No. IN THE SupremeCourt of theUnited States SANDRA SUE
GRAZZINI-RUCKI, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER CHILDREN, N.J.R.,
S.V.R., G.J.R., N.G.R., AND G.P.R., AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED v. DAVID KNUTSON, AN INDIVIDUAL; JOHN AND MARY DOES 1-20
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARITO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
MICHELLE LOWNEY MACDONALD SHIMOTA Counsel of Record MacDonald Law
Firm, LLC 1069 South Robert Street West St. Paul, MN 55118
[email protected] Telephone: (651) 222-4400 Facsimile:
(651) 222-1122 CURRY & TAYLOR ! 202-393-4141 Printed with
FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.comi QUESTIONS PRESENTED This
case presents issues of judicial immunity for Dakota County,
Minnesota Judge David Knutson under the Civil
RightsActof1871,42USC1983,includingone
extraordinaryissueoffirstimpressionregardingthis Courts Article III
jurisdiction to construe Section 1983,
andtwoadditionalissuesreflectingdivisionamongthe
circuitsregardingtheappropriatetesttoapplywhen deciding questions
of judicial immunity: (1)Whetheradistrictcourtmayextendimmunitytoa
judgeaccusedofviolatingtheCivilRightsAct, without conducting a
historical analysis of immunity forthefunctionsat
1871commonlawasinstructed under Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497
(2012).
(2) Whether a family court judge is immune under Stump v.
Sparkman for the functions of(a) administratively overriding the
case assignment process to assign all cases relating to a party,
including family, criminal,
andthirdpartycasestohimself;(b)conductinga
psychologicallisteningsessionuponalitigants children, absent any
motion or relevance to any issue before the judge; (c) issuing a
stream of stay away andpropertycontrolcommandsandcompellinga family
toundergocounseling;and (d)conducting a
trialwiththeattorneyhandcuffedinawheelchair, and forced to proceed
with the clients case, without
files,notes,evidence,eyeglasses,pen,paperorthe litigant?Whether
these behaviors, performed by a
familycourtjudge,arejudicialactswithinthe
jurisdictionofafamilycourtunderStumpv. Sparkman. ii
(3)WhetherthisCourtpossessedjurisdictionunder
ArticleIII,oftheUnitedStatesConstitutionin Pierson v. Ray to
construe Section 1983 contrary to
itsunambiguouslanguageandvividly-recorded
congressionalintent,therebyexercisinglegislative power vested
exclusively in Congress under Article I of the United States
Constitution, and in excess of its judicial power. Printed with
FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.comiii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
QUESTIONS
PRESENTED..............................................................
i TABLE OF
AUTHORITIES.............................................................
v OPINIONS
BELOW.........................................................................
1
JURISDICTION...............................................................................
1 RELEVANT PROVISIONS
INVOLVED......................................... 2 STATEMENT
..................................................................................
2 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
PETITION................................. 8
CONCLUSION...............................................................................
39 APPENDIX APPENDIXA: The March 31, 2015 Opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Case no. 14-2569
[unpublished] ................. 1a APPENDIXB:The May 29, 2014
United States District Court, District of Minnesota, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, Case no. 13-cv-2477 is not
reported...............................................................
5a APPENDIX C:The Grazzini-Rucki Petition for Rehearing en banc and
Petition for Rehearing by the panel were denied on May 15,
2015............................. 42a APPENDIX D:The December 12,
2013 Affidavit of Attorney Facts that Defendant David Knutson
Usurped Court Files, Improper Assignments, filed in response to
Motion to Dismiss based on Judicial Immunity, Case no.
13-cv-2477....................................................................................
44a iv APPENDIX E:The March 29, 2013 Order and Memorandum Sealing
Listening Session held for the sole purpose of facilitating
therapy; the District Court of Minnesota for Dakota County, case
no. 19AVFA-11-1273.
................................................... 67a APPENDIX
F:Form COL Violation Warning by Sandra Grazzini-Rucki Denial of
Rights Under Color of Law, 42 USC 1983 --- to (Judge) David L.
Knutson,July 23 , 2013 ....................................... 70a
APPENDIXG: Rucki Children on the NationalMissing and Exploited
Children list, April 19,
2013........................................................................................
72a Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.comv TABLE
OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES ADAMSV. MCILHANY, 764 F.2D 294 (5TH CIR.
1985)........21, 23 ANTOINE V. BYERS & ANDERSON, INC. 508 U. S.
429 (1993)
........................................................................
PASSIM ASHELMANV. POPE, 793 F.2D 1072 (9TH CIR. 1986)..............
23 AUSTIN V. BOREL, 830 F.2D 1356, 1363 (5TH CIR. 1987)
.........................................................................................
25 BABCOCK V. TYLER, 884 F.2D 497, 502-03 (9TH CIR.1989)
.................................................................................
30 BELTRAN V. SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 514 F.3D 906, 908 (9TH CIR.
2008).................................................................
30 BRADLEYV. FISHER 80 U.S.335 (1872)
..................................... 8 BREWERV. BLACKWELL, 692
F.2D 387, 396 (5TH CIR. 1982)
................................................................................
23 BUCHANAN V. FORD, 638 F. SUPP. 168 (N.D.N.Y. 1986)
.........................................................................................
25 BURNS V. REED, 500 U. S. 478
(1991)..................................10, 11 BUTZ V. ECONOMOU,
438 U. S. 478, 516 (1978)........................ 14 CLEAVINGERV.
SAXNER, 474 U. S. 193, 207-08
(1985)........................................................................................
14 CONCEPCION V. CINTRON, 905 F. SUPP. 57, 61 (D. P.R. 1995)
................................................................................
23 CTS CORP. V. WALDERBURGER, 573 U. S. ___, ___
(2014)........................................................................................
32 CZIKALLAV. MALLOY, 649 F. SUPP. 1212 (D.COLO. 1986)
.........................................................................................
26 D.T.B. V. FARMER, 114 F. APP'X 446, 447 (3D CIR. 2004)
.........................................................................................
29 DOE V. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 494 F. SUPP. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
......................................................................
25 DOE V. LEBBOS, 348 F.3D 820 (9TH CIR. 2003), ABROGATEDIN BELTRAN
V. SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 514 F.3D 906 (9TH CIR.
2008)................................ 26 DUZYNSKI V. NOSAL, 324
F.2D 924, 929 (7TH CIR. 1963)
.........................................................................................
29 vi DYKES V. HOSEMANN, 776 F.2D 942, 946 (11TH CIR. 1985)
.........................................................................................
23 FIGUEROA V. BLACKBURN, 39 F. SUPP. 2D 479, 487 (2D. CIR.
1999).........................................................................
23 GENTILE V. STATE BAR OF NEVADA, 501 U. S. 1030, 1074 (1991)
...............................................................................
36 GREGORYV. THOMPSON, 500 F.2D 59 (9TH CIR. 1974)
.........................................................................................
20 HARPER V. MERCKLE, 638 F.2D 848, 857 (5TH CIR. 1981)
................................................................................
PASSIM HOFFMAN V. HARRIS, 511 U. S. 1060 (1994)
........................... 11 HOLLOWAY V. WALKER, 765 F.2D 517,
522 (5TH CIR. 1985)
................................................................................
23 IMBLERV. PACHTMAN 424 U. S. 409(1976) .................. 10, 25,
26 JASPERSONV. PUROLATOR COURIER CORP., 765 F.2D 736
(1985)........................................................................
30 JENSEN V. LANE CNTY., 222 F.3D 570, 577 (9TH CIR. 2000)
.........................................................................................
30 KALINA V. FLETCHER, 522 U. S. 118, 124, N. 11, 132
(1997).............................................................................
10, 13, 30 KING V. STATE EDUC. DEP'T, 182 F.3D 162 (2D CIR.1999)
.................................................................................
27 LOPEZ V. VANDERWATER, 620 F. 2D 1229, 1235-36 (7TH CIR. 1980)
..................................................................15,
17 LYNCH V. JOHNSON, 420 F.2D 818, 820 (6TH CIR. 1970)
....................................................................................15,
20 MALLEY V. BRIGGS 475 U. S. 335, 339-340 (1986) ..........8, 10,
23 MARTINEZ V. ROTH, NO. 94-2206, 1995 WL 261127, AT *3 (10TH CIR.
APR. 26, 1995)............................................ 29
MARTINEZ V. WINNER, 771 F. 2D 424, 434 (10TH CIR. 1985)
.........................................................................6,
8, 12 MCALESTERV. BROWN, 469 F.2D 1280 (5TH CIR.1972)
..............................................................................9,
19 MCARDLE V. TRONETTI, 961 F.2D 1083, 1085 (3D CIR. 1992)
................................................................................
29 MERCKLEV. HARPER, 454 U. S. 816 (1981)
............................ 22 MICHIGAN V. BAY MILLS INDIAN
COMMUNITY, 572 U. S. ___, ___
(2014)................................................................
32 Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.comvii MILLER
V. GAMMIE, 335 F.3D 889, 898-900 (9TH CIR. 2003)
.........................................................................................
30 MIRELESSV. WACO, 502 U. S. 9, 13 (1991)
.............................. 20 MONROE V. PAPE, 365 U. S. 167,
185-191 (1961)...................9, 33 MORSTADV. DEP'T OF CORR. AND
REHAB., 147 F.3D 741, 744 (8TH CIR.
1998)................................................ 29 MOSES V.
PARWATIKAR, M.D., 813 F.2D 891, 892 (8TH CIR. 1987), DISAPPROVED
ONOTHER GROUNDS, BURNS V. REED, 500 U. S. 478, 496
(1991)........................................................................................
