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PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

DESIGN ARGUMENTS

Design or ‘teleological’ arguments are concerned with the specific details of the universe and how can we best explain them. These qualities include:

The regularity and order of the world The way that everything in the world seems to be designed for

some purpose The way that living things appear constructed so as to suit their

environment The fact that life developed in the world at all The fact that conscious beings exist.

‘Teleological’ has come to refer to the view that everything has a purpose and is aimed at some goal. So teleological or design arguments draw on evidence that the world has been designed and has a purpose in order to conclude that God exists.

Arguments from analogy

There is a tradition of teleological arguments which compare certain features of the universe with similar features of designed objects. These proofs argue from design in that they begin by examining design in human artefacts (in this sense then they are arguments from design). Similarities, or analogies, can be found between these designed objects and the world around us, and this leads to an intermediate conclusion that the world has also been designed. From here it is a short step to the final conclusion that God is the designer.

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William Paley’s argument from analogy

Paley (1743-1805) imagines himself walking across a heath and finding a watch on the ground. There is something about the presence of the watch on the heath that demands further explanation.

What Paley actually notices about the watch is that:

it has several parts the parts are framed and work together for a purpose the parts have been made with specific material, appropriate to their

action together the parts produce regulated motion if the parts had been different in any way, such motion would not be

produced

This list is Paley’s criteria for (or indicators of) design, and if an object meets these criteria then Paley will take it as evidence that the object has been designed. For Paley the watch on the heath has all the evidence of what he terms ‘contrivance’, i.e. design, and where there is design or contrivance there must be a designer or ‘contriver’. He concludes that the watch must have had a maker.

Having examined the watch and thereby established some criteria with which to determine whether something has been designed, Paley turns his attention to the natural world. He finds that all the indicators of design that we observed in the watch we can also observe in nature, except that the works of nature actually surpass any human design. This leads him to the conclusion that nature must have a designer wondrous enough to have designed such a universe.

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1. A watch has certain complex features (e.g. it consists of parts, each of which has a function, and they work together for a specific purpose).

2. Anything which exhibits these features must have been designed.

3. (From 1 and 2) Therefore the watch has been designed by a designer.

4. The universe is like the watch in that it possesses the same features, except on a far more wondrous scale.

5. (From 4 and 2) Therefore the universe, like the watch, has been designed, except by a wondrous universe maker – God.

We can summarise Paley’s argument in the following way:

Paley’s teleological argument is an argument from analogy. These arguments work by comparing two things, and by arguing that because they are alike in one (observed) respect they are also alike in another (unobserved) respect.

David Hume’s criticisms of arguments from analogy

David Hume offered some of the most memorable criticisms of the arguments from design, (writing 30 years before Paley). Paley anticipates some of these criticisms in his work Natural Theology (1809), in which he first outlined the watch argument. He attempts to address some of the challenges raised by Hume’s criticisms by proposing, and the rebuking, similar issues. We will examine each of Hume’s criticisms in turn, and consider the effectiveness of Paley’s response in each case.

Problem 1: We have no experience of world-making

We can only recognise that certain sorts of objects, such as machines, have an intelligent designer because we have had direct or indirect experience of such objects being

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designed and manufactured. So it is by observation of the way in which watches, for example, come into being in our world that we learn that they require a designer. But if we had never had any experience of manufacture, engineering or design, then we would never suppose that an object such as a watch had been designed. Hume’s point is that to know what has brought something about we have to have experience of its being brought about. So unless we have had some experience of other universes being made we cannot reasonably claim to know whether our own universe has been made.

Paley’s version of this criticism

Paley thinks that it does not matter if we have never seen a watch being made, and have no understanding of how it is manufactured. He asks the question ‘Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned?’ Since the answer is doubtless ‘no’, then how is it we nonetheless are certain that they have been designed? Paley’s answer is that there are certain intrinsic features possessed by certain objects which show that they are designed.

He points out that we encounter a similar problem when we look at the products of ancient crafts and forgotten arts, and we may never know the skills that were needed to create these products, as these are lost to time. But we are still able to draw conclusions from the product itself about the artists’ skills and the very fact that someone existed with the skill to create these cultural artefacts. Through a process of reverse engineering scientists deduced that a piece of bronze found in the sea in 1902 the mechanism

was probably a working model of the solar system, even though no one had witnessed the ‘Antikythera’ mechanism being constructed. So for Paley, even though we are ignorant of the design process, it is still legitimate to infer the existence of a designer from mysterious objects that exhibit all the characteristics of design.

