gave5 me a name or told me the identity of the official who6 had come forward. I was simply told, by my principal7 private secretary, that --

8 Q. That is Sir Kevin Tebbit, is it?9 A. My principal private secretary is Peter Watkins. This10 was my private office informing me that someone had come11 forward, that the Permanent Secretary would like to have12 a conversation with me, that is Sir Kevin Tebbit; and13 suggesting that we should meet later that day. In fact,14 we eventually met in the evening of 3rd July, where15 I was told in a little more detail, but still not given16 the name, that an official had indicated that he had had17 contact with Andrew Gilligan during what I might say was18 the relevant time period before the broadcast.19 Q. Were you told anything about a letter that the official20 had written?

21 A. I was told that he had set out, in some detail, that he22 had had this meeting with Andrew Gilligan. There were23 various details put to me, but I -- the significant24 thing was that although he had recognised some of the25 things that Andrew Gilligan subsequently broadcast as

121 being attributable to him and to his conversation, he2 did not believe that he was Andrew Gilligan's single3 source because there were other things in the broadcast4 that he did not recognise as having said to5 Andrew Gilligan in the course of that meeting.6 Q. Did you have any initial reaction to this information?

7 A. I think my first -- my very first reaction was that this8 was something that could well lead to disciplinary9 proceedings, as far as the official was concerned. The10 Ministry of Defence, in the period -- for some time, has11 had something of a reputation for unauthorised briefing12 and leaking to journalists; and it did appear that this13 was perhaps an opportunity to demonstrate that14 unauthorised contacts with journalists would be looked15 at seriously.16 Q. Can I just there take you to a reference which is17 5th June 2003, MoD/1/17? This is a memorandum from18 Martin Howard who the Deputy Chief of Defence19 Intelligence. He says, in paragraph 2, that the

20 Ministry of Defence had a reputation as a "leaky"21 department.22 Over the page at MoD/1/18, towards the bottom, he23 said this:24 "I repeat, that I have no reason to think that25 anyone in the DIS is responsible for the leak to

131 Mr Gilligan. But if it turns out that this is the case2 and the individual is identified, the strongest possible3 action will be taken."4 Which I think you say accords with your initial5 thought?

6 A. That was certainly my very first thought, because over7 some time there had been warnings to -- I will not just


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14 Q. Did you decide, when you were talking to15 Sir Kevin Tebbit, what to do in relation to Dr Kelly,16 about interviews or anything else?17 A. Well, I did not decide because it has always been my18 practice, in the Ministry of Defence, to ensure that19 appropriate responsibilities are dealt with by

20 appropriate people. When I first arrived in the21 Ministry of Defence I think it was the then Chief of22 Defence Staff described the leadership of the Ministry23 of Defence as a three legged stool. He had24 responsibility for military matters; the Permanent25 Secretary had responsibility for personnel matters,

161 Civil Service; and I was responsible for political2 leadership of the department. Therefore, as far as any3 personnel issues were concerned, the responsibility was4 clearly that of the Permanent Secretary.5 Q. Was anything said about interviews with Dr Kelly though,

6 in your discussions?7 A. The Permanent Secretary summarised the position8 consistently, I believe, with the thoughts that I have9 just set out to you in terms of my initial reaction,10 which was that either there could be a disciplinary11 process affecting the official or there could be what he12 described as a management process, reflecting the fact13 that the official had come forward, was apparently14 cooperating, and could, he believed at that stage,15 correct the public record, that is the material that16 Andrew Gilligan had broadcast. That was his analysis of17 the issue. That analysis I accepted because he was18 responsible for those personnel questions.

19 LORD HUTTON: Was correcting the public record a personnel20 matter?21 A. As far as Sir Kevin was concerned, it was important to22 the Ministry of Defence and indeed to the Government as23 a whole that the public record should be corrected.24 I think he viewed that as a management issue, as far as25 dealing with the official was concerned.

171 MR DINGEMANS: After the --2 LORD HUTTON: What did you understand by the public record3 being corrected, Secretary of State?4 A. I think it is important that I do not get ahead of my

5 knowledge at this stage, my Lord.6 LORD HUTTON: Leave it to a later stage if you prefer.7 A. I think I can say this: at the time --8 LORD HUTTON: I just want to know what was in your thoughts9 at the time.10 A. At the time we were obviously concerned about the11 broadcast that Andrew Gilligan had made. It appeared12 possible, but I can go no further than that and I would13 not put it any more strongly, that this particular14 official, at that time, would have had something15 relevant to say about the content of the broadcast and16 how Andrew Gilligan came about the material that he17 relied on for making the broadcast. But at that stage,

18 I was told that the official did not believe that he was19 Andrew Gilligan's single source or primary source, and


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20 the issue, therefore, was his exact status in relation21 to the material that Andrew Gilligan had relied on.22 MR DINGEMANS: Did you speak to anyone that evening, after23 your conversation with Sir Kevin Tebbit?24 A. I had a brief conversation that evening with25 Jonathan Powell simply to alert him and the

181 Prime Minister to the fact that this official had come2 forward.3 Q. Why were you speaking to Mr Powell at that stage?4 A. It seemed to me a matter of significance for the5 Government that an official who might have something6 relevant to say had come forward. It would be standard7 practice on an issue of that significance for me, and8 I am sure for other Secretaries of State, to inform the9 Prime Minister.10 Q. The 4th July we know is a Friday. Where are you on that11 day?

12 A. I was in my constituency.13 Q. Did you have any discussions relating to Dr Kelly, as we14 now know him to be, on that day? You at that stage know15 him to be an official.16 A. I think it is important that I just fill in the17 background. On the Thursday evening Kevin Tebbit had18 made clear to me that there would have to be an19 interview conducted by the personnel director,20 Richard Hatfield. I think my only involvement in the21 process is I was asked by Kevin whether that interview22 should take place on the Friday or the following Monday.23 Because of my concern about the Foreign Affairs24 Committee I suggested that it was better that that

25 interview should take place sooner rather than later.

191 It therefore took place on the Friday.2 The further conversation I had on the Friday was3 about the results of that interview conducted by4 Richard Hatfield.5 Q. Well, who gave you the results of the interview?6 A. Kevin Tebbit called me to say that the --7 Q. On the telephone?8 A. Yes, called me to say that the interview had taken place9 but that it was inconclusive as to whether or not the10 official -- and I think it was in that conversation that

11 I first learned of his name, so perhaps it would be12 sensible if I described him from now on as Dr Kelly.13 I was told, for the first time, his identity. But I was14 told that the interview had not established whether or15 not he was, in fact, Andrew Gilligan's primary source.16 Q. Do you remember what time of day this conversation took17 place?18 A. I am almost sure that it would have been towards the19 evening. I have checked my diary for that day. I had20 a very full programme of engagements in the21 constituency, including constituency surgery which again22 is done by appointment. So there was not a lot of free23 time in my diary that day. So I assume it would have

24 been some time in the early evening.25 Q. Did you have any discussions with Mr Campbell on that


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201 day?2 A. To the best of my recollection, the first time that3 I spoke to Alastair Campbell about this was on the4 Saturday morning; but I -- that is really largely

5 because of the busy nature of a full constituency day.6 I do not believe I had a conversation with Alastair on7 the Friday evening, I think it was the Saturday morning.8 Q. Friday evening or Saturday morning. What was the nature9 of your conversation with him?10 A. Well, the reason that I believe that it was Saturday11 morning was that there was an article in The Times on12 Saturday morning by Tom Baldwin which I saw in the press13 cuttings faxed to me that morning, which seemed to14 indicate some very detailed knowledge on the part of15 Tom Baldwin about the identity of Andrew Gilligan's16 single source. Because it was a media issue, and17 therefore something for which Alastair is responsible,

