Guerrilla Polling” in Syria: Opinion Polls or Public Diplomacy Tool?

“Guerrilla Polling” in Syria: Opinion Polls or Public Diplomacy Tool?

Michael Jablonski

Georgia State University

Abstract

The Democracy Council, a California NGO, conducted two polls in Syria that

assessed popular support for the Assad regime. The surveys were labeled “guerrilla

polls” because they relied upon unique methodologies that were thought to circumvent

restrictions on polling imposed by the government. The survey results, when compiled,

were widely distributed as constituting the first scientific assessment in Syria even

though multiple surveys had previously and subsequently been concluded by other

organizations. Methodological constraints caused the poll to be of limited validity,

raising a question as to why it had been performed. A potential answer is that the poll

represented a piece of a public diplomacy effort attempting to influence popular

attitudes in the country. The strategic use of a poll would be consistent with research on

identity formation, which may be a core principle of public diplomacy. The

participation of Democracy Council in US government operations supporting dissidents

suggests that the polls may have been more of a public diplomacy operation than an

assessment of attitudes.

“Guerrilla polling” 2

Introduction

Public opinion polls comprise a social science research tool with the ability to

measure beliefs and attitudes of a population being studied. Polls possess a companion

capability to alter attitudes following publication and dissemination of survey results

when a survey bolsters a pre-existing belief. Researchers have demonstrated that voters

may utilize poll results as a guide in some voting decisions. Polls that purport to assay

attitudes might be employed to shape attitudes.

Attitudes can be conceptualized as a learned sympathetic or unsympathetic

response to an issue (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Attitudinal responses can be shown to be

reinforced when beliefs are confirmed by extrinsic sources (Merton, 1968; Zajonc, 2001;

Zimbardo, Ebbesen, & Maslach, 1977; Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991). Supplying affirmative

information congruent with a previously held belief can energize attitudes to the extent

that behavior changes, an effect often studied in the context of health communication

(Brubaker & Fowler, 1990; Budd, North, & Spencer, 1984; Budd, 1986; Hennig &

Knowles, 1990; Miller & Grush, 1986; Pagel & Davidson, 1984; Timko, 1987) .

Public diplomacy, reduced to its fundamental precepts, proposes to shape

attitudes in order to create favorable public opinion (Public Diplomacy Alumni

Association, 2012). The generalized attitude held by a foreign public can undermine

American diplomacy in a country. Public diplomacy complements traditional diplomacy

by fostering favorable perspectives towards the US. An improvement in attitudes

engendered by effective public diplomacy changes the environment in which traditional


diplomacy operates (Cull, 2009; Peterson et al., 2003). This paper examines two

guerrilla polls conducted on behalf of the Democracy Council through the lens of public

diplomacy operations.

Guerrilla Polling in Syria

“Guerrilla polling” refers to a process employing “new technologies and practices

to circumvent government restrictions” on public opinion polling that inhibit effective

assessment of widespread attitudes and beliefs (Hawken & Leighty, 2010, p. np).

Conditions imposed upon on pollsters by autocratic governments, often accompanied by

generalized surveillance of the population the pollster seeks to study, emasculate the

ability of researchers to contact, interview, and accurately assess opinions held by its

citizens. “The Syrian government,” for example, “conducts intense physical and

electronic surveillance of both Syrian citizens and foreign visitors,” according to the U.S.

State Department” (2013, p. np). “U.S. citizens should be aware that any encounter with

a Syrian citizen could be subject to scrutiny by the General Intelligence Directorate

(GID) or other security services. Sustained interactions with average Syrians –

especially if deemed to be of a political nature – may subject that Syrian to harassment

and/or detention.” The perceived threat of repercussions from the government creates

an atmosphere thought to be inimical to the conduct of social science research.

Restrictions creating circumstances undermining the validity of research into

citizen attitudes could be avoided, it was believed, by using technology to conduct

surveys in a manner that would minimize perceived perils to both the researchers and

respondents. Survey design varies based upon technologies available and restrictions on


communication. Guerrilla polling in North Korea, for example, relied upon smuggled

cell phones while a companion poll performed in Syria used allegedly secure computer

links to train face-to-face interviewers (Hawken & Leighty, 2010). In both cases, it was

believed that the application of modern technology could circumvent restrictions on the

flow of information such that valid results could be obtained.

