FPRC Journal - WordPress.com · 2011-11-15 · FPRC Journal No. 8 India ‘s Look East Policy 2 RESPONSES A.P. Venkateswaran,Former Foreign Secretary of India C.V. Ranganathan,Former

FPRC Journal

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No. 8 2011

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Focus : India’s Look East Policy

Responses, Articles

(Ed.) Prof. Mahendra Gaur

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Foreign Policy Research Centre NEW DELHI (India)

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FPRC Journal No. 8 India ‘s Look East Policy

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RESPONSES A.P. Venkateswaran,Former Foreign Secretary of India

C.V. Ranganathan,Former Ambassador of India

Ranjit Gupta,Former Ambassador of India

Rajiv Bhatia,Former Ambassador of India

Vice Admiral Pradeep Kaushiva UYSM, VSM (retd),Director,NMF,New Delhi

Dr.Damodar R. Sardesai,,Emeritus Professor of History,University of California

Walter C. Ladwig III,Merton College , Oxford and an affiliate of the Corbett

Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at Kings College London. Articles

1.Dr Alexander (‘Sandy’) Gordon, Australian National University, Canberra

2.Dr.Pavin Chachavalpongpun,Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 3.Dr. Alka Acharya,Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. New Delhi 4.Dr.Mohammed Badrul Alam,Professor, Dept. of Political Science,Jamia Millia Islamia University,New Delhi 5.Dr. Joefe B. Santarita,Assistant Professor,Asian Center, University of the Philippines,Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines 6.Dr.Lipi Ghosh,Professor, Department of South & South East Asian Studies, Univ. of Calcutta 7.Dr. P.V.Rao,Former Director, Centre for Indian Ocean Studies,Osmania University 8.Dr. K. Raja Reddy,Former Director,Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati 9.GUO Suiyan, Deputy-Director General,Institute for South Asian Studies,Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences,Kunming, China

10.Dr Munmun Majumdar,Associate Prof. of Pol.Sc.,North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong

11.Dr.Rakhee Bhattacharya,Fellow,Rajiv Gandhi Inst. for Contemporary Studies,New Delhi

12.Dr. Rupakjyoti Borah, School of Liberal Studies, Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat

13.Dr. Binoda Kumar Mishra,Fellow,Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies,Kolkata

14.Dr Yadu Singh,President of Council of Indian Australian Inc, Sydney

15.Dr. K. Yhome ,ORF,New Delhi

16.Dr. S.UTHAM KUMAR ,Dept of Defence and Strategic Studies,University of Madras,Chennai ,India


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PREFACE

India's "Look East" Policy, which was initiated in 1991, marked a strategic shift in India's perspective of the world. Twenty years later it is but proper that we should have a re-look on this bold foreign policy initiative of India. It has rightly been suggested that India should take advantage of Look East policy’s 20th anniversary to update her relationship with the East. The 8th issue of the FPRC JOURNAL focuses on the various dimensions of India’s Look East Policy – (i) India’s Look East Policy-political,economic,strategic and cultural dimensions (ii) India’s Look East Policy- Domestic factor-North East (iii) India’s Look East Policy-working together with China, Japan, US & Australia

We are thankful to our contributors who have shared our sentiments and accepted our invitation to enrich the contents of the Journal,even at the cost of personal inconvenience. They have always been our source of strength. Mahendra Gaur Indira Gaur

Director Mg. Editor

Foreign Policy Research Centre New Delhi


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A.P. Venkateswaran, (pp.5-7) Former Foreign Secretary of India

C.V. Ranganathan, (pp.8-10) Former Ambassador of India

Ranjit Gupta, (pp.11-17) Former Ambassador of India

Rajiv Bhatia, (pp.18-21) Former Ambassador of India

Vice Admiral Pradeep Kaushiva UYSM, VSM (retd), (pp.22-27) Director,National Maritime Foundation,New Delhi

Dr.Damodar R. Sardesai,, (pp.28-35) Emeritus Professor of History,University of California Walter C. Ladwig III, (pp.36-40) Merton College , Oxford and an affiliate of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies

at Kings College London.


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(1) A.P. Venkateswaran

Former Foreign Secretary of India

Mr. Venkateswaran, former Ambassador to

China and the top bureaucrat in the Foreign

Affairs Ministry,served as Foreign

Secretaryof India from 1 April 1986 to 20 January 1987.On 21 January,1987,he

resigned as Foreign Secretary and communicated in writing his desire for premature retirement from the IFS.The exit of AP Venkateswaran from the FS’s post occasioned much excitement and speculation doubtless continues till today about

the background of the development.

Currently,he is Chairman , Asia Centre,Bangalore.


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Response to Questionnaire

on

India ‟s Look East Policy.

INTRODUCTION:

At the very outset, it is important to keep in mind that many terms used by people tend to be very general and only confuse rather than clarify one’s thinking. For example, a famous Chinese Classical Novel, which remains popular to this day in that country, is titled: “A Journey to the West”. It traces the travel of its main characters from China to India . Everything has to be seen in a relative context and has to be understood in terms of where we ourselves stand, at any point of time and space. That is one of the main reasons that India chose to call countries of the so-called “ Middle East ”, as West Asian Countries, which made more geographic sense to us. Suffice it also to recall the famous statement of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, when she was asked if she leaned to the West or to the East, that she had always stood Upright! That was also the basic logic of the Non-Aligned Policy that India adopted, shortly after becoming independent from the colonial yoke. Brief answers to the questions posed Seratim on India ’s Look East Policy are given below and have to be understood in that context. 1. India’s position has always generally been based on what is good for India . Fortunately, our universality of outlook has always stood us in good stead. At the time that that the world was sought to be divided by the major powers into two blocs, the Western Bloc led by the USA and the Eastern Bloc, led by the USSR, India had courageously formed the Non-Aligned Group of countries, to serve as a buffer between them and to avert the calamity of yet another devastating World War. I believe that when the History is written of this era, due credit will be given by historians to the enlightening philosophy of Non-Alignment that had prevented the complete polarization of the world into two warring groups, poised at each other’s throats! 2. China had joined India as a member of the Non-Aligned group of countries. Alas, she had failed the acid test of adhering to the 5-Principles of the on-Aligned Movement and used force to assert her territorial claims against India . But that should not make India adopt a similar hostile stance towards India . Resoluteness in keeping to one’s position is the key to settlement of differences.


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3. The USA , even initially, had been interested in forming an alliance with India . But, India had been reluctant to get involved in any kind of military alliance. It was only then that the USA turned to Pakistan and formed the SEATO and CENTO to further her own objectives in the region, having formed NATO earlier, with the European Powers. No wonder that the then US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had termed Non-Aligment as an “immoral” policy! Today, there is a desire on the part of the USA to exploit the concerns of India about an Emerging and increasingly assertive China , and form a closer association with India . It is certainly more advisable for India to plow her own independent furrow, with self-confidence, than to get involved with the USA or the Western Countries, which may only lead India to grief. 4. History is replete with past mistakes! When ASEAN was being formed in the 1960s, countries of ASEAN were keen to have India as a member. But India had been reluctant to join it. Now, she has perforce to take the low road and to gain greater acceptance from all members of the organization. There is no question that India ’s future is with the East rather than with the West. 5. Better relations with our neighbours to the East, such as Bangladesh , Myanmar , Thailand etc., will enable India to develop a better relationship with India ’s North Eastern Region. This is incontrovertible logic and we have been remiss in developing our ties so far in the region. Our earlier neglect was based on wrong premises of keeping the border states as “Museum Pieces” due to the advice of Christian Missionaries, like Verrier Elwin, who had pursued their own agenda. 6. Certainly, yes. If we had shown greater inetest earlier in developing these relations with our neighbours, we would have achived many objectives that elude us today. The recent successes with Bangladesh should be an object lesson in this regard. 7. The process has just begun. Better late than never. The fact that it will take time should not deter us, now that we seem to have woken up to this imperative. 8. It is beginning to have such a policy now. We should not be faint-hearted about it. We must develop the strategic vision and work together with South East Asian countries with whom we have had lasting historical and economic ties. The links with Indonesia , Cambodia etc are too well known to bear repetition. Our trade a thousand years ago by the sea route with China , during the Chola Period is well-documented. 9. I believe that the latent friendship with the ASEAN countries can be easily re-kindled, once India re-establishes her sincerity to do so. Our cultural and historic ties with these countries have always been peaceful.

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(2) C.V. RANGANATHAN Former Ambassador of India and Former Convenor, National Security Advisory Board

Amb. C. V Ranganathan joined the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) in 1959 and has served in a number of distinguished positions as a diplomat. He has been the First Secretary, Embassy of India , Beijing , China (1965 – 1968) and Commissioner of India , Hong Kong (1980 – 1983). He has been Ambassador of India to various countries to

including China and France . Though he retired from Indian Foreign Service in 1993, he continues to be active, holding advisory and research positions. He was the Co-Chairman of “India-China Eminent Persons Group”. He has published many articles and contributions to books, newspapers, journals, and magazines in India and abroad on international affairs. His book “ India and China – The Way Ahead” that he Co-author with V.C. Khanna has won critical acclaim. He was the Convener of the National Security Advisory Group (2002-2004)


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FPRC Journal- Replies to some Questions

1. Does India’s ‘Look East’ Policy mark a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world?

India’s ‘Look East’ policy needs to be seen in the context of the situation in India and in the world prevailing in the early nineties of the last decade of the last century. Former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao ably assisted by the then Finance Minister had embarked on the policy of opening up the Indian economy, the former Soviet Union was on the verge of imploding, India and China had started on the path of improving their relations after decades of stagnation, economic reforms in China were showing initial results and South East Asian countries had improved their economies. India clearly needed to adapt to these changes while discarding the insular economic policies of the previous decades. Although Indian strategic thinkers talk of the ‘Look East’ policy as a strategic shift etc. it was really an attempt at restoring in a modern context India’s traditional age old links in commerce, ideas and culture with a vast populated region with which India has historically, socially, culturally enjoyed close contacts. South East Asian countries also were enthused by the policy decisions to open up India referred to above as they also were no longer restrained by the previous estrangement between India and China. At the time of the announcement of the ‘Look East’ policy, in 1992,it would seem that the countries of the ASEAN Group were the first to see the potential inherent in the change of India’s domestic economic policies.

2. Has India’s ‘Look East’ policy paid good dividends in terms of power, commerce and influence?

In 2012 it is proposed to have a Summit meeting in Delhi to mark the twentieth anniversary of India-ASEAN relations which will be attended by Heads of States and Governments of respective member states. This is a symbol of the vast importance attached by the ASEAN as a whole and India to their mutual relations which has evolved to become a major factor in the geopolitics and economic relations in the region of South East Asia. Indo- ASEAN trade today has touched US50 billion. India has Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements with Singapore, which played a very leading part in the initial years of Indo-ASEAN relations in guiding India into the various institutions of ASEAN, Malaysia and such agreements are under negotiation with Indonesia and Thailand. Free Trade Agreement in goods has been signed between India and ASEAN. This needs to be supplemented by an FTA in services which is under intense negotiations. Mutual investments by India in ASEAN countries and by them in India have grown. In a situation where the Doha round under WTO has not seen success as yet and where western economies have collapsed the growing value of India’s relations with ASEAN as a whole needs no emphasis. The expanding role of military links between India and major ASEAN countries is another factor which consolidates mutual relations. Here the role of the


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Indian Navy which is today welcomed in the region as benign contributor in the event of disasters or against piracy or as a protector of the safety of sea lanes is important. 3. Why is China wary of India’s ‘Look East’ policy? Calls it a failure.

After the economic melt down in the West, the impressive growth of China and the steady economic growth of India have led to hyphenated international expectations that their rise would come to the rescue of the global economy. This is of course an exaggeration which points to the centre of economic gravity shifting to the East. However implicit in this are political implications about the increasing role of India in global affairs with which China needs to come to terms. The rapid growth of India-ASEAN relations offers a good building block for the EAST Asia Summit process to succeed in bringing a greater measure of economic and political order to a vast region of Asia, east of India. In spite of Chinese attitudes towards India all other participants in the East Asia Summit which would include the ASEAN, USA, Russia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand are supportive of India. Facts speak for themselves about the success of India’s Look East policy and its great value to expand interests in Asia, east of India. 4. Why is USA interested in working more closely with India in Asia Pacific?

Like others in Asia, USA has acknowledged India’s growth potential in terms of its scientific, entrepreneurial and military assets and the possible contributions it can make to enhance public goods in the Asia-Pacific region. However the precise content and scope of India’s contributions are subjects of India’s own autonomous judgement and its evaluation of its capacities and interests. In general India’s vision is of an inclusive Asian structural architecture whose ultimate aim should be to bring about a free movement of people, ideas, trade, commerce and cultural links through a vast continent linked by transport connectivity. In India’s case from the beginning of this century its relations with the major powers, USA, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, China, Brazil, South Africa and with major regional groupings such as European Union, ASEAN and others have vastly improved. Each of these relations are mutually reinforcing and the expectations of USA that India should play a greater role in Asia should be seen in that context. C.V.Ranganathan, I.F.S.Retd.

Former Ambassador to China. 30-10-2011


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(3) Ranjit Gupta Former Ambassador of India

Ranjit Gupta is a retired Indian Foreign Service officer. Till Nov 2010, he was a Member of the National Security Advisory Board; is currently a Distinguished Fellow of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies. Earlier he has been Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, Visiting Professor at the Academy

of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, and Ambassador-in-Residence at the Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has been delivering lectures at think tanks, universities and other academic institutions in India and abroad and participating in conferences, seminars and workshops primarily relating to India's relations with the Gulf region; Southeast Asia and East Asia including in particular relating to China, Myanmar, Taiwan and Tibet and India’s ‘Look East Policy’; India’s National Security Challenges and Role in the Emerging Global Geostrategic Scenario in the 21st Century; and, India-US Relations with particular reference to the regional fallout of what had been labeled as the ‘War on Terror

During his 39 year career with India’s Ministry of External Affairs he had served successively in Cairo, New York (at the Permanent Mission of India to the UN), Gangtok (at the time of Sikkim’s merger with India), Jeddah (Deputy Chief of Mission), Frankfurt (Consul-General) and Kathmandu (Deputy Chief of Mission). Later he was successively India’s Ambassador to Yemen (North), Venezuela, Oman, Thailand and Spain and finally was Head of India’s Representation in Taiwan.


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Response to Questionnaire on

India’s ‘Look East’ Policy

1.Does India’s Look East Policy mark a strategic shift in India’s vision of world? Is the East more relevant for India?

To answer this question meaningfully one has to recapitulate the ground realties of India’s situation in the international context at the time when the concept ‘Look East Policy’ first surfaced. Quotations from two articles that I had written earlier provide

a succinct yet comprehensive picture of this.

First – from my article entitled ‘India’s Future Security Environment’ included in the book ARMY 2020 edited by Lt. Gen Vijay Oberoi (Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2005) under the auspices of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies: “During the Cold War period India was surrounded by a network of alliances which greatly aggravated India’s geopolitical difficulties. One neighbour, Pakistan, was the hub of India’s security threats. Another neighbour, China, with which we have an even longer border, had been almost as hostile. To make matters worse, these two established an exceedingly close, lip-and-teeth, strategic, military and political alliance. The world’s most powerful nation, the United States, also established an alliance relationship with Pakistan and for the latter half of the Cold War the US also had a strategic partnership with China. In addition, the US also established a web of alliances in West Asia and South East Asia and Pakistan was a member of both. The dynamics of Cold War politics and India’s insular economic policies ensured that India had marginalized itself from the international mainstream. India never conceived a long term strategic vision of its future beyond being the leader and spokesman of the emerging Third World; this gave India very considerable international prestige and influence but started waning from 1955 or so and after 1962 went into free fall. Thus, India progressively lost clout even within the Third World while ensuring a poor relationship with the powerful Western World. At the end of the Cold War, India’s only friends were countries of the Soviet bloc, Bhutan, Cyprus, Maldives and Mauritius. (Vietnam had been inadvertently left out in the final version and should be in this list). Finally, India’s most stalwart friend, the Soviet Union, disappeared and India itself was on the verge of financial collapse (India’s credibility was so low that it was forced to have its gold reserves physically

airlifted out of the country to be bailed out).”

Second – from my article entitled ‘India’s Look East Policy’ in the book INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY edited by Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2007) under the auspices of the Foreign Service Institute of the Ministry of External Affairs: “ It would desirable to recall the scenario that existed when the ‘Look East’ Policy was initiated. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of its Communist empire marked the end of the Cold War. A dramatically


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changing global scenario started emerging with new equations and new relationships clearly on the horizon. The US became the sole global superpower. A rising China emerged as an increasingly significant player in East Asia. Japan entered a period of economic recession and was under severe US criticism for its hands off attitude in the first Gulf War and thus uncertain and confused about how to handle its relations with Asean, China and the US. Asean countries had dramatically transformed their economies by opening up to each other, to Japan, then to Taiwan and Korea, and finally to China to establish strong economic linkages, consciously setting aside and overcoming mutual historical animosities, for the greater benefit and prosperity of all. A country’s economic strength, vibrancy, policies and linkages with other countries were manifestly becoming the preeminent drivers of regional relationships. In the context of the constantly enlarging shadow of an increasingly self confident China looming over them, Asean countries came up with the strategy of engaging China by forging increasingly closer economic relations with it and by encouraging it to become involved in an increasing web of regional institutional linkages; at the same time they sought to reinforce, bilaterally and otherwise, their security and defence relationships with the US in particular and other Western countries. Asean had (more than once) tried to engage India earlier but had not been successful. The ‘Look East’ Policy represented the Indian response to this new and changing strategic milieu in the

region.”

“What was the ‘Look East’ Policy? India’s new and revamped approach towards the region east of India was dubbed the ‘Look East’ Policy. This was the brainchild of the then new Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. The first signal of the desire to change policy was the innovative and unorthodox choice of a technocrat as Finance Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. He was not a politician; not even a member of the Congress Party; however, he was an internationally known economist. Speaking at the 16th Asia Society Corporate Conference in Mumbai on March 18th 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said “I must pay tribute to our East and Southeast Asian neighbors for shaping our own thinking on globalization and the means to deal with it. Some of you might recall that in 1992 our Government launched India’s ‘Look East’ Policy. This was not merely an external economic policy, it was also a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global economy. Most of all it was about reaching out to our civilizational Asian neighbors in the region. I have always viewed India’s destiny as being interlinked with that of Asia

and more so Southeast Asia”.

Reengaging with Southeast Asia, in particular with Asean and its then member countries, was the primary objective of the ‘Look East Policy’ which was initially conceived mainly as an economic initiative. Over time, as engagement deepened and mutual confidence grew on both sides, this policy of engagement acquired political, military and strategic dimensions. Around that time there was an equally dramatic change in approach to relations with Myanmar and Taiwan, in the case of the latter


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the motive was purely economic but in Myanmar’s case the China factor was also an important element; the ambit of this policy was gradually extended to relations with countries of East Asia proper. Indeed, engagement with China itself grew exponentially particularly in the political and economic spheres to the extent that

China has been amongst India’s top two trading partners for the past few years. This radical reorientation of its approach to its external economic and political relations – the core of the Look East Policy – has not been confined to countries east of India but has been applied to forging new and changing relationships in other geographical theatres as well and equally successfully. West Asia, particularly its Gulf region, is as important for India as East Asia if not more so; indeed, as a potential global power, India’s relations with major world powers and all regions of the world are also of great importance. There is no need to put specific geographical

regions or individual countries in any hierarchical priority.

2.Why China is wary of India’s Look East Policy? Calls it a failure.

There was no official doctrinal definition of what came to be called the “Look East Policy”. The Look East Policy was simply a phrase coined to describe the reorientation of India’s approach to its external economic and political relations with the world which first manifested itself vis-à-vis countries of Southeast Asia and hence the ‘look east’ part. Since then, simply because a phrase existed - the ‘Look East policy’, all of India’s engagement with countries east of India has been broad

brushed as being a part of the ‘Look East Policy’.

India’s engagement with countries geographically east of India from a virtually non – existent base and tentative exploratory beginnings has blossomed, deepened and expanded truly spectacularly in a multi dimensional manner. Today’s ground reality in terms of relations with each country of the region and with the region as a collectivity could not have been remotely imagined by anybody two decades ago. In that sense the so-called Look East Policy has been an absolutely resounding success. It is axiomatic that India can play a role in the region only to the extent that countries of the region and countries that exercise influence in the region perceive that India’s involvement in or with the region is relevant to their needs and concerns. Therefore, these ‘challenges’ materially circumscribe the scope of India’s ability to take initiatives; it is much more up to countries of the region and countries playing roles in the region to involve India. Through the ‘Look East’ Policy, India signaled its interest and desire in reengaging with the region. Since then, more of the initiative was taken by the countries of the region to build the current superstructure on the foundations that India expressing its interest in being engaged represented. The China factor has certainly played a significant role in the emergence of these new ground realities in South and Southeast Asia but it has been a far more important motivating factor for countries of the region than it has been

for India.


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China respects power and firmness. China has noted that India’s relationship with the US is being dramatically transformed; that India has emerged as a major power in economic, political, military, strategic and technological terms on the global scene; and, that the world is welcoming India’s growing prowess and stature. What must particularly gall is that India has emerged as a player of considerable and growing significance in China’s own backyard in East and Southeast Asia. China is acutely aware of the centuries old cultural and spiritual ties that India shares with Southeast Asia. China knows that in the long term India is the only country that could possibly challenge its ascendancy and potential hegemony in Asia. All this

cannot but make China somewhat wary of a Rising India too

I do not know where the assessment that China terms the Look East Policy as a failure comes from? An analyst, Li Hongmei, had written in the People’s Daily on October 28th 2010 that India’s Look East Policy “was born out of failure - the failure of India’s Cold War strategy of playing both ends against the middle…”. That is factually correct as I have myself pointed out in the beginning. However, the analysis goes on to say that “…today, India is harping on the same string but should wisely skip the out-of-tune piece ….(etc,etc)...’’ implying that India’s assumed and presumed China containment efforts will fail. Chinese commentaries consistently ignore the fact that India has enunciated its policy approach towards China quite explicitly at the Head of Government and other levels repeatedly that there is enough space for both China and India to grow and co-exist in harmony and peace. India has not, does not and is unlikely to subscribe to any China containment policy.

3.Why US is interested in working more closely with India in Asia Pacific?

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during her recent visit to India, hailed LEP;

Assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, said:

"One of the most important aspects of our Asian Pacific strategy is to help put meat

on the bones of India's desire to play a prominent role in the Asian-Pacific region going forward."

This question is really for US analysts and commentators to answer. However, I will offer some comments. China clearly represents the most potent challenge to American hegemony or overarching influence in the region. The gap in economic power, political influence and regional military capability terms between the US and China is diminishing. Since the US is a superpower with global interests and particularly so in the Asia Pacific region, and has been the preeminent power in the Asia Pacific since World War II, it is understandable that the US would like to encourage as many countries as possible to have policies which are friendly to the preservation and protection of US regional interests. Therefore, it would encourage a rising India, with which it is forging a strategic partnership based on shared values, many interests and objectives, to be more actively involved in the region. India has its own vital interests in the region and to the extent that they are


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compatible, multi-dimensional cooperation between the two is desirable, inevitable and perfectly understandable. It would be entirely wrong to construe this as being a

threat directed at any particular country or countries.

4.Has the scope of India's Look East policy expanded? Is India ‘Looking East’ to ‘Look West’-towards US?

The answer to the first part is yes as I have already elaborated earlier. India’s interaction with every country of Southeast and East Asia has expanded dramatically in the past two decades covering all possible areas of activity and aspects of relations. India’s involvement in activities and deliberations in regional multilateral institutions such as the ARF, BIMSTEC, EAS, MGC, etc shows a continuing upward curve. Assessment and analysis is what is needed from a commentator more than statistical and factual data which substantiates that assessment - such data is easily available on the internet and so I will not make the

response longer than it need be. The second part – I do not believe in the usage of glib phrases which this is. India’s growing engagement with the US is across the globe and across an all embracing spectrum of activities. India does not have to look east to look west to the US!

5. What is the impact of LEP on India’s North East region?

Most regrettably there has not been a single meaningful and positive outcome of the enhanced engagement with neighbouring countries in India’s northeastern states yet. It has been articulated insufficiently but the amelioration of the economic and security situation in India’s northeastern states must be regarded as one of the essential objectives of this policy. Priority attention needs to be accorded to: first, the formulation of suitable schemes and projects for the northeast to be devised as an integral part of the nuts and bolts of this policy; and, second, the implementation

of these projects has be done efficiently and in a time-and-budget bound manner.

6. Has India’s LEP paid good dividends in terms of Power, Commerce and Influence? 9. Has India’s Look East Policy resulted in the development of India-ASEAN ties?

The short answer to these questions is a categorical yes. Till the end of the Cold War there was nothing of note at all in India’s relationships with Japan and South Korea for example – today these relationships are very robust and dynamic and acquiring the character of true strategic partnerships. I would term the India Singapore relationship as a special relationship; Singapore has played a hugely important and unique role in the processes of India’s growing interaction with the region. As I had said earlier, assessment and analysis is what is needed from a commentator more than statistical and factual data which substantiates that assessment - such data is


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easily available on the internet and so I will not make the response longer than it need be.

7. What are the prospects and challenges for India’s Look East Policy? 8. Has India a ‘Look East Policy’ at all? It is said that there is no strategic vision, no depth to bilateral agreements and no contacts at the civil society level.

Buddhism is the predominant religion of Southeast and East Asia. India is the home of Buddhism and of the Buddhist holy sites. India has not used this factor at all. A Buddhism based linkage would be a linkage at the grassroots level between the peoples of the region and India could be a particularly significant and enduring one. It would serve to greatly strengthen intergovernmental interaction and indeed even transcend inter governmental interaction with the potential to generate domestic pressures in most countries of the region to ensure the nurturing and maintenance of a truly excellent relationship with India. This glaring lacuna needs urgent priority attention. More efficient implementation of agreements signed is another definite shortcoming that needs focused remedial attention. India seems intimidated by the self created shadow of China over its interaction with the region and seems to have self-imposed entirely unnecessary restrictions in developing the security and defence aspects of its relationships with countries of the region. This needs revisiting. Beyond this one can only say that things can always be better than they

are and there is always scope to be more proactive and do things more efficiently.

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(4)Rajiv Bhatia

Former Ambassador of India

As a career diplomat, Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia served India with distinction for over thirty-seven years (1972 – 2009).

Presently, he is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

Known for his intellectual inclinations, Mr. Bhatia enjoys writing and speaking on a wide range of issues. Since his retirement in end-2009, he has published over 50 articles on foreign policy issues in India’s national dailies, journals and

other publications.

In recent months, he delivered lectures at the National Defense College, Foreign Service Institute, universities and other institutions in India. He has been a regular participant in seminars on foreign policy issues in New Delhi. He has been interviewed by BBC, Bloomberg News, NDTV and

others. He participated in an international seminar in Yangon hosted by the Myanmar Institute of International Affairs (June 2011). He conducted an innovative training workshop in Fiji for diplomats of Pacific Island States (Jan 2011) as well as a 2-week long training programme in Maldives for its future diplomats (Sept

2011).

After joining the Indian Foreign Service in July 1972, Mr. Bhatia served in Indian Embassies in Paris, Beirut, Brussels and Jakarta and as Consul General in Toronto. Later, he served as Ambassador/High Commissioner in Kenya, Myanmar, Mexico and South Africa.

He served as Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi and was responsible for India’s relations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Maldives. He also worked as Joint Secretary in

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce recognized Mr. Bhatia’s contribution to foster business relations by conferring on him the President’s Award for 1997. Kenya, where he was India’s PR to UNEP and UN-Habitat, gave him the opportunity to acquire expertise in multilateral diplomacy, especially during his tenure as the Chairman of Group of 77, Nairobi Chapter in 2001. He was instrumental in establishing India-Mexico Business Chamber (IMBC) in Mexico City in 2006. While in South Africa, he helped in establishing India Business Forum (IBF), India Club and South African Indian Forum (SAIF) to foster solidarity and enhanced effectiveness of Indian Diaspora. He delivered many lectures at various

universities and other institutions in the countries of his accreditation.

Mr. Bhatia has travelled extensively in Canada, West Europe and Southeast and East Asia covering China, Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore, the Philippines and Fiji, besides Indonesia, Myanmar and Bangladesh.

He has journeyed to 56 countries so far. He holds a Master’s degree in political science from Allahabad University, India. He served as a lectuin Meerut College, India for three years (1969-72).

He was born in November 1949. He is keenly interested in arts, culture, history and Indian Diaspora. Other interests are yoga, classical

music and golf. [email protected] email id:


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Interview with Amb. Rajiv Bhatia

India’s ‘Look East’ Policy

1. Does India’s Look East Policy mark a strategic shift in India’s vision of

world?

Yes and no. Let me explain. From ancient times, India has looked both towards the

West and the East because of our vision of ‘the world as a family.’ India has been at

the centre in Asia from where our religious, cultural and commercial influences

travelled in both directions, and ideas, goods and people too came from both sides.

But, colonialism compelled us to look towards Europe, especially London as the seat of

Empire. Later, the Cold War intensified that perception with post-independence India

watching what Washington and Moscow were doing before deciding its own policy.

Hence Prime Minister P.V. Narasimhan Rao’s exhortation to accord a higher importance

to building relations with Southeast Asia was indeed a strategic shift. This was

articulated in a seminal speech at the Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore in

September 1994. However, in the larger historical perspective, it was hardly a new

change as it amounted to going back to our roots in the past, to what Jawaharlal

Nehru, the visionary first prime minister, had told us was our destiny shaped by Asian

identity and solidarity.

2. Why China is wary of India’s Look East Policy? Calls it a failure. If China calls it a failure, I would not be worried. LEP has several components, one of

which is the endeavour to improve and strengthen relations with East Asia that includes

China. Our political and economic relations with China have expanded considerably in

recent years, even though outstanding problems remain. But, the central fact is that

the two countries have competing visions: India wants a multi-polar Asia and a multi-

polar world, whereas China seems to prefer a uni-polar Asia and at best a bi-polar

world.

3. Why US is interested in working more closely with India in Asia Pacific ? US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,during her recent visit to India,hailed LEP ;

Assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, said: "One of the most important aspects of our Asian Pacific strategy is to help put meat

on the bones of India's desire to play a prominent role in the Asian-Pacific region

going forward."


20

Deputy Secretary of State William J Burns said ; “India's outreach is growing, moving

toward a comprehensive vision for the East Asia region a 'Look East' policy that is becoming an 'Act East' policy," .

The reason is obvious: US is on decline and Asia is rising. As a result, the US looks

for a new architecture of relationships in Asia, one that will help it to safeguard its

interests even when its power is less than in the past. US and India share a

convergence of interests; so do US and China as well as China and India. Diplomacy in

Asia is a constant and complex dance, if I may use the term, with the sole aim of

promoting a constellation that favours you. India has no intention to bring into Asia a

new cold war. We work for stability, peace and progress for all, but we do this with

our eyes open i.e. with an ample dose of pragmatism and realism.

4. Has the scope of India's Look East policy expanded? Is India ‘Looking East’ to ‘Look West’-towards US ?

LEP, together with other facets of our external relations, such as the policy towards

the West, South Asia and the rest of the world, constitutes the totality of the Indian

foreign policy. LEP’s scope may or may not have increased, but the Western powers

are certainly seeing benefit in it for themselves.

5. What is the impact of LEP on India’s North East region? A serious disconnect exists here. Our North East generally feels neglected and

marginalized in the implementation of our Look East Policy. It is a justified perception.

Unless we use LEP to accelerate economic development of our North East which, in

turn, requires deepening of relations involving our North East as well as Bangladesh and

Myanmar, LEP will not be able to realize its full potential.

6. Has India’s LEP paid good dividends in terms of Power, Commerce and Influence?

Yes, indeed. From 1992 when India was accepted as a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN to

the recent stage when we have emerged as an important player in East Asia Summit

(EAS), we have come a long way. Next year, the change will be celebrated at a

commemorative India –ASEAN Summit, to be hosted by India. We are now viewed as a

major, responsible and benign stakeholder in Southeast and East Asia. Our trade,

investments and technological collaborations are all on an upward trajectory. In short,

India's relations both at the sub-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN levels show progress. But

have we exploited the optimal potential? No, not yet.

7. Has India a ‘Look East Policy’ at all ? It is said that there is no strategic vision, no depth to bilateral agreements and no contacts at the civil society level.


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I do not agree. My research indicates that the gains are real, but we are still

scratching at the surface. We should aim to achieve more, by striving more. The

comprehensive approach of deepening political, strategic, economic, cultural and people-

to-people relations with the East is already paying dividends, but it requires wider

political support in India. It also needs better and more effective implementation of

agreements reached, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has stressed.

8. Has India’s Look East Policy resulted in the development of India-ASEAN ties? It has. India – ASEAN relationship has traversed through several important

milestones. It has been further strengthened by notable progress in India's bilateral

relations with almost all member-states of ASEAN.

9. How the East looks at India’s Look East Policy?

In varying ways, but they all want closer relations with India. ASEAN considers India

as a very important partner in strategic terms. The states in Indo-China feel a special

affinity towards India even as relations of some of them with China are more advanced

in scope than with India. As regards East Asia, South Korea, Japan and Australia want

to expand relations with us. China, however is a case apart, for India –China relations

are characterized by a unique blend of cooperation, competition and (potential)

conflict. The broad view in Asia is that India, as a successful democracy and a fast

growing economy, remains a positive factor for security and prosperity. Realization of

the Asian century will partly depend on how Asian economies perform but also on

whether Asian powers are able to connect with each other meaningfully, thereby

contributing to peace and development.

*********


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(5)Vice Admiral Pradeep Kaushiva UYSM, VSM (retd)

Director,

National Maritime Foundation,New Delhi

Admiral Kaushiva specialised in Communications and Electronic Warfare, holds an M Sc (Telecom) degree and is a Fellow of the Institution of Electronics and

Telecommunication Engineers.

Experience: The Admiral commanded Indian Naval Ships Prachand and Veer, Coast Guard Ship Vijaya and the Guided Missile Frigate INS Ganga. His other important afloat assignments include the appointments of Fleet Communications & Electronic Warfare Officer, Western Fleet and Fleet Operations Officer, Eastern Fleet.

Ashore, he has been Director Naval Signals & Electronic Warfare and Director Naval Operations at Naval Headquarters. After promotion to the Flag Rank, he has been Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Information Warfare and Operations); Deputy Commandant and Chief Instructor, National Defence Academy at Khadakwasla; Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet and Chief of Staff,

Southern Naval Command at Kochi.

On promotion to the rank of Vice Admiral, he was appointed Commandant of the Naval Academy which was then under construction at Ezhimala, Kerala. He retired after 40 years of naval service as the Commandant of the National

Defence College, New Delhi.

Admiral Kaushiva takes keen interest in maritime affairs and strategic issues, and has been participating in seminars, discussions and dialogues on related matters in India and abroad. Currently he is also the Chairman of Oceans Beyond Piracy- India Working Group, a project of the NGO One Earth Future

Foundation.

He was awarded Commendation by the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Naval Command in 1971 and decorated by the President with Vishist Seva Medal in 1993 and Uttam Yudh Seva Medal in 1997 for distinguished

service of exceptional order.


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Interview with Vice Admiral Pradeep Kaushiva, UYSM, VSM (retd)

on

India‟s „Look East‟ Policy

1. Does India‟s Look East Policy mark a strategic shift in India‟s vision of world? Is the East more relevant for India?

To get the perspective on India’s “Look East Policy” (LEP), it would be useful to briefly recapitulate the world as it existed prior to the LEP and India’s engagement therewith. Emerging from the shadows of the colonial rule, India had sought to establish its identity through non alignment in the post World War II bipolar world and evolved the Nehruvian model of economy. This was a mix of state investment for development of heavy industries and infrastructure, and private investment for agriculture, consumer goods and service sector. Non alignment notwithstanding, India drew strategic support from the former USSR particularly in the decades of 1960’s and 1970’s. For this reason, and also because of her economic priorities then, India did not join the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its

inception in 1967.

By 1991, however, global strategic and economic paradigms had changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Indian economy was growing at a mere 3 % due to protectionist and interventionist policies of the Govt. The nation faced balance of payments crisis and had to pledge 67 tons of gold as part of a bailout deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF also required India to undertake a series of structural economic reforms. Even though some of the IMF stipulations were not implemented, Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao set into motion a slew of economic reforms through his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh. They also decided to economically engage the South East Asia region for its immense resources as well

as its virtually untapped markets.

The rationale behind the LEP was an appreciation that greater integration with East and Southeast Asia had become an imperative for India’s future and economic interests. The main features of this initiative were to increase economic and commercial ties with the ASEAN countries by having varying free trade arrangements (FTA) with Southeast Asian countries. By now ASEAN had also evolved its own platform for security related dialogues in the form of ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF) and India sought to join this.

The LEP was not a strategic shift in the sense of re-prioritising in favour of one at the cost of another. It was more in the nature of focusing upon a region which had


24

until then not received the attention it deserved. It was, thus, more of an inclusive engagement than an exclusive one.

2. Why China is wary of India‟s Look East Policy? Calls it a failure.

The rise of China has fundamentally altered the global strategic calculus in the first decade of the 21st century. With its booming economy and rapidly modernizing military, Beijing is now ready to engage more assertively in great power politics. This coincides with the relative decline of the US and economic rise of India albeit at a modest scale. Much to China’s discomfiture, many of the smaller states in her neighborhood have found commonality of interests with India in the emerging

regional geopolitical landscape. Even though China has derived full value from the Indian markets, traditionally it has been somewhat dismissive of India. However, over the last decade or so, the Chinese have been intrigued by the steady rate of India’s economic growth and its political stability. Now China seems to feel threatened in her own backyard by the success of India’s look east policy. It is, therefore, not entirely surprising that China would be wary of India’s LEP and even go to the extent of

calling it a failure.

3. Why is the US interested in working more closely with India in

Asia Pacific?

In the face of China’s rise and its own relative decline, the US views India’s closer geoeconomic and geostrategic linkages in the Asia Pacific region to be beneficial all round. Accordingly, the US is hoping that India would expand its market and security integration across the region and enhance her role at Asia Pacific

multilateral fora. The US is also seeking India’s help in exploring the possibility of a “regional architecture” in the Asia Pacific region that would enforce international norms, ensure collective security - particularly maritime security, and help combat sea

piracy together.

4. Has the scope of India's Look East policy expanded? Is India „Looking East‟ to „Look West‟-towards US?

The LEP, as enunciated in the early 1990s, was somewhat limited in scope with its emphasis primarily on economic relations with the ASEAN countries. But during the last decade, with changes in the geopolitical scenario, smaller south-east Asian states have also looked towards India to increase its regional profile and

engagement as a balancer.

India’s LEP can be now said to have been upgraded to version 2. Starting with development of trade and investment linkages with the ASEAN region, the focus is now on deeper economic ties and more consultation on security issues. With her


25

military-security power projection through naval deployments and maritime diplomacy, India has also moved into wider East Asia (Pacific Asia) and Pacific Basin (southern Pacific) settings. So, it can be seen that the scope of India’s LEP has

expanded. At least one analyst did indeed postulate that the foreign policy innovation to “Look East” was only the first stage of the strategy to “Look West”- towards US, but it later became an end in itself. Much deeper research would be required to establish or refute this and it would be perhaps best to leave it for history to judge after some

more versions of LEP have evolved.

5. What is the impact of LEP on India‟s North East region?

Though considerations of her own Northeast Region were not a part of India’s initial articulation of the ‘Look East’ policy, there has been increasing realization of its potential to alleviate the region’s poverty and economic backwardness through

direct cross-market accessibility to the vibrant economies farther east from us. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has recently said “Our growing interaction with ASEAN is critical to fulfilling the promise of the 21st century being an Asian Century, with the main engines of the world economy emerging in the Asia-Pacific Region. We want our North Eastern States to be in the forefront of these interactions and to

reap the benefits of enhanced peace and prosperity.”

Look East Policy version 2, thus, not only shifts the engagement paradigm from economic issues to the broader agenda including security cooperation but also envisages up-lifting of Northeast India through multiple linkages. India and Myanmar have recently agreed on the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Facility, which envisages connectivity between Indian ports on the eastern seaboard and Sittwe Port in Myanmar and then through riverine transport and by road to Mizoram, thereby providing an alternate route for transport of goods to Northeast India. Efforts are also underway to improve infrastructure, particularly road links, at the second India-Myanmar border trade point at Rih-Zowkhathar in Mizoram sector by upgrading the Rih-Tidim and Rih-Falam road segments in Myanmar. Apart from developing road links, efforts are underway to have a rail link from Jiribam in Manipur passing through the border town Moreh to Hanoi in Vietnam via Myanmar. With the Ganga Mekong initiative there is potential for direct flights between

Guwahati and Ho-Chi Minh city, Imphal and Hanoi.

What still remains to be done, however, is the real infrastructure development work at the state level. That is a primary pre-requisite for the Northeast to benefit from

the LEP.

6. Has India‟s LEP paid good dividends in terms of Power,

Commerce and Influence?


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Indeed, India’s LEP paved the way for strengthening her relationship with ASEAN countries in terms of multi-dimensional cooperation. This in turn has paid good

dividends in terms of trade and commerce, and India’s influence in Southeast Asia. The engagement has boosted India’s ability to negotiate (with Thailand) and conclude (with ASEAN, Malaysia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Indonesia) agreements of various types – on free trade and comprehensive economic cooperation. India’s trade with ASEAN nations has steadily grown from US$ 2.4 billion in 1990 to US $50.1 billion in 2010 and the figure is likely to go up to US$ 70

billion by 2014. India is engaged with the East Asian and Southeast Asian countries through regional confidence-building and cooperation mechanisms like the ARF, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and the MILAN exercises that India hosts every alternate year. India has also signed an agreement on counter-terrorism with ASEAN. Areas of cooperation include joint or coordinated naval patrolling, fighting piracy and other maritime security threats, and military, air and naval exercises. Maritime security has become an important priority for India particularly since the 26/11 terrorist

outrage in Mumbai.

7. What are the prospects and challenges for India‟s Look East Policy?

The Southeast Asian nations and India are increasingly becoming conscious of the imperative of interdependence. China’s growing economic and strategic influence in the region makes diversified relationship with India necessary for Southeast Asia. With the US down-scaling its presence in the region, many believe that India has the potential to contribute in enhancing stability and security of the region. The prospects are immense. But the challenge is to convert the potential into

achievement. The next phase of LEP will be much more complex as India’s increasingly global economic and strategic interests require capacity for undertaking coordinated and concurrent responses involving economic, commercial, cultural and strategic engagements. India will need to become adept at projecting various dimensions of her influence constructively in defending her own core interests. Also, the role of non-government actors, including the Diaspora, will need to harmonise with India’s

geo-economic and geo-strategic interests.

8. Has India a „Look East Policy‟ at all? It is said that there is no strategic vision, no depth to bilateral agreements and no contacts at the civil society level.

India’s LEP has been criticized by some who argue that there is more rhetoric than substance in the policy. They aver, for instance, that the India-Malaysia CECA aims to boost bilateral trade to $15 billion by 2015 but even that would make India only the 13th largest trading partner of Malaysia. More broadly, India-ASEAN trade


27

stands at over $50.1 billion (with a target of $70 billion by 2014), making India the Southeast Asian bloc’s seventh largest trading partner. This is in sharp contrast in comparison with ASEAN’s bilateral trade with China ($293 billion), Japan ($160

billion) and South Korea ($74 billion).

While these statistics may be correct, the conclusion that India’s LEP is just rhetoric misses the mark. The success of a foreign policy initiative is measured across the spectrum of mutually beneficial deliverables which include trade as well as

diplomatic and strategic gains.

9. Has India‟s Look East Policy resulted in the development of

India-ASEAN ties?

As a direct consequence of the Look East Policy, ASEAN-India dialogue relations have grown rapidly from a sectoral dialogue partnership in 1992 to a full dialogue partnership in December 1995. The relationship was further elevated with the convening of the ASEAN-India Summit in 2002. Since then the ASEAN-India Summit has been held annually. India has been participating in the ARF since 1996. All these took place within a decade, which clearly signifies the progress made in the

cooperation between India and ASEAN. This cooperation has transcended the realm of functional trade and economic engagement to cover political and security dimensions. India participates in a series of consultative meetings with ASEAN under the ASEAN-India dialogue framework, which include Summit, ministerial meetings, senior officials meetings and meetings at experts’ level, as well as through dialogue and cooperation frameworks initiated by ASEAN, such as the ARF, the East Asia Summit (EAS), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation and Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation

(BIMSTEC). Signing of the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement on 13 August 2009 was a logical progression of the Look East Policy. The agreement was only for trade-in-goods and did not include software and information technology. Negotiations for agreements on services and investment are currently in progress. India-ASEAN functional cooperation includes cooperation in sectors such as Science & Technology, Human Resources Development, Health and Pharmaceuticals, Space Sciences, Agriculture, Information & Communication Technology, Transport and Infrastructure, Tourism

and Culture, and Small and Medium Enterprises etc.

The fact that India and ASEAN have reciprocally embarked upon a number of initiatives for engagement in multiple areas, is a visible manifestation of the India – ASEAN ties. It would be accurate to conclude that a lot has already been achieved

but there is still considerable untapped potential to achieve much more.

**************


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(6)Dr. Damodar R. Sardesai Emeritus Professor of History

University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA)

Professor Damodar R. SarDesai has been at UCLA since 1961, first as a doctoral student (Ph.D. 1965) and since 1966 as a member of the History faculty. Before coming to UCLA in 1961, he received from the Bombay University his Bachelor's (1952) and Master's (l955) degrees, ranking first in Social Sciences for which he was awarded the Sir William Wedderburn Prize. In 1979, he was elected Fellow of the Royal

Historical Society of Great Britain. At UCLA, Professor SarDesai taught in the History Department as Assistant Professor (1966-69), Associate Professor (1969-77) and Professor of History (1977-94); Navin and Pratima Doshi Professor of Pre-Modern Indian History, 1998-2001 and as Emeritus Professor of History. His administrative service includes: Vice-Chair and Chair of the History Department; Chair, South and Southeast Asian Studies (ISOP) for 14 years; and as the first Director of the University of California's Education Abroad Program in New Delhi, India 1993-95. At UCLA, he served as member and/or chair of dozens of committees at the department, college and senate levels and on committees of UC statewide senate, and as a member of UCLA Senate's Council on Research, 2002-2005. In 1971-73, he was invited to reorganize historical studies at the University of Bombay as Chair of its History Department. In 1998, Professor SarDesai was recalled by UCLA to be the first holder of the newly-endowed Navin and Pratima Doshi Chair in Indian History, a position he held until 2001. Among the numerous grants and awards Professor SarDesai received are: Senior Fellowship, American Institute of Indian, Studies, Chicago (1980-81 and 1986-87); National Endowment of Humanities Grant; John and Dora Haynes Dissertation Fellowship; Ford Foundation Grant; Watumull Foundation Fellowship; and UC Berkeley South and Southeast Asian Studies Fellowship Grant. Among the others honors are: Fellowship of the Heras Institute, Bombay; Balwantrai Mehta Endowment Lectures at Bombay University and D.D.Kosambi Endowment Lectures, Bombay University. He has addressed the Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai. In 1972, he delivered the prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Lecture at the Trimurti House in New Delhi. Since 1966, Professor SarDesai has offered lecture courses and graduate seminars at UCLA in the history of India, Southeast Asia, and British Empire. Apart from serving on nearly 200 Ph.D. committees, he directly supervised fourteen students at the doctoral level. His writings and edited works -16 books and over 200 articles and book reviews- cover Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies


29

relating to India and Southeast Asia, Portuguese Colonial Administration in Goa and Malacca, History of the Marathas and British Imperialism in Southeast Asia. His books include; Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, 1947-64, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968; British Trade and Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1830-1914, Columbus, Missouri, South Asia Books, 1977; Vietnam, Trials and Tribulations of a Nation, selected as "Outstanding Book of the Year in Asia-Pacific Category," now in its fourth edition, published by Westview Press and Macmillan; Southeast Asia, Past and Present , published by Westview Press and Macmillan sixth edition, 2009 SarDesai’s prolific authorship continues. In 2006, the primary source companion to Southeast Asia: Past and Present--Southeast Asia: Essential Readings appeared--and his India: The Definitive History, was published by Westview Press in Summer, 2007. Altogether, he has authored and edited a dozen books of which two have won awards and two are in multiple editions and translated in two other languages. His recent work includes chapters on four Asian countries in the 3-volume World Education Encyclopaedia published by the Gale Group in November 2001; eleven articles in the 4-volume Encyclopaedia of India, edited by Stanley Wolpert and published by Charles Scribner's in 2005and Nuclear India in the 21st Century (ed. with Raju Thomas), New York, Palgrave, 2002. At UCLA, Professor SarDesai served as Director of several national and international conferences: The Punjab Question (Co-Director); The Legacy of Nehru; India and the Nuclear Question; Ayurveda and Yoga: Medicine in Ancient India (Co-Director); Indian-Americans and U.S.Politics, Heritage and Destiny; Development of Indology and Comparative Philology in Germany, 1750-1950 (Co-Director); India's Constitution at Fifty; Terrorism as a Threat to Democracy and Pluralism: The Case of India. Three of these conference proceedings have been published as edited scholarly volumes. Professor SarDesai has been interviewed dozens of time on radio and television in U.S. and India on topics concerning India and Vietnam. He has been honored by numerous organizations of Indian-Americans for his contribution to the better understanding of India in the US. He was instrumental in raising a quarter million dollars toward an endowment in 1999 in the History Department at UCLA for an annual award of $10,000 in the name of Sardar Patel for the best doctoral dissertation on any topic concerning Modern India approved at any US university in Humanities, Social Sciences, Arts and Education. He served for the first two years as Chair of the Evaluation Committee to determine the winner of the Sardar Patel Award. In India, he has helped in the regeneration of the Asiatic (formerly Royal) Society of Bombay as its President (1989-99) and has served as a Senior Trustee of the Prince of Wales Museum. In 1982, he was awarded by the Government of Maharashtra a sanmanpatra for his participation in the nationalist movement for the liberation of Goa. In 2005, Professor SarDesai was recognized with a Lifetime Achievement Award by CSULB’s Yadunandan Center for India Studies. In 2007, SarDesai was among a select eight international figures honored with the Global Goan Achievement Award.

D.R.SarDesai –Select Bibliography

Books

India Through the Ages, (with K.C.Vyas) New Delhi, Allied, 1960; 6th

edition, 1976. Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, 1947-1964,” Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968. Trade and Empire in Malaya and Singapore, 1869-1874, Athens, Ohio, University Southeast Asia Program, 1970.


30

International Bibliography of Theses and Dissertations on Southeast Asia (edited with Bhanu D. SarDesai), Leiden, IDC, 2

nd edition, 1971.

What is Nationalism? The Case of India (with Charles H. Heimsath), New Delhi, New York State Educational Resources Center, 1975. British Trade and Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1830-1914, Missouri, South Asia Books, and New Delhi, Allied, 1977. Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia (edited with S. Chawla) , New York, 1980; Indian edition by Allied Publishers, New Delhi. The Legacy of Nehru: A Centennial Assessment, (edited with Anand Mohan), New Delhi, Promilla, 1992. Environmental Challenges in India, (Ed. with C.K.Varshney), New Delhi, Wiley Eastern, 1993. James Darmesteter Remembered, (ed. with G. Lazard) , Bombay, Asiatic Society of Bombay, 1994. Nuclear India in the 21

st Century (ed. with Raju Thomas), New York, Palgrave/St Martin’s, 2002.

Indology in Germany, 1750-1957 (ed. with Peter Park and Doug McKetchin) New Delhi, Manohar, 2004 Southeast Asia: Past and Present, 5

th edition, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2003 (Commonwealth edition by

Macmillan, London; Indian edition by Harper Collins) A History Book-of-the-Month Club Selection. Vietnam, Past and Present, 4

th edition, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2005 (first edition published as Vietnam, Trials

and Tribulations of a Nation, New Delhi, Promilla Books and Long Beach Publications, 1988.) “Outstanding Book of the Year in Asia-Pacific Category” by Choice, American Library Association. Southeast Asia: Essential Readings, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2006. India: The Definitive History, Boulder, CO., Westview Press, 2007, Spanish Translation, Barcelona, 2008.. Select Articles “Portuguese Cession of Bombay, 1661-1664,” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, XXI (1958). “The Glory that was Gurjaradesh; The Glory that will be Gujarat”, Special article on the Birth of the State, The Current Weekly (Bombay), May, 1960. “Sir Andrew Clarke and Malaya, Personality Factor in British Empire History,” Journal of the University of Bombay, XXXI (1963). “Resident System in Malaya,” Journal of the Historical Society (Malaya), III (11964). “South Asia and the Vietnam War,” East-West Center Review (Honolulu), IV, 2 (1967); reprinted in United Asia, XX, 4 (July-August, 1968). “China and Peace in Vietnam,” China Report, V, 3 (1969); reproduced in Military Review ( Journal of the U.S. Army), XLIX, 12 (December, 1969). “The Portuguese Administration in Malacca, 1511-1641,” Journal of Southeast Asian History, X, 3 (1969). “The Vietnamization of Cambodia,” China Report, VI, 4 ( July-August,1970). “Nixon’s Wagnis in Kambodscha,” Europe Archiv, Folge 13/1970. “Die Rolle der Thais und der Vietnamesen in Kambodscha,” Europe Archiv, Folge 1/1971. “India’s Role in Southeast Asia in the Seventies,” China Report, VIII, 3 (May-June 1972). “The New Balance of Power in Southeast Asia,” United Asia, XXIV, 3 (May-June, 1972). “India’s New Image and Role in Southeast Asia,” Ahmedabad, Harold Laski Institute, Publication #108 (1972). “Vietnam and the Security of Southeast Asia,” China Report, IX, 4 (July-August, 1973). “India and China in Southeast Asia,” The Illustrated Weekly of India, Nov. 30-Dec. 6, 1980, pp. 22-25. “India and the Communist States of Southeast Asia, 1971-1983,” International Studies, New Delhi (1983). “Data on Punjab,” Conference on the Punjab Crisis, UCLA, October, 1987. Book Chapters “India and the Indochina Imbroglio,” in V.D.Rao, ed., A.G.Pawar Commemoration Volume, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1968. “India: A Balancer Power?” in Sudershan Chawla et. al. eds., Southeast Asia under the New Balance of Power, New York, Praeger, 1974. “India and Southeast Asia,” in B.R.Nanda, ed., Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years, Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1976. “Vietnam’s Quest for Security,” in D.R.SarDesai and S. Chawla, eds., Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia, New York, Praeger, 1980. “India and the Neutralization of Southeast Asia,” in Nemai S. Bose, ed., India in the Eighties, Calcutta, Firma KLM, 1982.