18 I called him to say that I had seen this article and19 felt that it was of some significance.20 I also spoke to Kevin Tebbit, who had also seen the21 article and who had also quite independently thought it22 was significant. Alastair, of course, had seen the23 article and told me that, as far as he was concerned,24 Tom Baldwin had got the material in the piece from an25 editorial lunch attended by Richard Sambrook at the

211 offices of The Times.2 Q. Did you speak to Mr Campbell about your initial3 reactions on hearing the news of Dr Kelly coming

4 forward?5 A. Yes, I did. I described to him the process that I have6 set out to you now, which is what my initial reaction7 was, the importance of security of information in the8 Ministry of Defence and the possibility of there being9 disciplinary proceedings, but also I emphasised to him10 my concern about any suggestion that the Government11 should be covering up the fact of a potential witness12 coming forward, in the light of the continuing, as13 I felt at the time, Foreign Affairs Committee14 deliberations. So I went through precisely the process15 that I have gone through today of describing to him both16 my initial reaction and then my thoughts about the

17 relevance of this to the Foreign Affairs Committee.18 Q. I think Mr Campbell's recollection was that the19 conversation was on the Friday. He also mentioned that20 after you had spoken about your initial instincts in21 relation to disciplinary proceedings, you mentioned the22 words "plea bargain". Do you recollect mentioning that23 to Mr Campbell?24 A. I do not remember using that particular phrase to him,25 but I can see that as a shorthand account of what I had

221 described to him it would have summarised, in a sense,2 the alternatives available to the personnel director in

3 the Ministry of Defence in dealing with Dr Kelly. But4 I would want to emphasise that it was never the case


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11 recognised and was clearly from him in the course of the12 conversations that he had had, but some of the material13 was not. And it may well have been that that particular14 aspect of it was part of the material that he15 recognised.16 Q. At this stage, had you seen Dr Kelly's letter which we

17 can see at MoD/1/19?18 A. I had seen it. I --19 Q. When had you seen it?20 A. I had seen it the previous evening, because I think it21 was following my conversation with Kevin Tebbit, when he22 reported the results of the initial interview with23 Richard Hatfield, I was concerned to know more about the24 background of the official coming forward. Therefore25 I asked for that to be sent to my office. It was sent

251 to my constituency office. I do not have a secure line2 there, so my private office topped and tailed the letter

3 to ensure that it was not identifiable.4 Q. So you see that on the Friday at your constituency?5 A. Yes, Friday evening.6 Q. Did you see any notes of the interview on that day?7 A. No, I did not.8 Q. But you were told about that by the Permanent Secretary?9 A. Yes.10 Q. And what level of detail did Sir Kevin Tebbit go into11 about the interview?12 A. I think the point I have made already, which was that as13 a result of the interview Richard Hatfield, the14 personnel director, had concluded that Dr Kelly was not15 the single source, was not the primary source that

16 Andrew Gilligan had relied on, and that, therefore, it17 would not be possible at that stage for Kevin Tebbit to18 seek to correct the public record -- I think that was19 the phrase that he used -- on the basis of Dr Kelly20 having come forward.21 LORD HUTTON: What did you understand by Sir Kevin Tebbit22 correcting the public record? I mean, if Mr Hatfield23 had concluded that Dr Kelly was the single source, how24 did you understand that Sir Kevin Tebbit would correct25 the public record?

261 A. Well, I think that is a --

2 LORD HUTTON: Again, perhaps this is coming ahead to a point3 you will deal with later.4 A. We were all concerned, but not only the politicians,5 my Lord, but also senior officials, including6 Kevin Tebbit, about the allegations that Andrew Gilligan7 had made, because they went to the heart of the8 Government's credibility and trust.9 LORD HUTTON: Yes.10 A. Therefore Sir Kevin was equally concerned to ensure that11 if there was relevant evidence supplied by an official12 who had had a relevant contact with Andrew Gilligan,13 that he could then use that material to demonstrate14 actually that what Andrew Gilligan had asserted in his

15 broadcast was not, in fact, true.16 LORD HUTTON: Yes.


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17 MR DINGEMANS: Were you aware, as far as Mr Hatfield was18 concerned, who is the personnel director, that the19 disciplinary side of proceedings had been concluded on20 that Friday evening?21 A. I do not think that was made known to me on the Friday22 evening. I learned subsequently that that was the case;

23 but certainly I had understood -- I know24 Richard Hatfield very well, he was formerly the policy25 director in the Ministry of Defence and I had regular

271 contact with him when he was in that position. He is an2 extremely capable and effective civil servant and I knew3 he would have gone through the material thoroughly and4 fairly with Dr Kelly.5 Q. We can see at MoD/1/26, which is part way through notes6 of the meeting on 4th July, and it is the first main7 paragraph, Mr Hatfield says he is prepared to accept his8 account in good faith. On the basis of his letter he

9 breached departmental instructions.10 He says later down that paragraph:11 "This was a potentially very serious matter.12 Nevertheless, I accepted his assurance that there had13 been no malicious intent and there appeared no reason to14 believe that classified material had been revealed. On15 that basis, I judged that it would not be appropriate to16 initiate formal disciplinary proceedings. I would,17 however, write to him shortly to record my displeasure18 at his conduct."19 In fact we know he wrote on 9th July. When did you20 become aware that had been the outcome of the21 disciplinary side of the process?

22 A. I am not sure I could give you a precise date. To the23 best of my recollection, there was some delay between24 the decision that Richard Hatfield took and actually25 seeing Dr Kelly to communicate that fact to him. But

281 I was certainly aware, probably second-hand, either from2 my private office or from Sir Kevin, that some sort of3 process was to be gone through with Dr Kelly arising out4 of the interview. As I have indicated previously, these5 were essentially personnel matters, they were not6 matters necessarily that concern the Secretary of State.7 Q. We also know that there was a draft press statement,

8 prepared by the Ministry of Defence that night, and9 draft Q and A material, also prepared that night. If we10 look at CAB/21/3, we can see at the top:11 "Produced on 4.7.03."12 A. Yes, I have the document in front of me.13 Q. That was produced on the Friday evening when you were in14 the constituency. Were you any part of this Q and A15 material and were you consulted about it?16 A. No, I was not. I would not expect to be consulted about17 that kind of material. It would be prepared in the18 press office for the guidance of individual press19 officers, particularly those coming on duty, to ensure20 that they had access to appropriate material should

21 these questions arise. But this was entirely material22 that was contingent upon their being asked these


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23 questions by journalists contacting the press office.24 Q. In fact no-one contacted the press office so, as we25 understand it, it was not deployed.

291 Were you aware that at this stage there had been

2 concern that Dr Kelly was the source of The Observer3 article on mobile trailers and whether or not they were4 related to chemical and biological weapons?5 A. I was not aware of that at that stage, no.6 Q. And were you aware of Dr Kelly's involvement, if any, in7 the dossier?8 A. Only because of the reference in the letter that he9 originally sent to the Ministry of Defence. There was10 a reference to his part in the dossier in his letter11 informing the Ministry of Defence that --12 Q. We can see the relevant extracts at MoD/1/19:13 "As you know I have been involved in writing three14 'dossiers'..."

15 If one scrolls down the page he says:16 "My contributions to the latter [that is the UK17 Government's dossier] were in part 2 (History of UN18 Inspections) and part 1 chapter 2 (Iraq's programmes19 1971-1998) at the behest of the FCO and I was not20 involved in the intelligence component in any way nor in21 the process of the dossier's compilation. I have not22 acknowledged to anyone outside FCO my contribution ...23 I am not a member of the intelligence community although24 I interact with that community and I am essentially, as25 an inspector, a consumer of intelligence not

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1 a generator..."2 So that is what you knew at this stage?3 A. Yes.4 Q. You think that the conversation you had with Mr Campbell5 was on the Saturday. Did you have any other6 conversations with anyone else that day?7 A. I am sure that there would have been some discussion8 with my principal private secretary. But that is the9 only conversation that I can recall was strictly10 relevant, as far as these issues were concerned.11 Q. Did you have a view at that stage about whether or not12 it was desirable that Dr Kelly's name should be made13 public?