The Democracy Council is an American NGO based in California. It states on its

website that its purpose is to develop approaches to sustainable economic opportunities

in the Middle East and Latin America (Democracy Council, 2011a). The guerrilla poll

executed on behalf of the Democracy Council in Syria in two sessions during 2010-2011

employed Skype to conduct training seminars in which local native dialect speakers

learned survey mechanics and respondent selection techniques (Hawken, Kulich,

Grunert, Kimbro, & Abu-Hamdeh, 2010, pp. 4–5). The adoption of Skype reflected a

belief that the communication service encryption of videoconferencing allowed the

Democracy Council to securely educate interviewers (Hawken & Leighty, 2010). The

pollsters recruited a second group of field coordinators for the 2011 session when the

original field team became unavailable (Hawken, Kulick, Leighty, & Kissee, 2011).

Design limitations inherent in guerrilla polling undermine its validity as a

research tool capable of producing a credible picture of attitudes held by citizens in Syria

(Buckner, 2012a; Jablonski, 2012; Labott, 2011). The most problematic for survey

validity is the high probability of self-selection bias in the population under study, a

defect acknowledged in the Syria poll reports. The initial survey provided training to

data collectors on techniques designed to obtain a sample representative of the

population for geographic differences, urban/rural, sex, age, religion, and education in


the knowledge that “a truly national representative sample based upon random selection

was not possible” (Hawken et al., 2010, p. 5). The second survey report concedes that

“that those agreeing to participate in such an exercise, without host government

approval, would be inherently more likely to express anti-government sentiment,” a

problem addressed by adjusting results to reflect weighting (Hawken et al., 2011, pp. 6–

8). The pollsters admitted to CNN that it was impossible to determine whether reported

results were representative of public opinion throughout Syria (Labott, 2011). The

structure of a poll incorporating known bias, as well as manipulation of data through

processes such as weighting, raises questions as to whether a poll is a tool in a campaign

to manufacture public opinion (Herbst, 1993; Jacobs & Shapiro, 1995; Lippmann, 1922;

Polsby & Wildavsky, 2000; West, 1991).

The use of Skype for secure communication between people conducting the poll

inside Syria and the organization managing it from a distance presents additional

difficulties. Reports on the poll emphasize that the Democracy Council understood the

potential for harm to participants if discovered to be engaging in an activity assessing

public sentiment without government approval. The field staff employed to produce the

first poll were unavailable for the second poll, a situation that required recruitment and

training of new personnel, as a result of what the pollsters described simply as

“circumstances” (Hawken et al., 2011, p. 6).

It is impossible to determine whether the circumstances included a breach of

secure communications. Skype is not a particularly secure program, even when used

with a VPN or through Tor. The Information Warfare Monitor, established jointly by the

University of Toronto and the University of Cambridge, discovered as early as 2008 that


that Skype formed an integral part of a surveillance network operating in China (IWM,

2012). Researchers at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs and at

the University of California, Berkeley discovered that computer surveillance software

manufactured by the Gamma Group possesses the ability to record Skype sessions,

although the specific software was not found in Syria (Perlroth, 2013). The Syrian

regime employs an espionage program, Dark Comet, which allows the government to

access computers used by activists. Dark Comet permits an administrator to access,

among other information, webcam activity. The Syrian government is believed to use

Skype to infect other machines by contacting users discovered from an initial intrusion

(McMillan, 2012; Zhang, 2012). The availability to the Syrian government of techniques

to infect computers used by dissidents and to subsequently infect other machines in the

dissident network is consistent with US fears that its programs had been compromised.

The US embassy in 2009, for example, raised the question of whether Democracy

Council activities were being used to entrap activists (Embassy Damascus, 2009b, para.

11).

Although repression by the Assad regime in Syria is manifest, long term, and

pervasive, no compelling case has been made for the use of questionable tools to assess

the state of public attitudes towards the regime there. Other polls employing traditional

survey techniques have been conducted in Syria demonstrate domestic antagonism

towards the regime. Terror Free Tomorrow, an organization that regularly conducts

polls in troubled regions that have been cited by military and political leaders in the US,

teamed with D3 Systems to measure Syrian attitudes in 2007. D3, according to the

published poll report, “has played a leading role in the international use of telephone


research for opinion polling and media audience measurement and evaluation into

denied or limited access countries” (Terror Free Tomorrow, 2007, p. 9). The D3 poll

utilized a telephone call center located in a country adjacent to Syria to contact almost

1500 respondents throughout the country. Telephone communication, the organization

reports, allowed pollsters to limit social and political interference while optimizing

rural/urban distribution, gender distribution, and fieldwork times. The existence of the

D3 poll or its methods is not addressed in the Democracy council poll releases.

