Forrest, W. G._motivation in Herodotos. the Case of the Ionian Revolt_Int. Hist. Rev., 1, 3_1979_311-322

Motivation in Herodotos: The Case of the Ionian RevoltAuthor(s): W. G. ForrestSource: The International History Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Jul., 1979), pp. 311-322Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40105017 .

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Motivation in Herodotos: The Case of the Ionian Revolt

W.G. FORREST

It is not uncommon to find Herodotos' ideas of historical explanation described as naive. He was, it is said, too fond of falling back on the divine as a moving force and, where he stayed at a human level, too fond of

emphasizing personal whim at the expense of those economic, social, political, or other motives which modern historians have grown to love.1

The role he ascribed to God will not be discussed here, though it is worth noting briefly that he was somewhat less guilty than he might at first

sight appear. Kroisos suffered, presumably, because God was angry with him for thinking himself the happiest of men (1:34), but Kroisos' own reasons for attacking the Persians were human enough, the desire to stop Kyros before he became too powerful, to annex Kappadokia, to avenge his brother-in-law, Astyages (1:46, 73). True, he was encouraged by the

Delphic Oracle, but there was ample evidence, more than half a ton of it, that Kroisos was encouraged by the Delphic Oracle (1:50-1). In a religious society, a religious motive can be a human motive, and only once, in his account of the break between Amasis of Egypt and Polykrates (111:40-3), did Herodotos allow the divine implausibly to extrude what we unbeliev- ers would call normal human motives. With that one exception, Herodo- tean men are men.

What about his gods? At vm: 13, 'God was doing everything he could to

bring the size of the Persian fleet down to the size of the Greek.' But the

adjustment was not brought about by an old man with a trident: it was made by a wind, a familiar enough natural phenomenon in that part of the world to have earned a local name, the 'Hellespontian' (vn: 188). This was no miracle; this was luck.' Only once did he come near to giving his

1 An even more incoherent version of this argument was given to the Cambridge Philological Society in February 1 977. 1 hope that it has benefited from the discussion; I know that I have, as I have too from talk with P.S. Derow, R. Padel, G. Devereux, and

many other friends.

The International History Review, 1, 3, July 1979 cn issn 0707-5332 © The International History Review



W.G. Forrest

approval to a story of direct intervention by a god, when, at vin: 129, he recorded a Potidaian tale that Poseidon had swamped some impious Persians, though even there we note that 'the Potidaians appear to me ev Xeyeiv' ('to be telling a good story') which is not quite the same as dp#<3£ keyeiv ('to be telling the truth'). Even in the famous case of the appearance of Pan to the runner Philippides before Marathon (vi:iO5), one senses behind the words 'as Philippides himself reported' potential approval for Leake's characterization of Philippides as 'the lying Athenian pezo- drome.'2 Thus, for Herodotos, God provided a metaphysical framework, an umbrella under which men operated in the ways that men do, in

principle much as they operate under the umbrella of a Christian god for a Christian historian or of 'necessity' for some others. For me, Herodotos' to theion (the divine) is not much more objectionable than a Christian God or inevitability.

The main question, however, is that of personal explanation. Here there are some preliminary points. Firstly, Herodotos was not equipped with the language of sophisticated analysis in many areas where modern historians take its existence for granted. Men can think psychological thoughts without benefit of psychological theory, and they can think economic thoughts without the science of economics. But they are less

likely to make a fuss about them. Given eunomia brought by Lykourgos, given rich land and a substantial population, Herodotos argued, the

Spartans in the sixth century shot up and flourished and were no longer content to stay at peace (1:66), which provides as nice a mixture of political, social, economic, and psychological explanation as one could wish. In about 540, the Chians refused to sell the Oinoussai islands to the Phokaians, 'fearing that they might become a new emporion (1:165), an economic explanation if ever there was one. But it is easy to overlook these things in Herodotos' throwaway and casual presentation.