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“India and ASEAN, An Overview,” in Satish Kumar, ed., Yearbook on India’s Foreign Policy, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1988. “The Military and Politics in Southeast Asia,” in U.S.Bajpai, ed. Military and Politics in Asia, New Delhi, India International Center (1989). “Southeast Asia: Cultural Heritage of a Diverse Region,” in Ashok K. Dutt, Ed., Southeast Asia: A Ten Nation Region, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996. “Kashmir: Its International and Legal Status,” in Raju Thomas. Ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, Boulder, CO., Westview Press, 1992. “British Expansion in Southeast Asia: Imperialism of Trade in the Nineteenth Century,” in Roger D. Long, Ed., The Man on the Spot: Essays on British Empire History in Honor of Professor John S. Galbraith, Westport, CONN., Greenwood Press, 1995. Foreword to Ramdas Bhatkal, ed., Alternative Strategies and India’s Development, Mumbai, Popular Prakashan, 1999. Encyclopaedia of World Education, Gale Group, 3 vols., 2001, articles on Pakistan, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. Contributing Editor, Jane’s Sentinel, (London) for South Asia (2002-2003)and Southeast Asia (2001-2003). Encyclopaedia of World Press, Gale Group, 2 volumes, articles on Foreword to Roger D. Long, ed., Charisma and Commitment in South Asian History, Essays presented to Stanley Wolpert, New Delhi, Orient Longmans, 2004. Encyclopaedia of India, New York, Charles Scribner’s, 4 volumes, (in press, 2005), articles on History and Impact of Portuguese Power in India; Goa; Vasco-da-Gama; Afonso de Albuquerque; Maharashtra; Shivaji; Peshwai and Pentarchy; and Asiatic Societies of Bengal and Bombay. BOOK REVIEWS “The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southwest Asia,” by Werner Levi in Pacific Affairs, LXII, 1 (1969). “India and Southeast Asia,” by Vidyut Sarkar in Pacific Affairs, LXII, 3 (1969). “A Cruize in a Queensland Labor Vessel to the South Seas,” by W.E.Giles in Canadian Journal of History, V (1970). “The Works of Ta’Unga, Records of a Polynesian Traveller in the South Seas, 1833-1896,” by R.J. and Marjorie Crocombe in Canadian Journal of History, V (11970). “The Malay States, 1877-1895: Political Change and Social Policy,” by Phillip Loh Fook Soong in American Historical Review (1970). “The Kingdom and the People of Siam,” by John Bowring in Journal of the American Oriental Society, XCI (1971). “A Guide to Books on Southeast Asian History,” by Gayle Morrison and Stephen Hay in Journal of American Oriental Society, XCI (1971). “The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, The Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism, 1750-1850,” by Bernard Semmel in American Historical Review (1972). “Problems in Indian Democracy,” by V.B.Kulkarni in Bhavan’s Journal (1972). “India and World Civilization,” by D.P.Singhal in Sunday Standard (Bombay), March 11, 1973. “A Diplomatic History of Modern India,” by Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh in India Quarterly, XXIX (1973). “The United States and India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh,” by W. Norman Brown in Pacific Historical Review, LXIII (1974). “In Search of Southeast Asia,” by David Steinberg, ed., in Southeast Asia, An International Quarterly (1974). “The Political System of the Atoni of Timor,” by R.G. Schulte-Nordholte in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay, (1974). “Indian Historiography,” by A.K. Warder in Sunday Standard (1974). “Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. I, 1889-1947” by S. Gopal in History, IV (1976). “The Indian Political Parties: A Historical Analysis of Political Behavior in 1974,” by B.B.Misra in History (1978). “Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colored Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830-1910,” by Roberet A. Huttenback in Journal of African Studies (1978). “Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese trade in Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century,” by A.R. Disney in The American Historical Review (1979). “the Making of Modern South-East Asia: Vol. II, The Western Impact: Economic and Social Change,” by D.M. Tate in The American Historical Review, LXXXV (1980). “The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand,” by George Vinal Smith in Journal of Asian Studies, LX (1981). “The Indian Ocean: A Select Bibliography of Resources for Study in the National Library of Australia in Journal of Asian Studies, XLI (1982). “Conflict in Indian Society,” by V.B. Kulkarni in The Economic Times, March 6, 1982 (Review Article).


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“Official History of Colonial Development,” 5 volumes by D. J. Morgan in The Journal of Modern History, LV (1983).

Over 150 short reviews in Choice, published by the American Library Association.

SarDesai Festschrift: Colonialism and Nationalism in South and Southeast Asia

Interview with Prof. Damodar R. Sardesai

(1) Does India's LOOK EAST POLICY mark a strategic shift in India's vision of the world? Considering that the Look East policy was declared in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and even more significantly, the launch of economic Liberalization by India, it was a very major change in policy, almost a 180 degree turning around. It would additionally mark a precipitous decline and eventual insignificance of the Non-Aligned Movement, which had been the mainstay of the Indian Foreign Policy during the Nehru era. Although its importance had already begun its decline during the latter part of Indira Gandhi's prime ministership, it was still held as an important plank of the Indian foreign policy. From the mid-1990s, the NAM movement all but collapsed. Until the end of the Cold War, the Indian foreign policy reflected Nehru's vision of the world , that it was divided into two camps led by the United States and the Soviet Union, both armed to the teeth with nuclear warheads, capable of destroying the world many times over. India's role was to organize and project a "bloc" promoting peace, with a policy of "plague on both the houses" in terms of staying away and not allying itself with either of the super-powers. It stood opposed to the pacts such as CENTO, MEDO and SEATO that the United States organized under its military leadership on the grounds that they were the props needed to shore up the Communist bloc and prevent it from further expansion. That was also the justification of the U.S. and its allies to keep Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from falling to the Communist bloc, an eventuality that was feared would lead to all of Southeast Asian countries falling like dominoes to Communism and possibly to Communist Chinese domination. But for Burma (later called Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia and North Vietnam, the rest of Southeast Asia had organized since 1967 under the ASEAN being rightly regarded pro-Western, pro-U.S. , anti-Communist and therefore, with suspicion by India.The dichotomy in Southeast Asia continued even after the end of the Vietnam conflict and the establishment of Communist regimes in Cambodia and Laos. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War formally ended this dichotomy and the need for India to see the world as being divided into two blocs. India's world vision changed but New Delhi was dragging its feet in delaying complete reconciliation with the West, particularly the U.S., continuing to believe in the need for NAM, whose effiicacy was fading rapidly. The Look East policy and the Economic Liberalization, both promoted by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s was partly an admission on India's part of the rapidly changing global situation including in Southeast Asia.

(2)Why is China wary of India's LOOK EAST POLICY? Calls it a failure. Historically, whether under imperial, "nationalist" or Communist aegis, China has always regarded Southeast Asia as falling under its political influence. This is a consistent thread in


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Chinese policy all the way from the Han dynasty, when the "tributary" system began and, with interrupions , continued until 1885 CE, in Myanmar and Vietnam. It was China's way of keeping a watch over its neighbors, regard them as barbarian or semi-barbarian and keep them divided and subservient to Chinese domination. The only exception was India, which was rightly respected as the fount of Buddhism, a religion the Chinese court had adopted. China did not mind India's overwhelming cultural influence in Southeast Asia because India showed no political ambitions there in China's "backyard."In 1955, at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, led by India, the then Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai had attempted to make it clear that the newly emerging Southeast Asian nations should take direction from Beijing, in other words, that New Delhi should not harbor any ambitions of leadership in the region. A decade later, even as the American intervention in the Vietnam conflict augmented, the Lin Biao doctrine declared China's plans to spread the revolution in the world, notably in Southeast Asia.In the post Vietnam war period, China found the new Vietnam obstructing China's plans in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN itself admitting the new communist as well as the formerly nonaligned countries of Southeast Asia as members, thus creating a bloc that would frustrate China's political and military ambitions in the region. In the recent past, China has been asserting its monopolistic control of the South China Sea and the numerous disputed island groups, particularly with Vietnam. In time, China can be expected to claim primacy in the Indian Ocean area surrounding most of the Southeast Asian countries. In this new phase of China's assertion or dominance of the South China Sea, China finds India an obstruction as the latter supports Vietnam's claim. The latest (late October 2011) indication of China's assertion of economic dominance in Southeast Asia challenging United States is China's plea to the ASEAN countries to use the yuan instead of the U.S. dollar for international transactions. This could be the first step to a much more refined and pervasive domination of China's backyard. China regarded India's Look East policy with suspicion that India may not limit itself only to economic benefits of trade and investment in Southeast Asia, that New Delhi might seek, with U.S. assistance, in blocking China's rising influence in the region.The suspicion has been augmented by India's growing stature in the ASEAN's deliberations.from being a "Sectoral Dialog Partner" in 1992, India moved three years later 1995 to a "Full Dialog Partner" and in the following year to becoming a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and since 2002, a Summit Level Partner. India has also been an active member of the larger strategic combine of the East Asia Summit (EAS), which includes the ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

(3)Why is U.S. interested in working more closely with India In Asia

Pacific? The U.S. has been closely watching the steady rise of China and the latter's ambition to be the main power determining the strategic equation in the entire Asia-Pacific region. It considers it as a sequel to the rise of China as Asia's economic powerhouse, controlling a large sovereign fund, which has a hugely increasing investment in U.S. Treasuries and bonds of over a trillion U.S. dollars.The augmentation of China's military capabilities, however, falls short in some very crucial areas such that it is unable to challenge the American military protective shield over the Taiwan Straits. Once that is accomplished, Beijing's bid to claim and establish supremacy over the ASEAN region and the Western Pacific is only a matter of time. On the other hand, the U.S. itself desires a reduction of its military obligations in East and Southeast Asia after six decades of primacy in he Asia-Pacific region. It is highly unlikely that Washington would easily yield that supremacy to China, which might impede or bloc the American access across the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and consequently to the Atlantic via the East. The U.S. regards India as the only major potential economic and military power which can


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develop into a challenge or at least a serious obstacle to China's ambitions to become a super-power with exclusive rights to so much in the Asia-Pacific region. It is, therefore, in the U.S. interest to strengthen India's obligations and ties with the ASEAN region and offer India support to checkmate China.

(4) Has the scope of India's LOOK EAST POLICY expanded? Is India „Looking East‟ to „Look West‟ -towards US? India's Look East Policy has had to take into account the existing power equation in the region.Even if India's goals are limited in East and Southeast Asia, it has to seriouslyconsider the role of the other major powers in the Asia Pacific region such as Japan, China, the ASEAN and most importantly, the United States.In doing this, Indian aims need not clash with those of the U.S. In fact, with the American plans to reduce its obligations in the region, very largely for economic reasons, Washington would be happy if India picks up some of the responsibility with potential for checking excessive power in China's hands.

(5)Has India's „LEP‟ paid good dividends in terms of Power, Commerce and Influence? Yes, indeed, particularly in economic terms, which would include the terms of trade, volume of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and access to certain kinds of raw materials much-needed for India's industrial growth. This has been achieved through India's signing Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreements with Japan and South Korea and Free trade Agreements (FTA) bilaterally with several several Southeast Asian countries, notably, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam. India has also entered into FTA with the ASEAN itself effective January 2010 with an immediate target of trade worth US$ 50 billion. The greatest benefits have been in the economic field. India's trade with East Southeast Asia is currently about 26 per cent of the total. Despite the rivalry,trade with China has balooned to nearly $50 billion, making it India's largest trading partner.The relationship with Singapore has been phenomenal: trade equaling US$16.1 billion in 2008-9 and Singapore's FDI in India is the second largest at nearly US$ 10 billion during the decade, 2000-2009. There are six countries -China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia among the top twenty trading partners of India. Additionally, Japan and South Korea are among the Leading countries investing in India. There are plans already in the pipeline for Japan's heavy involvement in the Indian bid dramatically to improve its infrastructure. Along with increased trade with the ASEAN, India is significantly involved in investments in the region, most notably in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam. As for power and influence, it has helped too but not so much as to count India as a crucial or critical power in the region. Not yet at least, although potentially a lot particularly if India joins hands with the U.S. in obstructing or slowing China's rise as the pre-eminent regional power.

(6)Has India a LOOK EAST POLICY at all? It is said that there is no strategic vision, no depth to bilateral

agreements and no contacts at the civil society level. I do not subscribe at all to this kind of a negative assessment of the Look East Policy. First of all, when the policy was announced, it was to correct what had been over the decades an overwhelmingly global policy of peace through attention to the two Super-Powers. Of the two, the


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Soviet Union and the U.S., India's relations with the Soviet Union had a greater economic and military content. But for a couple of exceptions, the Southeast Asian countries were looked at with suspicion as treading the American direction while those countries themselves had serious reservation of what was perceived as India's pro-Soviet policies. Therefore, in the aftermath of the Look East policy, India had to tread cautiously in the Southeast Asian, more specifically, ASEAN region. It had also to overcome the suspicions of the ASEAN member states, which were already warily eyeing China's ambitions in the context of growing U.S.desire to reduce its obligations in the Western Pacific. Any declaration of a major strategic vision on India's part would have seemed to be far beyond India's economic or military capabilities. The bilateral agreements have succeeded in their goals of increasing the volume and terms of trade, reduction of trade barriers by significantly removing items from the customs tariff list and by reducing the quantum of tariff. As stated elsewhere, India has been able to attract considerable FDI from the ASEAN, notably Malaysia and Singapore. The contacts at the civil society could have been increased in a variety of ways. The achievements in that respect are the minimum.

(7)Has India's LOOK EAST POLICY resulted in the development of

INDIA-ASEAN ties? Yes, indeed.

(8)How does the EAST look at India's LOOK EAST POLICY? The Southeast Asian region welcomes any major influence that can check China's ambitions in the region. It welcomed U.S. protective umbrella provided by the SEATO and U.S.'s bilateral, mutual treaties with countries in the region throughout the period marked by the Vietnam conflict. India was, during that time, on the other side, diplomatically supporting the Soviet-backed North Vietnamese. A saving grace for the ASEAN countries was the Sino-Soviet conflict, which served as a brake on China's ambitions in the region. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union,the ASEAN region had only one potential threat to contend with. That was and has been a rising China and its potential ambitions -political,economic and military for the region. Any power which can checkmate China is welcome. The U.S. has been advising the ASEAN countries of India's usefulness in this regard, though India is neither willing to toe the U.S. policies and anger China, which afterv all, is a neighbor while the U.S. is a geographically distant power, which has manifested a lack of will to continue with the military burden. The ASEAN countries look at India's Look East Policy as one that may not be of much help but one that cannot hurt either.

************


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(7)Walter C Ladwig III

Merton College , Oxford and an affiliate of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at Kings College London.

Walter C. Ladwig III is a researcher in International Relations at Merton College , Oxford and an affiliate of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at Kings College London. During the 2008-2009 academic year, he was a pre-doctoral fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia . His research has been published in International Security, Asian Survey, Comparative Strategy, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Asian Security, and War in

History, in addition to several chapters in edited volumes and articles in policy journals such Military Review, Strategic Insights, Seminar and Joint Force Quarterly. He has commented on international affairs for the BBC, has been interviewed by Reuters, the Associated Press and the New York Times and his commentaries have appeared in the Wall Street Journal Asia, the San Diego Union-Tribune, the Baltimore Sun, and the Indian Express. Outside of academia, he has previously worked for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Embassy in London , the RAND Corporation and several private sector consultancies.


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Response to Questionnaire on

India’s ‘Look East’ Policy 1. Does India ’s Look East Policy mark a strategic shift in India ’s vision of world? Is the East more relevant for India ?

Although geographically proximate, prior to the end of the Cold War, India was not in a position to make relations with Southeast Asia or the broader Asia-Pacific a priority. This was, in part, a product of Cold War divisions where ASEAN’s pro-Western orientation or Japan and South Korea ’s alliances with the U.S. did not mesh well with India ’s close ties to the Soviet Union . The Rao government initially launched Look East, in conjunction with domestic market reforms to tap into the economic potential of Southeast Asia as well as establish India as a regional actor outside of the confines of South Asia . With the policy embraced by successive BJP and Congress-led governments, and broadened to include the rest of the Asia-Pacific region, the Look East policy has become institutionalized as one of the country’s foreign policy priorities. This makes sense as the economic and political relevance of the Asia-Pacific is growing for India . For example, aside from China , Singapore and Hong Kong both feature as top-ten trading partners. In the defense realm, India has established strategic partnerships with Japan , South Korea , Australia , Indonesia , Vietnam and Singapore . This all represents a marked strategic shift in India ’s vision of the world when compared to its Cold War era foreign policy. However, we should note that in the mid-1940’s Nehru was already arguing that the ―Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic as a future nerve center of the world. Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there,‖ so in some respects the vision has been there all along.

2. Why China is wary of India ’s Look East Policy ? Calls it a failure. Generally speaking Chinese analysts to not take India too seriously as a rising power due to differential growth rates in their economy and defense spending. However, recently the military cooperation component of the Look East policy has provoked some concern. Closer military ties with countries such as Vietnam and Japan , which have their own difficult relations with Beijing have been denounced by some Chinese analysts as attempts to encircle China or hedge against its increasing regional influence. The close naval cooperation between India and Singapore , as well as India and Indonesia , highlights Chinese concerns about being denied access to the Straits of Malacca—a vital conduit for their hydrocarbon imports from the Persian Gulf and their

Europe/Africa bound exports—in a crisis. 3. Why US is interested in working more closely with India in Asia Pacific ? US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,during her recent visit to India ,hailed LEP ;

Assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, said: "One of the most important aspects of our Asian Pacific strategy is to help put meat

on the bones of India 's desire to play a prominent role in the Asian-Pacific region going forward."


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Successive American administrations have believed that a strong, confident India will be a net contributor to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. From Washington ’s perspective, India is a status quo power. They acknowledge that it would certainly like to have a greater voice in regional decision-making, but New Delhi is not interested in disrupting or overturning the existing regional order that has helped facilitate stability and economic prosperity in Asia for decades. Moreover, many of India ’s growing political and defense ties in the region are with countries, such as Japan , Australia , Singapore and South Korea , that also have close security ties to the United States . This has led Washington to perceive that Delhi ’s own independent actions are ―shoring up‖ the U.S.-led regional security architecture which presents Beijing with a series of structural constraints that may diffuse the negative aspects of China ’s rise. It is important to note that India is not subordinating itself to another power or seeking to be a junior partner in any coalition; rather it is pursuing its own agenda as an emerging great power, whose interests presently coincide with

those of the United States and its regional alli

4. Has the scope of India 's Look East policy expanded ? Is India ‘Looking East’ to ‘Look West’-towards US ? Look East initially began as a policy to increase India ’s economic engagement with Southeast Asia, a region with which India has a number of historical and cultural ties. In 2003 ―phase II‖ of Look East was launched to encompass the broader Asia-Pacific region and expand the scope of India ’s relations from strictly economic to embrace political and strategic ties as well. As a major pacific power, increased engagement with the U.S. in Asia has naturally resulted from India ’s eastward focus, however ―Look East‖ certainly preceded the dramatic improvement in Indo-US

relations that occurred under the Bush administration. 5. Has India’s LEP paid good dividends in terms of Power, Commerce and Influence? On the economic front, India ’s trade with ASEAN nations has increased from $2.4 billion in 1990 to more than $50 billion in 2010. India has also deepened its political and strategic ties in the regionn, joining the Asean Regional Forum—a regional security grouping that included Asia-Pacific powers such as Australia, China, Japan, and the US as well as the EU and Russia—in 1996, becoming a summit-level partner of ASEAN in 2002, and acceding to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003. On a bi-lateral basis, as was previously noted, India has growing defense relationships with Singapore , Vietnam , Indonesia and Malaysia . These economic and political achievements should not be overlooked, however, in comparative terms, India still trails both China

and the U.S. in terms of its economic or strategic importance to the countries of Southeast Asia . In the broader Asia-Pacific, Look East has actually achieved greater results in the political/strategic realm than in economic terms. Despite Chinese efforts to curtail its influence, India gained political acceptance in its bid to be recognized as an Asia-Pacific power in 2005 when it was invited to attend the inaugural East Asian Summit. This has been paired with strategic partnerships with South Korea , Australia and Japan —notably only the second such defense agreement Japan had ever entered into. Bilateral naval exercises occur with all three nations, as do high-level defense exchanges. Although India has managed to significantly grow its trade with South Korea from a meager $530m in 1992 to $12 billion in 2010, neither side is satisfied with that progress. Despite


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the best of intensions, economic intercourse with Japan has proven to be disappointingly anemic, topping out at $10.3 billion in 2010—one-third the size of Sino-Indian trade and one-twentieth of Sino-Japanese trade. On a more positive note, Japan has emerged as India’s sixth largest source of foreign direct investment and in 2009, for the first time, Japanese FDI in India exceed its investment in China, which might signal deeper economic interaction in the future. Nevertheless,

for the time being, economic linkages trail strategic ties in Northeast Asia . 6. What are the prospects and challenges for India ’s Look East Policy?

India ’s attractiveness to Asian-Pacific countries will depend on what it can offer. If India can sustain economic growth rates of 8-9%, countries in the region will take notice and accord closer relations a high priority. Similarly, if India ’s growing military power continues to demonstrate an ability to provide regional public goods, such as the massive humanitarian assistance the Indian Navy provided to Indonesia and Thailand after the 2005 Boxing Day Tsunami, India will be an increasingly valued partner. On the Indian side, one challenge to Look East will be the proliferation of India ’s global interests. As New Delhi increasingly focuses on energy diplomacy with the Middle East and Central Asia, a revitalization of its ties to Russia, and great power relations with the U.S. and China, the ―Look East‖ policy will have to compete for attention and scarce diplomatic resources with other parts of the world. As a result, India ’s emergence as a global actor could relegate Southeast Asia or the broader Asia-Pacific to becoming just another region for Indian

foreign policy rather than a priority area of focus. 7. Has India a ‘Look East Policy’ at all ? It is said that there is no strategic vision ,no depth to bilateral agreements and no contacts at the civil society level. It is certainly the case that New Delhi could take a more proactive role in putting forth its vision for the strategic relationships it is building in the Asia-Pacific, rather than merely reacting to the actions of others, which will allow it to start shaping events in the region. Moreover, on occasion the rhetoric of Look East exceeds the reality, as illustrated by the failure of Indo-Japanese economic engagement between to keep pace with the development of their security ties. However, it is not correct to say that there is no depth to the bilateral and multilateral relationships India has forged in the Asia-Pacific over the past two decades. There is significant scope to the economic and strategic linkages New Delhi now possesses with key countries and institutions in the region. The degree to which this is a result of a single strategic plan crafted by the MEA or merely the result of events taking their course in a series of separate state-to-state relationships is open to question, but not the reality of these developments. If the present government had any political capital to burn, the time may be ripe for a Look East, Phase III that articulates India’s vision of its political and economic role in the Asia-Pacific, its desired regional order and its role, if any, in the region’s key security challenges, such as North Korean nuclear proliferation or the territorial disputes in the

South China Sea. 8. How the East looks at India ’s Look East Policy?

A number of regional analysts perceive that India ’s economic and military engagement with the


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Asia-Pacific under Look East is a tangible sign that New Delhi will not meekly accept China ’s regional dominance. In Southeast Asia , such a competing influence is welcome, since the countries of the region have historically had difficulty preserving their autonomy in the presence of great powers. Without a legacy of dominating the region, India does not provoke this same anxiety as China or Japan does. India ’s increasing economic and military links broaden the range of powers influencing Southeast Asia, which allows local states to adopt hedging strategies versus

China – developing ties with New Delhi while maintaining relations with Beijing .

A similar phenomenon can be seen beyond ASEAN where support for India ’s inclusion in the East Asian Summit came from Singapore , Indonesia , and Thailand , as well as Japan and South Korea – all of which championed India ’s participation despite objections from China . Such a move was clearly made to prevent Beijing from dominating the institution. Japan increasingly sees India as a like-minder economic and strategic partner who shares significant mutual interests and concerns with respect to China ’s growing regional role. As a result, Japan has proactively advanced security cooperation agreements with India and also encouraged its participation in pan-Asian regional fora. Commenting on the significance of enhanced Indo-Japanese ties, then-Prime Minster Abe suggested that this will become Japan ’s ―most important bilateral relationship in the world,‖ a sentiment that has been shared by his successors. Given the importance of Japan ’s security

alliance with the United States , this is a bold pronouncement.

As the Asia-Pacific enters a period of transition, a number of actors believe that India ’s expanding economy, increasing maritime capability and security ties with Japan , Australia , and the United States , as well as key Southeast Asian nations, are positioning it to have a stabilizing impact on the region. Although, at present, India lacks the ability to independently shape the regional order in the Asia-Pacific, its presence is welcomed by the major democracies of the region as well as China-wary nations who believe that it is in India’s interests, as well as that of many states in East and Southeast Asia, to avert a power transition in the region. In so far as Look East is a concrete

sign of India ’s sustained interest in the region, it is a welcome one.


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1.Dr Alexander (‘Sandy’) Gordon, Australian National University, Canberra

-2.Dr.Pavin Chachavalpongpun,Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

pp.48-71 3.Dr. Alka Acharya,Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. New Delhi

pp.72-78 4.Dr.Mohammed Badrul Alam,Professor, Dept. of Political Science,Jamia Millia Islamia University,New Delhi

pp.79-83 5.Dr. Joefe B. Santarita,Assistant Professor,Asian Center, University of the Philippines,Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines

pp.84-99 6.Dr.Lipi Ghosh,Professor, Department of South & South East Asian Studies, Univ. of Calcutta

pp.100-126 7.Dr. P.V.Rao,Former Director, Centre for Indian Ocean Studies,Osmania University

pp.127-136 8.Dr. K. Raja Reddy,Former Director,Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati

pp.137-148 9.GUO Suiyan, Deputy-Director General,Institute for South Asian Studies,Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences,Kunming, China

pp.149-153

10.Dr Munmun Majumdar,Associate Prof. of Pol.Sc.,North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong pp.154-166

11.Dr.Rakhee Bhattacharya,Fellow,Rajiv Gandhi Inst. for Contemporary Studies,New Delhi pp.167-172

12.Dr. Rupakjyoti Borah, School of Liberal Studies, Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat

pp.173-181

13.Dr. Binoda Kumar Mishra,Fellow,Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies,Kolkata

pp.182-199

14.Dr Yadu Singh,President of Council of Indian Australian Inc, Sydney pp.200-206

15.Dr. K. Yhome ,ORF,New Delhi

pp.207-214

16.Dr. S.UTHAM KUMAR ,Dept of Defence and Strategic Studies,University of Madras,Chennai ,India

pp.215-226


42

India Looks East: as a member of Asia’s concert of powers?

Dr Alexander (‘Sandy’) Gordon

Australian National University

Professor Gordon was awarded his BA from the University of Sydney in 1965 and his PhD from Cambridge University in 1976 He joined the Australian Public Service in 1977, subsequently working in the Office of National Assessments,

AusAID and as Executive Director of the Asian Studies Council and Australian Literacy Council. In 1990 he became a Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, where he worked on South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In 1997 he was appointed head of intelligence in the AFP, a position he held until 2000. He then became Co-Chair of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Transnational Crime Working Group and a member of the National Expert Advisory Committee on Illicit Drugs. Between 2003 and 2005 he lectured on terrorism and transnational crime at the Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales. From 2005 to 2008 he was Associate Professor, Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, University of Wollongong. He is currently a Visiting Fellow with the Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, RegNet, College of the Asia-Pacific, Australian National University. He is the author of a number of books on India, including Business and Politics (Manohar and the ANU), The Search for Substance (Department of International Relations, ANU), India’s Rise to Power (MacMillan Press) and Security and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Region (SDSC, ANU).


43

India Looks East: as a member of Asia‟s concert of powers?

The CIA has assessed that India is a „swing state‟ in Asia. By that it means that how India, as a rising power, chooses to lock into existing security structures will have important implications for the Asian security order.

India‟s emergence is especially important in the context of the rise of China and apparent relative decline of the US. Leading Australian analysts such as Hugh White (Power Shift) and Coral Bell (Living with Giants) have advocated that China and India be inducted into a „concert of powers‟ consisting of those two plus the other big powers – the US, Japan and Russia. They thus hope to mitigate the perturbations that might otherwise be associated with China‟s rise.

A concert of powers consists of an informal agreement amongst its members not to challenge unduly the status quo, but rather to consult assiduously and informally to solve regional problems. Only the biggest and most powerful players have a seat at the table and the individual members are kept in line by the possibility that the others would set up a power balance against them if they were to challenge the status quo.

To retain the viability of the concert, members need to retain approximate equidistance each from the other. Movement towards a strategic relationship between any two or more members could quickly tip the incipient power balancing involved in any concert into containment and render the concert ineffective.

In Asia, an exercise in containment of China could come to resemble the central balance of the Cold War, during which two blocs confronted each other for four decades. Trade was virtually stalled between these two blocs. Any such development in the modern Asia-Pacific would prove economically and strategically disastrous, given the high degree of interdependence that has developed throughout the region.

According to advocates of a concert arrangement in Asia, the US must accord China sufficient „strategic space‟ to enable it to be inducted into the concert. The proponents don‟t spell out what this would involve, but in practical terms it may require that the US moderate its current off-shore balancing role and perhaps even back away from its commitments on the South China Sea and Taiwan. Those of a realist disposition, however, have questioned this approach, arguing that any sign of weakness towards China would be exploited by Beijing. Like major General Nolan (retired) they ask: “… are we going to manage China's emergence as a great power from a position of strength, or are we going to hope that China is nice to us, our allies and our neighbours.” [http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/02/08/Babbages-valuable-provocation.aspx].

http://www.quarterlyessay.com/issue/power-shift-australia%E2%80%99s-future-between-washington-and-beijing

http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=71

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/02/08/Babbages-valuable-provocation.aspx


44

The payback for conceding strategic ground to China would be the emergence of a possible concert of powers. But the concert of powers is a somewhat nebulous idea, delicately poised between incipient power balancing and containment. Proponents of the idea draw heavily on the Concert of Europe, which supposedly kept the peace from the Congress of Vienna of 1815 to the start of the First World War. We should note, however, that the „century of peace‟ during the nineteenth century was underwritten by rabid colony-seeking behaviour around the world, but especially in Africa. One might well ask whether it was, in fact, a century of peace for the colonized people of the world. More importantly for the present day, can conditions in nineteenth century Europe be equated with twenty-first century Asia?

A concert of Asia?

A modern concert of Asia involving India, China, the US, Japan and Russia would require that certain stringent conditions be met. Those powers would have to remain content with the status quo, approximately equal in power (or if rising rapidly, then willing to concede power to maintain the concert) and approximately equidistant from each other, lest any drawing together of certain powers in response to the rise of any other look too much like a policy of containment.

Advocates of the concert idea argue that the concert itself is dependent on the factor that any one power should maintain the status quo lest the others gang up against it in a power balance or even containment. This fear provides the incentive necessary to keep the concert in play. Advocates differ, however, as to whether this balancing role in the maintenance of the concert can consist of a balance „in being‟ or whether it must consist of nothing more than the potential to balance, or an „incipient balance‟.

Experience in Asia appears to show that it must remain an incipient balance. The sensitivity around power balancing was illustrated by the case of the abortive „quadrilateral‟ of 2007. In that year then US Vice President Cheney and then Japanese Prime Minister Abe proposed inducting India into the current „trilateral‟ dialogue process between the US, Australia and Japan, to form what was called a „quadrilateral‟. Note that this proposal was only for a „strategic dialogue‟ not a strategic relationship.

Nevertheless, Beijing objected strongly to the individual countries concerned and accused them of attempting to set up a NATO-style effort to contain China. Both Australia and India subsequently backed away from the idea and in her 2011 visit to Beijing Prime Minister Gillard confirmed that Australia had no desire to “contain” China.

We can see from this that India‟s potential role is highly sensitive to Beijing. But on its part, it is clear that the US, in proposing the nuclear agreement with India


45

in 2005, offering sensitive military technologies (including through Israel‟s proxy) and seeking an extensive military relationship, is attempting to put China off its stride by assisting the rise of another large Asian power – one moreover, with democratic norms and abiding territorial differences with China. Such activities are not consonant with the induction of China into a concert and would need to be modified.

White counters the prospect of a deepening US-India relationship by arguing that India is too large ever to be another power‟s “ally”. He is correct in so far as the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) would like India to retain its strategic independence and manoeuvrability.

But several factors should also be kept in mind.

India might not ever become formally allied to the US, but that is not to say it will not in future draw strategically closer to Washington. Moreover, thinking in the MEA on China is not necessarily universally shared in senior policy circles in New Delhi. Some elements of the Indian polity are increasingly wary of China, especially of its persistent claim over the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh, with a population of 1.1 million, and of its growing footprint in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and South Asia. There is a growing feeling in some quarters that the only way to deal with China is to stand up to it.

Crucially, although India is a rising power, with growth rates typically in the 7-9 per cent range, China, which is over twice as large economically and spends almost three times more on defence, is growing still more rapidly, thus continuing to draw away from India in capability. Given the possibility that China might continue to draw away from India, the incentive on New Delhi to draw closer to the US would be increased.

Some might argue at this point that India‟s demographic advantage over China will assist it relatively quickly to adjust its pace of economic development so that it is well placed in time to catch up with China. This is true up to a point. But it should also be noted that the rate of that process of catch-up is likely to be limited by two factors: India‟s need more quickly to develop its infrastructure in order better to capitalize on its labour-intensive manufacturing advantage; and the possibility that China can stave off the demograhic factor at least for a period by substituting capital for labour, just as Japan did for a significant period after its wage cost structure began to rise.

These factors, and additional potential complications in the US-Japan-China triangular relationship, mean that any concert of powers could be unstable. When combined with the nebulous nature of the concept, as described briefly above, prudent policy would dictate that any attempt to develop a concert by providing strategic space to China should be buttressed by other measures.


46

What might such measures be? Clearly, ensuring maximum military preparedness and coordination would be important. But as illustrated by the abortive „quadrilateral‟ episode, any military effort to coordinate a response to China beyond the current, bilateral system of „hubs and spokes‟ between the US and its key friends and allies would need to be handled sensitively, lest China be induced prematurely to become that which is most feared – an enemy. That does not mean, however, that more cannot be done to achieve better outcomes, perhaps by using the US initially as a „strategic go-between‟ between the other players, but short of any formal new multilateral security arrangements targeted specifically at China.

And nor should we abandon attempts to establish multilateral security structures in Asia, which might be a useful means of supporting the emergence of a concert of powers „in the wings‟. And here, it seems, the East Asia Summit (EAS), which includes all the major players but which is simply at this stage a summit of leaders without any on-going capacities, appeals particularly to India. With Mr Rudd‟s suggested new security body effectively dead in the water, perhaps the EAS could receive stronger Indian and Australian support as the key regional institution.

Additionally, it is apparent that one crucial issue driving China‟s enhanced interest in the Indian Ocean Region is concern about the security of its energy flows across the Indian Ocean Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS). In this regard, China apparently fears that during times of stress of even conflict, its energy supplies could be interdicted, thus rendering it highly vulnerable. Although China has sought to extend its energy options by means of various gas and oil pipelines, in themselves these cannot solve the wider problem.

One approach to assisting both China and India better to lock in to Asian security architecture – whether in the form of formal mechanisms such as an enhanced EAS or informal ones like the mooted concert of powers – would be to seek to allay China‟s concerns about energy security.

The current Indian Ocean multilateral forum, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOARC) is clearly inadequate for this purpose. It does not accord any status to outside powers with legitimate uses for the Indian Ocean such as the US, China, Japan and Russia. It does not include Pakistan. And it does not seek to deal robustly with security issues, even some important transnational ones such as piracy and drug and people smuggling.

An early move to promote transparency and better cooperation in the region could be undertaken by seeking to shore up this rickety structure by making it more inclusive and by making a greater effort to address, in the first instance, key transnational issues like piracy, drug, weapons and people smuggling. Any such move would obviously be a long-term process. But if regional great power


47

tensions are to be mitigated, the process must be commenced. India, moreover, has a key role to play in any rehabilitation of the IORARC. India is by far the largest regional power in the Indian Ocean. Without New Delhi‟s agreement, change, even incremental, cannot occur. With its agreement, however, perhaps all can eventually „rise on the same tide‟ in the IOR – a region that, for all its apparent entrenched poverty and dissonance, has enormous promise.

*********


48

Look East Meets Look West:

India-Southeast Asia Evolving Relations

Dr.Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Email: [email protected]

Fellow, RSPS

Lead Researcher for Political and Strategic Affairs,

ASEAN Studies Centre

Education

B.A. (Hons) (International Relations) Chulalongkorn

University, MPhil/Ph.D. (Political Studies), School of

Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Research Areas

Thai Politics, Foreign Policy and International Relations, Comparative Politics, Politics

of Myanmar and Indochinese States, Nationalism, ASEAN political cooperation

Publications

Books and Monographs:

Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin Shinawatra and His Foreign Policy, Singapore: Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.

Myanmar: Life After Nargis, (co-authored), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

2009.

The Road to Ratification and Implication of the ASEAN Charter, (editor), ASEAN Studies Centre,

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Report No.3, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies, 2009.


49

A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations, University Press of America,

2005.

Book Chapters, Academic Journal Articles, Working Papers:

“A Battle Royale: Thailand Takes on the Foreign Media”, Global Asia, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter, December

2010.

“Thailand Targets the Foreign Media”, Number 1 Shimbun, Vol. 42, Issue 8, August 2010, pp. 4-6.

“Temple of Doom: Hysteria about the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai Nationalist Discourse”, Legitimacy

Crisis in Thailand, (edited by Marc Askew), Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2010.

“The Last Bus to Naypyidaw”, Myanmar/Burma: Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, (edited by Lex

Rieffel), Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2010.

“Thai-Burmese Relations: Old Animosity in a New Bilateral Setting”, in Bilateralism Versus Multilateralism

in Southeast Asia, (edited by N. Ganesan and Ramses Amer), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies, 2010.

“Unity as a Discourse in Thailand’s Polarised Politics”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2010, Singapore: Institute

of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.

“Thailand: Bending with the (Chinese) Wind?”, in East Asia’s Relations with a Rising China, (edited by Lam

Peng Er, N. Ganesan and Colin Durkop), Seoul: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010.

“Dealing with Burma’s Gordian Knot: Thailand, ASEAN, China and the Burmese Conundrum”, Myanmar:

Prospect for Change, (edited by Li Chenyang and Wilhelm Hofmeister), Singapore: Select Books Publishing,

2010.

“Diplomacy Under Siege: Thailand’s Political Crisis and the Impact on Foreign Policy”, in Contemporary

Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Singapore: Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, December 2009), pp. 447-467.

“A Fading Wave, Sinking Tide: A Southeast Asian Perspective on the Korean Wave”, in Korea’s Changing

Roles in Southeast Asia: Expanding Influence and Relations, (edited by David I. Steinberg), Singapore:

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, March 2010.

“Confusing Democracies: Diagnosing Thailand’s Democratic Crisis 2001-2008”, in Political Change,

Democratic Transitions and Security in Southeast Asia, (edited by Mely Caballero-Anthony), London:

Routledge, 2009.

“Thailand”, in Southeast Asia in a New Era: Ten Countries, One Region in ASEAN, (edited by Rodolfo C.

Severino, Elspeth Thomson and Mark Hong), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.

“Diplomacy Under Siege: Thailand’s Political Crisis and the Impact on Foreign Policy”, in Contemporary

Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3, Singapore: Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, December 2009, pp. 447-467.


50

“Neither Constructive nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy”, in Between Isolation and

Internationalisation: The State of Burma, (edited by Johan Lagerkvist), The Swedish Institute of

International Affairs Paper No.4, 2008, pp. 201-222.

Book Reviews:

Sorpong Peou, Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific: Theory and Practice (California: Praeger, 2010), in

Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 3 , December 2010, pp.

494-496.

P. V. Rao, (ed.), India and ASEAN: Partners at Summit (New Delhi: KW Publishers Book, 2008), in Contemporary

Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 1, April 2009, pp. 181-183.

Mark Askew, William S. Logan and Colin Long, Vientiane: Transformations of a Lao Landscape (London: Routledge,

2007), in ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 3, December 2008, pp. 347-349.

Conference Papers Presented:

Empowering SEANWFZ: How Should ASEAN Tackle the Nuclear Power Issue, paper presented at the

International Workshop on “Nuclear Challenges in Southeast Asia: Promoting Cooperation and

Consensus, jointly organised by University of Canterbury (New Zealand) and Naval Postgraduate

School (USA), (Christchurch, New Zealand, 15-17 February 2011).

Years of Living Dangerously: Thailand’s Current Security Challenges, paper presented at the NIDS

(Japan’s National Institute for Defence Studies) International Workshop on Asia Pacific Security,

organised by NIDS, Ministry of Defence, Japan, (Tokyo, Japan 27-28 January 2011).

A United Community in a Divided Region: Southeast Asia, Japan, China and East Asian Community,

paper presented at the International Conference on “Japan’s Strategic Challenges: China’s Rise, the

U.S. Hegemonic Decline and Asian Security”, co-organised by Australian Research Council Asia Pacific

Futures Research Network and East Asian Institute (National University of Singapore), (Singapore,

20 January 2011).

Infrastructure Versus Superstructure: Evaluating ASEAN-Style Regionalism, paper presented at the

international workshop on “Differing Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism”, co-organised by the

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Korea Office), and Hiroshima Peace Foundation, (Hiroshima, Japan 30

November 2010).

Digital Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, paper presented at the international conference on “Rethinking

Diplomacy: New Approaches and Domestic Challenges”, co-organised by the Japan Foundation and

the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, (Tokyo, Japan 30-31 August 2010).

A Civilianised Burma: Anticipating a Renewed Thai-Burmese Romance, paper presented at the

International Academic Symposium on “Myanmar 2010: Election and Beyond”, co-organised by the

University of Hong Kong and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Singapore Office), (Hong Kong 23-25

June 2010).


51

Clash of Paradigms: Thailand’s Turmoil in May 2010, paper presented at the seminar “A Crisis of

Perspective and Clash of Paradigms: Thailand’s Turmoil in May 2010”, organised by Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies, (Singapore 11 June 2010).

Exporting Threats, Transmitting Instability: Conflicts in Myanmar, Effect on Thailand, paper presented at

the conference on “Internal Conflicts in Myanmar: Trans-border Consequences”, co-organised by the

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Centre for Security Analysis (Chennai, India), (Singapore 26-27

May 2010).

Glorifying the Inglorious Past: Historical Overhangs in Thai-Cambodian Relations, paper presented at the

workshop on “Historical Overhangs in East Asian International Relations”, co-organised by the Konrad

Adenauer Stiftung (Korea Office), Jeju Peace Institute and Hiroshima Peace Foundation, (Jeju 21-22 April

2010).

Thailand’s Position on Non-Proliferation Issues, paper presented at the International Conference on

Preparing for Nuclear Expansion in Southeast Asia: Frameworks for Effective Cooperation and Enhanced

Security, co-organised by School of Social and Political Science, University of Canterbury (New Zealand)

and the Centre for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Post Graduate School (USA), Christchurch, New Zealand,

26-28 August 2009.

Thai Political Parties in the Age of the Great Divide, paper presented at the International Conference on

Political Parties, Party System and Democratisation in East Asia, co-organised by the East Asian Institute,

Singapore and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Singapore, 13 August 2009.

Dealing with Burma’s Gordian Knot: Thailand, China, ASEAN and the Burmese Conundrum, paper

presented at the International Symposium on Political Development and New Challenges for International

Relations in Southeast Asia, co-organised by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Yunnan University

and Hong Kong University, Kunming, China, 20-21 July 2009.

ASEAN-India Connectivity and the Open Sky Initiative, paper presented at the Delhi Dialogue I: Regional

Security and Cooperation Dialogue, co-organised by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, India, 21-22 January 2009.

Reflections on ASEAN’s Involvement on Post-Nargis Response, paper presented at the High-Level

Roundtable on Post-Nargis Joint Relief and Recovery Efforts in Myanmar, organised by the Tripartite Core

Group (Government of Myanmar, ASEAN and the United Nations), Yangon, Myanmar 26 November 2008.

Thailand: Bending with the (Chinese) Wind?, paper presented at the International Workshop on East Asia

Facing a Rising China, co-organised by East Asia Institute, Singapore, and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,

Singapore, 11-12 August 2008.


52

Thai Position toward Burma, paper presented at the International Roundtable on Alliances and the

Problems of Burma/Myanmar Policy: The United States, Japan, Thailand, Australia and the European

Union, organised by Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Washington DC, USA, 3 November 2006.

Forthcoming:

“The Thaksinisation of the Military, the Army Factionalised and the Royal Politics”, in Southeast Asian Militaries,

(edited by Marcus Mietzner), London: Routledge, 2011.

ASEAN-US Relations: What are the Talking Points?, editor, ASEAN Studies Centre, Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011.

“Competing Diplomacy: Thailand in Sino-American Rivalry”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2011, (edited by Daljit Singh),

Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, April 2011.

“Look East Meets Look West: India-Southeast Asia Evolving Relations”, The International Spectator, London:

Routledge, forthcoming, 2011.

--------------------------------------------------------

Look East Meets Look West:

India-Southeast Asia Evolving Relations

The world in 1991 was a strange place. The Cold War had just ended; the earlier fall of

the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

symbolised the collapse of communist ideology, at least in Europe. In Southeast Asia,

countries braced themselves for an inevitable shift in the international order, with the

United States as the sole superpower and China growing rapidly. At the same time, the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) underwent a structural transformation,

laying out a proactive, outward-looking policy while seeking to connect with outside

powers.1 Confronted with such changed circumstances, in 1991 Indian Prime Minister P.

V. Narasimha Rao made a bold diplomatic step by initiating what was considered a

watershed in his country‘s foreign affairs — the 'Look East' policy. Although the so-called

Look East policy encompasses the larger Asia-Pacific region, there can be no question

that Southeast Asia, the focus of this article, constitutes a significant aspect of it.

During the Cold War period, India was perceived by its Southeast Asian neighbours as

something of a threat because of its intimate association with the Soviet Union and the

1 Founded in 1967, ASEAN members today include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. For a detailed discussion of ASEAN, see Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of ASEAN.


53

buildup of its military propelled by an ambition to become the region‘s naval power.

With a new political landscape in which Southeast Asia, and indeed the entire Asia-

Pacific, emerged as an economically dynamic region, Rao redirected his country

eastward and was eager, albeit in a subtle manner, to enter into competition with other

great powers to gain Southeast Asia‘s attention and, more importantly, to reap its

benefits. This represented the basis of India‘s Look East policy.

This article examines the internal and external factors responsible for the

formulation of such a policy. It supports the general argument that India was compelled

to respond to domestic and regional realities which urgently called upon it to bridge its

missing link with Southeast Asia and increase its presence in the region. The article

investigates and updates India‘s relationship with Southeast Asia, both with ASEAN as

an organisation and with individual countries. It argues that while India is currently not

a major strategic partner of ASEAN, the growing recognition among Southeast Asians of

India‘s emergence as a new regional power has significantly contributed to an

improvement in their relationship. Such an amicable atmosphere opens the door for

India to play a greater role in maintaining the region‘s balance of power. Southeast Asia

has recently begun to 'look west' toward India as a new source of economic interests and

regional security, especially in counterbalancing the unstoppable ascent of China.

Leaving its lonely planet

After regaining its independence in 1947, India pursued a foreign policy of non-

alignment. But like most countries in Asia, it was eventually unable to escape the impact

of the Cold War. Taking advantage of it, during the 1970s, India decided to tilt against

the United States as the provocateur in the ideological conflict with the Soviet Union.2

Ashok Kapur underscored that the aim was for the two superpowers to recognise India

as an important and independent player with socialist leanings in foreign affairs and in

its domestic economic and political arrangements.3 New Delhi gradually deepened its

ties with Moscow and ultimately accepted the latter‘s support in areas of strategic

congruence, without having to subscribe to Soviet global policies or proposals for Asian

collective security. Close and cooperative relations were particularly evident in the

sectors of Indian industrial development and defence production and purchases.

2 Damodaran, ―Indo-U.S. Relations: Prospects‖, 46-7. 3 Kapur, India: From Regional to World Power, 124.


54

This informal alliance between the Soviet Union and India profoundly worried

most countries in Southeast Asia. They already felt threatened by the advance of

communism in their own region. India‘s cosying up with Soviet Union automatically

erected a barrier in their relationship with it. Moreover, India‘s pro-Vietnamese policies

toward Cambodia increased the level of discomfort between the two sides. Contacts

between them were consequently scant during this period as mutual suspicion and

distrust came to define the state of their relationship.4 Thus, when the Cold War ended,

India may have suddenly felt 'forsaken' in its own neighbourhood, and sought to release

itself from ideological constraints while manufacturing a multi-dimensional foreign

policy. The change in the regional environment played a fundamental role in the shift of

India‘s policy toward Southeast Asia.

The end of the Cold War transformed Southeast Asia from an ideological

battlefield into a new source of economic vibrancy. The Rao administration immediately

grasped the opportunity and quickly (re)built economic and trade ties with countries in

the region. Domestic factors permitted India to break free from its 'policy loneliness'.

India, in the 1990s, commenced its own economic reform process, mainly to alleviate the

balance of payments crisis which forced the country to procure a USD 1.8 billion loan

from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Accordingly, the government introduced

stabilisation measures to reduce the fiscal deficit, including a devaluation of the rupee by

approximately 25 percent, as a short-term solution to the crisis. Simultaneously, Finance

Minister Manmohan Singh began to seriously address the underlying causes of India‘s

economic woes,5 such as India‘s failure to integrate effectively with the global economic

system. He immediately introduced broader reforms, including market-determined

exchange rates, liberalisation of interest rates and reductions in tariffs. Singh

enthusiastically encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI), promoting privatisation

and developing the country‘s service and tertiary sectors. FDI poured into various sectors

that resulted in rapid growth in the standard of living, per capita income and the gross

domestic product (GDP). India‘s subsequent economic growth unquestionably helped

expand its economic engagement with Southeast Asia. Although the Rao government

seemed eager to implement a proactive diplomacy toward Southeast Asia, his Look East

4 Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia, 1-6. Ayoob explains that India, too, had an ambivalent attitude toward Southeast Asia, especially in the wake of the establishment of ASEAN which India perceived to be a distraction from its non-alignment principle. 5 Ahuja et al., "Economic Reform in India", 7-8.


55

policy has often been criticised for lacking strategic vision. Baladas Ghoshal, for instance,

has argued that the policy was not conceived with specific goals or a roadmap and is

largely reactive in nature and simply addresses the rise of other regional powers and

players in Southeast Asia.6

Southeast Asian countries were also searching for new partners at that time to

strengthen their economies and to materialise economic integration within the

framework of ASEAN. There were at least two fundamental reasons for the

rapprochement between India and Southeast Asia: first, India‘s decision to curtail its

naval build-up due to financial constraints and, second, the United Nations-brokered

peace settlement in Cambodia.7 Amitav Acharya has argued that, prior to the

rapprochement, both Malaysia and Thailand expressed their concern about India‘s

growing naval capability, and that Thailand‘s own military build-up was partly a direct

reaction to the Indian threat.8 The two events dissipated some of the suspicion on the

Southeast Asian side and allowed India to develop its relationship with it. In 1993, Prime

Minister Rao, wishing to create a climate of confidence between India and Southeast

Asia, paid an official visit to Thailand, the first country he visited outside the Indian

subcontinent. From the Indian perspective, the Look East policy serves not only to

promote economic partnership with Southeast Asia, but also to diminish the country‘s

image as a military threat.

The Look East policy

Although the Look East policy may be an ―unstructured creation‖, India has continued to

implement it as a platform for its objectives in Southeast Asia. The essential philosophy

of the Look East policy is that India‘s future and economic interests are best served by

greater integration with Southeast Asia. Most analysts agree that the Asian region will

remain the most vibrant segment of the world economy in the medium term. Therefore,

to achieve higher economic gains, India has been enthusiastic to expand its economic

networks with Southeast Asian economies, as they have earned a large share of global

6 Ghoshal‘s presentation at the East West Centre, Washington DC, on ―India‘s Look East policy revisited‖, 27 May 2010. http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ewc-in-washington/events/previous-events-2010/may-27-mr-baladas-ghoshal/. 7 In 1980, India had ignored ASEAN‘s collective position on Cambodia by recognising the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh, thus worrying some Southeast Asian states about India‘s direct intervention in the Cold War politics in this region. 8 Acharya, Arms Race in Southeast Asia, 34.


56

exports in recent years, progressively becoming a part of supply chains of industrial

components and raw materials. Hence, it is an attempt to forge closer and deeper

economic integration with its eastern neighbours as part of the new Realpolitik evident

in India‘s foreign policy. G. V. C. Naidu succinctly sums up the essence of the policy:9

[The Look East policy] became a multi-faceted and multi-pronged approach to

establish strategic links with as many individual countries as possible, evolve closer

political links with ASEAN, and develop strong economic bonds with the region…. It

was an attempt to carve a place for India in the larger Asia Pacific…. The Look East

policy was also meant to showcase India‘s economic potential for investments and

trade…. Last but not least, the feeling of getting left out of the action in the Asia

Pacific, whether it was the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the ASEAN

Post-Ministerial Conferences (ASEAN-PMC) with the Dialogue Partners of ASEAN,

which had emerged as the only forum to discuss regional issues, also weighed heavily

in New Delhi‘s thinking.

But India‘s goals in Southeast Asia are not limited to the economic field. India

hopes to strengthen political and security ties with ASEAN, symbolically through the

exchange of visits between leaders of the two sides and, more tangibly, by joint military

exercise programmes and other non-traditional security cooperation. The Look East

policy also serves to reinvigorate India‘s cultural influence in Southeast Asia. Indeed,

special bonds of kinship and age-old cultural connections between India and Southeast

Asia have paved the way for a speedy process of rapprochement. Most Southeast Asian

states have, in certain periods and to varying degrees, been under the influence of Indian

civilisation. As early as 500 BC, India already had trade relations with Burma and

Malaya.10 Through trade, India was able to transmit its cultural influence to Southeast

Asia, including Buddhism and Hinduism, the Sanskrit inscriptions, literature

(Ramayana, composed in 1094), art, architecture, political and social structures through

the caste system, as well as cuisine. While attempts have been made at the state level to

connect the political leaderships between the two sides, cultural similarities have also

been used to boost familiarity at the people level. In psychological terms, the cultural

9 Naidu, ―India and Southeast Asia‖, 140. 10 Prasad, Foreign Trade in Ancient India, 36. Also see, Ooi, Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopaedia, 332.


57

linkages seem to signal that, despite their frosty relationship during the Cold War, India

and Southeast have never been too far apart

Has the Look East policy fulfilled some of these declared objectives? While Rajiv

Sikri, former Special Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs responsible for India‘s

Look East Policy, has opined that the policy seems to be a satisfactory achievement, given

that both India and Southeast Asia have continued to seek closer engagement with each

other,11 India is still not considered a major strategic partner of ASEAN. Although

economic activities between India and Southeast Asia – both ASEAN and individual

members – have increased significantly over the years, India is not involved in most

discussions of regional security issues, even in multilateral forums like the East Asia

Summit (EAS) of which both sides are members.12 Amitendu Palit has argued that India

has not played a role in this region that is commensurate with its new status as a rising

power.13 While it has become more interested in the region‘s security issues in recent

years, this effort has often been distracted by security concerns in its own

neighbourhood, ranging from the decades-old conflict with Pakistan to terrorism in the

South Asian region. Besides, India has no direct conflict with Southeast Asia, as

compared to China which has engaged in several territorial disputes with a number of

ASEAN members.14

India and ASEAN

As a friendly gesture from ASEAN following the implementation of the Look East policy,

India was granted a sectoral dialogue partner status in 1992.15 This proved to be the

spark India needed to jump-start more wide-ranging cooperation with ASEAN in the

11 Strachan, Kang and Sinha, India’s Look East Policy, 3. 12 The EAS is an annual forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia. Members include the ten ASEAN countries, plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The United States and Russia were admitted in October 2010. 13 A. Palit, ―India should Continue to Look East‖, East Asia Forum, 22 April 2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/22/india-should-continue-to-look-east/ 14 Such territorial disputes include 1) Macclesfield Bank/Zhongsha Islands (China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan; ongoing) 2) Paracel Islands (China, Vietnam and Taiwan; ongoing) 3) Scarborough Shoal (China, the Philippines and Taiwan; ongoing), and 4) Spratly Islands (China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan; ongoing). 15 As a Sectoral Dialogue partner of ASEAN, India proposed to work with ASEAN on trade, investment and tourism, with the possibility of expanding the relations to include other areas like development cooperation, transfer of technology and human resources development (HRD).


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areas of trade, investment, tourism and science and technology. In 1995, during the fifth

ASEAN Summit in Bangkok, ASEAN invited India to become a full dialogue partner.16 A

year later, India was admitted into the ASEAN Regional Forum. Since 2002, India and

ASEAN have organised summit level meetings on a yearly basis, deemed a fundamental

pillar for the qualitatively enhanced engagement that both sides have sought. But the

rapid development does not necessarily mean that there were no obstacles in the

bilateral ties. For example, on the part of India, some domestic political constraints have

impinged on desirable economic reforms, and as a result, impacted on India‘s trade

relations with ASEAN.