Pechter Polls conducted an online survey of opposition leaders during the same period

as the Democracy Council polls. The Pechter survey, as reported in the Wall Street

Journal, employed a controlled snowball technique relying upon referrals,

acknowledging an inability to use a true random selection of respondents, thereby

incurring many of the validity problems implicit in the Democracy Council polls.

Pechter, however, sought to gauge attitudes among a distinct group of acknowledged

critics of the Assad regime rather than the beliefs of the entire population (Pollock,

2012). The Doha Debates, a unit of the Qatar Foundation, published a poll regarding

Syrian attitudes towards Assad that YouGov performed on its behalf. The number of

respondents actually inside Syria, however, was not apparent as YouGov uses regional

panels in its methodology (YouGov, 2011).

Democracy Council creates the appearance that no opinion polling existed in

Syria when, in fact, multiple organizations perform assessments. Buckner challenged

the Democracy Council statement that it conducted “first scientific polling of Syrian

attitudes” by reporting that Syrian ministries, Gallup/Silatech, and non-profits had been

polling at least up to 2009 using a variety of sampling techniques designed to reflect


national attitudes (Buckner, 2012a). The regime in Syria certainly makes it difficult to

perform methodologically correct polling producing valid results. The Democracy

Council methodology produces evaluations of public opinion that, at best, are no better

than product from other groups. The Democracy Council results diffused widely on the

Internet, principally through the repetition of a press release issued by the poll

researchers (Jablonski, 2012). The circumstances surrounding the poll, as well as the

mystery as to its funding, prompts questions as to whether the poll could have formed a

portion of public diplomacy efforts in Syria.

Public Diplomacy and the Competition for Identity

Public diplomacy denominates the strategy of conducting foreign affairs by

nurturing public opinion in another country through media or non-governmental

agencies by nontraditional diplomacy (Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, 2012).

The operational definition characterizes public diplomacy as programs designed to help

“understand, inform, engage, and influence global audiences, reaching beyond foreign

governments to promote greater appreciation and understanding of U.S. society,

culture, institutions, values, and policies” (American Academy of Diplomacy, 2008, p.

14). Public diplomacy embraces a variety of programs that bring foreign citizens into

contact with American culture and citizens in a way that, hopefully, changes the

thoughts of foreign publics about the U.S. in the belief that changing attitudes of citizens

translates eventually into changing policies of their governments. Programs as diverse

as cultural exchanges, reading rooms, educational exchanges, broadcasting, internet

websites – anything conveying informing publics of the essence of what it means to be


American – comprise the tools of public diplomacy (Advisory Group on Public

Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 2003). The practice of public diplomacy to

support core diplomacy is characteristic of “soft power,” defined by Nye as “the ability

to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion (Nye, 2004, p. x).”

The principle distinction between public diplomacy and official diplomacy is that

the former is transparent and targeted for wider publics while the latter is opaque and

narrowly directed to foreign governments (Wolf & Rosen, 2004). Public diplomacy, by

its nature, takes place in public. Television broadcasts into a country, for example, reach

large groups. The action of public diplomacy accumulates as foreign audiences process

new information about the U.S. from a variety of sources, building an argument

generally favorable to U.S. interests. Stories seen on television, or heard on the radio, or

read across the internet mix with experience using products associated with the U.S. or

meeting with American students or any of the uncountable ways in which information

concerning American culture can be diffused to form an epistemological basis for a

schema about America. Core diplomacy, conversely, generally takes place in private

spaces: meetings between officials, diplomatic contacts behind closed doors,

conferences not transparent to the public. It is the direct interplay of one government

with another.

Competition for the “hearts and minds” of individuals can be characterized as a

competition for loyalty based upon identity. Price described the competition as taking

place in a market for loyalties where sellers exchange allegiance in return for

membership in a community marked by an image or forming a communal identity.

(Price, 1994). The market for identity exists because of the belief that individuals


develop social identity by exposure to a group that the individuals categorize as

constituting a superior relationship than the potential for relationships offered by other

groups. Identity with the group promotes self-esteem when a perception exists that they

have membership in the “right” group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Membership in the “in”

group requires that individuals surrender some measure of intrinsic self-worth in favor

of perceived value emanating from group membership (Turner, 1999). The process of

identity formation assumes exposure to a group representing some value interpreted by

the individual as being important; perception that they belong to the group, often

memorialized by indicia of membership; categorization of groups into desirable and

less-desirable divisions; and belief that the group in which the individual belongs

represents a superior class.

