-
Kant and Teleological Ethics.1)By Frank Thilly, University of
Missouri.
The goal at which every System of ethics aims, is the dis-covery
of a principle of morality, that is, to give a satisfactoryanswer
to the question, What shall I do? How ought I to act?For the
ancient Greeks the problem assumed the form of an in-quhy into the
highest good. By the highest good they meautthe highest end or
purpose, something which has absolute worth,which is desired not
for the sake. of something eise, but for itsown sake,
unconditionally. Aristotle expresses the idea in a cele-brated
passage: As it appears that there are more ends thanone, and some
of these, e. g., wealth, flutes, and Instruments ge-nerally, vve
desire s means to something eise, it is evident thatthey are not
all final ends. But the highest good is clearly some-thing final.
Hence, if there is only one final end, this will bethe object of
which we are in search, and if there are more thanone, it will be
the most final of them. We speak of that whichis sought after for
its own sake s more final than that which issought after s a means
to something eise; we speak of thatwhich is never desired s a means
to something eise s morefinal thau the things which are'desired
both in themselves and sa means to something eise; and we speak of
a thing s abso-lutely final, if it is always desired in itself and
iiever s a meansto something eise"2).
1) A paper read before the American Philosophical Association,
Co-lumbia University, New-York, at its first nieeting, April l,
1902. See theEeport of the Secretary The Philos. Keview". XI, 3,
279.
2) Nicoinachean Ethics, Bk. I chap.'V, Welldon's translation,
See .also Plato, P h i leb u s, 20 ff.
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Kant and Teleological UthicS. 31
For the Greeks, then, the highest good was the principle
orcriterion by which they judged of actions. Modern thinkers
ap-proach the problem of ethics from a different side, perhaps,
buttliey, too, endeavor to find a criterion which will enable them
todistinguisli between right and wrong conduct. Thus, there is
aschool of moralists which examines so-called right and wrong
acts,and finds that acts are right or wrong because they tend to
pro-duce certain effects or realize certain ends. The hedonists
say,this end is pleasure or happiness; the perfectionists seek it
inperfection or development or progress. Their reasoning is
some-what s follows: Such and such an act is wrong because it
tendsto hinder the realization of such and such an end, say
happinessor welfare. I ought not to perform such acts because they
makeagainst this end. The end or purpose itself, however,
thesethinkers do not attempt to justify, because it cannot be
justifiedor proved. The act is right or wrong because of the end
realizedor not realized by it, but the end or purpose is something
thathas absolute worth, it is desired and approved for its own
sake.John Stuart Mill, for example, agrees with Aristotle when he
says:Questions of ultiniate ends are not amenable to direct
proof.Whatever can be proved to be good must be so by being shownto
be a means to something admitted to be good without proof.The
rnedical art is proved to be good by its conducing to health;but
how is it possible rto prove that health is good ? The art ofmusic
is good for the reason, among others, that it produces plea-sure;
but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good?"1)
In short, the attempt is made in ethics to discover a prin-ciple
which is self-evident in the sense that everyone will acceptit,
which no human being will reject, or at any rate, which so-called
normal human beings accept or unconsciously obey in theirjudgment
of actions. According to this view, the particular actsare good or
bad according to the effects which they teud to pro--duce. The
moral laws serve a purpose; they are means to aneiid; not absolute,
but relative. They are, in the last analysis,commanded or
prohibited because of their effects; the final ground
*) Mill, Uti l i tar ianism, chap. 1. See also Hume,
Principlesof Morals, Appendix I, v; Spencer; Data of Ethics, chap.
, 9;Sigwart, Vorf ragen der Ethik, pp. 11 f., Logik, vol. , pp. 529
ff.;PauLsen, System der Etkikj Bk. , chap. 1.
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32 F. thilly,
of their rightness and wrongness lies in the puri)ose which
theyserve.