The new millennium signified another crucial turning point for ASEAN and, to a

great extent, its relations with India, simply because of the shift in the region‘s balance of

power. China continued to rise, economically and militarily, while the United States‘

attention towards Southeast Asia evaporated in the wake of the 9/11 incident. The Bush

administration invested all its foreign policy resources in its war on terror, thus limiting

the scope of its contacts with Southeast Asia. With a waning American presence in the

region, Southeast Asia, while forging a close partnership with China, was worried that

China could dominate the regional balance of power. Accordingly, ASEAN looked west

towards India. It encouraged India to become more involved in the regional integration

process to help maintain the atmosphere of multipolarity. Mohan Malik argues that

nearly all Southeast Asian countries, perhaps with the exception of Malaysia, supported

India‘s participation in the EAS, seeing it as a useful counterweight to China‘s growing

power.17 Beijing and New Delhi were careful, however, not to be seen as provoking a

game of rivalry in the region. In fact, both Chinese and Indian leaders refrain from using

terms like 'competition', 'rivalry' or 'hostility' in reference to each other, particularly as

they interact with their Southeast Asian neighbours. Furthermore, policymakers in India

were conscious of their country‘s limitations in Southeast Asia. Indeed, India‘s former

Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran even called his country a ―premature power‖, given the

existing imbalance between its role as a global actor and its inability to deliver basic

16 As a Full Dialogue partner, India has pledged to work closely with ASEAN in all areas of cooperation: political, economic and socio-cultural. 17 Prior to the formation of the EAS, Malaysia, a country with an anti-foreign power history, argued that the entry of extra-regional actors would dilute the putative identity and purpose of ASEAN and the already established ASEAN Plus Three (consisting of 10 ASEAN members plus China, Japan and South Korea). M. Malik, China and the East Asian Summit: More Discord than Accord, Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, February 2006, http://old.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/ChinaandEastAsiaSummit.pdf.


59

development needs to millions of its citizens.18 Thus, Indian leaders have averred that

their aim is to expand India‘s strategic weight in Southeast Asia and not to enter into

rivalry with China.19

No longer perceived as a threat

Throughout the 1990s and in the new millennium, the India government concentrated

mostly on eliminating the old perception of it being a threat and building confidence

with its ASEAN neighbours through a variety of means. First, India made it clear that it

was not seeking a hegemonic position in ASEAN, and that it would respect ASEAN

sentiments in order to nurture a long-lasting relationship.20 Second, India insisted on

not articulating a grand theory about its own changing strategic position in the region. In

other words, India refused to posit a theory about its own 'peaceful rise'. As Singapore‘s

Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew pointed out in December 2007, ―Asia and the world, for

various reasons, are not duly concerned about India‘s rising internal and regional

profile.‖21 C. Raja Mohan observes that India‘s democratic pluralism effectively provides

a natural counter to any future external military adventures. Having flirted disastrously

with grand concepts in the past, India has as its current emphasis, cautious Realpolitik.22

As Minister of External Affairs, in 2007 Mukherji stated, ―We value our membership in

the ARF and see it as an experiment for the fashioning of a new pluralistic, cooperative

security order in tune with the diversity of the Asia-Pacific region and in consonance

with the transition away from a world characterised by poles built around military

alliances.‖23

To further display its seriousness in engaging with the organisation, India signed

the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003 and became a member of the EAS in

2005. The ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) in goods was also concluded in

May 2009 and came into force a year later. ASEAN and India are both significant

18 See, S. Saran, ―India and China Take Different Roads to World Leadership‖, Yale Global Online, 1 November 2010, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/india-and-china-different-roads-part-i. 19 Mohan, ―India‘s Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security‖, 53. 20 L. Curtis, India’s Expanding Role in Asia: Adapting to Rising Power Status, The Heritage Foundation, 20 February 2007. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/02/indias-expanding-role-in-asia-adapting-to-rising-power-status. 21 Lee Kuan Yew, ―India‘s Peaceful Rise‖, Forbes, 24 December 2007. 22 Mohan, ―India in the Emerging Asian Architecture‖, 50. 23 Cited in Kesavan, ―Regional Institutions in Look East Policy‖, 108.


60

markets in the world economy. At the time of the AIFTA conclusion, both had a

combined market of almost 1.8 billion people and a combined GDP of USD 2.75 trillion.

While India‘s total trade volume with ASEAN is not as large as China‘s, its growth

trajectory is equally remarkable. According to ASEAN statistics, total India-ASEAN trade

mushroomed from USD 2.9 billion in 1993 to USD 47.5 billion in 2008, while India‘s

share of total ASEAN trade quadrupled from just 0.7 percent in 1993 to 2.8 percent in

2008, making it ASEAN‘s seventh biggest trade partner. Meanwhile, ASEAN accounts

for 10 percent of India‘s global trade and is India‘s fourth largest trading partner after

the European Union (EU), the United States and China. More importantly, India

recognises economic engagement with ASEAN as an instrument to develop its poorer

northeastern states bordering on Myanmar and providing physical entry into Southeast

Asia, while ASEAN views India‘s trade with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam as

an opportunity to help these newer, less-developed members of the organisation catch

up and further intra-ASEAN trade and unity.24 But a stronger partnership does not

always guarantee a smooth relationship. Actually forging partnerships and agreements

with India has been more problematic in certain areas than with China. Indeed, some

ASEAN leaders have complained about the difficulties in negotiating the AIFTA, while

ASEAN-China trade has progressed significantly with few hiccups.25 Here, the greatest

challenge seems to derive from the fact that both sides have been unable to remove

protectionism. Furthermore, the lack of economic structural reforms in India has the

potential to constrain their future cooperation. The Indian business community also

fears that a flood of cheap imports from Southeast could cripple domestic industries,

particularly in fields such as tea, spices, palm oil and rubber.

Moreover, little effort has been put into development of the human dimension.

Leaders tend to take the human dimension for granted, assuming that the people of their

respective countries are already familiar with each other‘s culture and customs. As

Parameswaran puts it, ―Bolstering the human dimension of the relationship will provide

a firmer foundation critical for the development [of the relationship] in the long run.26

Some Indian policymakers and scholars have already announced a second phase of the

24 Parameswaran, Strengthening ASEAN-India Relations, 2-3. 25 J. R. Ruolngul, "India-ASEAN FTA: Implications for India‘s Northeast", Sinlung, 11 March 2010. http://www.sinlung.com/2010/03/india-asean-fta-implications-for-indias.html. 26 Parameswaran, Strengthening ASEAN-India Relations, 8.


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Look East policy which encourages more intensive economic and defence contacts

through tailor-made programmes.27

All-encompassing cooperation

Economic cooperation with ASEAN is not the only area in which India has expressed its

keen interest. Both India and ASEAN have ventured into other areas of cooperation,

particularly in the security-related field. They have in the past years reinforced their

coordination in counter-terrorism, anti-piracy, counter-narcotics and sea lane

protection, all problems that neither ASEAN nor India could possibly tackle on its own.

For example, India has offered to participate in joint security patrols in the Malacca

Strait, one of the world‘s most important shipping lanes linking the Indian and Pacific

Oceans.28

In 2003, India and ASEAN concluded the Joint Declaration on Cooperation to

Combat International Terrorism involving cooperation on sharing intelligence. India has

suffered from a series of terrorist attacks, with the latest taking place in Mumbai in

2008. Similarly, ASEAN is not a terrorist-free region. Jamaah Islamiya (JI), responsible

for such attacks as the 2002 Bali bombings and the terrorist attacks against the JW

Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Hotels in Jakarta in 2009, is still actively operating in the

region.

Emerging non-traditional security challenges such as natural disasters and pandemics

have also given a boost to India-ASEAN relations. For example, both parties founded an

India-ASEAN Network on Climate Change and the Green Fund in 2007 as a framework

in which leaders committed to assisting each other in times of natural disasters. These

initiatives quickly took concrete form in the aftermath of the 2004 Boxing-Day Tsunami

that devastatingly hit the coasts of India and some ASEAN countries.

Forging bilateral ties

27 Muni and Mohan, ―India‘s Options in a Changing Asia‖, 63. 28About one-quarter of the world‘s traded goods pass through it, including an estimated 15 million barrels of oil per day. ―Country Analysis Brief: World Oil Transit Chokepoints‖, Energy Information Administration, January 2008. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html.


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While increasing its volume of joint activities with ASEAN, India has also firmed up its

relationship with individual members on a bilateral basis. India‘s rise has become a

factor of attraction, with Southeast Asian countries now endeavouring to reach out to

New Delhi, contrary to the initial period of the Look East policy in which India was the

one to reach out to the region. In recent times, bilateral relations have become

progressively more comprehensive, with special emphasis on economic and defence

cooperation.

Ties with core ASEAN members

Some Southeast Asian countries have been more enthusiastic than others in courting the

up-and-coming regional power, India. For example, in response to India‘s Look East

policy, Thailand, in 1996, announced its own ‗Look West‘ policy to cash in on the new

regional context. It aimed primarily at engaging, mostly economically, India and other

countries in the sub-continent. This policy brought about the establishment of the Bay of

Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)

and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) as regional mechanisms that bind countries

in the region together.29 The success of Thailand‘s Look West policy was seen clearly in

the conclusion of a bilateral FTA in 2003 – the first between India and an ASEAN

country – which served to slash tariffs to zero by 2010. Bilateral relations are,

nonetheless, not limited only to trade. Thai Premier Thaksin Shinawatra intensified

Thailand‘s security cooperation with India through joint efforts against terrorism and

narcotic trafficking, and joint naval patrols against narcotics and piracy. In addition,

Thaksin offered to perform as a gateway for India in its venture into Southeast Asia, and

ASEAN in particular. Generally, bilateral ties seem to be unequivocally positive in all

aspects.30

29 BIMSTEC was set up with the goal of combining the 'Look West' policy of Thailand with the 'Look East' policy of India and South Asia. BIMSTEC members are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, and promote 13 priority sectors—trade and investment, technology, energy, transport and communication, tourism, fisheries, agriculture, cultural cooperation, environment and disaster management, public health, people-to-people contact, poverty alleviation and counter-terrorism and transnational crimes. The Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) was established at Vientiane on 10 November 2000. It comprises India, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and emphasises four areas of cooperation: tourism, culture, education and transportation linkages as a basis for building a strong foundation for future trade and investment cooperation in the region. 30 Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand, 213-14.


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Other ASEAN members have followed in Thailand‘s footsteps. Singapore and

India concluded the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) in 2005,

considered a stepping stone for the India-ASEAN FTA. The multi-million dollar

Information Technology (IT) theme park in Bangalore, as well as collaboration in the

banking, pharmaceutical, bio-technology and telecommunications sectors are just some

of the areas of mutual interest in which the two countries have vigorously engaged with

each other. Joint military exercises have been conducted between the two countries‘

navies and armed forces, such as the annual naval training operations as part of the

Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX). Indeed, India and Singapore

have much in common.31 Both are multiracial, multi-religious, multi-lingual

democracies, non-aligned and members of the Commonwealth and G77 clubs. Indian

journalist, Sunanda Datta-Ray, has suggested that, because of these similarities,

Singapore will continue to facilitate India‘s links with the region.32

As for India-Philippines relations, bilateral trade has more than doubled in the past

decade, reaching USD 986.60 million in 2009, compared with USD 338.50 million in

2003.33 Numerous agreements have been signed, including one on avoidance of double

taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion and one on promotion and protection of

investments. The India-Philippines Joint Working Group (JWG) on Trade and Economic

Relations meets regularly to further promote cooperation in this field. In addition, the

two countries organise an annual foreign policy and security dialogue meeting to

synchronise their bilateral and regional political outlooks. India‘s historical ties with

Indonesia have proved to be a useful asset in the promotion of their modern-day

interactions. In the early days when India was practicing non-alignment, it supported the

Sukarno-led armed struggle against Dutch colonial rule. In fact, the Indian military

trained the armed forces of Indonesia after it became independent and Indonesia was

the only country outside the Commonwealth with which India held joint naval

exercises.34 Half a century later, with India rising and Indonesia re-emerged as a born-

again democracy after long, tumultuous years under the Suharto regime, bilateral

relations are seeing new heights. The two countries signed a strategic partnership in

2005 which serves as a crucial platform for discussion of issues of strategic concern,

31 Ming, ―Singapore-India Relations‖, 139. 32 See Datta-Ray, Looking East to Look West. 33 See Shekhar, ―India-Philippines Relations: An Overview‖. 34 Naidu, ―India and Southeast Asia‖, 134.


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including maritime security, energy security and cooperation in counter-terrorism.35

Economically, Indonesia is presently India‘s second-largest export market in ASEAN,

after Singapore. In 2006, India‘s exports to Indonesia increased by 33.77 percent to USD

1.407 billion from USD 1.052 billion in 2005. Imports, on the other hand, grew by 17.18

percent in 2006 to USD 3.39 billion from USD 2.878 billion the previous year. Gusmardi

Bustami, Director General of Foreign Trade at Indonesia‘s Trade Ministry, said in

February 2011 that his country had studied a possible India-Indonesia FTA and would

establish a team to start talks with India.36

In relations with other, smaller countries in ASEAN, India is seeking ways to

expand trade partnerships as a prerequisite for other aspects of bilateral ties. India and

Brunei set up a joint trade committee to enhance economic interactions. India also

signed an agreement with Laos for cooperation in the field of agriculture in 2004, and

donated USD 1 million to assist victims of the widespread flooding that occurred in Laos

in August 2008.37 Similarly, India signed an agreement with Cambodia to institute a

joint commission on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation. The

current level of bilateral trade, as of August 2010, stands at USD 50.60 million.

In October 2010, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh embarked on his

landmark visits to Malaysia and Vietnam. In Malaysia, leaders of the two countries

approved the final draft of the bilateral FTA which will come into force on 1 July 2011.

The FTA is expected to almost double bilateral trade by 2015 to about USD 15 billion,

allowing the two countries to reduce dependence on traditional growth engines such as

China and the United States. In the meantime, in Vietnam, the leaders of the two

countries launched a similar joint committee on trade, investment and agricultural

products. However, the real highlight was the strengthening of bilateral defence

cooperation. Prime Minister Singh proposed a joint military exercise with his

Vietnamese counterpart. In return, Vietnam agreed to provide assistance in the repair

and maintenance of Indian naval ships. Analysts argue that Vietnam‘s offer to provide

India with access to Cam Ranh Bay is aimed at countering China‘s dominance in the

35 See Jha, ―India-Indonesia: Emerging Strategic Confluence‖, 439-58. 36 ―RI should Speed up FTA Talks with India: Gapki‖, Jakarta Post, 22 February 2011. 37 ―India Donates USD 1 million to Laos to Assist Flood Victims‖, Zeenews.com, 10 October 2008. http://www.zeenews.com/news475233.htm.


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South China Sea, an area in which Vietnam and China have long had territorial

disputes.38

The Myanmar connection

Of all its relations with ASEAN countries, India‘s ties with Myanmar have remained the

most controversial; but still resonate the pragmatic thinking behind the Look East

policy. Wai Moe argues that India‘s Look East policy toward Myanmar is indeed

designed to obtain security along its common borders, to secure energy resources in

Myanmar, to develop an overland route to Southeast Asia, and to prevent the Chinese

influence in the Indian Ocean. If the military junta in Myanmar is able, on the other

hand, to persuade India to defend its regime in front of the international community and

supply resources for its armed forces – including arms and training – then China‘s

leverage over the regime will be reduced.39

In the past decades, China‘s influence over the regime in Myanmar has been

overwhelming. China has acted as a source of economic stability for the junta by

intensifying bilateral trade activities as well as a source of political legitimacy for

Myanmar‘s leadership. But this overwhelming influence has in turn restricted

Myanmar‘s policy choices. Thus, strengthening ties with India could help diversify

Myanmar‘s options.

India, although democratic, has been a quick learner in this ferociously competitive

economic and defence game. For instance, in the aftermath of the state‘s crackdown on

pro-democracy demonstrators in Myanmar in September 2007, the Indian government

announced its position of separating politics from economic interests in its relations with

Naypyidaw, purportedly to protect its energy security investments in Myanmar.40

Recently, as Myanmar was preparing for its first election in 20 years, held on 7

November 2010, India once again remained silent even though it fully understood that

the election would not be free and fair. It maintained its support for the SPDC and

upheld its contention that the election was an encouraging step toward pluralism. US

President Barack Obama, during his trip to New Delhi precisely at the time of the

38 ―Vietnam offers navy base to foil China‖, The Telegraph, 8 November 2010. 39 See W. Moe, ―Look-East Meets Look-West as India Hosts Than Shwe‖, The Irrawaddy, 27 July 2010, http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=19067. 40 ―Myanmar Issues a Catch-22 for India‖, Economic Times, 3 October 2007.


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Myanmar election, criticised India for shying away from condemning alleged human

rights abuses by the junta. ―When peaceful democratic movements are suppressed, as

they have been in Myanmar, then the democracies of the world cannot remain silent,‖

Obama said in an address to the Indian parliament.41

Elephant versus Dragon

To erase an impression of simmering tensions with China, Indian Prime Minister Singh

reiterated while visiting Malaysia, ―Are India and China in competition? I sincerely

believe that there are enormous possibilities for our two countries to work together. I

look upon the world as a large enough place to accommodate the growth and ambitions

of both India and China and it is in that sense that we approach India-China relations.‖42

Putting aside such flowery diplomatic language, it is undeniable that India, consciously

or otherwise, has entered the game of power politics in Southeast Asia. The regional

environment has changed over the past decade and Southeast Asia has acknowledged the

need to readjust itself accordingly in order to attain a certain degree of regional

autonomy. In recalculating its strategic position, Southeast Asia has looked west toward

India for closer collaboration. The EAS, for example, was actually the result of a

combination of ASEAN‘s principal approach of engaging with all neighbours and

averting confrontation with them,43 and pressure from other powers, such as the United

States, worried about China possessing too much power in the region. Thus, the main

problem for India is how to downplay its role as a competitor of China.

The problem has been aggravated partly by certain perceptions that prevail inside India.

While some Indian policymakers are optimistic that India can work with China so that

they can mutually enjoy their healthy ties with Southeast Asia.44 some continue to view

China as a threat.45 For the latter, history brings to mind inimical images of China,

41 ―Obama Raps India for Shying away on Rights Abuses in Myanmar‖, Daily News and Analysis, 8 November 2010. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_obama-raps-india-for-shying-away-on-rights-abuses-in-myanmar_1464031. 42 ―Malaysia-India FTA to Double Trade by 2015‖, Straits Times, 28 October 2010. 43 Interview with Rodolfo C. Severino, Former ASEAN Secretary General and Head of the ASEAN Studies Centre, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2 November 2010. 44 In June 2006, Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee described India‘s foreign policy, ―Premised on the twin policies of no extra-territorial ambition and no export of ideology, India seeks the peaceful resolution of all disputes…and forges significant strategic ties with East Asia." L. Curtis, India’s Expanding Role in Asia: Adapting to Rising Power Status, The Heritage Foundation, 20 February 2007. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/02/indias-expanding-role-in-asia-adapting-to-rising-power-status. Analysts also feel that irritants in Indo-Chinese relations are juxtaposed with areas of cooperation. Lakshminarayan, India Looks East, 3. 45 Athwal, China-India Relations, 128.


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ranging from disputes over overlapping borders, China‘s intimacy with Pakistan, the

Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War and China‘s uneasiness about India‘s nuclear

programme. The negative portrayal of China among some Indians provides a context of

rivalry between the two countries in Southeast Asia.

In the context of Sino-ASEAN relations, it is true that China has long regarded

Southeast Asia as its sphere of influence, both in the historical and contemporary period,

and has attempted to maintain that level of influence by developing closer links with the

region. But some Southeast Asian countries still regard Beijing as a threat. As China has

risen economically, it has modernised its army in parallel. This and the remaining

territorial disputes have revived Southeast Asia‘s fear of a growing military threat.

To counter this, Chinese diplomats working in Southeast Asia take every opportunity to

stress their country‘s peaceful coexistence principle and its keenness to become a part of

ASEAN‘s regionalisation process.46 China also signed a Code of Conduct aimed at

maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea during the sixth China-ASEAN

Summit in Phnom Penh in 2002, as a way of alleviating the region‘s threat perception of

China. In this same year, China initiated its FTA negotiation with ASEAN, and since

then progress has been remarkable. The much-anticipated FTA was formally launched in

early 2010, and with a USD 4.5 trillion trade volume, now ranks as the world‘s third

largest trade zone. The value of bilateral trade in the first half of 2010 reached USD 136.5

billion, with an increase of 55 percent year on year.47 In parallel, China has firmed up its

ties with individual members of ASEAN on a bilateral basis. For example, Thailand

became the first country in ASEAN to conclude a bilateral FTA with China which came

into effect in 2003. China has also begun conducting annual military exercises with

Thailand to emulate Cobra Gold, the largest military exercise in Asia between Thailand

and the United States.48 All Southeast Asian countries have signed similar strategic

partnership agreements with China, in the hope of garnering the benefits of its rise as a

regional and global power.

Dragon vs Elephant

46 In a private discussion with Chinese Ambassador to Singapore, Wei Wei, on 11 October 2010, Singapore. 47 ―FTA Pushes ASEAN Ties‖, China Daily, 28 August 2010. 48 Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand, pp. 196-97.


68

While it is apparent that India still lags behind China in terms of developing a strategic

partnership with Southeast Asia, this has not prevented the Chinese leaders from

portraying India as a sort of competitor and potential threat to their sphere of influence

in the region. For example, during Prime Minister Singh‘s visit to Malaysia, Vietnam and

Japan in October 2010, China‘s state-sponsored The People Daily reacted with disdain,

criticising India‘s Look East policy as a failure of its policy of non-alignment. It also

attacked Singh‘s visit as an attempt to form a regional counterbalance to China,

particularly to China‘s military assertiveness in the South China Sea and the Indian

Ocean. The Chinese media concluded by saying that the Indian leadership would d0 well

to remember that China is India‘s largest trading partner in Asia with an estimated USD

60 billion in total trade.49

Some scholars, however, argue that the Sino-India relationship should not be viewed

only in a negative light. Jonathan Holslag asserts that the growing commercial interests

in Southeast Asia will lead to enhanced cooperation between China and India,

particularly in the security domain. They recognise the need to build up a peaceful

environment to protect their business interests in the region.50 The visit of Chinese

premier Wen Jiabao to New Delhi in December 2010 reiterated the fact that China and

India have been drawn into competition as well as cooperation as they defend their

interests in Southeast Asia. Both need Southeast Asian markets to absorb their surplus

merchandise and new investments. Both are in search of new energy sources and access

to sea routes in Southeast Asia. Actually, more intense competition between India and

China could lead to some awkwardness in their relationship, but could also prove to be a

boon for Southeast Asia. In addition to spurring economic openness and competition, if

done in a controlled manner, competition could also compel both New Delhi and Beijing

to formulate a strategic policy toward Southeast Asia that would indirectly help

strengthen the region‘s balance of power.

One of Beijing‘s real concerns is the possibility of India cooperating with the

United States in weakening China‘s influence in Southeast Asia. President Obama visited

India at the beginning of November 2010, a move that was closely watched by the

Chinese leadership. Indeed, Obama‘s trip could be interpreted as part of the growing

49 The People Daily is considered the mouthpiece of China‘s ruling Communist Party and its report was believed to reflect the Chinese leaders‘ thinking. http://www.rediff.com/news/report/indian-look-east-policy-is-a-failure-chinese-media/20101101.htm. 50 Holslag, China and India: Prospects for Peace, 142.


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coordination between the United States and India on Asian affairs. It was reported that

Obama encouraged India not just to ―look east‖ but also to ―engage east‖.51 Furthermore,

the United States is supporting India‘s bid to become a permanent member of the United

Nations Security Council. Washington also continues to assist India in its civilian nuclear

energy programme. In spite of this, the current Indian government wishes to retain its

independent strategic identity and limit the potential costs of being identified too closely

with the United States in Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Singh said in June 2008 that

there was a need to develop closer relations with the United States but without

sacrificing India‘s independent foreign policy.52

Certainly, the United States has its own strategic plan as it strives to maintain its

supremacy in Southeast Asia. This was most evident during Obama‘s visit to Beijing in

November 2009. This time it was India that was infuriated by the Sino-American joint

statement released because it suggested that China should increase its role in the South

Asian region, which India considers its neighbourhood:

The two sides welcomed all efforts conducive to peace, stability and development in

South Asia. They support the efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism,

maintain domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social

development, and support the improvement and growth of relations between India

and Pakistan. The two sides are ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and

cooperation on issues related to South Asia and work together to promote peace,

stability and development in that region.53

In reality, Sino-India relations in the Southeast Asian context are not always

competitive and rival. Defining India‘s and China‘s efforts to increase their economic and

strategic presence in the region as such unnecessarily creates an atmosphere of distrust

between the Asian powers. Competition in certain realms may not preclude cooperation

in other areas. For example, helping Southeast Asia to prevent natural disasters and

pandemics, to carry out rescue operations during and after them or to face growing

51 See R. Velloor, ―US, India can Join Hands to Engage Asia‖, Straits Times, 9 November 2010. 52 PM's reply to the Debate on the Motion of Confidence in the Lok Sabha, 22 July 2008. http://www.pmindia.nic.in/lspeech.asp?id=695. 53 US-China Joint Statement, 17 November 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement.


70

terrorist threats are just a few of the functional areas in which there is room for

cooperation.

Conclusion

The Indian leadership should take advantage of Look East policy‘s 20th anniversary this

year to reenergise it. Bilaterally, India has entered into a number of trade pacts with

ASEAN countries but the record for their implementation has been a disappointment.

Seriously implementing those pacts would project an image of India as a credible trade

partner of Southeast Asian states. Moreover, the Look East policy could be further

extended to new areas, such as education (human resource development), democracy

and culture, where India has a comparative advantage over Asian countries. The ongoing

Nalanda project is leading India in the right direction.54 Tourism represents another area

of mutual interest between India and Southeast Asia. India‘s places of religious and

historical significance, for example, Bodh Gaya, Sarnath, Taj Mahal, Fatehpur Sikri

Ajmer and Hyderabab, are now increasingly popular among Southeast Asians,

strengthening people-to-people contacts. Also, more ASEAN countries are expressing

their interest in India‘s booming Information Technology (IT) industry and have

requested India to establish IT campuses in major capitals – Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta.

Ultimately, the Look East policy should reinforce and demonstrate India‘s commitment

to this region.55

Meanwhile, the rise of China and its resulting influence in the region should not

deter India from adopting a more assertive policy vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. Their

seeming competition in the region should not be interpreted as some kind of zero-sum

game. Furthermore, there are numerous areas in which India can cooperate with China.

India can also make use of available multilateral forums, such as the EAS, to achieve its

interests in the region while working with China to ensure a smooth process of Asian

integration. Successful integration will benefit all parties, and complement India‘s rise as

a new power in this part of the world.

**********

54 The ancient Nalanda University was set up by the Gupta dynasty. The royal patronage offered by the rulers subsequently enabled the university to emerge as the most prestigious institution of Buddhist learning in all of Asia between the fifth and seventh centuries. Today, various countries are involved in re-establishing the university as a centre of Asian excellence. 55 See Kuppuswamy, India’s Look East Policy.


71

References

Acharya, A. An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia: Prospects for Control. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994. Ahuja, S., J. Allentuck, J. Chung, C. Corrigan, I. Hathaway, C. Martin, M. O’Neil, B. Reeves, C. Rojas, L. Rushing, D. Swift and J. Yeaw. "Economic Reform in India: Taskforce Report". Chicago Policy Review 10 (Summer 2006). Anand, M. Trends in India-Indonesia Economic Relations. New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2008. http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2650. Athwal, A. China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics. Oxon: Routledge, 2008. Ayoob, M. India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies. London: Routledge, 1990.

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Chachavalpongpun, P. Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010. Damodaran, A.K. “Indo-U.S. Relations: Prospects”. In South and Southeast Asia in the 1990s: India and American Perspectives, edited by V. Suryanarayan. New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1992. Datta-Ray, S.K. Looking East to Look West: Lee Kuan Yew’s Mission India. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009. Holslag, J. China and India: Prospects for Peace. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Jha, P.K. “India-Indonesia: Emerging Strategic Confluence in the Indian Ocean Region”. Strategic Analysis 32, no. 3 (May 2008). Kapur, A. India: From Regional to World Power. Oxon: Taylor and Francis, 2006. Kesavan, K.V. “The Role of Regional Institutions in India’s Look East Policy”. In South and Southeast Asia: Responding to Changing Geo-Political and Security Challenges, edited by K.V. Kesavan and D. Singh. New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2010. Kuppuswamy, C.S. India’s Look East Policy – A Review, SAAG Paper No. 3662. Noida: Southeast Asia Analysis Group, 12 February 2010. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3662.html. Lakshminarayan, G. India Looks East: Encircling China or Enlightened National Interest, ISAS Brief no. 174. Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, 10 November 2010. Ming, H.T. “Singapore-India Relations: A Return to History”. Austrian Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 2, no. 2 (31 December 2009). Mohan, C.R. “India in the Emerging Asian Architecture”. In ASEAN, India, Australia: Towards Closer Engagement in a New Asia, edited by W.T. Tow, and K.W. Chin. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009. Mohan, C.R. “India’s Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security”. In Southeast Asian Affairs 2008, edited by T.M.M. Than. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008. Muni S.D. and C.R. Mohan. “India’s Options in a Changing Asia”. In India and Emerging Asia, edited by R.R. Shama. New Delhi and London: SAGE Publications, 2005. Naidu, G.V.C. “India and Southeast Asia: An Analysis of the Look East Policy”. In India and ASEAN: Partners at Summit, edited by P.V. Rao. New Delhi: KW Publishers Book, 2008. Ooi, K.G. Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopaedia, From Angkor Wat to East Timor. California: ABC CLIO, Inc. Parameswaran, P. Strengthening ASEAN-India Relations in the 21

st Century. Arlington: The Project 2049 Institute,

2010, http://project2049.net/documents/strengthening_asean_india_relations_21st_century_parameswaran.pdf. Prasad, P.C. Foreign Trade and Commerce in Ancient India. New Delhi: Shakti Malik, 1977. Severino, R.C. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006. Shekhar, V. India-Philippines Relations: An Overview, IPCS Special Report no. 43. New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, June 2007. Strachan, A.L., H.K. Kang and T. Sinha. India’s Look East Policy: A Critical Assessment, Interview with Ambassador Rajiv Sikri. IPCS Special Report. New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, October 2009.


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The „New Regionalism‟

and the China Factor in Rising India‟s „Look East Policy‟

Dr. Alka Acharya

Centre for East Asian Studies,

School of International Studies,

Jawaharlal Nehru University. New Delhi

Alka Acharya is Associate Professor and former

Chairperson of Chinese Studies in the Centre for East

Asian Studies, School of International Studies,

Jawaharlal Nehru University. She has been teaching

courses on Chinese Foreign Policy and Political Economy to the Masters and M.Phil

students and guiding doctoral research since 1993.

She is also an Honorary Fellow of the Institute of Chinese Studies (New Delhi) and

the Editor of China Report, a journal of East Asian Affairs since 2005. She is the joint

editor of the book Crossing A Bridge of Dreams: 50 years of India-China, published in

2002. She was a member of the India-China Eminent Persons Group (2006-2008) and

member of the National Security Advisory Board of the Government of India (2006-

2008). She has authored a book China & India: Politics of Incremental Engagement

which was published in 2008. She has been reappointed for a second term on the

National Security Advisory Board (2011-2013).


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The ‘New Regionalism’

and the China Factor in Rising India’s ‘Look East Policy’

Introduction

The rise of the ‘Asian dragons’ in the late 1960s and 1970s had encouraged a fairly

widespread assessment at that time among scholars and observers, that the 21st century

would be characterised as the ‘Asian century. The economic expansion of the Asia Pacific

region, through the 1980s, concomitantly with greater regional integration within an

increasingly globalised market economy, inaugurated a global shift of economic power,

with few if any precedents in world history. The post-Soviet world witnessed an

intensified economic regionalization in world affairs, which was however qualitatively

different from the earlier processes. By the early-nineties, there was no country in this

region which was not part of some regional grouping or the other, engaged in a wide range

and multiple levels of state and non-state economic cooperation. Despite the brief setback

to the economies of the southeast Asian countries in 1997, the period 2003-07, saw one of

the most remarkable phases of growth in world trade, compared to the past four decades.

But most significantly, it was Asia (including Japan) that led the way, with an average

annual growth of 8-9%. Across the region, trajectories of rapid growth and modernization

were seen and as was pointed out in many recent studies, in many countries the transition

from poverty to prosperity took place in a single generation. Globalisation in the 21st

century is crafting an Asia that is being interwoven into a single market for goods, services

and capital. Asia today has two countries with the largest foreign exchange reserves in the

world – China with around US $ 3 trillion, Japan with more than a trillion and India way

behind with approximately US $ 300 billion. Between 1950 – 2005, Asia’s per capita

income rose seventeen-fold (Britain and the US took 60 and 50 years respectively to

double - S. Korea, China and Taiwan doubled within a decade and rose even more rapidly

in the second decade. Asia’s share of global GDP from 1990-2007 has grown from 20.6 to

22.3% - largely due to China (US share declined marginally from 25.5 to 25.3%) Asia is


74

home to one-third of the world’s cross-border flows, it includes the world’s 2nd (China) 3rd

(Japan), 12th (India) and 15th (S. Korea) largest economies and the 2nd (China) 4th (Japan)

11th (Hong Kong) 12th (S. Korea) 14th Singapore and 17th (Taiwan) largest goods/services

exporters.

A different and ‘new’ stage has thus come about in the Regionalism that we are

witnessing currently. A vast distance has been covered since the 1960s when Joseph Nye

defined regionalism as “…a limited number of states linked together by a geographical

relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence. Largely an economic

phenomenon, the new regionalism is the product of the new stage of globalization over

the past decade, in which mobile capital traverses regions and countries with the best

production costs around the world, leading to a metamorphosis in the transnational

networks of production. So if there is something new about the economics of regionalism,

then there would be something new about its politics as well. And that new politics is now

emanating from the transformation of the fulcrum in the region.

The China Factor

China’s increasing centrality to the economic rise of the Asia Pacific and its growing

economic power is best revealed by its trade with ASEAN which stood at a mere US $390

million in 1976, growing to US $ 185.4 billion by early 2011. Apart from trade, China also

emerged as the major destination of direct capital investment from the region. A high

degree of interdependence has been established between the economies of the region and

there is clear recognition that any regional economic formation will have China playing a

central role. Even as analysts continue to debate whether China is a challenge and/or

threat or opportunity, there is no doubt that the consensus of views in the region generally

is in favour of greater engagement. The proliferation in the regional initiatives, which have

a mandate beyond just commerce and trade testifies to these integrative trends : ASEAN

plus 1, ASEAN plus 3, Asian Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

(SCO), the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000 as well the pan-Asian BOAO Economic

Forum. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 may be regarded as the turning point in the


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regional perception of China as also in the need for greater and wider regional

cooperation. What further assists the Chinese image is the widespread belief that

Washington helped cause the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 by pressing the developing

countries of the region into overzealous deregulation. By contrast, and there can be no

denying that there is here, an element of calculation for greater political and economic

benefits in the long term. China has “conceded” trade surpluses to “all its smaller

Southeast Asian and Korean neighbours…(which) are funnelling regional economic

growth, thus confirming China as the ‘heart’ of the present Asian economic system.” There

is thus a clear strategy discernable in the process of the PRC’s emergence on the regional

stage and tits increasingly prominent role as the principal alternative shaper of the

emerging Asian order. Very few, if at all, would contest that China in fact has already come

to play the role of an engine of growth in the region. If the current transformation of the

global economy, as analyst have pointed out, is about the development of an international

capitalist labor market, China has been a “driving force in this process because of the sheer

size of its labor market and the vast range of its highly competitive products.”

India’s ‘Look East Policy’

With the turn of the century we have also been witnessing an increasing body of

writing, which generally recognizes India’s status as a rising power in Asia. In that context,

analysts also acknowledge the now visible and growing impact of India’s comparatively

more proactive approach to its contiguous regions, in particular, Southeast and East Asia.

The spotlight on a rising India is however part of the broader discourse on the impact of

the forces of economic globalisation and the general trend of the post-cold war

international relations, which is assessed as being “Asia-centric”.

India’s ‘Look East Policy’, initiated in 1992 and described as marking “a strategic

shift” in India’s perspectives and policies, may be said to have emerged in response to the

above delineated trends and events. In fact, it is the considered opinion of many analysts,

that the ‘Look East Policy’ should have been put in place much earlier, since by the early

1990s, regional integrative trends in Southeast and Pacific Asia had advanced to a


76

considerable extent. Given the extensive historical-cultural linkages and the special bonds

of kinship between India and the countries of southeast Asia, the virtually complete

absence of any significant ties during the entire cold war period is in fact, seen as an

“exception”, or a story of “missed opportunities” almost in the nature of a “historical

intermission”. While there are many factors, which went into the revival of ties, the

economic boom in the region, India’s own growth story and the increasingly dominant and

dominating role of the People’s Republic of China, must be seen as the tryadic motivation

in India’s strategic shift. On their part, the ASEAN countries also responded

enthusiastically to India’s ‘Look East Policy’, reflecting the increasing importance of India

in the evolving global economy and the ASEAN countries’ perception of India’s possible

role as a counterweight. Landmark events, agreements and treaties over the past decade

between India and ASEAN testify to the rapid pace of the contacts and prospects. India-

ASEAN trade reached about US $43.90 billion in 2009-10 – though the global recession

contributed to a slight decline in these figures.

There is thus a interesting and natural synergy that is fuelling India’s regional

strategy with respect to ASEAN and southeast Asia in which strategic, economic,

(including technological) political and cultural elements are blended. In strategic terms,

ASEAN can be seen as the gateway to the Asia-Pacific region and India’s ‘Look East’ policy

becomes the springboard which could take India out of the geopolitically constraining and

confining south Asian context and enable it to position itself as a key player and emerging

major regional power. It is clear that if India would want to take advantage of the new

opportunities offered by the forces of economic globalisation, and achieve an annual

growth rate of more than 7-8%, the ASEAN would prove to be a key and crucial partner.

Equally, India with its vast pool of trained and skilled human resources, natural resources,

industrial base and expanding market has much to offer to the developing ASEAN

economies. This requires far more effective, extensive and efficient land and air linkages

with southeast Asia.

Conclusion


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What stands in sharp relief in the architecture of the world economy as it is evolving

today is the emergence of regional trading blocs which are acquiring ever greater salience.

The regional processes in Asia may be said to be going against conventional wisdom in a

sense, by allowing for multiple understandings of and approaches to development and

modernisation and newer forms of collaboration often grounded in cultural affinities.

These are, to a lesser or greater extent, challenging, or at any rate questioning the claims

to universality, implicit in the process of globalisation. At the same time, these are also

being contested continuously, within the regional organisations, they may be said to be in

a state of constant flux as a diverse set of political, economic, cultural, technological

imperatives try to fashion collective responses and attempt to rise above historical

rivalries and endeavour to create economic opportunities.

Secondly, it must be borne in mind that ‘regionalisation’ or ‘regionalism’ is not a

static conception, frozen in time, but a dynamic one, one that is witnessing and undergoing

both a deepening and broadening and also becoming more complex. More importantly,

this deepening is simultaneously altering our understanding of the notion of a region.

Regionalism, in other words, is shaping perceptions and attitudes to the regional

processes even as it is being shaped by them. It is increasingly evident that the defining

features of the rise of Asia, particularly in the post-cold war period, are Complex

Interdependence and Multilateralism. The trend of multilateralism, or in other words, the

demand for a greater democratisation of the world order and the need to bring about a

more cooperative and rule or norm based global order, increasingly being heard from a

wide cross-section of the international community, can also be assessed in terms of the

same historical process.

Regionalism can also be taken as a tactical approach, or even an instrument for

setting right the imbalance in the distribution of power, to prevent the emergence of any

one dominant power, either at the regional level or in the international system, while the

same time, seeking to place checks, through a collective/cooperative mechanism on

unilateral actions. The crucial question here is whether the leading proponents of


78

multipolarity would prioritse an economistic agenda, focussed on exporting their way to

prosperity or contribute to the creation of the ideas and political movements of the future.

The current trend of multipolarization is an unfolding one – it is still characterised by

elements of both competition and cooperation – the confrontations have so far sought to

be avoided. It is not possible to deal with the new world order in terms of either complete

collaboration with or uncompromising opposition to the dominant powers of the day. A

new order is emerging in Asia. Clearly, the responsibilities of those powers being

identified as the potential shapers of the coming century will be critical. If regions, no less

than nations are imagined constructs, it is time to re- imagine Asia – as also the sub-

regions within – for which the notion of the ‘collective’ has to be created anew. The

borderless world and its implications have to be thoroughly comprehended before we

begin to believe and act on it.

*****************


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India’s ‘Look East’ Policy:

An Overview of India-Singapore Relations

Dr.Mohammed Badrul Alam Professor, Dept. of Political Science

Jamia Millia Islamia University,New Delhi-110025 E-mail: [email protected]

Specialization : International Relations, American Studies, South Asia, East Asia and Indian State Politics

Membership of Professional/Learned

Bodies/Societies

Member, Indian Association of Canadian Studies Academy for Asia Pacific Studies

Member, Asian Political Science Association Member, International Political Science Association Member, European South Asian Studies Association Member, Japan Association of Asian Studies Publication Details

(a) Number of Papers published in refereed journals India 42 Abroad 20 (b) Number of Papers published n Conferences/Seminars/Workshops India 5 Abroad 10 Ph.D Thesis Guidance Total number of doctoral thesis Adjudicated - 12 Visits abroad

USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Philippines Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, China, Hong Kong, Bahrin, Saudi Arabia, Netherlands, Thailand, Nepal and France, Taiwan.

mailto:[email protected]


80

Awards Received 1.Fulbright Fellowship, Fulbright-Nehru International Administrator Seminar Award, Selected for 2011 2.University Grants Commission of India, Major Research Project, 2011-13 3.Shastri Fellow, Department of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa, Canada, and International Council for Canadian Studies, 2010-11 4.Salzburg Global Fellow, Salzburg Global Seminar, December 2009 5.The Japan Foundation (New Delhi) Travel Grant, October 2009 6.Fulbright Fellowship, Scholar-In-Residence Program, Selected for Spring 2009 7.Baden - Wuerttemberg Fellow, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany, 2008 8.Board member, Program on Asia and Pacific Studies, International Political Science Association, 2007 9.Dutch Travel Grant for South Asian Studies, Leiden, The Netherlands, June 2006 10. Visiting Scholar, East West Center, Hawaii, USA, February-March 2005 11.Swedish Travel Grant for South Asian Studies, Lund, Sweden, July 2004 12.Salzburg Fellow, Salzburg Seminar, Salzburg, Austria, December 2003 13.Visiting Fellow, Center for Indian Diaspora, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India, January 2003 14.Member, Japan’s Ministry of Education funded collaborative project on Risk Regime in North East Asia, 2003-2006 15.Member, Board of Editors, Project South Asia, South Dakota State University, Brookings, South Dakota, USA, 2002 - 16. Member, International Advisory Board, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany, 2002 - 17.COAS Research Grant, Miyazaki International College, Japan, 2002, 2000, 1999, 1998 18.Social Science Research Grant, Summer1995 19.Ford Foundation Grant, Summer 1994 20.Ashland Oil Research Grant, Kentucky, USA, Summer 1994 21.National Endowment for the Humanities Grant, Summer 1993 22.Short-term Enrichment Grant, American Historical Association, 1989. 23.Short-term Enrichment Grant, American Studies Association, 1988. 24.National Overseas Fellowship, India, 1983-87. 25.National Scholarship, India, 1969-75.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH INTERESTS

North American Studies (USA, Canada), International Relations, South Asia, East Asia (Japan/South Korea /North Korea/ China), South East Asia, Middle East, Ethnicity, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity, Nuclear Proliferation, State (Orissa) and National Politics of India, Study of Indian Minorities, Human Rights

LANGUAGE SKILLS

Proficient in the following languages: Hindi, Urdu, Oriya, Bengali. Working knowledge of Arabic. Interpreter for AT&T Language Line, Monterey, California, USA, 1984-1997.

DISSERTATION

“Kennedy Administration and U.S.-India Relations. 1961-1963.”

PUBLICATIONS: 1.“Between Rationality and Irrationality: A Critique of Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture”, in Taufiq A. Nizami, (ed.), International Politics: Areas of Conflicts and Cooperation, Manak Publications, Delhi, India, 2010


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2.“Nuclear India and Pakistan: Quest for Peaceful Dialogue”, in Manas Chatterji and D.Gopal, (eds.), Frontiers of Peace Economics and Peace Science, Series: Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bigley, United Kingdom, 2011, Forthcoming 3. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy in the Shadow of India’s Deterrence: An Evaluation”, in V.V.L.Gayatri (ed.), Nuclear Warfare: Emerging Legal Regime, The Icfai University Press, Hyderabad, India, 2009 4. "India's Nuclear Doctrine: Context and Constraints", in Jivanta Schottli and Siegfried Wolf, (eds.), State and Foreign Policy in South Asia, Samskriti Publications, New Delhi, India, 2009. 5. "Situating Asian Indian Diaspora in the United States: An Exploratory Study", in Ajaya K. Sahoo and K. Laxmi Narayan (eds.), Indian Diaspora: Trends and Issues, Serials Publications, New Delhi, India, 2008 6.“Embracing Rapprochement: Kennedy, Nehru and the Goa Issue”, in M. Saleem Kidwai (ed.), US Policy Towards South Asia: Focus on Sixty Years, Academic Excellence Publishers, New Delhi, India, 2008. 7.“Globalised Trend Towards Nuclear Proliferation: A Case Study of India and Pakistan as Glocalisation”, in Rumki Basu (ed.), Globalization and the Changing Role of the State: Issues and Impacts, Elgin: Illinois, USA, New Dawn Press, 2007 8.“Between Offense and Defense: An Analysis of Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy”, in Gautam Sen (ed.), Impediments to National Security, Pune:National Center of International Security and Defense Analysis, University of Pune, 2007. 9.Constructing Nuclear Strategic Discourse: The South Asian Scene, India Research Press, New Delhi, India, 2006. Forthcoming 10.“Orissa Politics: Validating Status Quo and Local Narratives”, in Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (eds.), India’s 204 Elections: Grassroots and National Perspectives, London: Sage Publishers, 2006. 11."George W. Bush Presidency and the Transformation of Indo-US Relations", in Vinay Malhotra and Tanmay Kanjilal, (ed.), Search for a New Partnership; Indo-US Relations in the 21st Century, Leeds, England; Wisdom House Publications, 2005 12.Jackie Kennedy: Images and Reality, Nova Social Science Publishers, Hauppauge: New York, USA, 2004 13."Between Engagement and Estrangement: Bush administration and US-India Relations", Evaluation of the Bush Administration, Small World Monograph Series, ArchiTect Press, Tokyo, Japan, 2003 14.'The Shaping of India's Nuclear Policy: Indira Gandhi Years", in Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora (ed.) Partition of India, Indo-Pak Wars and the UNO, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, India, 1999 15."Language Dilemma in Indian Federalism", in Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora (ed.), Encyclopaedia Of India and Her States: Indian Federalism and Center-State Relations, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, India, 1998 16.“Tokyo Olympics: 1964" in John Findling and Kimberly Pelle (ed.) 17.A Historical Dictionary of the Olympics, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, USA, 1996. 18.Aspects of American Government, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, India, 1994. 19.Essays on Nuclear Proliferation. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, India, 1995. 20.“Jack Kerouac” in Donald W. Whisenhunt(ed.) American Portraits, Kendall-Hunt, Dubuque, Iowa, USA, 1993. 21.“A Panorama of Orissa Politics:Resilience and Change.” In J. Lele and R. Vohra (eds.), State and Society in India; South Asia Books: Columbia, Missouri, USA, 1990. 22.India’s Nuclear Policy, Mittal Publications, New Delhi, India, 1988.

Bibliographies 1.Studies on Third Party Politics in the United States. Vance Bib; Monticello,Illinois, USA,1989. 2.Studies on Third World and MNCs Vance, Monticello, Illinois, USA,1988. 3.Studies on Non-Alignment Vance Bib, Monticello, Illinois, USA, 1988.


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4.Studies on UNESCO Vance Bib; Monticello, Illinois, Illinois, USA, 1988. 5.Studies on Brain Drain Vance Bib; Monticello, Illinois, USA,1987. 6.Studies on International Political Economy Vance Bib, Monticello, Illinois, USA,1987.

___________

India’s ‘Look East’ Policy: An Overview of India-Singapore Relations

Since the early 1990s, India’s ‘Look East’ policy and the tangible steps taken toward economic liberalisation coincided with Singapore’s ‘India Fever’ for diversifying the island nation’s choices in terms of business opportunities and defense parameters thus heralding a paradigm shift.

The spate of high profile visits between India and Singapore in the first decade of 21st century underline the significance New Delhi and Singapore attach for widening the window of opportunities and in forging closer economic and security links. On defense and military matters, the visit of Singapore Defense Minister, Teo Chee Hean and his talks with his Indian counterpart, Mr. George Fernandes in October 2003, resulted in a new defense cooperation accord. Since then, reciprocal visits have been undertaken by both sides on a regular basis to sustain this momentum. As part of this agreement, both the countries agreed to personnel training, intelligence exchanges, and regular naval exercises including the much publicised ‘Operation Bold Kurukshetra’ in March 2010. This defense agreement further institutionalized India-Singapore military ties as since 1991 India has welcomed visits by naval ships from Singapore to Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as well as at Vishakhapatnam. Since 1995, Singapore and other South East Asian countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia have taken part in joint military exercises with India, named, MILAN, to promote and calibrate confidence-building and cohesion among the participating nations. Singapore has also engaged in joint naval exercises with India, including anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue operations, and in conducting joint anti-piracy exercises near and around the Straits of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal. The joint patrolling of the seas by the two nations have been extremely helpful in protecting the commercial sea lanes, cutting off drug trafficking, curbing arms smuggling and preventing maritime terrorism. Since 9/11, India and Singapore in cooperation with the US have also shared vital intelligence on issues related to international terrorism. With the foreign companies now being allowed to take up to 26 percent of equity in India’s defense sectors, there are prospects for cooperation in the defense industry arena for Singapore based technological firms that gear up for market expansion and joint marketing with an eye for mutual profitable ventures among other South East Asian nations. Singapore and India also figure in the US scheme of regional security arrangement in South East Asia as there are talks for a new security system to empower Asia-Pacific democracies, a la Asian NATO. This arrangement, if materialized, will do two things. One, it will reduce some of the excess baggage from US by relocating its troops from the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea as well as from the Japanese island of Okinawa. And, two,


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it will provide India and Singapore significant leverage in reorienting their relationship with the United States in Asia-Pacific affairs. Similarly, on matters of trade and commerce, India and Singapore have launched a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) during Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s visit to India in April 2003. This agreement have yielded far reaching benefits for both nations leading to increasing investment flows and with greater exchanges in Knowledge Economy and professional services. The CECA eliminated tariff barriers, double taxation, and provided unhindered access and cooperation between the banks and financial lending institutions of India and Singapore. CECA also facilitated bilateral cooperation over education, intellectual property, aviation, science and technology, relaxed visa regime for Indian professionals in information technology, high tech engineering and financial and investment fields to emigrate and work in Singapore A number of Singapore mega agencies such as Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore(IDA), Agency for Science, Technology and Research(ASTR), International Enterprise Singapore(IES), Building and Construction Authority(BCA) and Economic Development Board(EDB) have evinced keen interest in investing in Indian market in a big way. A reflection of enhanced economic partnership between India and Singapore can be gauged from the following fact sheet. In 2001, India was Singapore’s 15th largest trading partner, 20th largest import source, and 14th in export market. While bilateral trade with India was S$2.4 billion in 1991, it increased nearly three fold S$6.9 billion in ten years time in 2001. An upward trend is being forecasted for the subsequent years. Singapore is the 8th largest source of investment in India and the largest amongst ASEAN member nation. Singapore is also India's 9th biggest trading partner as of 2005-06. Its cumulative investment in India totals USD 3 billion as of 2006 and is expected to rise to US 10 billion by 2015 On the international front, Singapore has played a key role in ensuring India’s inclusion in ASEAN, first as a Sectoral Dialogue Partner (Singapore, 1992) and than as a Full Dialogue Partner (Bangkok, 1995) which in turn facilitated India’s membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF). Singapore has also constantly supported India’s bid for a permanent seat in the expanded United Nations Security Council. With shared vision of the regional economic and strategic environment and with no apparent conflicts in terms of basic national interests, India and Singapore are likely to forge a more coordinated and proactive approach in the years to come. In this context, India’s support for ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and endorsement of the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, made at the October 2003 Bali Summit bode well for the future. With India’s stocks rising as a major hard power and soft power coupled with ‘smart diplomacy’, it is very likely that as ‘India’s natural Southeast Asian partner’, Singapore will hold the trump card for India’s gateway to East Asia and Asia-Pacific region and at the same time act as a catalyst and a balancer between an assertive China and resurgent India.

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Exploration or Implementation? : The Current State of India’s ‘Look East’ Policy

Dr. Joefe B. Santarita

Assistant Professor

Asian Center, University of the Philippines

Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines 1101

Email:[email protected]

Academic Background 2011 Fulbright Scholar in Residence, Kodiak College – University of Alaska, Anchorage (August 2011-May 2012) Research Scholar / PhD, National University of Singapore (2007-2011) 2004 Graduate, MA in Asian Studies, Asian Center, University of the Philippines (2002-2004) Recipient, JICA Japan-ASEAN Youth Fellowship for the 21

st Century. Japan (June- July).

2003 University Scholar, First Semester AY 2002-2003 (MA Asian Studies) Recipient, 1

st Southwest Pacific Dialogue (SwPD) Cultural Exchange Scholarship, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (DEPLU) Bandung City, Indonesia. (June-August) 2000 Units in Master of Management (Rural Development Management),University of the Philippines

(Visayas) (UPV) Units in Master of Education (Social Studies), UPV

1996 Graduate, Bachelor of Arts in History-Community Development. UPV Recipient, Milagros Fider-Sarmiento Scholarship (First Sem, 1995-1996) First UPV recipient, Francisco Nicholas (Reginald Lewis) Scholarship (Second Sem, 1995-1996) College Scholar (Second Sem, SY 1994-1995) Chairperson, UPV Kamaragtas External Affair Officer, UPV Sakdag

1992 Graduate, Secondary Education, Hinigaran National High School (HNHS) Class Third Honorable Mention

Editor-in-Chief, Ang Tinig, official publication of HNHS

9th

Placer, Copywriting and Headline Writing Regional Secondary School Press Conference in Janiuay, Iloilo

1988 Graduate, Elementary Education, La Consolacion School



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Class First Honorable Mention

Work Experience 2009 Teaching Assistant- FASS NUS, Singapore Studies 2214 First Semester 2007 Teaching Assistant- FASS NUS, Singapore Studies 2214 Second Semester

Issue Editor, Musyawarah Newsletter- official newsletter of the Asian Center, University of the Philippines (Jan-March 2007 & April-June2007Issues)

2006 Assistant Professor 4 in Asian Studies, Asian Center, University of the Philippines 2005 Assistant Professor 4 in History, Division of Social Sciences, UPV 2004 Assistant Professor 1 in History, Division of Social Sciences, UPV Chairperson, Committee for the Institution of the Master of History 2003 Instructor 5 in History, Division of Social Sciences Member, Education Committee, UPV Cooperative, Inc. 2001 Affiliate Instructor, UP-Open University (1999-2001)

Member, DSS Academic Personnel Committee SY 2001-2002

1997 Instructor I in History, Division of Social Sciences, UPV

Most Recent Publications Construction, Negotiation and Reproduction of Identity: The Sikhs in the Philippines in Sikhs in

Multicultural Southeast Asia–Negotiating an Identity. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 2011.

Contemporary Indian Communities in Western Visayas in Rising India and Indians in East Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia. September 2008.

Book Reviews. Contemporary South Asia. 17.2 (June 2009). Spooning the Strait: AHistory of Traditional Working Watercraft in Guimaras Island. Agustinian.

2006.

Traditional Utilization of Mangrove Resources in Sibunag, Guimaras. Palayag Journal. 2006.

