No. 14-2569 In the Wntteb Qtourt of for the ubtb Qtf rcuft Sandra Grazzini-Rucki individually, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. David L. Knutson, an individual, et al., Defendants-Appellants. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA, NO. 0:13-CV-2477 RESPONSE AND REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS March 4, 2015 Michelle Lowney MacDonald MacDonald Law Firm, LLC 1069 So. Robert Street West St. Paul, MN 55118 Telephone: (651) 222-4400 Facsimile: (651) 222-1122 Counsel for Appellants Appellate Case: 14-2569 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/04/2015 Entry ID: 4250770
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No. 14-2569 In the
Wntteb ~tateti Qtourt of ~ppeal~ for the
~f ubtb Qtf rcuft
Sandra Grazzini-Rucki individually, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
David L. Knutson, an individual, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA,
1. Judge Knutson Bears The Burden of Proving Immunity ................ 3
2. Neither the District Court Nor Judge Knutson Have Analyzed Historical Foundations for an Immunity of Accused Function .... .5
3. 3. The District Court Extended Immunity Based On Factors Not Relevant to Judicial Immunity .......................................... 6
C. ruDGE KNUTSON'S ADMINSTRATIVE BEHAVIOR IN ASSIGNING HIMSELF TO CERTAIN CASES IS NOT IMMUNE ............................ 7
D. ruDGE KNUTSON'S "LISTENING" PSYCHOTHERAPY SESSION WITH THE GRAZZINI-RUCKI CHILDREN IS NOT A ruDICIAL ACT ......................................................................................................... 11
E. MODERN FAMILY COURT JURISDICTION IS INFERIOR; IF IT HAS IMMUNITY IT IS EXTREMELY NARROW ....................................... 14
1. Section 1983 Does Not Require Proof of Malicious or Corrupt Intent .............................................................................................. 19
2. Pierson and Sparkman Erroneously Extended Common Law Immunity to Civil Rights Liability ................................................................................ 19
3. Pierson Incorrectly Analyzed Legislative Privilege Rather Than Judicial Immunity ................................................................. 20
4. Judicial Immunity is the Opposite of Legislative Privilege-Judges Are Sovereigns Possessing Not "Rights" but Delegated Authority ... 23
5. Congress Expressly Intended to Abrogate Judicial Immunity ....... 26
to determine that the function accused-testimony of a grand jury witness-enjoyed
immunity at common law. Id. at 1503-07.2
An officer's failure to prove up a common law analog is dispositive of the issue
regardless of countervailing policy considerations. Rehberg at 1502-03 ("We do not
simply make our own judgment about the need for immunity. We have made it clear that
it is not our role 'to make a freewheeling policy choice,' and that we do not have a
license to create immunities based solely on our view of sound policy."). Granting an
immunity absent this historical analysis is error. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249-
50 (1974) ("These cases, in their present posture, present no occasion for a definitive
exploration of the scope of immunity available to state executive officials.").
2. Neither the District Court Nor Judge Knutson Have Analyzed Historical Foundations for an Immunity of Accused Function
Judge Knutson proffered, and the district court undertook, no historical analysis of
whether any of the two dozen functions accused in the Amended Complaint were
functions that enjoyed judicial immunity at common law in 1871. The district court's
2 Similar historical analyses are apparent in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-85 (1961); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 703 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559-62 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hoffman v. Ha"is, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("The courts that have accorded absolute immunity to social workers appear to have overlooked the necessary historical inquiry; none has seriously considered whether social workers enjoyed absolute immunity for their official duties in 1871. If they did not, absolute immunity is unavailable to social workers under§ 1983; Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no "firmly rooted tradition" of immunity for function of a private psychiatrist employed by prison).
element. Sparkman, supra.5 Judge Knutson repeats the error. Knutson Brf. at 29-30
(citations to Billingsley and Duty).
Judge Knutson's reliance on Hardy v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., No. 93 C 1348, 1993 WL 85750,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1993) is misplaced. Hardy erroneously analyzed judicial acts
under the test for prosecutorial immunity. Hardy cited Imbler v. Pachtman, applying the
"intimately related with the judicial phase of the criminal process" standard. Id. at *2.
Hardy failed to cite or analyze under judicial immunity precedents including Sparkman,
Pierson, Bradley, or Randall. Judges do not perform prosecutorial function, and thus the
immunity of a judge is lost if she performs such functions. Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620
F.2d 1229, 1236 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding judge performing functions of a prosecutor not
entitled to either judicial or prosecutorial immunity).
