German Tactics

8/13/2019 German Tactics

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Section I. GENERAL TACTICAL DOCTRINES.

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar!#

O$$icially released $rom restricted status by t%e U.S. &rmy 'enter For Military History.

1. BASIC DOCTRINES.

&n outstandin c%aracteristic o$ t%e German nation is its $ondness $or e)eryt%in connected *it%

militarism. +%is is based not only on traditional sentiment but also on lon,rane and intense

education t%at lori$ies t%e military spirit. +%is i)es t%e German military leaders t%e essential

$oundation $or aressi)e military operations.

+%e Germans belie)e t%at only t%e o$$ensi)e can ac%ie)e success on t%e $ield- particularly *%en

combined *it% t%e element o$ surprise. German military literature- $or t%e past century- %as

emp%asied t%e need $or aressi)eness in all military operations.

+%e Germans %a)e been t%orou%ly a*are o$ t%e psyc%oloical component in *ar$are and %a)e

de)eloped systematic terroriation to a %i% deree.

&t t%e same time t%ey %a)e placed considerable reliance on no)el and sensational *eapons suc% as

t%e mass use o$ armor- t%e robot bomb- and t%e super,%ea)y tank. +%eir principal *eaknesses in t%is

reard %a)e been t%eir $ailure to interate t%ese ne* tec%ni/ues *it% establis%ed arms and tactics ,

German $ield artillery- $or e0ample- did not maintain pace *it% German armor , and t%eir de)otion

to automatic *eapons at t%e e0pense o$ accuracy.

& %i%ly trained o$$icer corps and a t%orou%ly disciplined army are t%e necessary elements to

implement t%is aressi)e p%ilosop%y. German tactical doctrines stress t%e responsibility and t%einitiati)e o$ subordinates. +%e belie$ o$ $ormer years t%at t%e German army *as in$le0ible and

lackin in initiati)e %as been completely destroyed in t%is *ar- in *%ic% aressi)e and darin

leaders%ip %as been responsible $or many bold decisions. 1et- *%ile t%e Germans %a)e many

e0cellent tacticians- t%ey tend to repeat t%e same type o$ maneu)ers- a $act *%ic% %as been $ully

e0ploited by &llied commanders.

+%e German specialiation in particular types o$ *ar$are suc% as mountain- desert- *inter- or t%e

attack on $orti$ied positions- s%o*ed t%orou% preparation and inenuity. &t t%e same time- t%e

Germans %ad been /uite *illin to learn $rom t%eir opponents and on numerous occasions %a)e

copied &llied tactics and *eapons.

2. RECENT TACTICAL TRENDS

From t%e time *%en t%e German &rmy *as $orced on t%e de$ensi)e by t%e &llied armies- German

tactical doctrines %a)e underone modi$ications suc% as renunciation (e0cept in unstated instances#

o$ air support- and t%e substitution o$ linear de$ense $or elastic o$$ensi)e de$ense.

+%e primary oal o$ Germany today is to ain time and to ac%ie)e )ictory in a political sense- since

t%e Germans are no loner capable o$ a military )ictory. O$ necessity t%eir military operations no*

supplement t%is e$$ort and %a)e become a lare,scale delayin action.

3. EXERCISE OF COMMAND


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+%e U.S. and German doctrines applied in e0ercise o$ t%e command are )irtually identical. +%e

Germans stress t%e necessity o$ t%e sta$$ in assistin t%e commander to e)aluate t%e situation and in

preparin and disseminatin orders to t%e lo*er units. +%ey emp%asie t%at t%e commander s%ould

be *ell $or*ard *it% %is units not only $or t%e purpose o$ $acilitatin communication- but also

because %is presence %as a salutary e$$ect on t%e troops.

Section II. RECONNAISSANCE



a: PURPOSE.

+%e purpose o$ reconnaissance and t%ey types o$ units employed to obtain in$ormation are similar in

t%e U.S. and t%e German &rmies. German tactical principles o$ reconnaissance- %o*e)er- di)ere

some*%at $rom t%ose o$ t%e U.S. +%e Germans stress aressi)eness- attempt to obtain superiority

in t%e area to be reconnoitered- and stri)e $or continuous obser)ation o$ t%e enemy. +%ey belie)e in

employin reconnaissance units in $orce as a rule. +%ey e0pect and are prepared to $i%t to obtain

t%e desired in$ormation. O$ten t%ey assin supplementary tasks to t%eir reconnaissance units- suc%

as sabotae be%ind enemy lines- %arassment- or counter, reconnaissance.

. TEC!NI"UE.

Only enou% reconnaissance troops are sent on a mission to assure superiority in t%e area to be

reconnoitered. 2eser)es are kept on %and to be committed *%en t%e reconnaissance must be

intensi$ied- *%en t%e oriinal $orce meets stron enemy opposition- or *%en t%e direction and area

to be reconnoitered are c%aned. +%e Germans encourae aressi)e action aainst enemy security

$orces. W%en t%eir reconnaissance units meet superior $orces- t%ey $i%t a delayin action *%ile

ot%er units attempt to $lank t%e enemy.

c. CLASSIFICATION.

2econnaissance is classi$ied by t%e Germans as operational- tactical- and battle reconnaissance ,correspondin to t%e U.S. distant- close- and battle reconnaissance.

2. OPERATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE #O$e%ati&e A'()*a%'n+,

Operational reconnaissance- penetratin o)er a lare area in reat dept%- pro)ides t%e basis $or

strateic plannin and action. +%is type o$ reconnaissance is intended to determine t%e location and

acti)ities o$ enemy $orces- particularly localities o$ rail concentrations- $or*ard or rear*ard

displacements o$ personnel- loadin or unloadin areas o$ army elements- t%e construction o$ $ield

or permanent $orti$ications- and %ostile air $orce concentrations. 3denti$ication o$ lare enemy

motoried elements- especially on an open $lank- is important. Operational reconnaissance is carried

out by t%e &ir Force and by motoried units. &erial p%otorap%y units operate at altitudes o$ 45-66

to 75-66 $eet. Since missions assined to operational air reconnaissance are enerally limited to t%e


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obser)ation o$ important roads and railroads- reconnaissance sectors and areas normally are not

assined. +%e motoried units employed $or operational reconnaissance %a)e only directions and

ob8ecti)es assined.

3. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE #Ta)ti-ce A'()*a%'n+,

a. PURPOSE

+actical reconnaissance- carried out in t%e area be%ind t%e operational reconnaissance- pro)ides t%e

basis $or t%e commitment o$ troops. 3ts mission embraces identi$ication o$ t%e enemys oraniation-

disposition- strent%- and antiaircra$t de$ense9 determination o$ t%e enemys rein$orcement

capabilities9 and terrain reconnaissance o$ ad)ance sectors. &ir Force reconnaissance units and

motoried and mounted reconnaissance battalions are employed $or tactical reconnaissance. +%eir

direction and radius o$ employment are based upon t%e results o$ t%e operational reconnaissance.

. AIR RECONNAISSANCE.

+actical air reconnaissance is normally made $rom altitudes o$ 5-66 to 45-666 $eet. &s a rule- air

reconnaissance units are assined speci$ic reconnaissance areas- t%e boundaries o$ *%ic% normally

do not coincide *it% sectors assined to round units. 2econnaissance planes enerally are

employed sinly.

c. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE.

Sectors o$ responsibility are assined to round tactical reconnaissance battalions. 3n order to make

t%em independent or to $acilitate t%eir c%ane o$ direction- battalions may be assined only

reconnaissance ob8ecti)es. 3n suc% instances- boundary lines separate ad8acent units. +%e Germans

a)oid usin main roads as boundary lines- de$inin t%e sectors in suc% a *ay t%at main roads $all

*it%in t%e reconnaissance sectors. +%e *idt% o$ a sector is determined by t%e situation- t%e type and

strent% o$ t%e reconnaissance battalion- t%e road net- and t%e terrain. 3n eneral- t%e *idt% o$ a

sector assined to a motoried reconnaissance battalion does not e0ceed 6 miles.

/. ORDERS FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE.

Orders issued to a reconnaissance battalion or its patrols normally contain- in addition to t%emission- t%e $ollo*in:

(4# ;ine o$ departure

(7# 3n$ormation concernin ad8acent reconnaissance units

(# Sector boundaries or direction o$ operation.

(!# Ob8ecti)es.

(# # 3nstructions reardin air,round liaison.

(?# +ime o$ departure- route- and ob8ecti)e o$ t%e main $orce.


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e. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE PROCEDURES.

W%en a motoried reconnaissance column e0pects contact *it% t%e enemy- it ad)ances by leaps and

bounds. +%e lent% o$ bounds depends on t%e co)er t%e terrain o$$ers as *ell as on t%e road net. &s

t%e distance $rom t%e enemy decreases- t%e bounds are s%ortened. +%e Germans utilie roads as lon

as possible and usually use di$$erent routes $or t%e ad)ance and t%e return.

+%e reconnaissance battalion commander normally sends out patrols *%ic% ad)ance by bounds.

+%eir distance in $ront o$ t%e battalion depends on t%e situation- t%e terrain- and t%e rane o$ t%e

sinal e/uipment- but as a rule t%ey are not more t%an an %ours tra)elin distance (about 7 miles#

a%ead o$ t%e battalion. +%e battalion ser)es as t%e reser)e $or t%e patrols and as an ad)ance messae

center (Meldekop$#- collectin t%e messaes and relayin t%em to t%e rear. &rmored reconnaissance

cars- armored %al$,tracks- or motorcycles compose t%e motoried reconnaissance patrols- *%ose

e0act composition depends on t%eir mission and on t%e situation. Motorcycles are used to $ill in

aps and inter)als- t%ereby t%ickenin t%e reconnaissance net.

W%en t%e pro0imity o$ t%e enemy does not permit pro$itable employment o$ t%e motoriedreconnaissance battalion- it is *it%dra*n and t%e motoried elements o$ t%e di)isional

reconnaissance battalion take o)er.

Di)isional reconnaissance battalions seldom operate more t%an one days marc% (4> miles# in $ront

o$ t%e di)ision- co)erin an area appro0imately 5 miles *ide.

0. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE. #Ge(ect-a'()*a%'n+,

a. GENERAL

@attle reconnaissance as a rule is beun *%en t%e opposin $orces bein to deploy. &ll troops

participatin in battle carry out battle reconnaissance t%rou% patrols- artillery obser)ation posts-

obser)ation battalions- and air reconnaissance units. +%e in$ormation obtained on t%e oraniation

and strent% o$ t%e enemy pro)ides t%e basis $or t%e conduct o$ t%e battle.

. ARMORED CAR PATROLS.

+%e


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enemy positions.

&t road blocks- t%e leadin car opens $ire. 3$ $ire is not returned- men dismount and o $or*ard to

attac% to* ropes to t%e road block. 3$ necessary- t%e patrol dismounts and proceeds *it% mac%ine

uns to reconnoiter on $oot.

& patrol is ne)er split up- but in open country distances bet*een cars may be as muc% as 766 to 66yards.

c. OBSERATION BATTALION AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE.

+%e German obser)ation battalion locates enemy artillery and %ea)y *eapons positions by sound

and $las% ranin and e)aluated aerial p%otorap%s. +%e &ir Force assists in battalion

reconnaissance by obser)in t%e distribution o$ t%e enemys $orces- %is artillery- bi)ouac and

mo)ements- reser)es- tank assemblies- and any ot%er special occurrences be%ind t%e $ront. 3n

eneral- air battle reconnaissance is e0ecuted under 5-666 $eet.

/. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS #S$at%'$$en,

+%e Germans send out reconnaissance patrols consistin o$ a noncommissioned o$$icer and t%ree or

$our men- to et suc% in$ormation as t%e location o$ enemy positions and mine$ields. +%ey enerally

a)oid contact and retreat *%en $ired on.

e. COMBAT PATROLS #Ge(ect--$at%'$$en o% St%o--t%'$$en,

+%ese consist o$ at least one noncommissioned o$$icer and ei%t men- but are usually stroner. &s a

rule- t%e combat patrol is commanded by a sereant *%o %as under %im 4 to 76 men- oranied in

t*o e/ual sections- eac% commanded by a section leader. +%ese are raidin patrols- and t%eir

mission o$ten includes brinin back prisoners o$ *ar. Since &llied air supremacy %as neutralied

German air reconnaissance to a reat e0tent- t%e Germans %a)e placed increased importance on

prisoners o$ *ar- especially o$$icers- as a source o$ in$ormation on enemy strent%- dispositions- and

intentions.

'ombat or ot%er types o$ patrols are o$ten sent out to test t%e strent% o$ enemy outposts. 3$ an

outpost pro)es to be *eakly %eld- t%e patrol attacks- occupies t%e position- and remains t%ere until

relie)ed by troops $rom t%e rear. 3$ t%e patrol is stronly arrisoned- t%e patrol attempts to return*it% a prisoner o$ *ar.

(. SPECIAL PATROLS #S$at%'$$en it e-on/e%en A'(+aen,

+%ese )ary in strent% in accordance *it% t%eir special mission. Special patrols are sent to carry out

suc% tasks as demolitions- enain o$ enemy patrols t%at %a)e penetrated German positions- and

ambus%in enemy supply columns.

+. MISCELLANEOUS RECONNAISSANCE.

Bnineer patrols are employed to reconnoiter approac%es to $orti$ied areas- de$iles- or ri)ers.


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&rtillery patrols- usually consistin o$ an o$$icer and a $e* mounted men- reconnoiter routes o$

approac%- obser)ation posts- and $irin positions.

. TERRAIN RECONNAISSANCE. #Ge*an/ee%)'n/'n+,

+%e Germans place reat emp%asis on terrain reconnaissance- realiin t%e in$luence terrain %asupon t%e conduct o$ operations. Most o$ t%eir usual reconnaissance missions include terrain

reconnaissance tasks. +errain may be so important at times as to re/uire reconnaissance by special

units. Ground and air reconnaissance units i)e special attention to t%e road net , its density-

condition- road blocks- mines- and demolition , as *ell to t%e terrain itsel$- particularly tank country.

i. E"UIPMENT AND SUPPORT.

+%e Germans e/uip t%eir round battle,reconnaissance patrols *it% mac%ine pistols and one or t*o

li%t mac%ine uns t%at are used to co)er t%e patrols approac% or *it%dra*al. Bnineers o$ten areattac%ed to uide a patrol t%rou% German mine$ields and to clear a *ay t%rou% enemy *ire or

mines. &rtillery support is i)en in t%e $orm o$ %arassin $ire put do*n 8ust be$ore t%e patrol reac%es

its ob8ecti)e. Sometimes t%e artillery $ires into ad8acent sectors to mislead t%e enemy as to t%e actual

area to be reconnoitered. 3n ot%er instances- artillery and mortars t%at %a)e reistered durin t%e

pre)ious day s%ell durin t%e ni%t t%e area to be reconnoitered. &s soon as t%e barrae is li$ted- t%e

patrol ad)ances under co)er o$ mac%ine,un $ire $rom $lankin positions.

SECTION III. MARC!ES



1. GENERAL

+%e $ormations and t%e oraniations o$ t%e marc% column in day or ni%t ad)ances are t%e same in

t%e German &rmy as in t%e U.S. &rmy and are o)erned by t%e same principles. $or a smoot%

$unctionin o$ t%e marc% t%e Germans stress: systematic trainin and practice9 attention to p%ysical*el$are9 care o$ )e%icles and e/uipment9 pre)ious reconnaissance o$ routes9 *arnin orders9 and t%e

issue o$ detailed marc% orders.

2. ORGANIATION AND CONTROL OF T!E MARC! COLUMN

3n order to secure t%e marc% column aainst enemy attacks- t%e Germans di)ide t%e column in t%e

same manner as U.S. doctrine prescribes- namely into &d)ance Guard (Cor%ut#- Main @ody (Gros#-

and 2ear Guard (ac%%ut#. German e/ui)alents $or t%e U.S. terms are:

&DC&'B GU&2DSpite ,


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Cortrupp , Support

Haupttrupp , 2eser)e

2B&2 GU&2D

ac%spite , 2ear


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columns. Ho*e)er- a smaller unit- suc% as a battalion- may ad)ance *it%out security detac%ments.

+%e Germans are )ery muc% concerned about antiaircra$t protecti)e measures and o$ten marc% in

open columns (Flieermarsc%tie$e#9 an ad)ance in deployed $ormation (Flieermarsc%breite# is

seldom practical. &ntiaircra$t de$ense is concentrated at important terrain $eatures- suc% as brides-

crossroads- and de$iles. @ecause o$ &llied air supremacy t%e Germans no* instruct t%eir troops to

conduct mo)ements and t%e transport o$ supplies only at ni%t- and *it%out li%ts. +%ey also ordert%eir troops to lea)e burned out )e%icles standin on t%e road to attract $res% attacks by enemy

aircra$t.


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SECTION I. OFFENSIE



1. GENERAL

+%e $undamental principle o$ German o$$ensi)e doctrine is to encircle and destroy t%e enemy. +%e

ob8ecti)e o$ t%e combined arms in attack is to brin t%e armored $orces and t%e in$antry into

decisi)e action aainst t%e enemy *it% su$$icient $ire po*er and s%ock. Superiority in $orce and $ire

po*er- t%e employment o$ armored $orces- as *ell as t%e surprise element- play a reat part in t%e

o$$ensi)e.

'oordination bet*een t%e combined arms under a stron uni$ied command is- t%e Germans

emp%asie- an absolute re/uisite to t%e success o$ t%ese s%ock tactics. +%is %as become more and

more true as t%e &llies %a)e de)eloped e$$ecti)e antitank *eapons and %a)e adopted deeper

de$enses- limitin t%e sel$,su$$iciency o$ German tanks. +o counter t%ese measures- t%e Germans%a)e increased t%e mobility and armor protection o$ t%eir motor,borne in$antry- and %a)e mounted a

lare proportion o$ bot% t%eir direct and indirect %ea)y support *eapons on sel$, propelled

carriaes.

3n attemptin t%orou%ly to paralye t%e de$ender up to t%e moment o$ t%e tank,in$antry assault- t%e

Germans realie t%at e)en t%e most $ormidable $orces are ne)er su$$icient $or o)er*%elmin

superiority on t%e entire $ront. +%ey t%ere$ore select a point o$ main e$$ort (Sc%*erpunkt# $or a

breakt%rou%- allottin narro* sectors o$ attack (Ge$ec%tsstrei$en# to t%e troops committed at t%e

decisi)e locality. +%ere t%ey also mass t%e bulk o$ t%eir %ea)y *eapons and reser)es. +%e ot%er

sectors o$ t%e $ront are enaed by *eaker- di)ersionary $orces. 3n selectin t%e point o$ main e$$ort-

t%e Germans consider *eaknesses in t%e enemys de$ensi)e position9 suitability o$ t%e terrain-especially $or tanks and $or cooperation o$ all arms9 approac% routes9 and possibilities $or

supportin $ire- especially artillery. &lt%ou% t%e Germans select a point o$ main e$$ort in all

attacks- t%ey usually also make plans $or s%i$tin t%eir main e$$ort i$ t%ey meet une0pected success

else*%ere. +o allo* suc% s%i$ts- su$$icient reser)es and a stron- uni$ied command are oranied.

&n attack alon a narro* $ront- accordin to German doctrine- must %a)e su$$icient $orces at its

disposal to *iden t%e penetration *%ile maintainin its impetus- and to protect t%e $lanks o$ t%e

penetration. Once t%e attack is launc%ed- it must dri)e strai%t to its ob8ecti)e- reardless o$

opposition.

2. T4PES OF ATTAC5

a. FLAN5 ATTAC5 #F*an)enan+%i((,

+%e Germans consider t%at t%e most e$$ecti)e attack is aainst t%e enemys $lank. +%e $lank attack

de)elops eit%er $rom t%e approac% marc% , sometimes t%rou% a turnin mo)ement , or $rom $lank

marc%es. 3t attempts to surprise t%e enemy and permit %im no time $or countermeasures. Since

mobility and t%e deception o$ t%e enemy at ot%er positions are re/uired- t%e $lank attack is most

success$ully mounted $rom a distance9 t%e troop mo)ements necessary $or t%e maneu)er can be

e0ecuted in close pro0imity to t%e enemy only *it% unusually $a)orable terrain or at ni%t. &ttacksare launc%ed on bot% $lanks only *%en t%e Germans consider t%eir $orces clearly superior.