The Origin of Daulah Islamiah Raya: With Special Reference to Ideology. Danyag Journal. 2004

Southwest Pacific Dialogue: Indonesia’s newest leverage in Asia Pacific. Asian Studies Journal. 2004.

Research projects 2007 Project Leader,AC.India’s Growing Knowledge-Based Service Industry:Treat or Threat to the Philippines?

Project Leader, AC. India’s Energy Security and its Implications to Southeast Asia. Project Leader, AC. Phase and Pace: Indonesia’s Cultural Diplomacy in the South West Pacific.

2006 Project Leader, AC. Appraisal and Revitalization of South Asian Studies’ Program in the Philippines. 2005 Project Leader, UPV, Assessment of Limited Entry Regulation for Visayan Sea Fisheries - Phase 1: The Case

of Fishers’ Registration in Northern Iloilo. Project Leader, UPV, Data Base System for the UPV Contributions to Academic Literature

2000 Project Leader, UP-CIDS funded project “An Evaluation of the Implementation of Primary Health Care in Miagao, Iloilo”. November 2000 - April 2001.

Research Associate. PCMARD-UPV project. Baseline Information Gathering of the Coastal Resource Management in the 13 Municipalities Surrounding the Visayan Sea. April-June.

1999 Project Leader. UP-CIDS through CWVS funded project. Plying the Straits: The Iloilo Guimaras-Southern Negros Batel Trade.

Awards/Grants Winner. Graduate Student Teaching Award for First Semester, SY 2010-2011. Faculty of

Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. 2010.


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Professorial Holder, Diamond Jubilee Professorial Chair Grant, UPV. 2004. Teaching Fellowship.

International/National Trainings/Conferences Attended

Paper Presenter, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies’ Workshop-Conference on Indians in East Asia. October 2006.

Paper Presenter, New Researcher’s Conference in Maritime History. The Historic Dockyard Chatham, United Kingdom. March 10-11, 2006.

Philippine Delegate/Overall Evaluator, Fisheries Category, JICA ASEAN Youth Fellowship for the 21st

Century Program, Japan, June 16 - July 10, 2004.

Speaker/lecturer. SWPD: Indonesia’s fresh initiative in Asia Pacific. Meyer Collection Anniversary, Central Philippine University. May, 2004.

Participant, JICA-Net Training Course in Methods for Regional Promotion as Seen in Okinawa and Regional Development in Southeast Asia. National Engineering Center, UP Diliman. February 16-March 2, 2004.

Observer, Asia-Africa Sub-Regional Conference, Bandung, Indonesia. July 25-26, 2003.

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Exploration or Implementation? :

The Current State of India’s ‘Look East’ Policy

The ‘Look East’ Policy1(LEP) was a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and her place in the evolving global economy.2Aside from the economic tinge, the policy3was believed to have been motivated also by the need of balancing China’s expansion in Southeast Asia and of addressing its domestic concerns. Among these are the development of India’s northeastern states and the need to curb insurgency activities along the border with Myanmar.

LEP took a definite shape under the direction of Prime Minister Pamulaparthi Venkata Narasimha Rao in 1991. With the help of Dr. Manmohan Singh then as finance minister, the Indian premier initiated reforms in transforming Indian economic institutions. As a result, this economic development began to steer the conduct of India’s foreign relations by launching officially the LEP. Through it, India made a distinct foreign policy and relations to get the political, economic, cultural and strategic partnership with the countries of Southeast Asia. 4

i Thus after 19 years, it is but proper that Prime Minister Rao’s brain child should be given at this juncture a second look on whether it evolve accordingly, from exploratory to implementation level, as one of the grand strategies in actualizing India’s power aspiration. Specifically, this paper reviews the cumulative factors that triggered its re-orientation in 1991. Moreover, this paper examines the nature of LEP with special emphasis on the roles of individuals and institutions behind its establishment, and also provides prospects significant both for India and the countries that constitute the East.


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Facts and Factors: Turning Points of Foreign Policy’s Re-orientation The world’s momentous political, social and economic developments that occurred within the decade at the turn of the 21st Century became a painful interlude in the trajectory of India’s quest for power. Being both a tragedy and a blessing, these developments provide India the space to realize the weaknesses of her existing policies and push her to assess carefully the priorities. The end of the Cold War as the ‘end of history’, for instance, confronted India with a new strategic situation of the semi-polar system in which Soviet Union was no longer available as a political, economic and security anchor. Such development practically made nonalignment to appear meaningless. As a consequence, India stood out, as Samuel Huntington was to describe it, as a ‘lonely’ and ‘friendless’ power.5India, to some extent, appeared lonely in times when countries of the world were in the hype of regional consolidation as a result of ‘new protectionism.’ Trading blocs were established with the transformation of the European Community into European Union (EU) and that United States of America and Canada laid down the foundations of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).6 The countries in Asia Pacific, on the other hand, established similar organizations due to the rising need of protecting their interest from EU and NAFTA’s complete trading infiltration. India, Japan and China, being big markets, nevertheless decided to economically survive independently while their neighbors were into the verge of mutating their respective political groupings into trading blocs. Aside from ASEAN, other sub regional alliance cum economic blocs emerged in the Asia Pacific zone such as ‘Tigers’, Australasia and other South Asian blocs.7This arrangement for India, however, was short-lived for she realized the importance of consolidation to co-exist comfortably in this competitive world.

At the same time, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had also mixed repercussions for India. During the Cold War, especially from the 1970s onward, India had become heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for supplies of arms, petroleum and to some extent economic assistance on liberal terms.8The Soviet Union had been a leading partner of India and was a big market of Indian consumer goods that ultimately lost. This triggered India to look for alternative sources of raw materials as well as explore possible markets. Without much sweat, India immediately saw Southeast Asia as a dynamic region which population can be of next big market for her products.

Moreover, the collapse of the Iraqi economy, the severe dislocation of the oil economy in the Gulf region following the crisis over Kuwait even added pressures to the ailing economy of India. Much more, it afforded of losing its expected remittances of approximately $ 205 million from Indian expatriates who were employed in Iraq and Kuwait. India lost an amount worth $ 500 million owing to it from Iraq at the start of the crisis and about $ 112 million in trade with Iraq and Kuwait. The fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe also adversely affected India’s trade with the Eastern Bloc.9 By 1992-1993, trade with former eastern bloc had fallen to a mere 2.6 percent of India’s


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total trade.10 Such event worsened even India’s unsustainable fiscal deficit at that time. Without any options, India then was forced to knock at the door of the International Monetary Fund.11

Although a painful process, the events in the Gulf region led to India’s realization of the need to diversify its sources of energy supply and reduce its dependence on its traditional suppliers in the Gulf and the erstwhile USSR. As a consequence, India steadily turned her head to the rich energy resource countries like Brunei, Indonesia and Australia in Asia-Pacific as alternative sources.12

Furthermore, India reoriented her policy as a form also of reaching out those countries which were alienated during her navy’s expansion in the Bay of Bengal in the mid-80s. It is understandable, from the construction of power theory, that India should also display her might in times when USA and USSR appeared to be the world’s superpowers. The opening of the FORTRAN (Fortress Andaman and Nicobar) joint-services base at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar islands in 198513was both a plus factor for India’s projection as a military might in the region and an irritant in her relationships with neighboring states particularly Indonesia. As a result, India needed to employ LEP as a tool of reclaiming back those affected allies without shaking much her hegemonic stance. Moreover, the need to curtail the expanding influence of China in Southeast Asia particularly with the establishment of a naval base in the southern most tip of then Burma also triggered for India’s foreign policy’s reorientation.14 Thus, this policy was a soft way of winning allies at her doorsteps such as Burma that can check and balance on her behalf China’s looming advances in the sea lanes of communication out of and into the Indian Ocean.15

In the larger scale, Batabyal (2006) noted that the strategic competition with China was the undeclared element of LEP.16 This claim was based on the alarming trade value between China and Southeast Asia from US $454.43 million in 1972 to US $1,903.86 million in 1980. This unexpected development was brought about by China’s steadily titivated image in Southeast Asia upon her acceptance in 1971 as a regular member of the United Nations and the subsequent visit of USA President Richard Nixon in Beijing the following year. The said value even soared further when China resumed its diplomatic relations with Indonesia and Singapore respectively in 1990. By 1991, China completely established or resumed foreign relations with all Southeast Asian countries. At this time, the trade value reached to almost 9 billion US dollars.17 Alarmed by the growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, the Indian government prompted to launch LEP as a way of neutralizing the Chinese expanding clout and conversely secured her own sphere of influence while there was still opportunity to do so.

India also needed warm bodies that will support her bid as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council which since then cannot be provided by her own regional grouping, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).18 Thus,


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Indian policy makers expanded the focus of their attention and aspirations beyond the narrow confines of South Asia and started to bank on from her allies in the east.

In effect, after almost two decades of India’s limited interface with Southeast Asia, the former turned her attention once again to the east. Although the policy is claimed to encompass the entire Asia-Pacific region, its primary focus is undoubtedly on Southeast Asia.19 Because it was here in the region that India saw how to combine politico-security and economic initiatives and forge them into a concrete form.20

Individuals and Institutions: Internal and External Movers of India’s LEP Aside from external and internal developments, LEP was also moved further by various individuals and institutions to be one of India’s grandest hegemonic instruments.

Foremost was the personality of Narasimha Rao as the 12th prime minister of India.21 Together with the economic transformation, he also reoriented the foreign policy directives towards her eastern neighbors particularly Japan. Despite sending Japanese investments in India, the latter’s responses were not enough to resuscitate its economy. Thus, Prime Minister Rao in his attempt to save the country from the cusp of economic turmoil turned his efforts to come closer to East Asia and Southeast Asia. Such move was faithful to India’s interest in participating lucidly in the regional economic organization by encouraging more foreign investments. At that time, the prime minister was also interested in closely observing and subsequently imitating the success stories of the East Asian economic developments.22

The presence of Dr. Manmohan Singh as the Minister of Finance from 1991 to 1996, moreover, had contributed to the advancement of LEP. His role in ushering a comprehensive policy of economic reforms, without doubt, provided a positive projection to international investors and attracted more foreign direct investments (FDIs). Being the ‘chosen one’ of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in which he was a part of before his appointment as finance tsar, Dr. Singh was able to advance Rao’s policy framework through economic diplomacy.23 He also negotiated an eighteen-month stand-by loan of 2.3 billion from IMF which ended in March 1993, for balance of payments support for Indian economy. Through Dr. Singh, Rao’s government issued a "new industrial policy statement" in July 1991 welcoming FDIs that were expected to contribute to India's industrial development.24The governments realized the significance of effecting investor-friendly reforms for attracting investments from all sources (indigenous industrialists, non resident Indians and foreign direct investors.25

Aside from people, regional and global institutions also contributed in the furtherance of LEP in East Asia. ASEAN, for instance, granted India in 1992 the status of ‘sectoral dialogue partner’ for tourism, commerce, investments, and science and technology. As a


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proof of its role and importance in the LEP’s advancement, Rao placed the Foreign Secretary directly in charge of Southeast Asian cluster in the second half of 1992, which had been previously been dealt with one of the secretaries of the Ministry for External Affairs. By this time, ASEAN, according to a member of the Secretariat for Economic Affairs of MEA in October 1995 was already at the heart of India’s reworked strategy.26 At this time, Pranab Mukherjee and J. N. Dixit assumed as the Minister and Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs respectively who also pivoted their organization in furthering the government’s foreign policy orientation and strategies.27

Aside from government initiatives, private organizations such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) also contributed in the reorientation and maintenance of the policy. Simultaneous with the abolishment of industrial licensing and a wide scale introduction of economic reforms, CII was born from a 112 year old miniscule association. Since then it grows to be the most visible business association in India.28 To strengthen the government’s LEP, CII established in Southeast Asia its regional representative office based in Singapore in September 2004. The office was envisioned to cooperate with businessmen and governments in ASEAN countries in devising a strategy that will promote mutually economic cooperation in the field of trade, investment, technology transfer, trainings on cross border developments on infrastructure, manufacturing and engineering, ICT, healthcare, tourism, environment, agriculture, science and technology, finance and banking, as well as logistics and retail.29 In fact, to-day this office serves not only as reference point for Indians but for ASEAN industry as well.

Since then, the organization worked closely with government on policy issues, enhancing efficiency, competitiveness and expanding business opportunities for industry through a range of specialized services and global linkages. An interesting project which has significant bearing to LEP is the Art-North-East Project, an initiative by CII and North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd.30 (NEDFi), which provide market linkages for handlooms and handicraft products from North East. The Rural Business Hubs Pilots projects initiated range from fruits in Nainital, Jathropa Cultivation for Bio diesel in Haryana to carpet weaving and 'Blue Pottery' from Rajashthan.31 The confederation also facilitated the participation of neophyte Indian entrepreneurs from northeast states to participate in Singapore’s trade exhibitions last August 2007. Shadow and Substance: The Nature of ‘Look East’ Policy For the purpose of demonstrating the evolving development of the policy as a hegemonic strategy of India, LEP is categorized into two phases32on the basis of the strategies employed within the context of their respective spatial and time milieu.

Phase One (1991-1997) was characterized by trade and investment linkages. This period witnessed India’s active attention to the dynamic ASEAN markets, and the latter’s intention in taking advantage of the former’s rising potential and business opportunities


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of a growing and more open Indian market. In the pursuit of mutual interests, ASEAN also fairly reciprocated such revitalized attention. Since 1991, several high level political visits have been exchanged on both sides and even frequented when ASEAN made India its Sectoral Dialogue Partner (SDP) in 1992. As a start off, both entities focused on four areas of potential cooperation such as trade, investment, tourism and human resource development including science and technology. Four years after, ASEAN made India its Full Dialogue Partner (FDP), together with China and Russia, after an impressive growth of trade and investment relations from 1993 to 1995. The regional body also invited India to join the ASEAN-drive Regional Forum which acts as platform for annual review of issues relating to regional peace and security.33

To supplement the government to government interactions, business to business level initiatives were also conducted by both entities. The Indian-ASEAN Economic Cooperation Committee (IAECC) and the ASEAN-India Business Council jointly identified the areas of energy, technology, capital goods, food and agriculture, telecommunications, transportation and banking as means to build closer mutual economic links and synergies. To cement these initiatives, academic and expert level undertakings were done by holding annual Indian-ASEAN lecture series in New Delhi.34

Phase Two which commenced immediately after the 1997 financial crisis to present, on the other hand, is marked by ‘arrangements for Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and establishing of institutional linkages between the countries of the region and India. The second part is being seen as a LEP’s re-momentum when India reactivated its relations with CLMB countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Brunei) in November 2000 and by pushing for the institution of the India-ASEAN Summit two years after. Various reasons were identified of such reactivation. Drastic improvement of Indo-US ties substantially altered India’s relations with the countries of Southeast Asia especially after President Clinton’s visit in 2000. This visit resulted in a marked realignment of New Delhi’s geo-strategic and foreign economic ties. Cumulatively, this factor also created avenue for India and China to address issues that divided them for so long. China’s entry in the World Trade Organization, its capacity to influence foreign direct investment and its strategic and political influence in the region also motivated India to engage in these countries. Eventually, it triggered India to rethink its relation with Myanmar especially its inclusion as a member of ASEAN in 1997. It should be noted that Myanmar is strategically important for India since it serves as the bridge to Southeast Asia through India’s eastern states which could either make or break its development if not properly addressed.35

It is interesting to note that at this phase, India’s total trade with Southeast Asian countries dramatically increased from US $2.4 billion in 1990 to US $ 23 billion in 2006.36 At the same time, the trading relations of India with the countries that belong to the East Asian Summit reached to US $67.6 billion in 2005 from a mere US $8 billion fifteen


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years ago. Such growth was supplemented also by the increase in foreign direct investments flow from India to the region and vice-versa.37

Moreover, the policy’s geographic scope has also widened from the initial focus on Southeast Asia to include East Asia and South Pacific. It expanded the definition of ‘East’ extending from Australia to China and East Asia with ASEAN as its core. Furthermore, it also widened its interest in these areas from purely economic into security cooperation which includes joint operations in protecting the sea lanes as well as pooling resources in the war against terrorism. The military contacts and joint exercises that India launched with ASEAN states on a low key basis in the early 1990s are now expanding into full-fledged defense cooperation. Japan, South Korea and China are also added to these contacts.38

In the pursuit of its policy’s success, India aimed for physical connectivity to Southeast Asia by establishing air and land links to this region. As part of its road diplomacy, India is now actively building transport corridors to the region. In recent years, India committed herself to the realization of the Asian Highway through the Trans-Asian Railway initiative under the Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID) project. ALTID, in turn, has been a priority project under the New Delhi Action Plan on Infrastructure Development in Asia and the Pacific (1997-2006). This initiative, in fact, allowed India to break the artificial political barriers between the subcontinent and Southeast Asia especially with the forging of new agreement between the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical Cooperation’ (BIMSTEC) members to further develop the Asian Highway connections between their countries.39 India is even willing to assist the Myanmar Government of its infrastructural projects including the proposed Tamanthi Hydro-Electric Project near the India-Myanmar border across Nagaland, the proposed Kaladan River navigation, Road and Pipeline Project in the Rakhine State providing a link to southern Mizoram and India's northeast as a whole.40 Furthermore, India has also quietly begun to put in place arrangements for regular access to ports in Southeast Asia. India is also interested to develop a deep sea port at Myanmar’s Dawei section to reduce the travel time of cargo between India and Thailand by bypassing Malacca Strait and southern tip of the Malay Peninsula.41

It is also important to note that LEP which was originally driven by China’s rivalry and competition now serves as a link of more Sino-Indian cooperation. Such collaboration is highlighted by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee in Indonesia when he stated that China remains an important priority of India's foreign policy. Frequent high level visits have further contributed to developing mutual trust and understanding. The India-China partnership is an important determinant for regional and global peace and development, and for Asia's emergence as the political and economic centre of the new international order. To realize this, the leaders of the two countries decided to establish a "Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity" during the visit of the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India in 2005. 42


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The developments recently between Southeast Asian countries and India on free trade agreements appeared to be an exciting part of this phase. Bilaterally, India inked similar economic pact with Thailand last 2004 that drastically reduced tariff barriers between the countries this year. It was followed by Singapore in 2005. By the end of this year, Japan and India are more likely to seal their Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement which will hopefully double the bilateral trade of US $8 billion in three years time.43 Perhaps for most observers, the most thrilling part is the realization of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement which preparation commenced as early as 2003 to establish a Free Trade Area by 2011 or 2018 when extended. In fact, as early as this, almost all ASEAN countries have entered into IT collaboration deals with India and have steadily increased the number of Indian software offices in ASEAN from 45 in 1996 to 73 in 2002.44 Exploration or Implementation? LEP as an initiative has evolved steadily in advancing the interests of India. In the course of its own development, the early phase was obviously in an exploratory level while the second stage is both an exploration and implementation. The argument behind it simply tells that while India is currently implementing and strengthening its existing diplomatic and economic ties with the countries in Eastern Asia, it also attempts to explore horizons that are not yet fully maximized and needed more attention. Even at this moment, there are still areas which are less prioritized as an effect of the unexpected Asian economic crisis and other internal problems.

Currently, various collaborative projects between India and Southeast Asian countries are in the pipeline and some are still in the drawing boards. A typical example of this would be the India-ASEAN Summit. Prime Minister Vajpayee demonstrated peculiarity by saying that while the summit is on progress, India should continue to reinforce its strong relations with Southeast Asia using various institutional support mechanisms.45

This summit, as logical corollary of LEP, is a good manifestation of the policy’s asymmetrical development. In spite of some claims that the summit is the peak of India’s re-looked, re-activated and re-accelerated LEP, it is unavoidable that in the process a couple of concerns must start again in the drawing board for improvement.

Despite some setbacks, LEP has technically been moving a long way. The various engagements have made this policy an effective instrument for India to efficiently address its concerns in the region. Some of these collaborations are now working in favor of India’s expansion in Southeast Asia especially in the field of information technology. The establishment of cyber parks not only in Singapore but also in other countries of Southeast Asia is a proof of LEP strategies’ realization. The mushrooming of India’s technology based multinational corporations and business process outsourcing (BPOs) in Southeast Asia is enough to prove its activation.


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Currently, IT in the region has been utilized largely for education46 health care, employment, small and medium enterprises and even for rural development.47

India also furthered her interest in forging strong ties with the riverine states of Southeast Asia through the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Project. It should be noted that this plan was part of the original motivations of the policy. It was only realized more than a decade after in 2003 at Bangkok to form the forum with the stakeholder states such as Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The forum aimed to promote tourism and culture as well as transport and communication links such as Trans-Asian Highway and East-West Corridor that will connect Singapore and the rest of Southeast Asia through India’s eastern states.48 The viability of the said link was tested and proven feasible sometime in 2004 known as the India-ASEAN Car Rally.

Another important success story of LEP was the establishment of the BIMSTEC. Although this sub-regional grouping was Thailand’s initiative, India’s involvement added new dimensions of the LEP and to the Asian paradigm of cooperation. This group is primarily interested in the areas of cooperation in trade, investment, industry, transportation, infrastructure, science and technology, human resources development, energy, fisheries, agriculture, natural resources and tourism.49 Now India has made this grouping as leeway in influencing her immediate countries within South Asia without disturbing its delicate regional order. The turning point of LEP as a grand strategy is the realization of the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (IAFTA). Even at this time, the proposal alone made in the India-ASEAN Summit at Phnom Penh has spurred excitement among analysts and entrepreneurs. Considered the watershed in the history of bilateral relations between India and Southeast Asia, the economic pact which is expected to operate by the year 2012 will cover about 1.5 billion consumers with a combined GNP at 1.7 trillion dollars.50

While waiting for this, India made some similar bilateral agreements with the Southeast Asian countries like Thailand and Singapore and is currently reviewing its versions with Malaysia, Indonesia and others.

Aside from these big-scale transactions with Southeast Asia in general, India is also active in her bilateral engagements with the respective country. It successfully utilized its soft power by offering technical, academic and even cultural scholarships through Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) and Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC). India also made significant contributions in rural development and agriculture through researchers’ exchange and pilot testing of newly developed species. It was highlighted by the presentation of the Asha peanut and sorghum seeds by then President Kalam in 2006 during his state visit in the Philippines. The cultivation of these species was already done years ago and on pilot testing in the various parts of the country.51 The pharmaceutical cooperation between India and Southeast Asia has already picked up recently with the flooding of quality and yet cheap medicines from


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India. Again, it is best exemplified of the Philippine case where the government invested greatly to expand its Botika ng Bayan project for the masses.52

Having all these concrete engagements where majority are on motion and some are still in the pipeline, India can definitely play a significant role as a power to influence Eastern Asian affairs. Avoiding complacency, India should actively explore more economic and bilateral horizons without sacrificing the welfare of the existing networks. Conclusion In a nutshell, LEP continues to work in favor of India as a strategy to be a power in Eastern Asia. In the first place, the policy provided a soft yet commanding position in balancing if not totally containing Chinese military expansion in Southeast Asia. It also appeared that India successfully stabilized the region’s economic spectrum by providing options to the possible excessive economic dependence on China. The policy also, from the perspective of New Delhi, was slowly helping India to address domestic concerns such as developing India’s northeastern region, and curbing insurgent activities with Myanmar’s borders. Sad to say, however, India’s LEP appeared meaningless at this moment for the majority of northeastern India’s constituency rarely felt its significant impact. It is a must therefore that the central government should actively rally its constituencies to convert their natural leverage as a potent gateway to Southeast Asia. The state governments, on the other hand, should also actively prepare their respective domains through an empowered North Eastern Council to lay down its technical (state policies, tax holiday and other perks for investors) and physical infrastructures (roads, bridges, and other important farm to market facilities) ahead of this inexorable economic outflow. At the same time, the National Eastern Development Corporation should strongly encourage the region’s businessmen and capitalists to be competitive for global economic integration. After all, one-third of India’s trade volume recently is with Southeast Asia which is the largest trading partner of India,53 where these states can actively participate and benefit as well.

It is also said that peace and stability is conditio sine qua non with development and vice versa. Thus, the problems of transnational crimes and insurgency in the borders of Myanmar can be addressed by this policy if properly maximized. India can make use of its economic and military leverage in cooperating with the Myanmar’s junta to control if not totally curtail the existing and ‘created’ insurgents. Conflict neutralization can be done also immediately if there are accessible roads for military contingents. Hence, India should give priority to the development and realization of ALTID’s highway as the key in forging strong partnership with ASEAN nations. Economically, the opening of the land routes would surely provide a natural market for Indian exports like textiles, consumer goods, light engineering items and agri-products. Reciprocally, products from Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and timbers from Myanmar will be available in India at a lower price compared to those imports that are made via the sea.


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By doing so, the network will subsequently reposition India’s northeast region as a regional hub.54 India at this juncture should seriously do the necessary preparation just before the materialization of IAFTA.

The LEP, as of this moment, did not make India instantly a superpower but in due time through its continuous technology and economic leapfrogging, the days of its realization will more likely to come soon. This assumption is based on the increasing BPO consortia with some Southeast Asian countries which will definitely strengthen India’s claim as the IT capital of the world. Once the plan of then President Kalam on World Knowledge Platform completely put into action, the Philippines, Korea and Singapore with India as the base will surely be a success story worthy for replication in other parts of the world. LEP will evolve into a more defined hegemonic strategy through ‘technological diplomacy’ that will redefine the domain of international relations. Moreover, the close relationship of India with United States will also boost and maintain its economic hegemony in the Pacific and the world. Despite the nuclear pact issue, its close association with United States will expand its market’s sphere with the help of its knowledge-based information industry. This idea is similarly shared by Raja Mohan (2003) that LEP as India’s new Forward Policy is a leverage to act in tandem with the current global dominant power.55 It is also with best hope that in the near future, through LEP, the regional free trade agreement between India and ASEAN will work into full circle. If this initiative will fall smoothly as envisioned, the IAFTA will be India’s essential key to expediently penetrate the conventional triad of Japan, South Korea and China in Southeast Asia. With the implementation of IAFTA, it is more likely difficult for the triad to benignly ignore India’s overwhelming presence in the region and thus cumulatively called for an economic integration leading to an Asian Economic Community. Together with this prospect, India should also redefine LEP’s breadth of influence to reach those countries of Oceania. By doing so, India can make use of New Zealand and Australia’s resources in securing its energy needs. To be a power, India should not take for granted the presence of small countries such as those that belong to the Pacific Islands Forum (Cook Islands, Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu). Small as they are, their collective initiatives can somehow either make or break India as a power in the near future.

Moreover, it is high time for India to make use of this policy in maximizing the potentials of her own diaspora in Eastern Asia. These migratory associated individuals and institutions can be transformed as effective catalysts of developments in furthering India’s interests. It is never too late for India to follow the same strategy employed by China with her own diaspora who either provided foreign direct investments to their country of origin or served as instant market distributors and opportunity locators in their respective countries of residence.


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In the end, a true major power should cater both its international and domestic clients. A genuine hegemon must have the capacity to employ its available strategies not only to smarten its international image but more importantly to improve its domestic condition by bringing out the real developments to the masses. Developmental projects and user friendly technology should be simultaneously offered to the people in order for them to appreciate the state’s quest for power. After all, a real power must be holistically secured both within and outside her domain for it cannot sustain a power status without the support of the sound and satisfied movers. It is at this juncture that LEP as a hegemonic strategy must also be felt largely in India.

---------------------------------

Look East in India‟s policy was primarily based on Swami Vivekananda‟s idea in 1890s that urged Indians to look at Japan.

This is the same point of reference made by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad in his own version of the „Look

East‟ policy in 1981. Sushila Narsimhan. “India‟s „Look East‟ Policy: Past, Present, and Future‟. Ed. Reedy, K. Raja. India

and ASEAN: Foreign Policy Dimensions for the 21st Century. New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2005. 28 & 31.

2 C.S. Kuppuswamy. “India‟s Look East Policy: More Aggressive, Better Dividends.” South Asia Analysis Group Paper 1663. 03

January 2006. 20 October 2007. http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers17%5Cpaper1663.html

3 Anindya Batabyal considered the „Look East‟ policy as a strategy adopted by post Cold War India to reorient its ties with

Southeast Asian and Asia Pacific states. It is a component of a grand Indian vision to play pre-eminent role in Asian and world

affairs. Anindya Batabyal. “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India‟s Look East Strategy.” China Report. 42.2

(2006): 180-181.

4 K. Raja Reedy. India and ASEAN: Foreign Policy Dimensions for the 21st Century. New Delhi: New Century Publications,

2005. xii.

5 Nayar and Paul. India in the World Order. 205. The said description was cited from the work of J. Mohan Malik, “India Goes

Nuclear: Rationales, Benefits, Costs and Implications.” Contemporary Southeast Asia. 20 (1998): 103.

6 Sandy Gordon. “India and Southeast Asia: A Renaissance in Relations?” Eds. Gordon, Sandy and Stephen Henningham. India

Looks East: An Emerging Power and its Asia-Pacific Neighbours. Australia: Australia National University, 1995. 1. In East Asia,

ASEAN gained more momentum by acting as the core of other regional groupings such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the latter‟s non-official counterpart, the Council on Security Cooperation for the Asia

Pacific.

7 Andrew Stoeckel, David Pearce and Gary Banks. Western Trade Blocs: Game, Set or Match for Asia-Pacific and the World

Economy? Canberra: Center for International Economics, 1990. 5. ASEAN being referred here is composed only of Thailand,

Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Brunei. Singapore, on the other hand, joined Hongkong, Taiwan and South Korea to

constitute the Tigers. Australia and New Zealand, on one hand, made their own Australasia while Pakistan, Bangladesh and

Sri Lanka conveniently categorized as the Other Asia.

8 Nanda. Rediscovering Asia. 268-9.

9 Ibid.

10 Gordon. “India and Southeast Asia.” 217. The Central government deficit was as high as 8.5 percent of GDP. India had an

unsustainable balance-of-payments deficit in which the current account deficit was close to 3.5 percent of GDP. The cumulative

impact of these developments can be observed in the mid-1991 steep fall in India‟s foreign exchange reserves and whatever was left

was only enough to cover two weeks‟ imports.

11 V. S. Mahaian. Manmohan‟s Dream India. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2005. 24.

12 Nanda. Rediscovering Asia. 272.


98

13 Sridharan. India-ASEAN Relations. 136. In fact, Maj. General Harsudiyono Hartas, head of the Diponegoro Command observed

that Soviet submarines roaming Indonesian waters in the northern tip of Sumatra originated from the Nicobar base on the eve of

Rajiv Gandhi‟s visit to Jakarta in October 1986. It was vehemently denied immediately by India.

14 P. Kamath. “India-China relations since the End of the Cold War: India‟s Security Concern and Policy Options.” Eds. David, M,

and T. Ghoble. Indian, China and South-East Asia. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications Pvt Ltd, 2000. 134.

15 Gordon. India and Southeast Asia. 218.

16 Batabyal. “Balancing China in Asia.” 179.

17 Wen, Chen. “ASEAN-China Trade Relations: Origins, Progress and Prospect.” Ed. Saw Swee-Hock. ASEAN-China

Economic Relations. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007. 69 & 73.


19 G. V. C. Naidu. “Wither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia.” Strategic Analysis. 28.2 (2004): 332.

20 Devare. India and Southeast Asia. 2.

21 “Narasimha Rao.” Wikipedia. 27 September 2007. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narasimha_Rao#Economic_reforms.

22 Jaffrelot. “India‟s Look East Policy.” 46.

23 http://pmindia.nic.in/former.htm. 13 October 2007. Dr. Singh was aided by his experience as the Governor of the Reserve Bank of

India from 1982 to 1985. Aside from that, he joined the Government of India as Economic Advisor in the Commerce Ministry in 1971.

This was soon followed by his appointment as Chief Economic Advisor in the Ministry of Finance in 1972. Among the many

Governmental positions that Dr. Singh has occupied are Secretary in the Ministry of Finance; Deputy Chairman of the Planning

Commission; Governor of the Reserve Bank of India; Advisor of the Prime Minister; and Chairman of the University Grants

Commission.

24 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Business Affairs. 1996 India Country Commercial Guide. 17 October

2007. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/economics/commercial_guides/India.html.

25 Charan Wadhva. “Political Economy of Post-1991 Economic Reforms in India.” South Asia. 23 (2000): 215.

26 Jaffrelot. “India‟s Look East Policy.” 47.

27 Pranab Mukheerji served as the board of governors in various international financial institutions from 1982-1985 such as

International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and African Development Bank. He also served as the

chairperson of the Group 24, a ministerial group attached to IMF and World Bank in 1984.

http://meaindia.nic.in/onmouse/eam.htm. 13 October 2007.

28 http://cii.in/menu_content.php?menu_id=57 23 October 2007. CII has a direct membership of over 6500 organizations from the

private as well as public sectors, including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Multinational Corporations (MNCs), and an

indirect membership of over 90,000 companies from around 350 national and regional sectoral associations.

29 India Brand Equity Foundation. “India-Singapore-Economic Relations.” 14 April 2005. 1 November 2007.

http://www.ibef.org/artdisplay.aspx?cat_id=402&art_id=5805

30 NEDFi is the premier financial and development institution of the North East of India which was conceived by then Finance

Minister Manmohan Singh in 1995. It is empowered to carry on and transact the business of providing credit and other facilities for

promotion, expansion and modernisation of industrial enterprises and infrastructure projects in the North Eastern Region of India,

also carry on and transact business of providing credit and other facilities for promotion of agri-horticulture plantation, medicinal

plantation, sericulture plantation, aquaculture, poultry, dairy and animal husbandry development in order to initiate large

involvement of rural population in the economic upsurge of the society and faster economic growth of different parts of the North

Eastern region. http://www.nedfi.com/what_we_do.htm. 23 October 2007.

31 http://cii.in/menu_content.php?menu_id=57 23 October 2007.

32 Yashwant Singha, Minister of External Affairs, Republic of India. Speech at Harvard University, date. In C. Raja Mohan „Look

East Policy: Phase Two” in The Hindu, October 9, 2003. http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/09/stories/2003100901571000.htm

33 Wadhva. “Revitalizing India-ASEAN Economic Partnership.” 62.

34 Ibid. 63.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narasimha_Rao#Economic_reforms

http://pmindia.nic.in/former.htm.%2013%20October%202007

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/economics/commercial_guides/India.html

http://meaindia.nic.in/onmouse/eam.htm.%2013%20October%202007

http://cii.in/menu_content.php?menu_id=57

http://www.nedfi.com/what_we_do.htm

http://cii.in/menu_content.php?menu_id=57

http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/09/stories/2003100901571000.htm


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35 Tridib Chakraborti. „Disparate Priorities: Explaining the Penumbra of India‟s Look East Policy.‟ Ed. Reedy, K. Raja. India and

ASEAN: Foreign Policy Dimensions for the 21st Century. New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2005. 65-68.

36 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “External Trade Statistics, 2005-2006.” 1 November 2007.

http://www.aseansec.org/18137.htm

37 Jyaneswar Laishram. “ASEAN-India FTA: A New Horizon.” Diplomatist. January 2007. 23 August 2007.

http://www.diplomatist.com/dipo1st/story_01.htm.


39 Japan-ESCAP Cooperation Fund. “Development of an Asian Highway.” 17 October 2007.

http://www.unescap.org/jecf/p06highway.htm. Originally, BIMSTEC stands for Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand

Economic Cooperation which was organized in 1997. Seven years later, it was renamed as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi

Sectoral Technical Cooperation.

40 Thiyam Barat. “Indo-Myanmar Trade and the Economy of Manipur.” Manipur Online. 03 November 2005. 17 October 2007.

http://www.manipuronline.com/Economy/November2005/manipurmyanmartrade03_3.htm. India‟s northeastern states include

Assam, Sikkim, Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal Praddesh, Tripura, Menghalaya and Mizoram, currently share a 1600 kilometers of

border with Myanmar.

41 Ramtanu Maitra. “The Energy Ties that Bind India, China.” Asia Times Online. 12 April 2005. 17 October 2007.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GD12Df03.html

42 Address by the External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee at a function jointly organized by the Embassy of India in

Jakarta and the Indonesian Council on World Affairs on " India's Growing Engagement with East Asia" 18 June 2007. 17 October

2007. http://www.hcindia-au.org/pr_104.html.

43 AFP. “Japan, India to seal Economic Partnership by Year‟s End.” The Raw Story. 22 August 2007. 1 November 2007.

http://rawstory.com/news/afp/Japan_India_to_seal_economic_partne_08222007.html

44 India Brand Equity Foundation. “Look East, Look West: A Bridge Across Asia. 22 November 2002. 1 November 2007.



46 Recently, the Philippines attempted to implement the cyber education program for secondary level students under the auspices of

Department of Education.




50 Ibid. 54.

51 International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. “Indian President Hands over ICRISAT Seeds to the

Philippines.” Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. 6 February 2006. 15 March 2007.

http://www.cgiar.org/newsroom/releases/news/asp?idnews=375.

52 Philippine International Trading Corporation. Botika ng Bayan means People‟s Pharmacy under President Arroyo‟s

administration. It was a continuation of President Fidel Ramos project under Pharma50 in 1997.

53 G. Srinivasan. India‟s Look East Policy Must Look at North-East. Business Daily. 13 July 2007. 20 October 2007.

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/07/13/stories/2007071350880800.htm

54 India Brand Equity Foundation. “India Looks East; Hits the Road.” 22 November 2004. 1 November 2007.


55 Raja Mohan. Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India‟s New Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Viking, 2003. 206. Cited in

Batabyal. “Balancing China in Asia.” 179.

*********

http://www.unescap.org/jecf/p06highway.htm

http://www.manipuronline.com/Economy/November2005/manipurmyanmartrade03_3.htm

http://www.hcindia-au.org/pr_104.html

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/07/13/stories/2007071350880800.htm


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Looking East : Myanmar Factor

in Contemporary India- Thailand Relations

Dr. Lipi Ghosh

Professor, Department of South & South East Asian Studies,

University of Calcutta

Lipi Ghosh is a M.A. and Ph.D in history from the University of Calcutta, India. Currently she is the Professor and Director of the Centre for South & S.E Asian Studies, University of Calcutta and she is the former Head of the Dept of South & S.E Asian Studies. She also teaches in the Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Calcutta.She founded, organised and has been administrating the Indian Association for Asian

& Pacific Studies, a Calcutta based international forum for scholars of Asian & Pacific research interest.

Her major areas of research interest are ethnicity, minority & cultural studies in context of South & Southeast Asia. Her special interest is about history of inter-Asian connections. Her first book is- Burma : Myth of French Intrigue ( Naya Udyog, Kolkata, 1994) . Other works are - Prostitution in Thailand : Myth and Reality, (Munshiram Manoharlal Pvt. Limited, New Delhi, 2002) , Religious Minorities in South Asia : Selected Essays on Post- Colonial Situation , (Manak Publications Pvt. Limited, New Delhi, ( co-edited), 2002., Ethnicity, Nations, Minorities : The South Asian Scenario, (Manak Publications Pvt. Ltd , New Delhi –(co-edited) 2003, Indian Diaspora in the Asian & Pacific Regions, (Rawat Publications, New Delhi, 2004 ) &


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Women Across Asia : Issues of Identity ( Gyan Publishers, New Delhi, 2005) Connectivity and Beyond : Indo Thai Relations Through Ages ( Asiatic Society, Kolkata, 2009 ) Political Governance and Minority Rights : South & Southeast Asian Scenario , (Routledge, New Delhi, London, 2009) and Eastern Indian Ocean : Historical Links to Contemporary Convergences, (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, London, 2011 ) She has also published many academic articles in several reputed national & international journals. Currently she is working on a UGC sponsored collaborative major projects named India’s Past Cultural Fabrics in Southeast Asia: A Study of Dvaravati Civilization of Ancient Siam. She also takes interest in the subject of India- SE Asia Relations in post colonial era .Her two important ongoing project works in the related field are Indo- Thai Relations in Context of Changing Globalized World & Tai Cultural Heritage in North East India : A Study of Tai Ahoms. Professor Ghosh was formerly a Visiting Associate to the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla (1997) Visiting Scholar and Visiting Professor to Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris (1997, 1998, 2004,2006, 2008) Visiting Faculty to the School of Oriental and African Studies, London under British Academy Award (1999) and Ford Asia Fellow and Visiting Scholar in the Institute of Thai Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand (2000). She has also been awarded the Visiting Scholarship to SEAP. Cornell University, USA. She was also a Charles Wallace Visiting Scholar to SOAS in 2004 , Visiting Scholar to the Centre for Women Studies & Gender Relations, University of British Columbia, Canada., 2005, and Visiting Faculty to the Nalanda Srivijya Centre, Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, 2010. She was the first ICCR Chair Professor in Lund University, Sweden in 2010-2011. She has participated to several national & international seminars/ workshops in different countries of Asia like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Japan, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. She knows French ( Degree from Alliance Francaise, Kolkata ), English , Elementary German, Thai (Degree from Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand) and Assamese languages.

**********

Looking East : Myanmar Factor

in Contemporary India- Thailand Relations

In India’s look East Policy Thailand takes an important place and while developing

India- Thailand Relations, Myanmar emerges as an important factor. Myanmar

remains a place where China meets with India, a region that — as The Economist


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reports — within an 1,100-kilometer radius is home to more than 600 million

people stretching from Thailand and Laos in the east to India, China, Bangladesh and

Bhutan in the west.1 According to the border agreement signed on 10 March 1967,

India shares a 1643 km long border with Myanmar and a long maritime boundary

(successfully settled in March 1984). India’s Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur

and Mizoram too share border with Myanmar. Similarly three states of Myanmar—

Kachin, Sagaing and Chin—border with India. With this proximity neither can

afford to ignore the other. This article throws light on the various dimensions on

Myanmar factor in today’s Look East policy of India.

During Britain's colonial rule over India, the British considered Myanmar as an

important post for monitoring activities of hostile powers such as Japan, Russia, and

China. Myanmar, like India, was under the British colonial rule (though

administratively separate from India) from 1886 until its independence in 1948.

Bound by strong historical and cultural ties, bilateral relations between the two

newly-independent countries were cordial and friendly. Early on, India provided

Yangon (then Rangoon) with military and economic assistance to fight insurgents

along their common border. Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru of India and U Nu of

Myanmar were instrumental in cementing initial political and diplomatic ties

between two countries. In 1962, there was a change of regime in Myanmar.

From 1962 till 1971 India was engaged in intermittent wars with its other

neighbours namely China and Pakistan. The period following that, till 1990, was the

most troublesome in the political history of India as there were secessionist

movements all over the country, the political instability reached a breaking point in

1975 by the declaration of national emergency and last but not the least, India’s

engagement with Sri Lanka where the Indian diaspora were at war with the state.

To add to the above-mentioned reasons, Indian economy had not reached a

stage to engage relatively lower economies. Therefore, there seems to be no causal

relationship between the regime change in Myanmar and the coldness of


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relationship between the two well-meaning neighbours. This is vindicated by the

fact that once India achieved reasonable political stability, brought most of the

internal disturbances under control and managed to improve its economic strength,

it showed eagerness to engage Myanmar which did not coincide with any change in

the nature of governance in Myanmar.

India’s Urgency in Engaging Myanmar

The first factor that effectuated a renewed interest in her neighbourhood is the

changed international situation that has shifted the focus of international attention

from Europe and the US to Asia. India certainly, wants to play a role in the emerging

international system particularly in Asia. This calls for greater engagement with the

Asian countries though this is not an easy task given the political condition in most

of India’s neighbourhoods. The second important factor is the persisting problem in

India’s Northeast.

India’s Northeast is arguably the most troublesome region of the Indian Union. The

seven sisters and one brother, as the Sikkimese call themselves, is the zone of

operation for 36 major and minor insurgent groups actively involved in articulating

demands of various natures. The government of India, on the other hand, has

adopted a very effective method to deal with the problems of the Northeast, i.e. trial

and error. India’s Northeast Region (NER) policy over the years has been based on

certain “misplaced paradigms”.2

Myanmar remains an area of security interest for India not only on account of the

activities of north-eastern insurgent groups that have set up camps across the

Indian border, but also because of the activities of countries working against India’s

legitimate security concerns and the repercussions of the tussle between the forces

of democracy and military government on these interests. India welcomes the

greater openness of the Myanmar government in its external relations and steps

towards political reconciliation, internally.3


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In March 1993 India sent her foreign secretary, J.N. Dixit, to hold talks with

Myanmar's officials on wide-ranging issues. Talks were again held in Yangon at

Myanmar's initiative in 1994. A Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation

between the border authorities of both countries for maintaining border tranquillity

was signed in 1994. India assured Yangon that it would not interfere in Myanmar's

domestic affairs. But bilateral relations deteriorated when the Jawaharlal Nehru

Award for promoting international understanding was given to Suu Kyi. Despite

this, India has kept political and diplomatic channels open with Myanmar and the

relationship is fast evolving towards irreversible engagements. It assumed strategic

importance during the visit of General Maung Aye, Myanmar's Vice-Chairman of the

State Peace and Development Council in 2000. During this visit both countries

discussed issues of common security concerns and identified a deep common

interest in undertaking counter-insurgency operations in India’s northeast and

decided to accelerate cooperation. This initiative was reinforced and reached the

highest point during Than Shwe's New Delhi visit in 2004. Gen Shwe said “not only

Myanmar would not permit its territory to be used for any hostile element for

harming Indian interests but also assured that whenever information on such

activity were to come to the notice of the Myanmar government, it would not

hesitate to take ‘appropriate action’ against such groups.” An important highlight of

Gen Shwe's visit was the signing of three agreements, including the most crucial

MoU on non-traditional security issues, signed by External Affairs Minister Natwar

Singh and his Myanmarese counterpart U Nyan Win. Under this MoU, both countries

have committed themselves to enhance cooperation against terrorism, arms

smuggling, money laundering, drug trafficking, organised crime, international

economic crime and cyber crime.

India has extended a number of general and project-specific credit lines to

Myanmar in the last few years. A number of agreements and MoUs, including the

Tripartite Maritime Agreement between India, Myanmar and Thailand, the Border

Trade Agreement and an agreement on Cooperation between Civilian Border


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Authorities, have been signed. Indian companies are involved in oil and gas

exploration in Myanmar. A feasibility study has been undertaken for a rail link

between India and Myanmar. India had upgraded the 160 km long Tamu-Kalewa-

Kalemyo highway in 2001 and will be maintaining it for the next six years. There is

an ongoing project for construction of a trilateral highway from Moreh in India to

Mae Sot in Thailand to Bagan in Myanmar, the progress of which is being reviewed

regularly by the foreign ministers of the three nations. India, Myanmar agree to

broaden relationship, intensify economic ties and they agreed on enhancing

effective cooperation and coordination between the two countries resulting in

connectivity from Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand via Myanmar,

Relations between Myanmar and India have been growing in the past few years.

Indian President APJ Abdul Kalam visited Myanmar in 2006 and two years later,

Vice-President Shri M.Hamid Ansari paid an official visit to the country in 2009.

Reciprocally, Myanmar's former leader Senior-General Than Shwe, Chairman of the

State Peace and Development Council and Vice Chairman, Vice Senior-General

Maung Aye also visited India in 2010 and 2008 respectively.

Myanmar-India bilateral trade reached $1.071 billion in 2010-11 and India stood as

Myanmar's fourth largest trading partner after Thailand, Singapore and China,

according to official statistics.Of the total, Myanmar's export to India amounted to

$876.91 million, while its import from India was valued at $194.92 million.

Agricultural produce and forestry products are leading in Myanmar's export to India

whereas medicines and pharmaceutical products are topping its imports from India.

India stands as a major buyer of Myanmar's beans, taking up 70 percent of the

latter's exporting agricultural produce.In June 2011, a memorandum of

understanding on building an industrial training school in Myanmar's Myingyan was

signed between the two governments during a visit to Nay Pyi Taw by Indian

Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna. According to Myanmar official figures, India's

contracted investment in Myanmar amounted to 189 million dollars as of March


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2011 since the government opened to foreign investment in late 1988, of which 137

million were drawn into the oil and gas sector in 2007. India stands 13th in

Myanmar's foreign investors' line-up.

The two countries have placed emphasis on the upgrading of border roads and

maritime transport along the Kaladan River to boost trade. Accordingly, India has

laid the foundation in December 2010 for the construction of port and waterway

terminal of a Myanmar-India Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project in

Sittway township of western Myanmar's Rakhine state.The Kaladan River project,

involving the Indian Inland Waterways Authority and ESSAR Projects (India) Co Ltd,

is targeted to complete by 2013.

Most Recently , on 12th October, 2011, Myanmar President U Thein Sein's goodwill

visit to India, will promote bilateral relations and cooperation with the

northwestern neighbor, observers said in China. Thein Sein is expected to hold talks

with his Indian counterpart Pratibha and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in

New Delhi, diplomatic sources said. 4

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), New Delhi has received assurances from

Myanmar that its territory will not be allowed to be used for insurgent activities

against India. “With respect to security we have ongoing cooperation with Myanmar.

We have also received assurances that Myanmar territory will not be allowed to be

used for insurgent activities against India. Both sides remained in close and regular

contact in this regard,” said MEA spokesperson Vishnu Prakash, while briefing

media persons on the state visit to India of the President of Myanmar Thein Sein.5

Myanmar President U Thein Sein arrived in Bodh Gaya on a State visit to India.The

visiting President assumed office on March 30 this year after general elections and

this is the first high-level visit from Myanmar to India, of the new civilian

government. Vishnu Prakash said India and Myanmar have enjoyed a longstanding

relationship underpinned by ethnic, cultural and linguistic proximities, affinities. “A

large section of the Myanmar population is Buddhist and naturally sees India as

their spiritual home. By various counts, something like a million people in Myanmar


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are of Indian origin,” said Vishnu Prakash.“Four of India’s Northeastern States –

Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram – share a land border with

Myanmar, which is more than 1600 kilometres. In fact, Myanmar is the only

Southeast Asian State with which we have a land boundary, and as such it is a bridge

between South Asia and Southeast Asia, and also a gateway to the ASEAN region.

Naturally connectivity through Myanmar can play a valuable role in spurring

economic development in our northeastern region,” he added. Stating that Myanmar

is also an integral part in our Look East Policy, Vishnu Prakash said: “India and

Myanmar are members of a number of regional fora including BIMSTEC, the East

Asia Summit, ASEAN Plus Six, as well as other international fora. In 2008, Myanmar

became an Observer at the SAARC.”6

” Our relations with Myanmar encompass a number of important areas like security,

trade and investments, energy, capacity-building, health and education, science and

technology, as well as infrastructure development,” he added.7 The MEA

spokesperson further said India attaches the highest importance to the state visit of

the President of Myanmar and is confident that this would place the relationship on

an even stronger footing. (ANI)

Greater Indo-Myanmar Interactions: Related Concerns

In an integrated region, the problems of one part are bound to affect other parts of

the region. Once Myanmar gets integrated into a larger region of South and

Southeast Asia, some of the problems that seem to exist in Myanmar are to affect the

neighbours. Way back on April 17, 1953, speaking at the United Nations General

Assembly V.K. Krishnamenon said: “What hurts Burma would hurt India because of

the links of friendship, geography and history between the two countries.”8 It is

true that there is great potential for growth for both countries in economic terms,

but there are numerous concerns that get automatically raised owing to the history

of coincidences in their nearly five decade relationship.


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Strategic Concerns (the China Factor):

It would be hypocritical if I say that India is not aware of the Chinese engagement

with Myanmar. The expansion of Chinese influence in Myanmar is an obvious factor.

China has supplied weapons for the re-equipment and expansion of the Myanmar

military since 1989; it has also been deeply involved in economic and trade

cooperation. It has provided assistance in building and strengthening infrastructure

in the country. However, what attracted the attention most in India was the up-

gradation of ports, especially at Hyanggi and the communications facilities at Coco

Island in the Bay of Bengal, a mere 45 kilometres from Indian territory. While

Myanmar has tried to reassure India that these are not targeted against India and

are for non-military purposes without any obligation to China despite Chinese

presence there, concerns about the future implications for security persist. When

seen in the context of larger China-Myanmar relations, with Myanmar’s increasing

dependency on China in economic terms as well as for weapons, these

developments require careful consideration. But India sees an opportunity in the

contemporary situation in Myanmar. The domestically strong military Junta is weak

to stand up to the Chinese influence (blackmail).9

The Junta has, off late, woke up to the “unforeseen spin-off of dependency … on

China that is slowly turning Burma (Myanmar) into another Tibet.”10 “The real

national menaces are the Chinese settlers and their deep rooted influence in all

sectors.”11 India sees Myanmar’s interest in her as a corrective measure on the part

of the Myanmar regime to counter the increasing influence of China. It is difficult to

say whether India would succeed in replacing China from the priority list of

Myanmar but it is true that India has plunged into the zero-sum game vis-à-vis

China over Myanmar.

Such engagement with Myanmar would bring India’s commitment to

democratic values under question. India certainly is not worried about the nature of


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government in Myanmar as clear from the official Indian posture. In the words of

Pranab Mukherjee, the External Affairs Minister of India, “India would deal with the

Government in power and had no intention of exporting democracy.” 12

But what worries or should worry India is the nature of governance in that country.

There are numerous allegations by the western countries that Myanmar has failed

to provide security, in the non-traditional sense, to its population and in some cases

helped some of the non-traditional security threats to persist in the region. Most of

the problems that exist in the region involving Myanmar are of direct consequence

to India.

1. Insurgency: Owing to geographical proximity and ethnic contiguity, Indian

insurgents try to use Myanmar as their base. Soils of other neighbours were used

and are still being used by Indian insurgents for anti-India activity. No doubt there is

cultural affinity between the people of India and Myanmar and insurgency is not a

favourable activity of general population of either country. But insurgency does not

thrive on popular support. Like any other illegal activity, it thrives on the network

built on black economy, drug and weapons trade. Dealing independently with

insurgency, the Myanmar government is making efforts to stop the use of its

territory by Indian insurgents. But the problem refuses to die. According to Indian

intelligence officials, more than half a dozen insurgent groups operate from

Myanmar soil.13

Indo-Myanmar relationship soured due to military take over in then Burma.

But the fact is that during 1967–68, Burma looked towards India to counter the

Communists who had launched an offensive against the military government with

Chinese material and ideological backing.14 India supported the military

government in its fight against the Communists with the promise from the Burmese

side that they would prevent the Indian insurgents from using their territory. The


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Burmese government succeeded in suppressing the Communist uprising but the

promise that Indian insurgents will not be entertained could not be met.

But things changed once the Myanmar government felt the pinch. It was only

when the Naga Insurgents form both sides of the border tried to articulate the

Greater Nagaland demand that the Burmese army acted and stopped the route to

East Pakistan. But the Burmese territory was still used this time to reach Yunnan

province of China. They crossed through the Kachin state where the Myanmar army

has relatively lesser control. The collusion theory gets some legitimacy from certain

actions of the present Myanmar Army. “In November 2001, the Myanmar Army

raided four Manipuri rebel bases and captured 192 rebels but surprisingly released

the rebels including UNLF leader Rajkumar Megen.” It is little disturbing to learn

that the Myanmar army attacks the Nagas who have their bases in relatively more

difficult terrains in comparison to UNLF and ULFA. Again theories are built on this

discrimination. It is said that the Myanmar government uses the Manipuri rebels

and the ULFA as bargaining instruments vis-à-vis India whereas crackdowns on the

Nagas for their demands of “Greater Nagaland”. However, “these rebel bases in

Myanmar serve three purposes: a) they offer shelter to the rebel leadership after

East Pakistan was lost as the safe base area, b) They serve crucial criminal link zone;

and c) They provide a safe training and regrouping zone for imparting training to

the new recruits in the art of guerrilla warfare.” 15

Even today some insurgent groups are operating from the territory of

Myanmar. The Khaplang outfit of the Nagas is still active and maintains

underground contacts with ULFA, Maghalaya’s Achik National Volunteer Council

(ANVC), and United National Liberation Front (UNLF) – Meghen of Manipur.16 In

2003, it revealed that it has provided extensive training to Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup

(KYKL) of Manipur and People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) of

Manipur ultras. All are aware of the formation of the Indo-Burma Revolutionary

Front (IBRF) created to bring together all the insurgent groups to build criminal


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links to sustain the insurgency struggle and facilitate all kinds of illegal activities.

