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MILITARY REVIEW ideas of the general staff but o f the will the commander. These recommendations of i D 1 l p E ~ r s o n a l i . t y  appear a bit exaggerated, how I t might be that those who take this have yielded t o the intense fear that staff officers would become con a s a result of their daily contact with chief and finally come t o consider them the command, thus losing sight of the situation." "I believe," Castex continues, "that it is 'indispensable that the chief have about him .. critical moments officers who are not only t'&iv.\ .,.,  t o draw up a n order and fill out a march but who are distinguished counselors. cannot subscribe -to the opinion occasionally . ~ ; l C p l ~ e s l ~ e d that the chief has no need of. of ficers a t his side who are conscious of the enormous importance o f their charge. On the contrary, everyone in the military profession should be aware of the importance o f his mission, which i s not the mission of one, but' of all. Only by paying this price can great results be attained. And this concept assumes the existence of a soul in everyone, a ca-' pacity for thinking-that is to say, a per- sonality. . This personality within the impersonal or ganization represented by the general staff has nothing to do with the idea o f responsi bility which, a s far as i t has reference t o decisions and the conduct of operations, is , wholly and absolutely a prerogative of com mand. Ger man Tactics o ombating Guerrillas Digested a t the Command and General Staff School from the Soviet Handbook of the Guerrilla 3d edition, 1942. GUERRILLAS' activities force the Germans t o constantly on the alert. Therefore, in the temporarily occupied b y them, the (X,erlnan command is compelled to ;resort to a Special guard system and t o punitive meas ures. : The Germans divide the occupied areas into sectors, each o f which is assigned t o a divi Every division has special reserves for t action against the guerrillas. Division- sectors and the methods each division emlul()vs i n fighting the guerrillas should be Disposition and strength of special should also -be known and always kept i n mind. The Germans pay particular attention t o security o f their lines o f communications, ' ~ ' A l 1 n ' l v , highways and railroads. In frontal regions, each 100-kilometer section of road is ',guarded b y a battalion. This, of course, varies ~ ~ e p e n d i n g upon the size and importance of the 'J'Oad and upon terrain. Every kilometer o f Each company i s assigned its own sector. The companies send out field patrols of from ten to twelve men. Battalion and company commanders are usually with the reserve con tingents, which are located i n the center of : sectors. . The field patrols and reserves set u p strongpoints surrounded by barbed wire. These are usually located in places with a . good field o fire. Reserves are moved b motor, b y railroad motor cars, and by. special trains. Posts are established t o guard individual' objectives. Their strength depends upon the size and importance of the objectives. As a rule, they are doubled a t night. Sentinels are stationed not only under bridges, but on trestles as well. Posts with poor fields of fire j have more men. - German patrols ride back and forth con-' tinuously, often on motorcycles. I n daytime, they cover a strip several kilometers wide on . a y be guarded by two men detailed both sides of the road. When troops are avail-) the battalion for constant guard duty. remainder' of the battalion is assigned able, this strip may be a s wide a s t w e n t y ; ~ kilometers, All populated places within i t a r e ork and serves a s a reserve.
3

German Tactics of Combating Guerrillas

Apr 14, 2018

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Page 1: German Tactics of Combating Guerrillas

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MILITARY REVIEW

ideas of the general staff but of the will

the commander. These recommendations of

i D 1 l p E ~ r s o n a l i . t y appear a bit exaggerated, how

It might be that those who take this

have yielded to the intense fear that

staff officers would become con

as a result of their daily contact withchief and finally come to consider them

the command, thus losing sight of the

situation."

"I believe," Castex continues, "that it is

'indispensable that the chief have about him

.. critical moments officers who are not only

....,.,... · to draw up an order and fill out a march

but who are distinguished counselors.

cannot subscribe -to the opinion occasionally

. , ~ ; l C p l ~ e s l ~ e dthat the chief has no need of. of

ficers at his side who are conscious of the

enormous importance of their charge. On the

contrary, everyone in the military profession

should be aware of the importance of his

mission, which is not the mission of one, but

of all. Only by paying this price can great

results be attained. And this concept assumesthe existence of 'a soul in everyone, a ca-

pacity for thinking-that is to say, a per-sonality." .

This personality within the impersonal or

ganization represented by the general staff

has nothing to do with the idea of responsi

bility which, as far as it has reference to

decisions and the conduct of operations, is

, wholly and absolutely a prerogative of com

mand.

