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Crime in the World of 1990 203
CRIME IN THE WORLD
OF 1990
Leslie T. Wilkins
If the political and the inconsequential are to be distinguished
from social dangers, if laws and regulations are to be functional
for society and not just for the law makers-then there is a need to
define crime in terms of an up-dated value system. Once this is
recognised, then there is a little less danger that the confusion
will persist in peoples minds over the fact that just because what
we are doing about crime has increased by leaps and bounds, so it
follows that the total amount of crime is increasing by a similar
amount.
APART from projections of the probable population of prisons (to
facilitate the building programmes) and similar types of
estimation, there seems to be a surprising paucity of projections
in the field of jurisprudence, law and crimi- nology. There is
nothing that considers the more fundamental issues of value
systems, likely changes in moral standards and biochemical or
medical technology.
It seemed that it might be a sound policy for criminologists and
jurists to devote some time and thought (and even research) to
problems which are not yet with us and which we can only project
with considerable uncertainty. It seemed probable, however, that
this view would not be universally shared. Are not our present-day
problems, it might well be asked, so pressing and demanding that we
should give every priority to research relevant to today? Some
might even suggest that unless we can approach a solution of
current problems in crime there may be no future worth planning
for. But clearly this last form of argument involves in itself a
loose prediction of the future.
It is more appropriate to ask-can we ever work our way out of
our present problems without consideration of the future? This is
very doubtful. Many critics of research complain that by the time a
project is completed the results are already out-of-date. Although
this might be so, it is a necessary concomitant of an emphasis on
current problems. In other words, we are in the mess we are in
today because research in the past was too much devoted to problems
which were then current.
Leslie T. Wilkins, currently Professor of Criminal Justice,
State University of New York, Albany, USA, was previously Dean of
the School of Criminology, University of California at
Berkeley.
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204 Crime in the World of 1990
If we accept the necessity for considering the future in our
current research plans and projects, then it seems to follow that
we should attempt also to apply research methods to our
projections. If the intuitive approach is not adequate for current
problems and we call for research, then the intuitive approach
would seem to be inadequate for projections for the future. It was
impossible to find any research in the criminological sector which
had even gone so far as to modify and apply the projection
techniques used in, say, econometrics.
Much of what the future has in store for us has a high level of
probability. There would seem to be no way of preventing many
technological developments from becoming available in the market
place, office or home even if we wished to do so. Many persons are
attempting to prevent supersonic flight, and they may be correct in
seeking reasonable restrictions, but it is a King Canute kind of
act to try to prevent it.
Rather than devote time and energy in attempting to prevent
technological development we might be advised to consider carefully
now, rather than later, its probable impact on our social
institutions and individual health. It might be reasonable to try
to insist that as a development becomes more and more probable,
more and more resources should be devoted to assessment of the
consequences.
The impact of advancing technology on law
Law, as one of the major institutions for social control, must
surely become involved with many of the consequences of advancing
technology. Yet, while the boards of businesses are asking
questions about the future, the main questions asked by the bench
are about precedents. Is this appropriate? Can it be argued that
while rational decisions about things and events must be referred
forwards in time, questions about morals and social values should
be referred backwards in time? This is an impossible case to
defend. Projecting the future, guessing the future, attempting to
influence the future and planning for the future whatever it might
be, are now accepted practices in many areas of human endeavour.
The efficient assessment of our present activities can be carried
out only by reference to our expectations of the future.
For those concerned with education, particularly professional
training, the problem of what to teach cannot be solved without
implicitly or explicitly taking into account the probable future
states of the profession or business. If we are training students
in terms of current procedures-a form of sophisti- cated
apprenticeship-we are implicitly taking the view that the future
will not be very different from now; but the students now leaving
our universities will be managing institutions and involved in a
world very different from now. It will have to be a very different
world if it is to stand any chance of existing. Change is not only
inevitable, it is desirable !