Given the history of Myanmar’s unconvincing commitment in curbing the activities

of the Indian insurgents, greater interaction with Myanmar is feared to give a boon

to insurgency activities in NER. Given the fact that there has been an increase in

crimes along the Indo-Burma border, operationalising the trilateral and bilateral

highways, possibly would import more trouble to NER.17

Here Manipur also plays a crucial role. As E Rammohan, former advisor to the

governor of Manipur, emphasised at an IDSA seminar (October 11, 2006) the

eastern border of India is much more under threat than the western border.

Manipur shares a 398 kilometre-long porous border with Myanmar. In fact, the road

between Tammu (Myanmar) and Moreh (Manipur) is the gateway to East Asian

countries, where illicit arms and drugs smuggling are rampant and where militants

are likely to reap benefits by expanding their networks. With the help of secessionist

groups in Myanmar like Karen National Union (KNU) and Kachin Independent Army

(KIA), Meitei outfits have established training camps along the Indo-Burmese

border. They have also done so in Bangladesh under the aegis of the government.

They have been covertly or overtly maintaining linkages with Pakistan and

Bangladesh through active Muslim militant outfits like the People's United

Liberation Front (PULF) and the Islamic National Front (INF). Interestingly, in an

incident on November 10, 2006, two PULF hardcore members were arrested from

Imphal airport while en route to Guwahati for an important meeting with the

outfit's chief. The Assam-based ULFA has been the facilitator for buying arms from

Cambodia and Bhutan for Meitei militant organizations. 18

Illicit arms uncovered in Manipur and other north-eastern states indicate that the

weapons have originated from countries like China, US, Russia, Belgium, UK,

Czechoslovakia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Thailand, Cambodia and Bangladesh, and

that they are being smuggled through routes along the Indo-Burma border as well

as via sea through Cox bazaar and Chittagong in Bangladesh. Most of the weapons

being used by the outfits in the region are Chinese-made and they are comparatively

more sophisticated than those wielded by the Indian army. Weapons such as Lathod


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M-76 (40mm grenade launcher), AGL, Chinese SAR rifles, AK series of Rifles, M-16

rifle, Machine guns, 60mm mortars, pistols, RPGs, sniper rifles are commonly used.

Most of these weapons are bought in South-East Asian black markets. At the same

time, Chinese arms manufacturing companies like Norinco are also clandestinely

supplying arms to these outfits. Thus, easy availability of arms in the area fuels

violence in the region. 19

Though Manipur is considered to be a tiny state in the large Indian landmass, the

sizeable casualty figures for both civilians and security forces inflicted by militancy-

related violence there is disproportionately large. Any further expansion in the

capabilities of Meitei militants and their networks within and outside the country

would pose an even more serious challenge. The Indian security establishment

needs to take the threat posed by Meitei militants more seriously and make

concerted efforts to staunch the spread of their networks within and outside the

country. 20

As it is well known, insurgency is not a new phenomenon to India’s Northeast. One

can even ask how can this be related to bilateral relationship between two

neighbours. It is not insurgency alone and independently that is and will cause

security threats for India. Closely linked to insurgency in the area is weapons

smuggling.

2. Arms Trade: Arms and ammunition received by the Northeast insurgent

groups often pass through Myanmar territory via Thailand and transit partly by the

sea route. Many of the seizures in India suggest that the arms used by the Northeast

insurgents are of Chinese origin. When the Nagas first started their guerrilla

campaign in 1956, they depended on World War II weapons left behind by the

Japanese and the Allies. Then Pakistan through her Eastern province, Present

Bangladesh, supplied arms to the Nagas and the Mizos. After 1971, the Chinese took

up the responsibility to keep up the supply of Arms. But things have taken two turns

till date to return to the old position where Myanmar remains the conduit for the

movement of Arms. 1) After mid 1980s, when China stopped her official supply, the


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NER insurgents were led by LTTE to Indo-China specifically Cambodia which had

emerged as the new bottomless dump of small arms. The route that was used earlier

was the sea route via Thailand to the Cox Bazar of Bangladesh from where these

weapons made their way to the insurgents’ hands no either side of Indo-Myanmar

border. The second turn was Operation Golden Bird by the Indian Army in 1995 and

a mysterious explosion in a weapons ship the following year. After these, the

insurgents turned to the Yunnan mafias such as Blackhouse.21 The Government run

weapon industry does not discriminate in selling weapons. These weapons are

believed to be 50% cheaper than the Indo-Chinese weapons. These weapons make

their way to the NER insurgents through Myanmar’s Northern and Northwestern

territory. ULFA is freely using the Myanmar territory for trading with weapons,

buying them from the Yunnan mafias and selling them to other insurgent groups in

the NER, Maoists in Nepal and other parts of India and the Islamic jihadis operating

from Bangladesh. Given the geographical proximity of China, Myanmar and the

Northeast of India, genuine fears are there regarding its possible increase in the

event of greater interaction in the border regions.

If Insurgency and arms trade constitute two threats that concern India, there

are other threats that do not seem to be posing a direct threat to either India as a

nation and/NER as a political unit of the Indian Union. These include non-traditional

security issues such as drugs, diseases and refugees.

3. Drug trade: India is bracketed by two of the world’s three largest narcotics

producing-exporting regions namely; Afghanistan and Myanmar. There are

indications that the narcotics traffic, from what is euphemistically referred to

as the ‘Golden Triangle’ encompassing Myanmar-Thailand-Laos, constitutes

the major source of illicit heroin and opium, although it has shown a decline

in recent years. India has become both a passage country (directly and via

Nepal) as well as a market for drugs produced in the Golden Triangle. Some,

if not most, of the crime and violence in our Northeastern region is linked to


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this factor. There were accusations of involvement of Myanmar officials in

the drug trade. But Myanmar vouches to have taken serious and significant

measures to control the menace with noticeable success even beyond the

liquidation of the activities of the notorious drug baron, Khun Sa. The area

under opium cultivation in Myanmar came down from 161,012 hectares in

1991 to 130,300 hectares in 1998 although this itself represents nearly 90%

of the production of opium in Southeast Asia. There are disturbing facts

about the drug situation in Myanmar and its impact on India, particularly

NER.

Poppy is being openly cultivated in the Kachin state. Of late, Myanmar has

started producing synthetic drugs called (amphetamines, and the more potent

Methamphetamines) which are flooding international market including India.

Myanmar continues to be the main Amphetamine producer in Southeast Asia and

the second largest opium producer in the world. Amphetamine use is rising faster

in Asia than in any other region of the world. It is home to 62% of the world’s

Amphetamine and Methamphetamine users with the predominance being in East

and Southeast Asia. A sharp increase in production and export of synthetic drugs is

threatening to turn the Golden Triangle into an “Ice Triangle.” Myanmar plays a

leading role in the regional traffic of amphetamines. The situation is getting worse

considering the number of seizures the Myanmarese government had in the year

2006. The number of seizures by the Chinese for the year 2006 was 435% more

than that of the previous year and in addition to this, the Thai officials seized 924 Kg

of heroin in 200522 which is alarming. The trade in Amphetamines is a multilateral

issue. Being a synthetic drug, it needs chemicals, which are not available in

Myanmar. Thus, it requires trade of such chemicals from either India or China to

Myanmar where amphetamine is produced and distributed back to India, China and

other parts of Asia and the world.23

The Myanmar government has officially committed itself to elimination of

the drug problem. But the commitment does not seem to be effective enough due to


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the policy of appeasement of various former insurgent groups with whom the

Myanmar government has entered into ceasefire agreements. It is alleged that

through its numerous ceasefire agreements the SPDC has allowed ethnic armies

such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democracy Alliance

Army (NDAA) to freely engage in narcotics production and trafficking. Because of

their pro-SPDC agendas, these armies have been considered by many to be simply

proxy armies for the regime. 24 The United Wa State Army, called the “speed tribe”

by the Time magazine, is considered to have monopoly over amphetamine

production and distribution within and outside Myanmar. Along with heroin this

new cheap drugs is making its way to India particularly the NER. Given the ethnic

interconnectivity as well as the underground economic interests of insurgents on

both sides of the Indo-Myanmar border, NER is being flooded with Drugs. We are

talking about economic integration of NER with Myanmar and Southeast Asia but

NER is already integrated into the drug network of the region25

The number of Drug addicts is steadily increasing in the NER. The number of

addicts increases as the proximity to the border closes. Few facts would suffice the

imminent dangers arising out of drug use in the Indian states bordering Myanmar.

Singpho, a tribe of Arunachal Pradesh is on the verge of extinction. The process of

annihilation is being accentuated by the switch over of 60 percent of its population

who are opium addicts from opium to the No. 4 or heroin brought from Myanmar.26

In Manipur the situation is gaining crisis proportions. Nearly a lakh are presently

addicted to the new synthetic drug. Mizoram having 510 KM of border with

Myanmar has a good supply of drugs. There is no proper survey to determine the

exact number of addicts, but according to Young Mizo Association (YMA) sources,

730 villages are affected by the abuse of drugs.27 The story is no different in

Nagaland. The official commitment of Myanmar of making Myanmar free from drugs

seems to be lopsided. It began its 15-year drug eradication programme in 1999 with

the declared objective of meeting the ASEAN-wide deadline of 2015 earlier by one

year. But the programme cannot be effective as it does not include amphetamine,


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the emerging primary menace, in its programme and concentrates only on opium.

The number of amphetamine laboratories destroyed in Myanmar is much below the

desired level to meet the official target. The role of State Peace and Development

Council (SPDC) has come under criticism for not doing enough to curb the drug

menace. It is even alleged that the SPDC, in order to use one ethnic force against the

other, has granted a free hand to the UWSA in cultivating and distributing various

kinds of drugs including amphetamines.28

4. Connectivity with Thailand and Access Points in Myanmar :

Tachileik / Mae Sai - foreigners can access this crossing from either side, and

enter and/or exit either country here. As of March 2007, travel beyond

Kengtung to the rest of Myanmar is not possible, even with a valid tourist

visa (can however visit Mongla, but this has become more respectable as the

Chinese casinos have cleaned up their act). Travellers wishing to exit

Myanmar at Tachileik can only do so with a permit from the MTT office in

Yangon.

Myawaddy / Mae Sot - foreigners can only access this crossing from the Thai

side; neither onward travel into Myanmar (ie beyond the border town) nor

overnight stays are possible. No visa needed; instead there's an entry stamp

fee - US$10 if paid with US$ notes, more (500 baht) if paid with Thai

currency. As of August 2009, only Thai baht is accepted.

Three Pagodas Pass (Payathonzu / Sangkhlaburi) - foreigners can only access

this crossing from the Thai side; onward travel into Myanmar (ie beyond the

border town) is not possible; entry/exit stamps are NOT issued here, and

foreigners passports are held at the Myanmar checkpoint, where a fee is

levied - US$10 if paid with US$ notes, more (500 baht) if paid with Thai

currency. However, as of November 25, 2008, this crossing is temporarily

closed. It was reopened in December 2010.

http://wikitravel.org/en/Thailand

http://wikitravel.org/en/Tachileik

http://wikitravel.org/en/Mae_Sai

http://wikitravel.org/en/Kengtung

http://wikitravel.org/en/Myawaddy

http://wikitravel.org/en/Mae_Sot

http://wikitravel.org/en/Three_Pagodas_Pass

http://wikitravel.org/en/Payathonzu

http://wikitravel.org/en/Sangkhlaburi


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Kawthoung / Ranong - foreigners can access this crossing from either side,

and enter and/or exit either country here. If entering without a visa,

maximum stay is 3 days / 2 nights, travel beyond Kawthoung is not

permitted, and there's an entry stamp fee - US$10 if paid with US$ notes,

more (500 baht) if paid with Thai currency. As of March 2007, the only way

to continue onward from here appears to be by plane to Mergui or Yangon,

although there have previously been ferries on these routes as well.

So, of these above noted fallouts of India- Myanmar relations, the last point that is

Thailand- Myanmar connection is most important for our purpose. The end of cold

war gave a strong rationale for regional development and cross border

infrastructure in mainland Southeast Asia. Right from the beginning, GMS initiatives

put strong emphasis on physical infrastructure and connectivity. In India-Thailand

connectivity like northeast India Myanmar also plays a leading role. In this context

first of all we can refer to the GMS corridor which links India with Thailand via

Myanmar. According to a master plan the whole GMS will be linking 2095 by a

whole network of road transport corridor linking the North(Kunming, Guangxi,

north of Laos, north of Myanmar, and north of Thailand)to the South (Hanoi, Da

Nang,Ho Chi Minh City,Bangkok), the East to West (Mawlamyine in Myanmar to

Khon Khen in Northeast Thailand to Sawannakhet in Laos to Da Nang in Central

Vietnam) and the South to the South (Dawei, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Ho Chi Minh

City).The whole network is interesting in the sense that it will also link the GMS to

the outside regions and countries.

So far the construction of first series of GMS road corridors are by and large

completed . As a result a number of further extended corridors are being targeted or

under construction. Thailand has started to feel the impact from such developments

and so the country looks to futher access cost and benefits involved .In tandem with

the above mentioned development Thailand has its Look West policies in particular.

It has desire to connect increasingly with emergent India.29

http://wikitravel.org/en/Kawthoung

http://wikitravel.org/en/Ranong

http://wikitravel.org/en/Mergui

http://wikitravel.org/en/Yangon


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In 2001, the Indian Army completed the construction of a major road along its

border with Myanmar. India has also been building major roads, highways, ports

and pipelines within Myanmar in an attempt to increase its strategic influence in the

region and also to counter China's growing strides in the Indochina peninsula.

Indian companies have also sought active participation in oil and natural gas

exploration in Myanmar.In February 2007, India announced a plan to develop the

Sittwe port, which would enable ocean access from Indian Northeastern states like

Mizoram, via the Kaladan River.

India is a major customer of Myanmarese oil and gas. In 2007, Indian exports to

Myanmar totaled US$185 million, while its imports from Myanmar were valued at

around US$810 million, consisting mostly of oil and gas.30

We need to discuss India Thailand relation in a changing cross border road

connectivity and to see if in this sphere Myanmar has a definite role to play. India

has already taken the first step in this direction and is involved in building the road

linking Tamu in Manipur to Kalemyo a key communication junction in the central

part of Myanmar and then connecting to Thai borders through Mae Sai or Mae Sot

on the Thai side. Appart from this two of the very first economic corridors linking

Thailand and Myanmar were the East West and the North South(R3W)economic

corridors. For the west economic corridor from MaeSot to Moulmein the distance is

around 198 kilometer .

There were further initiatives to link India to mainland South Asia and this had

heightened the whole idea of transportation linkages in Asia inside Myanmar

starting with all Asian highways.It is interesting to note how each Asian highway is

connecting either Myanmar -India or Myanmar- Thailand .

-Asian Highway no.1(AH-1),starting from Myanmar-Thai border town of Myawaddy

and ended at Myanmar-India town of Tamu,with its total road length of 1665km.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Army

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indochina

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_gas

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sittwe

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mizoram


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-Asian Highway no.2 (AH-2),starting from Myanmar –Thai border town of

Thachilek, passing through Kyaingtong ,Taunggi,Mekhtila. This road joins with AH-1

and ended in Tamu).

-Asian Highway no.3(AH-3),which is around 93km long linking Mandalay and Muse,

Mongla.

-Asian Highway no.14 (AH-14),which is 453 km long linking Mandalay and

Muse,passing through Lashio

Then ,there were also the ASEAN highways which are similar to Asian highways

concept but have further detailed plans as follows:

-It added further two new highways; ASEAN Highway no.111 which is 239 km long

from Loilim to Thibaw and ASEAN Highway no.112 which is 1058 km long from

Thatone to Kawthoung.

The Trilateral Highway project is an ambitious undertaking which was initially

launched under the vestiges of the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and later

incorporated into the transport sector of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral

Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC); but it has not yet fructified. What

are the bottlenecks in terms of financial, security and regional concerns? How will

this affect India’s Look East Policy (LEP)? What is needed to get this crucial project

executed?

With the aim to begin the project in early 2004, the construction of the 1360kms

highway at the cost of US$700 million was distributed in three phases so as to

connect Moreh (India), Mae Sot (Thailand) through Bagan in Myanmar. The inherent

logic of the road was to fulfil the ambition of creating a ‘link’ between Northeast

India and Southeast Asia.

The project however faces many problems. Financial problems remain a contentious

issue. India and Thailand have upgraded some of the link roads but due to financial

scarcity in Myanmar, much work remains incomplete. Tensions have also flared due


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to Myanmar’s demand for India and Thailand taking up the responsibility of bearing

the costs of road construction in its territory.

Additionally, there are also many debilitating security concerns in the region. A well

documented aspect of India-Myanmar border which we discussed above is that it is

plagued by numerous problems such as illegal trade, drug trafficking and

insurgencies. Recent news updates elicited the demand for Indian forces to seal the

border, in particular the stretch aligning Manipur, as outfits belonging to United

Liberation Front of Manipur (ULFM) and United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)

were regularly using the Friendship Road along the border to transport weapons

through the national highway 39. Additionally, China has a de-facto control over

Kachin state bordering the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as

its territory and the commencement of the Trilateral Highway could flood the state

with Chinese goods and illegal weapons hampering the security interests of India.

These concerns have always been present but the prospects of accruing long term

benefits from the highway are also substantial for India especially strategically, by

gaining a foothold in its eastern flank, therefore the enthusiasm for the highway still

prevails.31

Scholars believe that for India, however, the realization of the Trilateral Highway

will bring a greater share of problems along with the benefits. The trilateral project

raises concern on its final destination as well, i.e. the Myanmar-Thailand border

where the ethnic insurgent camps are still in existence. Myanmar, in the past has

accused Thailand of harbouring groups like the Karen National Union and the Chin

National Liberation Front. The cross border infrastructure has also been impeded

due to Thailand’s concern with the influx of illegal immigrants and the narcotics

business. 32

India- Thailand Connectivity : Fall outs

In view of all these practical constraints on development of the Trilateral Highway,


121

a deeper element of regionalism has to be taken into consideration as well. The

quicker integration of Greater Mekong Sub region (GMS) has cast a shadow over

other regional organizations like BIMSTEC and MGC. While cross border

connectivity has grown at a super rate between GMS countries, it has effectively

drowned the scope of projects like the Trilateral Highway as the Mekong region

countries are being increasingly sucked into the economic vortex of China.

Currently, GMS countries are concentrating on upgradation and construction of new

highways under the Asian Highway Project and already US$2.7 billion have been

invested to this effect. The East West Corridor, the North-South Economic Corridor

and the Southern Economic Corridor are the three major projects being

implemented. The upgradation of these highways and ratification of Cross Border

Transport Agreement (CBTA) have since quadrupled the intra-GMS trade. It is not a

surprise that the Trilateral Highway initiative already crippled with political and

financial problems has lost its charm.

The completion of the Trilateral Highway will forge greater connectivity between

India and Southeast Asia and the positives will outweigh the negatives in every

sense. Connectivity will bring its share of problems but will certainly open up

avenues for cooperation with the neighbouring states and provide effective

mechanisms for dealing with cross border problems which hitherto have remained

unresolved. Additionally, the Trilateral Highway will connect India to the Asian

Highway Network and trade between India and ASEAN will receive a further boost

which is already predicted to touch US$100 billion in the next five years and also

boost trade potential of India, Myanmar and Thailand that is largely carried out

through sea routes at present, adding to the substantial cost. Moreover, India’s

Northeast region will be repositioned as a regional trading hub. It is evident that the

Trilateral Highway is crucial for the realisation of the LEP and its failure might shake

the very foundations of this quest upon which India has embarked.33


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Political and financial ‘will’ remains a key to rejuvenate this moribund project and

India needs to strive to create this ‘will’. In the event this does not work, then India

could unilaterally shoulder the financial responsibility for the highway. After all,

US$700 million does not seem to be much when India can shell out a billion dollar in

aid to Afghanistan.ii 34

Although Myanmar is situated in mainland Southeast Asia the country is undeniably

playing an increasing role as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia with its

geographical position both India and Thailand need to work with Myanmar in the

promotion of regional and sub-regional cooperation . Myanmar is a full member of

ASEAN ,BIMSTEC and GMC. The role of Myanmar government in this sense is crucial

for the transport linkages particularly roads between India and Thailand . Under the

assistance of UNESCAP, ADB and GMS Myanmar has accepted to facilitate trade in

the region and more importantly for the development of transportation across GMS

countries and linking with India. 35

While we talk of Myanmar factor in India Thailand relations we need to also discuss

the context of sea connectivity. The development of Dawei deep sea port project is

important in this respect. The Dawei sea port project began after the agreements

signed at the meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Singapore on 19th May

2008.Both foreign ministers of Myanmar and Thailand signed the MOU on

implementation of the Dawei deep sea port and industrial estate and road and rail

links to Thailand. The port will handle five million tons of agricultural products such

as rice, sugar, corn, tapioca and other grains per year. It could also handle imports of

coal for another 25 million tons a year. Overall the port will handle 3.2 TEU a year

which is equivalent to 45 million tons,50 million tons of general cargo,35 million

tons of chemicals and petrochemicals and 36 million tons of crude oil. As such the

handling capacity of the port is estimated to be around 200 million tons a year.36


123

Dawei port is 350 km from Bangkok and 70 km from the border of Kanchanaburi .

Once completed these economic corridor will include roads, railways ,transmission

lines and oil and gas pipelines. The construction period for the Dawei deep sea port

and industrial estate trans border link will take at least 10 years to complete. The

project has three distinctive phases of five years each with the first phase starting in

2011.The port and its surrounding area involve an estimated total investment of 54

billion U.S dollars. The eastern coast line of Dawei is regarded as the area with the

most potential in Myanmar as it is situated at the other end of the GMS southern

economic corridor and is in its design to be an important hub linking to GMS

countries and sub regions and South Asia and Southeast Asia.

There are a few reasons why Thailand takes interest in the project first of all when

completed this project will decrease logistical costs of west bound trade instead of

the solely current sea routes originating from Thailand’s Eastern Saeboards

heading west needed traveling through the Malacca straits which was subjected to

risk from piracy and over congestion . The Thai government has set the

development of supporting infrastructure to the port with road and rail links from

Kanchanaburi to Dawei deep sea port . It is expected that on completion of this port

Thailand would be in a better position to establish connectivity with GMS countries

including India.37

Thailand is the second largest economy in south east Asia and she is well placed to

play its increasing role in trade and investment with an increasing ASEAN

integration . India on the other hand is the world’s emerging economic power and is

expected to extend its economic influence in many parts of the world. Leaders and

policy makers have helped to shape its future bonds evidently, on the Indian side,

with its Look East Policy ,ASEAN India dialogue, down to the recent initiative of

Mekong Ganga Cooperation(MGC) and on the Thai side with its Look West policy

,and the support the country given to all kinds of regional and sub regional

cooperation :ASEAN-India, BIMSTEC, and MGC.


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The Myanmar issue is important in this India-Thailand relation as Myanmar

serves as a major link point and bridge between two regions. The expansion of

Indian and Thai companies into each others markets and beyond is an important

development of the globalised and regionalized economy. As these companies see

new opportunity for business and they need to readjust thinking about there own

position in the corresponding markets and production possibilities. So the Indian

companies should use Myanmar as a spring board for market opportunities in

ASEAN and GMS . The Thai companies on the other hand should also use the channel

of Myanmar as another spring board for expanding to huge Indian market .

Both India and Thailand in there recent meeting in April 2011 stress the

significance of enhancing connectivity between the two countries and regions via

Myanmar and Northeast India. They reaffirmed the importance of strengthening

and enhancement of trade and economic relations through bilateral, sub regional

and regional frame work, i.e ASEAN-India, BIMSTEC and MGC. While they think of

mass transit by air connectivity they are also emphasizing the road as well as

railway connectivity between India and Thailand via Myanmar..

Before India embarks on connecting its northeastern states with mainland

Southeast Asia, these states need to be first connected properly with the rest of

India by road and rail networks. One of the most important factors responsible for

extremely limited connectivity between India and its neighbours has been the

prevailing security-oriented mindset among Indian policymakers, which has turned

the borders into an area of vigilance rather than of interaction and exchange. This

complex of insecurity has always been at the forefront whether in the case of

developing road and rail networks, easing visa regimes or liberalizing air services.

While it is certainly necessary to acknowledge that years of mistrust and suspicion

are not easily forgotten, it is just as necessary for India and its neighbours to remind

themselves that these years are but a small part of a much longer history of

togetherness, coexistence and exchange. It is time therefore, to see if returning to

traditional forms of interaction by renewing and revitalizing historical routes and


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using modern technologies to open new ones might not be a way to break out of the

current security-driven framework of bilateral and multilateral interactions. At the

very least, such moves should provide an additional push towards finding solutions

for existing disputes, if not an entirely new framework for dispute resolution. As

home to one-fifth of humanity, it is imperative for South Asia to be at the forefront of

innovation and change. This is essential not just for its economic development and

the prosperity of its millions but also for peace and stability in the region. Improved

physical connectivity is only the first step forward in this process.

----------------------------------------------------

End Notes

Akira Moretto ―Burma's Neighbors Can Help It Escape Past‖, Jakarta Globe, September 14, 2011, Akira Moretto is deputy head of research at Strategic Asia Indonesia, a consultancy promoting cooperation among Asian countries .

2The idea of ―Misplaced Paradigm‖ is derived from Jairam Ramesh‘s formulation of paradigmaticapproach

of Government of India towards the Northeast India. For details on the paradigms discussed here, see Jairam Ramesh, ―Northeast India in a New Asia‖, Seminar, No. 550, June 2005, online version, http://www.india-seminar.com/2005/550.htm. as discussed in Binoda Kumar Mishra, Security Implications of Greater Indo-Myanmar Interaction, Indian Foreign Affairs Journals, Volume-4, Issue-2, April - June 2009

3 Ministry of Defence, Government of India, ―Security Environment – An Overview‖,

http://mod.nic.in/aforces/body.htm as quoted in Binoda Kumar Mishra, op.cit

4 ―Myanmar President's India visit to boost ties‖, China Daily.cn, Wednesday, Oct 12, 2011 vide

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-10/12/content_13877503.htm . 5 ― Myanmar assures not to use its territory for insurgent activities against India‖, MEA , October 13, 2011

vide http://truthdive.com/2011/10/13/Myanmar-assures-not-to-use-its-territory-for-insurgent-activities-

against-India-MEA.html 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly, 7th Session, 1953. Cited in Subir Bhaumik, ―Guns, Drugs and Rebels,‖ Manipur Online, Saturday, February 18, 2006. http://www.manipuronline.com 9 Tint Swe, ―Burma/Myanmar: Its Strategic Importance,‖ South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 2316, July 27, 2007, http://www.southasiaanlysis.org. 10 ibid. 11 ibid. 12 Pranab Mukherjee quoted by Rajiv Sikri and Marie Lall, ―Whither India – Myanmar Relations?,‖ South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 2341, August 22, 2007, http://www.southasiaanlysis.org. 13 Binoda Mishra, op.cit

http://mod.nic.in/aforces/body.htm

http://www.manipuronline.com/


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14 Subir Bhaumik, ―Guns, Drugs and Rebels,‖ Manipur Online, Saturday, February 18, 2006, http://www.manipuronline.com in Binoda Mishra,op.cit

15 Subir Bhaumik, ―Guns, Drugs and Rebels,‖ Manipur Online, Saturday, February 18, 2006, http://www.manipuronline.com as quoted in Binoda Mishra,op.cit ) 16 Binoda Mishra , op.cit 17 ibid 18 T. Khurshchev Singh, External Linkages of Meitei Militants, IDSA COMMENT, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses , November 21, 2006 in http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ExternalLinkagesofMeiteiMilitants_TKSingh_211106 accessed on 3/10/2011 19 ibid 20 ibid 21 Binoda Mishra, opcit 22 ibid. 23 ibid 24

ibid

25 ibid 26.ibid. 27 ibid. 28 ibid 29 Suthiphand Chirathivat and Chayodom Sabhasri, India Mekong Cooperation Thailand‘s Prespective, unpublished paper presented in international conference on Mekong -India Cooperation:Linking Markets,Fostering Trade, organized by RIS New Delhi in collaboration with Institute of Foreign Policy Studies Calcutta University , Kolkata 23rd to 23th June 2011 pp1 - 2. 30 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_India#Myanmar accessed on 3/10/2011 ) India has granted US$100 million credit to fund highway infrastructure projects in Myanmar, while US$ 57 million has been offered to upgrade Myanmarese railways. A further US$27 million in grants has been pledged for road and rail projects.( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_India#Myanmar accessed on 3/10/2011 ) 31 Tanvi Pate, ―India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway‖, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi , Article 3115, 6 May 2010 32 ibid 33 ibid 34 ibid 35Suthiphand Chirathivat and Chayodom Sabhasri, India Mekong Cooperation Thailand‘s Prespective, unpublished paper presented in international conference on Mekong -India Cooperation:Linking Markets,Fostering Trade, organized by RIS New Delhi in collaboration with Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, Calcutta University , Kolkata 23rd to 25th June 2011 p.p.3-4. 36 Ibid.,p.14. 37 Thailand Economic Monitor, The World Bank, April 2011,pp.28-29

*********

http://www.manipuronline.com/

http://www.idsa.in/taxonomy/term/75

http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ExternalLinkagesofMeiteiMilitants_TKSingh_211106%20accessed%20on%203/10/2011

http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ExternalLinkagesofMeiteiMilitants_TKSingh_211106%20accessed%20on%203/10/2011

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_India#Myanmar

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_India#Myanmar


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Naval diplomacy in pursuit of Look East policy

Dr. P.V.Rao

Former Director, Centre for Indian Ocean Studies

Osmania University

[email protected]

P. V. Rao is former Director, Centre for Indian Ocean Studies, Osmania University, Hyderabad. Rao obtained Ph.D degrees from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He was a British Council Scholar at London School of

Economics; Fulbright Fellow, Johns Hopkins University; Ford Foundation Scholar at Bandarnaike Centre for International Studies, Colombo. Rao published: Globalisation and the New Regionalism in Indian Ocean, BCIS, Colombo, 1997; Indian Ocean: An Annotated Bibliography, ed. Kalinga Publishers, 1998;Regional Cooperation in Indian Ocean: Trends and Perspectives, ed. South Asia Publishers, 2001;India and Indian Ocean: In the Twilight of the Millennium, ed. South Asia Publishers, New Delhi, 2002;India and Australia: New Horizons, ed. Mittal Publishers, New Delhi, 2003;India and ASEAN: Partners at Summit, Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2008;Directory of UGC Area Study Centres, 2009; Rao is the founder editor of INDIAN OCEAN SURVEY, a bi-annual journal now published by Routledge. He is working on UGC major research project, ‘India’s naval diplomacy in Indian Ocean’. Rao is currently Visiting Professor, NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad



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Naval diplomacy in pursuit of Look East policy

India’s extended neighbourhood had accorded the Indian Navy a new role to show

the flag and project its presence in the hitherto least sailed Asian regions. The navy

had consciously come to be seen as a tangible instrument of India’s foreign policy, a

prestige which it enjoyed in a very limited degree in the past. Indian naval service is

generally known to bemoan its low-ranked position in the country’s strategic

foreign policy planning and execution. However as India’s foreign policy was

radically recast in the nineties to suit the realities of a new global power structure,

the Indian Navy had been carved out an elevated role in India’s foreign policy. It

ranked high as the country’s policy instrument in advancing India’s foreign and

strategic interests on the seas around and far beyond the conventional maritime

outerlimits.

The navy’s post cold war discourse is that it should grow in its power and

responsibilities commensurate with the country’s rise as an economic and political

power. As a former Indian naval chief reasoned the “Indian Navy’s rise coincided

with the end of the cold war,” a period which “has seen a coordinated use of the

Navy in concert with certain foreign policy initiatives” such as closer engagement

with the US Navy, Southeast Asian and the Asia-Pacific regions.1 The Indian Navy

had truly geared up to underwrite the country’s extended zones of involvement and

influence both to the west and east of the Malacca Straits. The ‘Indian Maritime

Doctrine’ (2004), defining the country’s maritime roadmap declares that the

country’s “maritime vision for the first quarter of the 21st century must look at the

arc from the Persian Gulf to the straits of Malacca as a legitimate area of interest.”2

Naval diplomacy, the less heard in the Indian diplomatic parlour, has gained greater

momentum as the country asserted her power and place in the Asian power politics.

Naval diplomacy of course is an empty slogan unless backed by substantive naval


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fire power and deterrent capabilities. Ken Booth who had authored a systematic

treatise on Navies and Foreign Policy (1979), explains that naval diplomatic

objectives entail three major functions, viz; negotiation from strength; manipulation,

and; prestige. While the first two of the three functions are perhaps more relevant to

a conflict or war time scenario, the third one “is geared to project a favourable

general image of one country, … and an image of impressive naval force.” (Ken

Booth). Indian Navy today is precisely engaged in such tasks, of gaining the goodwill

of the Asian maritime powers through a number of peacetime naval interactions,

projecting simultaneously the country’s rapidly growing naval armed capabilities on

the high seas.

Indian naval forces did play a key role as the country’s instrument of foreign policy

in the past during cold war years. Such role though was periodic when it was called

upon to throw its weight, often decisively, during the war time such as in the 1971

and Kargil wars. Nor the naval forces had sufficient hard power capabilities to sail

around the Indian Ocean to project the country’s power and image. Beginning with

eighties, navy had begun to receive greater priority in the modernisation of its

forces and ever since its share in the annual defence budget has been steadily

increasing to reach around eighteen per cent today, though the naval personnel

continue to grudge it is not an inadequate share to counter the Chinese naval

capabilities.

Navy’s Look East Drive:

Indian Navy had to guide itself into the Southeast Asian maritime zone with the cold

war baggage of a pro-Soviet and an ‘expansionist’ naval force representing the

hegemonic ambitions of India in the eastern waters of the Indian Ocean. These

myths required skilful diplomacy to project India and her naval forces as friendly

and benign actors. While the political leadership and diplomacy had eminently

succeeded in persuading our eastern neighbours to accept India as a friendly


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partner which needs to be factored into the emerging Asian balance of power

matrix, the navy had complemented such diplomatic objectives consummately.

But a broader issue, often missing the debate on the maritime dimension of the look

east policy, is what are the background factors which favoured an active Indian

naval involvement in the east. A combination of geo-political developments

characteristic of the post-Soviet Asian realignments facilitated a prominent Indian

naval involvement in the region. Among others, the Indo-US strategic partnership in

particular led Washington to persuade its regional allies in the Asia-Pacific to coopt

the Indian Navy as a balancing force.

The China factor dominantly influenced the need to assign a stronger role for Indian

Navy to balance Beijing’s growing shadow over their regional security regime. In

1988 the Chinese navy used force against Vietnam to occupy seven reefs in the

Spratly islands. Chinese southwestern forays into the Indian Ocean in early nineties

by gaining naval ‘bases’ on the Burmese islands in the Andamans began to cause

concern on either side of the Malacca. In fact, according to Adm. Hiranandani, “there

is a view that India’s Look East policy was adopted partially as a response to China’s

interest in Burma.” Hiranandani, who masterly authored and documented a three

volume official history of the Indian Navy, also contends that since maritime

security in the Bay of Bengal can not be managed by the Indian naval forces alone

without the whole-hearted cooperation of all the states bordering it, India’s look

east initiative sought “to deepen the quality of interaction with the Southeast Asian

countries.”3 Sustaining similar view a US Ministry of Defence (MoD) report notes

that “Indian concerns about Chinese influence spreading in Southeast Asia

prompted India’s ‘Look East’ policy.”4 Thus there is a strong maritime rationale,

apart from the political and economic, behind the Indian diplomatic move toward

East Asia.


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Soon after the look east’s official launch, the navy initiated the process of building

CBMs through a slew of naval partnership agreements with the Southeast Asian

neighbours. By mid nineties naval forces of India and the Southeast Asian nations

began regularly interacting with each other at bilateral as well as multinational

level. The unique India-sponsored Milan biennial multinational naval exercises with

the Southeast Asian navies, instituted first in 1995 in the Bay of Bengal, “were a

perfect complement to our ‘Look East’ policy and resulted in sending a powerful

positive signal to our maritime neighbours, of our peaceful intentions,”5 as claimed

by Adm. Arun Prakash, India’s former naval chief.

‘Foreign naval cooperation’ became a catchphrase of the Indian naval diplomacy

during this period which is aimed at building ‘bridges of friendship’ with foreign

navies in order to shape a favourable maritime environment in furtherance of the

country’s national interests. Naval cooperation broadly is of three types: naval

interaction, which involves bilateral and multilateral exercises, fleet reviews,

goodwill missions, etc. Under various bilateral agreements with the Southeast

countries, Indian naval forces began since early nineties a regular process of mutual

goodwill port visits, joint naval exercises, naval personnel exchanges, etc.

Naval soft power sharing with friendly countries, the second type of naval

cooperation, is another chosen aspect of the Indian naval diplomacy. Indian Navy is

very well endowed with maritime domain awareness, training skills, oceanographic

capabilities such as hydrographic surveys, maritime cyclonic disaster management

and humanitarian relief. These attributes of naval soft power the Indian Navy has

skillfully invoked in pursuit of its diplomatic missions. Just to mention a few, the

navy’s tsunami relief operations in 2004 in Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka hardly

need a repetition here. As late as in October 2011 the Indian Tsunami Early Warning

Centre (ITEWC) based in Hyderabad has agreed to provide on regular basis

tsunami-related data to twenty two Asian countries including Malaysia, Myanmar

and Thailand. Naval defence training programmes by India to the Malaysian and


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Singaporean naval personnel are another aspect of naval soft power sharing.

Indonesia solicited the Indian hydrographic services to delimit the EEZ jurisdictions

of some of her myriad islands.

Naval conferences are the third aspect of foreign naval cooperation which involves

participating in foreign maritime symposiums, organizing multilateral naval

gatherings, joining regional maritime security associations, etc. Again, Indian Navy

has been actively partaking in these activities thereby establishing its visibility in

the Asia-Pacific. In 1995, the same year the Milan was inaugurated, India entered the

Asean Regional Forum (ARF), ahead of China which anyway registered its protest.

ARF, the region’s only multilateral security association, endowed the Indian Navy to

share its rich maritime experiences with its counterparts at the different working

groups of the Forum.

It should not however be forgotten that not all ASEAN countries were ready as yet

to invite India into their regional forum such as Malaysia and Indonesia, the two

prominent littorals of the Malacca straits. J.N.Dixit, perhaps sensing the regional

mood, cautioned the Indian diplomats against rushing into the ARF. Only

Singapore’s active diplomacy made the Indian entry into the regional security forum

easier. ARF membership also enabled the Indian Navy to participate in the Forum’s

track two dialogue club CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific).

One of CSCAP’s workshops on maritime security cooperation in Asia-Pacific was

hosted by India in 2005. Subsequently India was admitted with an observer status

in the Western Pacific Naval Forum (WPNF), a premier association of maritime

awareness and operations representing the Pacific maritime powers.

From the above account it is evident that the look east policy had opened up several

diplomatic avenues which the Indian Navy has availed fully in building its image and

projecting the power in defence of the country’s broader politico-strategic

objectives in the region. No previous decade in post-Independent India and no other


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region during the cold war years had witnessed the Indian naval activity as much as

it did since the early nineties in the East Asian hemisphere. In doing so, the navy

perhaps might have inadvertently added greater thrust to the country’s political

diplomacy.

Navy’s Pacific Missions:

By the end of nineties the Indian Navy began sailing further beyond the Malacca

Straits into the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan. The rationale beyond this

extended involvement is that the “centre of gravity is shifting from the North

America-Western Europe axis to the North America-Asia Pacific rim, with Japan,

China and the Asian Tigers looming large…”6 The strategic objective clearly is to

project the Indian naval power in the Rising Asia of twenty first century and, in its

narrower sense to counter China which is contesting the Indian interests and

influence in the Indian Ocean. India’s strategic quid pro to China’s string of pearls in

Indian Ocean!

India’s naval diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific East paralleled with phase two of the look

east policy in late nineties. In 1998, the navy participated in the International Fleet

Review (IFR) off the South Korean waters. Indo-US Malabar exercises so far

confined to the eastern or western seaboard of the Indian peninsula, were held off

Okinawa in 2007, roping into its bilateral framework a third party, Japan. An Indo-

Russian naval exercise, codenamed Indra, was held the same year. Recalling the

strategic significance of these activities, Arun Prakash records: “it is perhaps a

fortuitous coincident that the Eastern Fleet of the Indian Navy sailed for the Pacific

on an operational deployment unprecedented in scope, duration and professional

content.”7 Same year a five-nation multilateral exercise was held in the Bay of

Bengal, which in addition to the above three included the Singaporean and

Australian navies.


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In strategic terms the sequence of 2007 Malabar exercises suggested that the

bilateral Indo-US maritime partnership was not limited to the Indian Ocean and that

both in geographical and participatory terms its scope could be expanded to reach

into the East Asian seas and further that the Indo-US strategic partnership had a

East Asian dimension too. While giving the two East Asian powers, Japan and

Australia, an Indian Ocean perspective, these multinational exercises also suggested

the advent of a new maritime coalition of like-minded partners, the so-called

‘democratic coalition’ converging, apparently to contain the Chinese power. An

obviously perturbed China made no attempt to conceal her anger and publicly

issued a demarche to the five powers protesting against their maritime alliance.

Two years later in 2009, the Indian Navy was again on a naval spree around the

northeast Asian waters. For the second time in the region an Indo-US-Japan

trilateral naval exercise was held close to Okinawa and not far away from the

Chinese maritime limits. Interestingly, just after the Okinawa exercises,

demonstrating its goodwill gesture and as a balancing act, the navy also participated

in the PLAN’s sixtieth anniversary celebrations off the Chinese province of Quindgo.

On its return path, Indian Navy’s battle group did not miss the opportunity to

exercise with the Vietnamese navy in the South China Sea. During this period, the

navy also visited Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia.

Such goodwill naval visits in the region brought into focus “India’s latest wave of

defence diplomacy in East Asia – a form of benign power projection.”8 Successively,

in the following years of 2010 and 2011, the Okinawa trilateral exercises were

continued, suggesting thereby a regular pattern in the Indian naval engagement

with the East Asian powers. These exercises are integral to the trilateral India-US-

Japan strategic partnership to balance the Chinese power in the Asia-Pacific. A US

embassy cable of 2006 from New Delhi, attributed to the Wickileaks, argues that

“while China is actively seeking to spread its influence through the Shanghai


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Cooperation organization, its ‘spring of pearls’ in the Indian Ocean, a more visible

U.S-Japan-India friendship would signal … a distinctly alternative model to China.”9

India’s East Asian naval diplomacy therefore is a function of the Indo-US strategic

partnership which pointed toward a realignment of great power relations in the

region by inviting India. Indian Navy’s relevance to East Asia will be measured by its

ability to serve the Indian Ocean interests of the East Asian powers. In tangible

terms, it means providing safety to East Asian merchant vessels, escorting them

through troubled waters, rescuing from maritime violence and disaster. In fact, the

navy had already extended some of these services to the Japanese and American

vessels, including warships. But the Indian Navy will not have the same degree of

strategic leeway and functional autonomy that it enjoys in the Indian Ocean. Nor all

the East Asian powers would be ready to acknowledge the Indian navy as a

legitimate player in their maritime domain, a role which is of India’s natural choice

in the IOR.

Maritime domains beyond the outer limits of the eastern Indian Ocean are the

known contested zones. South China Sea had already witnessed military

confrontation between China and Vietnam and still witnessing, while its maritime

jurisdictions are a source of conflicting claims by the littoral Pacific powers.

Similarly, the north of South China Sea too is a zone of Sino-Japanese traditional

maritime rivalry. Indian Navy therefore by its conscious choice of strategic

involvement has entered the troubled and potentially dangerous maritime domain

which could sharpen the Sino-Indian maritime rivalry in Asia. Rather it is already

obvious going by the recent wrangle over the Indian oil drilling operations off the

Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea.

ASEAN countries however want to accord only a limited role for the Indian Navy as

they are keen to prevent the region becoming a zone of great power maritime

competition. Thus despite India’s demonstrated interest in patrolling the Malacca


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straits it was spurned and at best they would treat India as a ‘user’ and ‘funnel’ state

of the straits. As a senior Indian admiral admitted the Malacca powers, barring

Singapore, are yet to shed the past hangover of an Indian design to dominate the

crucial sea lines of communication (SLOC). Nor would they brook the involvement of

any other power including the United States to patrol the straits.

In conclusion, it is pertinent to raise certain issues about the nature of Indian naval

involvement in East Asia. What are the limits to India’s naval participation in the

Pacific waters? Is it integral to the US naval strategy or can it act independently?

How would it respond to a future naval conflict in this contentious maritime zone?

And is it warranted? Otherwise, to avoid an ongoing naval competition, is it possible

to conceive a Sino-Indian strategic conundrum which would limit each other’s naval

forces from meddling in their respective core maritime domains? Sino-Indian land

CBMs have effectively cardoned off direct confrontation between their armies,

barring occasional local skirmishes. Why not similar maritime CBMs! The sea lines

of communications ranging from East Asia across the Indian Ocean hold such high

stakes that India and China, the two rising and responsible Asian powers and

economically interdependent, may not find it impossible to work out a long-term

plan in mutual interest instead of locking up their navies in the so-called ‘string of

pearls’ and ‘necklace of diamonds’ competitive strategies.

References:

1. Admiral Arun Prakash, From the Crow’s Nest, LANCER, NEW Delhi, 2007, p.153 2. The Indian Maritime Doctrine, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, 2004 3. Vice Admiral Hiranandani, “Looking East, past, present and future,” Indian Defence Review,

October-December 2002, vol.17 (4), p.91 4. Julie A. MacDonald, Indo-U.S. Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions, Booz Allen

Hamilton, 2002, p.10 5. Admiral Arun Prakash, n.1 6. Freedom to Use, India’s Maritime Military Doctrine, 2007, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of

Defence, New Delhi, 2007 7. Admiral Arun Prakash, n.1. p.174

8.P.S. Suryanarayana, “rising profile as a maritime power in East Asia,” The Hindu, May 2, 2009 9.Sarah Hiddleston, “How the ‘stars aligned’ for closer trilateral relations,” The Hindu, April 23, 2011


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India’s Look East Policy : Japan and China

Dr. K. Raja Reddy Former Director

Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati – 517 502.

K. Raja Reddy is Professor at the Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati. He teaches Vietnamese History, Indian Foreign Policy and Regional Organisations in Asia-

Pacific. He is the author of Vietnam: Struggle for Unification, 1954-197, and Vietnam Women: Past and Present and is the editor of India and ASEAN: Foreign Policy Dimensions for the 21st Century and Foreign Policy of India and Asia-Pacific. He was the founder editor of the Journal, Area Studies: A Journal of International Studies and Analyses. Professor Reddy has organised national and international seminars besides participating and presenting scholarly papers at various national / international conferences and seminars. He represented India in the Track II diplomatic International conferences held in Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. Professor Reddy has visited a large number of countries including Vietnam, United States, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. He is presently engaged in research on India’s bilateral relations with China and strategic partnerships with Vietnam and Japan.


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India’s Look East Policy : Japan and China

India viewed China and Japan as important nations in East Asia to cooperate.

China was well ahead in its economic reforms and eager to establish tranquility

in its borders with neighbours. China preferred to establish economic relations

with as many countries as possible in the world and wooed investors with all

kinds of economic concessions. Therefore, India felt that it can not afforded to

loose the opportunity by keeping itself away from China despite many

unaddressed bilateral problems including long pending border issue. Japan

being the second largest economy in the world has gained a rightful place in

India as Japanese goods were in demand. As Japan was particular to invest huge

amounts, India made attempts to attract Japanese investors. Japan, however,

guided by its foreign policy priorities and also because of India‟s close relations

with the former Soviet Union, showed reluctance to come closer to India.

Gradually the equations changed and by the beginning of this century Japan

looked India as a reliable nation and as a strategic partner in Asia-Pacific.

India’s Look East Policy The collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Cold War compelled India to

evolve a new strategic doctrine redefining her foreign policy options and also the

domestic economic policy under the leadership of reform minded Prime Minister

P.V. Narashimha Rao. Rao initiated economic reforms to attract foreign capital

to improve country‟s economy. Believed in Indian hidden economic

potentialities the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which were

considered as „tiger economies‟ came forward to interact with India by according


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sectoral dialogue partnership in 1992. The reciprocity between India and

ASEAN was a perfect match that for India looking at the east was an outcome of

its quest for a redemptive recompense for missed opportunities and for ASEAN

it was a hope that a massive nation like India which would be a counterweight to

China besides providing economic opportunities to do business: Unencumbered

by other considerations the two sides weighed the economic benefits of closer

interactions and responded to each other. 1 Against this background India

launched its Look East Policy (LEP) to better its stagnant economy and to achieve

its geopolitical goals in the spheres of strategic and security matters in the Asia-

Pacific region. The economic reforms initiated in the last decade of the previous

century made India an investment destination and had also a vast market region

to realize profits for the investors. Further, with three years of economic

reforms in hand and visible signs of economic change Rao travelled to Singapore

in 1994 to woo the countries in Asia and Pacific for greater economic engagement

with India. By delivering the famous Singapore Lecture in the Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, „India and the Asia-Pacific: Forging a New Relationship’ he

invited nations in the region to invest in India. He said: “I can assure this

gathering that India not only welcomes but is also worth your time and money.

Investment in India is an investment in the future – a future not only for the

investor but for a population of one billion which will remain a force for stability

in the world.” 2 He concluded his speech by telling: “I trust this vision will be

realized in the near future and that the next century will be a century of

partnership for us all.” 3 Thus, Rao gave content and tenor to India‟s Look East


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policy. A decade of India‟s LEP which was passionately called Phase I targets

ASEAN for trade and investment linkages. While not going into the details of

India ASEAN engagement an attempt is made here to explain the focus of Japan

and China in India‟s Look East policy.

India and Japan

In the initial years of LEP neither India nor Japan made any special effort

to upgrade their strategic relations. Though Japan showed its interest in the

developments of South Asia as being major donor of SAARC it recognised

India‟s preeminent position in the region. Japan started keenly observing

economic changes in India and its foreign policy priorities. Japan observers felt

the attitudinal change among the Japanese leaders and businessmen over the

changes that were taking place in India. According to a Japanese expert:

“India‟s pursuit of multi-dimensional diplomacy since 1992 has … reduced the

psychological gap that used to impede the bilateral relations during the Cold

War years.” 4 India became a Dialogue partner in ASEAN in 1996 and by virtue

of it also became a member in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) like Japan.

Since ARF is multilateral Forum which addressed the security issues of the Asia-

Pacific, India and Japan gained an opportunity to interact with each other more

closely. In two years that followed, certain irritants mired the relations between

India and Japan. In 1996 when Indonesia vacated the seat of non-permanent

member in the Security Council, Japan opted to contest the seat ignoring the

convention that the two seats allotted to Asia are rotated in such a way that the

same sub-region does not get over represented. The seat vacated by Indonesia


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should go to a country in South Asia, since South Korea was already occupying

the other seat. Having decided to contest, Japan used her „Cheque book

diplomacy‟ in the form of liberal offers of economic assistance to African and

Latin American Countries to obtain support for its candidature. Japan won this

seat with 142 as India got only 38 votes. Major embarrassment for India from

Japan was the latter‟s reaction to India‟s nuclear tests of 1998. Japan was

particularly very harsh in its criticism at the ARF meeting held in Manila and the

stoppage of Official Development Assistance (ODA) caused damage to the

relations between the two countries.

Strategic Engagement between India and Japan The effectiveness of India‟s LEP particularly demonstrated during the two

years that followed the nuclear tests. The growing clout of China in the region

caused concern to many countries in the region. Nuclear India was considered

as a real counterweight to China and many countries in ASEAN privately

welcomed the nuclearization of India. Soon other countries realised that they did

not want to forego the opportunity of engaging with an emerging India. Bill

Clinton‟s visit to India was the manifestation of this fact. Japan too was quick in

its policy changes towards India.

There was a spurt in the relations between India and Japan by the turn of

the century. The visits of Indian Foreign Minister in November 1999 and

Defence Minister in January 2000 to Japan laid emphasis to the strengthening

strategic relations. The China factor was also a reason for both these countries to

come together. The urge for both India and Japan to come closer was further

strengthened with the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yashiro in August


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2000. This was the first high level visit since India launched its Look East Policy.

His announcement of Japan‟s intention to develop “global partnership with India

in the twenty first century” augured well for rebuilding the relations between the

two nations. The return visit of the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee

in December 2001 have completed the process of normalizing relations which

were damaged after the nuclear tests. 5 Vajpayee‟s visit undertaken after 9/11

incident had naturally created conditions to evolve a “comprehensive security

dialogue” besides new economic linkages. Japan also suspended its economic

sanctions slapped on India after the nuclear tests. About the suspension of

economic sanctions, The Hindu editorially commented that “India and Japan are

indeed hopeful of a new spring in bilateral ties in the wake of a so called nuclear

winter that has gone by.“ 6

The greater engagement between India and Japan took shape since Koizumi

Junichiro became Prime Minister.7 As strong anti Japanese feeling was ignited in

China with a historical baggage of Japanese war crimes, Japan moved closer to

India. Japan‟s strong support for India‟s membership in the East Asia Summit

held in 2005 was the ample indication of emerging relations between the two

countries. Japan‟s strong lobbying in favour of India‟s participation in the

Summit is an open secret. By then India made a strong bid through its Look East

Policy to get integrated to the economies of China, Japan and Korea. The

inclusion of India in East Asia Summit was a strong indication of India‟s

emergence as regional power. On his way to Kuala Lumpur to attend the

Summit Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh stated: “The fact that India was


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invited to the meet speaks volumes about the regions acceptance of India as a

regional power.” He also described, “the invitation to the summit was a major

impetus to India‟s Look East Policy and India‟s participation as a fulfillment of

India‟s continued commitment to its Look East Policy.” 8 EAS provided India a

Summit status to interact with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New

Zealand. In a way it strengthened India‟s claims to join APEC.

The convergence between India and Japan got boosted through LEP was

also strengthened as Japan‟s main ally the United States had developed strategic

partnership with India. Close ties between India and Japan destined to become a

key driving force in shaping a new international order in Asia based on

“democratic values and market principles.“ It is clear that Japan and India are

likely to become closely tied partners in the coming years based on common

values and strategic interests and as a useful complement to Japan‟s traditional

strategic reliance on the US. 9 The real recognition for India‟s Look East Policy

and its rising profile was India talk among Australia, the USA and Japan

particularly in the absence of India. In this land mark security talks these three

countries focused to boost ties with India. Indian Navy‟s conduct of exercises in

the Bay of Bengal with Japan, US, Australia and Singapore is the indication of

growing security ties for the safety of international maritime traffic.

The August 2007 visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe indicated the

deepening all round relations between India and Japan. In a rare gesture Abe

was honoured to address both houses of Parliament. In his speech he indicated

the concept of „Broader Asia‟ with India‟s prominent presence. „He also talked


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about building an „arc of freedom and prosperity‟ indicating the unity of

democratic states urging a quick sealing of a Comprehensive Economic

Partnership Agreement with India.

India and Japan relations are strengthened day by day through economic,

political, strategic and cultural bonds. India‟s quick response of help and

assistance was deeply appreciated by Japan when it was distressed by a killer

Tsunami in March 2011. Japan‟s quick decision of restoring the Overseas

Development Assistance (ODA) which was suspended following the Tsunami

related developments by Japan was an indication for the unfolding stronger ties

between India and Japan.

India and China

India and China guided by the international political and economic

scenario made an effort to come closer in 1988 when Rajiv Gandhi visited China.

China‟s paramount leader Deng Xiao Ping advocated that the two Asian giants

could play an important role in Asia-Pacific in 21st century if the two nations

bury their past and cooperate each other in the interests of the two nations and

also in the interest of the region. As the former Indian Ambassador to China, C.