The practical application of identity theory constitutes the foundation for Price’s

loyalty market. In order to achieve success in aligning attitudes of indigenous peoples

with American interests exposure to information must take place and the available

information must be deemed salient by the target population. There are two

mechanisms theorized for promoting attachment to a group. An individual will form an

attachment to a group when beliefs and goals are perceived as being shared (Hogg &

Turner, 1985). Commonality of beliefs increases the probability that the individual

develops an interest in the group while the existence of mutual aspirations initiates the

operation leading to attachment. Another pathway exists where attachment is formed

during interaction with members of the group (Festinger, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). The

pathway based upon personal relationships developed during interaction with other


individuals perceived to be members of the group forms more stable, stronger

attachments (Yuqing et al., 2012).

The point of public diplomacy is to influence the citizenry of another country who

receive not just U.S. messages but messages from a variety of sources competing for the

favor of citizens. Attitudes – the subject of studies conducted by pollsters – are

important to the process. The motivation for the effort remains a belief “that attitudes

abroad can obstruct the success of US policies” (Peterson et al., 2003).”

The results of the Democracy Council polls in Syria have been widely

disseminated, usually uncritically, by repetition on the Internet (Jablonski, 2012). Mass

media generally assume polls to be more accurate than justified by results, biases, and

structural limitations (Franklin, 2003; Igo, 2007; Jackman, 2005; Lau & Redlawsk,

1997). Widely diffused polling results purportedly demonstrating generalized

dissatisfaction with the Syrian government can both reinforce personal attitudes and

create the impression that the attitude is shared by a significant portion of the

population (Festinger, 1985; Heider, 1946). An individual with attitudes perceived to be

consistent with a majority may be more susceptible to mobilization strategies seeking to

motivate political action (Nancarrow, Tinson, & Evans, 2004; Noelle-Neumann, 1974;

Wall, 1972).

Circumstantial evidence exists to support the proposition that Democracy

Council polls formed part of a public diplomacy effort to manipulate public opinion. The

Democracy Council performs unspecified activities for the US government. The

organization states on its website that it promotes programs facilitating sustainable

economic opportunity in the Middle East and Latin America (Democracy Council,


2011a). The United States Agency for International Development and the State

Department are among the organizations providing support for its programs

(Democracy Council, 2011b).

Neither of the poll reports specifies the source of funds for the poll. The costs may

have been significant. Field personnel had to be recruited and trained twice by

professional statistician. The 60 Arab-speaking personnel deployed for each assessment

were screened for ability to conduct the survey as well as for potential connections with

the Syrian government. The pollsters created a data collection manual that was provided

to two of the survey personnel that had been transported out of the country for

instructions. Surveys, conducted in Arabic, were scanned before transport to a transfer

station in Turkey, then delivered to the US for analysis (Hawken et al., 2010, 2011;

Hawken & Leighty, 2010).

The failure to disclose the source of funds used for this complicated project

contravenes generally accepted disclosure standards. The American Association of

Public Opinion Research, for example, requires identification in the poll report or

immediately after release of it “to the extent known, all original funding

sources”(AAPOR, 2010). The poll report simply states that the project was initiated by

the Democracy Council (Hawken et al., 2010). No publically available information

names the original source of the funds. Democracy Council, however, has been

identified by the Washington Post, relying on leaked diplomatic cables from the US

embassy in Damascus, as the conduit for State Department funds provided Syrian exiles

through a program called the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). The cables

identify Democracy Council as the recipient of $6.3 million provided by the State


Department for the “Civil Society Strengthening Initiative” (CSSI) (Whitlock, 2011).

Embassy cables describe the CSSI as a $6,300,562 “collaborative effort between the

Democracy Council and local partners that has produced a secure Damascus Declaration

website” and other broadcast concepts that would be funded from September 1, 2006 to

September 30, 2010 (Embassy Damascus, 2009a, para. 5). None of the contract awards

to the Democracy Council for these projects are listed at USASpending.gov, the website

mandated by the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 to allow

US citizens to hold the government accountable for each spending decision.

Funding for the MEPI program became a sensitive issue when the State

Department began to suspect that Syrian authorities uncovered the mechanism for US

payments to dissidents. In a cable dated September 23, 2009, the US Embassy in

Damascus concluded, “It is unclear to what extent SARG [Syrian Arab Republic

Government] intelligence services understand how US money enters Syria and through

which proxy organizations. What is clear, however, is that security agents are

increasingly focused this issue when interrogate human rights and civil society activists.