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. ENELOPMENT #U(a--'n+-an+%i((,

+%e en)elopment is a combination $lank,and,$rontal attack especially $a)ored by t%e Germans. +%e

en)elopment may be directed on eit%er or bot% t%e enemys $lanks- and is accompanied by a

simultaneous $rontal attack to $i0 t%e enemys $orces. +%e deeper t%e en)elopment oes into t%e

enemys $lanks- t%e reater t%e daner o$ bein en)eloped onesel$. +%e Germans t%ere$oreemp%asie t%e necessity o$ stron reser)es and oraniation o$ t%e en)elopin $orces in dept%.

Success o$ t%e en)elopment depends on t%e e0tent to *%ic% t%e enemy is able to dispose %is $orces

in t%e t%reatened direction.

c. ENCIRCLEMENT #Ein)%ei-'n+,.

&n encirclement- t%e Germans t%ink- is a particularly decisi)e $orm o$ attack- but usually more

di$$icult to e0ecute t%an a $lank attack or an en)elopment. 3n an encirclement- t%e enemy is not

attacked at all in $ront- or is attacked in $ront only by li%t $orces- *%ile t%e main attackin $orce

passes entirely around %im- *it% t%e ob8ecti)e o$ maneu)erin %im out o$ position. +%is re/uirese0treme mobility and deception.

/. FRONTAL ATTAC5 #F%onta*an+%i((,.

+%e Germans consider t%e $rontal attack t%e most di$$icult o$ e0ecution. 3t strikes t%e enemy at %is

stronest point- and t%ere$ore re/uires superiority o$ men and materiel. & $rontal attack s%ould be

made only at a point *%ere t%e in$antry can break t%rou% into $a)orable terrain in t%e dept% o$ t%e

enemy position. +%e $rontae o$ t%e attack s%ould be *ider t%an t%e actual area (Sc%*erpunkt#

c%osen $or penetration- in order to tie do*n t%e enemy on t%e $lanks o$ t%e breakt%rou%. &de/uate

reser)es must be %eld ready to counter t%e employment o$ t%e enemys reser)es.

e. 6ING ATTAC5 #F*'+e*an+%i((,

&n attack directed at one or bot% o$ t%e enemys *ins %as- t%e Germans teac%- a better c%ance o$

success t%an a central $rontal attack- since only a part o$ t%e enemys *eapons are $aced- and only

one $lank o$ t%e attackin $orce or $orces is e0posed to enemy $ire. @endin back one *in may

i)e an opportunity $or a $lank attack- or $or a sinle or double en)elopment.

(. PENETRATION #Ein%'c, AND BREA5T!ROUG! #D'%c%'c,

+%ese are not separate $orms o$ attack- but rat%er t%e e0ploitation o$ a success$ul attack on t%e

enemys $ront- *in- or $lank. +%e penetration destroys t%e continuity o$ t%e %ostile $ront. +%e

broader t%e penetration- t%e deeper can t%e penetration *ede be dri)en. Stron reser)es t%ro* back

enemy counterattacks aainst t%e $lanks o$ t%e penetration German units are trained to e0ploit a

penetration to t%e ma0imum so t%at it may de)elop into a complete breakt%rou% be$ore %ostile

countermeasures can be launc%ed on an e$$ecti)e scale. +%e deeper t%e attacker penetrates- t%e more

e$$ecti)ely can %e en)elop and $rustrate t%e attempts o$ t%e enemy to close %is $ront aain by

*it%dra*al to t%e rear. +%e attackin $orces attempt to reduce indi)idual enemy positions by

encirclin and isolatin t%em. +%e Germans do not consider a breakt%rou% success$ul until t%eyo)ercome t%e enemys artillery positions- *%ic% usually is t%e special task o$ tanks. 2eser)e units

roll up t%e enemys $ront $rom t%e ne*ly created $lanks. +%e Germans o$ten re$er to t%is maneu)er


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as "eil und essel".

3. ORGANIATION OF T!E ATTAC5

a. ATTAC5 ORDER.

+%e attack order (&nri$$sbe$e%l# enerally contains t%e ob8ecti)e o$ t%e attack- t%e disposition o$

t%e in$antry- unit sectors and boundaries- disposition and support missions o$ t%e artillery- location

o$ reser)es- and t%e time o$ attack. +%e order is not dra*n up in accordance *it% any stereotyped

$orm- but as a rule $ollo*s t%is pattern:

(4# Bstimate o$ t%e situation (disposition o$ %ostile and $riendly troops#

(7# Mission.

(# &ssembly areas $or t%e $or*ard companies9 ob8ecti)e9 sector boundaries9 orders $or t%e

continuation o$ combat reconnaissance.

(!# 3nstructions $or t%e preparation o$ t%e %ea)y,*eapons $ire support- especially $or massed $ire.

(# Orders to t%e artillery $or $ire preparation and coordination.(5# &ssembly areas $or t%e reser)es.

(=# +ime o$ attack.

(># 3nstructions $or rear ser)ices (medial ser)ice and supplies#.

(?# ;ocation o$ command posts.

(46# Miscellaneous.

. SECTORS OF ATTAC5.

+%e *idt% o$ a sector assined to an in$antry unit in t%e attack depends on t%e units mission and

battle strent%- on terrain conditions- on t%e a)ailable $ire support o$ all arms- and on t%e probable

strent% o$ enemy resistance. ormally t%e sector assined to a platoon is bet*een 45 and 776

yards. & company attack sector is about 6 to 6 yards. & battalion sector is about !!6 to 4-466

yards- *%ile a di)ision sector may be !-!66 yards to -66 yards. +%ese sectors also pro)ide t%e

boundaries $or t%e ot%er arms- especially $or t%e artillery in support o$ t%e in$antry- alt%ou% t%e

artillery may utilie $a)orable obser)ation positions in nei%borin sectors. +%is also applies to t%e

%ea)y in$antry *eapons.

For lare units t%e sectors are determined $rom t%e map9 $or smaller units- $rom t%e terrain. +%ese

sectors e0tend as deep into enemy territory as t%e plan o$ battle may re/uire. &s t%e situationde)elops- c%anes are $re/uently made. 3mportant points al*ays lie *it%in units sectors- unless t%ey

are to be attacked by se)eral units. +%e Germans do not consider it necessary to occupy t%e *%ole

*idt% o$ t%e sector *it% troops. Open $lanks ordinarily are not bounded.

c. FIRE PLAN.

Fire superiority is ac%ie)ed t%rou% coordination o$ t%e in$antry and artillery *eapons. +%e basis o$

t%e $ire plan (Feuerplan# is t%e reulation o$ t%e commitment o$ all *eapons. +%e $ire plan includes

t%e $ollo*in:

(4# &ssinment o$ combat missions.

(7# Distribution o$ obser)ation sectors and $ields o$ $ire $or t%e in$antry and t%e artillery.


12/39

(# &n estimate o$ capabilities o$ t%e artillery $or e$$ecti)e e0ecution o$ t%e combat mission.

(!# Orders $or t%e commencement o$ $ire and $ire sc%edules.

(# Orders $or t%e preparation $or massed $ire.

(5# 3nstructions $or ammunition supply.

+%e Germans stress t%e coordination o$ $lat and %i% tra8ectory *eapons so t%at all dead spaces areco)ered by $ire. ;ack o$ sinal e/uipment %o*e)er- o$ten %inders t%e application o$ t%is principle.

0. CONDUCT OF T!E ATTAC5

a. GENERAL.

Most o$ t%e German successes in t%e present *ar %a)e been ac%ie)ed *it% armored $ormations.

1ears o$ secret trainin and e/uippin *ere de)oted to t%e de)elopment o$ t%e


13/39

%o*e)er- replace t%e massed artillery $ire to a lare e0tent *it% t%e $ire o$ multi, barreled mortars

and rocket pro8ectors- t%ou% t%ese latter %a)e not t%e accuracy o$ t%e $ormer.

+%e Germans make a clear distinction bet*een an attack made $rom mo)ement and an attack $rom a

prepared position- *%ic% is t%e more common o$ t%e t*o.

: ATTAC5 B4 MEC!ANIED AND MOTORIED FORCES.

#1, T!E ATTAC5

3n armored,$orce operations- t%e Germans stress t%e need $or t%e concentrated employment- at t%e

decisi)e place and time- o$ t%e entire combined command o$ tanks and ot%er arms- less necessary

reser)es. +%e tanks constitute t%e strikin $orce o$ suc% a command and normally ad)ance as t%e

$irst ec%elon o$ t%e attack. +%eir primary mission is to break t%rou% and attack t%e enemy artillery-

rat%er t%an to seek out and destroy enemy tanks- *%ic% can be more e$$ecti)ely enaed by antitank

units. +%e mission o$ t%e ot%er arms is to assist t%e tanks in t%eir ad)ance- and particularly to

eliminated antitank *eapons. +%e smallest combat unit in suc% a $orce o$ combined arms is t%ecommune.

+%e basic $ormation $or t%e tank platoon- company- and battalion are $ile- double $ile- *ede- and

blunt *ede. +%e type o$ $ormation used $or a speci$ic task depends to a lare e0tent on terrain

conditions and t%e strent% o$ enemy opposition. & German tank platoon normally consists o$ one

command tank and t*o tank s/uads o$ t*o tanks eac%.

+%e tank reiment normally attacks in *a)es- in eit%er o$ t%e $ollo*in manners:

+%e tank reiment is ec%elon in dept%- one tank battalion $ollo*in t%e ot%er. +%e reimental

commanders location is bet*een t%e t*o battalions. +%is $ormation %as t%e ad)antaes o$ a

su$$iciently *ide $ront (about 4466 yards#- and close contact by t%e company commander o$ %is

units in t%e conduct o$ t%e attack. W%en t*o tank battalions are attackin- one be%ind t%e ot%er- it

takes t%em about %al$ an %our to pass t%eir o*n in$antry.

W%en t%e t*o,battalions,abreast $ormation is employed- it is almost essential t%at anot%er tank

reiment $orm t%e $ollo*in *a)e. +%is $ormation usually %as t%e disad)antae o$ bein too *ide.

+%e reimental commander cannot obser)e %is units- and %e %as no units o$ %is o*n be%ind %im

*%ic% %e can commit in a decisi)e moment. +%e attack normally proceeds in t%ree *a)es.