29 MYERS V. MORRIS, 810 F.2D 1437, 1466-67 (8TH CIR. 1987)
.........................................................................................
29 OLAJIDEV. GAFFEY, 2013 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 991, *5, 2013 WL 57862
(N.D. CAL. JAN. 3, 2013) ....................... 23 P.T., A.T.
& H.T. V. RICHARD HALL CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH CARE CTR., 364 N.J.
SUPER. 460, 462 (N.J. SUPER. CT. APP. DIV. 2003)
.......................... 29 PATTEN V. GLASER, 771 F.2D 1178, 1179
(8TH CIR. N.D.
1985)................................................................................
23 PAVELIC & LEFLORE V. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, 493 U. S.
120, 123
(1989)........................................................................................
32 PEOPLE UNITED FOR CHILDREN, INC. V. CITY OF NEW YORK, 108 F.
SUPP. 2D 275, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
....................................................................................18,
27 PETERSONV. PETERSON, 24 HAW. 239, 246 (1918) ................ 26
PICKING V. PENNSYLVANIA R.R., 151 F.2D 240 (3RD CIR. 1945)
.......................................................................
33 PIERSON V. MEMBERSOF DELAWARE COUNTY, NO. 99-3435, 2000 WL
486608, AT *4 (E.D. PA. APRIL 25,
2000).......................................................................
29 PIERSON V. RAY, 386 U. S. 547 (1967)
...............................8, 9, 31 RANDALL V. BRIGHAM, 74 U.
S. 523 (1868)........................27, 28 REHBERG V. PAULK,, 132
S.CT. 1497, 1503-07 (2012)........10, 23 RHEUARK V. SHAW, 628 F.2D
297, 304-05 (5TH CIR.1980)
.................................................................................
14 SCHEUER V. RHODES, 416 U. S. 232, 249-50 (1974) ................
11 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N V. CHENERY CORP., 318 U. viii S. 80, 88
(1943)
....................................................................22,
25 SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA V. CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED STATE 446
U. S. 719, 734-737
(1980).....................................................................................8,
13 TENNEY V. BRANDHOVE 341 U. S. 367 (1951) .....................8,
35 TENTH (LERWILL V. JOSLIN, 712 F.2D 435, 439 (10TH CIR. 1983)
.....................................................................
23 THOMASONV. SCAN VOLUNTEER SERVS., INC., 85 F.3D 1365, 1373 (8TH
CIR. 1996)............................................ 25 TROXEL V.
GRANVILLE, 530 US 57, 65 (2000)......................... 18 TURNEY
V. O'TOOLE, 898 F.2D 1470, 1474 (10TH CIR. 1990)
................................................................................
29 UNITED STATES V. LANIER, 520 U. S. 259, 266 (1997)
(PERCURIAM)..............................................................
33 UNITED STATES V. MORRISON, 529 U. S. 598, 621
(2000)........................................................................................
36 WILLIAM B. CASHION NEV. SPENDTHRIFT TRUST V. VANCE, 552 FED.
APPX. 884, 886 (11TH CIR. 2014)
.........................................................................................
23 WILLIAMSV. CONSOVOY, 333 F. SUPP. 2D 297, 302 (D.N.J. 2004)
...........................................................................
29 WYATT V. COLE, 504 US 158, 163 (1992)
...............................9, 31 STATUTES 18 U.S.C.
242............................................................................
33 20 U.S.C.
76cc...........................................................................
15 28 U.S.C.
1254(1)........................................................................
1 28 U.S.C.
1291............................................................................
1 28 U.S.C. 1331
...........................................................................
1 42 U.S.C.
1983....................................................................
1, 2, 9 Minn. Stat. 148.88
.......................................................................
24 Minn. Stat.
484.1........................................................................
5 Minn. Stat.
518............................................................................
27 Minn. Stat. 518.17
subds.1-2..................................................... 6
The Federalist No. 78
(1788)..................................................... 32
Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.comix RULES
Supreme Court Rule 10(a)
.................................................. 12, 16 Supreme
Court Rule
10(c)......................................................... 13
OTHER AUTHORITIES J. Feinman, R. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and
Theory, 31 S. C. L. Rev. 201, 243-249, 254-56
(1979)........................................................................................
37 Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J.
322, 327-328 (1969)............................................. 33
M. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not A Big Tent: The Improper Expansion Of
Absolute Judicial Immunity To Non-Judges In Civil-Rights Cases, 59
SMU L.Rev. 265,
276........................................................ 26 N.
Blake, The Road To Reno, A History of Divorce in the United States
56 (1962)............................................... 26 Printed
with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com1 OPINIONS BELOW The
March 31, 2015 Opinion of the United States Court
ofAppealsfortheEighthCircuit,Caseno.14-2569 attachedas Appendix A,
page1a is[unpublished]. The
May29,2014UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,Districtof
Minnesota,MemorandumOpinionandOrder,Caseno.
13-cv-2477grantingDefendantsMotiontoDismiss
Grazzini-RuckiAmendedComplaintonthebasisof
judicialimmunityisnotreportedandisattachedas
AppendixB,page5a.TheGrazzini-RuckiPetitionsfor Rehearing en banc
and for Rehearing by the panel were denied on May 15, 2015, United
States Court of Appeals
fortheEighthCircuit,Caseno.14-2569attachedas Appendix C, page 42a J
URISDICTION ThisCourthasjurisdictionunder28U.S.C.
1254(1)forapetitionforawritofcertiorariinacivil
caseafterrenditionofajudgmentordecreeofacourt
ofappeal.AjudgmentoftheUnitedStatesCourtof
AppealsfortheEighthCircuitwasenteredonMarch 31, 2015.Petitions for
rehearing en banc and rehearing by the panel were denied on May 15,
2015. The United States District Court for the District of
Minnesotahadjurisdictionunder28U.S.C.1331 (federal question) and
1343(a)(3) (civil rights) for claims
under42U.S.C.1983,1985,1986,and1988.The
UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheEighthcircuit
hadjurisdictionoverthedistrictcourtsMay29,2014 final judgment under
28 U.S.C. 1291. 2 RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED
ArticleI1oftheUnitedStatesConstitution provides: All legislative
powers herein granted shallbevestedinaCongressoftheUnited
States,whichshallconsistofaSenateand House of Representatives.
ArticleIII1,2oftheUnitedStates
Constitutionprovideinrelevantpart:The
judicialpoweroftheUnitedStates,shallbe
vestedinoneSupremeCourt....Thejudicial
powershallextendtoallcases,inlawand
equity,arisingunderthisConstitution,[and] the laws of the United
States . . . . Title 42 U. S.C. 1983 provides in relevant part:
Everypersonwho,undercolorofanystatute,
ordinance,regulation,custom,orusage,ofany
State...subjects,orcausestobesubjected,
anycitizenoftheUnitedStates...tothe
deprivationofanyrights,privileges,or
immunitiessecuredbytheConstitutionand
laws,shallbeliabletothepartyinjuredinan action at law . . .
STATEMENT This petition arises from a suit in the United States
DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofMinnesotaunder42
U.S.C.1983andstate-lawclaimsbroughtby
Plaintiffs-Petitioners,SandraGrazzini-Rucki, individually and on
behalf ofher minor children against
Defendant-Respondent,DavidL.Knutson,ajudgeof
theDakotaCounty,MinnesotaDistrictCourt.Judge Printed with FinePrint
- purchase at www.fineprint.com3
KnutsonpresidedovermattersinvolvingGrazzini-Rucki,subsequenttoPetitionersMay12,2011
Stipulated Judgment and Decree. App. 6a-7a.After the
Decreewasentered,Petitionersex-husbandDavid
Ruckichangedhismind,movingtosetasidethe
Decree,alleginghewastrickedintosettling.App.7a.
JudgeKnutsonthereafterassignedhimselftovacate the Decreeforcing the
parties back to court.App. 9a.
JudgeKnutsoninstructedJudicialDistrictDeputy
AdministratorSusanJ.Reichenbachtoassignhimto
allcourtproceedingsofanytypeinvolvingthe
parties,evenfuturecasesinvolvingthirdparties,and even criminal
matters.App. 8a, 44a-66a.He thereafter proceeded to issue over
3,400 directives to regulate this
familyincludingstayawayordersseparatingthe
childrenfrombothparents,kickingthemotheroutof
thehome,orderingpsychologicalexaminationsof family members, and
requiring custody evaluations and
therapyfortheentirefamilywithoutanytrialor finding of abuse.App.
10a-15a, 22a-24a.JudgeKnutson
commandthechildrentoattendwhathecalleda
listeningsessionwhichheadmittedwasforthesole
purposeoffacilitatingtherapy...Thissessionwasnot
pursuanttoanymotionorissueunderconsiderationat the time.App. 3a,
67a-69a.At the listening session,
JudgeKnutsonthreatenedthechildren.App.21a-25a. Two of the children
ran away. App. 72aGrazzini-Rucki
andthechildrensuedJudgeKnutsonalleging deprivation by:
(a)JudgeKnutsonsbypassingstandardcase
assignmentproceduretoassignallpre-existing and future hearings
relating to Grazzini-Rucki to himself; 4
(b)Conductingtheillegallisteningsessionfor the sole purpose of
psychotherapy; (c)Makingthestreamofillegalstay-away, property
control, and therapy commands; and
(d)Afterthefilingofthislawsuit,causing
Petitionerscounseltobe(i)arrestedwithout probable cause during a
recess in a custody trial;
(ii)heldincourthousedetention(iii)returnedto
thecourtroominawheelchairwhilehandcuffed to a waist belt (iv)
forced to try Petitioners case
insuchrestraints,andwithouteyeglasses,files,
penorpaperwiththreatofdefault;and(v) without Petitioner present.