Now this school of thiukers is opposed by those who denythe
relative charactcr of morality, and insist upon the absolutenessof
the inoral law. In onr day these moralists seek support fromthe
System of Iminanuel Kant, and refer to hini s the great ad-vocate
of their positiou. But it can be sliown, it seems to me,that they
err in appealing to hira, and that bis standpoint is byno means s
aiitagonistic to the socalled teleological theory, whichI have just
described, s is generally assumed. Kant's methodof p rocedure
differs from that employed by most modernthinkers, but his results
do not differ much from theirs afterall. He, too, is seeking for a
principle upon which to base mora-lity, and tries to find one that
will prove acceptable to every ra-tional human being. Gegenwrtige
Grundlegung ist aber nichtsmehr", he says, als die Aufsuchung und
Festsetzung des ober-sten Princips der Moralitt, welche allein ein,
in seiner Ab-sicht, ganzes und von allen anderen sittlichen
Untersuchungen ab-zusonderndes Geschft ausmacht"1). But while they
examine theparticular moral acts and attempt to read the supreme
principleout of thern, Kant, true to his rationalistic
proclivities, endeavorsto deduce it, a priori, from the notion of a
rational being ssuch. Also unterscheiden sich die moralischen
Gesetze, samtihren Principien, unter allem praktischen Erkenntnisse
von allembrigen, darin irgend etwas Empirisches ist, nicht allein
wesent-lich, sondern alle Mora lph i lo soph ie beruht gnzlich aufi
h r e m reinen Teil, und; auf den Menschen angewandt, ent-lehnt sie
nicht das Mindest^ von der Kenntnis desselben (Anthro-pologie),
sondern giebt ihm, als vernnftigem Wesen, Gesetze apriori", etc.2)
He works desperately at this task, and we al-most hear him panting
for breath in his labors, but the resultdoes not seem to me to
differ*so much from that'of the modernteleologist, s I shall
attempt to show in the following.*)
li G r u n d l e g u n g zur Metaphys ik der Si t ten, Vorrede,
p. 9,Eosenkranz.
2) Grundlegung, Vorrede, p. 6. See also Metaphys ik derSitten,
pp. 15 i :
3) I have based what follows largely upon the Grund legung
,because I do not believe there is any fundamental difference
betweenthiswork and Kant's later book, Krit ik der p r. V e r n u n
f t , so far s thequestion involved in this article is
concerned.
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Kant and Teleological Ethics. oo
In the first sectioh of the G r u n d l e g u n g zur
Metaphy-sik der Sitten, Kant first attacks Ms problem in a
populrway. Without quitting the moral knowledge of common
humanreason" *), s he says, he searches for the suprenie principle.
Hisline of thought is somewhat s follows: What is the highest
good?A good will. What is a good will? One that is actuated
by'duty. What is duty? Duty is to be deterinined by the
formalprinciple of willing. Hence a good will is one that is
determinedby the formal principle of willing, i. e., not by
material desires,not by empirical motives, but by an a p ri o ri
form. A good willis one that is determined by law, and not by
desires or inclina-tions. I must act from respect for law. But what
is this law?What have I left after elimiuating all empirical
motives? It isthis: Act so that you can will the maxim of your
willing to be-come universal law. If I cannot will that my maxim
become auniversal law, then this maxim must be rejected, not on
accountof the hrm it proinises me or some one eise, but because it
can-not be made to fit into a possible universal legislation s a
prin-ciple. This universal legislation commands my respect,
although Ido not, s yet, understand upon what this is based. I do
know,however, that my evaluation of it far surpasses the value of
any-thing praised by inclination, and that the necessity of my
actsfroin pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes
duty.This principle is present in every human consciousness. .
Andalthough common men do not conceive it in such an abstract
anduniversal form, yet they always have it before their eyes, and
useit s the Standard of their decision".
What eise does tbis mean than that morality is grounded inhuman
nature; not in the particular, temporary (empirical) desiresof the
individual, but in the (a priori) human reason s such?There is
present in every rational being a formal principle orlaw, a
principle which is the condition of all morality, which thebeing
respects and sets the highest value on: Act so that youcan will the
maxim of your conduct to become universal law. Donot lie. Why not?
Because you cannot will that lying shouldbecome universal. And why
not? So werde ich bald inne, dassich zwar die Lge, aber ein
allgemeines Gesetz zu lgen gar
*) I frequently follow Abbott's ^ercellent translations in the
courseof the paper.
KAutetudien VIII.
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34 P. Thilly,
nicht wollen knne; denn nach einem solchen wrde es eigentlichgar
kein Versprechen geben, \veil es vergeblich wre, meinenWillen in
Ansehung meiner knftigen Handlungen ndern vorzu-geben, die diesem
\7orgeben doch nicht glauben, oder, wenn sie esbereilter Weise
thten, mich doch mit gleicher Mnze bezahlenwrden, mithin meine
Maxime, sobald sie zum allgemeinen Gesetzgemacht wrde, sich selbst
zerstren msse"1). That is, ifeverybody lied, there would be no
confidence in promises, andlying would lose its raison d'etre, and
there would be no uni-versal legislation or society. The lie is
wrong, not because itmay happen to injure you or some other person
in this particularcase, but because the lie s such imdermiiies
confidence andh inders the realization of a good \vhich you and
every other ra-tional being value for its own sake. The
teleological moralistwill have no difficulty in accepting these
thoughts.