14 A. I was concerned at that stage that we did not have15 enough information to be able to be sure that Dr Kelly16 was the single source of Andrew Gilligan's material.17 And in those circumstances, and indeed throughout the18 history of this matter, because I was not sure that that19 was the case, I did not believe that it was appropriate20 to make his name public.21 Q. Were you aware that throughout, whether rightly or22 wrongly, Dr Kelly was contending that he was not the23 single source?24 A. That he was not?25 Q. Yes.

311 A. Yes, I was aware of that and I have said so already to


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2 the Inquiry. I was aware of that because of the letter3 that he wrote to the Ministry of Defence and, indeed,4 because of the interview that he had conducted with5 Richard Hatfield. That was a significant factor in the6 material that Kevin Tebbit told me about following the7 interview.

8 Q. Did you learn of any proposed meeting at the BBC over9 this weekend?10 A. Yes, I did. I think it was widely broadcast that there11 was to be a meeting of the BBC governors on the Sunday12 evening to consider these issues.13 Q. What was your reaction to that meeting?14 A. I think my concern, and I certainly discussed this with15 Alastair Campbell on the Sunday, which would have been16 the 6th, was that Andrew Gilligan may not have been17 reliably informing senior management in the BBC of the18 nature of his source. That particularly came out of an19 interview that Richard Sambrook did with the Today20 Programme somewhat earlier, where he had indicated that

21 the source was an intelligence source; and that did not22 appear to fit with Dr Kelly's position, although23 I recognised, and we had a good deal of discussion about24 this -- that is Alastair Campbell and I on the Sunday --25 that there were at least two possible explanations of

321 that. 1) that Andrew Gilligan had misrepresented the2 nature of his source to his management and that they3 were not therefore in a position to properly assess the4 material that he had provided to them; or, and this5 remained my concern throughout, that there was in fact6 another primary source, that there was another person

7 who had provided more significant information to8 Andrew Gilligan.9 Q. Did you, on the Sunday, discuss with Mr Campbell the10 desirability of bringing out Dr Kelly into the open?11 A. Not as far as his name was concerned, because I remained12 very concerned that that would have been unfair to13 Dr Kelly at that stage, because I was not sure that he14 was Andrew Gilligan's single source.15 What I discussed with Alastair -- we spent a lot of16 time discussing it, I am afraid rather fruitlessly in17 many ways -- was how we could find a way of encouraging18 the BBC to accept that it was in both our interests to19 identify Andrew Gilligan's source. It seemed to me that

20 there was at least the possibility that Andrew Gilligan21 was being less than frank with Richard Sambrook and22 others about the nature of his source and that,23 therefore, there was an interest both in the Ministry of24 Defence and in the BBC of identifying who that was.25 Q. Did you have any discussions with the Prime Minister

331 over the weekend about this?2 A. I certainly had a conversation with Jonathan Powell.3 I do not believe that I spoke directly to the4 Prime Minister on the Sunday, no.5 Q. And what was the nature of your conversation with

6 Mr Powell?7 A. Well, again, it followed on from the kinds of


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8 conversations that I had been having with9 Alastair Campbell. I am pretty sure that Alastair was10 also having them with Jonathan and probably with the11 Prime Minister, although I have no specific evidence of12 that. Simply that we were all concerned that someone13 had come forward, that they might have relevant evidence

14 to give about the nature of Andrew Gilligan's contacts,15 but that because we were not confident that he was the16 single source that Andrew Gilligan had relied on, that17 we could not confidently take the matter forward unless18 we had some process whereby the BBC were willing to19 confirm the identity of that source.20 I think it is fair to say that Jonathan was fairly21 sceptical about the willingness of the BBC to do that,22 and that we discussed various ways in which, in23 a confidential manner, senior BBC management might be24 willing to do that, simply because I thought that it25 might be in their interest to know whether or not, in

341 fact, Andrew Gilligan was reliably informing them of all2 the relevant information about his source.3 Q. Was this the genesis of the letters that we know you4 wrote on the 8th and 9th or 9th and 10th?5 A. There were a good deal of discussions in the days that6 followed about the best way of trying to give this7 information to the BBC or encourage the BBC to identify8 Andrew Gilligan's source. In the end, this was the one9 approach that was adopted. But other approaches were10 considered as well.11 Q. Because, I mean, logically if Dr Kelly goes before12 anyone and he is protesting he is not the single source,

13 whether or not very clever people like Sir David Omand14 think differently, unless the BBC have confirmed he is15 the single source, people like the Foreign Affairs16 Committee are likely to conclude as Mr Hatfield did,17 namely he has nothing to do with it.18 A. And that was exactly my view as well, because I think it19 was extremely important, in fairness to Dr Kelly, not to20 expose him as the single source without being sure that21 that was true; and I was not sure that that was true.22 And the Prime Minister was not sure that it was true.23 Eventually on that Sunday afternoon I had a message,24 it came from two sources, one from my private secretary25 and one directly from Jonathan Powell, that the

351 Prime Minister felt there was insufficient information2 to be able to confidently take forward any suggestion3 that Dr Kelly was the single source and that therefore4 we should not pursue the matter further that day, that5 is before the meeting of the BBC governors.6 Q. I appreciate we are running ahead of ourselves a wee7 bit.8 LORD HUTTON: Before we proceed, may I just ask, Secretary9 of State: with regard to your plan vis a vis the BBC,10 suppose you had given in confidence to the BBC or to the11 Government Dr Kelly's name and that the BBC had then

12 confirmed that: yes, he was Mr Gilligan's source. What13 was your thinking after that? What did you think might


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20 were still concerned with ensuring, out of fairness to21 Dr Kelly, his name did not come out before you were sure22 he was the single source.23 A. That is absolutely right. Indeed, I had a conversation24 with my private secretary on the day that the BBC made25 their announcement, still questioning whether in fact --

381 because I had been told they were going to make an2 announcement but I did not know the nature of it at the3 time. I still was not sure on -- when was it? --4 Sunday, about the 20th I should imagine, when they made5 their announcement, I still was not sure at that stage,6 before they made their announcement, that Dr Kelly was7 their single source.8 Q. I rushed ahead of myself a bit. Shall we go back to the9 Sunday? Does that cover all you wanted to say about the10 discussions on the Sunday?11 A. Just forgive me a second. (Pause). Yes.

12 Q. Coming on then to the Monday. We have heard about13 a meeting which took place in No. 10 and the fact that14 you were not there but Sir Kevin Tebbit was there. Did15 you have any discussions with Sir Kevin Tebbit before he16 went?17 A. He came into my office before going across to the18 meeting in Downing Street. I think the one thing that19 he told me at that stage was that it had been agreed20 with the Cabinet Office and Downing Street over the21 weekend that Dr Kelly would be interviewed again.22 Q. It had been agreed by?23 A. Well, I think in conversation with Sir David Omand on24 behalf of the Cabinet Office and Downing Street.