Some of the difficulties the criminologists experience in
relation to past, present and future arise from the close proximity
of our field to that of ethics. We have not distinguished
adequately between the desirable and the probable. Criteria have
been set in terms of desired goals, vaguely expressed without
concern for future probable states. Objectives have been described
for the criminal justice system on moral, dogmatic or expedient
grounds, and without
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Crime in the World of 1990 205
reference to probability. Indeed, jurisprudence has considerable
difficulties with the calculus of probabilities. Yet it seems that
probabilities must be a factor even in moral judgments. The artist,
priest, or mystic may be expected to imagine an end state (goal)
which is not necessarily probable. But the businessman, if he is to
survive, does not have this freedom of the imagination. Consider,
for example, a person who has purchased with his life savings a
small corner news- paper store. Would he be advised to select as
his model the chain store magnet? If he is to plan wisely, he will
examine the total set of probable outcomes. He will consider which
of these probable outcomes seem to be the more desirable. He will
relate his assessment of his present strategy and his future
planning conjointly to the level of probability and desirability of
these outcomes.
The assessment of the desirability of the outcomes or end states
is usually a moral judgment. But it is a bounded moral judgment. It
could be argued even that only those moral judgments which take
account of the boundary con- ditions are, in fact, morally sound.
It is the results of projection (estimation of the probable
futures) which enable us to put our moral judgments into
perspective-the perspective of responsible, intelligent social
beings. It is only when this is done that we have the basis for
moral, rational action.
In human affairs, most of us seem to be optimists. We seem to be
committed to the belief that any goal which can be specified in
principle, is capable of attainment. If we can imagine ourselves
there (wherever there might be) we seem automatically to assume
that a way there is possible. If a way there exists (and this is by
no means always likely to be the case) then it is probable that
several ways there exist. It is possible to draw more than one line
between where we are now and our goal. It may be worth while to
examine these kinds of problems and to try to find the critical
path. But again, that we seem disinclined to do. Yet, concomitant
with our general optimism in human affairs, we lack any clear view
of our goals. It is far easier to think about heaven than to
consider carefully the ways of getting there.
In the hard practical world it is often a far better strategy to
think of things that we would rather avoid than those that we would
like to experience. An avoidance strategy may be a lot easier to
work out. Perhaps we might select as our rational decision model
the strategy which minimises the probability of the maximum
harm.
The nature of goals in the criminal justice system
Who among criminologists, lawyers, social scientists, social
workers or even politicians would wish to set a goal of a crimeless
society? Some, perhaps for purposes of oratory, but none for
purposes of planning. Some might think the goal of a crimeless
society was a desirable one but impossible of attainment. The
majority would agree with Durkheim that crime (or rather the
definition of crime) is necessary in a society which is to function
in a manner which we understand to be a social system. A perfect
society would not be a functioning society. The literary writers
who have given us a number of utopias have not been very
sophisticated on this point. The function of the definition of
deviance is boundary setting for the social system. How else could
boundaries be set? Perhaps to most utopia writers, crime and an
ideal seem a contradiction of
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206 &me in the World of 1990
terms. This, of course, may be so while we see society as a
closed system rather than an open system.
Tolerating variety in the social system
The trouble with the pursuit of an ideal is that the concept of
an ideal does not accommodate the idea of variety. If an ideal is
right, then everything which does not conform to this ideal
singular state is not right: human beings and the physical world
proliferate variety. In variety reside the necessary elements for
adaptation. If man ceases to be an adaptive being; if man does not
find it possible to adapt still faster to the changes he is himself
generating, then like the other creatures before him who failed to
adapt he will become extinct. Some scientists believe that the
process of extinction is already at an irreversible point. There is
an analogy with the physical world here. Our problems of physical
ecological imbalance which are now among the most disturbing
features noted by the physical sciences, result, some physicists
say, from mans seeking to conquer nature rather than to co-operate
with it. Nature is too complex to control; its variety too great;
but co-operation might be possible. Similarly, our social systems
are too complex; we are characterised by infinite variety both as
individuals and as groups; attempts to reduce this variety by
trying to force us into a pattern which is seen as ideal can result
only in dangerous failure.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the quantity of variety in
a system will be greater when that system is subject to rapid
change. Change over a period of time is very similar to variety at
a point in time. If this is so, then there is more need now to find
social control and management methods which can accommodate
variety.