App. 22a-24a, 63a,64a. 2.JudgeKnutsonmovedtodismissunderRule
12(b)(6),assertingtheaffirmativedefenseofabsolute
immunity.Petitionerassertedthesewerenotjudicial
actsandthatJudgeKnutsonofferedandthedistrict
courtundertooknohistoricalanalysisofwhetherthe
accusedfunctionswereimmuneat1871commonlaw.
ThedistrictfoundKnutsontobeimmune,construing
Stumpv.Sparkman,Mirelessv.Waco,Forresterv.
White,andPiersonv.Ray(App.39a-40a)toextend immunity for all accused
behavior, reasoning: PlaintiffcontestsJudgeKnutsonscase
management,hissigningoforders,the substance of his orders, and the
trial proceedings onSeptember12,2013.Alloftheseactions, however,
were taken inJudge Knutsons judicial capacity. Printed with
FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com5
Thedistrictcourtsconclusionwasbasedonthe following findings:
(a)JudgeKnutsonhasnotinteractedwith
Plaintiffoutsideofhiscourtroomorhisjudicial chambers and (b) [T]he
underlying familylaw case was within
JudgeKnutsonsjurisdictionalauthorityunder
MINN.STAT.484.1(statedistrictcourtshave
originaljurisdictioninallcivilactionswithin their respective
districts). App.40a.ThedistrictcourtenteredaFinalOpinion and Order
on May 29, 2014. Grazzini-Ruckiappealedthefindingofimmunity,
arguing (1) Judge Knutson failed to carry his burden of
proving1871commonlawextendedanabsolute
immunitytotheaccusedfunctions;(2)the(a)
administrativecaseassignment,(b)psychotherapeutic listening
session, (c) stay away and property control
orders,and(d)arrestandconductingoftrialwithher
attorneyinshacklescouldnotbeimmuneunderany
constructionofimmunitydoctrine;and(3)Piersonv.
Raywasanunconstitutionalexerciseoflegislative powers vested solely
to Congress under Article I of the
UnitedStatesConstitution.OpeningBrief,Sept.25,
2014,Response&ReplyBrief,March4,2015,Caseno. 14-2569.
4.Thecourtofappealsaffirmedthedismissal stating: 6
(a)JudgeKnutsonsself-assignmentof
relatedmatterswasajudicialactbecauseitis
stillajudicialfunctioninthesensethatit
directlyconcernsthecase-decidingprocess,
citingout-of-circuitauthorityofMartinezv.
Winner,771F.2d424,434(10thCir.1985), vacated as moot after remand,
800 F.2d. 230 (10th Cir. 1986). (b)thepsychotherapeuticlistening
session was a judicial act because:
(i)Thelisteningsessionwasheldatthe
courthouse;(ii)...attendedbytheparties,the
attorneys,theguardianadlitem,andthetherapist;and(iii)...wasrecordedbyacourt
reporter. ThecourtreasonedthatMinnesotascustodylawsare
soflexiblethatthelisteningsessionwasafunction
normallyperformedbyajudgeindecidingcustody
disputes...App.4a.(citingMinn.Stat.518.17
subds.1-2establishingbestinterestsstandardfor
determiningcustody).JudgeKnutsoninhisorder
characterizeditasanon-judicialacthimself.Thecourt
disregardedJudgeKnutsonsadmissionthatthe
listeningsessionwasheldforthesolepurposeof
facilitatingtherapypreviouslyorderedbytheCourt, concludingthatJudge
Knutsonscharacterizationdoes not require the conclusion that the
listening session was something other than a judicial act. App. 3a
Thecourtofappealsignoredboth(c)movement
andpropertycontrolordersand(d)conductingachild Printed with
FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com7 custody trial without
Grazzini-Rucki present, and while her attorney was in handcuffs.
5.Grazzini-Ruckipetitionedforrehearingand hearing en banc, arguing:
(1)ThepanelfailedtoaddressGrazzini-Ruckis
argumentthatneitherJudgeKnutsonnorthe
districtcourtconductedhistoricalanalysisof
immunityat1871commonlawforthefour accused functions;
(2)Thepanel(a)appliedafour-factorimmunity
testfromtheFifthCircuitratherthanStumps
(controlling)two-factortest,(b)confusedthe
withinthejurisdictionprongwiththe
ordinarilyperformedbyajudgeprongfrom
Stump,and(c)failedtoaddressthestay-away orders and shackling of
counsel behavior; (3)Thepanelappliedmootedauthorityof
MartinezinconsistentwiththisCourts precedent; and
(4)Piersonv.Raywasanunconstitutional
exerciseofArticleIauthoritybythisCourt,in excess of the judicial
power vested under Article III. 6.TheEighthCircuitdeniedboth
petitions for rehearing. 8 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
InPiersonv.Ray,386U.S.547(1967)thisCourt
construedSection1983oftheCivilRightsActof1871
contrarytoitsunambiguouslanguageandvividly-recordedcongressionalintent,wronglyanalogizingthe
legislativespeechanddebatelibertyfromTenneyv. Brandhove 341 U. S.
367 (1951) to the sovereign judicial
function.Contradictingtheunambiguousstatuteand
clearcongressionalrecord,theCourtpresumedthat
congressdidnotintendSection1983toabrogate
immunityofstatejudgestocommonlawtortswhich existedunder
nineteenthcentury English commonlaw,
asrecitedinBradleyv.Fisher80U.S.335(1872).
Followingthispresumption,thisCourthasinstructed:
Ourinitialinquiryiswhetheranofficialclaiming
immunityunder1983canpointtoacommon-law
counterparttotheprivilegeheasserts.Malleyv. Briggs 475 U. S. 335,
339-340 (1986). TheEighthCircuitfailedtoconductthisinitial
inquiry,insteadconstruingthedoctrineofjudicial
immunitycontraryStumpv.Sparkman475U.S.335,
339-340(1986).ThecourtextendedimmunitytoJudge
Knutsonsadministrativecaseassignmentfunction
underauthorityfromtheTenthCircuit,Martinezv.
Winner,771F.2d424,434(10thCir.1985),whichwas
mootedinMartinezv.Winner,800F.2d230,231
(10thCir.1986),thatisdirectlycontrarytoExparte
Virginia100U.S.339,228(1879);SupremeCourtof Virginia v. Consumers
Union of United State 446 U. S.
719,734-737(1980);andAntoinev.Byers&Anderson, Inc. 508 U. S.
429 (1993). Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com9
ItalsoextendedimmunitytoJudgeKnutsons psycho-therapeutic function
under a test from the Fifth
Circuit,McAlesterv.Brown,469F.2d1280(5th
Cir.1972),acasethatwasabrogatedinStump.The
courtrefusedtoanalyzeJudgeKnutsonsproperty
controlandtherapycommandsandtheshacklingof counsel.
Yetevenifproperlyconstrued,absoluteimmunity
isanunconstitutionalabominationregularly
deprivingmillionsofUnitedStatescitizensthe
fundamentalrightofremedyforconstitutionalinjury
byjudicialwrongdoing.Theincontrovertiblerecord
demonstratesthatthe1871CongressenactedSection 1983specificallyto
abrogatethisinsulttojustice.This
CourtsdecisionresurrectingitinPiersonv.Raywas
animpermissibleindeedrecklessexerciseof exclusive congressional
authority. I.THELOWERCOURTSHAVEFAILEDTOREQUIRE
THEOFFICIALCLAIMINGABSOLUTEIMMUNITYTO PROVE A COMMON LAW ANALOG TO
ACCUSED FUNCTION Section1983unambiguouslyregulatesevery
personactingundercolorofstatelaw.42U.S.C.
1983.Thevividrecordofcongressionaldebates
precedingtheCivilRightsActsof1866and1871
demonstratesCongressintendedpersontoinclude judges. See, e.g.,
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 185-191
(1961);Piersonv.Ray,386U.S.547,559(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 US 158, 163
(1992).Circumventingtraditionalstatutory
interpretation,thisCourtinPiersonpresumedthat
despitethestatutesfacialclarityandvividrecorded
debate,Congressintendedtoincorporateajudicial 10
immunity,whichChiefJusticeWarrenbelievedwas well-settled at 1871
common law. Pierson at 554-555.
Followingthispresumption,thisCourthas instructed lower courts to
evaluate an officials claim to
animmunitybyexaminingEnglishandAmerican
commonlawtodeterminewhetherasof1871an
officialperformingtheaccusedfunctionenjoyed
immunity.See,e.g.,Malleyv.Briggs,475U.S.335, 339-340 (1986) (Our
initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under 1983
can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he
asserts.); Imbler v. Pachtman,424U.S.409,423n.20(1976);Burnsv.