But the philosopher is not satisfied with a mere Statementof the
principle s it is found even in the commonest man. Thecommon man,
of course, needs no proof of the principle; it wouldbe a sad thing
for morality if he did. We do not need scienceand philosophy to
know what we should do to be honest andgood, yea, even wise and
virtuous". The thinker, however, whoendeavors to construct a System
of morality, must show the logi-cal necessity of the truths he
presents. The principle spoken of,is not derived from experience,
says Kant; it is a priori andmust be proved by a priori reasoning.
We cannot derive mora-lity from examples, we need a priori
principles, that is, we needa metaphysic of morals, which will give
us universal and neces-sary knowledge. Aus dem Angefhrten erhellt,
dass alle sitt-lichen Begriffe vllig a priori in der Vernunft ihren
Sitz undUrsprung haben, und dieses zwar in der gemeinsten
Menschenver-nunft ebensowohl, als der im hchsten Masse
spekulativen; dasssie von keinem empirischen und darum bloss
zufllige Erkenntnisseabstrahiert werden knnen; dass es nicht allein
die grssteNotwendigkeit in theoretischer Absicht, wenn es bloss auf
Speku-lation ankommt, erfordere, sondern auch von der grssten
prak-tischen Wichtigkeit sei, ihre Begriffe und .Gesetze aus reiner
Ver-nunft zu schpfen, rein und UDvermengt vorzutragen, ja den
Um-fang dieses ganzen praktischen oder reinen
Vernunfterkenntnisses,
G r u n d l e g u n g , p. 24, R,
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Kant and Teleological Ethics. 35
d. i. das ganze Vermgen der reinen praktischen Vernunft, zu
be-stimmen, hierin aber nicht, wie es wohl die spekulative
Philoso-phie erlaubt, ja bisweilen notwendig findet, die Prinzipien
von derbesondern Natur der menschlichen Vernunft abhngig zu
machen,sondern darum, weil moralische Gesetze fr jedes
vernnftigeWesen berhaupt gelten sollen, sie schon aus dem
allgemeinenBegriffe eines vernnftigen Wesens berhaupt abzuleiten,
und aufsolche Weise alle Moral, die zu ihrer Anwendung auf
Menschender Anthropologie bedarf, zuerst unabhngig von dieser als
reinePhilosophie, d. i. als Metaphysik, vollstndig
vorzutragen"1).
The problem is to deduce morality from the conception of
arational being s such. This Kant struggles heroically to do inthe
second section of the Grundlegung. A rational being, hefinds, is
one that has power to act according to the conceptionof laws, i.
e., a will. When reason determines the will inevitably,then the
acts of the rational being are subjectively necessary.But in human
beings the will is not determined sufficiently byreason alone, it
does not completely accord with reason; hencetheir acts are
subjectively contingent; the will does not of neces-sity follow the
principles of reason. Hence we have here in sucha will Obligation
(Nthiguug). The conception of an objectiveprinciple which is
obligatory for a will, in the way just shown,is a command, and the
command is expressed in imperative form.There are two kinds f
imperatives, hypothetical and categorical.The hypothetical
imperative does not command the action absolu-tely, but only s a
means to another purpose. The categoricalimperative commands a
certain conduct immediately, without havings its condition any
other purpose to be attained by it. Itconcerns not the matter of
the action, or its intended result, butits form and the principle
of which it is itself the result.
Now the important question arises, Is there really such
animperative s this? We cannot determine this empirically
fromexamples, says Kant; the existence of the imperative must
beproved a priori , that is, must be shown to follow
necessarilyfrom the conception of a rational being. But before this
difficulttask can be performed, we must first inform ourselves
concerningthe content of the imperative. We can deduce this content
apriori from the notion of a categorical imperative, that is,
its
G r u n d l e g u n g , Rf, pp. 34 f.3*
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36 F. flnliy,
content will follow logically from the very notion of it. When
Ithink a eategorical imperative, I know at once Avhat it
contains.It contains the iujunction: Act only on tliat maxirn
whereby thoucaust at the same time will that it should become a
universallaw". Or it may also be expressed s follows: Act s if
themaxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Lawof
Nature". Let us now note the application of this principle,
toparticular examples. You cannot will to take your life,
becauseyou cannot will that the maxim prompting the deed, which
wouldbe self-love in this case, should become a universal law.
Youcannot will to break your promises, because you cannot will
thatsuch a breach become universal. No nature could exist in
whichthe maxim prompting these acts, self-love, became the law. In
athird example Kant shows that no one can will that his
highernature be subordinated to his lower. Here he seems to
inodifythe principle somewhat. He finds that a nature would
actuallybe possible in which persons subordinated their higher
functionsto the lower, but that no one could will such a nature.