Most of our systems of social organisation emerged in periods
when the rate of change was relatively slow. Change, particularly
rapid change, makes prediction of human behaviour more difficult
because the utility of experience is reduced. This is one of the
features of the phenomenon termed the generation
gap-- and, of course, there are many other gaps. Conforming
behaviour is predictable behaviour. Thus, the simplest means
whereby predictability of individual behaviour can be obtained is
by reduction of variety of that behaviour. The implicit belief
seems to be that if we had enough laws, and if everybody obeyed
these laws, then we would be able to predict.
It is interesting that we use the term law to describe the
process whereby we seek to reduce variety in human behaviour. There
is an implied association with laws (as we describe certain
scientific statements) in the physical world. But physical laws
must accommodate the variety of the natural system. True, we see
nature as law abiding and, to such an extent that when we find it
not to be so, we immediately change our statements of the laws to
take account of the new perceptions of the events described. Laws
of nature do not restrict the variety or complexity of the natural
system, rather they provide a means for prediction through the
richness of their information. We certainly have no ways for
punishing nature when it does not follow our laws! The most elegant
statements of natural laws are not only rich in information, but
most concise.
Criminal law, unlike scientific laws, may not be intended to
summarise
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Crime in the World of 1990 207
observations of actual behaviour. Few, if any, jurists would
claim this as its function. We have, then, two uses of the same
word with two entirely different meanings, and any analogies
between the two will be highly dangerous.
Few social systems can tolerate much variety. The hundred
flowers which Mao once said were to be permitted to bloom, did not
live long; and, of course, he may never have intended this
picturesque phrase to mean a tolerance for variety within the
system of Chinese communism. The hundred flowers were expected to
be all of one form and colour. Yet, as we have noted, our society
proliferates variety and it is impossible to consider the idea of
progress without the contingent idea of diversity. Variety
possesses the information content necessary to permit and
facilitate adaptation.
If todays younger generation were to behave as the previous
generation behaved when their age, such behaviour would undoubtedly
be dysfunctional and unadaptive in the very different conditions of
today. Change and variety must be built into our social
organisations, and the organisations must be capable of change. The
prediction of probable change can facilitate smooth progression
from stage to stage. Adjustment to change when it is forced upon a
society by dramatic incidents, serious conflict or a breakdown of
the local structure is, obviously, undesirable. Yet, perhaps, this
kind of event has been the main vehicle for change in recent years.
Prison reform has achieved less than prison riots; black militancy
has obtained a pay-off; violence tends to be rewarded and
reinforced. Yet violence is obsolete as a means for problem
solving. Violence seems to have a natural tendency to escalate, and
we know little of the techniques of de-escalation, either in
individual, small group or national and international conflict
situations. The decision-making process should reduce (not
eliminate) uncertainty; it is not necessary to reduce variety,
indeed it may be dangerous to do so.
The impact of changing values on the 1990s
The very large rise in recorded crime in the last few years has
troubled most countries. In England, for example, while the
incarceration rate did not change apart from small random
fluctuations between the two Great Wars, from 1945 to date it has
increased by more than 300%. It is clear that what we are doing
about crime has increased by leaps and bounds; it is a little less
certain that the total amount of crime has increased by a similar
amount. Much depends upon our reference. If the cost of living
legally increases, and we have to increase our productivity to keep
pace, then, surely the cost of illegal living also increases! If we
measure the increase in crimes against property against the
increase in the availability of goods, say, as evidenced by
increases in the gross national product, the increase in the crime
rate is less dramatic. Of equal importance to what the criminal
does is what society does about him-in other words- decisions about
criminals are as important as criminals decisions. As Peter
McNaughton-Smith has observed, Perhaps we do not so much have a
drug problem, as a drug-problem problem. What we decide to do about
crime may be an important factor in its increase. We tend to focus
on the assumption that since we do not like crime, whatever we do
about it must tend to decrease it; but this is a non-sequitur.
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208 Crime in the World of 1990
There has been a trend recently in the USA to try to do
something about social evils which, according to sociological
theory, are causes of crime. This may be a self-defeating strategy.
Social ills should be dealt with not because they give rise to
crime, but because they are social ills. There is little doubt that
if the present trend towards emphasis on law and order continues,
the court system will break down. In the major metropolitan areas
it has already broken down, although various expedient substitutes
have been extemporised.