Dasgupta stated: “Prime Minister Rajiv Gandi‟s visit to China in December 1988

is usually indentified as a turning point and break-through in India-China

relations.”10 For the fist time the frozen relations were activated by drawing up a

„road map‟ to normalise the relations. Subsequently Working Groups were

established to address the contentious issues including the border issue. P.V.

Narasimha Rao‟s visit to China in 1993 was an another milestone in the relations


145

between India and China. During his visit a number of important decisions were

taken in view of the ongoing reforms in both China and India and both the

nations laid special emphasis on the economic relations keeping aside the

contentious bilateral issues for future resolution.

The launching of Look East policy provided a greater thrust in the

relations between India and China as the former laid emphasis on its relations

with the nations of the East. China also took number of measures to boost the

bilateral trade by fixing targets periodically. Chinese President Ziang Zemin‟s

visit to India in 1996 provided great momentum to the relations. To make India

get assured that the Chinese are really interested to forget their past animosities

Zemin singed a landmark agreement conducting military confidence building

measures along the border between the two nations. Zemin‟s visit was followed

by another important Chinese leader Zhu Rongji, the Prime Minster, in 2002. He

took a number of initiates to strengthen economic cooperation. He invited

Indian businessmen to invest in China in the sectors such as IT, Engineering and

Services. Atal Bihari Vajpayee‟s return visit to China in 2003 further strengthened

economic bond between the two nations and fixed target of bilateral trade as US

$ 25 billion by 2006.11 Between India and China the bilateral trade target

achieved was much beyond the target fixed, but the trade was always in favour

of China. The present two-way trade is more than US $ 60 billion.

Unlike the progress in the trade related bilateral relations, the Chinese

always looked at India with suspicion. China was against India playing a

dominant role in the region as the later was sure to generate enormous good will


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in Southeast Asia and East Asia as it does not carrying any baggage of enmity in

the past. China, therefore, was not interested India to integrate with ASEAN as

it has security stakes with some of the states of Southeast Asia particularly in

South China Sea. China also opposed India‟s membership in the East Asian

Summit (EAS) established in 2005 as India pushing closer towards the countries

of East Asia under its Look East policy, China was becoming wary of India. As

India was moving closer to the United States, China started encircling India with

an intention to keep its naval presence in Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It

also tried to fish in the troubled waters in Bangladesh and Nepal against India.

As Japan came forward to bat for India in the EAS and subsequently forging

strategic partnership between the two nations in the wake of Japan, India, the US

and Australia coming closer, China started viewing this group coming together

as a dangerous security threat to it.

India‟s Look East policy put the country in a good position by not only

enhancing its economic position in the countries of Southeast Asia, East Asia and

Australia but also gaining confidence of these countries in providing security

support in the blue waters. India had already proved its capability in protecting

sea lanes to be free from piracy menace. China always intends India to keep

away from its presence in the region. As the controversy continued to rage

between China and Vietnam on the territorial rights of the islands in South China

Sea, recently, India moved to the area and declared that its ONGC Videsh Ltd

(OVL) will explore oil in the two blocks permitted by Vietnam.12 China,

surprised by India‟s assertiveness expressed its displeasure through Chinese


147

media, but India was unrelented. India chose to snub China by asserting its

position in the international waters and go by Vietnam‟s claims of sovereignty

underlined by „United Nations Convention of 1982. 13 Vietnam stoutly defended

Indian right to stay in South China Sea. Immediately Japan extended its support

to India in this regard. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, however, down played

the whole affair which China appreciated. 14 These diplomatic niceties did not

reflect in the resolution of pending issues including the border problem for long

time. The Fifteenth round of border talks which are scheduled to be held by the

end of this year is keenly observed by the experts.

Conclusion

The launching of India‟s Look East policy was a demonstration of India‟s

preparedness to bring in dynamics in its foreign policy and relations in tune with

the global changes in the last decade of the previous century. By the turn of the

present century India was well integrated with the countries of Southeast Asia

and East Asia economically, politically and strategically. The Look East policy

provided India an opportunity to project its potentialities and strengthens to the

countries in the East which welcomed India‟s presence in the region except

China. The conclusion of strategic partnerships with countries such as Japan,

Vietnam and some nations in Southeast Asia are viewed as strongly military in

nature apart from economic cooperation. In spite of continued political

uneasiness between India and China the economic cooperation is spectacular.

India‟s two way trade of US $ 60 billion with China achieved in stages is

considered a robust economic growth between the two nations. India‟s attention


148

to the East under its Look East policy is expected to produce substantial results

despite uneasiness with China.

------------------------------------

Notes

1. Kripa Sridharan, “The ASEAN Region in India‟s „Look East‟ Policy,” in K. Raja Reddy (ed.), India and ASEAN: Foreign Policy Dimensions for the 21st Century, (New Century Publications, New Delhi, 2005), pp.118-119.

2. P.V. Narasimha Rao, India and the Asia-Pacific: Forging a New Relationship, Singapore Lecture (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1994), p. 16.

3. Ibid. , p.17 4. K.V. Kesavan, “Changing Perceptions on Indo-Japanese Relations,” Dialogue, Vol.8, No.3, p.91. 5. Lalima Varma, “Japan-India: Moving Towards a Global and Strategic Partnership,” Dialogue,

Vol.8, No.3. 6. The Hindu, 12 December 2001. 7. Ibid., 29 April 2005. 8. http://specials.rediff.com/money/2005/dec/11asean.htm. 9. Anirudh Suri, “India and Japan: Congruence at Last,” Asia Times Online, 9 June 2007. 10. http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A011.htm. 11. Surya Narain Yadav and Indu Baghel, India’s Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Obstacles in

the Post-Cold War Era, (Global Vision Publishing House, New Delhi, 2009), pp.232-233. 12. http://www.c3sindia.org/india/2602 13. http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2011/09/indias-look-east-policy.html 14. The Hindu, 26 October 2011.

http://specials.rediff.com/money/2005/dec/11asean.htm

http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A011.htm

http://www.c3sindia.org/india/2602


149

Look East Policy: A Review and Its Possible Future

GUO Suiyan Associate Professor, Deputy-Director General

Institute for South Asian Studies Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences

Kunming, China

[email protected]

Major research includes: “Strategic Study on Yunnan-South Asia Economic Cooperation”, “A Research on India’s Competitiveness, Market Potential and Regional Cooperation”, “Yunnan-India Local Trade Relations”, “A Research on Indian IT Industry”. She works as editor and co-editor for South Asian Report 2004/05, 2005/06, and 2009/10, co-authored Yunnan-India Local Trade, and published papers includes “India’s Look East Policy and the Changing Role for North East India”, “Cultural Diversity and Regional Economic Cooperation: China and India Perspective”. In 2007 she was awarded the “Asian Scholarship” with which capacity she undertook a 9-month research on “India’s ‘Look East’ Policy” in Jawaharlal Nehru University.


150

Look East Policy: A Review and Its Possible Future

Peace and development are the two recurrent themes in the aftermath of the Cold

War international system. Along with these, globalisation and regional or sub-regional

cooperation are setting the trend for international relations in the 21st century. India is

gearing for these opportunities and challenges with signs of determination to play a

prominent role in the world political economy, at least in Asia. With this in mind, India

launched the Look East Policy (LEP) in early 1990s. After two phases of improvement,

India has successfully regain its political influences in South Asia, and economically

benefited by actively joining the processes of ASEAN regional integration. Into the 21st

century, the LEP has been further enriched, together with India strengthening its role as

an emerging power in the world, and the restructuring its external strategy. The LEP is a

reflection of the trend of globalisation in the post-Cold War era and the surging

regionalism in India and the rest of Asia, and the policy itself was widely accepted by

most interests groups in India, and persisted despite new political parties coming to

power, and has come to stay as one of the corner stone of India‘s foreign policy.

A Review on LEP

It responded to the needs of the time

In early 1990s when the world politics underwent substantial changes, India needed

too to restructure its external policy. India chose to adopt a pragmatic external policy to

respond to the global trend of regional integration. At the same time, the financial deficit

that India had been experiencing for a few years had brought the country‘s economy to

the verge of breaking down. And India had to reform its economy at the same time. It is

with the backdrop of this changed political and economic situation, the launching of LEP

allowed India to adapt to the needs of the time.

While entering the 21st century, the effort to make India economically more

developed and politically more influential has seen its outcome, and India is obviously

showing the ambition to emerge as a global power, not only confined in South Asia.

India‘s relation with ASEAN, the original destination of the LEP at an earlier phase, has

reached a new height. With these new phenomenon, further adjustment on India‘s

external policy was needed to adapt to the country‘s pace of stretching out of South Asia

and becoming a global power. So does the LEP which was to expend its destination from

ASEAN in the first phase to cover a much bigger region of East Asia to consist Australia,


151

China, Japan and South Korea; and a much wider scope of cooperation to include

security, maritime development, energy and anti-terrorism coordination.

What we could expect in the next few years is that, with the gradually forming of its

Asia-Pacific strategic thinking, India is bound to pursue a more prominent role in Asia

and the world. And the LEP would be reconstructed to consist new goals and content.

Then it could be expected that the LEP would evolve into Phase Three.

It has fulfilled expectation of most aspects

At the political front, through more then 20 years of efforts, India has strengthened

its ties with ASEAN and consolidates its influences in the region. LEP allows India to

further extend its diplomatic boundary, and improve its relation with other Asian

countries, to establish its status as a regional power.

At the economic front, by strengthening economic cooperation with ASEAN and

other East Asian countries, India found impetus force from the fast growing East Asian

economic such as South Korea, China, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the

Philippines, for its own economic development. Since the economic liberalisation in

early 1990s, India ushered in a period of rapid economic development.

At the security front, the changes in India‘s relation with neighbouring countries,

particularly the improvement of relation with Myanmar and Bangladesh, to cooperate in

fighting against cross-border criminal activities, and improve the security situation in

India‘s long time troubled Northeast Region.

It has constraints

However, the specific content of such an important external policy has never been

clarified in detail in any of official documents; neither could we find official plans and

programs under LEP. Its content and policy intentions are embodied in the talks of

government officials as well as some specific outcome of the policy implementation.

Such a formulation gives the government full liberty to adjust and enrich the LEP and

makes it as inclusive and flexible as possible. In the entire process of its formation and

implementation, successive governments and prominent officials of deferent parties and

various departments could interpret, adjust and enrich the content of LEP in accord with

their political tendencies, department interests and the needs of the time. So that the LEP

involves India‘s domestic politics, external relation, economy and other different sectors,

to encompass India‘s policy with ASEAN, China and other Asian countries, economic

reform, foreign trade, and the stability and development of Northeast India, as well as

many other elements.


152

From another perspective, when a strategy is too inclusive, trying to include too

many elements, it may be interpreted differently by different departments, or its focus

may be lost in the process of implementation. When India is to further extend a closer

and more comprehensive relation with countries in Asia-Pacific region, a series of more

focused, more content specific and more operational policies need to be developed with a

complete framework of Asia-Pacific strategy, other then the everything-included LEP.

Another issue which has not been well taken care of in the LEP is the China-India

relation. Since 1962 the China-India relations experienced several ups and downs,

intertwined, particularly after the 1990s, with many factors such as Tibet issue, border

issue, trade imbalance, etc. With the rapid development of both countries‘ economy and

their expending political influences, there emerges overlapping, or sometime even

contradiction of interest, of the two countries in Asian-Pacific region, particularly in the

region around Indian Ocean. Such character in India‘s relation with China is directly

reflected in the LEP. When LEP was introduced in 1990s, one of its initial aim was to

counter balance China‘s influence in East and Southeast Asia. And during the following

years, India is even more ambitious in demonstrating its intention of taking leadership

and competes with China‘s growing political and economic influences in Asia-Pacific

region. However, it is undeniable that China‘s rapid growing economy and its leading

role in the regional development has a strong appeal to India as well; and the actual effect

of the 20 plus years of implementation of LEP has greatly propelled India‘s economic

cooperation with China quantitatively and qualitatively, to a historically new height.

Meanwhile, a series of regional cooperation that India is actively involved and

encouraged has indeed build platforms for India and China for dialogue and cooperation

in various fields.

The current China-India relations indicates that, India has not yet formed a mature,

specialised, strategic and forward-looking China policy. So as a comprehensive external

strategy, the LEP shows ambiguity and to a certain degree conflicted attitude towards

China. If LEP is to be further expended and extended to become India‘s comprehensive

Asia-Pacific strategy, then its China policy will be a bottleneck.

The Possible Future of LEP

It may evolve into India’s new Asia-Pacific strategy

When entering the 21st century, India is even more ambitious to look beyond the

South Asian region, actively involved in the Asia-Pacific region. By strengthening its

cooperation with major powers such as the US, and improving relation with Myanmar


153

and other neighbouring countries, obviously India is decided to become a regional power,

even global power. In such circumstances, India is in urgent need of a matured Asia-

Pacific strategy. While after more then 20 years of evolvement, LEP has been very well

developed both in content and extension, and has evolved itself into one of the most

successful external policies in India. In near future, it may be even more enriched and

restructured to cover a much wider region -- the Asia-Pacific region in whole and the

region around the Pacific in particular. At the same time, more focus may be laid on

traditional and non-traditional security issues, highlighting India‘s strategic consideration

and concerned initiatives on regions of particular significance such as Malacca Straits or

South China Sea. Together with new initiatives on educational and cultural cooperation

with the countries in Asia-Pacific region, India may announce the third phase of LEP in

near future.

It may concentrate more on regional issues

However, with some of the constraints as mentioned above, further development of

LEP may encounter bottleneck. If India could form a series of policies and strategies

which are more systematic, focused and operational, in a reasonably short time, then,

LEP may return as a strategy to concentrate particularly on Southeast Asia externally and

on the development of Northeast India internally. Northeast India has always been an

important factor in the thinking of LEP. Expectations are high in the Northeast India on

LEP, and the central too hope the region would play an active part in India‘s cooperation

with Southeast Asian countries. Although the region is still bothered by poverty and

insurgency problem, the central government of India is gradually opening the region and

encourage more economic cooperation with ASEAN countries. In 2008, the North

Eastern Region Vision 2020 was launched to announce an increase of investment on

infrastructure in the Northeast region, while at the same time giving more preferential

policies for the development of export-oriented industries and foreign trade. Most

recently, in January 2011, the Ministry of Home Affaires of India announced the

temporary suspending of the requirement on foreigners of special permits to visit

Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland. From these initiatives, we could safely say, that

India‘s Northeast will continue to play an significant role, if not even more important

role, in India‘s future consideration of regional strategies, and its deeper economic

integration with the neighbouring countries would be greatly encouraged.

**********


154

Engaging Myanmar through India‟s Look East Policy: How far have we gone?

Dr Munmun Majumdar Associate Prof, Dept. of Political Science

North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong

MA, M.Phil, Ph.D

from Jawaharlal Nehru University,

New Delhi

Awarded UGC

Research Award from July 1999 to

June 2002.

Completed post Doctoral Research in 2002 on “ASEAN and Conflict

management: case of Cambodia”

Has been an Associate at the Institute of Advance Study, Shimla

Has 2 books to her credit and a number of research articles in both national

and International Journals.

Her recent publication includes “Conflict Management of the Spratlys in the

South China Sea : the ASEAN way”, Indonesian Quarterly, Vol 38, no 1, 2010


155

Engaging Myanmar through India’s Look East Policy: How far have we gone?

A new dimension indicative of the economic drivers to India‘s strategic considerations

emerged in its Look-East policy1 when India became a Summit level partner of ASEAN

in 2002 and a member of the East Asia Summit in December 2005. In addition a number

of institutional mechanisms have been put in place for regular interaction at all levels and

simultaneous strengthening of bilateral linkages with individual member-states. The

Look-East policy has thereby expanded to include political, defense, maritime, strategic

and hitherto unexplored areas of economic cooperation with the Pacific Asia as well.2

In other words, the Look- East policy has presently acquired a strategic dimension. As a

result the Look- East policy is responsible in making India an inalienable part of the

Asia-Pacific strategic discourse. This can be viewed as the second phase of the

engagement which began in 2003 as a more comprehensive phase involving players

extending from Australia to East Asia with ASEAN as its core.3

Significantly, this

approach received unanimous support from all governments that came to power in New

Delhi since that time, regardless of their political persuasion. India and Southeast Asia are close geographical neighbors that share both maritime and

territorial boundary and have a mutual stake in each other‘s progress, prosperity, stability

and territorial integrity. The strategic imperatives and vision was spelt pointed out long

back by a leading Indian Scholar and diplomat Sardar K. M. Panikkar in his book, The

future of Southeast Asia: An Indian View, where he urged India and Southeast Asia to

work out a co-prosperity sphere based on their interdependence and the need for a

common defensive system.4 Implicit in his thoughts was a historical insight and a

suggested guideline that geography has inextricably linked together the destinies of India

and Southeast Asia and therefore they will be well advised to deal with issues of security,

peace and development on the premise of cooperative security. It can be seen that the

present day Indian policy broadly follows the same line. What is interesting is that the

Indian presence is appreciated and welcome by ASEAN. The absence of conflict on vital

issues, and the presence of common challenges make it less complicated to expand

constructive ties between India and Southeast Asia. Despite the fact that India and

Southeast Asia have no history of wars between them India acceded in October 2003 to

the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). And through this gesture, India has

reaffirmed ASEAN‘s territorial integrity and sovereignty and also non-interference in

ASEAN‘s internal affairs.

Therefore, while the first phase of the Look-East policy of India marked the first time

since independence that the Government of India turned its attention towards the ASEAN

region with economics in mind,5 the second phase is a deviation from the complete

economic to the broader agenda involving security cooperation, actively constructing

transport corridors and erecting pillars of linkages and connectivity. The second phase of

India‘s Look-East Policy also marked a chapter that rendered ample relevance to

developing relations with its eastern neighbors from the prism of its domestic

compulsions particularly in the Northeast6 and in the Andaman Sea. This phase of the


156

Look-East policy is more ambitious as it aimed at political partnership, physical

connectivity, free trade arrangements and defence cooperation suggesting that India

appears to be well poised for a more meaningful role in the Asia-Pacific affairs.

The policy of looking east brought a direct interface for India‘s northeastern region with

Myanmar, which shares its border with the northeastern states of Arunachal Pradesh,

Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram. And Myanmar‘s states that border India are Kachin,

Sagaing and Chin.7

Myanmar therefore, became geographically contiguous, with parts of

northeast India and a land bridge connecting India with the rest of Southeast Asia. This

was significant since Southeast Asia begins with Myanmar and for these reason Indian

foreign policy makers saw the importance of Myanmar as the economic gateway, more

so, when it became a member of the ASEAN. China and Myanmar also share a border of

more than 2000 Km.8

Since Myanmar has shared boundaries with India from the

northwest and China in the northeast it is becoming a new hub of their security, strategic,

military and economic interests. And despite its problematic human-rights record the

military regime has been able to take advantage of the economic, security and

geostrategic interests of both China and India in the country to achieve developmental

and security goals.

Myanmar was one of the countries that recognized PRC in 1949 and has been supporting

‗one China‘ principle for a long time.9

The isolation faced by both Myanmar and China in

the wake of the Yangon massacre of 1988 and the cruel suppression of the Tiananmen

Square protests in 1989 clubbed them together in the same bludgeon. China grabbed the

opportunity by establishing closer relationship after Myanmar uprising of 1988 when

military took over the country. The relationship blossomed when internal stability in

Myanmar was in great turmoil and China aided the country with massive arms supply,

signed trade agreement in 1994.10

Myanmar‘s relations with Beijing in particular have

assumed ever greater significance as Western capitals have sought to place Myanmar

under the scrutiny of the UN Security Council on the grounds that its domestic

circumstances have regional security implications. In 1992, Myanmar agreed that China

would modernize Myanmar‘s naval facilities and since then, Chinese technical experts

have prominently improved and militarized Myanmar‘s port facilities in the Bay of

Bengal at Akyab (Sittwe), Kyaukpyu and Mergui, constructed a major naval base on

Hainggyi Island near the Irrawaddy river delta, and upgraded the naval base on Great

Coco Island.11

When Premier Li Peng visited Myanmar in 1994, the regime referred to

China as its ‗most trusted friend‘. And more recently, during a controversial visit by a

Myanmar‘s delegation to China, President Thein Sein announced that Naypyidaw fully

supports Beijing‘s contention that it owns most of the South China Sea (to which at least

six other Asian states have laid claim) which is not consistent with bloc leaders‘ Joint

Statement on the ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations, issued during

the Indonesia ASEAN Summit in May.12

China has also blessed Myanmar through veto

whenever UN tried to impose sanctions on the country for its violation of human rights


157

and want of political reforms and has contributed greatly to regime survival. A friendly

Myanmar gives China opportunity to afford control over the Malacca Strait which is the

main route for oil shipment. This route carries 80% of China‘s total oil imports. In order

to ensure free and safe supply of oil, China is building naval bases and transport routes in

Myanmar.13

On the other hand, India cut off all contacts and remained critical to Junta after military

suppression of pro-democracy movement in 1988 crises and gave Nehru award to Aung

Sang Suu Kyi, the leader of the National League.14

India was the only Asian country to

officially condemn acts in Myanmar. India remained strong supporter of the democracy

movement throughout 80‘s and provided sanctuaries to thousands of Burmese refugees

afterwards. Indian government permitted the opposition National Coalition Government

of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) to run an office in New Delhi in July 1992.15

India

also allowed them to transmit radio broadcasts into Burma to mobilize popular resistance

to the junta Government in Myanmar.16

Yangon considered these moves as interference

in Myanmar‘s internal affairs. In 1993, by the time India contemplated its policy failure,

it realized that it had lost Myanmar to China. Consequently India felt it necessary to

change its foreign policy from ―Isolation‖ to ―Constructive Engagement‖. India decided

to place security and economic objectives ahead of political and human-rights

considerations when dealing with Myanmar.17

But this shift from value based foreign

policy to realpolitik on Myanmar came after India burned its hands and didn‘t have much

to show of it.18

The primary rationale of engaging Myanmar in India‘s Look-East policy in the

contemporary context emerged when the dragon intensified its relationship with

Myanmar since the late 1980s.19

This together with the increased isolation of Myanmar

during the early 90s helped to raise the consciousness of China‘s growing regional

influence. India was uneasy with China‘s Myanmar policy on several counts primarily:

1. Serving as the key to circumvent the Malacca dilemma as it were,

2. Its assistance in rebuilding roads, bridges and other infrastructure throughout

Myanmar,

3. Making inroads into Myanmar and gain credible access to its natural resources, market,

and its military bases in Myanmar close to India.

India perceived all of this as a threat since it feared that China would in the process gain

easy access to India‘s northeast. Apart from this Myanmar‘s border with Bangladesh to

its northwest is important since it provides an alternate route from India to Myanmar and

to the rest of Southeast Asia. Myanmar also enjoys great maritime significance. In the

South it is washed by the Bay of Bengal and in the Southwest by the Andaman Sea with a

coast line of 1930 Km wide open on the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal facing the

Indian territories of Andaman Islands offering a strategic challenge to India‘s Eastern

frontiers as well. Myanmar is also the second largest nation in the Indian neighborhood

and the largest country on the eastern flank which could provide the north-eastern littoral


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areas access to the Bay of Bengal. Consequently, India sought to befriend Myanmar‘s

generals with a policy of constructive engagement and gain a strategic foothold in

Myanmar that would enable India to deal with the potential threat posed by China on its

eastern flank. It would also allow India to respond to China‘s growing influence as well

as military presence in this strategic space and make it possible to secure the strategic

zone between India, China and Southeast Asia. The internal and external considerations

as a matter of fact make it hard for India to avoid dealing with neighboring, resource rich

Myanmar with which India‘s northeast shares a porous 1643 Km long border. As a result

despite enduring sympathies for Myanmar‘s pro democracy stirrings since 1988, India

was convinced that it must engage Myanmar for more than just strategic reasons.

Consequently, India opted for cautious but direct engagement with Myanmar that would

meet India‘s national interests, to consolidate India‘s presence in a neighboring country

where the West is largely absent and check China‘s advancement towards the Indian

Ocean. Very often India‘s engagement of Myanmar is assessed through the strategic

security prism of China-Myanmar relations. Such comparison is inevitable since China‘s

presence is strongly felt in Myanmar. For more than a decade now India and Myanmar

have been trying to broad base their relations focusing on capacity building of Myanmar

in developmental areas, mutual trade, improving communication infrastructure for land

and sea links between India‘s landlocked regions and Myanmar, defence cooperation and

coordination, and regional cooperation. After having discussed the cultivation of India‘s

policy to engage Myanmar the second part of the article will try and see the outcome of

such an engagement imbued with realism in relation to trade, energy and connectivity.

Trade

The geographical proximity between India‘s northeast and Myanmar has translated into

long standing trade relations across land borders and even though there is no precise

estimate of the volume of trans-border informal trade, it is widely believed that Champai

and Moreh‘s official trade (Bilateral trade for 2010-2011 was 1.28 billion dollars) is only

a fraction of the expanding grey market.20

Although trade between the two is said to have

expanded in the wake of the Look-East initiative, the lack of a memorandum of

understanding between the designated banks on the two sides, the limited number of

items on the trade lists, the fact that Indian goods are not able to compete with the cheap

Chinese made goods, the problems of cross border insurgency, together have contributed

to the thin trade traffic across the border with very little trade benefits for the northeastern

states despite the tall claims made.21

In addition the lack of regulation by Myanmar on

transiting third country goods especially from China and threat of non-state actors

hassling traders in strong turf wars, have all left no incentive to develop commerce. As a

result trade has shifted to Tamu‘s Namphalong market in Myanmar, disappointing local

entrepreneurs in Manipur. The Myanmar Government has asked for strengthening the

existing Moreh post so as to reap its full potential, before proposed trade points at


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Lungwa/Ledo, Pongru and Pokhungri in Nagaland and Nampong, Vijayanagar and

Khimiyang in Arunachal Pradesh are agreed upon.22

Talks are also on for opening the historic Ledo road that links India with China‘s

Kunming via Myanmar. However, India is guarded about the prospect of opening a direct

route between its northeastern region and China as it may facilitate the flow of Chinese

goods into the region.23

Against the background of major hurdles in trade between India

and Myanmar,24

the Union Government will need to do a realistic assessment of the

goods to be traded especially those that are required across the border such as locally

made textiles and woven tribal items, improve the border facility with Myanmar.25

Although India-Myanmar trade is set to double at $1.4 billion it is about one fourth of

China‘s estimated figure of $4 billion plus. As discussed above India‘s trade lacks variety

and depth, and unless direct communication links between India and Myanmar are better

established increased trade would continue to be limited to border trade alone. What is

pertinent to note is that unlike India, China has, a better border facility with Myanmar,

which helps China to penetrate deeper into Myanmar.

Energy

Myanmar despite facing International condemnation has emerged as an attractive place to

its neighbors for its rich energy resources. Myanmar has the world‘s tenth biggest gas

reserves estimated at more than 90 trillion cubic feet.26

India‘s new ambitions in

Myanmar‘s energy sector marks a phase when it chose to compete in a regional market

with China. However, India is still grappling with the problem of transportation. And as

evidenced by the former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, ―At present, we only hold a 30

per cent stake in A1 and A3 blocks, and that too we are forced to sell to China because of

the absence of a proper pipeline between India and Myanmar‖.27

Fresh initiatives were taken after the failure of India‘s attempt to transport gas from

Myanmar along Bangladesh coastal region. These talks between Myanmar and India are

being aimed to bring the gas through a 1,575 km pipeline, from Sittwe port in Myanmar

through Aizwal–Silchar-Guwahati-Siliguri to Gaya, and linking it to the Haldia-

Jagadishpur oil pipeline in Gaya (Bihar). 28

As for China according to reports, Petro China ―is constructing a four billion cubic meter

gas depot at Hutubi in the border province of Xinjiang to make the most of gas piped

from Myanmar. China has been pushing Myanmar to speed up laying the planned 878

km-long crude pipeline to secure access to Myanmar‘s oil reserves.29

Simultaneously, a

2,389 km pipeline from Kyakphu in Myanmar to China‘s Yunnan province is also being

pursued. The pipelines will cross Kunming in Yunnan Province and pass through

Guizhou province to Chongqing in southwest China. Myanmar‘s Kyaukpyu port is

important since it is through this port that Beijing will be able to import natural gas and

oil from the Middle East and Africa – The two countries that supply about 85 percent of

its oil demand, without tankers having to pass through the Malacca Strait choke point


160

between Singapore and Indonesia. 30

The Myanmar project will also help Beijing gain

direct foray into the Indian Ocean avoiding Malacca Strait and the South China Sea as

well.

The booming energy cooperation between China and Myanmar is also associated with

building of infrastructures meant for military purposes. In an attempt to reach the Indian

Ocean the Chinese have been attempting to secure connectivity to the Bay of Bengal

through Myanmar‘s territory. In 2010, the Asian giant pumped investments estimated at

$8.17 billion.31

Although the geo-politics of energy have started to alter relations

between India and Myanmar, China‘s moves will, expectedly amplify competition with

India, as they are both energy hungry. India and China are major players in Myanmar,

their policies, calculations and approaches towards Myanmar are triggering troublesome

circumstance which is likely to complicate the energy matrix in their global quest for

energy. In this China has consistently outbid India in the competition for energy sources

in the world market and taken an upper hand. President Thien Sein‘s visit along with at

least nine economic and infrastructure ministers is a golden opportunity worth exploring.

Considering Myanmar is keen to diversify its economic dependence and is looking for

partners, India should respond quickly to avoid past mistakes especially in the oil and

energy sector. India ignored Chinese caution and went ahead with signing of agreement

between state-owned Indian and Vietnamese companies on cooperation in exploiting oil

and gas resources of Vietnam during President Truong Tan Sang‘s visit is significant as it

has come at a time when Vietnam is locked in a confrontation with China over oil

exploration in disputed waters.

Connectivity

Since road and communication constitute important elements of infrastructure in any

country‘s economy, physically connecting the northeast to the business centres of

Southeast Asia was important. An important step was taken when the 160 Kilometer long

road provided linking the border town of Tamu to Kalemyo and Kalewa, to the Indian

border town of Moreh was taken.32

In 2002 India, Myanmar and Thailand agreed to work

towards the construction of a trilateral highway that would link these countries. A more

ambitious venture is to link the ports on India‘s east coast and Sittwe in Western

Myanmar. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project will provide an access to

Mizoram and to other northeastern states of India and an outlet to the sea as well,

bypassing Bangladesh. Such collaborative arrangements would liberate the Northeast

from its geographic isolation while Myanmar would stand to benefit from Indian

investment in infrastructure and as for Thailand it would open road connectivity to a huge

market.33

Although the current emphasis seems to be on the Kaladan Multimodal Transit

Project its completion is expected by 2013. Yet logistical issues of river engineering like

dredging, removal of rock outcrops, rapids, lack of navigation aids, etc., combined with

environmental concerns, may delay its dividends. The much hyped Asian highway


161

project connecting India with Singapore through Myanmar undoubtedly holds great

potential but it would have to address issues of ecological security, terrorism and

trafficking of drugs and narcotics. In the absence of an appropriate strategy it would not

be able to make much progress in that direction either.

While it is recognized that a meaningful cooperation with Southeast Asia is possible only

when India establishes connectivity between its northeastern states with mainland

Southeast Asia just beyond its borders, yet India‘s highest decision makers have so far

made limited attempts to just build and improve border roads. The details of the

ambitious Rhi-Tidim and Rhi-Falam road projects, the Moiwa-Chindwin-Thailand

trilateral highway project as well as trans-rail networks are being worked out. The cross-

border highways planned to connect India with Myanmar and beyond are still in progress.

India‘s financial support for the construction of infrastructures in Myanmar, the

development projects and investments in Myanmar has per se stressed on state sponsored

infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, port facilities, hydropower plants and

energy development.34

These are located in remote and under populated areas, thus

reducing their impact on the local Myanmarese communities. Recently India extended an

additional $500 million line of credit to infrastructure in Myanmar making a total of $800

million.35

Yet India needs to do a lot more to catch up with China‘s strides in Myanmar

which are well planned and well executed too. China is far ahead with the re-building of

the historic ―Stillwell Road‖ while India has not begun to build its side of the road.

Opinion stands divided on this. Indian businessmen feel that rebuilding this road will

help re-establish the region‘s trade ties with Western China and Southeast Asia. The

Government, in contrast, sees this as a risky investment. 36

The ground realities are that overall, unlike China, India lacks in skilled manpower,

which is a glaring shortcoming. Both in quality and quantity China seems to be at an

advantage. India has failed to capitalize on its relations with Myanmar whether economic

or strategic or in ensuring energy security. Infrastructure bottlenecks remain in all of the

India-initiated rail, road, power and energy related projects. The detailed project report on

the 2000 MW Tamanthi river project in Chindwin signed in 2008 is still being updated to

get the requisite approvals. Building of the Tamanthi dam should not be perceived as a

project meant for mere generation of electricity. It represents the Indian attempt to

enhance strategic as well as bilateral ties with Myanmar. The delay as a result generates

comparison between the sluggish Indian performances with the promptness of Chinese

companies to complete projects that they undertake. This is where China acts to take the

match in its favor while India deliberates.

While these initiatives and connectivity proposals are relevant in bringing together the

northeast India and the adjacent trans-national areas on its east, it offered at the same

time, an opportunity to New Delhi to balance institutionally the rising Chinese presence

and initiative in the Mekong sub-region. Beijing had taken advantage of the opportune


162

moment and backed the military-led Junta when it was internationally isolated and

extended infrastructure support and soft loans long before India decided to constructively

engage Myanmar. In addition China has protected Myanmar when the United Nations

imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions and the United States declared it as a rogue

state. Whereas for India the balancing acts of maintaining ties with both the military junta

and the pro-democracy forces within Myanmar have proved to be a difficult act. As a

result the lack of synchronization of India‘s policies with China, ASEAN and Myanmar

has impacted the pace of the Look-East policy to a large extent.

As for Myanmar, given its colonial traumatic legacies, it has never been enthusiastic

about wholly embracing India‘s east ward expansion, and has done so only to the extent it

suited its immediate interests and to adequately counterbalance pressure from China.

Despite Than Shwe‘s second visit, no pro-India faction has emerged in the Myanmarese

military and the country‘s strategic vision remains firmly in the hands of nationalists who

have developed an acute understanding of Myanmar‘s geopolitical position and strength.

Although Myanmar‘s leaders are suspicious of Chinese influence over their country, their

concerns for the regime survival are supreme. As such they are aware that unlike India,

China by virtue of its status has the power to grant them the security guarantee. As a

result it is unlikely that in a competition over resources or political influence between

India and China, Myanmar would choose India. Just as it is unlikely, that China would

facilitate space for India to achieve parity with its own influence. In any event, India‘s

current commitments in Myanmar seem to have been already outpaced by China. In a

recently concluded visit to Myanmar in April 2011 by Mr.Jia Quinglin, Head of the

Chinese People‘s Consultative the Chinese leader re-invoked the spirit of ―Paukphaw‖

(blood brothers) to reiterate China‘s commitment towards Myanmar for whom China is

the second trading partner. Therefore, India should work out a concrete policy vision that

would ensure that Myanmar is less reliant on China. While closer cooperation between

the Indian and the Myanmar security forces may have indeed weakened the anti-Indian

insurgencies that emanate out of Western Myanmar what has to be taken note of is that in

seeking military cooperation to curb insurgency in India‘s northeast it must not be

overlooked that there are parts of Myanmar bordering India where the Myanmar

government and the armed forces have little or no control. Expecting the regime to

undertake military action to stop the insurgents‘ entry into India is perhaps too

unrealistic. Besides, the curbing of insurgency would be impossible without negotiating

with Bangladesh. In 2004, India and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding

on cooperation in non-traditional security issues. The MOU covers terrorism, arms

smuggling, money laundering, drug smuggling, etc. Myanmar‘s Senior General Tan

Shwe assured India that terrorist groups would not be allowed to operate from

Myanmar.37

And even if Naypyidaw provides reassurance to New Delhi about the alleged

Chinese military presence in Myanmar, the capacity of Indian leadership to influence the

Myanmar‘s counterpart remains as of now woefully limited. Officially both India and

Myanmar have avoided making public reference to strategic security aspects beyond the

denial of sanctuaries for Indian insurgent groups in Myanmar soil and goodwill visits of

military chiefs of both countries. This has now been broadened (in the context of the

current Myanmar‘s military confrontation with the Kachin Independence Army –KIA) to


163

include denial of sanctuaries to Myanmar insurgents on Indian soil. Contacts between the

armies of both countries have been limited to exchange of visits of senior officers, border

meetings of sector commanders and limited cooperation at the ground level in trans-

border operations against insurgents. New Delhi managed to get commitments from Tien

Sein, Myanmar‘s first civilian President, that Naypyidaw would not allow its territory to

be used by insurgents against India. which has prompted chief minister Tarun Gogoi to

demand Ulfa hardliner‘s commander-in- Chief Paresh Barua‘s ouster from the

neighboring country.38

He said that though Myanmar is not an immediate neighbor of

Assam, having a good relationship with the country would not just improve the security

in Assam but also help develop the economy of the region under India‘s Look East

Policy.

It is high time for India to reassess and reinvigorate its Look East Policy with a definite

roadmap to include plans to promote soft power in the region, and devise concrete

strategy with actionable goals, to open up its eastern frontiers to Myanmar taking into

account all eventualities in Myanmar‘s political future. The efforts in trying to improve

connectivity and energy access on the other side cannot be de-hyphenated from the

economic development of the unique North East region which has had historically trans-

national links, and India‘s constructive policy towards Myanmar. It would do well to

involve the northeast states just as China has done in the Kunming initiative, to involve

and take advantage of Yunnan‘s geographical location and of its cultural affinities with

its neighbors across the border — and to restore Yunnan‘s historical role as a bridge to

Southeast Asia and South Asia. In doing so, India can draw lessons from the Chinese

experience in Yunnan in developing its northeast region; primarily in considering the

significance of the non- traditional security risks. Furthermore India can refer to the

Southeast Asian roots of the Tai Ahom39

or the Balinese Hinduism and art forms that are

close to Manipur‘s culture and thereby convert India‘s northeast history, trans-border

links based on cultural affinities, tradition and ethnicity that have governed relations

between the Northeast India and the neighboring Southeast Asian countries into a soft

power resource bank.40

This in turn will encourage greater interaction leading to an

increase in trade, commerce and tourism41

in the entire region. Just as, the security

cooperation between India and Myanmar could include human resource training,

exchange of officers, joint border patrols, counter terrorism and battling sea piracy. The

cultural diplomacy can also be backed up by promoting cooperation in the field of

education and human resource, science and technology, where India has notable assets

and strengths. Similarly sectors like pharmaceuticals could play an important role in

boosting India –Myanmar cooperation. The premier institutions of India such as IITs,

IIMs, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi School of Economics, etc, can attract bright

students from Myanmar and certain seats could also be reserved for them. The dividend

from such a policy will be enormous, as the products of these institutions would

eventually emerge as critical elites in decision making and corporate life in Myanmar and

India will strike a familiar chord for them.42

While India has been concerned for some time now with China‘s increasing influence in

India‘s neighbourhood it cannot also ignore the possible implications of Myanmar‘s


164

civilian President talks of ―multi-strategic cooperation‖ in partnership with China. The

title ―Joint Statement Between The Republic of the Union of Myanmar and The Peoples‘

Republic of China on Establishing a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership‖

issued after the Myanmar President‘s visit is probably indicative of Myanmar‘s desire to

indicate that despite adopting a multi-party parliamentary system, it was business as usual

with China. It becomes all the more necessary to take into account when China

completes its ongoing communication projects in Myanmar and the increased strategic

cooperation between Myanmar and China would significantly enhance security threat to

India‘s weak eastern flanks. It is important that India takes the lead to evolve proactive

policies to influence regional developments in its favor instead of adopting a policy,

which is more often than not, reactive to the China‘s actions in Myanmar. While it is a

matter of deliberation if India‘s present engagement policy towards Myanmar through the

Look East Policy is adequate enough to face the increasing Chinese strategic options in

the region and Indian Ocean, what is certain however, is that the inclusion of Myanmar in

India‘s regional geopolitical vision has fitted well with India‘s desire to make its presence

felt much more in Asia.

1. See Sudhir Devare., India and Southeast Asia Towards Security Convergence, Institute of Southeast Asian studies, Singapore 2006.

2. Yashwant Sinha, “Resurgent India in Asia”, Speech at Harvard University in 29th September 2003, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, http: //mea.gov.in/speech/2003/09/29ss09 html. Accessed on September 1, 2007.

3. n.2 4. Sardar K. M. Pannikar, The Future of Southeast Asia:an Indian View, London:George

Allen and Unwin 1943, p.16. 5. See Annual Report: 1992-93, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New

Delhi, 1993, p.27. 6. India’s Northeast popularly known as the seven sisters consist of separate seven states:

Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. This entire region is collectively and commonly referred to as “the Northeast”. In 2001, Sikkim was added to the North Eastern Council. In this article, Sikkim is not included in the term Northeast India.

7. Land border between Northeast states and neighbors are with Myanmar 1450 km, China 1000 Km, Bangladesh 1500Km, Bhutan 650 Km, Source; DRI Shillong.

8. Crisis Group report, No.177, China’s Myanmar Dilemma, 14 September 2009, p.3 9. C. S. Kuppuswamy, 2008, ―Myanmar, Sandwiched between China and India and gaining

from both‖, South Asia Analysis Group, No. 2574 10. Renaud Egreteau, “India’s Ambition in Burma: More Frustration than Success”, Asian

Survey, vol.58 (XLVII), No.6, Nov/Dec, 2009, pp043-044. 11. Gurpreet S. Khurana, ―China‘s String of Pearls in the India Ocean and its Implications‖,

Strategic Analysis, vol.32, No.1 January 2008, pp.13-14. Yossef Bodansky, ‗Beijing‘s

Surge for the Strait of Malacca‘ at http://www.

freeman.org/monline/bodansky/beijing.htm (Accessed May 3, 2007). Cited from Kolås,

Åshild. 2007 ―Burma in the Balance: The Geopolitics of Gas‖, Strategic Analysis, 31:4,

Pp. 635.


165

12. The 18th ASEAN Summit 2011 Towards a Global Community of Nation 6 May 2011

<www.aseansummit.org/news14-the-18th-asean-summit-2011-towards-a-global-

community-of-nation.html > 13. See Fink, Christina, Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule. London: Zed Books 2001.

See also Susan L. Shirk, China Fragile Superpower, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

14. J. N. Dixit, My South Block Years: Memoirs ofa foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 1997, p.154, See Yogendra Singh, “India’s Myanmar Policy: A Dilemma between Realism and Idealism”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Special Report, No.37, March 2007.

15. Thin Thin Aung and Soe Myint, ―India-Burma Relations‖, in Aung Zaw, David Arnot,

Kavi Chongkittavorn, Zunetta Liddel, Kaiser Morshed (et.al), Challenges to

Democratisation in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses,

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 2001, p.110

Daniel Twining, 2008, India's Relations with Iran and Myanmar: ―Rogue State‖ or

Responsible Democratic Stakeholder?, India Review, 7:1, p. 17.

16. Ibid 17. Jürgen Haacke, 2006, Myanmar's foreign policy towards China and India, Adelphi Series,

46:381, Pp. 34. 18. John Feffer, ―A stable Myanmar to benefit India, China‖at

http://www.dawn.com/2008/01/19/int9.htm 19. For a discussion of the Chinese involvement in Myanmar see Bertil Lintner, “Myanmar’s

Chinese Connection,” International Defence Review 27:11 (November 1994), William Ashton, “Chinese Naval Base: Many Rumors, Few Facts,” Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (June-July 1993) , William Ashton, “Chinese Bases in Burma: Fact or Fiction?” Janes Intelligence Review 7:2 (February 1995) and Andrew Selth, Chinese Military Bases in Burma: The Explosion of a Myth, Griffith Asia Institute Regional Outlook, 10 (Griffith University, 2007) available at <http://www.griffith.edu.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0018/18225/regional-outlook-andrew-selth.pdf>

20. See N. Taneja, “Informal trade in SAARC region”, Economic and Political Weekly, March 17, 2001. See also M.P. Bezbarua, “Indo-Myanmar Border Trade; The Stakes for North East India,” Dialogue, Vol. 9, No.1, 2007.

21. See Embassy of India (Yangoon), Joint Statement on the Visit to Myanmar by H.E.Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, Vice –President of the Republic of India, Yangoon, November 4, 2003.

22. Ministry of Development of North East Region, http://mdoner.gov.in/index2.asp?sid=127.

23. Rajiv Sikri and Marie Lall, “Whither India Myanmar Relations”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No.2341, 22 August 2007.

24. For more discussion on border trade see Syed Ali Mujtaba, “India- Myanmar Trade Relations”, 23 July 2007 available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.pho3id_article=9085

25. ibid 26. For details see Tin Maung Maung Than, “Myanmar Energy Sector:Banking on Natural

Gas”, Southeast Asian Affairs (2005), pp.257-89; and Marie Carine Lall, “Indo-Myanmar relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 28:3 (December 2006), pp.424-46.


166

27. “India’s strategic interests in Myanmar : An interview with Shyam Saran,” by M. Chaturvedi http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR98-ShyamSaranInterview.pdf.

28. Kuppuswamy, C.S., Indo-Myanmar Relations - A Review, Paper no. 2043, November 30, 2006, available at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers21%5Cpaper2043.html>

29. Saibal Dasgupta, “China’s Sweetener to speed up pipeline through Myanmar,” Times of India, 27April2011.

30. Zhu, Zhiqun, China’s New Diplomacy; Rationale, Strategies and Significance, Ashgate

Publishing Ltd, 2010, p.168. 31. “Chinese investment in Myanmar tops $8 bn this year,” Reuters, 16 August 2010,

reuters.com/article/2010/08/16/idINIndia-50868920100816. 32. Rakesh Sinha, World’s biggest democracy gives a Valentine’s Day gift to Myanmar

Junta”, Indian Express (India), 15 February 2001. 33. Keynote address of External Affairs Minister at the Institute for Security and

International Studies (ISIS), Chulalongkorn University, on “India’s Look East Policy: Implications for Thailand and South-East Asia”

34. K. Yhome, “India-Myanmar relations (1998-2008): A Decade of Redefining Bilateral Ties”, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi: Ocassional Paper No.10, January, 2009.

35. “India vows for $500 m for Myanmar infrastructure”, Aljazeera 14 October 2011 36. Rajiv Sikri and Marie Lall, “Whither India Myanmar relations”, South Asia Analysis group,

paper No. 2341, 22 August 2007. 37. Sudha Ramchandra, “Myanmar Power play leaves India Smiling”, Asia Times, October

21, 2004 38. Times of India, Guwahati, 16-October-2011 39. Yasmin Saikia, “The Tai-Ahom Connection”, Seminar 550, June 2005,

<http://www.indiaseminar.com/2005/550/550%2oyasmin%20saikia.htm> accessed on 10 May 2007.

40. Joseph Nye espoused soft power as the use of attraction persuasion in foreign policy and the appeal of a country based on its culture, values, beliefs, practices, policies and way of life.

41. Jarnail Singh, Secretary of the ministry of Development of Northeast Region, in his speech to the three day conference organized by the Ministry and Indian Chamber of Commerce, Hanoi, 12 February 2009. See <www.saigon-gdaily.com.vn/Business/2009/2/68535/>

42. See Baladas Ghoshal, “Indonesia in India’s Look East Policy”, IDSA Issue Brief, 20 January 2011.

**********

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers21%5Cpaper2043.html

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Look East Policy : Twenty Years After

Rakhee Bhattacharya Fellow

Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies New Delhi

[email protected]

Rakhee Bhattacharya is an economist and currently a fellow at Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies of Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi. Her research area covers the issues of development, disparity, poverty, regional economies & conflicts, and India’s regional economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. She has worked on many such issues for India’s Northeast.

She is the author of the book ‘Development Disparities in Northeast India’, Cambridge University Press, which speaks about the skewed development of Northeast India in the context of India’s pre and post liberalised economic scenario. She has also edited five volumes on Northeast India, all of which deal with various development challenges of the region. She is a former Australian Endeavour Post Doctoral Fellow. She has contributed to several national and international journals including Routledge.


168

Look East Policy : Twenty Years After

The year 1991 was a landmark in the modern history of India. The year witnessed the

assassination of India‘s young prime-minister Rajiv Gandhi, greatly upsetting the body

politic of the country, and bringing direct dynastic rule to a halt. But the vision of Rajiv

Gandhi to build a ‗young India‘, with economic modernization backed by technological

revolution, led by the youth as its driving force, survived his unfortunate death. The seed

of this idea developed into a concrete reality through the ‗New Economic Policy‘ of

liberalization embarked upon in the same year, under the premiership of Narsimha Rao

and stewarded by his able Finance minister Dr. Manmohan Singh. The policy was borne

to rescue India‘s then sinking economy from the brink of a disaster. Dr Manmohan

Singh, had re-written the economic roadmap of India by making a paradigm shift from

planned centralized economic policy to a well-perceived, open and liberalized economic

policy, which for the next two decades would dramatically transform the development

discourse of India. After twenty years of the journey of this economic liberalization, with

a real growth in the economy touching 8%, the country has become an incorrigible

economic power-horse, and its earlier muffled voice now rising to a pitch that can no

longer be ignored by the twenty-first-century-world. A new India with a new identity has

emerged with a very sound knowledge economy, increasing adaptation of technology and

innovation, unleashing the creativity, energy and dynamism of its one billion people. It

empowered the youth of India, giving them economic freedom after the political freedom

in 1947. India is increasing assuming an increasingly important role in the region, though

still far behind China. This modern and economically empowered India is today

beckoning many international partners through an open door policy for trans-national

economic co-operation, which actually has helped India to take several significant steps

towards redirecting her foreign policies and forging new partnerships through global and

regional ties.

In the same year 1991, India reached another milestone in its foreign policy by initiating

what is called ‗Look East Policy‘. After many decades, the country adopted a strategic


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shift in its foreign policy by introducing this widely focused ‗Look East Policy‘ to re-

build her relations with Southeast Asian Nations, a relation that was lost and

disconnected during colonial period. Even after independence, India was oblivious about

her East and Southeast Asian partners, and her foreign policy was heavily aligned

towards the Western nations. But in 1991 the country was forced to make such geo-

strategic shift to the East and Southeast Asian neighbours also because her most aliened

post-independent partner, Soviet Union collapsed and disintegrated in the same year, and

India lost her strongest global partner and a staunch ally. Her crisis in foreign policy was

as grave as her crisis in economic policy, occurring at the same time and she urgently felt

the necessity of having new regional and sub-regional partners beyond the SAARC zone.

Thus Southeast Asia with which India shared civilizational links was positioned as the

most favoured destination for evolving India‘s urgently needed alternative foreign policy.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao, had initiated this alternative policy to build

relations with East and Southeast Asian nations, not only for historical but also for

economic reasons, as these small neighbouring nations were on a fast-growth trajectory.

Thus ‗Look East Policy‘ was as path-breaking as India‘s ‗New Economic Policy‘ in

1991. Later when Dr. Manmohan Singh became the Prime Minister, he mentioned in one

occasion that ‗Look East Policy‘ was not merely an external economic policy, that it also

indicated a strategic shift in India‘s vision of the world and India‘s place in the evolving

global economy. Most of all, it was about reaching out to India‘s civilisational

neighbours in South East Asia and East Asia. Understanding the significance of his

statement, it is clear that the idea of Look East Policy was to make a strong and positive

economic engagement with Southeast Asia through multilateral and bilateral co-

operations; and eventually aiming to re-establish cultural connectivity by trailing the lost

links; and finally to address the security-sensitivity of this whole region. The policy was

envisioned thus to reestablish and strengthen relations with India‘s East and Southeast

Asian neighbours, which was much neglected and ignored for several decades after

independence.

The year 1991 thus remains extremely significant in contemporary Indian history, having

seen two such strategic shifts in its policies, formulated and guided by two significant


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political leaders of the country, and attempted to make a ‗tryst with destiny‘ of millions

of Indian masses cutting across both mainland and borderland. Apart from India‘s broad

relations with Southeast Asian nations, Look East Policy was also evolved with an idea

of bringing India‘s isolated, landlocked and conflict-prone borderland Northeast, which

has a very close geographical proximity with these neighbouring nations, having

Myanmar as the gateway. The idea was also to bring Northeast borderland in a

development paradigm by making connectivity with Southeast Asian countries, and

conceptualizing the region in a trans-regional economic space. The international

boundary of Northeast has remained close since colonial period due to strategic and

geopolitical sensitivities, which critically disrupted the natural flows of people, economy,

culture and ethnicity in the region. Therefore one major objective of Look East Policy

was to revive such lost relations with its neighbours and bringing a solution to its long-

standing insurgency issues, human poverty and economic backwardness. The idea was to

break India‘s Northeast from its age-old peripheral status and to make it a strategic

economic location, which can open up various possible economic interjections and

collaborations with her neighbouring and culturally aliened nations of Southeast Asia,

encountering the security sensitivity of the region.

Twenty years after such bold attempts in policy reforms, one is in a position to say not

only India‘s New Economic Policy has worked magically to improve her growth

scenario, but her Look East Policy also remained no less successful, achieving several

significant steps and milestones within India‘s foreign policy framework. ASEAN, one of

the most powerful Asian sub-regional forum has come closer to India through various

economic, trade and tourism engagements. A number of institutional mechanisms have

been put in place to promote economic exchanges both at governmental and private

sector levels. ASEAN-India joint Cooperation Committee and an ASEAN-India Working

group on trade and investment were set up along with the creation of an ASEAN-India

Fund to promote trade, tourism, science, technology and other economic activities. From

virtually no investment from Southeast Asia in early 1990s, India can proudly claim that,

today around 5% of investment comes from different nations of this region to the

country. This is certainly an achievement of India‘s Look East Policy. According to the


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ever-optimistic Indian Government, ‗trade between India and ASEAN countries is

expanding significantly. India has signed free trade area (FTA) agreements with Thailand

and Singapore; there are plans to create a free-trade area with Brunei, Indonesia and

Malaysia by 2011 and with the remaining ASEAN countries – the Philippines,

Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam – by 2016. There are a number of structures of

sub-regional cooperation in place including the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and

BIMST-EC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral, Technical and Economic

Cooperation). India‘s Look East Policy also has shown interest in regional

multilateralism, and has come up with a number of new multilateral initiatives with

Southeast Asian countries. Ganga-Mekong Swarnabhumi with India, Myanmar,

Thialand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam launched in 2000, is one among them. These

initiatives basically address economic development issues of volatile India‘s Northeastern

region, and trying to create a sub-regional energy grid, and to tackle other non-traditional

security issues of the region like light weapon smuggling, narcotics and terrorism. This is

the multi-dimensional and bold approach in India‘s foreign policy with East Asian

neighbours. Look East Policy thus is primarily being pursued as an economy-centric

endeavour, and has created an ambience of confidence to boost economic ties and

negotiations between India and Southeast Asia. This foreign policy initiative has

remained a most appropriate for India as has remained her economic policy.

But the success story cannot keep the failure story unturned. Twenty years after such bold

policies, India is suddenly confronted with severe new challenges. The widening inequity

and lack of transparency in the system have thrown new threats to Indian Union. The

‗young India‘ of Rajiv Gandhi‘s dream which brought glory to the nation is reflecting

frustration with the system, having lack of efficiency, heavy corruption and governance-

deficit, which are posing major threats to human security. The force of ‗young India‘ is

now expressing their anguish against such issues in different fora. Therefore the time has

arrived urgently to revisit India‘s well acclaimed economic policy of liberalization in the

light of such challenges. On the other hand her Look East Policy, which promised to

usher prosperity to Northeast India through positive neighbourly relations has yet to see

the fruits, and thus needs a review. The policy has hardly made any fruitful impact in


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region‘s development through economic and trade revival. The region is yet to gain any

tangible benefit through this policy and initiatives, which were taken by overlooking the

demands and overhearing the voices of the people of Northeast. Having the vision of a

prosperous Northeast India connected to the economies of Southeast Asia, the Look East

Policy envisages the growth of communication, industries and trade that would enable the

people in the region to significantly improve their quality of life. But people of Northeast

are yet to witness any such benefits, and still suffer from her age-old issue of economic

isolation. Leaving aside investment, infrastructure, tourism, even the border trade is yet to

gain momentum. This widens the scope of igniting anger amongst the youths of

Northeast against such policy, who await opportunities for better living.