Finally, none of the authority relied on by Judge Knutson analyzed the critical
test-whether the function of assigning cases was a judicial act at 1871 common law.
Absent such analysis, the authority is error. Rehberg, supra.
D. Judge Knutson's "Listening" Psychotherapy Session with the Grazzini-Rucki Children is Not a Judicial Act
5 A simple example is that the Chief Justice of the United States is authorized by law to serve as the Chancellor of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. 20 U.S.C. § 76cc. Such authorization does not convert such service to a judicial act. See, e.g., Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (1970) ("A judge does not cease to be a judge when he undertakes to chair a PT A meeting, but, of course, he does not bring judicial immunity to that forum, either.") Id. at 820 (cited favorably in Sparkman at 370 n. 10).
jurisdiction, and for acts done "maliciously or corruptly." Randall at 531. 10 While Judge
Knuston bears the burden of demonstrating modem family court functions enjoyed any
immunity at 1871 common law, in no case will he achieve an immunity scope greater
than an 1871 inferior court; for judicial acts within their jurisdiction not done
"maliciously or corruptly." Id.
Judge Knutson's Assertion of Broad Immunity Lacks Authority
Judge Knutson asserts: "Acts and orders related to overseeing a family law case,
including orders requiring therapy and efforts to facilitate it, are acts inherently judicial in
nature." Knutson Brf. p. 35. His authority does not support this proposition.
Judge Knutson cites Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1448 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated by
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). Myers was the first case in this Circuit to consider
the 1976 decision of Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Imbler was the seminal
Supreme Court case extending prosecutorial immunity under Section 1983 to acts of "the
prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State." Id. at 431 n. 33. The Court recognized
10 This distinction was recognized in Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978), fn. 7. See also Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1868) ("In reference to judges of limited and inferior authority, it has been held that they are protected only when they act within their jurisdiction."); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johnson 282, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) 1810 WL 1044, affd, 1811WL1445 (1811) ("[T]he judges of the king's superior courts of general jurisdiction were not liable to answer personally for their errors in judgment. . . . [W]ith respect to the inferior courts, it was only while they act within their jurisdiction."); Phelps v. Sill, 1Day315, 327 (1804). See also 1871 comments of Representative Arthur, infra, describing common law immunity: "Hitherto, in all the history of this country and of England, no judge or court has been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts .... Willfulness and corruption in error alone created a liability .... "
or investigative functions in "approv[ing] or direct[ing] the removal of children from
their homes upon the arrest of one or both parents." Id. at n. 11.11
In Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 4 78 (1991 ), the Supreme Court revisited Imbler and
analyzed Meyers to resolve circuit splits on the scope ofprosecutorial immunity. It found
the immunity extends to a prosecutor's "participation in a probable cause hearing, which
led to the issuance of a search warrant" but not to "the use of hypnosis12 and the existence
of probable cause to arrest petitioner" Id. at 491-93. Contrary to Myers, the Court found
no absolute immunity for a prosecutor's investigative and administrative activity despite
that activity occurring after initiation of the criminal prosecution. Id.
Judge Knutson claim Myers immunizes "family law judges to work with experts to
determine the care provided to children in custody and applying judicial immunity to that
work." Knutson Brf. at 35. This is incorrect. Myers involved a criminal prosecution, not
"family law judges." Myers at 1452. Myers did not involve Minnesota laws regarding
''best interests," nor ajudge or psychologist determining "best interests"-but criminal
prosecution. Moreover, Myers expressly recognized that investigative functions such as
the "listening session" in which Dr. Gilbertson and Judge Knutson "the session was held
11 Specific to family issues, the Meyers plaintiffs accused ''us[ing] the interviews [of children] to coerce perjured statements from young and vulnerable witnesses" in a criminal investigation and "initiat[ ing] neglect proceedings in the family court on behalf of the Scott County Human Services Department [and] sign[ing] and approv[ing] the neglect petitions." Id. at 1450. Because these functions are "functionally comparable to prosecutor's initiation of the judicial process," this Court extended absolute immunity. Id. at 1452. 12 A psychotherapeutic function.
Moreover, actual analysis of the congressional record, and history of judicial immunity
reveals Chief Justice Warren's presumption is simply wrong.