Secondly, in part because of this shortage of technical jargon, in part because of Herodotos' sense of a duty to record what was said even if he did not believe it, but mainly perhaps because of his desire to indulge his brilliance as a story-teller, he chose to write descriptive rather than analy- tic history, to give a full narrative of events in Greece and Persia from about 550 onwards3 rather than palm us off with a Thucydidean Pen- tekontaetia. The reader is left to judge for himself, to produce his own analysis.

Neither of these points elevates the actual importance of the individual in the making of history, but both, by default as it were, by submerging

2 W.M. Leake, Travels in the Morea (London 1830), 11, p. 330. 3 M.E. White, 'Herodotus' Starting Point,' The Phoenix 23 (1969), pp. 39-48. 1 should

emphasize more than she does the completeness of the story thereafter.

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Motivation in Herodotos

other explanations in a non-technical narrative, increase his apparent importance. There are, however, two more positive considerations.

The bulk of Herodotos' information came from oral tradition; and the bulk of such tradition tends to recall the startling, the colourful, the scandalous, and the heroic; and, most startling, colourful scandals or deeds of valour centre round individuals, not inventories. The British remember the austerity of Stafford Cripps, not the balance of payments in the postwar years; and contemporaries will remember the character of Amin, or even Entebbe, long after the role of the Asian in the life of

Uganda has been forgotten. Then, most important, Herodotos was writing of, if not in, a period

when individuals did matter more than historians now think they matter or mattered at any time. A party leader today will impose some of his

personal colour on the party and, conversely, an ancient politician could not altogether ignore the views of his hetairoi. But Dareios, Polykrates, Kypselos, and the rest meant more than Mr Trudeau or even President Carter.

For example, it is an exaggeration to say, as has been said, that in Herodotos the story of Sparta from 519 to 490 is the story of King Kleomenes. But the man does dominate, and it would be quibbling to make much of the fact that sometimes, as at v:64 and in: 148, he appears only as agent or adviser. Elsewhere the decision is his and his alone. But, given the powers and privileges of Spartan kings, military, religious, social, judicial, and constitutional, which Herodotos sketches at vi:56ff., a

strong Spartan king would be a leader in decision-making. One cannot

ignore a commander-in-£hief, a man who may have had some special position in the Gerousia, a man who, if popular, would regularly have a

majority of the ephors on his side.4 The charge against Herodotos would

only begin to look serious if, in making up his mind, Kleomenes was

regularly said to have acted out of personal whim rather than from reason, if he agreed with his daughter Gorgo because he liked her face, not because he approved of her sagacity. Sometimes, admittedly, he did. It was personal affection for Isagoras, or his wife, and personal pique against the Athenians that led to his two interventions (v:7o, 74). But even a sane king can sometimes be petty, and it must be remembered that Kleomenes was mad.5

In short, many a Herodotean story may seem inadequate. But before the historian condemns it, he must be sure that it is translated properly not

only into his own language but also, if it makes him happier, into his own

4 A. Andre wes, 'The Government of Classical Sparta,' in E. Badian, ed., Ancient Society and Institutions (Oxford 1966), pp. 8-10.

5 W.G. Forrest, History of Sparta (London 1968), ch. 8.

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W.G. Forrest

style. Then, if it is still not entirely to his taste, there remains the much more difficult job of questioning his own taste before that of Herodotos.

To turn to his account of the Ionian Revolt of which even a very sympathetic commentator, A.R. Burn, has somewhat ruefully remarked that 'after his manner Herodotus gives only personal griefs/6 the personal griefs, that is, of Aristagoras and Histiaios. So, almost, he did.