The information agents are able to frame their questions with more and more specific

information and names …. [I]t may suggest the SARG has keyed in on MEPI operations

in particular” (Embassy Damascus, 2009c, para. 8). Earlier in the cable the embassy

references Democracy Council funding while recounting the experience of a dissident

questioned by SARG about embassy and State Department contacts who “recounted a

June interrogation during which she was questioned about MEPI-funded Democracy

Council activities….” (Embassy Damascus, 2009c, para. 2). Similarly, SARG began

interrogating citizens about contact with Democracy Council or its president, Jim


Prince, by name in July, 2009 (Embassy Damascus, 2009b, para. 9). The embassy

indicated that it did not know “of how much or for how long SARG has known about

Democracy Council operations in Syria…,” concluding, “If SARG does know, but has

chosen not to intervene openly, it raises the possibility that the SARG may be mounting

a campaign to entrap democracy activists receiving illegal (under Syrian law) foreign

assistance” (Embassy Damascus, 2009b, para. 11). The cables not only show that

Democracy Council received government money through MEPI to operate in Syria but

that the Syrian government increasingly suspected that the NGO supported dissidents in

an operation sanctioned by the US.

The receipt of MEPI grants by Democracy Council does not necessarily mean that

the guerrilla poll was funded by US government money. The burden of producing

information on the source of funds, however, is placed on the organization publishing

the poll (AAPOR, 2010, sec. III.A.1.) The only financial information available to the

public, the IRS Form 990 that the Democracy Council is required to file in order to keep

its tax exempt status, shows that in two years the total income of the organization grew

8 times, to $4.5 million (Buckner, 2012b). It was during this time that US embassy in

Damascus reported that the Democracy Council managed a $6.3 million program in

Syria (Embassy Damascus, 2009a). The Washington Post concluded, “According to the

cables, the State Department funneled money to the exile group via the Democracy

Council, a Los Angeles-based nonprofit” (Whitlock, 2011, p. n.p.). Whether the guerrilla

polling program formed part of the effort to fund Syrian dissidents remains unproven by

direct evidence, although the circumstantial evidence appears compelling. The president

of the Democracy Council, James Prince, called upon the Syrian government to change


policy towards polling in terms that indicate that the poll was designed as a rhetorical

tool: “There is public good in giving voice to the Syrian public” (Democracy Council,

2011c, p. n.p.). The sentiment is echoed on the MEPI website, which states, “MEPI’s

emphasis is on supporting citizen empowerment” (MEPI, 2013a).

None of the data from the Democracy Council poll has been made available to the

public for review. The agreement between Democracy Council and Pepperdine

University providing for the analysis of data contains a clause which prevents the

academic researchers from releasing information to anyone other than entities specified

in the agreement (Buckner, 2012a). AAPOR standards provide for maintaining the

confidentiality of information when engaged by a private client (AAPOR, 2010, sec.

I.B.1.). Private clients are to be encouraged to release “essential information about how

the research was conducted….” (AAPOR, 2010, sec. I.C.1.). The decision by the

Democracy Council to embargo data makes it difficult to analyze the actual poll to

determine validity. The survey attempts to avoid this problem by making it appear that

an “independent survey report” prepared by an unconstrained research organization

validated results (Hawken & Leighty, 2010, p. n.p.). None of the reports, press releases,

or articles issued in support of the survey disclosed that Angela Hawken, the leader of

the team writing the survey report, is a member of the Democracy Council Board of

Directors (Democracy Council, 2011a).

Conclusion

Democracy Council promoted its polls as both an assessment of public attitudes

in Syria as well as an operation to give voice to the people of Syria. Due to limitations in


design, the polls cannot be understood to represent the feelings of Syrians in general at

the time. It seems plausible that the polling operation was undertaken for a purpose

other than to assess attitudes.

Several explanations are possible, although none can be definitely proven. The

power of polls to affect and strengthen attitudes has been well documented. It is

conceivable that the polls were undertaken in order to create the appearance of

widespread dissatisfaction with the Assad regime among the populace in order to

strengthen the resolve, and perhaps motivate action by, dissident Syrians. Funding for

the Democracy Council project would have been consistent with aspirations of public

diplomacy to affect the attitudes of indigenous populations. US government funding for

Democracy Council projects was consistent with MEPI goals “to support civil society

groups, political activists, and business leaders in their efforts for political and economic

reform, government transparency, and accountability projects” (MEPI, 2013b, p. n.p.).