Therefore more vigorous and comprehensive approaches are needs of the hour now, as it

is increasingly realized that India can never have a stable and secured Northeast region

without economic resurgence with Southeast Asia through open door policy. Only if the

investors of all fronts go there and explore the economic possibilities more intensely, the

mutual economic trust and benefits are bound to excel in this entire region. Look East

Policy also needs to be more forceful in the context of China being the rising regional

power, both economically and militarily. It has skillfully made a good grip over

Southeast Asian countries, and has stared afresh intruding in Northeast India‘s internal

security issues through border disputes and extending support to the extremists of the

region. So to encounter ‗China factor‘, India needs a much more stronger diplomacy to

implement Look East Policy in full force and to anchor ASEAN by multiplying its trade

volume and establishing trust through investment, support and goodwill policies.

Country‘s Myanmar policy also needs to be more effective, without which Northeast

India cannot find long term stability. Therefore a time has come for Indian policy makers

to realize that if promises are not fulfilled, and policies are vaguely implemented, it

would add more conflicts to India, blurring the distinction of the needs of mainland and

borderland, as ‗young India‘ is passing through a test phase of patience and tolerance.

*********


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INDIA’S “LOOK-EAST POLICY” -HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS IT BEEN?

Dr. Rupakjyoti Borah

School of Liberal Studies,

Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat

Dr Rupakjyoti Borah is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the School of Liberal Studies, Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge in 2009 and

holds a PhD from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India. He has researched at the University of Western Australia, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, University of Queensland, Australian National University, Canberra, University of Sydney, University of New South Wales, La Trobe University and Monash University. He has published in journals, books and newspapers both in India and abroad.


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INDIA’S “LOOK-EAST POLICY”-HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS IT BEEN?

One of the hallmarks of Indian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has been its

“Look-East Policy”, which marked a revival of India’s age-old ties with the countries

of Southeast and East Asia. It must be mentioned here that India and the countries of

Southeast and East Asia have millennia-old ties with Indian culture and customs

having seeped their way into the hearts and minds of the people in these parts of the

world. Even today, the influence of Indian customs and culture is manifest in many

of these countries. So while Pancasila (derived from the Sanskrit words, panca-

meaning five and sila-meaning principle) is the state philosophy of Indonesia, the

island of Bali in Indonesia is predominantly Hindu-in a country which has the

largest population of Muslims in the world. The Angkor Wat temple complex in

Cambodia stands testimony to the Indian influence in this region and so do epics

like the Ramayana and Mahabharata which are still enacted in many localised forms

across many of these countries.

However, in the years following its independence, this region was completely

overlooked by India for various reasons. India supported the anti-colonial

movement in Southeast Asia - the convening of the Asian Relations Conference in

1947, a special conference on Indonesia in January 1949, Chairmanship of the

International Control Commission on Indo-China in 1954 and the sponsoring of the

Bandung Conference: all these reflected India’s deep involvement in the freedom

struggle being waged by the countries of the region.

However, India’s position on the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the

recognition given to the Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia hindered the

development of its ties with the countries of Southeast and East Asia. The end of the

Cold War meant that India’s foreign policy mandarins had to look afresh at the

world. The quantum leap in India’s ties with the countries of Southeast and East

Asia came in the early 1990’s when India embarked on its economic liberalisation

programme and launched its “Look-East Policy”, designed to reach out to the


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countries of Southeast and East Asia, with whom India has had historical links but

had lost out in the period after its independence in 1947.

India’s economic liberalisation programme was undertaken when it faced a

severe balance of payments crisis and its foreign exchange reserves were abysmally

low. Since the launch of its “Look-East Policy”, India’s relations with the ASEAN

have picked up and it became a sectoral dialogue partner of the ASEAN in 1992

while in 1996, India became a full dialogue partner of the ASEAN. In October 2003 in

Bali, Indonesia, ASEAN and India signed a Joint Declaration on Cooperation to

Combat International Terrorism and in the same year, India acceded to the Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

THE IMPACT OF THE LOOK-EAST POLICY

India and the countries of Southeast and East Asia share many areas of

strategic convergence. There is scope for greater defence cooperation, intelligence-

sharing and joint initiatives on maritime security, counter-terrorism, disaster

prevention and management and energy security between India and these

countries. They also face common dangers from non-military threats like piracy,

accidents and oil spills and have a deep interest in ensuring the safety of the sea

lanes of communication (SLOC’s) in the region around the Straits of Malacca, which

is a choke-point. The Indian Navy is the predominant power in the region between

the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca, home to some of the world’s most

important and vulnerable sea lanes of communication.

India’s relations with the countries of Southeast and East Asia have also seen

a steady improvement since the launch of the “Look-East Policy”. One remarkable

turnaround has been in India’s ties with Myanmar, whose President Thein Sein

recently visited India in October 2011. Earlier in July 2010, the Myanmarese military

strongman General Than Shwe paid a five-day official visit to India. India and

Myanmar have cooperated in areas like counter-insurgency operations, energy and

joint infrastructure projects. India is executing a host of infrastructure projects in


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Myanmar. One of them, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit-cum-Transport Project

aims at promoting transportation on the Kaladan river, which weaves in and out of

India’s Northeastern state of Mizoram and then empties into the Bay of Bengal near

Sittwe port in Myanmar. Interestingly, the Kaladan project is being executed by an

Indian engineering company, Essar. Once the project is completed, it will provide

India’s landlocked Northeast direct access to the Sittwe port. This area is also

significant for India since its state-owned ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Commission)

Videsh Limited and Gas Authority of India Limited hold a 30% stake in the

exploration and production of gas in the off-shore blocks located near Sittwe.

There are many reasons behind India trying to court Myanmar. First, India

does not want Myanmar to get too close to China. Already, Pakistan-sponsored

terror has emerged as a major security concern for India even as China and

Pakistan’s “all-weather friendship” seems to be getting stronger.

Second, Myanmar shares a 1600-km border with India’s Northeast which is

plagued by insurgency. Many of the insurgent groups in Northeast India have camps

in Myanmar. The present Shiekh Hasina government in Bangladesh has handed over

to India many wanted Northeastern militants and India wants Myanmar to follow

Bangladesh’s lead.

Third, India’s booming economy needs energy resources and Myanmar is

very rich in natural gas. The much talked-about Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI)

has been a non-starter because of factors like American opposition to the same, and

the prevailing situation in Pakistan.

India also has close ties with Indonesia. Indonesian President Susilo

Bambang Yudhoyono was the chief guest at India’s 62nd Republic Day celebrations

in January this year. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was a strong

votary of Indonesia’s freedom struggle from the Dutch. It must be mentioned that it

was he who had taken the initiative to organise the historic Asian Relations

Conference in New Delhi during March 23-April 2, 1947 to bring together the Asian

nations and peoples.


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Following the end of the Cold War, India provided spare parts, trained

Indonesian pilots and serviced its MiG-29 fighters. The two countries have

institutionalised a biennial dialogue at the level of Defence Ministers and there are

regular exchanges between the defence establishments of both countries. They

have also been conducting joint India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrols

(INDINDOCORPAT) every year in the Andaman Sea since September 2002 to

improve interoperability of their navies. Besides, India has been hosting a biennial

gathering of ships known as the Milan since 1995 to increase regional cooperation

where Indonesia has participated along with countries like Singapore, Thailand and

Malaysia.

India has also been steadily increasing its naval strength. It is acquiring the

augmented and retrofitted 45,000-tonne displacement Kiev class aircraft carrier

Admiral Gorhskov—renamed INS Vikramaditya while at the same time construction

has already begun on India’s indigenous 37,500-metric tonne displacement aircraft

carrier and both these aircraft carriers are expected to join service before 2015. 1

INDIA’s GROWING INTERNATIONAL PROFILE

India’s profile has also been growing on the international stage. Last year, especially the month of December, saw a succession of state visits by the top leadership of all the five permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members to India, which is reflective of India’s rising profile in the global arena and the desire of these countries to engage with India, especially given its huge economic potential. Last year, the British Prime Minister David Cameron was in India in late July (27-29), and the American President Barack Obama came calling in early November (6-8). President Sarkozy of France visited India in early December (4-7) while Chinese Premier Hu Jintao followed in mid-December (15-17). Russian President Dmitry Medvedev came towards the end of December 2010(20-22).2 India has already proclaimed its bid to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and even the United States has lent support to India’s case.

THE CHINA FACTOR

China has the fastest growing economy of the world 3 and has largely come out

unscathed from the worldwide economic meltdown. India is not too far behind with


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the second fastest growing economy in the world. 4 The economic potential of China

and India is aptly illustrated by a Carnegie Endowment report “The G-20 in 2050”

which says “by 2050, the United States and Europe will be joined in economic size

by emerging markets in Asia and Latin America. China will become the world’s

largest economy in 2032, and grow to be 20 per cent larger than the United States

by 2050.” 5

Indian strategic planners have been voicing concerns over the so-called Chinese

“string of pearls” strategy to enclose India in the Indian Ocean region. China has

funded ports and refuelling stations in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota),

Bangladesh (Chittagong), and Myanmar(Sittwe and Kyaukpyu)6 much to India’s

chagrin. Recent media reports from China indicate that it has developed its first

stealth fighter-the Chengdu J-20 fighter and an anti-ship ballistic missile that could

sink U.S. aircraft carriers. The newly-developed "D" version of China's DF-21

medium-range missile could potentially change the balance of power in the Asia-

Pacific region.

Maritime cooperation is one of the most important aspects of India’s “Look-

East Policy”. The Indian Navy in the post 9/11 period has participated in escort and

joint patrolling activities in this region. India’s location places it adjacent to some of

the most vital sea-lanes of the world stretching from the Suez Canal and the Persian

Gulf to the Straits of Malacca through which around 55,000 ships and much of the oil

from the Gulf region transit each year.7

There cannot be any doubts that China has been a factor in the emerging ties

between India and the countries of Southeast and East Asia. India’s national psyche

still bears the scars of the 1962 war with China, despite the efforts to normalise

Sino-Indian relations since 1988. China has proliferated missile and nuclear

technology to Pakistan, and continues to be a major source of weaponry for that

country.

Buoyed by its booming foreign exchange reserves, China has adopted an

increasingly belligerent posture in Asia. During the visit of the Chinese Premier Wen

Jiabao to India during December 15-17, 2010, China and India could not resolve


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many of the pressing issues plaguing their ties. First, unlike American President

Obama and French President Sarkozy, China chose to be ambiguous on the issue of

India’s quest for a seat in the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) and refused to

openly back India. Second, India’s protests over the issuing of stapled-visas by China

for the residents of its province of Jammu and Kashmir went unheeded. There was

no forward movement on the vexed border issue as well. The 2,520-mile frontier

between India and China is the only one of China’s land borders that has not been

demarcated.

THE US FACTOR

One of the most important developments in the period after the end of the

Cold War has been the development of close ties between India and the United

States. Although India’s nuclear tests gave a temporary jolt to the relationship, US

President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000 signalled that the US-India

relationship had come of age. India’s location, strong economy and huge pool of

highly qualified technical talent make it very important in the American scheme of

things. The Indo-US civilian nuclear deal is ample testimony to the complete change

in the dynamics of the relationship between the two countries. The signing of the

bilateral Agreement for Cooperation Regarding the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

on October 10, 2008 marked the end of India’s nuclear isolation.

In June 2010, the Indian and US governments held the inaugural Indo-US

Strategic Dialogue in Washington, which focused on five major areas: strategic

cooperation; energy and climate change; education and development; economics,

trade and agriculture; and science, technology, health and innovation.8 Though the

two countries would not like to admit it, there are obvious concerns about the rise

of China, not only in Asia, but also on the global stage.

India and the US have been holding a series of joint military exercises,

something which was unthinkable during the Cold War era. Earlier Russia was the

supplier of choice for the Indian armed forces, which has of course changed in the

last decade. Many American defence firms have now entered the lucrative Indian

defence market.


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Terrorism is one factor which has brought the United States, India and the

countries of Southeast and East Asia closer since all of them have a shared interest

in fighting global terrorism. The American decision to lift the nuclear sanctions

against India in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests and the emerging regional

scenario after September 11 has helped to cement a natural alliance between India

and the United States. The two nations have recognised the prospects for

cooperation in maintaining a stable balance of power in the Indian Ocean region and

its periphery. The improving ties between India and the United States has helped to

fuel the ties between India and the countries of Southeast and East Asia, since many

of these countries are close to the United States themselves.

INCREASING CONNECTIVITY

In order to bring about a closer association with the countries of Southeast and

East Asia, the Government of India has promoted an Open Skies policy, which would

enhance air connectivity. Meanwhile, work on the Trilateral Highway Project which

will connect India, Myanmar and Thailand is also progressing steadily. At the India-

ASEAN Ministerial meeting held in July 2010, ASEAN and India proposed to build a

new highway linking India-Myanmar-Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam while under the

Mekong-Ganga Cooperation programme an agreement has been reached to build a

Delhi-Hanoi rail link.

Tourism could be a major revenue earner for both India and the Southeast and

East Asian countries and also a very good way to promote people-to-people links.

Many of these countries have huge Buddhist populations and India is the birthplace

of Buddhism. With the support of countries like Singapore, India's ancient Nalanda

University, dating back to 5th century B.C., would again start functioning tentatively

by 2013, which is reflective of the increasing cooperation between India and these

countries.

NORTHEAST INDIA IN INDIA’S LOOK-EAST POLICY

The Northeastern states of India play a pivotal role in India’s “Look-East Policy”

since they share a land border with the ASEAN. However, it is a matter of regret that

they have not been able to reap the benefits of India’s “Look-East Policy”. The 160


181

km India-Myanmar Friendship Road, between Tamu and Kalemayo in Myanmar and

running onward to Kalewa, was built with Indian assistance. However, there is a

need to increase trade between India’s Northeastern states and the ASEAN

countries, given their geographical contiguity. There is also a need to involve the

people of this region in any initiative to foster closer ties with the ASEAN countries.

The Central government should also take into confidence the Chief Ministers of this

region while framing policies as part of India’s “Look-East Policy”. Once Northeast

India begins to reap the benefits of the “Look-East Policy”, it will also help in the

establishment of peace in this militancy-hit region.

THE ROAD AHEAD

The “Look-East Policy” has been a success of the Indian foreign policy

establishment. In the years to come, India and the countries of Southeast and East

Asia will grow even closer. However, in spite of diverging viewpoints in some areas,

what is certain is that India and these countries will need to cooperate even more in

order to face common challenges.

------------------------------------------------------------- 1.Radhakrisna Rao, Meeting Maritime Challenges : Indian Navy Looks Skywards, IPCS Issue Brief, February 2010 2. S.D. Muni, World Powers Beeline to Delhi, ISAS Brief, No. 183 – 28 December 2010, <http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Brief_183-Email- World_Powers_Beeline_to_Delhi_30122010163824.pdf>, accessed 10 January 2011 3. China country profile, BBC News, 18 October 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1287798.stm>, accessed 27 December 2010 4. ADB raises India GDP estimate for FY11 to 8.5%, Financial Express, 29 September 2010,<http://www.financialexpress.com/news/ADB-raises-India-GDP-estimate-for-FY11-to-8-5-/689591/>, accessed 28 December 2010 5. Uri Dadush, Bennett Stancil, The G20 in 2050, November 2009, <http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24195>, accessed 17 June 2010 6 .Ashley Townshend, “Sino-Indian Maritime Relations: Managing Mistrust in the Indian Ocean”, Lowy Institute, Sydney, December 2010,<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1461>, accessed 23 December 2010 7 .Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report, 2009-10, p. 2

8. K. Alan Kronstadt, Paul K. Kerr , Michael F. Martin , Bruce Vaughn, India-US relations, 27 October 2010,

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf>, accessed 24 November 2010

http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Brief_183-Email-World_Powers_Beeline_to_Delhi_30122010163824.pdf

http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Brief_183-Email-World_Powers_Beeline_to_Delhi_30122010163824.pdf

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1287798.stm

http://www.financialexpress.com/news/ADB-raises-India-GDP-estimate-for-FY11-to-8-5-/689591/

http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24195

http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1461

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf


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Realist Foundations of India’s Look East Policy

Dr. Binoda Kumar Mishra Fellow,

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies,

Kolkata [email protected]

Dr. Binoda Kumar Mishra is a Ph.D. from

JNU. Currently, a Fellow at Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS), Kolkata, working onSino-Indian

Competition for Strategic Space in South and Southeast Asia.

He specializes on security studies and focuses on traditional and non-traditional security issues in South and Southeast Asia. He is the coordinator

of K2K (Kolkata to Kunming Forum) a civilian initiative between Yunnan Province of China and West Bengal of India.

.



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Realist Foundations of India’s Look East Policy

A plethora of literature has been produced and more are being produced on India’s Look East Policy. There is no dearth of data related to the daily developments on the subject. I wonder as to what causes such enormous interest in the subject? What makes it any unique than other foreign policy initiatives of India? The answers are not clear to me but a likely explanation can be the contemporary uncertainties about the international system and the anxiety related to that. The collapse of the monotonous Cold War international system has made the international system suddenly dynamic with Asia emerging as the centre of this dynamism. Further, within Asia we see various configurations taking place that are, even at times, overlapping. Such configurations include regional and sub-regional arrangements, bilateral and multilateral economic engagements, and issue based strategic alignments. Among all this something important is also happening that not only concerns Asia but also the international system at large. It is the rise of the two most populous countries of the world, i.e. India and China. These two neighbours have started their march towards the core of international economic system and seem to be marching at a fair speed. Their combined march can be compared to the “rise of Europe during the 19th century or the burst of the US in the 20th century”.1 It may be early into the present century but there are unmistakable allusions that the current century is going to be shaped largely by the actions of these two Asian giants. Some see the rise of India and China as a single phenomenon ‘the rise of Chindia’ and some are interested in the implications of the rise of these two powers.2 The fact that both India and China are growing at a sustained rate despite fluctuations in global economy is the primary cause of anxiety for many who find it difficult to comprehend that two drastically different systems are performing similarly and spectacularly in the global economic sphere. The anxiety is due to it being unprecedented and lacking any reference to any other global phenomenon. Those who believe in the ‘End of History’ theory find the rise of China beyond any plausible explanation and those who see India, through J.K. Galbraith’s eyes, as a ‘functional anarchy’ find it difficult to account factors for such a sustained growth. The second reason for the increasing anxiety among those who are watching this rise is the uncomfortable bilateral history and the geopolitical issues involving both these countries. The rise of India and China is giving jitters to the Westerners who fear job loss and many other deprivations. But India and China on the other hand have a tough task at hand as they house one third of world’s population and aspire to provide them the standard of life comparable to the West. This compulsion along with an age-old saying that ‘great powers, either established or aspiring, even if good neighbours, do compete,’ makes competition between these two ‘Asian giants’ imminent. No where will this competition have as much effect as on Southeast Asia, the immediate neighbourhood of these two countries. Larger Asia Pacific and South Asia will of course come under impact. Both China and India are late but simultaneous entrants into Southeast Asia. But China, it is assumed, to have


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integrated herself substantially with the region where as India, it is argued, to be lagging behind. It is in this background, India’s Look East Policy emerges as a subject of serious interest. India’s engagement with Southeast Asia restarted from 1992. This new engagement came to be known as Look East Policy. From then on, India is, slowly but increasingly, getting engaged with Southeast Asia. Beginning as a sectoral dialogue partner in 1992, India became a full dialogue partner in 1995, member of ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996, a summit level partner in 2002, and finally a member of the East Asia Summit in 2005. This ‘unusually proactive’ move3 from the Indian side has generated a debate as to what is the objective of this Look East Policy? It has been termed as a manifestation of India’s assertiveness in the immediate neighbourhoods and at the same time, it has also been identified as a strategic move specifically designed to contain China in China’s traditional sphere of influence. Another interpretation is that it is primarily an automatic fallout of India’s expansionist attitude. Such interpretations are based more on certain held conjectures than on any objective analysis of India’s foreign policy. Therefore, in order to get rid of the conjectures and to reach at the reality, one must start with an understanding of India’s foreign policy approach and the place Southeast Asia holds in India’s scheme of things. Given the fact that there is a host of literature dealing with the factual evolution of India’s Look East Policy, I would avoid repeating a factual description of Look East Policy. Rather what I propose to do in the following pages is to explain the reasons for the emergence of certain conjectures regarding Look East Policy and attempt to refute them in the light of facts and logic in order to arrive at an objective understanding of the realistic foundations this much discussed foreign policy initiative of India. India’s Foreign Policy Approach and Southeast Asia India’s rich civilisational heritage followed by two centuries of colonisation and the unique nature of freedom struggle have all contributed to the nature of India’s foreign policy and foreign policy priorities. The leaders of nascent independent India were primarily concerned with the preservation of the new found political sovereignty and autonomy in international affairs which was under constant threat in the emergent Cold War characterised international system. Added to this, the direct security threat created by the partition of India and an assertive China coming to India’s doorstep through annexation of Tibet, created a complex that compelled India to focus more on these two neighbours. The second major characteristic of India’s foreign policy comes from India’s need for a fruitful association with the developed world to ensure steady economic growth that was of prime concern to nascent independent India. This entailed that India avoids meddling with murky international affairs particularly where there was a tussle between the two super powers was evident. Coming out of the colonial yoke, India had developed an “anti-hegemonic foreign policy ethos.”4 Thus, India had the task of engaging the Western


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industrial nations without surrendering her political autonomy. This needed either balancing of economic engagements with other countries or creating new economic blocs. India pursued both. She diversified her economic relations by engaging USSR and other East European countries and committed herself to the promotion of South – South relations, to increase trade, joint ventures and collaboration with other developing countries. At the political front, India championed the idea of Non-Alignment. Within this broad framework, Southeast Asia occupied a very important place. For India, being committed to the idea of South – South relations, it was almost a compulsion to factor in Southeast Asia in all her foreign policy calculations. The recent memory of suffering under colonialism made India sympathetic towards the freedom struggles throughout Southeast Asia. India saw these movements for independence as a natural extension of India’s freedom struggle. India’s sincerity was evident from the fact that barely one and half years into her independent existence, India organised a conference on Indonesia during January 1949, which was attended by fifteen countries. India also extended support to Vietnam’s struggle against the French and Malaysia’s struggle against the British, though with different degrees. The strategic importance of the region to India’s security was driven home by Japan’s swift sweep of Southeast Asia during World War II. This made India realise the strategic importance of Southeast Asia for protecting her eastern and southern frontiers. Thus, India from the very beginning intended to have some presence, if not control, in the region. The importance of Malacca strait and the kind of control India can exercise over that was the other strategic reason for India’s interest in the region. Thirdly, the rise of China certainly made India apprehensive about the future of the region and the implications for India. Particularly the reconciliatory approach of China towards states such as Pakistan which were allies of the West and China stealing the show at the 1955 Bangdung conference convinced India that China is trying to increase her sphere of influence in the region at the expense of India. In addition, the rise of communist movements in various Southeast Asian countries, particularly in Malaysia and Vietnam were perceived as potential threats in alliance with rising China. This concern was evident from the difference in Indian attitude towards the Indonesian freedom struggle and the communist led freedom movements in Malaysia and Vietnam. While India was pro-active in the case of Indonesia, was lukewarm towards the other two. Last but not the least, certain economic gains were also anticipated from interactions with Southeast Asia within the framework of South – South relations. A pattern of economic interdependence was realised as evident from the fact that immediately after India’s independence, Southeast Asia (the whole region) ranked third, after United Kingdom and United States as her trading partner. 5 India’s genuine interest in Southeast Asia was evident from her desire to be part of the region in any form the members of this region wanted. While the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was in the making, the then Foreign minister of


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India, M. C. Chagla during his visit to Singapore and Malaysia in May 1967 expressed India’s support to the formation of ASEAN and wanted to be part of this grouping in any form the members think fit.6 Suffice here to point out that China severely criticised the formation of ASEAN and called it ‘Puny Counter-revolutionary Alliance.’ 7 But it was only in the year 1992 that India started her formal engagement with Southeast Asia as a bloc. This long gestation is generally accounted to two factors: 1) the emergent ASEAN was primarily an association of Western Alliance; 2) India was seen as hobnobbing with Soviet Union. But the reality is India had always wanted to be a part of the grouping in some capacity or the other but India was not invited at the inception of the grouping. Secondly, economically, India focused on West Asia due to the presence of Oil on which India was heavily dependent and strategically Pakistan attracted most of India’s foreign policy attention being seen as the most immediate threat. Things started changing from 1980s. India’s efforts to engage with Southeast Asia almost materialised during 1980 when it was about to get the status of a dialogue partner. “[B]ut India’s support to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and her subsequent recognition of the Vietnam backed regime in Cambodia upset ASEAN.” 8 Around the same time the importance of West Asia started reducing for India due to fall in oil prices, and the Gulf war in which both the then super powers were heavily interested and deeply involved. It was perceived to be against India’s interest to remain involved in a region where both the super powers were involved as any action would have angered one or the other of the big powers. Secondly, India started producing two third of its own oil requirement which further reduced the primacy of West Asia for India. Thirdly, by becoming a group, Southeast Asia experienced steady economic growth which was seen as an opportunity for Indian surplus skilled and semi-skilled labour force. Fourthly, ASEAN, on its part, started looking outside its original 6 members in order to obtain optimality in economic terms under the guiding vision of S. Rajaretnam who, in 1973, set ‘outward looking’ as a strategy for ASEAN’s steady development. 9 All these were reasons enough for India to seriously pursue ASEAN and engage fruitfully at the earliest with this emerging regional organisation at her neighbourhood. But what prevented her from pursuing ASEAN is the nature of her economy that was largely closed and was yet to reach a point where India can effectively gain from any economic engagement. It was the coincidence of the end of the Cold War and liberalisation of the Indian economy in early 1990s that created a favourable atmosphere for India to pursue her natural ambition of furthering relationship with the Southeast Asian neighbourhoods. Initiation of Look East Policy The name “Look East” is though a misnomer gives a fairly clear expression of India’s priorities. The articulation of Look East Policy was preceded by India’s engagement with ASEAN in 1992 when India became the sectoral dialogue partner in the fields


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of trade, investment, and tourism. The Singapore lecture of the then Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao that became the foundation of the Look East Policy does not specify the nature of engagement India wishes to have with the Asia Pacific except indicating the economic nature of the initial engagement. It outlines the broad contours of India’s wishes. This broad spectrum has created enough scope for interpretation or formation of conjectures. The first of the conjectures is that India’s Look East Policy is an expression of India’s assertiveness within Asia on her way to emerge as a global power. This is a logical interpretation of India’s current foreign policy keeping the geo-strategic factors in mind and based on an unqualified assumption that India wishes to assume, if not global, regional leadership. Thus, Look East Policy seems to be the latest attempt after a series of initiatives such as the Asian Relations Conference, the Bandung Conference and the subsequent Non-Alignment Movement failed to obtain a leadership position for India among the developing countries. In addition to these failures, India, it is argued, saw the non-functioning of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a wastage in terms of furthering India’s interest and ambition of enhancing her global and regional image. The final qualification for such a conjecture is that India cannot move westward given the presence of Pakistan and other Islamic countries and to the east lies powerful China, making Southeast the only way India can expand her sphere of influence. The validity of such an interpretation can be questioned on the ground that a nation does not pursue global power ambitions during economic duress. A look at Indian economy during late 1980s and early 1990s, prior to her engagement with Southeast Asia, would make it clear that it was in shambles to say the least and India desperately needed assistance from outside to ride over the tough economic situation. By no stretch of imagination, global power status crossed the minds of Indian policy makers while formulating the Look East Policy. A circumstantial coincident can be discovered in the nature of Indian early engagement with ASEAN. The three sectors India identified for engagement with ASEAN were the sectors that experienced sudden collapse with the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the disappearance of USSR, India lost a major trading partner and the most important investor.10 The balance of payment crisis thus created called for search of new partners that would be interested in investing in India and would trade with India. Thus, at the inception, the Look East engagement was a desperate economic measure than any other thoughtful step in Indian foreign policy. Secondly, during the formation of ASEAN, India had clearly articulated her priority and ruled out any intension of dominating the region or any grouping.11 On the other hand it can be said that the Look East Policy was a measure to assuage the fear related to India’s intensions that was building up due to India developing naval and air power – aircraft carrier from the UK, a nuclear-powered submarine on lease, the TU-142 MR long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, modern Kilo-class conventional submarines from the former Soviet Union. 12 It was feared that India is trying to exercise control over the Malacca strait and other places from India’s strategically


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located Andaman naval base. Suffice here to mention that it was the Indian navy that made serious efforts in assuaging this fear of the Southeast Asian countries “…by undertaking a variety of confidence building measures such as bilateral and multilateral naval exercises, invitation to senior naval officers to visit the Andaman base facilities and regular port calls.” 13 Look East Policy is primarily an economic initiative is clearly spelt out in the Singapore lecture of P. V. Narasimha Rao. He was clear in his mind when he said “the Asia-Pacific could be the springboard for India’s leap into the global market place.” 14 The economic primacy in India’s Look East Policy is both natural and prudent. ASEAN is primarily an economic organisation, thus if India has to ride on ASEAN for her broader Look East Policy then it has to give primacy to economy. At the same time, India needing newer avenues for economic engagement, found ASEAN as the most suitable in all considerations. In the words of J.N. Dixit:

The economic involvement of important industrialised countries of the West and Japan with ASEAN countries makes it a catalyst through which India can have access to investment and technologies. India’s initial experience with ASEAN countries shows that it is an important growing area for Indian investment, joint ventures and trade promotion.15

In course of India’s engagement with ASEAN, India has substantially increased her economic interaction with this economic bloc. From negligible in 1990, India’s share in ASEAN’s total trade now stands at moderate 2.5 percent.16 Currently, ASEAN is the forth largest trading partner of India with a two way trading figure of more than 40 billion USD and can be expected to emerge as the largest trading partner soon considering the compounded annual growth rate of 27 percent since the year 2000 and the operationalisation of the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement from 2010.17 The second conjecture that has achieved almost universality among scholars looking at India’s Look East Policy is that India is trying to chase China out of latter’s traditional sphere of influence. This is a logical construction of the circumstances under which India initiated her Look East Policy but is a grossly over simplified analysis of the dynamics of India-China relationship and their interactions with the immediate neighbourhoods. Since early 1980s, India increasingly realised the fact that it is China that is emerging as the principal long-term concern. China’s continued support to Pakistan, her own conventional and nuclear force expansion, persistence of border dispute with India, non-relenting posture regarding Tibet and Taiwan, the history of Chinese support to Indian insurgents were enough reasons to perceive China as a concern. But pursuing Southeast Asian countries can no way be related to India’s concerns vis-à-vis China. First of all, since the establishment of Peoples’ Republic of China, China had no strategic presence in Southeast Asia except her large diaspora. Secondly, the inception of ASEAN was never encouraged by China and China did not consider ASEAN to be of any importance in her scheme for the future. It is only after the end of the Cold War and once ASEAN showed signs of ideological neutrality that China started cultivating Southeast Asia as a group. It is almost at the same time when India started her engagement with ASEAN that did


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China start engaging ASEAN. In terms of economic engagement, China’s bilateral trade increased rapidly and from US$ 8.8 billion in 1993 to UD$ 55.4 billion by 2001. 18 India made no way comparable progress in her economic engagement with ASEAN. Thus, India attempting to chase China does not hold good in economic terms as it is China which clearly is the major partner in ASEAN’s economy in comparison to India. The India chasing China theory is a by-product of the belief that there is a zero-sum competition between India and China. The fallacy of such theorisation is that it treats India and China as the only players and the Southeast and East Asia as a passive field wherein India and China are playing their zero-sum game. An objective understanding entails factoring in the role of the Southeast and East Asian countries based on their perceptions of the two big regional powers namely India and China and their expectations from India and China. It is beyond the scope of the this paper to make a detailed analysis of the role of Southeast and East Asian countries in determining the Look East Policy of India and China’s engagement with Southeast and East Asia. But it must be mentioned here that, at least in economic terms Southeast and East Asian counties are looking for engaging both India and China for their own economic development and to achieve optimality that was and is lacking in ASEAN as a regional economy. In other words, China and India may have not reached a point to put their hardware and software complementarities in their bilateral relations but it is the wish of the Southeast and East Asian countries to gain from these complementarities in their own region and economy. A strong case is made about India’s strategic engagement with Southeast and later East Asian countries through her Look East Policy. It is argued that India’s economic engagement with ASEAN may be in its future potentials, but India’s strategic engagement at least with Southeast Asia is complete. Again this conjecture is based on two overly generalised assumptions: 1) there is geographical contiguity between India and Southeast Asia making their security and strategic needs similar and compatible; 2) India intends to contain China in response to the latter’s attempt to contain India. The refutation for this conjecture is difficult to be put convincingly as circumstantial evidence can be gathered to give credence to the India – China mutual containment theory. China’s continuous assistance to Pakistan in the latter’s military build up, both nuclear and conventional, against India is at the base of the assumption that China wants to contain India. Added to this, China’s prolonged engagement with the military regime in Myanmar, new attempts to befriend Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh provide substantial material to argue that China wants to contain India. I do not intend to refute the fact that China always sees India as a ‘long-term’ potential threat. 19 Thus, China trying to contain India as a possibility cannot be ruled at any point of time. But to interpret any and all of Chinese foreign policies directed towards India’s neighbours as part of China’s containment attempt is slightly misplaced. Two examples would make it clear. It is argued that China’s construction of Gwadar port in Pakistan and the Hambontota port in Sri Lanka are part of Chinese strategy to contain India. The Gwadar port is meant primarily to establish an alternative route for China’s oil supplies. It is a genuine attempt by


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China to ensure safe passage of oil from Middle East which accounts for 80 percent of China’s oil import. Thus, the port is a commercial port which is evident from the fact that the port has been handed over to a Singapore company to manage. Similarly, the Hambontota port in southern Sri Lanka is also a commercial port being developed with partial Chinese contribution.20 To interpret these Chinese moves as part of the containment strategy of China is slightly misplaced in analysis or more a result of paranoia about China. As mentioned earlier, the strategic importance of Southeast Asia for India was driven home by the experience of World War II. Thus, it is essential that India monitors the strategic configurations of the region for ensuring India’s safety and security. K. M. Panikar, way back in 1960, pointed out that “India’s security interests cover … Burma, Thailand, Indochina coastlines, certainly including Malaysia and Singapore.”21 During the Cold War period, the region was largely dominated by the Western alliance leaving little space for India to engage strategically with the region. The end of Cold War and signs of the US losing interest in the region created a condition that demanded India’s immediate attention. This is not to argue that India senses any threat to arise from Southeast Asia as such but it is rightly believed in New Delhi that the developments in Southeast Asia would affect its interests directly and indirectly.22 The region may present itself as a cohesive economic bloc but strategically they remain largely fragmented. There are attempts to project ASEAN as a security community on the loose ground that a security community emerges when a group of states commonly renounce the use of force in resolving conflict.23

But in reality the security interests of the Southeast Asian nations vary widely and at times overlap causing frictions among Southeast Asian nations. The claims over Saprtleys and Paracel islands in South China Sea are cases in point. There are other areas of contention as well.24 This fragmented nature of the strategic environment of the region called for a complex strategic engagement with Southeast Asian nations. Two factors are currently characterising India’s strategic engagement with the states in the region – first, the security and strategic interests of the states of the region where India can play a supportive role in assuaging their security anxieties; second, India’s own strategic and security calculations in the region. Since there is hardly any security and strategic convergence among the Southeast Asian states, India had to engage states at different levels. This is clearly visible in the nature and degree of Indian strategic engagements. Before delving into India’s strategic and security engagements with Southeast Asian countries, it is suggestive to have a brief discussion on the security and strategic scenario in Southeast Asia to find out if there is any common denominator in the security and strategic interests of the ASEAN states that India can target to further her own strategic interests in the region. The “process regionalism” that characterises the evolution of ASEAN creates ample scope for convergence of security and strategic interests among themselves. During the Cold War, the region was well under the shadow of the Western alliance.25 Thus,


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security of the region was never a major agendum in the ASEAN affairs. But once the Cold War ended and the US seemed to be lacking in her commitment to the region, there emerged the necessity to give some serious thought to the security situation in the region. Prior to this, the only arrangement that ensured relative peace in the region was the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) formally adopted in 1971. Though this did not induce full compliance from the members of the ASEAN members, it still managed to keep inter-state wars among the Cold War time members at bay. But the changed international situation demanded for changed approach towards the concept of security. One major characteristic of ASEAN has been the concept of maintenance of sovereignty and autonomy of the member states. Thus, the primary task of looking after the security requirements of the member states was left to the individual states to manage. Thus we see bilateralism is a preferred approach for most of the ASEAN countries than multilateralism. However, there emerged one requirement that brought in some sense of congruity in the security and strategic interests. It is the rise of China in both economic and military terms. This is the only factor that can be identified as common traditional security concern among most, if not all of the Southeast Asian countries. There is a general sense of anxiety among the Southeast Asian countries vis-à-vis China. It is a fact that China has tried to woo the ASEAN countries by keeping aside her territorial and other disputes, but this has done little to assuage the anxiety among the Southeast Asian countries. This certainly helped India’s cause of getting associated with ASEAN in some form as evident from the fact that India was accepted as the dialogue partner of ASEAN ahead of China. Engagement with future major players is the preferred approach for ASEAN and China, India, Japan and the US are identified as the major powers to operate in the region. The importance of India at this stage is well articulated by the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong, as the western wing of the ASEAN aircraft while the eastern wing comprised China, Japan and Korea.26 In the security sphere, it is clear thus that ASEAN as a group is interested in India for the specific congruity in security interest its members have, i.e. anxiety over China’s long-term intentions. Other than this there is no security or strategic convergence in the traditional sense of security. India, therefore, is engaged more bilaterally in the region than ASEAN as a group. Though it has been a general practice among the Southeast Asian countries to resolve their disputes peacefully there are moments when force has been projected a means to resolve conflict. For example, in March 2005 Indonesia sent warships to the Sulawesi Sea to protest against Malaysia’s decision to award a contract to an Anglo-Dutch firm to explore and mine the Ambalat and East Ambalat oil and gas blocks. Such incidents drive home the point that each of the Southeast Asian nations need to maintain modernised military equipment and trained personnel to deal with any future eventuality. India figures prominently as source to seek assistance for modernising armed forces and equipments. The various defence agreements between India and individual Southeast Asian States suggest that India caters to these specific needs since


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“[c]ompared with ASEAN countries, India’s weapon systems are not only good in quality but also inexpensive.27 These strategic engagements of India with Southeast Asian countries are interpreted by some scholars both in India and more so in China that India is trying to chase China out of the region. It is true that India’s engagements are giving jitters to China but that is not because India wants to chase China out of the region. A realistic interpretation of India’s strategic moves would be to consider the vacuum that was created by the departure of the US at the end of the Cold War. With the US withdrawal from the Philippines, there was a possibility that the region would be thrown into strategic chaos and instability. India on the other hand had always wanted to keep its neighbourhood stable by not allowing any single power to control the region and create strategic instability. One may recall India’s initiative in 1967 to create an Asian Council with the singular objective of ensuring that no power to ever emerge enough powerful to dominate Asia, particularly South and Southeast Asia.28 The post-Cold War conditions provided India with the opportunity to put in place a kind of diversified security order in which no single State within or outside the region can ever emerge as a major preponderant. In a sense, India intends to play the role of a balancer in the region and wants to ensure stability in the security order of the region. The balancing role is not necessarily directed against any particular country. If India has security and strategic relationship with countries like Vietnam and Japan on the one hand, on the other hand India has strategic understanding with China and Russia. At a different level India ropes in Japan, the US and Australia, who have major stakes in the region, into some kind of security arrangement. Therefore, to say that India’s strategic engagement with the members of the ASEAN as a move to chase out China is a just a conjecture based on the assumption that India and China are involved in a zero-sum game in the region. Southeast Asia as a group, on its part welcomes this role of India as there is a convergence of Indian and ASEAN’s strategic perspective, i.e. preventing any single power domination in the region.29 There exists a more clear security convergence between India and Southeast Asia in the non-traditional security matters. Both India and Southeast Asia suffer from similar non-traditional threats such as, terrorism, drugs and arms smuggling, human trafficking, sea piracy, etc. The importance of mutual cooperation in tackling the growing menace of terrorism is realised by all the ASEAN members and India. Attacks in Indian soil, attacks in Indonesia have contributed to this realisation. Moreover, the entire ASEAN region is infested with various terrorist threats such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Muslim separatist forces in Southern Thailand, the Abu Sayyaf, etc. These groups have got international in their activities and have developed close contacts with insurgent groups active in North East Region (NER) of India and Jammu and Kashmir. India thus is seriously interested in roping in ASEAN for some kind of arrangement to curb these activities keeping India’s security in view. Thus, cooperation on this issue was an immediate necessity


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to which both India and ASEAN as a group instantly responded by concluding a joint declaration on combating terrorism in October 2003. North East Region of India and Look East Policy Another major interpretation of the Look East Policy is that it is a policy aimed at uplifting the economic condition of India’s most underdeveloped and troubled NER. The argument advanced by Indian policy establishment and instantly picked up by Indian academia is that development of NER is a major component of Look East Policy. This argument rests on the articulation that NER can be integrated into the larger economic canvas of Southeast Asia. The economic integration of NER is supposed to take place through Myanmar. This logic seems valid to give credence, and to some extent urgency, to the Look East Policy. But in close scrutiny it would be clear that NER was never a part of Look East scheme. As we know the Look East Policy got operational in 1992 with India being admitted to ASEAN as a sectoral dialogue partner. It must be remembered that Myanmar was yet to be a member of ASEAN. Thus, integrating NER to Southeast Asia logically could not be a thought at that time. It is worth mentioning that neither NER nor Myanmar was a part of India’s planning under Look East Policy. In the year 1994 a sub-regional grouping by the name BISTEC was formed involving India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand. It is only after Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1996 that Myanmar was considered to be part of this economic sub-regional organisation in 1997. Subsequently, the name was changed to BIMSTEC.30 Therefore, one can at best say that NER became a part of the Look East Policy only as an afterthought. India has always taken a paradigmatic view of NER and till date none of the paradigms have proved to be a success in improving the economic condition of the region. 31 On the other hand the region experiences alienation which is manifested in various forms, most important of them being insurgency around the question of legitimacy of New Delhi’s sovereignty. The first paradigm that shaped India’s approach towards NER was “culture paradigm.” This entailed that the NER needs to be protected from cultural intrusion from mainland India as the region is an exotic cultural space. This did not help either the cause of NER in prospering culturally or the cause of Indian State in integrating NER into the national mainstream. This was followed by the security paradigm that identified NER as strategically important to the security of the country and called for enhanced presence of security forces. This was followed by politics/representation paradigm. The rationale was the assumption that if the diverse communities and sub-national identities of NER were allowed greater representation in the mainstream political process, the divisive tendencies would turn into assimilative ones. This was followed by the latest, i.e. developmental paradigm. Develop the region and this would make the people happy. Give them development and they will forget about problems of identity, problems of assertion, problems associated with creating a nation out of essentially tribal communities. Given the historical and contemporary circumstances one can


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only say that there existed only an imagined correlation between these initiatives and the desired results. For example, ‘development initiative’ would ‘develop’ the region, and development would ultimately lead to solution of the problems arising out of sub-national assertions. Myanmar joining ASEAN coincided with a paradigmatic shift in New Delhi in its approach towards NER. The latest in the line of paradigms that New Delhi has followed towards NER is the developmental paradigm. In the newly emerging economic situation, a thought is being articulated that the Look East Policy needs to be pro-actively followed through the NER in order to facilitate NER’s economic integration with the larger Southeast Asian economy through the land gate of Myanmar. 32 The idea that NER would develop through economic integration with Southeast Asia is more fanciful than grounded on reality. The economic potential of the region that can be harnessed by its economic interaction with Southeast Asia is being zealously advocated. But the reality on the ground and possible manifestations of economic integration to larger geographically and ethnically contiguous space is often overlooked. In an insightful article Samir Das looks at the ethnic cause of various resource conflicts in the region and warns us about the possibility of the ethnic ties across boundaries getting crystallised and posing serious threat to Indian Union.33

This explains a lot about India’s reluctance in allowing NER to have greater interaction with region adjacent to it. The second reality is the newfound love of Myanmar in India is leading to a situation which jeopardise most of Indian plans to make her Look East Policy more pro-active. It is no secret that India has changed her preference on Myanmar. From being sensitive to the nature of government in that country now India seems not even sensitive to the nature of governance in that country under the Junta. The general observation on such a shift in India’s policy towards Myanmar is that India wants to counter China’s overwhelming presence in Myanmar and needs the support of Myanmar government to keep the insurgency movements in NER under check. 34 A more plausible explanation of the shift in India’s position vis-à-vis Myanmar emerges from a careful look at the India’s compulsions ahead. The growth rate India has achieved over the past decade is impressive and India needs to maintain that growth rate which requires huge quantity of energy. India thus is in search for sources of energy every where. Of late, Myanmar has emerged as a promising source of energy. Tapping these sources of energy became the primary target of India. This needed changes at two levels. India had to show acceptance towards the regime in Myanmar, and secondly India needed to devise a rationale to open up NER to international interaction. But the ground realities of NER has offset the entire planning to give a push to Look East Policy and to tap the sources of energy in Myanmar. The story of the gas pipeline from Myanmar to India is a case in point. India initially planned to bring the gas from Myanmar through Bangladesh. On the latter’s refusal India had the only option of bringing the gas through NER but decided against it which led to the gas flowing into China. Thus, NER is yet to be


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considered safe enough to act as gateway to Southeast Asia. And it is NER that is proving to be an impediment in India’s successful integration into Southeast Asian space. Culture The last in the list of conjectures regarding India’s Look East Policy is related to culture. In the ancient past Indians from her east coast travelled to the shores of the present Indonesia and her neighbours, built empires and conquered those areas culturally. India maintained trade as well as cultural relations with Burma, Siam (Thailand), Malaya (Malaysia), Kambhoj (Cambodia), Annam and the East Indies (Sumatra, Java, Bali, Borneo etc). These regions were referred to as Suvarnabhumi and Suvarna Dwipa meaning golden land and Golden Island. The Buddhist Jatakas refer to Indian merchants sailing from Tamralipti (coast of Orissa) or Bharukachcha (Broach in Gujarat) to get riches. Brihat katha of Gunadhya and Kathasritsagar, both works of ancient India give us several stories of merchants going to Suvarna Dwipa for trade. Buddhist texts also speak of trade contacts with South East Asia. Most important Hindu kingdom in Sumatra was Srivijaya, which established a vast empire comprising Malaya, the present Malaysia. It became a great centre of Buddhism. Sailendra Empire became powerful in the 8th century comprising Sumatra, Java, and Malaya. The empire had cultural and commercial contacts with South India. Buddhism spread in this empire and splendid monuments were built to perpetuate India’s cultural influence over this region. With this background, it is generally argued that India and ASEAN wanted to reconnect with each other through the Look East Policy. It is advocated that India, in order to make her integration with Southeast Asia durable, needs to use culture as a tool or as a soft power. The cultural contiguity between India and Southeast Asia cannot be denied at any point of time but to suggest that it would be an effective tool for advancing India’s interests in the region is certainly a misplaced assumption. The cultural connectivity that existed in the past is no longer that strong. The region has developed indigenous cultures based on Buddhism. More importantly, Islam has made a strong presence in the region. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world and Malaysia has more than 60 percent35 Muslim population. The large Muslim population in the region is not a problem as such to hinder India’s cultural advance into the region. It is the increasing Islamisation of Indonesia and Malaysia that would prevent India from making cultural advances. One should not ignore the systematic efforts being initiated in countries like Malaysia to eliminate Indian cultural symbols from its soil. Cultural assertion by India would most likely generate anxiety over India’s intensions. One can expect anti-India sentiments gaining strength against prominent cultural presence. Culture thus puts India in a very precarious position as to how much India can engage Southeast Asia and India has to handle the issue of cultural interaction to avoid any possible backlash that can even spill over to political and economic realms jeopardising India’s genuine interests in the region.


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Conclusion In the light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that India always had an interest in Southeast and the extended Asia Pacific. But the Cold War characterised post-World War II international system made it difficult for India to engage with the region as Non-alignment remained the principle of India’s foreign policy that made India avoid too much involvement in any region or issue in which the then two super powers were involved. Despite ideological constraints, India tried to be part of any multilateral arrangement in the region in whatever benign form possible. But the Soviet leaning of India and her policies towards the Cambodian crisis dissuaded ASEAN to accept India as a member in any form during early 1980s. But with the removal of the Ideological barrier a conducive political environment emerged for ASEAN to follow its outward looking policy. This international development coincided with crisis driven economic liberalisation in India which, for the first time opened up Indian economy to international economy. The compulsions created by the disappearance of USSR forced India to look elsewhere in search of economic partners. Emerging as the only successful regional economic organisation in Asia, ASEAN became the obvious choice for Indian economic engagement. It is apparent thus that the Look East Policy is primarily being pursued as an economy-centric endeavour with visions of economic integration of India with Southeast Asia and later with the larger Asia Pacific region. According to all available data and projections for the future, the Asian region is growing faster than the European or the American region, notwithstanding the melt down of Southeast Asian economies during the second half of 1990s. This means that there are more business opportunities in the Asian region for Indian business as well as for the Asian business in India. In the past one-and-a-half decades, India's trade ties with the Southeast Asian and East Asian countries have increased significantly. India has signed free trade area (FTA) agreements with Thailand and Singapore; there are plans to create a free-trade area with Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia by 2011 and with the remaining ASEAN countries – the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam – by 2016. There are a number of sub-regional cooperation arrangements in place including the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and BIMSTC. Yet there is always a room for still more growth in economic ties by virtue of their commitment to liberal economic principles. A perception that does the round is that India’s interest in Southeast Asia is a reactionary one vis-à-vis the Chinese engagement with the region. One cannot entirely ignore the impact China’s Southeast Asia engagement has on Indian Look East Policy but its independence cannot be completely denied at the same time. Whether as a collaborator or as a competitor, China’s strong presence in Southeast Asia is a fact India has to accept and operate with. But there is enough scope for both India and China to pursue their interests in the region without necessarily clashing. A tacit competition between India and China in the region is a compulsion no one can avoid. If it is to be seen in zero-sum terms, then the victory of either


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would depend largely on the perception ASEAN and Asia Pacific countries about India and China. The invented rationale, Look East Policy for the development of NER of India, is a post thought. On the contrary NER is proving to be an impediment for India pursuing her Look East Policy as pro-actively as she needs to do. A notion that age-old Indian cultural contact with Southeast Asia puts India in a better position to integrate into the region, should not be over emphasised. The assertive endogenous cultures in the region and the rise of Islamic nationalism can pose serious resistance to India’s cultural initiatives and may even have negative spill over effects on India’s genuine and benign interests in the region. Last but not the least, notwithstanding India’s claim to have started the second phase of India’s Look East Policy where in India hopes to pursue economic and strategic interests at larger Asia Pacific region, it is too early to figure out what India wants to obtain in strategic terms from her engagement with Asia Pacific except possible economic gains. To conclude, Look East Policy remains primarily an economic initiative and the strategic engagements with the countries of Southeast and Asia Pacific are expedient to minimally satisfy the security requirement of the individual Southeast Asian countries and to protect India’s genuine concerns. Endnotes

1. David Smith, The Dragon and the Elephant: China, India and the New World Order, London:

Profile Books, 2007, p. 171.

2. Ibid.

3. Scholars in India do not consider India to be generally proactive in her foreign policy.

4. Mohammed Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies, London and New

York: Routledge, 1990, p.2.

5. Ton That Thien, India and South East Asia, 1947-1960, Geneve: Librairie, 1963, p. 74. Cited in,

M. Ayoob, p.15.

6. K. P. Saksena, Cooperation in Development: Problems and Prospects for India and ASEAN, New

Delhi: Sage Publications, 1986, p.53.

7. ―Meeting in Bangkok: Puny Counter-revolutionary Alliance,‖ Peking Review, 18 August 1967.

Cited in, M. Ayoob, p, 11.

8. Chulacheeb Chinwanno, ―The Dragon, the Bull and the Ricestalks: The Roles of China and India

in Southeast Asia,‖ in Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun and Chin Kin Wah, (eds.), ASEAN-China

Relations: Realities and Prospects, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, p. 159.

9. It was S. Rajaretnam, the Foreign Minister of Singapore and one of the founding fathers of

ASEAN who advocated the idea that ASEAN, in order to achieve optimality in economy has to

attract outside powers to be involved in the region. For more see, New themes for Asia. South-

East Asia in transition. Singapore solution / by S. Rajaratnam, Reprinted from The Australian

outlook, Dec. 1973, East Melbourne : Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1973, p. 243-

260.

10. Zhao Hong, ―India and China: Rivals or Partners in Southeast Asia,‖ Contemporary Southeast

Asia, vol. 29, no. 1, 2007, p.122.

11. M. C. Chagla‘s Speech at Singapore during his visit to Malaysia and Singapore in may 1967.

Quoted in K. P. Saksena, Cooperation in Development: Problems and Prospects for India and

ASEAN, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1986, p.53.

12. G.V.C. Naidu, ―Looking East: India and Southeast Asia,‖ p.195. www.sinca.edu.tw/

13. ibid.

http://www.sinca.edu.tw/


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14. P.V. Narasimha Rao‘s views articulated by Sudhir Devare. See Sudhir Devare, India and

Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asina Studies,

New Delhi: Capital Publishing Company, 2006, p.126.

15. J.N. Dixit, Indian Foreign Policy and Its Neighbours, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2001,

p.340.

16. ―Chambers give thumbs up to Indo-ASEAN trade pact,‖ Business Line, 15 August, 2009.

17. The figures are quoted from ―India & ASEAN,‖ India Brand Equity Foundation, September 2009.

Available at, http://www.ibef.org/india/indiaasean.aspx.

18. Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, ―The Logic of China-ASEAN FTA: Economic Statecraft of ‗Peaceful

Ascendancy,‘‖ in Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku (eds.), China and Southeast Asia: Global

Changes and Regional Challenges, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Kaohsiung:

Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, p.26.

19. in 1993, the authoritative Chinese Central Military Commission chaired by Deng Xiaoping and

Jiang Zemin published a report titled ―Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?‖ The report

summed up the threats perceived by Chinese leadership in the coming years. It characterised India

as the ―longest potential threat,‖ US as the ―open adversary‖ and ―the number one military power

in the world,‖ Japan as ―a resurgent powerful adversary,‖ Vietnam as ―unpredictable super-killer,‖

and Russia as ―still powerful threatening force.‖ See, ―Can the Chinese Army Win the Next

War?‖, Beijing: Central Military Commission, 1993, cited in Ashok Kapur, ―China and

Proliferation: Implications for India,‖ China Report, Vol. 34, Nos. 3-4, July-December 1998, pp.

403-404.

20. For a detailed analysis on Gwadar and Hambantota, see, B. Raman, “Hambantota & Gwadar -- An Update,” South Asia Analysis Group Paper No.3248, 12 June 2009

21. K. M. Panikar, Problems of Indian Defence, London: Asia publishing House, 1960. Cited in Hu

Shisheng, ―India‘s Approach to ASEAN and its Regional Implications,‖ in Saw Swee-Hock,

Sheng Lijun and Chin Kin Wah (eds.), ASEAN-China Relations: realities and Prospects,

Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, pp.136-37.

22. Frederic Grare, ―In Search of a Role‖, In Frederic Grare and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), India and

ASEAN: The Politics of India’s Look East Policy, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2001, p. 136.

23. For details on ASEAN as a Security Community, see Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security

Community in ASEAN: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, London and New York:

Routledge, 2001.

24. Articulating K. S. Nathan‘s views Sudhir Devare say‘s ―ASEAN, unlike the European Union

(EU), can be described as a ‗process regionalism‘ as against ‗product regionalism‘, which does not

have a common security policy. Sudhir Devare, India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security

Convergence, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asina Studies, New Delhi: Capital Publishing

Company, 2006, p.45.