+%e $irst *a)e t%rusts to t%e enemys antitank de$ense and artillery positions.

+%e second *a)e pro)ides co)erin $ire $or t%e $irst *a)e- and t%en attacks t%e enemys in$antry

positions- preceded- accompanied- or $ollo*ed by part o$ t%e


14/39


15/39

and to increase its speed. +%e in$antry lea)es t%e )e%icles at t%e last possible moment- and oes into

action mainly *it% li%t automatic *eapons.

+%e tanks ad)ance by bounds $rom co)er to co)er- reconnoiterin t%e terrain a%ead and pro)idin

protecti)e $ire $or t%e dismounted


16/39

t%e tank unit is placed under t%e command o$ t%e tank unit commander.

+%e Germans belie)e t%at t%e artillery $ire must not c%eck t%e momentum o$ t%e attack.

'onse/uently t%e %ea)iest $ire must $all *ell a%ead o$ t%e tanks or outside t%eir sector.

+%e mission o$ t%e artillery preparation be$ore t%e attack is to destroy- or at least neutralie- t%e

opponents antitank de$ense in t%e area bet*een t%e line o$ contact and t%e reimental reser)e line.'ontinuous counterbattery $ire pre)ents t%e enemy $rom s%ellin t%e tank assembly area and $rom

breakin up t%e preparation o$ t%e tank attack.

+%e artillery %as t%e $ollo*in missions be$ore t%e tank attack:

'ounterbattery $ire on enemy artillery located in positions *%ic% command t%e round o)er *%ic%

t%e tank attack is to be made.

'oncentrations on enemy tanks in assembly areas.

Harassin $ire on all areas in *%ic% t%e antitank units are located or suspected. Fire is %ea)iest onareas in *%ic% tanks cannot operate but $rom *%ic% t%ey can be enaed e$$ecti)ely.

&d8ustin $ire *it% %i% e0plosi)es on probably enemy obser)ation posts commandin t%e sector to

be attacked. +%ese obser)ation posts are blinded *it% smoke as soon as t%e attack beins.

B0perience %as tau%t t%e Germans t%at t%e $lanks o$ a tank attack are )ulnerable. +%ere$ore t%ey

assin to t%e artillery and t%e rocket pro8ector units t%e task o$ protectin $lanks by barraes usin

%i% e0plosi)es and smoke s%ells.

+%e artillery %as t%e $ollo*in missions durin t%e tank attack:

'ounterbattery $ire.

@lindin enemy obser)ation posts.

&s t%e attack proresses- enain successi)e lines o$ antitank de$ense- especially areas to t%e rear

and $lanks o$ t%e sector attacked.

Screenin t%e $lanks o$ t%e attack *it% smoke and neutraliin t%e enemys in$antry and rear areas.

Delayin t%e mo)ement and deployment o$ enemy reser)es-- particularly tanks.

+%e Germans stress t%at t%is *ide )ariety o$ tasks must not lead to t%e *%olesale dispersal o$ e$$ort.

+%e main task o$ t%e artillery is at all times t%e destruction o$ t%e enemys antitank *eapons- tanks-

and artillery.

;iaison bet*een artillery and tanks durin t%e attack is establis%ed by t%e commandin o$$icers and

t%e artillery liaison roup- *%ic% normally mo)es *it% t%e $irst *a)e. &rtillery $or*ard obser)ers- i$

possible in armored obser)ation posts- ride *it% t%e most $or*ard elements. & German $ield

e0pedient is $or t%e tank unit to take alon a $or*ard obser)er in one o$ its tanks. 3t o$ten %appens

t%at t%e tankman %imsel$ %as to take o)er t%e obser)ation o$ t%e artillery. He %imsel$ can re/uest $ire

and s%i$t concentrations *%en t%e situation re/uires suc% c%anes.


17/39

SECTION I. OFFENSIE 7 Pa%t II



c. T!E INFANTR4 DIISION IN T!E ATTAC5.

#1, Gene%a* $%inci$*e- (o% e$*o8ent.

German teac%in en)isaes in$antry di)isions bein employed to make a penetration in t%e enemy

de$ensi)e positions t%rou% *%ic% armored and mec%anied $ormations can pass. Durin t%e course

o$ t%is *ar- %o*e)er- no ma8or attack %as been carried out by in$antry di)isions *it%out t%e support

o$


18/39


19/39

3n determinin *%en to deploy- t%e Germans take into consideration additional p%ysical strain

placed on men *%en t%ey marc% cross country.

#0, TEC!NI"UE OF ATTAC5.

+%e in$antry attack on prepared positions is made in t%e same se/uence as t%at o$ t%e


20/39


21/39

same manner as t%e U.S. &rmy. +%e Germans consider t%e battalion as t%e $irin unit. Splittin up

an artillery battalion into batteries and placin batteries under an in$antry battalion is t%e e0ception

8usti$ied only *%en t%e in$antry battalion %as an independent mission ($or e0ample- $lank

protection# or *%en t%e terrain does not permit uni$ied $ire control by artillery battalion

commanders. Sinle commitment o$ uns is aainst German tactical doctrine.

Carious recent reports- %o*e)er- describe de)iations $rom t%e prescribed practice. ormally t%eGermans do not employ sinle $ield artillery pieces $or direct $ire- as- $or instance- t%e 2ussians do.

@ut muc% use is made o$ ro)in uns (&rbeitsesc%ut#- and o$ uns $irin $rom alternate positions

to make identi$ication more di$$icult. Standin German orders call $or t%e preparation o$ alternate

$irin positions- *%ic%- %o*e)er- are used no* only in cases o$ )ery %ea)y counterbattery $ire- as

t%e asoline s%ortae keeps all mo)ements to a minimum.

+%e Germans o$ten desinate t%e number t*o piece as t%e ro)in un- and unlike t%e ot%er pieces- it

normally is not du in. 3t $re/uently c%anes its position- *%ic% is about 76 to 66 yards $rom t%e

rest o$ t%e battery.

+%e German artillery o$ten enaes a taret $rom a lateral position. +%is deception- particularlyidenti$ied *it% loner rane *eapons- is e0tended by employin anot%er un- o$ten o$ li%ter

caliber- in a care$ully coordinated attack on t%e same taret. Flas% simulators also increase t%e

di$$iculty o$ )isual location o$ acti)e uns.

+%e $irst step to obtain in$antry,artillery coordination is taken in t%e attack order and is assured by

direct contact bet*een t%e commanders- artillery liaison units (&rtillerie)ebindunskommando#-

and direct contact bet*een artillery obser)ers and in$antry units.

+%e Germans also employ $or*ard obser)ers (Coresc%obene @eobac%ter#- *%o %a)e t%e same task

as t%eir U.S. counterpart.

+%e sinal e/uipment necessary $or communication bet*een units- liaison units- and obser)ers is

only partly oranic. +%e Germans keep most o$ t%e sinal e/uipment centralied in t%e di)ision

sinal battalion- *%ic% allots e/uipment as needed to t%e )arious units.

3n t%e attack t%e reater part o$ t%e artillery supports t%e main e$$ort. +%e remainder o$ t%e artillery

is assined t%e mission o$ $lank protection aainst possible enemy counterattacks.

#;, MEETING ENGAGEMENT. #Be+e+n'n+-+e(ect,

3n t%e meetin enaement t%e Germans belie)e t%at t%e ad)antae lies *it% t%e side *%ic%

succeeds $irst in makin e$$ecti)e preparation $or t%e attack and t%ereby depri)es t%e enemy o$ %is

$reedom o$ action. W%en bot% ad)ersaries attack immediately $rom marc% columns- t%e decisi)e

$actors are t%e initiati)e o$ t%e 8unior o$$icers and t%e e$$iciency o$ t%e troops. +%e senior

commander /uickly coordinates t%e $unctions o$ t%e )arious o$$icers- *%ile t%e ad)ance uard

secures $or %im $reedom o$ action and t%e opportunity $or a speedy deployment o$ %is troops.

#


22/39

pursuit re/uires reat initiati)e $rom commanders o$ all ec%elons o$ command- *%o must not

%esitate to start pursuit immediately- e)en *%en t%eir troops are e0%austed. +%e enemy must be

i)en no time to pause to reoranie %is $orces and reconstitute %is de$ense.

+%e pursuit is conducted on a broad $ront by means o$ $ire and mo)ement. W%en makin $or distant

ob8ecti)es e)ery e$$ort is made to et around t%e enemys $lanks and e$$ect a surprise attack in %is

rear. Ho*e)er- care must be taken t%at enemy attack on ones o*n $lank does not cause de$lection$rom t%e oriinal direction.

Fast,mo)in troops are used in t%e pursuit. +%ese troops o$ten are oranied into pursuit or ad)ance

sections. +%e in$antry scatters t%e enemy and by,passes resistin enemy Stronpoint- lea)in t%eir

destruction to units $ollo*in in t%e rear.


23/39

SECTION . DEFENSIE 7 Pa%t II



0. DEFENSE OF TO6NS.

+%e Germans reard to*ns and )illaes as e0cellent stronpoints- particularly i$ t%e buildins are o$

masonry. +o*ns also are rearded as e0cellent antitank positions because o$ t%e considerable

in$antry,artillery e$$ort necessary to neutralie t%em.

3n de$endin a to*n or )illae- t%e Germans locate t%eir main line o$ resistance *ell *it%in t%e

built,up portion9 t%e edes o$ t%e to*n- *%ic% pro)ide easy tarets $or artillery $ire- are belie)ed to

be too )ulnerable. +%e main line o$ resistance is laid out irreularly in order to de)elop $lankin

$ire- and e)ery e$$ort is made to conceal its location until t%e last possible moment. Minor

stronpoints are maintained $or*ard o$ t%e line in order to break up attacks and pro)ide additional

$lankin $ire. 'ul,de,sacs are oranied and attempts made to trap attackin $orces in t%em $ordestruction by counter, attackin mobile reser)es. +%ese reser)es are kept in readiness *it%in t%e

to*n itsel$- but ot%er reser)e $orces are %eld outside t%e to*n to pre)ent %ostile $lankin maneu)ers.

@ot% occupied and unoccupied buildins are booby,trapped in oraniin t%e de$ended positions.

Bntrances to buildins are blocked and all *indo*s are opened so as not to disclose t%ose $rom

*%ic% $ire is maintained. 2ooms are darkened- and passaes are cut in t%e *alls bet*een buildins.