3. Pierson Incorrectly Analyzed Legislative Privilege Rather Than Judicial Immunity
In Pierson Chief Justice Warren ''presumed" that "the immunity of judges" was
"equally well established" as the legislative privilege. Remarkably, in presuming, he
failed to conduct analysis of the common law of judicial immunity-citing only to
Bradley's (post-Civil Rights Act) holding and Scott v. Stansfield, 3 Law Reports,
Exchequer, 220.15 Pierson at 554. Despite having on hand the meticulous historical
analysis of nineteenth century common law and the 42nd Congress' legislative intent
provided by Justice Douglas in 1961 's Monroe v. Pape decision, Chief Justice Warren's
1967 opinion ignored it.
Dissenting, Justice Douglas-the author of Monroe--did draw from his prior
historical analysis of common law and the congressional record to the Civil Rights Act,
reaching a forceful conclusion: "The Court's ruling is not justified by the admitted need
for a vigorous and independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common-law doctrine
of judicial immunity, and does not follow inexorably from our prior decisions." Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Similar rich analyses and
enlivened opinions are evident in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
15 Analyzed in Bradley at n. 16. "[A] judge of a county court was sued for slander, and he put in a plea that the words complained of were spoken by him in his capacity as such judge, while sitting in his court, and trying a cause in which the plaintiff was defendant."
speech liberty with the federal "speech or debate" analog in the United States
Constitution at Article I, Sec. 6, cl. 1.16 Like Chief Justice Warren, Justice Frankfurter
presumed-analyzing no legislative history-that the 42nd Congress would not have
intended to limit any state's legislative activity in enacting the 1871 Civil Rights Act
because Congress was itself a "staunch advocate of legislative freedom." Id. at 376
(emphasis added).
Tenney justified extending the speech or debate liberty to the committee hearing
function because legislators are directly-elected and immediately accountable to voters.
Id. at 378. Tenney also held the narrow immunity was lost if"there was a usurpation of
functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive." Id.
4. Judicial Immunity is the Opposite of Legislative Privilege-Judges Are Sovereigns Possessing Not "Rights" but Delegated Authority
Judicial authority and legislative freedom are night and day. Judges exercise jurisdiction
as sovereigns-not liberties from sovereigns. While judges have all the rights of any
16 That privilege is narrow: "The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place." The privilege is against arrest-not civil liability-does not extend to felonies or treason, or "breach of the peace"- a misdemeanor. Arrest outside of "Session" is permitted, and members maybe "questioned" for activity other than "speech or debate." Tenney at 377 (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (false imprisonment not privileged); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917). Even so limited Jefferson was fearful of the power it gave legislators. Tenney at 375. Hamilton was not so fearful of "the least dangerous branch"-because it exercised no similar liberty. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (1788).
citizen qua a citizen, a judge qua judge possesses no rights. "First and Fourteenth
Amendments restrain "only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States."
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000). "[T]he censorial power is in the
people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people." New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964). There is no need for a judge to
express opinions, experiences, or desires of her own or those she represents to create
law-he/she is given law. 170ther than necessary for faithful adjudication, a judge's
"freedom of conscience" is irrelevant to judicial function-relevant "conscience" is given
in the form of law that has matured through free debate elsewhere. County Judges do not
function as a body, and (should) have no one to "debate." The United States and State of
Minnesota constitutions do not extend a speech or debate privilege to the judiciary
because courts are not empowered to speak or debate. The function of a judge is to
adjudicate-apply the given law to properly-admitted facts. There is no need to protect a
judge's "speech" other than to preserve the judge's ability to pronounce adjudication-
merely a "substantial state interest"18 that must yield to Minnesota's "fundamental
law"---citizen rights such as remedy, 19 due process, equal protection, speech, and
17 See Separation of powers Minn. Const. Art 3, sec 1. 18 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991). 19 Minnesota Constitution, Article 1. sec. 8 provides: Redress of injuries or wrongs.
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and
association. See Theide v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 226-27, 14 NW 2d
400, 406 (1944) (forcibly removing woman and children from their home in sub-zero
weather by the town sheriff and forced to return to their "legal settlement" in another
town for the purpose of obtaining poor relief violated "fundamental law"20 despite
consistency with state law.). Minnesota courts may not construe statutes contrary to
citizen rights under the "fundamental law." See T. Flemming, J. Norby, The Minnesota
Bill of Rights: Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist, 7 HAMLINEL.REv. 194 (1984).