25 Q. Right. And Sir Kevin Tebbit had agreed that?

391 A. Yes.2 Q. So what were you told on the Monday morning by3 Sir Kevin?4 A. Well, simply that. There was some discussion about the5 fact that Dr Kelly had already set off for6 RAF Honnington to attend a course, I think in7 preparation for his going back to Iraq, and therefore8 there was discussion about how he could be returned in9 order to be further interviewed.10 I also discussed with him the same point that we

11 have just gone through: the possibility of approaching12 the BBC privately to see whether they would be willing13 to confirm the identity of Andrew Gilligan's single14 source as part of this management process affecting both15 institutions.16 Q. And what was his view about that?17 A. Well, I think it was part of the general discussions18 that were taking place. I assumed he would have fed19 that into the discussion that then took place in20 Downing Street subsequently about what action to take.21 Q. Sir Kevin goes off to Downing Street then?22 A. Yes.23 Q. We know that the FAC report is published. Did you look

24 at it on that day?25 A. Yes, I did. I certainly -- I do not think I looked at


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401 the entirety of the report. I certainly looked at the2 conclusions and recommendations. I mean, this was3 a high profile report. It was directly concerned with4 issues that I had obviously been very much involved

5 with, the decision to take military action in Iraq. So6 its conclusions were of great interest to me.7 Q. Can I take you to FAC/3/7, which is part way through the8 conclusions part of the FAC report. Scrolling down we9 can see there is a paragraph 26. Did you see that10 conclusion at the time?11 A. Yes, I did.12 Q. Did that have any influence on your thinking?13 A. Well, I think it simply emphasised the concern that14 I had had since the Thursday, since I had been told that15 an official had come forward. My concern on the16 Thursday, as I have indicated already, is that we should17 not be seen to be covering up the fact that this man had

18 come forward. Here was the Foreign Affairs Committee19 actually emphasising the importance to them of20 a thorough investigation into Andrew Gilligan's alleged21 contact. So it rather heightened my anxiety that we22 should not be holding back the information that someone23 had come forward.24 Q. Did you look at the relevant part of the report? It25 says paragraph 154 there. In fact, that is

411 a typographical error and it is paragraph 152. If we2 look at FAC/3/48 you can see paragraphs 150, 151 and 1523 of the report. Did you look at that that morning?

4 A. I am not sure that I looked at it that morning but5 I certainly did look at it later.6 Q. What they say:7 "Mr Gilligan [tells us he has lots of] ... contacts,8 both official and unofficial."9 They say: we are quite concerned about that. And at10 the end of paragraph 152:11 "We accept the need for the agencies on occasion to12 brief the press within very strict guidelines ... [but]13 we recommend [the] ... alleged contacts be thoroughly14 investigated."15 Did you read that as suggesting that anyone you16 found had leaked a document should be hauled off before

17 the FAC?18 A. No, I did not. But I equally recognised that the FAC19 might have an interest in taking evidence from anyone20 who had been in contact with Andrew Gilligan, as a way21 of assessing the reliability of Andrew Gilligan's22 evidence to them and indeed as a way of assessing the23 nature of the dispute that had arisen between the24 Government and the BBC.25 Q. We know there was a draft press statement prepared on

421 7th July. That is MoD/17/2. This is something Ms Teare2 provided after her evidence because she had referred to

3 some drafts. At the moment in the draft it says:4 "In its Report published yesterday, the House of


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5 Commons Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that6 Andrew Gilligan's alleged contacts be thoroughly7 investigated.8 "In this context it may be relevant that an9 individual working in the MoD has come forward to10 volunteer..."

11 That press statement we know was not put out in that12 format. Did you influence, at this stage, the draft13 press statement because it appears to be reflecting your14 thinking at the time?15 A. Well, I did not see the drafts. Whether any comments16 that I made influenced it, I do not know. It is17 a rather difficult question for me to answer in terms of18 whether I influenced it. I think it was well known,19 certainly I had made this concern known to the Permanent20 Secretary that I was anxious about the Foreign Affairs21 Committee report and conclusion. So I may have22 influenced the way in which that work was carried on;23 but I certainly did not see the draft press releases in

24 preparation.25 Q. We know that Sir David Omand has written a note after

431 the event, it is 21st July, in which he refers to the2 importance of Dr Kelly cooperating with the process. We3 also know that on 7th July, it is MoD/1/44, there is4 a memo here which is dated 8th July but we have heard5 that it was in fact produced on 7th July because it6 referred to the interview that is going to take place.7 What it says at paragraph 2 is:8 "What is now needed now is a more intensive9 interview with Kelly."

10 In fact it was produced on the morning, we were11 told, of 7th July.12 A. Hmm, hmm.13 Q. Over the page at MoD/1/45, paragraph 5:14 "In all this PUS [Sir Kevin Tebbit] remains15 concerned to ensure that Dr Kelly's rights are16 respected -- it is important to understand he is17 cooperating voluntarily."18 There is the different angle, that in the event that19 it becomes evident that he may have divulged classified20 or privileged information, proceedings would need to be21 stopped to avoid prejudicing any case.22 Were you aware at this stage that Dr Kelly's

23 involvement was all to be voluntary?24 A. I certainly had understood from the beginning that25 Dr Kelly had come forward, he had volunteered the fact

441 he had had a contact with Andrew Gilligan, that he was2 cooperating. Certainly I think that is important in3 terms of the sequence of events that took place.4 Q. We have also seen, at CAB/1/46, a memo that Mr Scarlett5 had dictated on the morning, where he had agreed with6 Sir Kevin Tebbit's letter of Saturday, that is written7 after Mr Baldwin's article, that:8 "... the finger points strongly at David Kelly ..."

9 He had been through the transcript, he attached10 copies of that, which make it clear that:


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11 "Gilligan has only talked to one person about the12 September dossier. If he could have referred to any13 corroborating information he would have done so. If14 this is true, Kelly is not telling the whole story."15 A. Hmm.16 Q. Were you aware of any doubts being expressed about

17 whether Dr Kelly had told the whole story, at this18 stage?19 A. I recognised, in the range of possibilities, that that20 was one of them. But I was not -- I had not seen this21 particular document. In fact, I think this is probably22 the first time that I have seen it. I was not aware23 that those doubts were being expressed elsewhere in24 Government; but I recognise in the series of options of25 facts that that was one of them.

451 Q. We know that at the meeting that Sir Kevin Tebbit2 attended it was decided to give Dr Kelly a second

3 interview.4 A. Yes.5 Q. We also know that that took place in the afternoon of6 the 7th July, the Monday.7 A. Hmm.8 Q. Were you made aware that the second interview was taking9 place?10 A. Yes. Yes. It was something that Kevin had mentioned to11 me on the morning in the meeting before he went across12 to Downing Street.13 Q. And did anyone report to you the outcome of the second14 interview?15 A. I cannot recall formally that happening, but I certainly

16 was aware that that second interview had not taken the17 issue much further forward, the issue being whether or18 not Dr Kelly was Andrew Gilligan's single source.19 Q. No. I mean, I think we have heard that Mr Scarlett20 thought, as a result of his memo and the further21 information, and Mr Howard thought, that he was22 definitely the single source, but it does not23 necessarily seem that Mr Hatfield had changed his view.24 A. No.25 Q. You were aware of a range of views on that?

461 A. I was aware of Richard Hatfield's view. I was not aware

2 that there were other views elsewhere. I thought I made3 that clear earlier.4 Q. Right. We can see that the Ministry of Defence are5 still preparing some press statements. But these are6 now being at least altered or improved by7 Downing Street. If I take you to CAB/1/50 we can see8 some of the drafting that is going on on Ministry of9 Defence press statements. It appears that this was10 happening on about 7th July. In fact, if you look at11 the top left-hand corner you can see the fax date.12 Were you aware that Downing Street was involved in13 helping the Ministry of Defence with their press14 statements?