+o a)oid detection- t%e Germans $ire $rom t%e middle o$ t%e rooms- and $re/uently c%ane t%eir

positions- *%ile communication is maintained t%rou% cellars and o)er roo$s. Mac%ine uns are

sited lo*- usually in basements- to pro)ide better rain $ire. '%imneys and cornices are used as

co)er $or men on roo$s9 tiles may be remo)ed to pro)ide loop%oles. Searc%li%ts are mounted toilluminate $ields o$ $ire9 in t%eir absence )e%icle %eadli%ts may be used as substitutes. W%en

%ouses collapse- t%e de$ense is carried on $rom cellars- and rubble %eaps o$ destroyed areas are

oranied into stronpoints.

+anks are considered to be ine$$ecti)e *it%in a de$ended to*n- alt%ou% t%e Germans %a)e used

t%em in static- du,in positions at cross,roads and s/uares. &s a result o$ t%eir e0periences on t%e

Bastern Front- t%e Germans belie)e sinle tanks are too )ulnerable to Moloto) cocktails- manetic

mines- and e0plosi)e c%ares. W%en t%e Germans t%emsel)es use t%ese antitank *eapons- t%ey

employ t%em $rom $o0%oles du outside t%e perimeter o$ t%e to*n. B$$orts are made to destroy

enemy tanks immobilied by antitank action- eit%er *it%in or outside t%e to*n in order to pre)ent

t%eir reco)ery or use as artillery obser)ation posts and mac%ine,un nests. &ntipersonnel mines are

interspersed in antitank mine$ields because t%e attackin in$antry are considered t%e c%ie$ menace.

&ssault uns may pro)ide direct de$ensi)e support $ire i$ attackin $orces break t%rou% and

disoranie t%e German position. +o secure t%e added protection a$$orded by masonry *alls- t%e

Germans may locate assault uns or tanks *it%in buildins and use t%em aainst %ostile armored

)e%icles and in$antry. 'ounterattacks- supported by assault uns or tanks- *ill not be *it%%eld until

t%e situation %as become desperate9 indeed surprise counterattacks may be launc%ed at any time.

For t%e de$ense o$ )illae stronpoints special battle commandants (amp$kommandanten# are

appointed. +%e battle commandant is usually t%e senior o$$icer and t%e tactical commander o$ allmilitary $orces- emerency units- and ci)il oraniations in %is area. He %as t%e disciplinary po*er

o$ a reimental commander.


24/39


25/39


26/39

a. GENERAL

+%e Germans break o$$ an enaement $or one or more o$ t%e $ollo*in reasons: *%en it %as ser)ed

its purpose9 *%en conditions re/uire t%e employment o$ t%e troops- or part o$ t%em on anot%er $ront9

*%en a continuation o$ t%e battle i)es no promise o$ success9 or *%en de$eat is imminent.

W%en an attack e0%austs itsel$ *it%out attainin its ob8ecti)e- t%e Germans assume t%e de$ensi)e ast%e $irst step in *it%dra*in $rom action. 3$ t%e de$ense must be continued in a rear*ard position-

t%e breakin o$ contact- t%e retirement- and t%e resumption o$ t%e de$ense are care$ully planned

be$ore%and.


27/39

retires *it% t%e main body- none bein assined to t%e rear uard. Sel$,propelled and %ea)y

in$antry,support uns- and e)en %o*iters- are $re/uently attac%ed to t%e rear uard. +anks also may

be assined. & typical rear uard $or eac% route in a di)ision retirement is one in$antry battalion to

*%ic% are attac%ed elements o$ t%e reconnaissance unit- to protect t%e $lanks- and o$ t%e enineer

unit to prepare demolitions.

7. +%e rear uard in$antry battalion normally employs only one o$ its ri$le companies on acti)e rearuard tasks. +%e t%ree ri$le companies per$orm t%is $unction in turn as lon as t%eir strent% remains

appro0imately e)en. 3$ t%e terrain demands it- t*o companies are employed at a time. +*o or more

antitank uns and %al$ o$ t%e sel$,propelled or %ea)y in$antry uns allotted to t%e $ull rear uard

support t%e rearmost ri$le company or companies. W%en pressure becomes too stron- t%e sinle

ri$le company is *it%dra*n t%rou% t%e t*o remainin ri$le companies *%ic% are supported by t%e

remainder o$ t%e attac%ed *eapons. Cariations o$ t%is leap$roin proress are repeated until

darkness- *%en a eneral disenaement takes place and t%e oriinal $ormation is resumed.

. 2ear uards *it%dra* by bounds to selected but not prepared positions. +%e e0tent to *%ic%

positions e)entually can be prepared depends on t%e pro0imity o$ t%e pursuin $orces- t%e lent% o$

time eac% particular position is likely to be %eld- and t%e decision o$ t%e indi)idual company andplatoon commanders. Durin eac% stae o$ t%e retreat- t%e commander o$ t%e rear company can

order a *it%dra*al to t%e main rear uard position- but *it%dra*al $rom eac% main rear uard

position is ordered by t%e commander o$ t%e main body. Fre/uently t%e speed o$ *it%dra*al is

based on a time,distance sc%edule. Durin t%e *it%dra*al $rom a certain to*n- rear uards *ere

instructed to retire not more t%an -666 yards a day.

!. B0perience %as s%o*n t%at in certain types o$ country a rein$orced rear uard company enerally

can %old up )ery superior $orces on a $ront as *ide as t%ree miles. 3n one instance o$ a *it%dra*al

$rom a de$ensi)e position alon a ri)er line- a German


28/39

retire in order- and establis% a ne* de$ensi)e position. Delayin actions t%ere$ore seek to decei)e

t%e enemy as to German strent%- dispositions- and intentions9 to pre)ent t%e enemy $rom

committin t%e main German $orces9 and to pre)ent close pursuit o$ t%e main $orces by t%e enemy.

+%ese measures are accomplis%ed by rear uards- special battle roups- and stronpoints- all o$

*%ic% are c%aracteried by %i% automatic $ire po*er- mobility- and economy in numerical strent%.

Delayin actions are oranied not in a main de$ensi)e belt- but on lines o$ resistance

(Widerstandslinien#. +%e distance bet*een suc% lines is reat enou% to pre)ent t%e enemy $rom

enain t*o o$ t%em $rom t%e same artillery position. He is compelled to displace and mo)e up %is

artillery to enae eac% line. +%ese lines o$ resistance are normally establis%ed alon $or*ard slopes

to $acilitate disenaement and *it%dra*al under co)er. +%e delayin actions are $ou%t $or*ard o$

t%e lines o$ resistance *it% mobile $orces. Furt%ermore- battle outposts are oranied $or*ard o$

eac% line.

+%e main delayin *eapons are mac%ine uns- mortars- and sel$,propelled *eapons. +anks are used

in small roups.

Maintenance o$ contact is a most conspicuous principle in t%e Germans conduct o$ a *it%dra*al

and delayin action. +%e sie- composition- direction- and intention o$ t%e attackin enemy $orce are

obser)ed at all times.

. CONDUCT OF T!E DELA4ING ACTION.

Durin a delayin action- *ide sectors are co)ered by artillery units *idely deployed , uns are

sited by sections i$ necessary , and by *idely distributed in$antry,support *eapons. +%e de$ense is

t%en $urt%er oranied by establis%in stronpoints manned by small roups.

+%e positions $rom *%ic% delayin actions are $ou%t are c%aracteried by )ery sli%t dept%. &s a

eneral rule- a unit is responsible $or double t%e $ront normally allocated in de$ensi)e $i%tin. &

company sector is 56 to 4-66 yards9 a battalion sector 4-=6 to !-!66 yards9 a reimental sector

!-!66 to 5-566 yards9 and a di)ision sector 4-666 to 77-666 yards.

3n lea)in a line o$ resistance- German co)erin $orces attempt to disenae by ni%t. 3$ t%at is not

possible- t%eir actions are o)erned by t%e $ollo*in principle: t%e enemy is not allo*ed to come

closer to t%em t%an t%ey are $rom t%eir ne0t line o$ resistance. +%e troops must be able to reac% t%e

ne* position be$ore t%e enemy reac%es t%e old one- or t%eir losses *ill be e0cessi)e.

+%e troops t%ere$ore do not retire in t%e $ace o$ enemy patrols , e)ery e$$ort is made to destroy suc%

patrols , but only *%en t%e enemy mounts an attack. 3$ it can be ascertained t%at t%e enemy is

preparin $or a massed attack- t%e Germans make a timely *it%dra*al to a)oid e0posin t%e troops

to enemy artillery concentrations. &d)ance elements employ smoke to enable t%em to make a

eta*ay in a critical situation. 2i$lemen co)er t%e disenaement o$ %ea)y *eapons- *%ic% mo)e

back by bounds. B)ery opportunity is taken to make limited counterattacks in order to in$lict

casualties on an enemy *%o ad)ances recklessly.

Fire is opened at e0treme ranes on an enemy ad)ancin $or a ma8or attack. Bnemy reconnaissance

$orces are allo*ed to approac%- %o*e)er- and t%en an e$$ort is made to destroy t%em.

'ounterattacks on a lare scale are a)oided- e0cept *%en t%e enemy t%reatens to penetrate t%e line

o$ resistance. W%en t%at occurs- t%e Germans counterattack *it% t%e main $orces o$ t%e rear uard


29/39

and seek to restore t%e situation in order t%at t%e proram o$ staed *it%dra*al may be continued.

;ocal counterattacks are made $or t%e protection or retention o$ some $eature essential to t%e sa$e

conduct o$ t%e main *it%dra*al- or to ain time $or t%e preparation o$ t%e line o$ resistance or p%ase

line.

+%e area bet*een t%e lines o$ resistance is called t%e intermediate area (E*isc%en$eld#. B0plicit

orders are i)en as to *%et%er t%e intermediate area is to be co)ered in one bound or is to be $ou%to)er. +%e latter necessity arises especially *%en t%e ne0t line o$ resistance %as not been $ully

prepared and time must be ained. Detac%ments must reac% t%e line o$ resistance early enou% to

insure t%at all t%e main positions are occupied in time.