Simi-larly, s is brought out in a fourth example, it would be
possiblefor a nature to exist in which I injured no one, but at the
sametime contributed nothing to his welfare. However, it would
beimpossible for me to \vill such a principle. Why? Because sucha
will would contradict itself; a person would will that otherpersons
help him, and at the same time he would will not to helpothers
himself. Einige Handlungen sind so beschaffen, dass ihreMaxime ohne
Widerspruch nicht einmal als allgemeines Natur-gesetz gedacht
werden kann; weit gefehlt, dass man nochwollen knne, es sol l te
ein solches werden. Bei ndern istzwar jene innere Unmglichkeit
nicht anzutreffen, aber es ist dochunmglich, zu wollen, dass ihre
Maxime zur Allgemeinheit einesNaturgesetzes erhoben werde, weil ein
solcher Wille sich selbstwidersprechen wrde"J).
The thought here is this: You cannot will suicide and de-ception
to become universal. Why not? Because if they did, anature
(society) would be impossible. Nor can you will to sub-ordinate yur
own higher powers to the lower. Why not? Anature would be possible
in \vhich that were done. But youcannot will that such a nature
should exist. Hence certain acts
*) p. 50, R.
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Kant and Teleological Ethics. 37
are immoral, not because a nature would be impossible with
them,but because a certain natiire, one in which the lower was
sub-ordinated to the higher,. would be impossible. Noy can you
willmerely not to injure anybody; you must help your fellows
directly.Why? Because you want others to help you. If you desire
themto help you, you must will to do the same for them.
We see, Kant packs into his categorical imperative a con-tent
which he really derives from the practical examples beforehim, and
not from the imperative itself, nor from the principlewhich he
believes follows necessarily from the very conception ofa
categorical imperative. In this way we actually get the follo-wing
principles: 1) Do nothing that will hinder the realization ofthe
ideal, nature (or society) (the principle of justice); but2)
endeavor to promote it positively (the principle of bene-v le nee);
3) Subordinate your lower seif to your reason (theprinciple of
selfcontrol) *).
It must next be proved, a priori, of course, from the.na-ture of
a rational being s such, that there is such a categoricalimperative
s has been described. To do this Kant now beginsall over again. He
goes back to the conception of a rationalbeing, and tries to spin
out of this the desired results. Eatipnalbeings have the power to
determine themselves according to theconception of laws. This power
is called will. The will, there-fore, determines itself by an
objective principle. Such a principleis a purpose, and, when this
purpose follows necessarily from thereason s such, is valid for all
rational beings. There are pur-poses which are means to other
purposes, but these are only re-lative. A purpose which has
absolute value is a purpose in itself,an objective purpose. There
is such a purpose. Every rationalbeing is a purpose or end in
itself. Irrational beings have onlyrelative worth, s means, and are
therefore called t hing s. Ra-tional beings are called persons,
because they are ends in them-selves, and therefore objects of
respect. Every rational beingconceives itself s such an end in
itself, hence this purpose is anobjective purpose or end. This
purpose is expressed in the im-perative form, and s a categorical
imperative, because it is an
l) It is interesting to compare with the above, Sidgwick's
principles:the priuciple of rational self-love, the priuciple of
the duty of benevolence,and the principle of justice. See the
Methods of Ethics,
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38 F. Thil ly,
cnd in itself, a purpose having absolute or unconditional
worth.This imperative is: So act s to treat humanity in your own
per-son s well s in the person of every one eise always s an endand
never s a ineans merely. In order to be raoral your actsmust
couform to this principle. You nmst treat humanity s anend in
itself; you must promote this end in your own person andin that of
others, that is, you must make the end of your fellow-man your
own.
This purpose cannot be derived from experience, 1) becauseit is
a universal priuciple; 2) because in it humanity is not con-ceived
s the end of men (subjectively), that is, s an objectwhich one of
oneself makes one's purpose, but s an objectiveend, one which,
whatever may be our purposes, must, s a law,constitute the highest
limiting condition of all subjective ends orpurposes. That is, it
is not a temporary, empirical or subjectivepurpose, but the highest
end or purpose, one that has absolutevalue and precedence. Hence
the end must spring from purereason *).