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Does this get round Hume’s 1st criticism?

Paley may have thought he had accounted for the issue raised by Hume, however Hume’s point cuts deeper than this. It is indeed possible, as Paley says, for us successfully to infer that some unfamiliar object has been designed. But this is only because we can compare it to other manufactured objects that we’ve previously encountered. If we had absolutely no experience, direct or indirect, of the manufacturing process, then the object would remain a mystery to us. Yet we have no experience of the process that causes universes to come into being, as the universe is unique and there is nothing we can compare it to. For Hume, if we have no experience of this universe being designed, and if we cannot compare it to other universes that have been designed, then we have no grounds for concluding that God or anyone else has designed it.

Problem 2: Arguments from analogy are weak

An argument from analogy claims that, because X is like Y in one (observed) respect, they are therefore probably alike in some other (hidden) respect. However, arguments like this are only reliable when the two things being compared have lots of relevant similarities. The question is: does a machine have enough relevant similarities with the universe to support the conclusion that they were both designed?

Hume suggests that the universe is not at all like a machine, not even a vast and complex one. Hume argues that the universe resembles something more organic than mechanical; it is far more like an animal or vegetable than ‘a watch or a knitting-loom’. And since a vegetable does not have any designer, we have no reason to suppose that the universe is designed. Perhaps it simply grew!

It may seem rather absurd to compare the universe to a giant vegetable, but this is partly Hume’s point: it is only as absurd as comparing the universe to a machine. For Hume there is nothing to choose between the world/machine analogy and the world/vegetable analogy: both are equally flawed comparisons. There are not enough similarities between the world and a machine, and therefore Paley cannot conclude, on the basis of the analogy with a machine, that the universe has a designer

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Problem 3: It is possible that the appearance of design occurred through random processes

David Hume suggests an alternative to the claim that the universe, with its appearance of purpose and order, must have had a designer. Hume argues that it is at least possible that the universe is ordered and life-supporting as a result of chance and not intelligence. This theory is often referred to as the Epicurean hypothesis, after the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (341-270 BCE) who proposed that the universe exists the way it does as a result of the random movements of a finite number of atoms. Over an infinite period of time these atoms will take up

every possible position, some of them ordered, some of them chaotic. It just so happens that the physical universe is currently in a state of order, and that, by chance beings have evolved that are capable of reflecting on the universe and why it is here. Hume argues that, although this may be a remote possibility, it cannot be disregarded as a plausible explanation for the so-called design in the universe.

Problem 4: The argument does not demonstrate the existence of God

Paley’s analogy is based on the assumption that ‘like effects have like causes, i.e. that two things that are similar in their effects have similar causes. Paley must make this assumption if he is to conclude that the universe has a designer:

1. Machines and the universe exhibit similar features of design (‘like effects’).

2. Therefore they have both been designed by some intelligent being (‘like causes’).

However by staying true to the analogy one can arrive at possible causes of the universe that are nothing like a perfect, unique God. Consider the following points.

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1. Teams of people are usually involved in the design and construction of complex machines. So, by the ‘like causes’ principle, the universe may also have been designed and created by many gods, not by a single deity.

2. We can take the analogy to its extreme by making the designers of universes very similar to humans. For example, the designers and constructors of complex machines are often foolish and morally weak people. In the same way the gods who built the universe may well be foolish and morally weak. Humans involved in manufacture are both male and female, and reproduce in the usual fashion; so perhaps the deities are gendered and also engage in reproduction.

3. In most cases complex machines are the product of many years of trial and error, with each new generation of machine an improvement on its predecessors. By the ‘like causes’ principle then ‘many worlds might have been botched and bungled’ before this one was created.

4. Where there are design faults in a machine we usually infer that the designer lacked resources or skills, or simply didn’t care. The universe appears to contain many design faults (particularly those that cause needless pain and suffering). For all we know this is because it was created by a God who lacked the power, skill or love to create something better. This is a far cry from the all-loving God envisaged by Paley.

Paley’s version of this criticism

Again, Paley anticipates this final problem, and makes the criticism himself in order to rebuke it. Paley focuses on the last of Hume’s unappealing conclusions about God derived from the like causes principle. He points out that people may observe problems in the functioning of the watch; for example, an irregularity of movement, or simply a failure for it to work, which would lead us to question whether it really had been designed.