15 A. I was not directly aware of that, but it would not be16 a particular surprise given the involvement of


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17 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office in these events.18 These were events that affected the Government as19 a whole, and therefore I would have expected there to be20 a great deal of contact between the Ministry of Defence21 and other parts of Government involved; in this case,22 the Cabinet Office and Downing Street, which was

23 obviously why I called Jonathan Powell on the Thursday24 and why Kevin Tebbit wrote to David Omand on the Friday.25 Q. Who did you understand to be the lead department? Had

471 it now become No. 10 or was it still the Ministry of2 Defence?3 A. Well, the Ministry of Defence was the lead department as4 far as dealing with Dr Kelly on a personnel basis, as5 far his position, as far as the department were6 concerned, then I was concerned that the Permanent7 Secretary should look at that matter as an employment8 concern issue, to look at it from a point of view of

9 ensuring that Dr Kelly was properly and fairly treated.10 Equally, there were clearly wider implications in what11 was happening as far as the Government as a whole were12 concerned. That is why the Cabinet Office and13 Downing Street were engaged.14 Q. Did you have any conversations with Mr Campbell that15 evening?16 A. Yes, I did. There was a further conversation, in17 a sense, following on from our discussions --18 inconclusive discussions the day before about --19 Q. Did you go and see him? Was it on the telephone?20 A. I think it was on the telephone.21 Q. Where were you --

22 LORD HUTTON: I think before we proceed into the details of23 this it is a convenient time to give the stenographers24 a break. I will rise for five minutes.25 (11.45 am)

481 (Short Break)2 (11.50 am)3 MR DINGEMANS: We were on Monday 7th July, and you were4 about to tell me about your telephone conversation,5 I think you said it was, with Mr Campbell. Where were6 you when you made the call?7 A. As far as I am aware I was in the Ministry of Defence.

8 Q. And where is Mr Campbell?9 A. I assume in Downing Street, but I could not give10 evidence to that fact.11 Q. Right. What was said in this conversation?12 A. Well, it really was following on the conversation that13 we had had the previous day about how to try to find14 a way to persuade the BBC to acknowledge15 Andrew Gilligan's single source. We discussed various16 possibilities. I think it was on that occasion that he17 put forward a further possibility of briefing18 a newspaper that someone had come forward as a means of19 putting further pressure on the BBC to acknowledge that;20 but I had -- I was pretty doubtful about that, and

21 I think I pointed out to him that actually it still left22 open the possibility that the BBC would simply deny it,


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23 would simply say that this person was not their source;24 and we would be no further forward.25 LORD HUTTON: But why, if you are thinking of putting

491 pressure on the BBC, why brief a newspaper as opposed to

2 issuing a statement directly?3 A. Well, my Lord, I was not thinking of briefing4 a newspaper; and indeed I did not agree to that5 approach. Although Alastair put it forward, I think it6 is fair to him to say that he did not brief a newspaper7 either. It is simply part of the discussions that were8 taking place. It was one suggestion that he had made.9 It was not something that I agreed to or indeed did10 anything about.11 LORD HUTTON: No.12 MR DINGEMANS: Did you recall the conversation, at any time,13 being switched on to a speaker phone?14 A. Not at my end of the conversation, no.

15 Q. No. But when you are talking to someone and you are16 switching on to a speaker phone, sometimes you hear it17 sounds different, does it not?18 A. I was not aware of that.19 Q. You were not aware of Godric Smith joining the20 conversation at all or listening into the conversation21 at all?22 A. (Pause). No.23 Q. Did Mr Campbell mention any particular newspaper?24 A. (Pause). Not to the best of my recollection, no.25 Q. At this stage, did you understand whether or not

50

1 Dr Kelly was happy for his name to be given to any2 newspaper or press statement?3 A. That, at that stage, obviously had not been discussed4 with Dr Kelly; and part of my concern, as well, as5 I have indicated, certainly throughout the weekend, was6 that whatever action we took we should be sure about the7 factual basis; and since I was not sure on the Monday8 evening any more than I had been over the previous9 weekend, then I would have been uncomfortable about10 briefing a newspaper because I did not judge that it11 would have taken us any further forward.12 Q. On the morning of 8th July Mr Baldwin has told us in13 a Q and A column in The Times newspaper he had said

14 this: conversations with Downing Street say he is not15 a member of the Intelligence Services but more likely to16 be a weapons of mass destruction specialist at the17 Foreign Office. He said that that was a variety of18 conversations with sources in different Government19 departments. For perfectly understandable reasons he20 has not helped us any further with who those people21 were. Do you know anything about those conversations22 with Mr Baldwin?23 A. No, I do not; and they certainly did not involve me.24 Q. We have seen the defensive Q and A material that was25 actually deployed. Can I take you to some draft Q and A

511 material which we have received --


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2 A. Sorry, I apologise for interrupting you but when you say3 they have actually been deployed, I am not sure it is4 right to say they were deployed. At that stage there5 was no reason for them to be used.6 Q. Sorry, deployed on 8th July, 9th July.7 A. Sorry.

8 Q. What was actually used. We have now been provided with9 further drafts. Going to the morning of 8th July, if we10 go to CAB/21/5, this is some Q and A material which is11 said to have been sent to the Permanent Undersecretary12 office at 8.07 on Tuesday, 8th July subject to13 discussion and approval.14 If you can look down to the fifth question:15 "Is it X (ie the correct name)?16 "If the correct name is put to us from a number of17 callers, we will need to tell the individual we are18 going to confirm his name before doing [I imagine that19 is a typo for 'so']."20 The actual Q and A material put out later that day

21 and used on 9th July has a rather different look to it.22 If you look at MoD/1/62, you can see:23 "Who is the official?"24 At the top:25 "We wouldn't normally volunteer a name.

521 "If the correct name is given, we can confirm it..."2 That is a reasonably substantial change. One is3 saying: we need to go back to the individual and tell4 him first. The other appears to be: well, we will tell5 you.6 Do you know whether or not Dr Kelly was told about

7 the draft Q and A material and the Q and A material as8 deployed?9 A. I do not, no. But can I make clear that I did not see10 either of these documents. They were not submitted to11 my office. That would not be something that I would12 normally deal with.13 Q. I will come back, if I may, to the Q and A material14 because that comes later on on 8th July.15 A. Can I just deal with a point about "put out" because16 I think it is something that has been dealt with17 previously in evidence before the Inquiry? These18 questions and answers are prepared for the use of19 individual press officers and, particularly in the

20 Ministry of Defence where there is a 24 hour process, it21 may well be that an individual press officer comes on22 duty without necessarily being aware of particular23 issues. So these questions and answers are used by24 individual press officers to answer specific questions25 that are put to them by journalists. They are not "put

531 out" in any sense at all. They are simply sitting there2 in the press office for use by those press officers3 should these questions arise. But they are not4 communicated generally to the world in any sense at all.5 Q. No, but when they ring up and ask the right question:

6 "Did he play any part in drawing up the dossier?"7 They are told:


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8 "He was involved in providing historical details..."9 A. The director of news would be responsible for drawing up10 these documents to guide her staff, her press officers,11 in the work they do in responding to questions from12 journalists.13 Q. We have heard about some meetings that took place in

14 Downing Street on 8th July, and in particular a meeting15 at 11.45 am when it is decided that in the light of the16 second interview his name ought to be supplied to the17 Intelligence and Security Committee; and it is proposed18 initially that that is going to be by way of a letter19 that is going to be copied to the FAC, and because it is20 going to be copied to the FAC it is going to be made21 public.22 As I understand from what you were saying, the23 Ministry of Defence were going to be the lead department24 on the personnel side of matters, and obviously putting25 his name to the Intelligence and Security Committee part

541 relates to personnel; is that right?2 A. Yes, that is right. Yes.3 Q. We have also heard from Sir Kevin Tebbit that he was4 handing out medals, I think, for HMS Nottingham and5 saving her from sinking. We have also heard you were6 not at that meeting at 11.45.7 A. No.8 Q. So how was the Ministry of Defence, as it were, dealing9 with the personnel issues at that stage?10 A. By then, because of the contacts, in particular with11 David Omand, who also has personnel responsibilities for12 the Cabinet Office, obviously these are discussions that

13 are taking place in Government and not simply involving14 a particular department.15 Q. But if we look, for example, at MoD/1/41, this is the16 letter that Sir David Omand had written. It is17 misdated, we now know this. It is written to18 Sir Kevin Tebbit, in which he deals with what the19 situation was over the weekend:20 "The Prime Minister subsequently saw your letter ...21 "The Prime Minister asked for a deeper analysis ...22 "Your follow up letter has also been seen by the23 Prime Minister ... The Prime Minister concluded that24 notwithstanding the further circumstantial details in25 your second letter he agreed with your recommendation...