The long history of preservation of legislative speech and debate-a fundamental
liberty-is entirely absent from the history of judicial immunity. See Monell at 665-94;
Pierson (Douglas, J. dissenting); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974) ("Indeed,
as the Court also indicated in Monroe v. Pape, supra, the legislative history indicates that
there is no absolute immunity"); Pulliam at 540 (1984) ("every Member of Congress who
spoke to the issue assumed that judges would be liable under§ 1983"). There being no
"judicial speech" liberty in 1871, there is no reason to "presume" that the 1871 Congress
would have seen need to expressly abrogate a tradition that has never existed.
without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws. Judges are not representatives of voters, but independent of electoral will, passion, and accountability. 20 "The entire social and political structure of America rests upon the cornerstone that all men have certain rights which are inherent and inalienable. Among these are the right to be protected in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the right to acquire, possess and enjoy property; and the right to establish a home and family relations-all under equal and impartial laws which govern the whole community and each member thereof ... The rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens exist notwithstanding there is no specific enumeration thereof in State Constitutions." Theide at 226-27, 14 NW 2d at 406.
On that record it is incontrovertible that the 42nd Congress affirmatively rejected common
law judicial immunity.
I answer it is better to invade the judicial power of the States than permit it to invade, strike down, and destroy the civil rights of citizens. A judicial power perverted to such uses should be speedily invaded.
The 1866 Act was vetoed by President Johnson because it abrogated common law
judicial immunity.24 In the fight to defeat the veto, Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Trumbull expressed revulsion at the entire concept of judicial immunity: "It is
the very doctrine out of which the rebellion was hatched. "25
Section 1 of the 1871 Act (now Section 1983) passed rapidly through Congress because
debate wasn't necessary-Congress recognized Section 1 as merely "adding" a civil
remedy to the 1866 Act. Debate instead focused on section 2 of the bill (modernly
Section 1985) because of concerns over federalism and regulation of private behavior.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971).
The recorded debate demonstrates unequivocally that Congress intended to abrogate
common law judicial immunity:
[T]he decisions of the county judges, who are made little kings, with almost despotic powers to carry out the demands of the legislature which elected thempowers which, almost without exception, have been exercised against Republicans without regard to law or justice, make up a catalogue of wrongs, outrageous
24 Yale Note at 327. 25 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull); Yale Note at 328.
violations, and evasions of the spirit of the new constitution, unscrupulous malignity and partisan hate never paralleled in the history of parties in this country or any other.
What is to be the case of a judge? ... Is that State judge to be taken from his bench? Is he to be liable in an action? ... It is the language of the bill: for there is no limitation whatsoever on the terms that are employed, and they are as comprehensive as can be used.
Id. (remarks of Senator Thurman).
"[T]he judge of a State court, though acting under oath of office, is made liable to a suit in the Federal Court and subject to damages for his decision against a suitor, however honest and conscientious that decision may be ... "
Id. (remarks of Representative Lewis). Representative Arthur recognized the law would
be a drastic reversal of common law immunity:
Hitherto, in all the history of this country and of England, no judge or court has been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts .... Willfulness and corruption in error alone created a liability . . . . Under the provisions of this section every judge in the State court. . . will enter upon and pursue the call of official duty with the sword of Damocles suspended over him ... "
Courts considering parallel questions have deferred to this vivid record. See, e.g.,
Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151F.2d240 (3rd Cir. 1945) ("But the privilege as we have
26 See also Yale Note at 328 and references to additional consistent comments inn. 38. "On three occasions during the debates, legislators explicitly stated that judges would be liable under the [1871] Act. No one denied the statements." "In sum, the question of congressional intent seems relatively clear: there was no universal acceptance of the broad English immunity rule in 1871, and the only legislative history available supports the proposition that Congress intended Section 1983 to cover judges." Yale Note at 328. Yale Note's 1969 author left open the door that "the legislative history does not preclude entirely the Court's construction of the statute if the policy reasons for judicial immunity are sufficiently persuasive." That "policy reasons" door was closed eleven years later in Malley.
stated was a rule of the common law. Congress possessed the power to wipe it out. We
think that the conclusion is irresistible that Congress by enacting the Civil Rights Act sub
judice intended to abrogate the privilege to the extent indicated by that act and in fact did
so . . . . The statute must be deemed to include members of the state judiciary acting in
official capacity."); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665
(1978); Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 643 (1980) (''Nowhere in the
debates, however, is there a suggestion that the common law excused a city from liability
on account of the good faith of its authorized agents, much less an indication of a
congressional intent to incorporate such an immunity into the Civil Rights Act"); Pulliam
v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 543 (1984).