The great political emphasis on law and order has consequences
not only for the offender or would-be offender; indeed, it is
possible that the most serious effect is upon the law-abiding
citizen. We are moving towards a time when the middle-class form of
living will look similar to that of the mediaeval lords of the
manors. Already in New York City there are apartment blocks which
function as the Norman castle-closed circuit television monitors
the entrance ; guards further check each visitor; locks are
electronic; and patrols move around continuously-a striking
similarity to the moat, walls and battlements of centuries past.
The trend is set in the direction of abandonment of the streets at
night to outlaws, and this results not so much from what we have or
have not done about criminals, but is best considered as the result
of a deviation-amplification process related to the fear generated
in the law-abiding citizen. If the citizen is not on the streets,
his place cannot be taken by uniformed officers of the state.
It will take us a long time to learn to distinguish the
political and inconse- quential from social danger; to substitute
as a criterion for criminal law, the socially dangerous for the
socially annoying or morally disapproved. A large body of our laws
and regulations are functional for the law-makers, but not for the
s0ciety.i What are the major dangers for society? The main threats
today, and in the immediate future, tend to be invisible. They
arise from the increasing size of the total environment, the
increased interdependence of the parts and the unpredictable
connections between them. This is a result of the accelerating and
unevenness of change. 2 A few figures: New York City disposes of
garbage which fills seven miles of rail trucks in one day; Londons
incinerator deals with 700 trucks a day; San Francisco (a
relatively small city) dumps 1500 tonnes a day in its Bay. There
are also the dangers of pesticides, of thermal pollution as well as
atomic waste pollution, and of the threat to our existence of the
ecological imbalance. This is a social threat indeed. The major
dangers now result from collective guilt, rather than individual
misbehaviour. Yet our social institutions and the law find this a
difficult concept. We spend millions fiddling with marijuana use
while the Rome of our society heads for burning.
The next few years will, undoubtedly, see a great increase in
the conglomerate financing and control of business. A financial
power elite may well exceed the power of elected governments.
Information and its handling constitute a power as important, or
even more important than horse-power. Informational power is
purchased through the funding of research. Curbs on official
spending reduce the power of elected officials to purchase research
and obtain access to informa- tion on behalf of the people they
represent. There will be an increasing tendency for information to
be possessed by private corporations and conglomerates. How can we
be assured that this information power is accessible to the
people?
There are traces in some contemporary Western societies that
private power
FUTURES September 1970
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will not be restricted to the use of information, but extend to
the use of more conventional force in situations which the elected
officers of the state would not be prepared to use. In England,
surprisingly enough, there have already been instances of private
forces, armed similarly to the police and wearing similar types of
uniforms being used by private organisations to deal with
demonstrators in situations where the police authorities did not
consider action was called for. Dissatisfaction with the police on
the part of the unorganised members of the public is one thing, but
on the part of organisations it is more insidious.
Money, for the individual member of our society is, without
saying, an important commodi~. Money in its old (and obsolescent
form) is issued by the government, but more transactions are now
made by means of credit cards for which the determination of the
character of the individual is in control of private
organisations.
The trend towards more and more power over the individual being
in the hands of non-elected organisations may be expected to
continue. In itself this may not be undesirable. If the private
organisations concerned comply with the general ethic of the
society, they might perform more efficiently than an official body.
Our problem is to ensure that the general ethic is stated and
maintained.
These examples are somewhat specific. Similar examples could be
found from many other areas. Medical scientists expect, for
example, that not only will drugs to dissolve gall stones be
available before 1980, but also new, more varied and more reliable
drugs for control of fatigue, relaxation, alertness, mood,
personality, perceptions and fantasies.3 Who is going to be given
the right or to have the duty to see that these substances are not
misused? What will we mean by misuse ? When these substances are
actually available, will it be possible to state the serious
questions in any different terms from those in which they can now
be stated? If not, should we not begin now to consider them? Does
not this prognosis put some of our present policies into different
per- spective? The rate of change is so great that few of our
projections on the basis of current states of knowledge may be
expected to be late in arrival.
An article in the June 1969 issue of Futzlres noted that among
expected com- puter developments was the following: Policing of
individual vehicles by combined radar detection and computer record
of violations-licence number, excess speed, etc; expected date:
198L4 Before this date, oral input to com- puter, laser memories,
laser transmission of information and computers learning from
experience; and again, much, much more.