25. During the Cold War the membership was 6 as Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar were yet

to join the group.

26. Goh Chok Tong‘s speech at the ASEAN plus India Summit, Phnom Penh, November 2002. Cited

in Sudhir Devare, India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence, Singapore: Institute

of Southeast Asina Studies, New Delhi: Capital Publishing Company, 2006, p.50.

27. ―Hu Shisheng, ―India‘s Approach to ASEAN and its Regional Implications,‖ in Saw Swee-Hock,


Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, p.132.

28. ―Hu Shisheng, ―India‘s Approach to ASEAN and its Regional Implications,‖ in Saw Swee-Hock,


Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, p.136.

29. Zhao Gancheng, ‗India‘s Look East Policy: A Chinese Perspective,‖ in P.V. Rao (ed.), India and

ASEAN: Partners at Summit, New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd., p.223.

30. BISTEC stood for Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation. It was Changed

to Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation. In February 2004,

with the signing of the Framework Agreement for establishing FTA, Bhutan and Nepal joined the


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grouping, which is now re-named as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and

Economic Cooperation

31. The paradigms are derived from Jairam Ramesh‘s formulation of paradigmatic approach of

Government of India towards the North-East India. For details on the paradigms discussed here,

see Jairam Ramesh, ―North-East India in a New Asia‖, Seminar, No. 550, June 2005, online

version, http://www.india-seminar.com/2005/550.htm.

32. Jayram Ramash is one such advocate. He has been arguing through his writings an speeches that

NER should be allowed to integrate into the Southeast Asian economy and at the same time the

region should be politically integrated into Indian Union.

33. For detail analysis, see Samir Kumar Das, ―Looking East via the Northeast: the Ethnic

Dimension,‖ http://www.mcrg.ac.in/SD_Looking %20East%20via%20the%20Northeast.doc.

34. One of the major arguments advanced to justify India‘s Changed position regarding Myanmar.

See, Renaud Egreteau, Wooing the Generals: India’s New Burma Policy, New Delhi: Authors

Press, 2003.

35. Department of Statistics Malaysia. 5 September 2008.

http://www.statistics.gov.my/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50:populatio

n&catid=38:kaystats&Itemid=11.

http://www.india-seminar.com/2005/550.htm


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India's Look East Policy: Australia is a perfect fit in it!

Dr.Yadu Singh

Dr Yadu Singh

is a Sydney-based cardiologist and is the president of Council of Indian Australian Inc. He is a co-chair of National Council

of Indian Australians. He was the chair, Indian Consul

General’s committee on Indian students in 2009. He has keen interests in Australia-India relations. The views in the current article are his own, and do not represent views of the organisations he is associated with.


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India's Look East Policy: Australia is a perfect fit in it!

Since 1991, India has been following “Look East Policy” [LEP] in its foreign policy. It has given substantial attention to the countries which are in South East Asia and East Asia. India's emphasis has been to improve relations with Myanmar, countries of ASEAN region and East Asia. In early 1990s, India had experienced significant financial difficulties, and its leaders had to open the Indian economy. The then Prime Minister, P.V. Narsimha Rao and the then Finance Minister, who is the current Prime Minister of India, Mr Man Mohan Singh liberalised the Indian economy by doing away with the restrictions and adopting market economy. As a result of these changes, Indian GDP has been growing between 8 to 9% annually since then. Despite recent Global Financial Crisis [GFC], Indian economy did not slow down as much as other developed economies did during that period. India's Look East Policy has definitely helped enhance the trade between India and the countries in the east, particularly ASEAN countries, South Korea and Japan. India's trade with China has also grown substantially. Despite the intractable boundary dispute and many political issues between India and China, the trade between two nations has continued to grow at a fast pace.

To maintain the growth of its economy, India needs to have peace at its borders. Despite its attempts to have peace at the borders, India has not been as successful in it as it has been in the growth of its economy. The nexus between Pakistan and China has been a matter of serious concern, particularly with the open support of China to Pakistan, which unfortunately has done very little to stop terrorism against India from its territories. Even though India wishes to have friendly relations with China, China does not seem to reciprocate these wishes with practical steps. Active military & nuclear support to Pakistan, presence of Chinese armed forces in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir [POK], failure of settlement of Sino-Indian borders, claiming Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory, aggressive incursions of Chinese army men across borders and issuing of stapled Visa to residents of Jammu & Kashmir [J&K], thus refusing to accept J&K as an integral part of India, even after India accepted Tibet as a part of China, have created serious concerns about Chinese intentions in India. It is the opinion of many that China has been working actively to contain India in South Asia. To achieve this result, China has been setting up bases in the countries around India. China is perceived as a security threat by many in India. India’s former Defence minister, George Fernandez had once called China “Enemy number 1”. In this context, it is worth noting that unlike other permanent members of United Nation Security Council [UNSC], China has not been supportive of India as a permanent member of UNSC. China has generally been against India’s membership with multi-lateral groupings in Asia Pacific region. India is still not a member of Asia Pacific Economic Community [APEC] and Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO].


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China has been growing consistently over the last several decades. China's economy is now #2 in the world. While the rise of China is obviously good for Chinese people, it has also become the backbone of world economy. While Chinese economic growth is great for the global economy, it’s posturing towards the countries in the region has been disquieting. Increasingly assertive stand by China and Chinese Navy in South China Sea and East Asian Sea have created a significant concern in the region. China’s maritime claims with unilateral interpretation of the law of sea in South China Sea and East Asian Ocean have caused alarms and have not gone down well in the region. It would not be unfair to say that the rise of China is not being perceived as peaceful by anyone in the region as well as in the wide world, including USA. As a result, there have been efforts to develop strategic understanding and relations among the countries in the region. As a dominant global power, USA has been playing a significant role in the Asia Pacific and wishes to continue doing so in future too. This is the desire of the countries in the region too. India and Japan have a strategic understanding, and have a trilateral security dialogue involving USA. India has also developed significant trade and security relations with Vietnam. More recently, India has reversed its former policies for Myanmar, which prevented meaningful relation, and has instead established good relations with the government in Myanmar. Recently, head of Governments from Vietnam and Myanmar visited India. India has now become either a member or a dialogue partner with multiple multilateral organisations with the active support from the members of these organizations in Asia Pacific region. The only exceptions to this are APEC and SCO, of which India is still not a member. From the recent indications, it is likely to change soon.

With the prevailing situation in the Asia-Pacific region, where the rise of China is being perceived as anything but peaceful, largely due to very assertive posturing by Chinese government and Chinese Navy, there is a clear momentum to develop strategic relations among various players in the area. Literally, every country in the region wants the presence and active involvement of USA in the Asia-Pacific region to maintain peace and security.

With Chinese dominance in the region and its belligerent posturing, India is being increasingly seen as a counter to the Chinese position. India’s strategic understanding with Japan, Vietnam and USA should be seen in this context. India’s trade relations with ASEAN and East Asian nations should also be seen in this context to some extent. Most experts view enhanced India-USA strategic relations in this context. The trilateral strategic dialogue involving USA, India and Japan included Australia prior to 2007 but it was reversed in 2007 when Australia’s new Govt led by Kevin Rudd withdrew Australia from it. China was apparently a factor in it. It was then named Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Many democracies in the Asia-Pacific region have been doing naval exercises with India, which is seen as a rising global power, and most importantly, a power which can work as a counterbalance against China in future.


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India's Look East Policy certainly has helped the trade relations between India and the countries of the region but it has also cemented its strategic and political relations between India and various countries of the region.

The only country where there have been some hiccups has been Australia. Australia is an important country in Asia-Pacific region. It is a member of the G20 group and has a developed economy. Australia also did not suffer as much during GFC as other developed economies did. Australia's economy growth has been largely based on resources, coal, minerals and agriculture produce. While this is also true that China has been the backbone of the Australian economy, other countries including Japan, South Korea and India have also been crucial trading partners of Australia. While enjoying strong trade relations with China, Australia has shared the concerns about China's rise exactly the same way as other countries in the region have. Australia has strong strategic partnership with USA, being a member of ANZUS Treaty, which may create some complications for Australia as there is an increasing possibility of some sort of confrontation between USA and China in the future. Australia may well be required to take sides if a feared confrontation does eventuate between USA and China.

Nobody doubts about the benefits if world peace is maintained and there are no confrontations, particularly among global powers. While hoping for world peace, prosperity and free trade, every country has to prepare for the possibilities of confrontations and adverse events.

It is in this context that it becomes imperative for democracies in Asia Pacific region to develop a much better understanding about security implications in the region. Freedom for navigation in the Indo-Pacific Ocean must be maintained and no country should be allowed to interpret the law of sea unilaterally, based on historical claims, and using maritime capabilities.

Although desirable, India-Australia relations have not grown in the manner they should have or could have. India perceives, rightly or wrongly, that Australia has not given sufficient importance to its relations with India, largely due to Chinese influence. This needs to change.

It is in this context that a recent report has recommended a security dialogue involving Australia, USA and India. A combined paper from Australia's Lowy Institute, India’s Observer Research Foundation and USA’s Heritage Foundation has called for greater engagement among three nations. They have outlined the need for a trilateral dialogue and coordination across a host of economic, political, and security issues. A vital role for Australian navy and Indian navy has been foreseen to maintain maritime security as they operate within the contiguous maritime boundaries. They also recommended reversing the ban on Australian Uranium sale to India.


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Coalition parties in Australia [Liberal and National Parties] are also in favour of a closer relation with India. Recently, a segment of Australian Media [The Australian newspaper] has outlined the need to develop a closer relation between Australia and India. They recommended the reversal of Australian Labor Party’s policy of banning Uranium sale to India, which is being perceived as an obstacle in these relations.

Australia-India relations will grow with faster speed once the irritations in the relations are removed.

Uranium: The first such irritation is of course Uranium trade with India. ALP’s insistence on NPT signature by India is irrational, illogical and impractical. With Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG] exemption for India, which Australia supported, there is no justification for insisting on NPT signature. India will never sign NPT, with the existence of hostile nuclear powers in its neighbourhood. Almost everybody including Australian Opposition [Liberal and National Parties] are in favour for such trade. Many ministers in Australian federal Govt, retiring South Australian premier, Mike Rann, and Ex-speaker of Federal Govt, Mr Stephen Loosely have supported such trade. ALP left and Green party are the only exceptions. It is about time that ALP does away with this ban in its national conference in December 2011. An argument like India is getting sufficient Uranium from other countries and hence does not need Australian Uranium is not a proper excuse. India may or may not need Australian Uranium but this ban is definitely harming the relations between two nations. If it is not tackled soon, it is likely to cause a lasting damage to the bilateral relations. Indian prime minister, Man Mohan Singh’s non-attendance in recent CHOGM in Perth is been seen in this light.

Indian PM’s visit: It is often mentioned that no Indian Prime Minister, after Rajeev Gandhi in 1980s, has visited Australia. This is not conducive to healthy relations between two nations. It is as much beneficial for India to have better relations with Australia as it is for Australia to have better relations with India, as any relationship is a two way process. After all, India is an important trading partner for Australia and an increasing number of Indian companies are investing heavily in Coal and other mining businesses in Australia. It is my view, as is of others, that Indian PM should schedule a visit to Australia to give an impetuous to the bilateral relations, irrespective of Uranium issue.

Students, education & tourism: With the issue of Indian students’ troubles in recent years, a segment of Indian media ran a vicious campaign against Australia. Their reports were often irrational, exaggerated and illogical. They branded Australia a racist country. Contrary to the impression created by Indian media, which did a severe damage to the image of Australia internationally, Australia is not a racist country. It is a successful multicultural and a safe country. With more people to people contact, this false impression about Australia will be rectified. Australia


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should use its Indian Australian community to be its ambassadors in removing this false impression in India.

India wants to train 500 million students in the years to come. This is needed for the growth of Indian economy. Australia can help India in this either by providing onshore or off shore education, with the help of TAFE and Universities, which might consider setting up campuses in India, in collaboration with Indian educational institutions.

Both countries should have an active programme which should facilitate people to people contacts and bilateral exchange visits at multiple levels. It should include key opinion leaders and journalists. All efforts should be made to grow bilateral tourism between both countries, which will definitely get a boost if there are direct flights between two nations.

AIC: Australia India Council [AIC], Australia India Institute and Indian chairs in various universities in Australia are likely to do a good job in nurturing the bilateral relations and policy debate. This needs to be replicated in India too to maximise the benefits. There is a need to initiate Australia India Dialogue, involving policy makers, opinion leaders from Australia, India and Indian Australian community. Lowy Institute in Sydney had organised one such dialogue recently but such dialogues should also include key people from media and community including Indian Australian community.

Trade & FTA: With good efforts from both sides and with future Free Trade Agreement, the trade relations will grow multifold. Both nations can enhance the trade relations involving resources, mining, energy, services, education, IT services and infrastructure with a fast speed, which will obviously help both nations. India has $500 billion worth infrastructure projects in its plans. Australia is well placed to get a chunk of this pie. High level dialogues, at the relevant ministerial levels, should continue, and more such dialogues should be initiated soon in all key sectors. Trade imbalance in favour of Australia is not healthy for bilateral trade, and efforts must be made to address this imbalance.

Security: While trade grows between two nations, it is important that a security dialogue is initiated between two nations. Maritime Safety and security in Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean is crucial for the world trade. Australian and Indian Navy have an important role in securing the ocean passage, allowing freedom of navigation, as they operate in contiguous maritime zones. It is crucial for a better networking and exchanges between two naval forces. While a bilateral security dialogue is the need of the time, it would be advantageous to have USA as a party, making this a trilateral arrangement, as USA is a key strategic partner with both India and Australia, and is likely to have a key strategic role in Asia Pacific for a long time.


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The real need here is for the initiatives which will give birth to focussed maritime and security cooperation among like-minded key powers, rather than just relying on moribund Organisations like The Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation [IOR-ARC] and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium [IONS], which, although with the agenda to facilitate trade and maritime security in Indian Ocean, have not been effective so far due to inherent nature of these groupings. The time has come again for the Quadrilateral security dialogue and arrangement involving USA, Japan, India and Australia, with later inclusion of other key powers in Asia Pacific region, to be revived.

With accelerated and robust Australia-India relations in all fields, including strategic, the Asia Pacific region will be a better and safer place. After all, Australia and India share so much in so many fields. There is a potential for the best of the best relations between these two nations, but it will only happen when irritations in the bilateral relations are eliminated actively and expeditiously.

References:

1. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/11/Shared-Goals-Converging-Interests-A-Plan-for-U-S-Australia-India-Cooperation-in-the-Indo-Pacific

2. 2. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/call-for-indo-us-security-pact-with-canberra/story-fn59nm2j-1226185208073?sv=ab060d251ab5f1726e41c1f2d114df5d

3. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/2011/11/01/chogm-our-complex-relationship-with-india/

4. http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/opinion/editorial/general/us-shifts-its-focus-on-china/2340939.aspx?storypage=0

5. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/alp-needs-to-get-over-itself-on-uranium-to-india/story-fnapmixa-1226179958459?sv=e99ff30e4a4c6ad5db122b192aa0c564

6. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/empty-chair-speaks-volumes/story-fnapmixa-1226180000829

7. http://yadusingh.wordpress.com/2011/07/12/oz-uranium-to-indiamy-article-in-mining-technology-australia-journal/

8. http://yadusingh.wordpress.com/2010/08/20/australian-uranium-to-indiawhy-australia-should-sell-it-to-india/

9. http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/505628/Maritime_Partners_in_the_Indo-Pacific.pdf

10. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mapping-the-indopacific/867004/0

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/11/Shared-Goals-Converging-Interests-A-Plan-for-U-S-Australia-India-Cooperation-in-the-Indo-Pacific

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/11/Shared-Goals-Converging-Interests-A-Plan-for-U-S-Australia-India-Cooperation-in-the-Indo-Pacific

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/call-for-indo-us-security-pact-with-canberra/story-fn59nm2j-1226185208073?sv=ab060d251ab5f1726e41c1f2d114df5d



http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/2011/11/01/chogm-our-complex-relationship-with-india/

http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/2011/11/01/chogm-our-complex-relationship-with-india/

http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/opinion/editorial/general/us-shifts-its-focus-on-china/2340939.aspx?storypage=0

http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/opinion/editorial/general/us-shifts-its-focus-on-china/2340939.aspx?storypage=0

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/alp-needs-to-get-over-itself-on-uranium-to-india/story-fnapmixa-1226179958459?sv=e99ff30e4a4c6ad5db122b192aa0c564



http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/empty-chair-speaks-volumes/story-fnapmixa-1226180000829

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/empty-chair-speaks-volumes/story-fnapmixa-1226180000829

http://yadusingh.wordpress.com/2011/07/12/oz-uranium-to-indiamy-article-in-mining-technology-australia-journal/

http://yadusingh.wordpress.com/2011/07/12/oz-uranium-to-indiamy-article-in-mining-technology-australia-journal/

http://yadusingh.wordpress.com/2010/08/20/australian-uranium-to-indiawhy-australia-should-sell-it-to-india/

http://yadusingh.wordpress.com/2010/08/20/australian-uranium-to-indiawhy-australia-should-sell-it-to-india/

http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/505628/Maritime_Partners_in_the_Indo-Pacific.pdf

http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/505628/Maritime_Partners_in_the_Indo-Pacific.pdf

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mapping-the-indopacific/867004/0


207

India‟s “Look East” Policy

The Emerging Discourse

Dr. K. Yhome

Research Fellow

Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi

Dr. K. Yhome is a Research Fellow at the Observer Researcher Foundation in Delhi, India. He completed his Ph.D from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His research interests include India’s neighbourhood policy, Southeast Asia and China’s Southwest Provinces. He has published a book, Myanmar:

Can the General Resist Change? and contributed chapters and articles in edited books and journals. Of late, he has focused on political developments in Burma/Myanmar and is currently engaged in studying Myanmar’s relations with its neighbours. He can be contacted at [email protected]



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India‟s “Look East” Policy

The Emerging Discourse

Introduction

In recent years, new thinking has shaped India’s ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP) and

accordingly, inventive strategies have been employed to achieve the objectives of

the evolving policy. India’s engagements with its “extended eastern neighbours”

have existed for centuries and had evolved over time.1 The latest “wave” of India’s

eastward orientation was enunciated in the early 1990s under the policy called

‘Look East’. India’s engagement with the East through its LEP is not operating in a

vacuum. The dawn of the twenty-first century saw the rise of Asia and the economic

and strategic dynamisc of the region is likely to dominate international power play

in the course of the next several years to come.

From a policy driven largely by economic logic when it was launched, the LEP has

increasingly been shaped by strategic considerations. Recent trends suggest that the

LEP has been taking the long-term imperatives into account. Over the years, the

LEP’s strategic vision and strategy have also undergone changes.2 The “strategic

vision for the East now extends to the whole of Asia-Pacific region” and India has

demonstrated both its “willingness and capability to play a critical role in the

emerging strategic dynamics and architecture for the region.”3 The past decade has

given a direction to the policy and the current phase, which some considers the

“second phase”, has focused on accomplishing the new vision and goals.4

India as a Major Strategic Player

Debates on the changing strategic profile of India in the East have gained currency

in recent years. 5 Two important gains of the LEP are seen in the closer re-

engagement with the eastern neighbourhood and India emerging as a significant

player in the strategic dynamics of the region. India’s trade with the East Asian

countries has grown phenomenally in the past two decades. India’s trade with


209

ASEAN and China together has reached almost US$100 billion. Trade with Japan,

South Korea and Australia has also been growing fast. Investment from the East

Asian countries to India has also increased, reaching a figure of US$13.15 billion in

2009, while India’s investments in Southeast Asia has made a steady growth, which

stood at US$962.3 million in 2008-09.

As India further integrates itself with the economies of the East, there is a sense that

it will likely to push for a comprehensive economic partnership framework at the

regional level. The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) that

India has signed with Singapore and Malaysia and the Comprehensive Economic

Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with South Korea and Japan are seen as building

blocks towards achieving a regional framework. Efforts are underway to push for

such agreements with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with the hope that

India further consolidate and expand economic cooperation. India hopes to expand

the Free Trade Agreement in goods which it has concluded with ASEAN to areas of

investment and services. To enhance India’s posture as a “rising power” in the Asia-

Pacific region, Indian strategists believe that expanding and deepening of economic

engagement and further integrating with the regional economic structure is critical

for India.

India has also expanded defence and strategic cooperation with the East Asian

countries through the LEP. Defence cooperation includes supplying and upgradation

of defence equipments, defence technology exchanges, joint production of military

hardware, training of defence personnel and setting up military academies – these

initiatives that have generated interest in the Asia-Pacific region. 6

As India increases its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, its stakes in regional

stability has also increased. India’s strategic engagement can be seen in the way it

has involved itself in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence

Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). Other defence initiatives include bilateral

dialogues and consultations on regular basis have been institutionalized. Military

visits and joint exercises with the East Asian countries have increased. Defence and


210

strategic cooperation with Japan, Australia and Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, South

Korea and Indonesia have also been developed.

As a major strategic player, India not only wants to integrate with East Asia but also

desires to play a role in shaping the evolving regional multilateral economic and

security institutions. Its confidence has come from a rapidly growing economy

driven by a strong political will. There are external factors that have also

encouraged India to enhance its role in the region. Many of the Southeast Asian

countries do not want to see a situation where they are pushed to choose between

China and the US. To avoid such a situation, the presence of multiple players has

been encouraged and India is viewed as one of the key players. At another level,

several Southeast and East Asian countries see India as a strategic balancer vis-à-vis

China. In this context, New Delhi thinks there is space for it to play a larger strategic

role as this serves both regional as well as its long-term interests. India enjoys a

great deal of goodwill in many of its extended eastern neighbours and the LEP has

been taking advantage of the existence of these factors in furthering its policy

objectives.

The China factor continues to loom large in India’s LEP. 7 New Delhi has improved

its relations with China, particularly, in the political and economic realms in recent

years, however, strategic and security tensions between the two Asian giants

continue to linger on. China’s growing relations with South Asian countries is seen

by New Delhi as a strategy to “encircle” India, while Beijing sees India’s

strengthening ties with Southeast and East Asian countries as a strategy to “contain”

China. 8

Two factors seem to be driving the current thinking on India’s LEP. First, the current

policy is base on a realistic approach taking into account the regional realities where

security dynamics is fast changing. In this situation of transition, India considers it

imperative to hedge against uncertainty. One of the foremost desires of India is to

shape the evolving security environment so as to ensure a place for itself and to

secure its long-term interests in the region. Secondly, there are also domestic needs

in terms of maintaining the high economic growth and exploring new markets. India


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recognizes that to sustain the high growth rate that it has attained in the past

decade, it has to further strengthen economic ties with and find new markets in the

world’s fastest growing region, that happens to be its extended eastern neighbours.

The Strategy

Rebuilding of cooperative relations with the East is seen both as “strengthening

bilateral relations [as well as] getting integrated with the regional cooperative

organizations in Southeast Asia.” 9 India has being using all diplomatic tools at its

disposal - economic, cultural, energy and military to achieve the objectives of the

LEP. Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore have emerged

as key partners in the strategy.

In the era of globalization, India’s economic diplomacy has become an important

component of its foreign policy that aims to protect and promote its commercial

interests and exploit opportunities thrown up by a fast integrating world. 10 The

growing economic pacts such as free trade agreements with ASEAN, South Korea,

and Japan, and the ongoing talks to establish FTAs with Taiwan, New Zealand are

expected to further deepen India’s economic cooperation with the Asia-Pacific

region.

India has upped its defence diplomacy with several East Asian countries including

Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, and Australia in the recent years.

The maritime dimension of the LEP has gained importance and maritime capability

has been given priority as India plays a balancing strategic role in Southeast Asia.

Towards that end, India has focused on strengthening its capabilities – building a

blue-water capability 11 and upgrading its military bases in the Indian Ocean.

In recent years, India has been taking advantage of its rich cultural heritage to

advance its national interests. New Delhi has employed cultural diplomacy to

enhance its links with the Indian diaspora through its growing cultural centres

abroad 12 and to advance its economic interests.13 The Nalanda University project is

seen as an “instrument of soft power” of India’s LEP.14


212

India has also been involved in the oil and gas sector in several Southeast Asian

countries including Myanmar, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. In trying to further

strengthen strategic ties with the Asia-Pacific countries, India has been seeking

long-term supply of LNG. The latest energy diplomacy can be seen in New Delhi’s

efforts to win LNG producing countries of Asia Pacific to forge long-term

relationship. India has begun talks with countries such as Brunei, Indonesia,

Australia and Malaysia in order to diversify its sources of supply of LNG. 15

In the past decade or so, New Delhi has been actively participating in most of the

multilateral forums in the Asia Pacific region. It has become a member of all the

ASEAN-driven institutions including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia

Summit (EAS), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Defence Ministers

Meeting Plus (ADMM+). In fact, India has also taken the lead in establishing sub-

regional groupings such the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Scientific,

Technological and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Indian Ocean Rim

Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the Mekong-Ganga

Cooperation Initiative (MGCI). India’s strategy to integrate itself with the

multilateral regional groupings has been to minimize the domination by one country

in these regional mechanisms.

Even as New Delhi has expanded its LEP in scope and reach, ASEAN remains at the

core in India’s strategy. ASEAN is likely to remain the driver of the evolving regional

economic and security architecture in the foreseeable future and India’s active

participation in the ASEAN-driven institutions ensures it a place to play a vital role

in shaping the evolution of regional security and economic frameworks in Asia.

Southeast Asia’s geostrategic location in the Asia-Pacific also warrants a strong

strategic foothold there if it were to have any meaningful impact in the region.

India’s LEP is likely to be pursued by New Delhi irrespective of whichever

government comes to power. As the Indian Leader of Opposition, Sushma Swaraj

has observed that the LEP “has had all the characteristics of bipartisanship.” 16


213

To sum up, it has rightly been asserted that India’s emergence as an economic

power and the growing partnership with key regional actors is “positioning India to

have a dynamic impact on the emerging economic and security architecture of the

Asia-Pacific.” 17 Even as India robustly pursues its LEP, there are external factors

that could impact its strategy. Most important is the direction in which China-US

relations will evolve in the Asia-Pacific region, as this will have its own implications

on India’s relations with countries in the region and secondly, how China’s relations

with countries in the Asia-Pacific region will evolve in the coming years,

particularly, in the context of issues concerning regional strategic importance such

as the South China Sea disputes.

********

1. For a discussion on the historical evolution of India’s ‘eastward orientation’ see S.D. Muni, “India’s ‘Look East’ Policy”, ISAS Working Paper, No. 121, 1 February 2011.

2. See Prakash Nanda, Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of India’s Look East Policy (New Delhi: Kancer

Publication, 2003); Sudhir Devare, India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006); and Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi, Sage 2009).

3. S.D. Muni, “India’s ‘Look East’ Policy”, ISAS Working Paper, No. 121, 1 February 2011. 4. For a discussion in the different phases see Yashwant Sinha’s Speech at Harvard University,

Cambridge, 29 September 2003; S.D. Muni, “India’s ‘Look East’ Policy”, ISAS Working Paper, No. 121, 1 February 2011; C. Raja Mohan, “Look East Policy: Phase Two”, The Hindu, 9 September 2003 http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/09/stories/2003100901571000.htm; Anindya Batabyal, “Looking east 1: South-East Asia and ASEAN”, in David Scott, ed., Handbook of India’s International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 131-142 and Walter C. Ladwig, “Looking east 2: East Asia and Australasia/Oceania”, in David Scott, ed., Handbook of India’s International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 142-155.

5. C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Changing Strategic Profile in East and Southeast Asia”, Paper presented

at the Regional Outlook Forum 2008, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, January 8, 2008, Singapore.

6. See S.D. Muni, “India’s ‘Look East’ Policy”, ISAS Working Paper, No. 121, 1 February 2011. 7. C. Raja Mohan, “Mongolian Connection”, The Indian Express, 3 August, 2011,

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mongolian-connection/826286/

8. For Chinese perspectives in India’s LEP see for instance Li Li, “India’s Engagement with East Asia: a Chinese Perspective”, paper presented at the 24

th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Strengthening

Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific, held on 7-9 June, 2010, Kuala Lumpur at http://www.isis.org.my/files/24APRWEB/Li_Li.pdf and Li Hongmei, “India’s ‘Look East Policy’ means ‘Look to encircle China’ ?”, People’s Daily Online, October 27, 2010 at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/96417/7179404.html

http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/09/stories/2003100901571000.htm

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mongolian-connection/826286/

http://www.isis.org.my/files/24APRWEB/Li_Li.pdf

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/96417/7179404.html


214

9. S.D. Muni, “India’s ‘Look East’ Policy”, ISAS Working Paper, No. 121, 1 February 2011.

10. For a commentary on India’s “economic diplomacy” see P. S. Suryanarayana, “New economic idiom in Look East policy”, October 26, 2011, The Hindu; Also see Economic Diplomacy: Ten-point Plan for Making It More Effective, The Association of Indian Diplomats, October 2005, http://www.associationdiplomats.org/publications/ifaj/Vol1/ecodiplomacy.htm

11. “Navy to build blue-water capability with a balanced force structure, says Naval Chief”, Indian

Defence Review, Issue: Vol 25.1 Jan-Mar 2010 at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlight/Navy-to-build-blue-water-capability-with-a-balanced-force-structure-says-Naval-Chief.html

12. “Cultural diplomacy in mind, India plans 15 centres in 2 years”, The Hindu, December 8, 2009 at

http://www.thehindu.com/arts/history-and-culture/article61729.ece.

13. For a discussion on this subject see Simon Mark, “A Comparative Study of the Cultural Diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India”, Ph.D Thesis, The University of Auckland, 2008.

14. S.D. Muni, “Nalanda: A Soft Power Project”, The Hindu, August 30, 2010 at

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article604248.ece?homepage=true

15. “India seeks long term LNG deals with East Asian nations”, The Hindu, 21 September, 2011 at http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/article2473496.ece

16. “Building Bridges For Peace And Regional Cooperation - India and It’s East Asian Neighbours”, Public Lecture by Sushma Swaraj , Hon’ble Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha , India on 14 September 2011 at Institute of South Asian Studies , Singapore.

17. S.D. Muni, “India’s ‘Look East’ Policy”, ISAS Working Paper, No. 121, 1 February 2011.

http://www.associationdiplomats.org/publications/ifaj/Vol1/ecodiplomacy.htm

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlight/Navy-to-build-blue-water-capability-with-a-balanced-force-structure-says-Naval-Chief.html

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlight/Navy-to-build-blue-water-capability-with-a-balanced-force-structure-says-Naval-Chief.html

http://www.thehindu.com/arts/history-and-culture/article61729.ece

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article604248.ece?homepage=true

http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/article2473496.ece


215

SECURING SEA LANES AND INDIA’S MISSION IMPERATIVES:

WISDOM FROM MARITIME JUGGERNAUTS

Dr. S.UTHAM KUMAR * Senior Lecturer

Dept of Defence and Strategic Studies University of Madras,Chennai ,India

Field of Specialisation

US and South Asian Security

Conflict Resolution and Regional Cooperation

Awards Received RCSS Fellow

Salzburg Global Seminar Fellow.

International Visitor Fellow, U.S. Department of State, USA.

Australia-India Council Fellow

Gerald R. Ford Foundation Research Grant.

White House Historical Association Research Grant

Lubin-Winant Research Grant

John. F. Kennedy Library Foundation Research Grant

Selected Publications India in the minds of American First Ladies, Dept of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Madras,

Chennai, 2008.

Essential components of National Security: A Comprehensive perspective in Gopalji Malviya ed., Essential

components of National Security, Centre for Security Analysis publication, Chennai, 2007

Nuclear Factor in India-Australia Relations, Journal of Foreign Policy Research Centre, Journal No. 4,

January 2010.

Maritime transnational Crime in the Asia Pacific: Challenges and Response, Journal of Area Studies, Vol-1

No.2, December 2007.

Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanism for South Asia - A Primer, Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 12,

issue.3, July-September, 2005.

* I would like to thank Mathew George, a recent graduate of M.Phil. of Defence and

Strategic Studies at the University of Madras,for the assistance provided by him in the preparation of this article.. Presently, he's working in Pondicherry on a project on “Human Security"


216

SECURING SEA LANES AND INDIA’S MISSION IMPERATIVES:

WISDOM FROM MARITIME JUGGERNAUTS

India's look east policy has been largely understood to be one of economic interests. It

has prompted the government to look actively into enabling a stronger dialogue with the

ASEAN and other countries in the region to facilitate trade. This has helped in improving

ties with respect to security needs, through cooperative measures, and allowed for India

to reach higher levels of acceptance and importance in relation to defence needs and

cooperation.

However, India still faces gaping holes in its security apparatus especially in the

protection of these vital Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) that help boost this

economy and the cooperation that has been built by looking east.

Although there is ample discussion on the approach towards the securing of SLOCs,

especially on who should protect it and how, this paper would try to approach the topic

on the basis that States should be the primary actor in the protection of SLOCs. These

SLOCs can be in their sovereign territory, as well those that are of a strategic interest to

the State in an extra-territorial region should the States, present in that region, are

incapable of ensuring the safe passage of vessels through that region.

The security of SLOCs is of primary importance to a State and the gaps present in the

steps present to secure these need to be urgently filled to ensure that growth is not

impaired, but also to ensure that India's interests, both to present itself as a viable

destination of investment, and to become a regional and possibly a global power, are

guaranteed and not a distant dream.

However, as India's defence acquisitions and planning are skewed to think more about its

own land borders, it is imperative that India needs to look at other means to achieve the

security of its SLOCs.

At the outset, it would seem that the best way to do this would be through the cooperation

with other countries, especially those who are more adept at securing their maritime

interests. Two primary examples of these are Japan and Australia.

This paper would try to look at this by first trying to understand why SLOCs and its

protection require a great deal of importance. It would then try to explain the Japanese

approach to securing SLOCs and its maritime front, followed by the Australian approach

to the same. These would then be compared to the Indian situation. The paper would then

focus on the mission imperatives facing India and some of the conceptual issues with

these imperatives and finally approach recommendations or solution based on the varying

ideas of the imperatives with the influences of knowledge gained from the two

approaches.


217

However, it must be kept in mind that this article does not provide for a definitive,

comprehensive understanding of the approaches presented. It provides for a topical

understanding of the policies and numbers used. And the situation on the ground is

always more complicated that what may be represented on paper.

Why SLOCs?

While the role of India in an Asian Century is something to be made concrete, it can be

easily said that there is a long way to go from achieving most goals that India has set for

itself. If so, what then is the need here to focus on Sea Lanes of Communication

(SLOCs)?

SLOCs are important because they are, in most cases, the major source of economic

growth.1 In Australia, freight by sea in 2006-07 was 99.9% .

2 This dependence on SLOCs

is so important for these two countries that it is easy to say that SLOCs are in most cases

the lifelines of these economies. The same is the case for India.

SLOCs having this primacy in global trade, it can be hypothesized that should the

security of SLOCs be taken lightly, the emergence of an Asian Century, from the view of

Asian States becoming global powers, itself may be doubted. The rise of Asia is

attributed to the rapid economic growth of the region which depends and is sustained

through the regular use of shipping lanes to carry out trade.

The majority of India‘s trade is through the sea. This fact alone shows the primacy of the

need to ensure the security of the SLOCs so that the Indian growth story remains one of

growth.

To compound the importance of the SLOCs, it must be remembered that India imports

70%. 3 of its oil requirement through the sea. This is a staggering amount. Any disruption

in the flow of oil is a major concern to any of the emerging economies in Asia, as is very

well the case of India. The repercussions in the disruption of oil and energy are immense

and could effectively bring the entire economy to a halt. It is also possible to state that if

SLOCs are affected, India‘s dream run can be affected.

This is one aspect of why SLOCs are important. The other aspect is that the protection of

SLOCs requires a comprehensive approach towards maritime security, and hence

improving the overall maritime security apparatus. Also, the improvement of the

maritime security of a country requires an improvement in the internal security and

stability of the country, and so, maritime security itself requires the improvement of the

entire security apparatus of the country.

The internal security of a country needs to be strong to ensure that the instability and the

lack of a strong security apparatus does not give the power to rouge groups to terrorize

and hold to ransom the seas surrounding a country. Also, should the situation be like this,

it reflects in investments that a State is able to get and hence affecting the economic


218

growth of the State. This then compounds the issue of not being able to support its

security apparatus adequately, leading to a deterioration of the security situation further.

For all these purposes, securing the SLOCs can be seen to be of primary concern to States

and hence was understood to be the best starting place to see how India should approach

the challenges it faces in ensuring its growth story and securing its vital interests on sea

and becoming a global power.

Japanese Approach

The Japanese approach to security and the security of the Japanese nation is very

different from that of India. Being an island nation, the Japanese have always understood

the importance of the sea and adopt a security policy that envisions threats to the State

emanating from the sea.

Due to this, the Japanese have planned the entire defence of the country with emphasis on

the sea and from the point of securing the seas around the mainland to prevent the

mainland‘s invasion. This view has allowed the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force

(JMSDF) to be the primary body in charge of Japanese Defence.

This immense dependence on the maritime force is also reflected in the number of vessels

and personnel that Japan employs. The JMSDF has roughly 45,800 personnel who man

around 110 ships, including 16 submarines, and around 314 aircraft.

This relatively large force has the task of securing Japan‘s huge 4.4 million square

kilometres Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This also includes all activity, and living

and non-living resources in this region.

It is only natural then that, Japan has recognized the need to protect its SLOCs. However,

Japan faced a constitutional problem of protecting its interests away from its immediate

region.

Faced with this concern, Japan however, did not sit on the sidelines and wait for other

countries to do their part. Japan was able to change their laws to allow for the JMSDF to

function outside their immediate waters, and allowed the JMSDF to function in the

Indian Ocean.

Japan now plays an important role to ensure the security of SLOCs near Somalia.

However, this sudden realization wasn‘t the recognition of the importance of the SLOCs

alone. It was also the realization that inactivity would not allow for the world community

to see Japan as a serious player in global affairs.

The largest blow for Japan came in 1991 after the Gulf War. Japan, with its legal

obligations and limitations could not send a force to assist the Kuwaiti troops in fighting


219

the invasion of Iraqi forces. Instead, it sent monetary aid to the tune of 13 billion dollars.4

After the war, when the Kuwaiti authorities released an advertisement thanking all the

nations that had taken part in the War, there was no mention of Japan.5

This had sent a

ripple through the Japanese establishment, who then sought to reanalyze the methods

used to assist other countries, and Japanese involvement in crises overseas.

Japan, however, does not envision conducting these operations on its own. It values

partnerships with other sovereign nations.6 The new National Defence Program

Guidelines (2011) focuses on multilayered security cooperation with the international

community, and while stating this, the guidelines, ergo the Japanese administration does

not mince their words, it‘s an explicit statement. Furthermore, it is highlighted how the

Japanese establishment looks to function in this manner, given the opportunity with

regards to SLOCs as well.

Australian Approach

Australia too is an island nation. Hence, Australia too has rightly recognized and

understood the importance of the seas. The entire defence of the country has been

planned with the possibility of threats emanating primarily from the sea.

Added to this understanding of the possibility of the invasion of the mainland from the

sea, is the knowledge of the resources available and the responsibility of protecting the

roughly 8.1 million square kilometres of Australia‘s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

This is third largest EEZ in the world.

It is only understandable then that, just as in the case of the Japanese, the Australians too

have designed the majority of their defence structure from the point of view of the seas.

And in charge of the seas, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) employs roughly 14,215

personnel, who operate in 53 ships including 6 submarines.

However, the number of personnel is considerably smaller compared to Japan. The

question would then be is the sense of responsibility only seen on paper? And, why isn‘t

Australia expanding its Navy to those numbers seen in Japan or even more, considering

its EEZ is almost twice that of Japan?

These questions are put to rest when one sees the methods adopted by Australia to secure

the seas around them.

Australia is aware that it cannot use all of its resources in building the RAN. This would

be disastrous when it came to sustainable development of the country. At the same time,

it recognizes the need to have a strong plan to counter threats from the sea. Also, it is

aware of the small population of Australia in comparison to the territory of Australia.

This ratio is again skewed when considering the larger EEZ that Australia is entitled to.


220

Considering these factors, Australia had to develop a method for the effective use of its

resources in the protection of its sovereignty from all threats, as well as the protection of

its interests in its EEZ from exploitation of actors whose intensions were inimical to its

own. Australia as a result, developed the mechanism in which it uses all resources

available to the specially crafted Border Protection Command (BPC) to ensure that its

borders are protected.

However, it is the only body entrusted with aspects of the sea. There are other bodies

with their own specific jurisdiction of functioning. But it is important to know that the

BPC plays an important part in surveillance and other aspects of security that augments

the functioning of the other Departments. The duties are clearly enunciated in the

following paragraphs:

―(The) BPC in concert with other government agencies and stakeholders protects

Australia‘s national interests by generating awareness of activity in Australia‘s maritime

domain, and responding to mitigate or eliminate the risks posed by security threats.

(The) BPC is an Australian Government multi-agency command staffed by officers of the

Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs and Border Protection), the

Department of Defence (Defence), the Australian Fisheries Management Authority

(AFMA) and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS).

(The) BPC directly controls the assigned ADF, Customs and Border Protection and

contracted maritime aerial surveillance aircraft and maritime surface response vessels

used for maritime security threat management. BPC is the primary government law

enforcement organisation in Australia‘s maritime domain

(The) BPC contributes to the management (through prevention, preparedness, response

and recovery) of all security threats within Australia‘s maritime domain‖7This description

of the functioning of the BPC shows the interconnectedness and planned use of limited

resources to expand the limited capabilities of each Department in charge of a certain

function on the sea. It shows how Australia with its smaller number of personnel is still

able to ensure that its waters are safe for trade, but at the same time, the mainland and its

interests are not compromised in any manner.

The enormity of trade depending on the sea also allows for Australia to see the

importance of SLOCs, and the need to ensure the protection of their trade routes, spills

over in to the protection of the entire maritime sphere of functioning; leading to the

various Departments being set up and the comprehensive and interconnected approach to

security of Australian waters.

It should be remembered however that Australia cannot function on its own to protect the

surrounding waters from illegal activity. The regions near the Northern Territory bring

Australia into contact with numerous Southeast Asian countries that have their own

reservations about foreign forces in their waters. Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia


221

assert that the sovereignty over their waters is ensured by not entertaining the presence of

foreign navies in their waters at any cost.

Interestingly other Pacific island nations do not have the resources to sustain or create

navies of their own. Australia works in ways to ensure that these small nations also come

under the surveillance of Australia, and at the same time, they work to create cooperative

mechanisms with neighbouring states to ensure the security of trade routes. This allows

for the free flow of trade which helps the Australian economy to grow.

Such mechanisms allow Australia to set up specially created quarantine zones to check

illegal migration and entry of foreign species to the mainland. Thereby, allowing for a

close understanding of movement of ships in its region while also checking the

possibility of attacks on its SLOCs or any other untoward activity.

It may be summarized that Australia went through unprecedented changes in outlook to

establish further relationships with neighboring states to build their forces or take care of

their defense setup. Like all governments, Australia too does not believe in the static

nature of relationships. It significantly changed its outlook on relations with Japan to help

in enhancing its capabilities of gathering information on the larger Asian region.8

Australia looks at cooperative means to ensure the security of its maritime regions of

interests, both in its own federal structure as well as in the international sphere as well.

However, when we talk of Japan and Australia, we should not forget that the security

apparatus of both these countries depend heavily on the United States of America (USA).

Both countries are allies of the USA and come under the security umbrella provided by

the USA. Australian interest is seen many a times as an extension of USA interest in

Asia, and the military alliance treaty of ANZUS is usually seen as the representation of

this belief.

Japan on the other hand has been under the security of the USA after WWII, and much of

its military acquisitions have been limited through constitution. However, being a close

ally of the USA, the USA takes care of any threat that the Japanese may face, and this is

cemented through the military alliance between Japan and USA.

Nonetheless, plagued by internal and external differences and large budgetary factors, the

USA is actively looking for both the countries to take up larger regional responsibility.

This can also be seen in the subtlety of the manner in which Japanese acquisitions of

weapons and weapon systems take place due to definitional differences of what is

considered attack and defence systems.9

This brings us to look at the Indian approach to its maritime security.

Indian Approach

India is not an island nation, and it has historically been bothered only about the


222

invasions over land, primarily through the North-western region. Invasion through the sea

however, took place only once, during the colonization of India. This kind of

representation of a ‗pan-Indian‘ history as largely land related may allow one to have a

justification of the lack of influence of maritime affairs over strategic affairs of India.

However, there is ample evidence to suggest a rich and vibrant maritime history to India.

Nonetheless, India‘s understanding of the importance of the seas is quite ambivalent with

the priority in defence expenditure going to the Army.10

As far as India is concerned, the security of the maritime environment primarily rests

with the Indian Navy. This task is carried out by personnel of around 55,000 equipped

with 171 ships including 16 submarines and 241 aircraft. This large force is the primary

body in charge of the security of the 2.3 million square kilometres EEZ.

This might seem to be a big number in relation to Japan and Australia. However, in

relation to India‘s aspirations of a regional and global power, the capabilities of this

number seem to be problematic. Or rather, even with such a number, is India ready to

project its force, should it be required, or does it have the capabilities to be an authority to

adorn the mantle of a global power?

India cannot however take its security gaps lightly. Unlike the cases of Australia or

Japan, India is not covered by a security partner to take care of its security. India has

itself to depend on to take care of the security of its maritime interests whether these

interest are either in our immediate waters, or in extra-territorial waters.

It‘s easy to say that India takes in Navy for granted. While, recognizing the importance of

trade, and the volume of trade that is conducted through the sea, only 15% of the defence

budget is spent on the Navy.11

And more often than not, inadequacies in the maritime

security apparatus are overlooked and blame games used so that every ministry and

department dealing with maritime affairs try to give themselves a clean chit.

In the light of the above, it is essential to compare the different ways in which the

countries tackle the problem of maritime security.

Almost in summation to the approaches it can be said that Japan looks at securing its

SLOCs and maritime front by itself in the seas surrounding it. It extends this unilateral

approach to the IOR region to safeguard its interests when cooperation does not exist. A

reflection of this is the interest of Japan to open an overseas base in 2011 in Djibouti, ―to

provide an airfield for maritime patrol aircraft and a permanent port facility for

warships.‖12

The acquisition of bigger and more technologically advanced systems is also

a reflection of this.13,14

Due to the primary role that the JMSDF plays for Japan, the active

expansion and upgrading of technology of the JMSDF has primacy in defence matters.

On the other hand, Australia looks at securing SLOCs by itself, however, looks at the

active engagement of other partners for the same purpose. It looks for cooperative


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methods to work with nations in the IOR region and its immediate maritime borders in

the Southeast Asian region. It too looks for the upgradation of its technology, but this is a

concern as always due to the requirements on the exchequer.15

This is an obvious concern

for all governments and their defence expenditures. However, this is also overcome

through the planning of the resources as mentioned earlier.

India too looks to secure its SLOCs and maritime environment, but it is caught between

doing this on its own and with the assistance of others. While India actively looks for

participation, it also is wary of what its roles should be, what its partners‘ roles should be

and how active these partners should be allowed to function in the IOR region.

Also, while India does feel that the Navy is important, it also feels that it isn‘t as

important as the other forces. Even though one may cite the short history of the State in

this regard, one cannot forget that the State‘s prosperity and capability to upgrade the

other forces rests heavily in the security of the seas and the trade that takes place on it.

India also has plans for technological and equipment upgrades, however, these are not

always followed up by time bound practices to induct the best and the latest. This

lacklustre planning is also reflected in the number of ministries and departments that are

put in charge of securing the maritime environment. While this may mean the maximum

coverage of the largest range of subjects under maritime security, it also results in

duplication of tasks and resources as there is no central coordinating agency. This is the

case with security of the maritime front in the case of SLOCs as well.

This comes down to the question of mission imperatives. In this regard, it is necessary for

India to decide what India wants to do. Does it want to become a true regional and global

power? If so, what does India mean by a regional or global power? Or does India want to

secure her maritime interests including security in the IOR front. However India wants to

look at her mission imperatives, India will not deny that the security of the State and of

her interests is of primary importance.

India has never shied away from her aspirations of becoming a global leader, and has

always expressed this desire at all platforms available. Nonetheless, the definition of a

global power is still to be defined or clearly understood. But it is safe to say that

currently, the definition seems to be one of a responsible economic powerhouse that leads

the global economic scene.

However, it must be remembered that such economic prosperity cannot be guaranteed by

the waves of economic growth. Military power and capability to secure this is extremely

important. India should be capable of securing its economic interests. Military security is

important because, as Barry Buzan puts is, ―state and its society can be, in their own

terms, secure in the political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions, and yet

all of these accomplishments can be undone by military failure.‖16

This brings to the possibilities of future action for India. Following the Japanese


224

enthusiasm, India would have to develop and improve its naval technology and

capabilities to ensure a three dimensional security of the seas around India and follow this

up with bases around the IOR region to ensure security of the IOR region on the whole to

ensure that the protection of SLOCs can be ensured through its own capability or through

the closest available resources. Added to this, following the Australian BPC model,

improve the coordination between the agencies, and possibly create an overarching

authority to deal with maritime security.

Also, India could follow up on its current interest in cooperating with other countries to

ensure maritime security and make it a viable option for countries to cooperate with India

in this regard. In other words, countries should be enticed to be made willing to assist in

securing the area.

All these steps would allow for India to behave like a regional power and in the future,

act like a global power. And should India wish to be regarded as a strong, hard power, or

a soft power with a strong hand in ensuring security of the region the capability to project

power is a must for India to add these tags to her name.

Furthermore, cooperation allows for new avenues where the mission of securing India‘s

maritime interests is covered in terms of agreements, ties, management of resources,

enhanced trade etc. And at the same time, should cooperation fail, India retains the ability

to take command of the situation in its favour; while ensuring that current deficiencies

like the lack of the equipment to monitor our seas and deter any attempts at opportunism,

the presence of some equipment but lack of will to assert ourselves and the lack of a

security partner can all be mitigated.

This would mean that, India would need to strengthen its Navy not just in the field of

modernizing equipment but also in the approach to problems and challenges. This in

effect requires us to look at what India‘s strategic culture, and needs to influence and

change this strategic culture which as of now is grossly sea-blind.

However, what this entails is the need to increase the spending in maritime areas,

becoming assertive on the seas, and developing the capabilities to ensure security above,

on and below the seas.

Increase in the spending in the maritime areas means that India spends more of the

defence budget on the Navy, it would also allow for the setting up of structures to bridge

the gaps in the defence structure. Also, it would assist in the induction of new equipment

without delays while also creating the possibilities to make incentives for the merchant

fleets to cooperate with defence structures and protocol to ensure safety of those on board

and the State as such.

Technology acquisition would incorporate not only the several weapon systems, but also

technology for surveillance as well as the capability of a three dimensional sphere of


225

security. And, it would also enable India to create the technology that is required in a

time bound manner should the technology currently not exist or is not available for India.

An assertive nature and approach to India‘s maritime security and its trading lines would

allow for greater trust in the region on India‘s capabilities and an assurance to global

trade of the safety of the IOR region both on the seas and the ports. This assertive nature

can be augmented through the creation of the security initiatives like the CSI, should

India find problems with the current initiatives in place. Such improved roles, and a

record of implementation of strict rules would in the future allow for different initiatives

to merged reducing duplication of resources. This may be an option should the resolution

of such differences be difficult currently.

Also, assertiveness requires that India assist all cargo ships that request for

assistance/help at any time, even if this may seem uneconomical currently. This assertive

nature may be easily reflected when, coupled with tracking and surveillance technology,

ships are stopped when they deviate from standard operating behaviour.

Threats that affect India‘s maritime interests and its SLOCs are adapting always to the

situation. India or any other country cannot wait for threats to escalate to acquire

mechanisms to counter them. Proactive measures with long term planning should be a

core part to how resources are spent. And it is strategically unsound to not do something

in the fear of escalating a situation. It is for these reasons that India should develop its

capabilities to ensure security above, on and below the surface of the seas.

This acquisition of new weapon systems, if handled right, would not send out wrong

signals of an arms race that India wants to initiate. On the contrary, India‘s military

acquisitions do not send out threatening signals to the larger IOR region who wish that

India takes on a more proactive role in the security of the region.

Lastly, one should remember that one of the functions of war games is to help in the

achievement of interoperability and help practice for a scenario tactically. In the same

manner India should also prepare for scenarios instead of creating solutions after they

happen. In other words, proactive functioning in the area of maritime security must begin

at the strategic level itself.

------------------1. Guoxing, J. (2000, February). Center Occasional Paper- SLOC Security in Asia Pacific. Retrieved

September 10, 2011, from Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies:

http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Ocasional%20Papers/OPSloc.htm

2. Australian Government. (2009). Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements (GAMSA).

Canberra: Australian Border Protection Command. p. 5

3. India's Energy Data, Statistics, and Analysis- Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal. (2010, August).

Retrieved August 24, 2011, from http://205.254.135.24/emeu/cabs/India/Full.html


226

4. Kuwait returns favour, donates oil to Japan. (2011, April 28). Retrieved August 29, 2011, from

The Asahi Shimbun: http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/analysis/AJ201104284330

5. Ibid.

6. Ministry of Defence, Government of Japan. (2011). Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 3 Multilayered Security Cooperation with the International Community. Retrieved

August 28, 2011, from Defense of Japan 2011 (Provisional Translation):

www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2011/11_Part3_Chapter3.pdf p.1

7. Australian Government (2009). Op. Cit. p. 19

8. Walton, D. (2006). Australia-Japan and the region, 1952-1965: The beginnings of security policy

networks. In B. Williams, & A. Newman (Eds.), Japan, Australia and Asia-Pacific Security (pp.

9-29). New York: Routledge. p. 9

9. An example of this is Japanese plans to buy or build a new helicopter carrier. Although critics

argue that carriers go against Article 9 of the Constitution, definitional differences allow for it to

be included as helicopter carriers are classified as ‗amphibious assault ship‘ that primarily function

for logistics and transport rather than attack.

10. Behera, L. K. (2011, March 7). India's Defence Budget 2011-2012. Retrieved September 1, 2011,

from Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses:

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasDefenceBudget2011-12_lkbehera_070311/

11. Ibid.

12. Piracy and maritime Security in East Asia. (2011, February 10). Retrieved August 30, 2011, from

East Asia Forum: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/10/piracy-and-maritime-security-in-east-

asia-2/

13. Japan Launches Helicopter Carrier. (2009, March 18). Retrieved August 30, 2011, from

Spacewar.com: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Japan_launches_helicopter_carrier_999.html

14. Japan to Build New Helicopter Carrier. (2011, September 15). Retrieved September 16, 2011,

from Defense-aerospace.com: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-

view/release/128706/japan-to-build-new-helicopter-carrier.html

15. Rudd defiant amid Defence spending criticism. (2009, May 3). Retrieved August 31, 2011, from

ABC News: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-05-02/rudd-defiant-amid-defence-spending-

criticism/1670440?section=justin

16. Sheehan, M. (2010). Military Security. In A. Collins, Contemporary Security Studies (pp. 169-

184). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.170

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/analysis/AJ201104284330

http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2011/11_Part3_Chapter3.pdf

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasDefenceBudget2011-12_lkbehera_070311/

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/10/piracy-and-maritime-security-in-east-asia-2/

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/10/piracy-and-maritime-security-in-east-asia-2/

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Japan_launches_helicopter_carrier_999.html

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/128706/japan-to-build-new-helicopter-carrier.html

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/128706/japan-to-build-new-helicopter-carrier.html

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-05-02/rudd-defiant-amid-defence-spending-criticism/1670440?section=justin

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-05-02/rudd-defiant-amid-defence-spending-criticism/1670440?section=justin


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i K. Raja Reedy. India and ASEAN: Foreign Policy Dimensions for the 21st Century. New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2005. xii.

ii Ibid

FPRC Journal - WordPress.com · 2011-11-15 · FPRC Journal No. 8 India ‘s Look East Policy 2 RESPONSES A.P. Venkateswaran,Former Foreign Secretary of India C.V. Ranganathan,Former

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