Paley’s response to this criticism

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However, we would still be able to observe the details of the machinery, the cogs and gears, and all the qualities Paley outlined in his first examination of the watch. Paley argues that, whether or not the mechanism actually works, these qualities in themselves still lead us to the conclusion that the watch was designed.

For Paley, following this line of reasoning, even if it could be shown that the existence of pain and suffering were a flaw in the workings of the universe, it would not therefore follow that God did not exist. We can still infer a designer from the mysterious processes in the universe, which meet all the criteria for design.

Does this get round Hume’s 4th criticism?

Even if we accept Paley’s conclusion that the features of the world allow us to infer that it has a designer (and this had already been thrown into doubt by the Hume’s first two criticisms), does the argument prove the kind of God Paley wants it to? Paley’s admission that there may be flaws in the workings of the universe does undermine the strength of Paley’s conclusion that there is an intelligent and skilful watchmaker. Hume’s point that serious flaws in the workings of a designed object lead us to presume a lack of skill in the designer still stands, and all Paley does in his version of this problem is establish that the argument proves the existence of a designer; and not a designer with perfect qualities.

Hume concludes that the very most that arguments from design are able to establish is ‘that the cause or causes of the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence’. Such a tentative conclusion is unlikely to persuade anyone of the existence of God, unless they already believe in him.

Issues raised by Kant

Kant is extremely sympathetic to arguments from design, stating that they should be treated with respect (in contrast, perhaps, to Hume’s treatment of them). We owe these arguments respect, says Kant, because they are the oldest and clearest proofs, and are the ones that most strike a chord with the way we think about the world.

Criticism 1 – The argument does not prove a creator

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Kant does not think we need to criticise too strictly the analogy between the natural world and the world of human artefacts. The real, decisive flaw that Kant finds within the argument from design is that its conclusion is not enough to prove the existence of God in the way that its supporters want.

If we are to be careful in our use of the argument from analogy then Kant thinks we are only justified in reaching a conclusion which the argument merits. Yet the argument from design does not do this, but instead it draws a conclusion which it is not justified in making. When we look closely at the world of human artefacts (such as houses, ships and watches) then we are entitled to conclude that those artefacts have properties which indicate that they were designed by architects, shipbuilders and watchmakers. However, the architects and builders did not create these houses and ships from nothing; they used materials that already existed.

Likewise we only conclude from Paley’s design criteria that the watch-maker designed and put together the form or structure if the watch; we do not actually conclude that they also created the material (the metal, glass and leather strap) that the product was made from. When we transfer this argument, by analogy, to the universe, we are only entitled to conclude that there is a worldly architect. We are not entitled to draw from the analogy the conclusion that the designer of the universe also created the materials with which they built the world.

Criticism 2: the move to God’s perfection is not justified

Kant also argues, following a similar line of reasoning to Hume’s third criticism, that we cannot conclude from the argument that the ‘worldly architect’ has the perfect, infinite qualities normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, supreme goodness. This is the problem, Kant thinks, with a priori proofs for God’s existence: you cannot move from evidence in the world (for example, that the world has uncanny regularity, order, and so on) to the conclusion that God is perfect. This last step to perfection, which is the most crucial step, cannot be taken purely on the basis of observation.

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The challenge of Darwin

Much of the persuasive power of an argument like Paley’s lay in examples of design taken from the natural world: it seemed obvious that the intricacy of a human eye and the beauty of a peacock’s tail could not have come about by chance; they must have been designed. However, Darwin provided an account of how such perfectly adapted features could and did come about, not by intelligent design, but by the struggle of every generation of species to compete, survive and reproduce. Darwin’s theory of evolution became widely accepted as the best explanation of the features that William Paley puzzled over, namely that:

living organisms consist of individual parts these parts are framed and work together for a purpose they have been made with specific material, appropriate to their

action together they produce regulated motion if the parts had been different in any way such motion would not

be produced

Random mutation plus the pressures of natural selection is the designer of all living organisms: it is not an intelligent or purposeful designer, but a blind unthinking mechanism.

Darwin’s theory did not extinguish arguments from design altogether. Some philosophers incorporated evolution into their arguments. Swinburne, as we shall now see, created an argument form analogy which takes into account the scientific understanding we now have.

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Richard Swinburne’s argument from design

Richard Swinburne (1934-) has put forward an argument from design that he believes avoids both the formal objections made by Hume in the Dialogues and the challenge of evolutionary theory. At the beginning of his paper, Swinburne outlines some clear parameters within which he thinks his argument succeeds.