+%e supply o$ ammunition is care$ully oranied. & reat deal o$ ammunition is re/uired $or

delayin actions because a $e* *eapons on a broad $ront must do as muc% as or e)en more t%an t%e

normal number o$ uns in a de$ensi)e position. W%en ammunition is scarce- t%e Germans speci$y-

do*n to sections i$ necessary- t%e /uantity o$ ammunition t%at may be used at eac% position. B)ery

commander maintains a supply o$ ammunition $or emerencies.

+%e Germans stress t%e importance o$ decei)in t%e enemy by e)ery means. &rtillery and %ea)y*eapons are mo)ed continually to i)e an impression o$ reater strent%. Dummy positions and

camou$lae are also *idely used.

So t%at isolated roups may be ade/uately directed- sinal communication recei)es special

attention.

3n delayin actions in mountainous terrain- t%e Germans make reater use o$ t%eir reconnaissance

and enineer units t%an o$ any ot%er component. 2econnaissance units are almost continuously in

contact *it% ad)ance and $lankin enemy elements- and participate in most rear,uard and battle,

roup enaements.

c. STRONGPOINTS IN DELA4ING ACTION.

+%e Germans co)er t%e rear uards resistance or p%ase lines by a system o$ stronpoints or

de$ended localities. ust as it is a $unction o$ t%e rear uards to pre)ent a pursuin $orce $rom

makin contact *it% t%e main body *%ile it is on t%e mo)e- so it is t%e $unction o$ stronpoints to

pre)ent t%e penetration o$ resistance or p%ase lines until t%e main body %as *it%dra*n to its ne0t

position.

3n mannin stronpoints- t%e Germans s%o* t%e same economy o$ $orce t%ey s%o* in $ormin rearuards. +ypical $ire po*er o$ a stronpoint in close country is one or t*o sel$,propelled uns- t*o

%ea)y mortars- and up to si0 mac%ine uns. 3n open country- one sel$,propelled un is normally

employed- supplemented by t%ree tanks and a small party o$ in$antry *it% mortars and mac%ine

uns in armored %al$,tracks.

Stronpoints enerally are oranied on t%e %ede%o principle.


30/39

to dislode t%e arrison o$ t%e stronpoint- *%ic% normally *it%dra*s 8ust be$ore t%e attack can

materialie. &pproac%es to stronpoints *%ic% cannot be co)ered by $ire are $re/uently mined.

B0tensi)e mine$ields are $re/uently laid at t%e %eads o$ re,entrants in %illy terrain.

/. BATTLE GROUPS IN DELA4ING ACTION.

@attle roups are normally oranied $or t%e e0ecution o$ some speci$ic task in t%e *it%dra*al- suc%

as a local counterattack or t%e de$ense o$ some particular $eature *%ose retention is necessary $or

t%e security o$ t%e main *it%dra*al.

@attle roups- *%ic% t%e Germans employ $or o$$ensi)e and de$ensi)e as *ell as delayin missions-

)ary in sie $rom a company or t*o- *it% attac%ed close support *eapons- to a reiment or se)eral

battalions rein$orced *it% tanks- artillery- antiaircra$t- enineer- and reconnaissance elements. 3n all

cases t%e Germans seek to make t%em as sel$,su$$icient as possible in combat. 3n actual practice-

%o*e)er- t%e composition o$ German battle roups appears o$ten to %a)e been dictated less by t%e

t%eory o$ *%at units s%ould be put toet%er to $orm a sel$,su$$icient combat $orce- t%an by t%e

demands o$ an emerency situation *%ic% commanders %a)e been $orced to meet *it% t%einsu$$icient and normally disassociated units at t%eir disposal.

German battle roups may be oranied $or s%ort- lon- or c%anin missions. +%ey are usually

kno*n by t%e name o$ t%eir commander.

e. DEMOLITION AND OBSTACLES.

+o pre)ent t%e pursuin enemy columns $rom approac%in close enou% to enae e)en t%eir rear

uard elements- t%e Germans continually employ demolitions and obstacles o$ all kinds. +%e

t%orou%ness *it% *%ic% enineer operations %a)e been carried out %as increased steadily

t%rou%out t%e *ar. 'ul)erts and brides are completely destroyed. 2oads and all natural detours

are mined- cratered- or blocked by $elled trees9 in streets and )illaes- streets are blocked by t%e

*reckae o$ buildins. Certical rail obstacles are placed to obstruct main routes9 mines o$ten are

laid $or 6 yards around t%e ede o$ t%e obstacle. Wooden bo0 mines are used to a lare e0tent as

demolition c%ares- and aerial bombs and artillery s%ells are sometimes similarly employed.

Fre/uently rear parties are committed to a delayin enaement in order to co)er t%e preparation o$

demolitions immediately be%ind t%em. Durin static periods in t%e eneral *it%dra*al- *%en t%e

Germans occupy t%eir line o$ resistance or p%ase line- enineer units prepare demolitions in t%e rear.

&$ter t%e *it%dra*al- t%ese demolitions are co)ered by sniper $ire- mac%ine uns and sel$,propelled*eapons as lon as possible.

SECTION II. MINEFIELDS



1. GENERAL

+%e Germans make e0tensi)e use o$ mines *%ic% t%ey consider a most e$$ecti)e de$ensi)e *eapon.


31/39

Mine$ields are utilied c%ie$ly to co)er de$ensi)e actions and retreats- alt%ou% limited use is made

o$ t%em in o$$ensi)e actions $or $lank protection. 3n a static situation t%e Germans reard mine$ields

as an element o$ t%e $ront line position- laid out accordin to an o)er,all mine plan de)eloped in

close con8unction *it% t%at $or t%e $ields o$ $ire o$ all *eapons. Wit%in recent mont%s- standard

German doctrine $or mine$ield location %as been modi$ied. 3nstead o$ layin dense mine$ields in

$ront o$ t%e main line o$ resistance- dispersed mines are laid t%ere- *%ile t%e mine$ields proper are

sited *it%in t%e main battle position.

2. SURE4ING OF MINEFIELDS

+%e Germans consider it necessary to sur)ey t%e location o$ mine$ields and indi)idual mines *it%in

t%e mine$ields. German enineers are instructed to c%oose re$erence points (Festpunkte or F


32/39

& number o$ antitank mines are laid in t%e $or*ard ede o$ antipersonnel mine$ields to pre)ent

armored )e%icles $rom detonatin t%e main belt o$ antipersonnel mines. +%e $or*ard edes o$

mine$ields o$ all types o$ten are so*n *it% e0plosi)e c%ares placed in *ooden bo0es $itted *it%

pressure $uses. +%ese act as bot% antitank and antipersonnel mines and discourae t%e use o$

detectors to locate t%e mines.

For*ard o$ most reular $ields- and particularly in $ront o$ lanes- mines may be $ound *idely

spaced or scattered at random in unmarked roups. Mines also are laid in spaces runnin out at ri%t

anles $rom t%e $or*ard ede o$ t%e mine$ield to damae )e%icles mo)in alon t%e $ield in searc%

o$ lanes.

&ll pressure,type antitank and antipersonnel mines are laid in lines. For measurin distances and

spaces- t%e troops use a mine,measurin *ire (Minenmessdra%t# *%ic% t%ey t%emsel)es make $rom

old telep%one *ire. +%e mine,measurin *ire is 7! meters (about 7 yards# lon- and e)ery meter

( $eet inc%es# is marked *it% a piece o$ *ood. +%e rins on t%e ends are about $i)e inc%es in

diameter. +%e measurin *ire- in addition to measurin t%e distance bet*een $i0ed points- ser)es to

lay out ri%t anles by stakin out a trianle o$ 5- >- and 46 meters respecti)ely. Spaces bet*eenmines are determined by re$erence to t%e marks on *ire9 t%e $our rins on one end are used to o$$set

t%e ro*s. +%e density o$ a mine$ield depends upon t%e inter)al bet*een mines and t%e number o$

ro*s. +%e table abo)e represents t%e density.

Mine lanes are le$t open $or patrols- and passae lanes $or assault troops. For permanent patrols ne*

lanes are made $rom time to time- and t%e old ones closed. & mine,$ree sa$ety strip is pro)ided on

t%e Germans side.

+%e Germans normally lay mine belts in indi)idual sections >6 by 46 $eet. +%e sections usually are

staered- and- $or e0tensi)e mine belts- t%ey are combined in units o$ t%ree or $our to $orm $or*ard

or re)erse arro*%eads- or ec%elons. Mine$ields arraned in ec%elon are sur)eyed by usin corner

posts on t%e %ostile side o$ intermediate mine$ields as sur)ey points.

+%e Germans emp%asie t%at mine$ields must be co)ered by $ire- alt%ou% durin a %asty retreat

t%ey o$ten do not tend to $ollo* t%is principle. 3t is common $or a reular mine$ield to %a)e a

listenin post *it% t*o men at t%e rear*ard ede9 about =6 or >6 yards $art%er to t%e rear t%ere

usually is a co)erin party o$ $our or $i)e men armed *it% one or t*o li%t mac%ine uns.

W%en t%e Germans are in %asty *it%dra*al- t%ey usually lay a lare number o$ small nuisance

mine$ields. +%ese $ields contain many di$$erent types o$ mines- *%ic% o$ten are unmarked and s%o*

e)ery e)idence o$ %urried layin. +%e conse/uent lack o$ pattern uni$ormity makes t%eir detectionand clearance a laborious and danerous task. +%ou% no consistency is noted in layout and types o$

mines in suc% $ields- t%e Germans s%o* certain pre$erences in t%eir c%oice o$ sites $or t%em.

. LOCATION

3n eneral- mines are laid eit%er close to- or on- roads9 on air$ields and rail*ays9 and alon telerap%

routes. Sur$aced portions o$ roads are usually a)oided by t%e %asty mine layer- but k%aki,painted +,

Mines sometimes are placed on t%e sur$ace at dips in t%e road- in t%e %ope t%at dri)ers *ill be

unable to c%eck t%eir )e%icles in time to a)oid t%em. +%e Germans also place mines alon t%e

s%oulders o$ t%e road opposite narro* places *%ere dri)ers %a)e to detour to pass- and at t%eentrances to de$iles *%ere t%ey %a)e to pull o$$ t%e road to *ait $or )e%icles mo)in in t%e opposite

direction. Ot%er places usually so*n *it% antitank mines are turnouts- s%arp bends- t%e unsur$aced


33/39

islands sometimes $ound at crossroads- berms- and *ell *orn *%eel ruts.

c. CONCEALMENT

+%e Germans- *it% reat inenuity- attempt to make t%eir mines di$$icult to detect. +%ey bury t%em

as muc% as 7! inc%es belo* t%e sur$ace *%ere t%ey e0plode only a$ter passae o$ a number o$)e%icles %as compacted t%e eart% co)er su$$iciently to operate t%e $ue. +%ey put e0plosi)es in

*ooden bo0es to pre)ent t%e e$$ecti)e operation o$ ordinary mine detectors- and mark tire prints in

t%e eart% on top o$ t%e mine by dra*in a detac%ed a0le and *%eels o)er it.