Reed,500U.S.478(1991)(Scalia,J.,concurringin
judgmentinpartanddissentinginpart)([w]herewe have found that a
tradition of absolute immunity did not
existasof1871,wehaverefusedtograntsuch
immunityunder1983.).TheCourthasforthat
reasonbeenquitesparinginrecognizingabsolute immunity for state
actors.Burnsat 486-87. A.TheLowerCourtsFailedToMake
FindingsThatTheAccusedFunctions Existed, And Were Immune, As Of
1871 ThisCourthasinstructedthatlowercourts
analyzinganofficialsimmunitydefensemustexamine
nineteenthcenturysocialandlegalsystemsto
determinewhethertheaccusedfunctionwasthen
immune.See,e.g.,Rehbergv.Paulk,,132S.Ct.1497, 1503-07(2012)
(examiningnineteenthcenturycaselaw);
Kalinav.Fletcher,522U.S.118,124,n.11,132(1997)
(Scalia,J.,Thomas,J.,concurring)(examining17thand
18thcenturycaselaw);Antoinev.Byers&Anderson,
Inc.,508U.S.429,432(1993)(examiningtreatisesand Printed with
FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com11
scholarlypublicationsdescribinghistoryofcourt reporting). As noted
by Justices Thomas and Scalia, dissenting from denial of certiorari
in Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U. S.
1060(1994),thishistoricalinquiryisfundamental,yet ignored among the
circuits: The courts that have accorded absolute immunity . . .
appeartohaveoverlookedthenecessaryhistorical inquiry; none has
seriously considered whether social
workersenjoyedabsoluteimmunityfortheirofficial
dutiesin1871.Iftheydidnot,absoluteimmunityis
unavailabletosocialworkersunder1983.Thisall
assumes,ofcourse,that"socialworkers"(atleastas we now understand
the term) even existed in 1871. If
thatassumptionisfalse,theargumentforgranting
absoluteimmunitybecomes(atleast)moredifficult to maintain.
Id.(slipop.at5);seealsoAntoinev.Byers&
Anderson,Inc.,508U.S.429(1993)(denyingcourt
reporterabsoluteimmunitybecausereportingbegan
after1871).Extendinganimmunityabsentthis
foundationiserror.Scheuerv.Rhodes,416U.S.232,
249-50(1974)(Thesecases,intheirpresentposture,
presentnooccasionforadefinitiveexplorationofthe
scopeofimmunity....).Thejudgebearstheburden of proof. Burns v.
Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 486487 (1991).
JudgeKnutsonfailedtoproffer,andthedistrict
courtandcourtofappealsfailedtoconductthis
thresholdinquiryforanyofthefouraccusedfunctions.
Absentthisrequiredthresholdshowing,Judge Knutson is not entitled to
immunity. 12 Thewidespreadfailureamongthecircuitsto
conductthethresholdinquiryofthehistorical
foundationsforagovernmentalimmunityasof1871
warrantssupervisoryreviewunderSupremeCourt
Rule10(a)andbothconflictanderrorreviewunder Rule 10(c).
II.THECOURTOFAPPEALSMISCONSTRUEDSTUMPV.
SPARKMAN,WHENITEXTENDEDABSOLUTEIMMUNITY TO FUNCTIONS THAT CANNOT BE
IMMUNE A.Case-Assignment is Not J udicial
InextendingimmunitytoJudgeKnutsons
improperassignments,overrideofDeputy
AdministratorSusanJ.Reichenbachcaseassignment
function,andusurpingcasefilesinvolvingGrazzini-Rucki,orherformerhusband,thecourtofappeals
cited,butfailedtoapplyStump,insteaddivertingtoa test from the Tenth
Circuit case of Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir.
1985), mooted in Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir.
1986).Martinez is inconsistent with Stump. Stump held:
[T]hefactorsdeterminingwhetheranactbya
judgeisa"judicial"onerelatetothenatureof
theactitself,i.e.,whetheritisafunction
normallyperformedbyajudge,andtothe
expectationsoftheparties,i.e.,whetherthey dealt with the judge in
his judicial capacity. Stump at 362. Printed with FinePrint -
purchase at www.fineprint.com13 Judges dont normally assign cases,
participate in childrenstherapysessions,orcarryoncustodytrials
withouttheparent,andwhiletheparentsattorneyis
inhandcuffs.ThecourtofappealscitedStump,but
failedtoexaminewhethercaseassignmentis(i)
normallyperformedbyajudgeand(ii)withinthe
expectationsoftheparties.Itinsteadasserted
rationaleusedinMartinezthatJudgeKnutsonscase
assignmentwasjudicialbecauseitdirectlyconcerns
thecase-decidingprocess.Martinezat434;App.3a. The failure to
analyze under Stump is error reviewable under Supreme Court Rule
10(c). 1.Marti nezwasMootedandis InconsistentwithGenerationsofThis
Courts Precedent InextendingimmunityunderMartinez,thecourt
ofappealserredunderthisCourtsprecedentsholding that judicial
officers performing executive functions are notimmune.See, e.g, Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339,
228(1879)([a]dministrativedecisions,eventhough
theymaybeessentialtotheveryfunctioningofthe
courts,havenot...beenregardedasjudicialacts.);
SupremeCourtofVirginiav.ConsumersUnionof United States, 446 U. S.
719, 734-737 (1980) (refusing to
extendimmunitytobehaviorpromulgatingacodeof
conductforattorneysbecauseitwasnotanactof adjudication but one of
rulemaking.); Antoine v. Byers
&Anderson,Inc.,508U.S.429,435(1993)(finding
courtreporterspartofjudicialfunctionyetnot
absolutelyimmune);Kalinav.Fletcher,522U.S.118
(1997)(reasoningprosecutorsinvestigationconcerns adjudication but
not judicial). 14 InMartineztheTenthCircuitheldChiefJudge
Winnersself-assignmentofacasewasjudicial(a)in
thesensethatitdirectlyconcernsthecase-deciding
processand(b)bystatuteitistheresponsibilityof
thechiefjudge.Martinezat434(citingRheuarkv.
Shaw,628F.2d297,304-05(5thCir.1980)).Martinez
reasonedanactmaybeadministrativeorministerial
forsomepurposesandstillbea"judicial"actfor
purposesofimmunityfromliabilityfordamages.
Martinezat434.ThoughbothMartinezandRheuark cite Stump, they
construe that test incorrectly. (a)ThisCourthas never
heldthatagivenfunction
maybebothjudicialandadministrative.Indeed,the
Courthasforgenerationsheldtheoppositethat
judicialofficersperformingnon-judicialfunctionsare
notentitledtoabsoluteimmunityevenifthefunction concerns the
case-deciding Apologistsforabsoluteimmunityclaimthe
injusticesitimposesarecheckedbyadversarial process, restraint by
principles of law, and vulnerability to appellate review.See, e.g.,
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S.193,207-08(1985)(refusingtograntprison-disciplinecommitteeabsoluteimmunitybecauselackof
proceduralsafeguards);Butzv.Economou,438U.S.
478,516(1978)(grantingadministrativelawjudges absolute immunity
because procedural safeguards were
comparabletojudicialprocess).ButJudgeKnutsons override of the
DeputyAdministrator to assign himself
toallpastandfuturecasesisnotreviewable,nota
resolutionofadispute,andnotsubjecttoprinciplesof lawbut a
ministerial rule. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at
www.fineprint.com15 Othercircuitsrecognizethatajudgeperforming
executivefunctionscannotbeimmuneundereither
StumporImbler.See,e.g.,Lopezv.Vanderwater,620 F. 2d 1229, 1235-36
(7th Cir. 1980) (declining immunity to
judgeperformingprosecutorialfunction);Harperv.
Merckle,638F.2d848,857(5thCir.1981)(declining
immunitytojudgeactingasascomplainingwitness,
prosecutor,factfinder,andjudge.).Thefactthata judge is authorized
to also function asan administrator
doesnotconverttheadministratorfunctionintoa
judicialone.SeeLynchv.Johnson,420F.2d818,820 (6th Cir. 1970) (cited
favorably in Stump at 370 n. 10) ("A judge does not cease to bea
judge when he undertakes tochairaPTAmeeting,but,ofcourse,hedoesnot
bring judicial immunity to that forum, either.").
(b)Further,theexistenceofstatutory
responsibilityisnotdispositiveofthejudicialin
natureissue.Statutesmaygrantjudgesavarietyof
non-judicialdecision-makingauthority.Asimple
exampleisthatChiefJusticeRobertsisauthorized under 20 U.S.C. 76cc
to serve as the Chancellor of the
BoardofRegentsoftheSmithsonianInstitution.Such
authorizationdoesnotconvertChiefJusticeRoberts governance into a
judicial act. Further,evenunderMartinezJudgeKnutson
couldnotbeimmune because,unlikeJudgeWinner,he
isnotaChiefJudgeandhasnooversightauthority over Deputy
Administrators.Martinez at 434.
(c)Finally,thecourtofappealsfailedtoobserve
thedistinctionbetweenJudgeKnutsonsstatusasa judge and the functions
accused.Courts must examine
thenatureofthefunctionperformed,nottheidentity 16
oftheactorwhoperformedit.Buckleyat269.The mere fact that an officer
claiming immunity is a judge is
insufficienttoaccomplishabsoluteimmunity.Rather,
absoluteimmunitydependsonwhethertheaccused
functionwasabsolutelyimmuneasof1871.Stumpat 362; Malley at 339-40.
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits construction
andanalysisunderStumptoextendimmunityto
administrativecaseassignmentunderMartinezand Rheuark
iserrorsubjecttoreviewinthisCourtunder Supreme Court Rules 10(a)
and (c). 2.ProperlyConstruingStump,the
CourtofAppealsWouldHaveFoundNo Immunity
WouldthecourtofappealshaveappliedStump,it
wouldhavefoundJudgeKnutsonwasnotimmune:
UsurpingcourtfilesbyoverridingDeputy
AdministratorReichenbachscaseassignmentprocess
isnot(a)normallyperformedbyajudgeand(b) within the expectations of
the parties. (a)JudgeKnutsontooktheunusualstepof
commandingJudicialDistrictDeputyAdministrator Reichenbach toassign
him tothe divorce andorder for
protectioncasesrelatedtothefamily,andthenmade orders assigning
himself to all court proceedings of any
typeinvolvingSandraGrazzini-RuckiandDavid
Rucki.App.54a.TheseincludedDavidRuckis
criminalcases,andcasesinvolvingthirdparties.App.