Another speculative explanation is that the guerrilla poll was designed to assist in

the provision of funds to dissidents through payments made to people in Syria to work

on the poll. Although there is no information as to payments in any of the poll

documents or on government websites describing projects in Syria, MEPI makes it clear

that its purpose included support for activists. Published reports identified Democracy

Council as a funnel for US payments to Syrian exiles (Whitlock, 2011). The embassy

cables depict Democracy Council as working to support US diplomatic goals in Syria.

The purpose of public diplomacy is to affect attitudes such that traditional diplomacy

operates in an altered environment, presumably one more favorable to the goals of

American policy. Guerrilla polling can be seen as supporting US policy goals by creating


the impression that opposition to the Assad regime had been documented. The polls

tend to reinforce attitudes favorable to dissidents.

Further research is required to document the relationship between guerrilla

polling in Syria and the practice of public diplomacy by the United States. While

documents evidence a clear association between activities of the State Department and

Democracy Council, none of the information in the documents currently available to

researchers discuss the guerrilla polling operation. Funding amounts disclosed by

Democracy Council in IRS Form 990 made available to the public need to be reconciled

with grants and contracts identifying the organization as receiving either a prime award

or a sub-award on USSpending.gov. The majority of Democracy Council awards listed

by the government flow from the US Agency for International Development and,

further, do not appear to be for work in Syria. The data needs to be evaluated carefully

in the absence of any release of information regarding funding the polls from the

government or Democracy Council.

Public diplomacy may be far more complicated than cultural exchanges and

broadcast of quality information depicting life in America. The construction of a polling

program represents an active approach to the alteration of the diplomatic environment.

Secrecy surrounding funding, program operations, and the actual results of the polling

make it difficult to assess whether funds where spent in a manner entirely consistent

with US policies and goals. Better information would result in meaningful oversight.


Sources

AAPOR. (2010). American Association for Public Opinion Research Code of

Professional Ethics and Practices (Revised May 2010). Deerfield IL. Retrieved

from http://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Code_of_Ethics/4249.htm

Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World. (2003).

Changing minds, Winning peace: a new strategic direction for U.S. public

diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim world (p. 80). Washington, DC: The Advisory

Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World.

American Academy of Diplomacy. (2008). A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future:

Fixing the crisis in diplomatic readiness. Stimson Center. Retrieved from

http://www.stimson.org/budgeting/Publications/Long_Final_11_08.pdf

Brubaker, R. G., & Fowler, C. (1990). Encouraging college males to perform testicular

self-examination: Evaluation of a persuasive message based on the revised theory

of reasoned action. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 20(17, Pt 1), 1411–

1422. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1990.tb01481.x

Buckner, E. (2012a, January 5). Secret Surveys !?$#. Elizabeth Buckner. Retrieved

March 20, 2013, from http://elizabethbuckner.com/2012/01/05/secret-surveys/

Buckner, E. (2012b, January 20). Update on the Democracy Council. Elizabeth Buckner.

Retrieved from http://elizabethbuckner.com/2012/01/

Budd, R. J. (1986). Predicting cigarette use: The need to incorporate measures of

salience in the theory of reasoned action. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,

16(8), 663–685. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1986.tb01752.x


Budd, R. J., North, D., & Spencer, C. (1984). Understanding seat-belt use: A test of

Bentler and Speckart’s extension of the “theory of reasoned action.” European

Journal of Social Psychology, 14(1), 69–78. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420140106

Cull, N. J. (2009). Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past. Los Angeles, CA:

Figuerora Press.

Democracy Council. (2011a). Who We Are. Democracy Council. Retrieved November 18,

2011, from http://www.democracycouncil.org/who_we_are.html

Democracy Council. (2011b). Support Us. Democracy Council. Retrieved November 21,

2011, from http://www.democracycouncil.org/support_us.html

Democracy Council. (2011c). Historic Opinion Survey Reveals Substantial Public

Dissatisfaction in Syria (Press Release) (p. 2). Los Angeles: The Democracy

Council. Retrieved from http://www.democracycouncil.org/media-

events/releases/syria_survey_release.html

Embassy Damascus. (2009a). Cable Reference Id: #09damascus306: Behavior

Reform: Next Steps for a Human Rights Strategy. Retrieved from

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09DAMASCUS306.htmlfiles/449/cable.ht

ml

Embassy Damascus. (2009b, July 8). Cable Reference Id #09damascus477: Murky

Alliances: Muslim Brotherhood, the Movement for Justice and Democracy, and

the Damascus Declaration. Wikileaks. Retrieved from

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09DAMASCUS477.html

Embassy Damascus. (2009c, September 23). Cable Reference Id: #09damascus692:

Show Us the Money! Sarg Susepcts “illegal” Usg Funding. Retrieved November


19, 2011, from

http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09DAMASCUS692&q=democrac

y-council

Festinger, L. (1985). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford Calif.: Stanford

University Press.