+%e Germans also s%o* considerable inenuity in sitin random antipersonnel mines on t%e line o$

t%e %ostile ad)ance. 2oad demolitions are plenti$ully so*n *it% S,Mines and kilometer posts at

points *%ere )e%icular dri)ers %a)e to dismount to read directions are similarly treated. S,Mines

also are placed in ditc%es- o$ten close to t%e trip *ire pe o$ anot%er mine.

uisance $ields on lines o$ communication enerally are closely spaced- occasionally so closely as

to cause sympat%etic detonation. +%is is particularly possible *%en mines are laid *it% t%eirpressure plates almost $lus% *it% t%e sur$ace o$ t%e round and only li%tly co)ered *it% eart%.

German dummy mine$ields take )arious $orms. 3n some cases a trip *ire is laid to i)e t%e

appearance o$ a mine$ield perimeter *ire- *it% t%e usual lanes- and t%e round is disturbed at

reular inter)als. Scrap metal- o$ten dispersed *it% real mines- is placed in s%allo* %oles to cause a

reaction in t%e mine detector. Dummy mines o$ten are *ired in and connected *it% booby traps.

Section III. SPECIAL OPERATIONSSource: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar!#


1. TO6N AND STREET FIG!TING

3n attackin a to*n or )illae- t%e Germans employ $lankin and encirclin tactics. +%ey attempt to

cut o$$ *ater- electricity- as- and ot%er utilities. W%ile carryin out t%e $lankin maneu)er- t%ey pin

do*n t%e de$enders *it% %ea)y artillery $ire and aerial bombardment. W%en it is necessary to make

a direct assault- t%e Germans concentrate all a)ailable %ea)y *eapons- includin artillery and airunits- on one taret. +%ey $a)or as tarets $or t%eir massed $ire t%e $or*ard edes o$ t%e community-

especially detac%ed roups o$ buildins and isolated %ouses. Durin t%e $ire concentration t%e

in$antry assembles and attacks t%e ob8ecti)e immediately upon termination o$ artillery $ire. +anks

and assault uns accompany t%e in$antry in s*eepin a*ay barricades- blastin passaes t%rou%

*alls- and crus%in *ire obstacles. Guns and mortars are used aainst concealed positions- and

antitank uns co)er side streets aainst possible $lankin operations. Mac%ine uns enae snipers

on roo$s.

+%e immediate ob8ecti)e o$ t%e Germans is to di)ide t%e area occupied by t%e enemy. +%ese areas

are t%en isolated into as many smaller areas as possible- in order to deny t%e enemy $reedom o$

mo)ement.

&not%er $orm o$ attack employed by t%e Germans is to dri)e t%rou% a community and establis%


34/39

ood positions beyond t%e to*n to block t%e retreat o$ t%e de$ender. +%en t%ey try to anni%ilate t%e

enemy *it%in t%e community.

+%e assaultin troops are di)ided into a number o$ columns and make a series o$ coordinated

parallel attacks. &ttacks $rom opposite directions and con$lictin anles are a)oided- since t%ey lead

to con$usion and to $irin on $riendly troops. +%e columns are sub,di)ided into assault and mop,up

roups. &ssault detac%ments o$ enineers- e/uipped *it% demolition e/uipment- $lame t%ro*ers-and renades- accompany t%e in$antry. W%ere possible- t%e Germans blast %oles t%rou% t%e *alls o$

ro*s o$ buildins alon t%e route o$ ad)ance in order to pro)ide t%e in$antry *it% co)ered

approac%es. +%ese passaes a$$ord protection $or brinin up supplies and e)acuatin casualties.

Houses are cleared o$ de$enders by small,arms $ire. Streets are a)oided as muc% as possible by t%e

Germans *%o in$iltrate simultaneously t%rou% back yards and o)er roo$s. +%ey attempt to $urt%er

t%e ad)ance by seiin %i% buildins *%ic% o$$er dominatin positions and *ide $ields o$ $ire.

W%en compelled to ad)ance t%rou% streets- t%e Germans mo)e in t*o $iles- one on eac% side o$ t%e

t%orou%$are. +%e le$t side is pre$erred as it is more ad)antaeous $or $irin ri%t %anded $rom

door*ays. 'onsideration is i)en to t%e problem o$ $i%tin aainst de$enders oranied not only in

dept% but in %ei%t. 'onse/uently t%e men recei)e speci$ic assinments to *atc% t%e rooms- t%e)arious $loors o$ buildins- and cellar *indo*s. Side streets are immediately blocked- and at ni%t

searc%li%ts are kept ready to illuminate roo$s.

&s soon as a buildin is occupied- t%e Germans oranie it into a stronpoint. Windo*s and ot%er

openins are con)erted into loop%oles and embrasures. 'ellars and attics are occupied $irst in

oraniin $or de$ense.

B)en buildins *%ic% %a)e been completely destroyed are kept under constant obser)ation to

pre)ent t%eir reoccupation by t%e enemy. From occupied buildins t%e Germans deli)er continuous

mac%ine,un and ri$le $ire *it% t%e ob8ect o$ denyin t%e enemy t%e opportunity to occupy alternate

positions.

Underround corridors and se*ers- *%ic% pro)ide e0cellent co)er $or de$enders- are attacked *it%

determination. W%en immediate clearance or smokin,out is not possible- t%e entrances are

barricaded- blocked- or uarded.

&*are t%at t%eir tanks and assault uns are )ulnerable to attacks by tank,%untin units- t%e Germans

assin in$antry to protect t%em. @arricades and obstacles are cleared by in$antry and enineers. &ll

able,bodied ci)ilians- reardless o$ daner- are summoned to clear t%e streets o$ debris.

W%en a section o$ a to*n is occupied- t%e Germans close up all side streets leadin $rom t%eoccupied area- block all e0its o$ %ouses- and t%en bein a %ouse to %ouse searc% *it% details

assined to special tasks- suc% as moppin up roo$s- attics- basements- courtyards- and staircases.

2. ATTAC5 ON FORTIFIED POSITIONS

+%e Germans realie t%e di$$iculty o$ attackin a stronly $orti$ied enemy position and prepare suc%

an attack *ell in ad)ance o$ t%e actual operation. @e$ore attackin a lare and intricately $orti$ied

position co)erin a lare area , a classic e0ample *as t%e assault on t%e @elian Fortress Bben

Bmael , t%e Germans attempt to secure- in addition to in$ormation obtained t%rou% normal

reconnaissance- its e0act plan by t%e employment o$ aents and $i$t% columnists. W%en timepermits- t%ey construct a duplicate o$ t%e $orti$ication on similar terrain *ell in t%e interior o$

German- as t%ey did *it% Bben Bmael. 3n buildin suc% installations $or intensi)e re%earsal trainin


35/39

o$ specially, oranied combat teams- t%e Germans spare neit%er labor nor e0pense. +%ese special

combat teams usually consist o$ combat enineers- rein$orced by in$antry- antitank- and c%emical

*ar$are units.

+%e attack on t%e $ortress usually is preceded by an intensi)e di)e,bomber bombardment and lon,

rane %ea)y,artillery $ire. +%e purpose o$ t%ese bombardments is to destroy obstacles and

mine$ields- and to create bomb craters *%ic% not only pro)ide co)er $or t%e assaultin troops butalso may be con)erted into $irin positions. O$ten paratroopers land in close pro0imity to t%e

$orti$ication 8ust prior to t%e assault- immediately establis%in radio communications *it% t%e

combat,team %ead/uarters.

+%e climatic p%ase o$ t%e operation is t%e assault. 3ts primary ob8ecti)e is to et t%e enineers

$or*ard to certain selected *orks. durin t%e approac%- and until t%e enineers reac% t%e

$orti$ications- t%e artillery deli)ers $ire o$ ma0imum intensity. &ntitank uns lay direct $ire aainst

t%e embrasures- and c%emical *ar$are units employ smoke to blind $orts and ad8acent supportin

*orks. +%e in$antry co)ers t%e embrasures *it% ri$le and mac%ine,un $ire and remains in readiness

to mo)e $or*ard and consolidate any success t%e enineers may ain. Bnineers cra*l $or*ard-

utiliin s%ell %oles $or co)er. +%ey are e/uipped *it% %and renades- blocks o$ ++- andsubmac%ine uns. Some roups use banalore torpedoes- some pole c%ares- *%ile still ot%ers are

armed *it% %ea)y $lame t%ro*ers. Wit% ++ and pole c%ares- t%ey attempt to demolis%

systematically t%e *eaker *orks suc% as embrasures- ports- turrets- 8oints- and doors.

3. COMBAT IN 6OODS

W%en attackin into *oods- t%e Germans usually di)ide t%e area into company sectors. +%e

Germans stress constant reconnaissance to disco)er t%e most *eakly manned enemy position. +%is

reconnaissance is carried out- e)en t%ou% company strent% becomes temporarily reduced.

2econnaissance patrols usually mo)e clock*ise $rom t%eir oriinal position. +%e company

commander re)ie*s t%e reconnaissance reports in detail *it% %is platoon and section leaders.

+%e company usually deploys in *ede $ormation *%en ad)ancin. 3n order to ac%ie)e surprise- t%e

Germans o$ten lea)e t%e roads and ad)ance cross,country.

&s soon as t%e point o$ t%e *ede o$ t%e company is in si%t o$ t%e enemy- t%e Germans creep

$or*ard to close,combat rane- al*ays keepin contact *it% ad8acent and supportin units. +%e

company t%en storms t%e enemys position- usin t%e reatest possible number o$ %and renades-

pole c%ares- and close, combat *eapons. +%e ad)ance elements attempt to break into t%e %ostile

position as deeply as possible- t%e body o$ t%e *ede *idenin t%e penetration on bot% sides. +%ecompany commander t%en decides *%et%er to roll up t%e enemy position on t%e more important

$lank or to %old t%e round until rein$orcements arri)e be$ore continuin t%e attack.