8a,48a-63a.Ajudgeusurpingallpendingandany future cases to himself
is not normally performed by a judgecaseassignmentisalwaysrandomand
Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com17
performedbyJudicialDistrictAdministrators.App. 46a (b) Nor can any
officers case assignment be within
theexpectationsofthepartiesbecauseassignment occurs before a judge
is assigned a case, and long before the parties have any
expectation about a judge acting.
CertainlyJudgeKnutsonpresentednoevidencethat
Petitionerhadanysuchexpectationofsuch.Infact,
Petitionersexpectationsweretheoppositeunder
Minnesotarules,anypartycanremoveaJudgeby
noticewithin10daysafterthepartyreceivesnotice
ofwhichJudgeistopresideoverthecase.Judge
Knutsonsadministrativeoverrideeviscerated Petitioners right to
removal. 3.TheFifth,Eighth,andTenth CircuitsImproperlyApplyImblers
Intimately Associated Test CitingMartinez,thecourtofappealsextended
immunitybecauseJudgeKnutsonsoverridedirectly
concernsthecase-decidingprocess.Thistest
resemblesImblersintimatelyassociatedwiththe
judicialphaseofthecriminalprocess.Imblerat430.
However,Imblerstestdoesnotapplytojudges(see, e.g., Lopez, supra)
and there is no prosecutorial function
orcriminalprocessinfamilycourt.Obviouslycases
areassignedbyacourtadministratorbeforethe judicial phase
begins.Minnesota family court judges, guardians, and psychologists
exercise nearly unfettered
discretionunderweakproceduralrestrictiondespite
thatfamilycourtsadjudicatefundamentalrights
includingspeech,association,conscience,movement,
andpropertyownershipandcontrol.See,e.g.,People 18
UnitedforChildren,Inc.v.CityofNewYork,108F. Supp. 2d275,
286(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holdingfamilycourt
isnotacourtofcompetentjurisdictionforRooker-Feldmananalysisbecauseofweakproceduraland
constitutionalprotections); Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57, 65
(2000) (describing parental rights as perhaps the
oldestofthefundamentallibertyinterestsrecognized by this Court.).
TheEighth,Fifth,andTenthCircuitsincorrect
applicationofImblertoextendimmunitytojudges
performingadministrativecaseassignmentwarrants
exerciseoftheCourtssupervisoryandconflict resolution jurisdiction
under Rules 10(a) and (c). B.PsychotherapeuticFunctionIsNot J
udicial Thecourtofappealsextendedabsoluteimmunity
toJudgeKnutsonforparticipatinginwhathehimself
describedasalisteningsessionwiththeGrazzini-Ruckichildrenforthesolepurposeoffacilitating
therapy...Thissessionwasnotpursuanttoany
motionorissueunderconsiderationatthetime.
App.3a-4a.Thoughhethreatenedandcoercedthe
children,hisbehaviorbyhisownadmissionwas
irrelevanttoanyissueandwasnotadjudication,but psychotherapy.
Neitherlowercourtmadefindingsrequiredunder
Stumpregarding(a)whetherpsychotherapywasa
functionnormallyperformedbyajudge(at1871
commonlaw)and(b)theexpectationoftheparties.
Thecourtofappealsfurthererredinfindingthat
psychotherapyisjudicialbecausethesessionwas(a) Printed with
FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com19
heldatthecourthouse;(b)...attendedbythe
parties,theattorneys,theguardianadlitem,andthe
therapist;and(c)...wasrecordedbyacourt
reporter.App.3a-4a.Thesefactsarenotrelevant under Stump. 1.The
Court of Appeals Cited Stump, butAppliedtheAbrogatedFifthCircuit
Test from McAlester v. Brown
Thecourtofappealsfocusedonthelocationofthe
session,attendancebyparties,andrecordation.App. 3a-4a.These are not
relevant under Stump, but may be
relevantunderatestoriginatingintheFifthCircuitMcAlesterv.Brown,469F.2d1280(5thCir.1972)a
testthatwasabrogatedinStumpatp.361,yettoday
somehowthriveswithinthecircuits,requiringthe
Courtssupervisoryandconflictresolutionjurisdiction under Rules
10(a) and (c). Stumpsettledcacophonyamongthecircuits
extendingimmunityinconsistently.Stumpat360-363 and n.10.Justice
White cast aside considerable debris
amongthecircuits,includingMcAlester,theleading
immunitycasefromtheFifthCircuit.SeeHarperv.
Merckle,638F.2d848,857(5thCir.1981),cert.denied
454U.S.816(1981).McAlesterstestfoundanact
judicialinnaturebasedonfourfactors:(1)the
preciseactcomplainedof...isanormaljudicial function; (2) the events
involved occurred in the judge's
chambers;(3)thecontroversycenteredaroundacase
then-pendingbeforethejudge;and(4)the
confrontationarosedirectlyandimmediatelyoutofa visitto thejudgein
his officialcapacity.McAlester at 1282 (analyzed in Stump at 361).
20 InStump,JusticeWhiterecited,thenrejected
McAlestersfocusonlocationoftheactbeingin
chambersrelatingtoapendingcase,andduringa
visittoajudge.Stumpat361-2.Inrejecting
McAlesterstestJusticeWhitefavorablycitedaNinth Circuitdecision,
Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d59 (9th
Cir.1974)whichrejectedimmunityforajudgewho
physicallyevictedalitigantfromchambersduringa visit to a judge and
relating to a pending case.Stump
at370,n.10.HealsoanalyzedLynchv.Johnson,420
F.2d818(6thCir.1970)whichsimilarlyheldthata
countyjudgeforciblyremovingamanfromafiscal
courtwasnotimmune.Id.at820.ClearlyJustice White cited Gregory and
Lynch to reject McAlester and to emphasize that even if a judge
acts in chambers, or relatingtoaconfrontationorpendingcase,the
judgesbehaviormaynotbejudicialinnature.See
alsoHarperv.Merckle,638F.2d848,857(5thCir.
1981),cert.denied454U.S.816(1981)(decidingchild
supportenforcementproceedinginsideofcourtroom,
byajudge,andrecordedbyreporternotimmune);
Mirelessv.Waco,502U.S.9,13(1991)(deciding
physicalassaultbyajudgeoutsideofcourtroom immune).
Stumpitselfunderminesthecourtofappeals
relianceonattendedbytheparties.PlaintiffLinda
Sparkmanwasabsentfromanddeceivedofher
motherspetitiontosterilizeher:Linda[Sparkman]
enteredtheDeKalbMemorialHospital,havingbeen
toldthatshewastohaveherappendixremoved.The
followingdayatuballigationwasperformeduponher.
Shewasreleasedseveraldayslater,unawareofthe true nature of her
surgery.).Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com21
Yet,despiterejectioninStump,thecourtof
appealsappliedMcAlesterstestexclusivelyfocusing
onlocation,attendedbyparties,andrelationshiptoa
pendingcase.Thelowercourtsapplicationofthe wrong test warrants
review under Rule 10(c). 2.TheCircuitsHaveConsistently
Mis-Construed Stump McAlesterspersistencedespiteabrogationin
StumpfollowsanaberrationoccurringintheFifth
CircuitcaseofAdamsv.McIlhany,764F.2d294(5th
Cir.1985).SevenyearsafterStump,theFifthCircuit
inAdamsrefusedtorecognizeStumpsabrogationof McAlesters four
factors.As if the Supreme Court were
asistercircuit,theFifthCircuitcitedStump,then
turneditsbackonit.Id.at297(Thefourfactors
generallyrelieduponbythiscircuit....)(emphasis
added).Adamsproceededtoanalyzeunder
McAlesterstestratherthanStump,erroneously
relyingonthefour-factortestdebriscastasideby Justice White.Adams at
297. AdamsmisperceivedMcAlestersvitalitybecause ofapeculiaroutcome
inthecaseofHarper v. Merckle,
638F.2d848,857(5thCir.1981).InHarper,theFifth
CircuitdeterminedthatJudgeMercklewasnot
immuneforfalselyarrestingHarper,amanwhohad
attemptedtomakeaspousalsupportpaymentdirectly
tothejudgeinthejudgeschambers.Thejudge
attemptedtoplaceHarperunderoathtolearnhis
address,whereuponHarperfled.JudgeMerckle
orderedbailiffstochase.Theyshortlycapturedand
returnedHarpertoJudgeMerckleschambers
whereuponJudgeMerckleplacedHarperunderoath 22
andquestionedhimascomplainingwitness,
prosecutor,factfinder,andjudgeinacontempt
proceedingofsorts.Harperat852.Thehearingwas recorded, related to a
pending child support case, in the
courtroom.Id.JudgeMercklefoundHarperin contempt, and three days
later released.The contempt
convictionwasreversedonappeal,andHarpersued Judge Merckle.Id. at
854. InanalyzingimmunitytheFifthCircuitcitedboth
McAlesterandStumpastheguidinglightsinour analysis.Id. at 859.Yet
the court ignored Stump and
analyzedjudicialactonlyunderMcAlestersfour-factortest,findingJudgeMercklesbehaviordidnot
satisfyallfourfactors.Harperat858-59.Judge Merckle appealed to this
Court, which denied certiorari. Merckle v. Harper, 454 U. S. 816
(1981). FouryearslaterAdamscitedthedenialof certiorariin Harper
asindicia ofvitalityof McAlesters
fourfactortest.Thedeductioniserror.Though Harper cites McAlester
and Sparkman as two guiding
lights,Harperreachedresultconsistentwithboth
McAlesters(abrogated)four-factortestaswellas
Stumps(controlling)two-factorauthority.Harpers result was thus
correct, but by means of faulty analysis
thatresurrectedMcAlesterstesttoequaltoStumps,
makingthisCourtsdenialofcertiorarionresult
proper.SeeSec.&Exch.Comm'nv.CheneryCorp., 318 U. S. 80, 88
(1943). TheFifthCircuitsresurrectionofMcAlesterhas
beenperpetuatedamongmanycircuits,includingthe Printed with
FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com23
First,1Second,2Fifth,3Eighth,4Ninth,5Eleventh,6and of course the
court of appeals below.7
ThewidespreadperpetuationoftheFifthCircuits
refusaltoalignwithStumpwarrantsexerciseofthis
Courtssupervisoryandconflictjurisdictionunder Rules 10(a) and (c).