Festinger, L., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1997). Sticking together or falling apart: In-group

identification as a psychological determinant of group commitment versus

individual mobility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 617–626.

Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior : an

introduction to theory and research / Martin Fishbein, Icek Ajzen. Reading,

Mass. : Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., [1975].

Franklin, C. (2003). Polls, Election Outcomes and Sources of Error. In Conference

Papers -- American Association for Public Opinion Research (p. N.PAG).

Presented at the Conference Papers -- American Association for Public Opinion

Research.

Hawken, A., Kulich, J., Grunert, J., Kimbro, L., & Abu-Hamdeh, S. (2010). Survey

Findings: Syria 2010 Public Opinion Survey (Poll report prepared for The

Democracy Council of California) (p. 40). Malibu: Pepperdine University.

Retrieved from http://www.pepperdine.edu/pr/images/press-

releases/2010/august/Syria Survey Report_August 5_final.pdf

Hawken, A., Kulick, J., Leighty, M., & Kissee, J. (2011). Survey Findings: Syria 2011

Public Opinion Survey (Poll report prepared for The Democracy Council of

California) (p. 60). Malibu: Pepperdine University. Retrieved from


http://www.pepperdine.edu/pr/releases/2011/september/Syria_2011_09

23_Final_with cover.pdf

Hawken, A., & Leighty, M. (2010, November 25). Want to Know What North Koreans

Think About Kim Jong Un? Argument. Foreign Policy. Retrieved November 20,

2011, from

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/25/want_to_know_what_north

_koreans_think_about_kim_jong_un

Heider, F. (1946). Attitudes and cognitive organization. The Journal Of Psychology, 21,

107–112.

Hennig, P., & Knowles, A. (1990). Factors Influencing Women Over 40 Years to Take

Precautions Against Cervical Cancer. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,

20(19), 1612–1621.

Herbst, S. (1993). Numbered voices : how opinion polling has shaped American politics

/ Susan Herbst. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1993.

Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1985). Interpersonal attraction, social identification and

psychological group formation,. European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 51–

66.

Igo, S. E. (2007). The averaged American: Surveys, citizens, and the making of a mass

public. Cambridge, MA US: Harvard University Press.

IWM. (2012). The Information Warfare Monitor Project Publishable Summary.

Information Warfare Monitor Project. Retrieved from http://www.infowar-

monitor.net/reports/IWM-Project%20Publishable%20Summary.pdf


Jablonski, M. (2012). Polls as Persuasion Instruments in Public Diplomacy: A Case

Study of “Guerrilla Polls” in Syria. Global Media Journal - American Edition,

11(21), n.p.

Jackman, S. (2005). Pooling the polls over an election campaign*. Australian Journal of

Political Science, 40(4), 499–517. doi:10.108010361140500302472

Jacobs, L. R., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1995). Presidential manipulation of polls and public

opinion. Political Science Quarterly, 110, 519–538.

Labott, E. (2011, September 27). Syrian poll finds optimism for future, but little support

for Assad. Security Clearance. CNN. Retrieved March 20, 2013, from

http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/27/syrian-poll-finds-optimism-for-

future-but-little-support-for-assad/

Lau, R. R., & Redlawsk, D. P. (1997). Voting Correctly. American Political Science

Review, 91(3), 585–598.

Lippmann, W. (1922). Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=eLobn4WwbLUC

McMillan, R. (2012, July 11). How the Boy Next Door Accidentally Built a Syrian Spy

Tool | Wired Enterprise | Wired.com. Wired Enterprise. Retrieved March 19,

2013, from http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/07/dark-comet-syrian-

spy-tool/

MEPI. (2013a, March 20). FAQs. http://usembassy.state.gov/about-faq.html.

Retrieved March 25, 2013, from http://mepi.state.gov/about-faq.html#a3

MEPI. (2013b, March 20). Home. http://usembassy.state.gov/index.html. Retrieved

March 25, 2013, from http://mepi.state.gov/


Merton, R. (1968). Social theory and social structure (1968 enl. ed.). New York: Free

Press.