According to our first principle, the form of universality isthe
objective ground of all practical legislation, that is, the for-mal
condition of all morality. The subjective ground is the endor
purpose. Now according to our second principle every rationalbeing
s an end or purpose in itself, is the subject of all ends.Hence
follows the. third principle of the will: the idea that thewill of
every rational being is a universal legislative will. Thatis, every
rational being is an end in itself, the highest end; itgives itself
the law. Now the form of all law is universal. Henceevery rational
being legislates universally. It follows from allthis that such a
universal will can give a categorical imperative.Man is subject to
his own will, but his own will legislates forall. The notion of
such a wHeads us to the idea of a kiug-dom of ends, that is, a
systematic union of different rationalbeings by common laws. This
notion of a kingdom of ends is only
x) Kant thinks that because this highest end or purpose isa
priorior innate in'man, it cannot be derived from experience. Now
the end initself may not be the product of experience, it may be a
priori, yet ourknowledge of it might be derived from experience.
But Kant will notadmit this, because he aims to base morality on an
absolute foiindation,to make the truths of morality s necessary
as'those of mathematics, andtherefore rejects everything that
smacks of empiricism..
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Kant and Teleological Ethics. . 39
an ideal-, but every rational being can become a member of sucha
kingdom by virtue of its universally legislating will.
Hencemorality is a reference of .all acts to such legislation s
wouldmake a kingdom of ends possible. This legislation, however,
mustbe capable of being found in every rational being and
springfrom its will. The principle of this will is: Never to act on
anymaxim which cannot \vithout contradiction be also a
universallaw, and accordingly always so to act that the will can at
thesame time regard itself s giving in its maxims universal
laws".
We conclude, s we started, with the notion of an absolutelygood
will. That will is absolutely good which cannot be bad,hence whose
maxim cannot contradict itself. Hence this principleis its highest
law: Always act upon a maxim which you canwill to become a
universal law." The same thought can also beexpressed: Act on
maxims which can have s their object them-selves s univeral laws of
nature". If these principles-were uni-versally obeyed, the kingdom
of ends would be realized.
But we have not proved the possibility of the
categoricalimperative after all, Kant now teils us. Wie ein solcher
synthe-tischer praktischer Satz a priori mglich und warum er
notwen-dig sei, ist eine Aufgabe, deren Auflsung nicht mehr binnen
denGrenzen der Metaphysik der Sitten liegt, auch haben wir
seineWahrheit hier nicht behauptet, vielweniger vorgegeben einen
Be-weis derselben in unserer Gewalt zu haben. Wir zeigten nurdurch
Entwickelung des einmal allgemein im Schwange gehendenBegriffs der
Sittlichkeit, dass eine Autonomie des Willens dem-selben,
unvermeidlicher Weise, anhnge,, oder vielmehr zum Grundeliege. Wer
also Sittlichkeit fr Etwas, und nicht fr eine chim-rische Idee ohne
Wahrheit hlt, muss das angefhrte Princip der-selben zugleich
einrumen. Dieser Abschnitt war also, eben so,wie der erste, bloss
analytisch. Dass nun Sittlichkeit kein Hirn-gespinst sei, welches
alsdann folgt, wenn der kategorische Impe-rativ und mit ihm die
Autonomie des Willens wahr, und als einPrincip a pr ior i
schlechterdings notwendig ist, erfordert einenmglichen
synthetischen Gebrauch der reinen praktischen Vernunft,den wir aber
nicht wagen drfen, ohne eine Kritik dieses Ver-nunftvermgens selbst
voranzuscliicken, von welcher wir in demletzten Abschnitte die zu
unserer Absicht hinlnglichen Hauptzgedarzustellen haben" *). The
key to the riddle which we are trying
i) B,., p. 76.
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40 F. T h i l l y ,
to solvc is said to lio in the couception of frccdom. Kant,
there-forc, trics to dcduco tho categorical imperative from the
notion offrccdom. Frccdom is a kind of causality of rational
beings: it isthe powcr to act independently of foreign causes.
Stated positi-vely, the frccdom of the will is a u ton o my, the
property of thewill to be a law to itself. But this is really
identical with theformula of the categorical imperative, which
reads: Always act ona maxim which can have s an object itself s a
universal law,Hence it is plain that if there is freedom of the
will, there ismorality, that is, the principle of all morality, the
categoricalimperative, follows necessarily from the conception of
free will.
But still the problem is not solved. It must next be provedthat
all rational beings are free. Kant argues: A being that can-not act
otherwise than on the i d e a o f f r e e d o m is practicallyfree,
that is, all the laws hold for it which are inseparably con-nected
with freedom. Now we must ascribe to every rationalbeing that has a
will, the idea of freedom. For we conceive sucha being s having a
reason which is practical, i. e., has causalitywith respect to
objects. We cannot think a reason which iscontrolled in its
judgments by foreign causes, for if that were thecase, the subject
would ascribe its judgments not to its reason,but to something
eise. It must regard itself s the cause of itsprinciples,
independent of foreign influences, hence it must regarditself s
practical reason or s the will of a practical being, hences free.