Types of moral values likely to characterise the future
If we are to deal ahead of time with the technological
developments that will surely be with us, we need to know whether
in our research and deliberations we should use current value
systems or not. If our current value systems are to be modified,
then the kinds of solutions which might be appropriate could
differ.
Where can we find the information which could indicate the lead
or pipeline in which changing moral values might be identified? It
is, perhaps, in the voices of the under-30s. They will be in charge
of the society when these projections are realised. Will they
change their views and as they get to our
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210 Crime in the World of 1990
age look on life as we now do ? If they do, then surely man will
become extinct. On this assumption, let us try to make some
assessment of the values against which deviance and crime of 1990
will be measured.
Every person whom we determine as deviant is, to some degree
commenting by his actions, not only upon himself, but also upon his
society. In some deviant acts the degree of comment on society may
be the major element, in others it may be a very small element. But
even persons adjudged as insane reflect in their insanity something
of the culture and their environment. We might try to hear some of
the comment, even although we may deprecate the language of theft,
assault, drug use or demonstration in which it is expressed. The
message (however encoded) may be important.
Some young persons say that what they are about is revolution.
They say that we are a violent society and that we have got our
values screwed up, Carl Oglesby has described a process of changes
through which a revolutionary develops. An early stage is that of
prayer and petition.5 At this stage, the individual seeks to appeal
to an authority which is higher than that which he sees as
responsible for his condition. At this stage, he believes that
there are some persons of authority who know what is right and who
would assist him if only they knew his situation. The appeal is
often that of incantation and quasi- religious. Underlying this
stage of belief is the assumption that there is some view of
justice within the social system which accords with the petitioner.
He feels that he can get into touch with that power, and that such
contact would be adequate. Without developing this further at the
moment let us try to relate this to law and morals.
The similarity between this form of belief and that of religious
beliefs will be self-evident. God is good-good, that is, in
absolute terms, hence, in terms which are meaningful to us as
individuals. If God is supremely powerful and just and if He has
His representatives in our modern society, then we cannot revolt
against an authority which we see as the ultimate court of appeal.
If our concept of law, justice and right are summarised into a
belief in one God, and our God is also the God of those in power,
then we must accept those in authority in His name. But if this
simple structure begins to break down : if God (our God) is not on
the side of those in power over us: or if there is no God : or if
He is irrelevant, then the situation begins to look very different.
The approach from prayer, incantation and appeal seems invalid.
In the light of this analysis it is possible to interpret part
of an essay by one of my students. The sad fact, he wrote, is that
we . . . are beginning to come to grips with the realities of
American life; the incantory petition to authority . . . will not
change anything. The reason, stated too simply, is that there is no
just king. One cannot appeal to a higher justice which does not
exist. It may be noted that the claim that justice does not exist
within the structure relies equally on the concept ofjustice. To be
able to say that tjustice does not exist presupposes that we know
what justice is, and that what exists is not that. Does it seem
paradoxical that a belief in justice leads to the development of a
revolutionary viewpoint ?
Again, quoting the same student, . . . the incantation of appeal
must become protest and resistance if we are to avoid the
co-option, invisibility and sheer impotence that have been our
experience. Alternative responses are, of
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Crime in the World of 1990 211
course, opting out of the system and seeking whatever
satisfactions are possible within oneself or from a sub-cultural
setting as independent as possible of the social order one
abhors.
It was earlier suggested we should listen to young people who
say things like this, We should seek to decode anti-social
behaviour and find the message. Many seem not to agree. However, it
should be noted that while repression of dissent may provide a
period of quiessence, it will only be at great cost and in the end
prove dysfunctional.
Decoding information youth transmits about society
As the hackneyed phrase has it, there is a communication gap and
a generation gap; more, there is a conceptual gap. It is not hard
to suggest some reasons for this.
Law, for its rationale, relates to ethics, but operationally the
legal system is an integral part of the political system. Law is
what legislators legislate. In countries where political regimes
have obtained power and are such that the majority of the world
population would consider them to be immoral, the judiciary has not
long been able to hold out against the attack from the political
powers. By this it is not to say that crime is nothing more than
politics, rather, the connection between law and ethical
considerations is effected through the political system. The legal
system is modulated by the political system and the political
system is modulated by the value systems of the society. The legal
system has some small room for manoeuvre independent of the
political system, but not much. The more closely the legal system
is considered by the public to be associated with the political
system, the more open to challenge are the legal concepts on the
part of those who do not accept the philosophy of the party in
power.