Miller, L., & Grush, J. (1986). Individual differences in attitudinal versus normative

determination of behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 190–

202. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(86)90023-5

Nancarrow, C., Tinson, J., & Evans, M. (2004). Polls as Marketing Weapons:

Implications for the Market Research Industry. Journal of Marketing

Management, 20(5/6), 639–655.

Noelle-Neumann, E. (1974). The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion. Journal

of Communication, 24, 43–51.

Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power. New York: PublicAffairs.

Pagel, M. D., & Davidson, A. R. (1984). A comparison of three social-psychological

models of attitude and behavioral plan: Prediction of contraceptive behavior.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47(3), 517–533.

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.47.3.517

Perlroth, N. (2013, March 13). Researchers Find 25 Countries Using Surveillance

Software. Bits Blog. New York Times. Retrieved March 19, 2013, from

http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/researchers-find-25-countries-using-

surveillance-software/

Peterson, P. G., Bloomgarden, K. F., Grunwald, H. A., Morey, D. E., Telhami, S., Sieg, J.,

… Council on Foreign Relations. (2003). Finding America’s voice: a strategy for

reinvigorating U.S. public diplomacy: report of an independent task force

sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. New York, NY; Washington,


D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations Press; distributed by the Brookings

Institution Press.

Pollock, D. (2012, May 30). What Does the Syrian Opposition Believe? Wall Street

Journal. Retrieved from

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303610504577420220577542

772.html

Polsby, N., & Wildavsky, A. (2000). Presidential elections : strategies and structures of

American politics (10th ed.). New York: Chatham House Publishers.

Price, M. (1994). The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and Global Competition for

Allegiance. Yale Law Journal, 104(3), 667–705.

Public Diplomacy Alumni Association. (2012). About Public Diplomacy. Retrieved from

http://publicdiplomacy.org/pages/index.php?page=about-public-diplomacy

Scheufele, D. A., & Moy, P. (2000). Twenty-Five Years of the Spiral of Silence: A

Conceptual Review and Empirical Outlook. International Journal of Public

Opinion Research, 12(1), 3–28.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior.

Nelson-Hall.

Terror Free Tomorrow. (2007). Syrian Public Opinion: Pioneering New Survey of

Syria. Washington, DC: Terror Free Tomorrow. Retrieved from

http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/TFT Syria 0Poll Report.pdf

Timko, C. (1987). Seeking medical care for a breast cancer symptom: Determinants of

intentions to engage in prompt or delay behavior. Health Psychology, 6(4), 305–

328. doi:10.1037/0278-6133.6.4.305


Turner, J. C. (1999). Some current issues in research on social identity and self-

categorization theories. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.),

Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford, UK:

Blackwell.

US State Department. (2013). Syria: Country Specific Information. International Travel

Information. Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Retrieved

March 17, 2013, from http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1035.html

Wall, V. D. (1972). Evidential Attitudes and Attitude Change. Western Speech, 36(2),

115–123.

West, D. M. (1991). Polling Effects in Election Campaigns. Political Behavior, 13(2),

151–163.

Whitlock, C. (2011, April 18). U.S. secretly backed Syrian opposition groups, cables

released by WikiLeaks show. The Washington Post. Retrieved from

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-secretly-backed-syrian-opposition-

groups-cables-released-by-wikileaks-

show/2011/04/14/AF1p9hwD_story_1.html

Wolf, C., & Rosen, B. (2004). Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from

http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP134

YouGov. (2011). Syria’s President assad - should he resign (p. 24). Doha: The Doha

Debates.


Yuqing, R., Harper, F. M., Drenner, S., Terveen, L., Kiesler, S., Riedl, J., & Kraut, R. E.

(2012). Building member attachment in online communities: applying theories of

group identity interpersonal bonds. MIS Quarterly, 36, 841–864.

Zajonc, R. B. (2001). Mere Exposure: A Gateway to the Subliminal. Current Directions

in Psychological Science, 10(6), 224–228.

Zhang, M. (2012, June 11). Syria ramps up cyber mining to target activists. OpenNet

Initiative. Retrieved from https://opennet.net/blog/2012/06/syria-ramps-cyber-

mining-target-activists

Zimbardo, P. G., Ebbesen, E. B., & Maslach, C. (1977). Influencing attitudes and

changing behavior : an introduction to method, theory, and applications of

social control and personal power. 2d ed.

Zimbardo, P. G., & Leippe, M. R. (1991). The psychology of attitude change and social

influence. New York, NY England: Mcgraw-Hill Book Company.

Guerrilla Polling” in Syria: Opinion Polls or Public Diplomacy Tool?

Documents