First, he acknowledges that the argument from design cannot prove the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good being. Swinburne thinks instead that the argument from design shows the existence of ‘a very powerful, free, not-embodied rational agent’ who is responsible for the order or regularity of the universe. By moderating his conclusion in this way Swinburne side-steps Kant’s criticisms.

Second, Swinburne concedes that his argument is an argument from analogy, and as such it is vulnerable to the criticism that the analogy between the order found in human productions and the order found in the universe may be considered by some people to be too weak to support the conclusion.

Third, Swinburne thinks we need to make a distinction between two types of regularity or order. The first type of order is regularities of co-presence (or spatial order), which is the arrangement of objects in space; the parts of Paley’s watch are an example of this, as are the different parts of a human eye, or the arrangement of books in a library. The second type of order is regularities of succession (or ‘temporal

order’), which is the pattern of the way objects behave in time; a billiard ball being moved when it is hit, or a stone falling to the ground, or a friend arriving at your house because you have asked them round.

This is an important distinction for Swinburne because he thinks that Paley’s design argument relies on the first type of order (regularities of co-presence) to prove that God exists. This has made them vulnerable not only to Hume’s criticisms, but also to Darwin’s theory of evolution. The theory of evolution explains natural ‘regularities of co-presence’ without any reference to God; e.g. it explains how the parts of an eye evolved to work together with such efficiency and success.

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Swinburne thinks that his revised argument, which is based on regularities of succession, can avoid these criticisms.

Within these parameters Swinburne puts forward his argument:

7b. Finally, we humans are free rational agents who control our own bodies, and it is through our bodies that we are able to act on the universe. Swinburne argues that an agent who could directly control the whole universe cannot have a body. So we should add to point 7 that the being who shapes the universe is disembodied.

Swinburne’s criticisms of Hume

Remember that Swinburne’s aim in this argument is to avoid the criticisms that Hume makes of the argument from design. Swinburne feels he has done this by building his argument on the basis of regularities of succession; by being careful in how far his conclusion extends (he doesn’t claim it proves the existence of a perfect being); and

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1. Regularities of succession occur both as natural phenomena (as a result of natural laws) and as a result of free human action (for example, billiard balls moving and stones falling can be explained by natural laws; friends actually turning up to your house on time for once can be explained by the free action of humans).

2. Regularities of succession in the human world can be properly and fully explained by the rational choices of a free agent (for example, ‘I said to my friend to turn up at seven, and she didn’t want to be late, so she got her act together and rushed over on time’).

3. This (point 2) is because free agents have the intelligence, power and freedom to bring about regularities of succession.

4. Regularities of succession that are the result of natural laws (for example, gravity) cannot be explained by reference to other natural laws.

5. However, by analogy with point 2, regularities of succession in the natural world can be fully explained by the rational choices of a free agent.

6. The universe, and its natural laws, is immense and complex.7. Therefore (from points 5 and 3) regularities of succession in the natural

world can only be fully explained by a free agent who has the immense intelligence, power and freedom needed to bring about such order in the universe.

by acknowledging that it is an argument from analogy and so is vulnerable to criticisms made of analogies.

Let us briefly go through some of Hume’s criticisms, outlined above and look at Swinburne’s response.

1. We have no experience of world-making. Swinburne argues that Hume is wrong to criticise the argument from design on this count; after all, science does proceed by proposing and testing theories both for things they have not observed and for things which are unique. Most obviously, theoretical physicists and cosmologists propose respectable theories about the universe, which is unique.

2. The universe could be the result of random processes (chance). Swinburne points out that even Hume’s explanation of chance relies on laws of nature, which still themselves need explaining. According to the Epicurean hypothesis changes over time produce sometimes order; sometimes chaos. But Swinburne argues that these changes must be brought about by regularities. The laws of nature seem unlikely to change on a random basis. So in terms of explaining the regularity of the laws of nature chance leaves just as many questions unanswered as God

3. The argument does not demonstrate the existence of a perfect being. We have seen that Swinburne is prepared to concede this, and he accepts that his argument may only prove the existence of an immensely powerful, immensely intelligent, free and rational agent who is disembodied ad who shapes the universe. However if Swinburne has successfully proved the existence of such a being then the case for atheism has been severely damaged.

4. Arguments from analogy are weak. Finally, we know that Swinburne is prepared to concede that his argument is vulnerable to criticism from people who are not convinced by the analogy, and who are prepared to hunt out and find disanalogies.

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