But we cannot really prove this freedom, we must pre-suppose it
when we conceive a being s rational and endowedwith the
consciousness of freedom.
But we seem to reason in a circle here, according to Kant.First
we assume that we are free in order that we may conceiveourselves s
subject to moral laws; then we conceive ourselves ssubject to these
laws because we have assumed that we are free.This difficulty is
removed by the introduction ef the conceptionof an in te l l ig ib
le world. Every rational being regards itself,first, s belonging to
the world of sense, and therefore subject tothe laws of nature,
and, secondly, s belonging to the intelligibleworld, and 'hence
subject to laws which are independent of nature,not empirical, but
grounded in reason alone.
It is not necessary, however, for our purposes, to .considerthis
question of freedom any further. Kant finally concludes thatwe
cannot really prove how the idea of freedom is possible. It
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Kant and Teleological Ethics. 41
is possible on the assumption of an intelligible world, but
wehave no knowledge of such a world. Die Frage also: wie
einkategorischer Imperativ mglich sei, kann zwar soweit
beantwortetwerden, als man die einzige Voraussetzung angeben kann,
unterder er allein mglich ist, nmlich die Idee der Freiheit,
ingleichenals man die Notwendigkeit dieser Voraussetzung einsehen
kann,welches zum praktischen Gebrauche der Vernunft, d. i. zur
ber-zeugung der von der Gltigkeit dieses Imperativs, mithin auch
dessittlichen Gesetzes, hinreichend ist, aber wie diese
Voraussetzungselbst mglich sei, lsst sich durch keine menschliche
Vernunftjemals einsehen" *). If we assume the freedom of the will,
itsautonomy will necessarily follow. It is not only possible to
assumethis freedom without contradicting the principle of natural
causa-lity in the phenomenal world, but it is absolutely necessary
for arational being which is conscious of freedom to assume it
practi-cally, i. e., to presuppose it in all its voluntary
actions.
We have, in the preceding, frequently compared Kant's ethi-cal
teaching with the teleological theory. Let us now gathertogether
the results we have reached with respect to this matter,and present
them in somewhat more connected form. Accordingto the teleologist,
an act is, in the last analysis, right or wrong,because it does or
does not tend to realize a certain end or pur-pose. This end or
purpose itself is something prized for its ownsake, sometbing of
absolute worth. We cannot explain why hu-man beings prize it s they
do; it is a law of their nature. Itis a principle common to all
human beings, though they are notnecessarily clearly conscious of
its existence. A certain school ofteleologists, called hedonists,
teaches that pleasure is the end orpurpose described. This view
Kant vehemently opposes. There is,however, another school,
according to which the end or purposeis not pleasure, but the weif
are of humanity, such a developmentof man's nature that his lower
impulses, his material seif, shallbe subordinated to his higher
powers, his spiritual seif, and thathe may become a worthy member
of society. And that is, in myopinion, exactly what Kant teaches,
though he states it in some-what different language and attempts to
prove it in a diffe-rent way.
He, too, finds in man a principle that is common to all
ra-tional beings, a principle over and Hbove his temporary
individual
. i) p. 96.
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42 F. Thil ly,
desires and inclinations, au end or purpose that docs not
derivcits valuo from something elso, but has absolute worth. That
is,overy rational being conceives itself s an end in itself,
meaningby its seif not its particular, momentary desires, but that
whichit has in common with all rational beings, that which makes it
ahuman being. This purpose expresses itself in imperative
form:Treat every personality, your own s well s others', s au end
initself and never s a means. That will make possible a kingdomof
ends, a union of rational beings, a society. This society Avouldbe
realized if every man obeyed the dictates of his nature,
thecategorical imperative. But the ideal caniiot be realized
withoutobedience to law. The principle must therefore be
observed:Never do anything which you cannot will to become a
universallaw. That is, the ideal cannot be reached unless every man
ful-fils the primary coudition of its realization. If lying and
stealingbecame universal, there could be no kingdom of ends, no
society.You can always judge of the morality of an act by asking
your-self whether you would be willing to have everybody do s
youdo. Its fitness to become a univeral law determines the worth
ofthe act. This principle will hinder you from treating your
fellowmen s means merely, for you cannot will that they treat you
smeans. If you treat each other s means, you cannot realizethe
ideal which you prize above everything eise, the ideal of
hu-manity.