German Tactics of Combating Guerrillas

Digested at the Command and General Staff School from the Soviet Handbook ofthe Guerrilla, 3d edition, 1942.

GUERRILLAS' activities force the Germans to

constantly on the alert. Therefore, in the

temporarily occupied by them, the

(X,erlnan command is compelled to ;resort to aSpecial guard system and to punitive meas

ures.

: The Germans divide the occupied areas into

sectors, each of which is assigned to a diviEvery division has special reserves for

t action against the guerrillas. Division-

sectors and the methods each divisionemlul()vs in fighting the guerrillas should be

Disposition and strength of special

should also -be known and alwayskept in mind.

The Germans pay particular attention to

security of their lines of communications,highways and railroads. In frontal

regions, each 100-kilometer section of road is

',guarded by a battalion. This, of course, varies

~ ~ e p e n d i n g upon the size and importance of the

'J'Oad and upon terrain. Every kilometer of

Each company is assigned it s own sector.

The companies send out field patrols of from

ten to twelve men. Battalion and company

commanders are usually with the reserve contingents, which are located in the center of

their respective sectors. .

The field patrols and reserves set up

strongpoints surrounded by barbed wire.

These are usually located in places with a

good field of fire. Reserves are moved by

motor, by railroad motor cars, and by. special

trains.

Posts are established to guard individua

objectives. Their strength depends upon the

size and importance of the objectives. As a

rule, they are doubled at night. Sentinels are

stationed not only under bridges, but on

trestles as well. Posts with poor fields of fire

have more men.

- German patrols ride back and forth con-

tinuously, often on motorcycles. In daytime,

they cover a strip several kilometers wide onay be guarded by two men detailedboth

sidesof the road. When troops are avail

the battalion for constant guard duty.remainder'of the battalion is assigned able, this strip may be as wide as t w e n t y ;

kilometers, All populated places within it areork and serves as a reserve.

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.. i i · h ~ " . ,that guerrillas should

short attack is

-

on

FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS

places

night.

lated

force.

ger.

unit

vidual

toons.

investigated. At night, however, only the road

:itself is patrolled.

In order to get a better field of fire and to

deprive the guerrillas of concealment, the

Germans often burn hamlets located near

railroads.

For fighting the guerrillas in a given area,

the Germans employ special troops which are

garrisoned in populated localities. In most

localities the garrisons are either companies

or larger units.

To learn the disposition of guerrillas, the

Germans usually use spies. Sometimes, the

latter are German soldiers dressed in civilian

clcthes. Then the Germans designate certain

for ambushes and occupy them at

In the morning, .the main forces of

,punitive troops march up to the line of ambushes. On their way up, they examine popu

points, individual back yards, and

houses.Undertaking punitive expeditions, the Ger

mans, as a rule, do not resort to troop recon

naissance and never to reconnaissance in

In their opinion, reconnaissance will

only warn the guerrillas of impending dan

T h e r ~ f o r e , while on a punitive march,

the Germans send out only advance guards.The Germans always try to surround·guer

rilla units and to attack them, preferably late

at night or at dawn. If, for some reason, a

is stationed in a populated point, the

Germans will suddenly open fire either with

incendiary or signal ammunition, attempting

to set fire to straw roofs. As a rule, this is

followed by mortar fire. Then comes the con

centric attack of German storm detachments.

Some troops are always left in reserve. Indi

enemy detachments maintain cpm

.munication with each other by means of sig

rockets and telephone. Sometimes the

Germans use motorized and cavalry units for

attacks on populated places; In such cases,

the motorized unit breaks through the popu

lated place, while the cavalry units surround

it. The cavalrymen usually make a check of ,

al l inhabitants.

Units most commonly used by the Germans

in fighting guerrillas are companies and pla

They are armed with heavy machine

guns and grenade rifles. Fpr t r l ! 1 n l ~ p ( ) r t a t i , o ~ ( ~they use bicycles, motorcycles, and· truCKS.

When guerrillas are found on islands

difficult approaches, the Germans use grlElnlldEV

rifles' on a large scale. Small

take dogs with them.

Operating against 'our guerrillas themans recognize only one kind of Dattle--tJ'le"

offensive battle. Defensive battles are

sidered extremely undesirable. If their a t j ~ a c ! ] ( jfails, they prefer to quit fighting and ,

draw. This means

ways energetically force their initiative

the enemy. If, however, a

at once successful, they should quickly'

engage from the enemy and withdraw, if

sible.