Far from an intent to incorporate common law judicial immunity, Congress in
passing both Acts specifically intended to eliminate it as the source of the monumental
evil of state-sponsored oppression jeopardizing our nation's existence by precipitating
civil warfare.27
27 Congress' intent to hold judges accountable is recorded as recently as 1979 by the 96th Congress:
[Section 1983] is an essential element of an extraordinary series of congressional enactments that transformed the relationship between the Federal Government and its constituent parts. [T]he very purpose of the 1983 was to interpose the Federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's Federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of State law, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.
Statement of Representative David A. Clarke, Chairperson, Committee on Judiciary, Government of the District of Columbia on the Act of Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284, PL 170 LH, 1st Sess. (Dec. 29, 1979) (emphasis added).
If aura there be, it is hardly protected by exonerating [rom liability such lawless conduct as took place here2
Nineteenth and twentieth century American judges have overstepped constitutional
restriction to usurp powers reserved to the legislature and written for themselves an
immunity far greater even than that of an English judge, or even a King, at common
law.29
The purposes of immunity-to protect efficient process-is today accomplished at
the pleading stage. Unlike the 1871 era of federal procedure in which a judge could be
forced to stand trial on mere "ascription" of culpable intent to an accused act, 30 modernly,
like all litigants, a judge is protected by procedural barriers provided in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) which
protect against a mere "ascription" of malice. These are bolstered by the plausibility test
provided in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 thereafter.
28 Sparkman at 368 (Stewart, J. dissenting). 29 "[T]o no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice." Magna Carta (1215); "[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (quoting William M. Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *23). 30 "Few persons sufficiently irritated to institute an action against a judge for his judicial acts would hesitate to ascribe any character to the acts which would be essential to the maintenance of the action." Bradley at 348.
The expansion of a judge-made exception to the civil rights act , chief redress of
civil rights violations, has rendered state judges immune from suit even for the most
bizarre, corrupt or abusive judicial acts.
A Judge's invocation of the doctrine of judicial immunity has effectively denied
citizens any redress for injuries, embarrassment, and unjust imprisonment caused by
errant judges. If judicial immunity truly is to serve as a bulwark of justice, more clearly
defined limits must be placed on it, arising from the due process clause itself
Clothing a Judge with immunity simply because he performed a ''judicial act" overlooks
the real-world probability that even judicial acts can be utterly inconsistent with due
process. Important personal rights, such as the right to have a family here, can be
destroyed by the mere nod of a judge's head. Judges should not be privileged to violate
the rights of citizens unfortunate enough to find themselves in a biased, corrupt or
irresponsible court. Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing Appellants' case.
Dated: __ M_ar~ch_4 ____ , 2015
MACDONALD LAW FIRM, LLC
Isl Michelle L. MacDonald Michelle L. MacDonald, # 1823 70 1069 South Robert Street West St. Paul, MN 55118 Telephone: (651) 222-4400 Facsimile: (651) 222-1122
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)
because this brief contains 6946 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed.
R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6)
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionality spaced typeface in Microsoft
Word 2010 in Times New Roman 14 pt. type.
3. Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28A(h), I also hereby certify that electronic files of
this Brief and accompanying Addendum have been submitted to the Clerk via the
Court's CMJECF system. The files have been scanned for viruses and are virus-free.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: __ M_ar~ch_4 ____ , 2015
MACDONALD LAW FIRM, LLC
Isl Michelle L. MacDonald Michelle L. MacDonald, # 1823 70 1069 South Robert Street West St. Paul, MN 55118 Telephone: (651) 222-4400 Facsimile: (651) 222-1122
I hereby certify that on February 26, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit by
using the CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are registered
CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.
Dated: __ M~ar~c~h_4 ____ , 2015
MACDONALD LAW FIRM, LLC
Isl Michelle L. MacDonald Michelle L. MacDonald, # 1823 70 1069 South Robert Street West St. Paul, MN 55118 Telephone: (651) 222-4400 Facsimile: (651) 222-1122