Bac% platoon details at least one obser)er- armed *it% an automatic *eapon to neutralie enemy

treetop snipers. +%e Germans belie)e t%at bursts o$ $ire- rat%er t%an sinle s%ots- are necessary to

deal e$$ecti)ely *it% suc% snipers.

+%e Germans consider $i%tin in *ooded areas as t%e primary task o$ ri$lemen and mac%ine

unners- since t%e employment o$ %ea)y,support *eapons o$ten is impossible. +%e Germans

occasionally dismount %ea)y mac%ine uns and use t%em as li%t caliber mac%ine uns. &ntitank

uns o$ small caliber and li%t in$antry %o*iters sometimes are brou%t $or*ard manually- and*%en indirect $ire is not possible t%ey enae tarets directly. ;i%t mortars are employed

indi)idually. From Finnis% troops- t%e Germans learned a success$ul met%od o$ usin mortars in


36/39

*oods. +%e mortar obser)ers- accompanied by a telep%one operator- mo)e *it% t%e ad)ance

element. +%e line back to t%e mortar cre* is e0actly 766 yards lon. One man is detailed to see t%at

t%e line does not et %un on t%e *ay and as $ar as possible runs in a strai%t line. W%en t%e

ad)ance element contacts t%e enemy- t%e obser)er 8udes t%e distance $rom %imsel$ to t%e taret and

adds t%e 766 yards to t%e mortar rane. @racketin o$ $ire $or ad8ustment is considered too

danerous because o$ t%e close pro0imity o$ $riend and $oe.

W%en t%e Germans lea)e a *oods or %a)e to cross a lare clearin *it%in t%e *ooded area- t%e

troops *ork t%emsel)es close to t%e ede o$ t%e *oods. +%en all t%e men lea)e t%e *oods

simultaneously- rus%in at least 466 yards be$ore seekin co)er.

0. COMBAT IN MOUNTAINS

a. GENERAL

+%e German principles o$ combat in mountain areas correspond in eneral to t%ose employed on

le)el terrain. +%e peculiarities o$ mountain terrain- suc% as limited routes- e0treme *eat%erconditions- and di$$icult communications- necessitate additional considerations in t%e tactics

employed. +%e reatest di$$erences occur in t%e %i%er mountains- *%ere t%e Germans utilie

specially trained mountain troops- *%ic% include t%e reno*ned +yrolean and @a)arian

mountaineers.

+%e Germans emp%asie t%at all operations *ill be o$ loner duration in mountainous country t%an

in lo*lands- and t%ere$ore make proper allo*ance $or t%e $actors o$ time and space. For e)ery 6

yards o$ ascent or 6 yards o$ descent t%ey add 4 %our to t%e time estimate $or co)erin a i)en

distance on t%e map. Mo)ements- command- and supply in mountain areas represent sources o$

di$$iculty- accordin to t%e Germans.

. TACTICAL C!ARACTERISTICS OF MOUNTAIN 6ARFARE

+%e Germans di)ide t%eir units into numerous marc%in roups- *%ic% normally consist o$ a

rein$orced in$antry company- an artillery battery- and an enineer platoon. 3n t%is manner t%e

Germans counteract t%e daner o$ ambus%- since eac% roup is able to $i%t independently. +%e

Germans locate t%eir enineer units *ell $or*ard *it% t%e ad)ance uard so t%at t%ey may assist in

road repairs. +%e Germans realie t%at small enemy $orces can retard t%e ad)ance o$ a *%ole

column and t%ere$ore t%ey %a)e sinle uns sited *ell $or*ard. +%ey also oranie stationary and

mobile patrols $or $lank protection.

+%e skill and leaders%ip o$ 8unior commanders are se)erely tested in mountain *ar$areas $orces

enerally are split into small roups- t%e e$$icient command o$ *%ic% re/uires a %i% standard o$

trainin and discipline. 'olumns o$ten are separated by lare areas and impassable country- and

since lateral communication is o$ten )ery di$$icult- command o$ deployed units becomes muc% more

complicated t%an o)er le)el terrain.

ormally supplies are oranied in t*o ec%elons- t%e mountain and )alley ec%elon.

+%e Germans make e0tensi)e use o$ %i%,tra8ectory *eapons in mountain $i%tin- alt%ou%

antitank uns and %ea)y mac%ine uns are used $or co)erin road blocks. +%e e$$ecti)eness o$ t%emountain artillery depends on care$ully selected obser)ation posts *%ic% are in communication *it%

t%e sinle un positions.


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2adio is t%e primary means o$ communication- since t%e layin o$ telep%one *ire is not considered

$easible.

c. MOUNTAIN TACTICS

&ttacks across mountains are made to protect t%e $lanks o$ t%e main attack- to *ork around t%e

enemy rear- or to pro)ide $lankin $ire $or t%e main attack. +%e Germans attempt to seie

commandin %ei%ts and mountain passes.

+%e Germans select t%eir assembly areas as close to t%e enemy as possible to make possible a s%ort

assault. Supportin *eapons are attac%ed to companies- and *%ere $easible- to platoons.

3n de$ense- t%e Germans oranie t%eir ad)ance positions on t%e $or*ard slope- *%ile t%e main

battle position *it% %ea)y, support *eapons is located on t%e re)erse slope. +%e reater part o$ a

unit o$ten is %eld in reser)e. +%is necessitates t%e oraniation o$ relati)ely narro* sectors- *%ic%-

%o*e)er- results in an oraniation o$ round $a)orable $or counterattacks.

0. 6INTER 6ARFARE

Many o$ t%e tec%ni/ues o$ German *inter *ar$are *ere de)eloped $rom t%ose o$ t%e mountain

troops- *%ic% *ere adapted easily to conditions o$ e0treme cold.

Ski patrols are t%e c%ie$ means o$ reconnaissance in sno*,co)ered terrain. &s a rule- t%e strent% o$

t%e patrol is a s/uad- rein$orced by in$antry soldiers trained as enineers- artillery obser)ers- and a

communication detac%ment. 3n addition to normal reconnaissance missions- patrols obtain

in$ormation as to t%e dept% o$ t%e sno*- load capacity o$ ice sur$aces- and daner o$ a)alanc%es.

+%ese ski patrols normally blae trails by markin trees or rocks and by erectin poles or $las.

Stakes are used to indicate t%e e0tremities o$ roads.

Under *inter conditions- German units keep support *eapons and artillery *ell $or*ard *%ile on

t%e marc%. +%eir antitank *eapons are distributed t%rou%out t%e entire column. Ski troops are

oranied to uard t%e $lanks. Slei%s are added $or t%e support o$ *eapons and supplies.

+%e Germans assin to trail units t%e task o$ cuttin tracks $or t%e $ormations t%at $ollo*. +%e

strent% o$ t%e trail unit o$ a company is one or t*o s/uads9 t%at o$ a battalion up to t*o platoons. 3n

di$$icult terrain t%eir strent% may be doubled. +rail units are di)ided into a number o$ traildetac%ments consistin o$ si0 to ten men- ec%eloned be%ind t%e $irst o$ t%e trail units. +%e marc%

$ormation o$ ski troops is enerally sinle $ile9 usually parallel trails are used to reduce t%e lent% o$

t%e column.

3n *inter *ar$are- attacks *it% limited ob8ecti)es are t%e rule. +%e Germans attempt *%ere)er

possible to combine $rontal and $lank attacks under conditions o$ e0treme cold and sno*. +%ey

employ support *eapons as $ar $or*ard as practicable. &ttacks o$ten are made by ski troops9

because o$ t%e di$$iculty o$ transportin artillery- ski troops $re/uently %a)e to dispense *it%

artillery support. For t%is reason t%e Germans consider it all t%e more necessary to concentrate

%ea)y and li%t in$antry *eapons at points o$ main e$$ort and to coordinate %i% and $lat tra8ectory

*eapons. W%en pack %o*iters are a)ailable- t%ey can be dismantled and brou%t $or*ard onsledes. &ssault uns can e$$ecti)ely support ski troops in sno* under 45 inc%es deep. +%ey eit%er

accompany t%e attack as $ar as road conditions allo* or mo)e into positions at e$$ecti)e rane- not


38/39

e0ceedin -66 yards- on specially cleared pat%s a*ay $rom roads. +%ey occupy t%eir positions 8ust

be$ore t%e attack. &s a rule attac%ed assault uns are employed in platoon and company strent%9

sinle commitment is a)oided. +ank units are attac%ed only in e0ceptional circumstances.

Oraniation o$ a de$ensi)e position in deep sno* or on $roen round takes considerable time- $or

it is necessary to mo)e *eapons into position- lay out $oot pat%s and roads- and build stron

outposts and stronpoints *it% all,around de$ense. 'amou$lae is particularly stressed under suc%conditions. Since normal units used as reser)es in deep sno* %a)e only limited mobility- t%e

Germans employ ski troops $or reser)es *%ere)er possible. +%ese ski units are used $or immediate

counterattacks *%ic% are directed- *%ere possible- aainst t%e $lank o$ t%e attackin enemy. +%e

Germans also use t%e ski troops as raidin parties to %arass t%e enemys $ront and rear.

. PARTISAN 6ARFARE

ote: &s t%is $ile concerns itsel$ only *it% German tactics t%e ma8ority o$ t%is section *%ic% deals

*it% &llied partisan acti)ities %as been omitted. +%is includes sections "a" t%rou% "e".

(. GERMAN PREPARATION FOR PARTISAN 6ARFARE

@eyond doubt- t%e Germans prepared and are still preparin $anatical members o$ t%e ational

Socialist


39/39

mac%ine,un $ire at reater distance. +%ey belie)e t%at $ire is more e$$ecti)e immediately upon t%e

landin o$ t%e %ostile $orce- be$ore a consolidation o$ position %as been made. Bnemy transport

planes are considered particularly ood tarets since t%ey must reduce speed 8ust prior to t%e 8ump

o$ t%e troops.

+%e Germans appreciate t%e importance o$ immediate action aainst airborne troops and *%en no

alternati)e is possible t%ey *ill commit in$erior $orces to combat t%e %ostile aerial in)asion- %opinto delay t%e attack until reser)es can be brou%t up.

German Tactics

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