Global Nuclear Expansion ~ Challenges and Opportunities~

GLOBAL NUCLEAR EXPANSION ~CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES~

Tsutomu AraiDirector, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Contents1. Introduction: Nuclear Renaissance2. Global Nuclear Expansion: Risk and Risk

ManagementNuclear SafetyNuclear SecurityNuclear Non-Proliferation/SafeguardsManagement of Radioactive Waste

3. Japan’s Nuclear Energy Diplomacy4. Conclusion

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1 Nuclear Renaissance Global competition for energy resources

Climate change concerns

World trend of introducing or expanding NPG Countries planning to introduce NPG Countries planning to expand NPG

NPG, which lowers greenhouse gas (CO2) emissions, could provide a basic source of power supply.

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1.1 Countries and regions planning to introduce NPGPoland

Georgia

Albania

Italy

Libya

Egypt

Nigeria

Ghana

Tunisia

Morocco

Belarus

Turkey

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Israel

Iran

Yemen

GCC Countries（ UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia)

United Arab Emirates

Bangladesh

Chile

Indonesia

Malaysia

Venezuela

Philippine

Thailand

Vietnam

Mongolia

Singapore

Algeria

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1.2 Countries and regions planning to expand NPG

United Kingdom

Ukraine

Switzerland

Spain

Sweden　　Czech

Germany

Netherlands

Belgium

France

Slovenia

Hungary

Rumania

Bulgaria

Finland

Slovakia

Lithuania

South Africa

Russia

Canada

Japan

South Korea

China

Argentina

Brazil

Pakistan

India

Taiwan

Mexico

Armenia

United States

Reference: World Nuclear Association web siteURL http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/ractors.html

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2. Global Nuclear Expansion: Risk and Risk Management

Nuclear safety prevention of accidents A large scale accident in one country could have negative impact on

peaceful uses of nuclear energy in other countries.

Nuclear security counter-terrorism measures Should nuclear terrorism happen, the global trend of nuclear renaissance

could be reversed.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation/Safeguards prevention of diversion of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, etc.

Compatibility of nuclear power utilization with non-proliferation requirementsGlobal efforts are required for ensuring nuclear

non-proliferation/safeguards, safety and security6

2.1 Nuclear Safety : Challenges Continued operation of old-type reactors

Safety of nuclear reactors has been improved since large accidents. (ex.) Three Mile Island accident (1979), Chernobyl

accident (1986)

Human resources development Countries introducing NPG should develop their human

resources in the field of regulation as well as operation. Countries expanding NPG should develop additional human

resources and maintain nuclear safety culture.

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2.1 Nuclear Safety : International Efforts International conventions (ex.) Nuclear Safety Convention, RadWaste Safety Convention

IAEA activities Development of Nuclear Safety Standards Conduct of peer reviews ANSN (Asian Nuclear Safety Network)

Bilateral cooperation (ex.) Japan conducts bilateral cooperation between regulatory authorities of ROK,

China, US, etc.

Non-governmental cooperation WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators)

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2.2 Nuclear Security: Challenges Threat of nuclear terrorism

Nuclear power plants Theft of nuclear material for malicious

acts, sabotage of facilities, etc.

Radioactive sources utilizationtheft of radioactive sources for malicious acts (ex. “dirty bomb”)

International community has taken various measures to address threats of nuclear terrorism.

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2.2 Nuclear Security Security issues

Security of nuclear material • Importance of physical protection of nuclear

material both at facilities and during transport

• IAEA illicit trafficking data base (ITDB) 15 incidents ---unauthorized possession and

related criminal activities involving HEU and plutonium (during1993-2008)

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2.2 Security of Radioactive Sources Need to secure radioactive sources (Co60, Cs137, etc.)

Radioactive sources are applied in various fields (medicine, industry, agriculture, etc.)

Relatively easy access to radioactive sources (ex. hospitals)

International documents IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive

Sources (2003) IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive

Sources (2004) IAEA Recommendation on Security of Radioactive Sources

and Related Facilities (to be published) The Communiqué of Nuclear Security Summit (2010) also

refers to the security of radioactive substances 11

2.2 Nuclear Security: International Efforts International Conventions

Nuclear Terrorism Convention Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

and its Amendment IAEA guidelines and documents

INFCIRC/225 (Rev.5 will be published by the end of this year), other Nuclear Security Series documents

International efforts to improve capabilities IAEA supports (through its Nuclear Security Fund),

GICNT(Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism),G8 Global Partnership, GTRI (Global Threat Reduction Initiative), etc.

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2.2 Nuclear Security Summit Background: Need to strengthen nuclear security worldwide

Collect political will to address nuclear security at the highest level

Participants: 47 countries and 3 international organizations (UN, IAEA and EU)

Outcomes: Share of the goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years,

adoption of the Communiqué and Work Plan

Next Summit: 2012, In Seoul

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2.2 Nuclear Security Summit: Outcomes Full implementation of all existing efforts (implementation of

relative conventions, GICNT, G8GP) Support of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, Convention on

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment Minimization of use of HEU where technically and

economically feasible Emphasis on the important role of the IAEA Cooperation for prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear

material Importance of the role of industry, promotion of nuclear

security culture WINS(World Institute for Nuclear Security) Security of radioactive substances Japan will start the radioactive source registration

system from January 2011. 14

Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit

Nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials. In addition to our shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we also all share the objective of nuclear security. Therefore those gathered here in Washington, D.C. on April 13, 2010, commit to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Success will require responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation.