1 Concepcion v. Cintron, 905 F. Supp. 57, 61 (D. P.R. 1995). 2
Figueroa v. Blackburn, 39 F. Supp. 2d 479, 487 (2d. Cir. 1999).
3Adamsv.McIlhany,764F.2d294(5thCir.1985);Brewerv. Blackwell, 692
F.2d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 1982). 4 Patten v. Glaser, 771 F.2d 1178,
1179 (8th Cir. N.D. 1985).
5Ashelmanv.Pope,793F.2d1072(9thCir.1986)(applying
Dykes,infra.);Olajidev.Gaffey,2013U.S.Dist.LEXIS991,*5, 2013 WL
57862 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2013). 6 Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942,
946 (11th Cir. 1985) (reading
HarperasfocusedonMcAlesterstest,therebyperpetuating
McAlestersfourfactortestatStumpsexpense);WilliamB.
CashionNev.SpendthriftTrust v. Vance, 552Fed. Appx.884, 886 (11th
Cir. 2014).7ThecircuitshavealsoperpetuatedtheFifthCircuits
erroneouspro-immunitypolicy(seeMcAlesterat1282-83)in
defianceoftheCourtscondemnationoffreewheelingpolicy
analysisfromMalleyv.Briggs,475U.S.335,339-340(1986) through Rehberg
v. Paulk,, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1503-07 (2012).Circuits
applyingafreewheeling policy include at least the Fifth (Adams
v.McIlhany,764F.2d294,297-98(5thCir.1985);Hollowayv.
Walker,765F.2d517,522(5thCir.1985)(freewheelingpolicyto
immunizejudgeconspiringtoplunderacorporation));Ninth
(Ashelmanv.Pope,793F.2d1072,1075(9thCir.1986));Tenth (Lerwill v.
Joslin, 712 F.2d435, 439 (10th Cir.1983)); and Eleventh (Dykes v.
Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 945 (11th Cir. 1985)).24 3.Psychotherapy Is
Not JudicialFunction Today or in 1871 Ifthe courtof appealswould
haveapplied Stumps judicialinnaturetest,itwouldhavebeenapparent
thatinalisteningsessionisneitherafunction
normallyperformedbyajudgenorwithinthe
expectationsoftheparties.JudgeKnutson
affirmativelystatedhispurposewassolelyto
facilitatepsychotherapy.App.3a.Psychotherapyis
notnormallyperformedbyajudgeinMinnesotait
maybelegallyperformedonlybylicensed
psychologists.8Independentinvestigationisforbidden
tojudges.ModelCodeofJudicialConductCannon 3(B)(7) cmt. (1990).
Thereisnoevidencethepartiesexpectedthat
JudgeKnutsonwasfunctioninginanywayotherthan
heclaimedfacilitatingongoingpsychotherapy.Most
importantly,thepartiescertainlydidnotexpect Judge Knutson to
threaten the children that they would follow his commands or be
punished, causing them fear, and to run away days later.
i.Thedistrictcourtandthecourtofappeals
divertedfromnecessaryhistoricalinvestigationto
determinewhetherpsychologistsevenexistedin
1871,insteaddrawinganalogybetweenthelistening
sessionandabestinterestsofthechild
determination.App.4a,39a.Theywronglyconcluded
thatabestinterestsdeterminationisafunction
normallyperformedbyajudgeindecidingcustody 8 Minn. Stat. 148.88,
Psychology Practice Act.Printed with FinePrint - purchase at
www.fineprint.com25 disputes...andtherefore,byanalogy,sowasthe
listening session. Id. YetthisCourthasdisapprovedofsuchimmunity by
analogy.As noted by Justices Thomas and Scalia in
Hoffman,thisimmunitybyanalogytacticdoesnot
satisfytherequirementtoexamine1871commonlaw.
SeeHoffmanatslipop.5-6(recitingImblerv.
Pachtman424U.S.409(1976)asholdingprosecutors
areentitledtoimmunityforfunctionsintimately
associatedwiththejudicialphaseofthecriminal
process)(emphasisbyJusticeThomas).Justices
ThomasandScaliacriticizedthesecourtsforignoring
theimportantthresholdquestionwhethersocial
workersare,underanycircumstances,entitledto absolute immunity.
Likethecourtofappeals,manyothercircuits
continuetoextendimmunitybyanalogytomodern
functionswithoutexamininghistoricalfactual
foundation,includingatleasttheFirst9,Fifth10,
Eighth11Ninth12andTenth.13Unsurprisingly,the 9Buchananv.Ford,
638F.Supp.168 (N.D.N.Y.1986)
(analogizingchildabuseworkertopoliceratherthan
prosecutor);Doev.CountyofSuffolk, 494F.Supp.179 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(same).10 Austinv.Borel,830F.2d1356,1363(5thCir.1987) (denying
absoluteimmunitybyanalogizingsocialworkertocomplaining witness,
without analyzing common law); 11 Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer
Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1373
(8thCir.1996)(extendingimmunitytosocialworkerinitiating
childprotectionproceedingsbyanalogytoprosecutorialfunction, without
analyzing common law); 26 circuitshaveextendedimmunitybyanalogy
inconsistently.Id. 14 ii.Thecourtofappealsfailedtoidentifyabest
interestsfunctionsofafamilycourtexistingat1871
commonlawbecausein1871nociviljudicialtribunal
possessedjurisdictionoverdivorceorchildcustody.
Itiselementarythatintheearlyhistoryof
jurisprudenceinEnglandthecommonlawcourts exercised no jurisdiction
over divorce cases, jurisdiction
insuchmattersrestingentirelywiththeecclesiastical courts of the
realm. Peterson v. Peterson, 24 Haw. 239,
246(1918).Americanfamilylawhasnocommonlaw
lineageitisentirelyatwentiethcenturystatutory
creation.N.Blake,TheRoadToReno,AHistoryof Divorce in the United
States 56 (1962). The concept of best interests of the child arose
in the twentieth century.See R. Mnookin, Child-Custody
Adjudication:JudicialFunctionsintheFaceof
Indeterminacy,39LAWANDCONTEMP.PROB.226,234 (1975).
12Doev.Lebbos,348F.3d820(9thCir.2003),abrogatedin Beltran v. Santa
Clara County, 514 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2008) (Lebbos
extendedabsoluteimmunitybyanalogytoprosecutor;Beltran overruled
Lebbos. Neither case examined 1871 common law); 13Czikallav.Malloy,
649F.Supp.1212 (D.Colo.1986)
(analogizingchildabuseworkertopoliceratherthan prosecutor);14 See
generally M. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not A Big Tent: The
ImproperExpansionOfAbsoluteJudicialImmunityToNon-Judges In
Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L.REV. 265, 276. Printed with FinePrint
- purchase at www.fineprint.com27 4.UnderBradley,FamilyCourt
FunctionsareInferior,andThusNot Entitled to Absolute Immunity
Familyjurisdictionisincontrovertiblyspecificandthusinferiortoacourtofgeneraljurisdiction.
Minn.Stat.518.Familycourtinadissolution
proceedingisacourtoflimitedjurisdiction.Kingv.