551 "We agreed that you will circulate the detailed2 account ..."3 It was all being written, as we understood it, to4 the Ministry of Defence because they were in charge of5 the personnel side. But it rather looks like at the6 Tuesday morning meeting there is no-one from the7 Ministry of Defence actually taking an active role in8 it; is that fair or unfair?9 A. Well, I think as a matter of fact it must be fair,10 although, as I understood it, Kevin Tebbit did come back11 from Portsmouth before that meeting concluded. So

12 I thought that he was present for at least part of the13 meeting and certainly was present in the course of


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14 drafting material following on from that meeting.15 Q. I think, in fact, as a matter of chronology, he was not16 there at the first meeting which finishes at about 12.3017 but arrives during the course of the second meeting18 which started at 1.30. He arrived, I think we were19 told, some time about 2 o'clock.

20 You had a meeting on 8th July with Mr Sambrook of21 the BBC. Were you being told at all what was being22 decided at the meeting at 11.45 in Downing Street?23 A. Before I had the meeting with Richard Sambrook I was24 certainly told that there was a proposal, I think from25 David Omand, to contact the ISC and to use the ISC as

561 a means of perhaps persuading the BBC to reveal2 privately their source and that, therefore, I should not3 reveal the identity or the fact that Dr Kelly had come4 forward. That was certainly a thought that I had had5 before the meeting with Richard Sambrook.

6 I was very concerned that we had got into something7 of a cul-de-sac with the BBC, that I needed to try and8 find a way out of that cul-de-sac to take things9 forward, and having a meeting with Richard Sambrook, who10 I had written to on a number of occasions but never met,11 seemed to me a possible way of moving things along, of12 trying to improve relations with the BBC, particularly13 as far as the Ministry of Defence was concerned, but14 also to find a way in which if we could engage sensibly15 in a proper discussion he might recognise he also had16 a problem of a management kind, not being absolutely17 sure he was getting all the right information from his18 employees.

19 Q. You are rather warned off that because Sir David is20 going to write to the ISC.21 A. Yes.22 Q. But when Sir David is writing to the ISC, were you told23 the letter was going to be copied to the FAC and made24 public?25 A. I was aware that there was a proposal to use the ISC for

571 the kind of process that I have just described, trying2 to find a way of identifying the single source and3 persuading the BBC to explain who that was. I was also4 aware, quite soon afterwards, that Ann Taylor did not

5 want the ISC to be used in that way, I think6 specifically because that would have involved the7 publication of material. I think, because of the reason8 you are giving, it would have had to have been copied to9 the Foreign Affairs Committee and therefore that would10 have compromised the confidential way in which the ISC11 operates.12 LORD HUTTON: May I ask you, Secretary of State, when you13 say that you understood that the ISC was going to be14 enlisted as a means of persuading the BBC to reveal the15 identity of the source, did you understand that there16 was any thought that the ISC would go rather beyond that17 and would examine Dr Kelly for the purpose of coming to

18 the conclusion that Mr Gilligan's main criticism was19 incorrect? In other words, that Dr Kelly would tell the


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20 ISC that he had not made the report to Mr Gilligan which21 Mr Gilligan then broadcast. That would be a more direct22 way of dealing with the matter, would it not?23 A. When you say, my Lord, they were enlisted; I knew and24 I was aware this was a proposal.25 LORD HUTTON: I am not so much concerned with the word

581 "enlisted" or "a proposal", but what was the purpose?2 Was the purpose more than to hope that the ISC would put3 pressure on the BBC or persuade the BBC, or was it that4 the ISC themselves would come to the conclusion that5 Mr Gilligan's report, in its main thrust, was incorrect?6 A. I was not present at that meeting, but what I understood7 to be the case was that given the confidential way in8 which the ISC operates, that by giving the name of9 Dr Kelly to the ISC on our side might encourage the BBC10 to reveal their source on their side, so that, in11 effect, Ann Taylor became the person who was in

12 a position to identify the matching individuals if13 indeed that was the case.14 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.15 MR DINGEMANS: Did you not say, at this stage, to16 Sir David Omand -- was it Sir David Omand you spoke to,17 who told you not to mention to Mr Sambrook the18 possibility of the source at this stage?19 A. No, it was not. I think it was simply a message from20 Jonathan Powell to my private office. So the21 information would have been relayed to me by my private22 office.23 Q. Did you not say at this stage: well, hang on a minute,24 Dr Kelly has not yet admitted he is the single source,

25 for the reasons you have given before we are not going

591 to put his name in the public; if we start publicising2 the fact someone has come forward it is going to create3 a dreadful scramble to find out who he is before we know4 he is the single source?5 A. In the process I have just described to you, I was not6 proposing to publish the name. The issue was passing7 the name, as I understood it, in confidence to the ISC;8 but there was no decision at that stage about9 publication, as far as I was aware.10 Q. Passing it in confidence, but making it plain, by

11 publishing the letter, that a name had been passed?12 A. Well, I was not party to these discussions. I think it13 is important that I do not go beyond what my knowledge14 at the time was. My knowledge at the time was that15 there was a proposal to use the ISC for the kind of16 purpose that I had previously described to the Inquiry,17 as a way of giving the BBC some confidence that its18 source would not be compromised, in a way that assisted19 both the Government and the BBC in identifying that20 source properly.21 Q. We know you have the meeting with Mr Sambrook. That22 takes place at about 1.30. I think that is right.23 A. Yes, it is.

24 Q. Is that at the Ministry of Defence?25 A. No, it took place in my office in the House of Commons.


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5 been checked with the Ministry of Defence beforehand,6 that I should have the opportunity of at least refuting7 that.8 Therefore, when the Today Programme asked me on more9 than one occasion to appear, I said: yes of course10 I would appear but I felt it was only fair that I should

11 have the opportunity of at least indicating that the12 Today Programme had not in fact, and Andrew Gilligan had13 not in fact checked the story. The problem with that is14 that the Today Programme would not allow me on on that15 basis and withdrew the invitations for me to appear.16 But I could see that that was not necessarily17 a healthy state of affairs either for me, the Government18 or for that matter for the BBC. There were many issues19 on which I should appear on the Today Programme and do;20 and I wanted to try and find a way out of that21 particular -- I think I described it earlier as22 a cul-de-sac, and that is why I wanted to talk to23 Richard Sambrook about a more sensible basis on which we

24 could move things along both, I hope, in the interests25 of the BBC and in the interests of the Government.