We welcome and join President Obama’s call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, as we work together to enhance nuclear security.

Therefore, we:

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Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit1. Reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of States, consistent with their

respective international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control; to prevent non-state actors from obtaining the information or technology required to use such material for malicious purposes; and emphasize the importance of robust national legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security;

2. Call on States to work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as necessary;

3. Recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautions and agree to promote measures to secure, account for, and consolidate these materials, as appropriate; and encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel and minimization of use of highly enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible;

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Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit4. Endeavor to fully implement all existing nuclear security commitments and

work toward acceding to those not yet joined, consistent with national laws, policies and procedures;

5. Support the objectives of international nuclear security instruments, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as essential elements of the global nuclear security architecture;

6. Reaffirm the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the international nuclear security framework and will work to ensure that it continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities in accordance with its Statute, relevant General Conference resolutions and its Nuclear Security Plans;

7. Recognize the role and contributions of the United Nations as well as the contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G-8-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction within their respective mandates and memberships; 17

Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit8. Acknowledge the need for capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation at

bilateral, regional and multilateral levels for the promotion of nuclear security culture through technology development, human resource development, education, and training; and stress the importance of optimizing international cooperation and coordination of assistance;

9. Recognize the need for cooperation among States to effectively prevent and

respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking; and agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement, and the development of new technologies;

10. Recognize the continuing role of nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and will work with industry to ensure the necessary priority of physical protection, material accountancy, and security culture;

11. Support the implementation of strong nuclear security practices that will not infringe upon the rights of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technology and will facilitate international cooperation in the field of nuclear security; and

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Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit

12. Recognize that measures contributing to nuclear material security have value in relation to the security of radioactive substances and encourage efforts to secure those materials as well.

Maintaining effective nuclear security will require continuous national efforts facilitated by international cooperation and undertaken on a voluntary basis by States. We will promote the strengthening of global nuclear security through dialogue and cooperation with all states.

Thus, we issue the Work Plan as guidance for national and international action including through cooperation within the context of relevant international fora and organizations. We will hold the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Republic of Korea in 2012.

April 13, 2010 19

2.3 Nuclear Nonproliferation Light water reactors (using LEU) will be mainly deployed in

countries introducing NPG

Nonproliferation issues Prevention of spread of sensitive technologies/equipment (ex) enrichment and reprocessing technology

Strengthening of the IAEA safeguards Increase of facilities to be covered by the IAEA safeguards

Need to address budget increase and to enhance effectiveness of safeguard activities

Contribution of the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) through the improvement and strengthening of international export controls of

nuclear-related materials, equipment and technologies.

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2.4 Management of Radioactive Waste Global nuclear expansion Increase of

spent fuel and radioactive waste worldwide Radioactive waste disposal

Technical issue (ensuring safety and security) Financial issue (cost to process and dispose) Public acceptance (ex.) Interim storage of HLW at Rokkasho,

Aomori Pref. in Japan

Public acceptance is a common problem for all countries utilizing NPG.

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3.1 Japan’s Domestic Nuclear Energy Activities: General

Starting the operation of the first nuclear power plant in 1966, and adding the capacity continuously.

10 electric power companies are now operating 54 LWRs (30 BWRs and 24 PWRs) that supply about 30% of electricity.

2 units are under construction and 12 units are in preparation.

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3.2 Japan’s Domestic Nuclear Energy Activities: Ensuring 3S

Non-Proliferation/Safeguards Conclusion of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and

its Additional Protocol The Integrated Safeguards have been applied since 2004.

Nuclear SafetyConcluding all international conventions related to nuclear safetySharing experience and lessons learned from the earthquake in

Niigata Pref. in 2007 Nuclear Security

Conclusion of Nuclear Terrorism Convention and Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 Implementation of CoC, Import-Export Guidance

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3.3 Japan’s Nuclear Energy Diplomacy: Bilateral Agreements

Ensuring 3S (nuclear Non-Proliferation/Safeguards, Safety and Security) including conclusion of Additional Protocol

Other factors Prospect for concrete plan to introduce NPG, general

bilateral relations (including economic relations)

Additional ProtocolStrengthening the safeguards system, in particular the

Agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities in States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.

Verifying not only the correctness of States’ declarations of nuclear material, but also their completeness (i.e. the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities).

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3.3 Japan’s Nuclear Energy Diplomacy: Basic Elements of Bilateral Agreements

Peaceful use Non-Proliferation/Safeguards Nuclear safety Physical protection / nuclear security Control on transfer to third countries　　 +α

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3.3 Japan’s Nuclear Energy Diplomacy: Status of Japan’s Bilateral Agreements

Concluded: 6 countries and 1 international organization Australia, Canada, China, France, UK, US, Euratom

Signed: 3 countries Russia, Kazakhstan, Jordan

Agreed on substance: 3 countries UAE, Vietnam, South Korea

In negotiation: 2 countries South Africa, India

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Conclusion Taking measures for ensuring non-proliferation/

safeguards, safety and security by each country using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

International efforts are required to address common challenges, including international cooperation in capacity building for countries introducing NPG

Development of proliferation-resistance technology as a long-term goal

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Thank you!