StateEduc.Dep't,182F.3d162(2dCir.1999);People
UnitedforChildren,Inc.v.CityofNewYork,108F. Supp. 2d275,
286(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holdingfamilycourt
notacourtofcompetentjurisdictionforRooker-Feldmananalysis).Randallv.Brigham,74U.S.523
(1868)describesthelimitedscopeofimmunityfor
inferiorcourts:Judgesexercisinglimitedjurisdiction
wereimmuneforactswithinthelimitedjurisdiction,
yetwereliableforcivildamagesforactsinexcessof
theirjurisdiction,andforactsdonemaliciouslyor corruptly.Randall at
531.15This observation was not
disturbedinBradly.WhileJudgeKnutsonbearsthe
burdenofdemonstratingfamilycourtfunctioneven
existedat1871commonlaw,innocasewillheidentify
animmunityscopegreaterthanan1871inferior
courtjudicialactswithinfamilyjurisdictionnot done maliciously or
corruptly.Id. Thecourtofappealsextensionoftherulefora
courtofgeneraljurisdictionwhichimmunizesacts
donewithmaliceorcorruptionofmotive16to inferior family jurisdiction
was error. 15ThisdistinctionwasrecognizedinStump,435U.S.349,356
(1978),fn.7.SeealsoRandallv.Brigham,74U.S.523,535-36 (1868). 16
App. 3a. 28 5.The Court of Appeals Conflated (1) Judicial in Nature
and (2) Subject Matter Jurisdiction The court of appeals referenced
the flexibility that Minnesotascustodylawstogivetothecourtto
determinethebestinterestsofthechildrenconcludingthatstatutoryauthorizationsupportsa
conclusionthatthelisteningsessionconstituteda
functionnormallyperformedbyajudgeindeciding
custodydisputes.App.4a.Thisisamisconstruction
ofStumpstest:Theexistenceofsubjectmatter
jurisdiction(flexiblestatutestodeterminethebest
interestsofthechildren.)isnotdeterminativeof
judicialinnature.Anofficialassertingimmunity
mustproveboth(1)judicialactand(2)withinsubject matter
jurisdiction.Stump at 362. Yetthecourtofappealsattributedthesecond
subjectmatterjurisdictionelementtothefirstjudicialactfactor.Whenflexiblejurisdictionis
properlyanalyzedonlyunderthesecondsubject
matterjurisdictionprong,thecourtofappeals
analysisunderthefirstprongisbereftofsupporting
findings.Thecourtofappealsextensionofimmunity absent proof of both
elements was error.Id. 6.The Circuits are Divided on Immunity of
Psychologist and Social Worker Function
Thecourtsofappealdisagreeonthelevelof
immunityappropriateforcourt-connected
psychologistsandsocialworkers,warrantingreview Printed with
FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com29
underRules10(c).TheThird,17Seventh,18Eighth,19
andTenthCircuits20haveincorrectlyextendedquasi-judicialimmunitytovariousfunctionsofcourt-appointedsocialworkersandpsychologists,reasoning
theseinvestigatorsarearmsofacourtsimilarto prosecutors. The Ninth
Circuit has corrected its course,
17Hughesv.Long,242F.3dat126-28(extendingjudicial
immunitytoprivatechildcustodyevaluatorandapointed
psychologistasarmsofthecourt);D.T.B.v.Farmer,114F.
Appx446,447(3dCir.2004)(applyingHughesv.Longto
immunizecourt-appointedpsychologist);McArdlev.Tronetti,961
F.2d1083,1085(3dCir.1992)(immunizingappointedprison
psychiatrist);Williamsv.Consovoy,333F.Supp.2d297,302
(D.N.J.2004)(findingpsychologistappointedbyparoleboard
absolutelyimmune); Pierson v. Members ofDelawareCounty, No.
99-3435, 2000 WL 486608, at *4 (E.D. Pa. April 25, 2000) (appointed
psychiatristconductingcompetencyevaluationabsolutelyimmune
asanarmofthecourt);P.T.,A.T.&H.T.v.RichardHallCmty. Mental
HealthCare Ctr.,364 N.J.Super. 460,462 (N.J.Super. Ct.
App.Div.2003)(applyingabsolutejudicialimmunitytoacourt-appointed
psychologist). 18Duzynskiv.Nosal,324F.2d924,929(7thCir.1963)
(immunizing appointed psychologist evaluating mental health).
19Morstadv.DeptofCorr.andRehab.,147F.3d741,744(8th
Cir.1998)(immunizingappointedpsychologistasessentialtothe
judicialprocess.));Mosesv.Parwatikar,M.D.,813F.2d891,892
(8thCir.1987),disapprovedonothergrounds,Burnsv.Reed,500
U.S.478,496(1991) (extendingabsoluteandwitnessimmunityto
court-appointed psychiatrist conductingcompetency examination);
Myersv.Morris,810F.2d1437,1466-67(8thCir.1987)
(immunizing[n]onjudicialpersonswhofulfillquasi-judicial functions
intimately related to the judicial. . . . ).
20Turneyv.OToole,898F.2d1470,1474(10thCir.1990)
(extendingquasi-judicialimmunitytopsychologist);Martinezv. Roth,
No.94-2206,1995WL261127, at*3(10thCir.Apr.26, 1995) (extending
quasi-judicial immunity to court-appointed psychologist assisting
courtin best interestof the childinvestigation because service was
integral to the judicial process). 30
aligningwithAntoineandKalina.21Thesestubbornly
inconsistentdecisionswarrantreviewunderRules10 (a) and (c).
C.TheCourtofAppealsFailedto Analyze(c)StayAway andProperty Commands
and (d) Arrest and Shackling of Counsel in a Wheelchair at Trial
Neitherthedistrictcourtnorthecourtofappeals
analyzedwhether(c)movementandpropertycontrol
ordersor(d)arrestandshacklingofcounselwere immune.22
Regarding(c),movementandpropertycontrol
orders,asnotedabove,modernfamilycourtsexercise
highlyinvasiveequitablepowerstoorderlitigantsto
stayawayfromtheirfamilyandfriends,abandontheir
home,surrenderproperty,andundergoexpensiveand
humiliatingforensicexaminations,psychotherapy,
21See,e.g.,Millerv.Gammie,335F.3d889,898-900(9thCir.
2003)(reversingBabcockv.Tyler,884F.2d497,502-03(9th
Cir.1989)asfundamentallyinconsistentwiththisCourts
decisionsinAntoinev.Byers&Anderson,Inc.,508U.S.429
(1993)andKalinav.Fletcher,522U.S.118(1997));Beltranv.
SantaClaraCounty,514F.3d906,908(9thCir.2008)(reversing
Doev.Lebbos,348F.3d820(9thCir.2003)asinconsistentwith
AntoineandKalina,andfindingsocialworkersnotimmunefor investigative
conduct); and Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir.
2000) (finding no firmly rooted tradition atcommon law of absolute
immunity for psychiatrist function). 22
Thecourtofappealsmayhaveignoredtheargumentas
outsidethescopeoftheopeningbrief,citingJaspersonv. Purolator
Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736 (1985). Such would be error.
Grazzini-Ruckis opening brief set forth all four categories,
arguing not one was immune. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at
www.fineprint.com31 andsupervisedvisitation.[O]verthreethousand
fourhundred(3,400)directivesofDefendantDavidL
Knutson[sic]regulatethis[Plaintiffs]family,without
dueprocessorruleoflaworruleofevidenceseizing
Plaintifffromherhome,childrenandProperty.
App.22a.Giventhatthesesweepingpowerstocontrol
familyareenabledbytwentieth-centurylegislationandonlyintwentiethcenturyfamilycourtsJudge
Knutsoncouldnotcarryhisburdenofprovingsuch function as judicial in
1871. Regarding(d) --- arrestandshacklingofcounsel ---
severalcourtshaveheldphysicalassaultorevicting
litigantsarenotjudicialacts.See,e.g.,Greggory,
Harper,supra.ItisapparentthatJudgeKnutson
couldnothavecarriedhisburdenofshowingimmunity
fortheillegalarrestandshacklingofPetitioners
counsel,andthencarryingonthetrialwiththe attorney in handcuffs.
I.PI ERSONANDSTUMPSTANDINERROR FOREXCEEDINGTHEJ UDICIALPOWER
VESTEDINUNITEDSTATESCOURTSUNDER ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION
IndecidingPiersonv.Ray,386U.S.547(1967),
thisCourtconstruedSection1983tonarrowits
sweepfindinganimmunitywhichisinconsistentwith
thefaceofthestatuterestrainingeveryperson.
Imblerat417(Thestatutethuscreatesaspeciesof tortliabilitythat
onitsfaceadmits ofnoimmunities.); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 US 158, 163
(1992).Clearer language has likely never emerged from Congress.Id.
32 A.ThisCourtLacksJ urisdictionto Construe An Unambiguous Statute
ArticleIIIvestsonlyjudicialpowerinthis
Court.ArticleIreserveslegislativepowerto Congress.For I agree there
is noliberty, if the power
ofjudgingbenotseparatedfromthelegislativeand executivepowers.A.
Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 (1788).If congress has given the
power to this court, we possess it, not otherwise....Turnerv .
Bankof NorthAmerica,4U. S . 8,10n.1(a)(1799). These principles of
course apply to Section 1983.[I]t is
forCongress,notthisCourt,todeterminetowhat
extenttoabrogatethejudiciary'scommon-law immunity. Pulliam v.
Allen, 466 U. S.522, 543 (1984).
Section1983isnotasubjectforstatutory
interpretation.Whenwefindtheterms... unambiguous,judicial inquiryis
complete . . . . Pavelic
&LeFlorev.MarvelEntertainmentGroup,493U.S.
120,123(1989);CTSCorp.v.Walderburger,573U.S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip
op.,p. 10)(Congressional intentis
discernedprimarilyfromthestatutorytext.).The
Courtdoesnotreviselegislation...justbecausethe
textaswrittencreatesanapparentanomaly.
Michiganv.BayMillsIndianCommunity,572U.S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip
op., p. 10). Piersons presumptionofCongressionalintentto read an
immunity into Section 1983 was a legislative act
narrowinganunambiguousstatutean act in excess of this Courts
jurisdiction under Article III, and invading exclusive
congressional authority under Article I, of the
Constitution.Onthisbasisalone,Piersonmustbe reversed. Printed with
FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com33
B.AnyConstructionofTheCivilRights Act Must Admit Congresss Remedial
Intent CongressadoptedthelanguageofSection1983
fromitscriminalpredecessorthe1866CivilRights Act, today codified at
18 U.S.C. 242.Monroe v. Pape,
365U.S.167(1961).23Section1983wasintroducedby
OhioRepresentativeShellabarger,whoexplainedhis
billontheHousefloorbyreferencingSection2ofthe
1866Act:thatsectionprovidesacriminalproceeding
inidenticallythesamecaseasthisoneprovidesacivil
remedyfor...24Section1ofthe1871Act(now Section 1983) passed rapidly
through Congress because CongressrecognizedSection1asmerelyaddinga
civilremedytothe1866Act,forwhichthereisno
absoluteimmunity.UnitedStatesv.Lanier,520U.S.