Some minorities have always tended to challenge the authority of
the current law on grounds of a higher allegiance. This is the
position of many young today. They do this with a level of
conviction and in such proportions that they are seen as both
immoral and unpatriotic. One of the reasons they can so protest is
that they see law as dependent upon political factors rather than
on divine or other acceptable authority. Democracy, if it could be
believed to exist, might provide a basis of ethical support for
law, but the political system is considered to be only called a
democracy. The present political system is seen as the tyranny of
the majority over the minorities. Power is achieved, it is thought,
by manipulation of mass media, money and bureaucracies. Thus a
crisis in confidence in politics is becoming a crisis in law and
order.
This process implies a different concept of the basis of law
from that which we may see as acceptable; nevertheless, it seems to
be irreversible. We cannot go back to some divine right of kings,
nor expect a revival of the church, the extended family or other
doctrinal support. Rather we must follow the challenge of the new
patterns of thought and see where these might lead. Myths are
beginning to loose their grip. The first myth challenged by youth
is that God (rather than politics) provides the basis of law.
Empiricism and phenomenology lead to this point.
We must accept as a fact that young persons see the present
world differently
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212 Crime in the World of 1990
from those who are older. We may be looking at the same things,
but young persons interpret phenomena with reference to a different
set of experiences. They are the first generation to experience no
times prior to the mass com- munication media of television; they
are the first generation to experience from the first time they can
begin to appreciate what war means, that mankind has the undoubted
potential to destroy itself; they are the first generation to begin
life within a world which evidences the four dimensions of space;
they are the first generation to experience the implications of
uncertainty and probability as a general principle.
Changes in the physical ecology are evident. We have recently
been warned of the complexities of ecological balance and begun to
know how critical it is for survival. But this is not all. We are
not only influenced by the changing physical ecology, but bound up
with technological development are changes in our verbal or
linguistic ecology. Certainly those who use visual analogies as a
vehicle for their thought find the available resources greatly
enriched. Similarly, our verbal ecology has been enriched as a
direct result of the physical develop- ments. A child does not tend
now to ask how far one place is from another, but how long the
journey will take. Time has replaced distances as a measure in many
respects of ordinary life. Those people who have tried to help
their children with their new mathematics will have some idea of
the conceptual gap. As the language to describe and operate with
the new technology has been added to our vocabularies, so has
increased the verbal store available for thinking about anything
else, even morals and values. We cannot separate the warp of speech
and thought relating to technology from the weft of speech and
thought about any other problems which we may wish to consider. Not
even the older generation can now find it possible to think
according to the manner and style of thought which they used before
they thought as they now think.
What is here termed the linguistic eco-system within which young
persons function differs markedly from that of the older
generation. Moral principles have conveniently been taught by means
of metaphor and analogy-the Kingdom of Heaven is like unto . . .
Remember too, the concept of justice as a blindfolded maiden with
scales to balance and assess weights. Thus, it seems reasonable to
claim that moral principles have depended for their communication
upon the linguistic and physical ecology in which those who taught
and those who learned then lived. Moral principles have also been
generally expressed in simple dichotomies-wrong and right; true and
false; responsible and not responsible; guilty and not guilty;
saved and unsaved; Christian and heathen; and so on. But then too,
in the world of scientific thought less than a century ago there
was cause and effect and a simple determinism underlay the
models.
Today the only occasions when a young person is likely to
experience the language of black and white-the simple two-value
logic-is when he goes to church, or to court.
We have at the present time one form of language (or set of
linguistic conventions) in which we find it necessary to express
our moral concepts, and a different language, a new one, to
describe the fields of knowledge.
When our models of the universe were simple, the earlier
language was adequate to describe and conceptualise the issues with
which we were concerned.
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Crime in the World of 1990 213
We could then use the same language for morals issues and
scientific issues. It is only recently that we have had to utilise
probabilistic models, stochastic processes and cybernetics models
as forms of explanation.