Now such acts are, in the last aualysis, moral s make itpossible
to realize the ideal, the union of rational beings, thekingdom of
ends. Not only must we refrain from perfonning actswhich hinder the
realization of the ideal, we must also endeavorto promote the ideal
directly by positive action, by helping our'fellows. And it is not
enough to have any union whatever.The" highest ideal is a society
of a certain Mnd, a kingdom inwhich the lower desires and Impulses
of man are controlled byreason, and in which the individual has
regard for the whole. Itwould be possible, perhaps, to have a
society in which every maurefrained from injuring his fellows and
indulged his lower appetites.But such union is not Kant's ideal.
Even if such a state werepossible, we could not will its
existence.
It is held by some that Kant eliminates the teleological
ele-ments which we have pointed out, in his later work, the
Kritikder praktischen Vernunft . Thus Dr. Thon, in a recent work,
,
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Kant and Teleological Etliics. 43
Die Grundpr inc ip ien der Kan t i s chen M o r a l p h i l o s
o -p h i e in ihrer Entwickelung, admits tliat the principle: Actso
tliat you can will the- maxim of your action to become uni-versal
law, is a disguised eudaemonism, but asserts that the prin-ciple is
modified in the Kritik der pr. Vernunf t in such amanner s to
escape this Charge. The new reading is: Act sothat the maxim of
your will can always at the same time holdgood s a principle of
universal legislation. I quote from Dr.Thon: Ganz anders aber
gestaltet sich die Beurteilung des kate-gorischen Imperativs, wenn
in seiner Formel an die Stelle desWollen-Knnens" ein Gelten-Knnen"
tritt. Die Entscheidungist dann nicht mehr subjektiv, sondern
objektiv, nicht mehr psy-chologisch, sondern nur logisch. Der
Massstab fr die Tauglich-keit der Maxime zum allgemeinen Gesetz
liegt dann nur im logi-schen Satze des Widerspruchs. Hebt sich eine
Maxime, wenn sieverallgemeinert wird, nicht selbst auf, d. h.
bergeht sie nicht inihr kontradiktorisches Gegenteil, dann knnte
sie ein allgemeinesGesetz werden, und sie ist daher
moralisch-zulssig. Wir nehmennun das klassische Beispiel Kant's vom
Depositum vor. Ich binim Besitze eines Depositums, dessen Eigentmer
gestorben ist,ohne eine Urkunde darber hinterlassen zu haben. Soll
ich esden Erben zurckgeben, oder nicht? Gesetzt, ich wrde mir
zurMaxime machen, ein Depositum nicht zurckzugeben. Nun ver-suche
ich, diese Maxime zu einem allgemeinen Gesetz auszubauen.Da sehe
ich sofort ein, dass sie in ihr kontradiktorisches
Gegenteilbergeht. Depositum heisst: Die Anlage eines
Wertgegenstandes,mit der ausdrcklichen Bedingung der Rckerstattung
desselben.Das aus der Verallgemeinerung meiner Maxime
hervorgegangeneGesetz wrde also lauten: Der Gegenstand, der
zurckgegebenwerden soll, soll nicht zurckgegeben werden. Meine
Maximetaugt also offenbar nicht fr ein allgemeines Gesetz und ist
somitunmoralisch. Wir haben hier mit reinen Begriffen operiert,
dieErfahrung gar nicht zu Hilfe genommen, und die Formel hat
sichdoch als zuverlssig erwiesen" >).
I cannot agree with Dr. Thon. I do not believe that Kantintended
to modify the principle in his later work in the mannerindicated by
Dr. Thon, but simply to state it raore coucisely andaccurately. I
see no , great difference between the examples of
*) pp. 63-64.