631 Q. That meeting takes place at 1.30. We know that in the2 course of the afternoon there is, as I think you have3 already mentioned, a reply back from the Clerk to the4 Intelligence and Security Committee saying they are not5 very happy with the idea that they should have a public6 letter and apparently suggest a press statement. Were7 you told about that proposal?8 A. No.9 Q. Did you know that before the Ministry of Defence made

10 the press statement on 8th July that it was proposing to11 issue a press statement?12 A. Well, I was certainly aware that -- as I think I have13 indicated -- there were a number of discussions taking14 place about the best way of trying to persuade the BBC15 to reveal its source. This was one option which, on the16 morning of Tuesday the 8th July, those engaged in the17 meeting preferred. It was not successful because of the18 reluctance of Ann Taylor to become involved in the19 process. Therefore, in effect, the fall back was for me20 to write to the BBC and to publicise the fact that an21 official had come forward.22 Q. That was a fall back, suggesting someone had at least

23 a plan or a strategy. Whose plan or strategy was it, as24 far as you understood?25 A. It was something that had been discussed. It was

641 something I had discussed as long before as the Sunday2 with Alastair Campbell. It was --3 Q. Whose decision was it to implement that fall back4 position?5 A. I think that came out of the meeting on the Tuesday in6 the Cabinet Office involving David Omand and others.7 I simply -- I was given a message to the effect that it8 was now appropriate for me to write to the Chairman of

9 the governors. Given that this is something that I had10 wanted to do for some time, you know, I was certainly


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11 willing to do that.12 Q. So the implementation of the fall back plan you had at13 least envisaged on the Sunday is coming to you from14 No. 10, as it were?15 A. Yes.16 Q. You do write a letter on 8th July. Can I take you to

17 that? That is MoD/1/66. You are writing "Dear Gavyn",18 that is to the Chairman of governors.19 "I am writing to draw to your attention an MoD20 statement which we will be issuing later today about21 Andrew Gilligan's 'single source'. This is enclosed.22 "You will see that we have not named the official23 within the MoD who has come forward. We would, however,24 be prepared to disclose his name to you in confidence,25 on the basis that you would then immediately confirm or

651 deny that this is indeed Mr Gilligan's source, in the2 interests of resolving what has become a management

3 problem for both our organisations."4 I think you have already explained what you meant by5 that.6 A. Yes.7 Q. "I am sure you will understand that this is not the same8 as divulging a source ..."9 That evening a press statement is actually issued.10 We will find that at MoD/1/56. In fact, we have seen so11 many drafts of the press statements et cetera, this is12 our best guess as to what was actually issued.13 A. If I may say so, you have seen more drafts than I have.14 Q. We can see there that the individual has volunteered he15 met with Mr Gilligan:

16 "The official has told us that he made no17 allegations or accusations about the dossier ... this18 discussion was not authorised ..."19 And:20 "There is no reason to suspect that a breach of21 security is involved."22 We have seen earlier drafts which have the ISC23 references in. For understandable reasons they may have24 gone out.25 So your understanding was that this was part of

661 a fall back after the first public letter to the ISC had

2 been rejected, to get the BBC to confirm whether or not3 Dr Kelly was the source; is that right?4 A. Yes.5 Q. And as far as you understood, it was not intended that6 Dr Kelly's name should ever be made public until he had7 been confirmed as the source; is that right?8 A. That was certainly my concern, yes. That we should only9 act when we were sure about his role.10 Q. What is also distributed for deployment that day and the11 following day when queries come in about the press12 statement are the Q and A that was actually finalised.13 That is at MoD/1/62. If we look at the second --14 LORD HUTTON: Just before we go on to that, is it your

15 evidence, Secretary of State, that this MoD statement16 was issued solely for the purpose of trying to persuade


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17 the BBC to reveal its source or was there another reason18 behind it?19 A. That was certainly part of it, but throughout I had been20 concerned, as I think I have indicated, my Lord, to21 the Inquiry already, that we were in possession of22 significant information about a potential witness

23 relevant to Parliamentary proceedings, relevant to the24 public debate; and I, as each day went by, was25 increasingly concerned that we were not making this

671 information known, certainly to the Foreign Affairs2 Committee but to the wider public.3 LORD HUTTON: Yes.4 A. I was very conscious that we risked being accused of5 a cover-up. I remember having a conversation about what6 would happen if, say, a Sunday newspaper on the Sunday7 had got wind of the fact that someone had come forward8 in the Ministry of Defence. I am sure that they would

9 have accused us of covering that fact up.10 LORD HUTTON: Yes.11 MR DINGEMANS: Your letter of 8th July that we have seen at12 MoD/1/66, did you actually come up, yourself, with the13 wording or did anyone bring a draft of that letter to14 you?15 A. Well, the normal process will be for a draft to be16 brought to me. I --17 Q. Do you know who had compiled the draft?18 A. No, I do not but it is a very short letter. It was19 probably -- it could easily have been prepared in my20 private office. It is not a very detailed thing. What21 I would say is that I regularly interfere in the drafts

22 that are put before me and change the wording.23 Q. The defensive Q and A material, you have told us how24 that works, at MoD/1/62. I was looking, really, at the25 second question down:

681 "What is his name and current post?"2 You issue a press statement saying: an unidentified3 official has come forward.4 A. Hmm.5 Q. The press department or press office are likely to be6 rung up and asked who it is. Now, the name is something7 any journalist is going to ask for, is it not? And this

8 is the proposed answer:9 "We wouldn't normally volunteer a name.10 "If the correct name is given, we can confirm it and11 say that he is a senior advisor to the Proliferation and12 Arms Control Secretariat."13 A. If you forgive me, I do not think that is quite the14 right way to present this material. This is a guidance15 for press officers. They are not going to read those16 words out in the way you just have. These are17 instructions to a press officer how to deal with the18 request. I would not expect them to read that out in19 the way you have just done.20 Q. We have heard evidence from journalists about what they

21 were told. Some of them did ask some questions. If we22 go down the page:


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23 "Is he in Iraq?"24 We are talking about weapons of mass destruction and25 someone who has a good understanding of that, so

691 a question that one can anticipate:

2 "No, though he visited Iraq recently ...3 "Is he a member of the ISG?4 "No."5 LORD HUTTON: You are reading 62?6 MR DINGEMANS: Towards the bottom, my Lord.7 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Thank you very much.8 MR DINGEMANS: You can see effectively further up the page:9 "Did the official play any part in drawing up the10 dossier?11 "He was involved in providing historical details of12 UNSCOM's activities ..."13 Effectively there are a number of pieces of14 information which are going to assist any journalist to

15 identify Dr Kelly. Is that a fair analysis of this16 defensive Q and A material?17 A. I do not believe that this necessarily would have led to18 the identification of Dr Kelly on the assumption that19 a journalist went through each and every one of those20 questions. It seems to me highly unlikely that they21 would have done.22 I did not see this Q and A and played no part in its23 preparation, so it is a little difficult for me to24 comment about any underlying purpose. But if you are25 suggesting that there was some deliberate effort here to

70

1 identify Dr Kelly, I say that is absolutely wrong and2 certainly no effort by me or my office to do that. As3 I have emphasised throughout, my concern was to identify4 the facts, and the key fact was whether Dr Kelly was or5 was not Andrew Gilligan's single source.6 LORD HUTTON: But you have also said that in your earlier7 discussions with Sir Kevin Tebbit he had said that the8 fact that Dr Kelly had come forward might enable the9 public record to be corrected. I think you had accepted10 that that was a consideration in your mind as well.11 A. Yes, my Lord, but that was only on the basis that he was12 clearly Andrew Gilligan's single source.13 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. But we have heard that in the

14 course of the week, and indeed over the preceding15 weekend, the feeling had been growing amongst some very16 senior officials that, in fact, Dr Kelly was the single17 source. Were you aware of that, and in the week18 beginning 7th July?19 A. I cannot comment on -- I think your Lordship is20 referring, probably, to David Omand's assumptions at21 that stage.22 LORD HUTTON: Yes.23 A. I was not aware of David Omand's thinking. I was aware24 that Sir Kevin Tebbit, having on the Friday evening25 readily accepted the advice from Richard Hatfield about

711 his assessment of Dr Kelly's position, thought again on


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2 the Saturday, particularly after seeing the article by3 Tom Baldwin in The Times; and I think as a result of4 that he wrote a further letter to David Omand indicating5 that he felt there was now more evidence pointing to the6 fact that Dr Kelly was the single source. So there was7 a change in his thinking. But again, I do not think

8 I or anyone else at that stage was sure enough,9 certainly from my position, to name Dr Kelly, because10 I think that would have been unfair to Dr Kelly.11 LORD HUTTON: Yes.12 MR DINGEMANS: This is 8th July. The Q and A material13 I think is deployed effectively on the 9th once the14 press statement has been made. But Mr Baldwin writes an15 article, he told us in his evidence, saying that there16 was an adviser who was undertaking work with the17 Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, previously18 a UN weapons inspector. That is published on 9th July.19 So after the press statement has gone out but before, as20 far as we know it, the Q and A material has been used by

21 the press office. He has told us that that came from22 more than one source. Again, he has not told us, for23 understandable reasons, who that is.24 Do you know anything about that story in The Times?25 A. No, I do not. It certainly did not come from me.