A relationship which the culture can accommodate must exist
between our value system and its means of expression and our system
of knowledge. Persons and societies who have not arrived at such an
accommodation will experience conflict and disorganisation. Our
young people are facing these issues. Some theologians may claim
that we must exist with two different languages; that values
systems are essentially dichotomous. But even if this formulation
can be sustained, the point about the necessity of an accommodation
still holds. The conflict of conceptual systems (one derived from
our enriched vocabulary resulting from technological development,
the other the two-value logic of morals and religion) is one of the
possible explanations of the present state of malaise of the law
and the judicial systems of advanced countries. The dis- crepancy
between the two forms of language is most apparent to the young,
and particularly to those among them who are the more highly
educated. It is not surprising, therefore, that major difficulties
are experienced by (and with) the best students and the best
universities.
Would it not be a better strategy to seek to join them in their
endeavour to find a set of moral values appropriate to our time,
rather than classifying them as deviants, rebels, unpatriotic, or
any of the other terms of abuse which are commonly heard? Are the
values of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant ethic adequate for the future?
Come to that, are they adequate for the present?
Moral values for the future
What are the values of the Protestant ethic? Trist has listed
four corner-stones of our traditional morality: achievement,
self-control, independence, and endurance of distress (grin and
bear it).6 What then are the values of the dissidents ? Trist (who
specifically rejects the views of Marcuse), notes these as :
self-actualisation, self-expression, inter-dependence, and a
capacity for joy. Not all of these two sets are in conflict;
perhaps the most difficult to reconcile is that of the new value
ofinterdependence as against the old value of independence. Of
course there will be crime in 1990; but it is to be hoped (if not
projected) that it will then be defined in terms of up-dated value
systems.
What about the process of transition ? We are already late. It
is difficult to estimate whether we can adapt quickly enough.
Perhaps the impact of other systems in society upon the legal
system will force an acceleration in the needed change. The recent
interventions of systems engineers and management scien- tists
would lead one to hope that this may be so. But we must be careful
that these new techniques are harnessed to a value system that is
not out-of-date. It is possible to use computer technology to do
fast and badly what has previously been done badly and slowly. If
we programme our computers to do faster, cheaper, more accurately
and far less personally that which is being done personally, we may
have a trade-off which represents a distinct loss and a great
danger.
Adaptation to change over time is closely related to variety at
a point in time. If we cannot cope with variety now, we may cut off
the very growing points of
FUTURES September 1970
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214 Crime in the World of 1990
society and wreck our chances for change and adaptation. We do
not need more conformity with existing norms, but more of the
beauty of functional variety. We do not need more effort to be
given to finding out who is to blame, but more effort to enrich the
complexity of our social control processes through the use of
information. We must take great care to avoid in the future the
creation of problems through our methods of seeking to eliminate
them.
We must work for both more democracy and more technology at one
and the same time. This will be difficult, but it is essential for
survival of our society as we know it.
There are many problems which we should take out of the field of
criminal justice and work upon them as though they were problems in
management science. There are others where the contribution of
legal philosophy is small but important, and in these kinds of
problems we must find ways to co-ordinate a variety of approaches.
We must explore the consequences of applying the models afforded by
stochastic processes, epidemiology, information and decision
theory, and in general look at the criminal justice area as an open
system-and not only as a system.
In short, the need is for planning; for consideration of the
probabilities of future outcomes in terms of their perceived
desirability; a need for serious, scientific planning.
References
1. I. Gerver and J. Bensman, Crime and Punishment in the
Factory, in B. Rosenberg, I. Gerver, F. W. Howton, Eds, Mass
Society in Crisis (New York, Macmillan, 1964)
2. E. Trist, Urban North America, World Congress on Mental
Health, Edinburgh, 1969
3. A. Douglas Bender, Alvin E. Strack, George W. Ebright, and
George von Haunalter, Delphic Study Examines Developments in
Medicine, Futures, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 289-303
4. Chrestem A. Bjerrum, Forecasts of Computer Developments and
Applications 1968-2000, Futures, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 331-338
5. Carl Oglesby, Containment and Change (New York, Macmillan,
1967) 6. E. Trist, op tit
FUTURES September 1970