259,266(1997)(percuriam).TheActsthusmustbe
construedasinparimateriaanyconstructionofthe
1871Actmustadmitcongressionalintentinenacting
the1866Act.Pickingv.PennsylvaniaR.R.,151F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945).
Onthatrecorditisincontrovertiblethatthe42nd
Congressaffirmativelyrejectedcommonlawjudicial immunity.
[T]hedecisionsofthecountyjudges,whoaremade little kings, with
almost despotic powers to carry out
thedemandsofthelegislaturewhichelectedthem-powerswhich,almostwithoutexception,havebeen
23Seealso,Note,LiabilityofJudicialOfficersUnderSection 1983, 79
YALE L.J. 322, 327-328 (1969) (hereinafter Yale Note)24 Cong.
Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (App.) (1871); Yale Note at 327. 34
exercisedagainst Republicanswithoutregard tolaw
orjustice,makeupacatalogueofwrongs,
outrageousviolations,andevasionsofthespiritof
thenewconstitution,unscrupulousmalignityand
partisanhateneverparalleledinthehistoryof parties in this country
or any other. Cong.Globe,42ndCong.,1stSess.186(1871)(remarks of
Representative Platt). Whatistobethecaseofajudge?...IsthatState
judge to be taken from his bench? Is he to be liable in an
action?... It is the language of the bill: for there is
nolimitationwhatsoeveronthetermsthatare
employed,andtheyareascomprehensiveascanbe used. (remarks of Senator
Thurman).25 (1866)(remarksofRepresentativeLawrence).The
1866ActwasvetoedbyPresidentJohnsonbecauseit abrogated common law
judicial immunity.26In the fight
todefeattheveto,SenateJudiciaryCommittee
ChairmanTrumbullexpressedrevulsionattheentire concept of judicial
immunity: It is the very doctrine out of which the rebellion was
hatched.27
25 Seealso Yale Note at 328 therewasno universalacceptance of
the broad English immunity rule in 1871, and the only legislative
historyavailablesupportsthepropositionthatCongressintended Section
1983 to cover judges.Yale Note at 328.26 Yale Note at 327.
27Cong.Globe,39thCong.,1stSess.1758(1866)(remarksof Senator
Trumbull); Yale Note at 328. Printed with FinePrint - purchase at
www.fineprint.com35 C.Piersons Adoption of Tenney v. Brandhove Was
Startling Error Instead of applying the unambiguous statute, Chief
JusticeWarreninPiersonadoptedanalysisof
legislativeprivilegefromTenneyv.Brandhove,341U.
S.367(1951),readingimmunityintothestatute
becauseheperceivedTheimmunityofjudgesfor
actswithinthejudicialroleisequallywellestablished
[asthespeechanddebateprivilege],andwepresume
thatCongresswouldhavespecificallysoprovidedhad
itwishedtoabolishthedoctrine.Piersonat554-555 (1967). In Tenney
Justice Frankfurter aligned the English
speechlibertywiththefederalspeechordebate
analogintheUnitedStatesConstitutionatArticleI,
Sec.6,cl.1.28LikeChiefJusticeWarren,Justice
Frankfurterpresumedcontrarytotheunambiguous
statute,andanalyzingnolegislativehistorythatthe
42ndCongresswouldnothaveintendedtolimitany
stateslegislativeactivityinenactingthe1871law
becauseCongresswasitselfastaunchadvocateof
legislativefreedom.Id.at376(emphasisadded).
Tenneyalsoheldthenarrowimmunitywaslostif
therewasausurpationoffunctionsexclusivelyvested in the Judiciary or
the Executive.Id.
28Thatprivilegeisagainstarrestnotcivilliabilitydoesnot
extendtofeloniesortreason,orbreachofthepeace.Arrest
outsideofSessionispermitted,andmembersmaybe questioned for activity
other than speech or debate.Tenney at 377. 36 Yet judicialimmunity
isthe oppositeof legislative
privilegejudgesaresovereignspossessingnot rights but delegated
authority.While judges have all the rights of any citizen qua a
citizen, a judge qua judge possessesnorights.FirstandFourteenth
Amendments restrain only such action as may fairly be
saidtobethatoftheStates.UnitedStatesv.
Morrison,529U.S.598,621(2000).Thefunctionofa judge is to
adjudicateapply the given law to
properly-admittedfacts.Judgesarenotrepresentativesof
voters,butradicallyindependentofelectoralwilland
accountability.Thereisnoneedforajudgetoexpress opinions of her own
or those she represents to create lawshe is given law.Other than
necessary for faithful
adjudication,ajudgesprivatefreedomofconscience is irrelevant to
judicial function.Relevant conscience
isgivenintheformoflawthathasmaturedthrough
freedebateelsewhere.Countyjudgesdonotfunction
asabody,and(should)havenoonetodebate.The
framersoftheUnitedStatesandStateofMinnesota constitutions did
notdraftajudicial speech ordebate
privilegebecausejudgesarenotempoweredtospeak or debate. There is no
need to protect a judges speech other
thantopreserveabilitytopronounceadjudicationmerelyasubstantialstateinterest29thatmustinall
casesyieldtofundamentalrights.Therebeingno
judicialspeechlibertyin1871,thereisnoreasonto
presumethatthe1871Congresswouldhaveseen
needtoexpresslyabrogateatraditionofimmunityto constitutional injury
that has never existed. 29 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.
S. 1030, 1074 (1991). Printed with FinePrint - purchase at
www.fineprint.com37 D.AmericanCommonLawDoes Not Support J udicial
Immunity This Court has commanded that courts considering
anofficersaffirmativedefenseofimmunitymust
examinethecommonlawtradition.In Pierson Chief
justiceWarrenfoundthatjudicialimmunitywasat least as well
established as legislative privilege in 1871
withoutconductinganyhistoricalanalysisofcommon
law,citingonlyBradleys(post-CivilRightsAct)
holdingandtheKingsBenchcaseofScottv. Stansfield.30Pierson at 554.
Yet Bradley wasdecided in1872ayearafterCongresspassedSection1983.
Congresscouldnothavehaditinmindwhiledebating Section 1983.
JusticeFieldsarticulationofimmunityinBradley
wasinnovativenotdescriptive.31Bradleyrationalized
adoptingtheEnglishsovereignimmunityasgood
policy.Thisprovisionofthelawisnotforthe
protectionorbenefitofamaliciousorcorruptjudge,
butforthebenefitofthepublic,whoseinterestitis
thatthejudgesshouldbeatlibertytoexercisetheir
functionswithindependence,andwithoutfearof
consequences.Bradleyatn.16.Thispolicy 30 3 Law Reports, Exchequer,
220 (1868), analyzed in Bradley at n. 16.Available at
http://www.forgottenbooks.com/readbook_text/The_Law_Reports_1868_v3_1000098717/237.31SeeJ.Feinman,R.Cohen,SuingJudges:Historyand
Theory,31S.C.L.Rev.201,243-249,254-56(1979)(hereinafter
SuingJudges)(Certainly,nobroadruleofimmunityexisted
priortoBradley.Formostofthehistoryofthecommonlaw,
judgeshadonlyaverylimitedimmunity.);YaleNoteat323-327 ([J]udicial
immunity was not a universal doctrine.). 38 exhortation was an
expansion from the more restrictive
rulesanalyzedinRandallv.Brigham,74U.S.523
(1868):[Was]theactdoneajudicialact,donewithin
hisjurisdiction?Randallat531.Randall
acknowledgeddecisionswhichdeniedanabsolute immunity wherethe
acts,in excessofjurisdiction,are
donemaliciouslyorcorruptly.Moreover,every
authoritycitedinbothRandallandBradleyisor
adoptsforeignlawtheEnglishsovereignimmunity
rulesimposedbyanautocracyournationfoughtwars to become independent
of. See, e.g., Randall, n. 14.32
Farfromanintenttoincorporatecommonan English monarchical sovereign
immunity rule, Congress inpassingtheunambiguousCivilRightsAct
specifically intended to eliminate it as the source of the
monumentalevilofstate-sponsoredoppression
jeopardizingournationsexistencebyprecipitating
civilwarfare.Piersonwasastartlingindeed
dangerousdeparturefromprinciplessettledatthe founding of our nation
and cherished for centuries since.
Becausethecourtofappealsextendedimmunity
relyingonPiersonsprogeny,Stump,itdecidedan important question of
federal law that has not been, but should be,settled bythis
Courtpursuant to Rule 10(c): Whether this Court in Pierson exceeded
its jurisdiction underArticleIII,andinvadedlegislativepowerunder
Article I, of the United States Constitution. 32
SeeSuingJudgesat224-43(analysisofpre-Bradleyprimary sources).
Printed with FinePrint - purchase at www.fineprint.com39 CONCLUSION
The Petition for certiorari should be granted. Respectfully
submitted, Michelle Lowney MacDonald ShimotaSupreme Court Bar No.
28825 MacDonald Law Firm, LLC 1069 South Robert Street West St.
Paul, MN 55118 Telephone: (651) 222-4400 Facsimile: (651) 222-1122
[email protected] Attorney for Petitioner Sandra
Grazzini-Rucki Printed with FinePrint - purchase at
www.fineprint.com