The Germans also undertake large

ditions to clear whole districts of

groups. For such operations the

assign at least a battalion to operate

a zone of up to twenty kilometers

side of a railroad. Such a unit covers ablclUi;"c

not

are sellrchej

get information concerning the g u l e r r i J l a l ~ ,

at rest or

mobile detachments return to the villages

ready examined in order to get the reaction

the guerrillas and of the local population

theimpossible. The

Opera

guerrilla units, the Germans

aviation. Their planes fly over villages at

speed and altitude. They examine them

on roads,

Guerrillas should thoroughly conceal

fifteen kilometers a day. To avoid warni

guerrillas, reconnaissance is

All along the way populated places

amined and individual houses

When time is available, the Fascists

two or three-day halt in every large

it by, cruelty, intimidation, or bribery;

the main enemy forces are

the measures taken by. t h ~ Fascists.

Even when the Germans send out

expeditions, they consider

large forested areas

r e q u i r ~ d would be very large.

forests are dangerous. The Fascists are

of large forest tracts.

To find

oughly, paying attention to traffic

fires, smokes, etc.

movements, making use of

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MILITARY REVIEW

vegetation, and darkness. Open and

:SJtnoKiIllg bonfires should not be allowed. Spe

<!ial dugouts should be prepared for this pur

,pose. To mislead the Germans, open bonfires'

~ o u l d · be started some distance away from

th e location of the unit. '

Every guerrilla should know the rules of

camouflage against aviation and be skilful in

fighting and hitting Fascist aircraft with

rifle and machine-gun fire.

The Use of Tanks as Heavy Cavalry in Italy

An article by M. J. Massey in The Sphere (Great Britain) 29 January 1944.

WHEN IT comes to dislodging an enemy

hilly country, such as frames prac

the whole of our present line in Italy,

of conventional solutions have to be

It is usually not possible to group

weight of artillery necessary to bring a

knock-out barrage on the target, anderiemy normally has plenty of "dead

\ g , r ·UUHU" in which he can shelter his troops

the moment when he has to produce

to meet attacking infantry.

really mountainous country the ground

i.oonf4ers no favors on either side, and the old

that defense is the stronger part of

is never truer. In pre-mechanized days,

advance on Rome would have been looked

essentially as a job for cavalry, with goodtry backing them up. It is interesting

note that for one of the few times on record

this war, the tanks on both sides are now

near bottlenecks in the line of our advance.

I f they can catch an advance party of our

infantry working its way forward without

much in the way of support, they will swoop

down and exploit the situation. As soon as

the element of surprise is lost they will be

off to' try their luck elsewhere. Some ofour forward field engineering companies

seem to have been particularly harassed by

these roving panzer groups, probably com-

posed of th e faster medium-armor types.

Parties of our troops endeavoring to pre

pare bridgeheads for oui" forces have been

singled out for attack, frequently before

they have had time to establish their posi-

tion securely. There is little doubt that the

Germans make a practice, when their infantry are forced to leave a position, of s ~ n d i n ga fair force of tanks to investigate the

chances of making at least a temporaryplaying the scouting, thrustitlg, and

roles they were originally intended

in their role of mechanized cavalry.

We have seen them used as mobile artil

as stationary strongpoints, and as a

of armored infantry going in under the

of heavy artillery barrages, but notindulging in neat, quick, cut-or-thrust

such as those it was, always held

fight. But at last, in the actions

Ortona, Tommasso, and most re

at Cassino, the fighting has tempo

taken on a cavalry character. The ene-

has very sensibly chosen to use his tanks,

in stolid frontal attacks which give op-

artillery ample time to do their worst,

in enterprising sorties calculated to in

the greatest inconvenience on us at the

, cost to· them. Thus, German tanks lurk

counterattack before we have settled in. I n ~country where the advance is continuously

under the protection of heavy artillery such

tactics would not pay, but in the labyrinthine

folds of the Apennines it has been quite prof

itable. Two other factors have also helped

the Nazis here, our "tank-buster" air squad

rons have frequently been grounded on their

temporary waterlogged airfields, and our'

forward troops have often been operating on

the far side of swollen rivers and dama;ged

bridges over which it has been difficult to

bring our own armor.

The Allied tanks; on the other hand, have

found their principal occupation in the heavy

street-fighting which has been such a feature

of the whole front. The cracking of strong-

points in house cellars, or pillboxes concealed