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44 F. Thi l ly ,
t ho applicatiou of this principlc, s given, say, ou pages
137,150 f., and 192, of Kosenkmnz's edition of the K r i t i k derp
r a k t i s c h e n V e r n u n f t , and the corresponding
examples inthe earlier work. Thns Kant says on page 159: Eben so
wirddie Maxime, die ich in Ansehung der freien Disposition ber
meinLeben nehme, sofort bestimmt, wenn ich mich frage, wie sie
seinmsste, damit sich eine Natur nach einem Gesetze derselben
er-halte. Offenbar wrde Niemand in einer solchen Natur sein Lebenw
i l l k r l i c h endigen knnen, denn eine solche Verfassung
wrdekeine bleibende Naturordnung sein, und so in allen brigen
Fllen".He likewise says in connection with the deposit-example: I
amnot williug to make a general law that everyone should keep
adeposit provided it cannot be proved that such a deposit hasbeen
made. Ich werde sofort gewahr, dass ein solches Princip,als Gesetz,
sich selbst vernichten wrde, weil es machen wrde,dass es gar kein
Depositum gbe. Ein praktisches Gesetz, dasich dafr erkenne, muss
sich zur allgemeinen Gesetzgebung quali-ficieren; dies ist ein
identischer Satz und also fr sich klar. Sageich nun, mein Wille-
steht unter einem praktischen Gese tze , sokann ich nicht meine
Neigung (z. B. im gegenwrtigen Falle meineHabsucht) als den zu
einem allgemeinen praktischen Gesetzeschicklichen Bestimmungsgrund
desselben anfhren: denn diese,\veit gefehlt, dass sie zu einer
allgemeinen Gesetzgebung tauglichsein sollte, so muss sie vielmehr
in der Form eines allgemeinenGesetzes sich selbst aufreiben. Denn
da sonst ein allgemeinesNaturgesetz Alles einstimmig macht, so wrde
hier, wenn man derMaxime die Allgemeinheit eines Gesetzes geben
wollte, gerade dasusserste Widerspiel der Einstimmung, der rgste
Widerstreit unddie gnzliche Vernichtung der Maxime selbst und ihrer
Absichterfolgen. Denn der Wille hat alsdann nicht ein und dasselbe
Ob-jekt, sondern ein Jeder hat das. seinige (sein eignes
Wohlbefinden),welches sich zwar zuflligerweise auch mit Anderer
ihren Ab-sichten, die sie gleichfalls auf sich selbst richten,
vertragen kann,aber lange nicht zum Gesetze hinreichend ist, weil
die Ausnahmen,die man gelegentlich zu machen befugt ist, endlos
sind, und garnicht bestimmt in eine allgemeine Kegel befasst werden
knnen".
I do not see that there would be any logicl contradictionin
keeping a deposit, s Dr, Thon asserts. Suppose we define adeposit s
something which is given one man by another withthe understanding
that it be returned. Now suppose I refuse to
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Kant ana Teleologicai Ethics. 45
return a deposit. I ask myself: What if everybody refused
toreturn a deposit? Well, even if everybody should refuse to
returna deposit, a deposit would still remain a deposit. If
everybodyshould refuse to return a deposit, that would not
contradict thedefinition of a deposit by any means. A deposit would
still be adeposit. There is no logical contradiction in saying, Let
everyonerefuse to return what he promised to return. Failure to
returndeposits, can become a universal law without violating the
logicalprinciple of contradiction, but it cannot become a law
withoutdefeating its own purpose and making social life impossible.
Ifno one ever returned a deposit, no one would ever inake one,
noone would trust any one eise, and the ideal, the kingdom of
ends,would not be realized. Heiice why not keep deposits? Becauseof
the effect which failure to restore his rightful property to
anowner would tend to produce.
Kant's standpoint may safely be characterized s teleological.The
difference between his theory and that of the modern teleo-logical
moralist is one of method. Kant attempts to follow theold
rationalistic method, to construct a logic-proof System, afterthe
manner of mathematics, to deduce from principles that areuniversal
and necessary (a priori), other truths having the sameabsolute
validity. This he is particularly anxious to do in hisethical
inquiries. He endeavors to base the truths of ethics uponan
absolutely sure foundation, a task which in his opiniom,
empi-iicism is utterly unable to perform. The moral laws must
notonly seem absolute to the common man, but must be proved tobe to
by the philosopher. In order to realize this rationalisticideal and
to deduce every possible moral truth from the conceptionof a
ratiunal being s such, Kant is, of course, compelled to givethis
conception the content \vhich he afterwards draws out of it,or to
pretend that somethiug follows from his so-called first prin-ciples
that does not follow at all. Thus the content of the cate-.gorical
imperative cannot be derived from the conception of suchan
imperative without the application of force. Nor is it possibleto
deduce from the conceptiou of a rational being \vhat its pur-pose
is, unless we first read that purpose into our definition ofsuch a
being. It is, of course, possible to define a rational beingin such
a'way s to make it the bearer of any kind and anynumber of
qualities we choose, but in any event the definitionwill ultimately
have to rest upon experience in order to have any
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46 #. ihilly, Kant and Teleological Ethic.
value at all. The modern teleogist examines the laws whichhuman
beings accept s moral and analyzes the mental states towhich they
owe their existence. By reflection upon experiencehe hopes to reach
the principle or principles upon which moralityis based, and may
then attempt to deduce from these their logi-cal consequences, In
other words, he employs the methods follo-wed by all sciences, and
his results have the same value s thoseof any other brauch of
scientific knowledge, no more, no less.