721 Q. That is the 8th July. Is there anything else that2 occurred on 8th July, so far as you recollect?3 A. Well, I think the only point perhaps we have not covered4 is that fairly promptly Gavyn Davies rejected the5 proposal I had made, on the grounds that it would6 conflict with the journalistic principle of source

7 protection.8 Q. I take you to the letter, we have seen it before, it is9 MoD/1/68. This is in response to your letter of10 8th July. You have had a meeting with Mr Sambrook. You11 write your letter as a result of the fall back. Then12 Mr Davies replies saying:13 "I have to say that the offer in your letter seems14 to be an attempt to force the BBC to reveal the name or15 names of source(s) used by Andrew Gilligan on Today and16 Susan Ms Watts on Newsnight."17 And says he is not going to go down that route.18 A. Yes.19 Q. Actually, in the light of what you have told us, that is

20 probably a fairly fair analysis. You were trying to get21 the name of the source out.22 A. I think I would make two qualifications to that. First23 of all, we were not trying to force the BBC to do24 anything. We were giving them an opportunity, if they25 judged it appropriate, to reveal their source.

731 Secondly, we were not as such trying to get the name2 out. We were trying to identify whether or not Dr Kelly3 was the single source and to give the BBC the4 opportunity of conceding that, if they thought it5 appropriate. They did not, at that stage.

6 LORD HUTTON: Just going back to the question and answer7 material. I appreciate you say that you did not see


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8 this material --9 A. No, my Lord.10 LORD HUTTON: -- but Miss Pam Teare said that one of the11 factors that influenced I think her and others in12 preparing this material was that the press might suggest13 the names of other MoD officials or persons from the

14 Government as being the source, and the view was taken15 that it would be unfair if that were not denied in case16 suspicion fell on the wrong people. I appreciate you17 say you were not concerned with that aspect but what is18 your view on that, Secretary of State?19 A. Well, I was aware of certainly Sir Kevin Tebbit raised20 that with me. He was very concerned that other21 officials might come under investigation by journalists;22 and indeed I think it is right that one did find23 a journalist in his garden approaching his children.24 So, it is clear that that did happen.25 I think another aspect of this is the extent to

741 which -- and I have had these conversations with2 Pam Teare over the period that she has been working in3 the Ministry of Defence -- it is -- it would be wrong to4 ask press officers to deceive journalists, and no-one5 would suggest that is appropriate. It is also quite6 difficult actually, in the face of very determined7 efforts by journalists, for press officers to, I think8 your Lordship has used the phrase, batten down the9 hatches to try to obfuscate the position. It puts quite10 often relatively junior civil servants under a great11 deal of pressure from sometimes quite aggressive12 journalists. She prefers, and the advice she gave, is

13 that where it is possible to do so press officers should14 be straightforward in responding to requests for15 information by journalists.16 LORD HUTTON: But one way of battening down the hatches is17 simply to say: we do not give the names of civil18 servants. That is not obfuscating, is it?19 A. Yes, my Lord, although that would not necessarily be20 true. That would not be an absolute policy that has21 always been followed. Civil servants routinely give22 evidence to Select Committees. They are routinely23 identified. Therefore, I think it would be quite hard24 to maintain that as an article of policy. It simply is25 not something that has been routinely the case.

751 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.2 MR DINGEMANS: One other way of battening down the hatches3 would have not been to make a press statement. At this4 stage you do not know it is Dr Kelly, you are making the5 press statement as part of the fall back plan to try to6 get the BBC to confirm whether it is or not. If you7 make the press statement, for all the reasons you have8 given, the press are going to go into a detailed hunt9 for that person; why not just avoid making the press10 statement?11 A. Because of the need to acknowledge the fact that someone

12 had come forward. There are a number of factors13 relevant to that. It is not only the attitude of the


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14 Foreign Affairs Committee; it is the fact that at some15 stage, for example, Government would have to respond to16 the Foreign Affairs Committee's conclusions and17 inevitably the timing of our knowledge about a potential18 witness would have to be made known. And I do not think19 it is -- I do not think you should underestimate the

20 view that Parliament would take of a Government21 department deliberately withholding such information.22 Q. Now, on 9th July, we know that there are various Lobby23 briefings given -- we have heard evidence -- in the24 afternoon. It is CAB/1/221. That further details were25 given out about the person who had come forward. If we

761 look at the bottom of the page, you can see that the2 Prime Minister's official spokesman is:3 "Asked for his definition of a 'senior intelligence4 source', the PMOS said that there was a difference5 between someone who was a technical expert on machinery

6 and equipment and someone who had intelligence7 information about what was happening ... The person in8 question was a technician -- a technical expert -- not9 an intelligence official ..."10 At 221, at the top of the page, we are told the11 salary is being paid for by another department.12 We have heard from Mr Blitz of the Financial Times13 that those were indicators that assisted him to locate14 who Dr Kelly was. I think we have heard about the15 searches that were undertaken in that respect. Were you16 aware that this material was being distributed at the17 Lobby briefings?18 A. No, I was not. But I routinely read the Lobby briefing

19 when it becomes available after the event. But I was20 not aware that this was going to be said at the time.21 Q. Going back, if I may, to your correspondence with22 Mr Davies. You, in fact, write a letter, which we can23 see at MoD/1/71, on 9th July. You say:24 "Thank you for your letter replying to mine of the25 same day.

771 "This is not about the divulging of sources."2 You give the name, in confidence, to Mr Davies of3 Dr Kelly.4 What is the purpose behind this correspondence?

5 A. Essentially to -- by then I had accepted that the BBC6 were not going to volunteer the name of their source.7 I thought it might assist them in assessing the8 reliability of what Andrew Gilligan might have said to9 them to indicate privately to Gavyn Davies the name of10 the official who had come forward.11 Q. Were you given any assistance in writing this letter?12 (Pause). Any drafts?13 A. Well, there would have been a draft. I cannot tell you14 precisely where it came from, but again it is not a long15 letter. There was certainly some discussion, because16 I think the suggestion for naming Dr Kelly at this stage17 to Gavyn Davies, I think it actually came from

18 Jonathan Powell. This was something that, in a sense,19 was consistent with the approach that we had taken over


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20 several days.21 Q. Can I ask you to look at CAB/11/136? This is an e-mail22 that comes from the Garden Rooms and it is to "dnews;23 Defence Secretary". It is copied to Jonathan Powell.24 We can see "Alastair's note of 9th July".25 Going on to 137 we can see some similarities with

781 the letter you finally sent:2 "Thank you for your letter replying to mine of X.3 "I am not asking you to divulge your reporter's4 source ..."5 You appear to cut out quite a lot of this material.6 You say:7 "I can tell you that the person is named X X, and he8 is employed as Y Y ..." et cetera.9 A. I have not seen that before. I accept it does bear some10 similar

Hearing Transcript - 27 August 2003 Morning

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