Among the tyrants whom the Persians installed or encouraged after their occupation of the Greek cities in Asia Minor was one Histiaios in Miletos. Histiaios served the Great King Dareios well on his ambitious and shockingly unsuccessful campaign against the Skythians in about 514 bc and was rewarded with the gift of Myrkinos in Thrace, later with the slightly less covetable position of a Dr Kissinger in Sousa, without Kis- singer's mobility. Meanwhile he had had to leave his son-in-law, Aris- tagoras, to look after his tyranny in Miletos. Aristagoras devised a scheme to annex the powerful Aegean island of Naxos for the Persians and persuaded the Persian governor at Sardis, Dareios' own brother, Ar- taphernes, to support him. The expedition against Naxos was then be- trayed by his Persian colleague, Megabates. The failure prompted Aris- tagoras to withdraw from Persian control and to raise general revolt in Ionia. Many Ionians responded by expelling or even killing their own tyrants. Aristagoras' visit to mainland Greece in search of help and the miserable fate of that help when it came can be ignored. Sufficient to note that after a while, and a debate on strategy with his political colleagues, Aristagoras withdrew to Histiaios' property in Thrace where he was, soon afterwards, killed. Meanwhile, Histiaios, feeling that it was better to rule in Miletos than serve in Sousa, had, so the story goes, sent a messenger down to the coast enjoining revolt in the hope that he would then be sent back home to control it. He shaved the head of a slave and inscribed on it the order 'Revolt'; when the hair had grown again, the slave set off for Ionia and arrived just as the pot was boiling over. Chronological difficul- ties abound: how long would it take for a slave's hair to regain a decent length; how many kilometres of the Royal Road could a slave cover per diem; how far-sighted was Histiaios? But these questions arise later. Whether or not Histiaios himself took any part in bringing about the trouble, his 'purpose' was served and he contrived to persuade Dareios that he was to be trusted with a peace-making mission.

On the way, he paused in Sardis but found Artaphernes so threatening that he soon absented himself and arrived, first of all, in Chios. By then

6 A.R. Burn, Persia and the Greeks (London 1962), p. 193. In what follows I give no references to the direct narrative of the revolt, v:28- 1 26 and vi: 1-43, or to modern works. See, most recently, P.B. Manville, 'Aristagoras and Histiaios,' Class. Quart. 27 (i977)»PP- 80-91.

3H




Aristagoras had run away, but Histiaios did not immediately resume the purple. He convinced the Chians of his virtuous past and future promise as a revolutionary leader but, a littler later, failed to convince his own Milesians. He fled north, acquired some ships from Lesbos, seized the Hellespont, and there settled down to take vessels coming from the Black Sea and hold them unless they were prepared to obey his orders. News of the fall of Miletos after the battle of Lade prompted a raid on Chios, then an expedition against Thasos, and finally a return to Lesbos, whence a foray on the mainland brought about his death at the hands of Ar- taphernes and the other Persian general Harpagos. Dareios was not well pleased with his native servants.

This then is the story, a story of two adventurers. Should there be something 'deeper' behind the revolt? Something economic, perhaps? Suggestions have not been lacking. The fall of Sybaris had damaged Milesian trade.7 Perhaps it had, but mourning for Sybaris scarcely spells an evening on friendship with Persia. The fiasco of Dareios' Skythian campaign in 514, planned to expand Ionian enterprise in the Black Sea, had produced disillusion.8 But, while Thilhellenism' can never be ruled out as a motive for any of Dareios' actions, it is not easy to see how success would have had or failure did have any marked effect on the relations that Milesian and other settlements, Istros, Olbia, Berezan, Pantikapaion, and the rest, had established with the Skythians or other native populations of the area. Certainly, at Istros, traces of destruction of the right date have been discovered near the archaic harbour, plausibly associated by the excavators with the Skythian counter-attack; but the hinterland of Istros was not Skythian and the natives of Tariverde, for example, may have suffered as much as or more than the Greeks of the coast - the Skythians were advancing through alien territory and mistakes do happen in war- time. It is wisest to conclude, with Professor Pippidi, 'che (per quanto gravi siano state le perdite sofferte da parte di uno dei belligeranti) il benessere sia stato in breve ristabilito.'9 'Things were soon back to normal.' The only clear overall pattern is a gradual decline throughout the sixth century of eastern Greek imports and a gradual, then not so gradual, increase in Attic. This is not a pattern to raise any eyebrows. In about 496 there were still enough ships, presumably grain ships, sailing out of the Black Sea, to merit Histiaios' attention.

A third source of economic decline has been found in Kambyses'

7 T. Lenschau, Pavlys RealEncyd. (Stuttgart 1914), ix, 'Iones,' i883ff. On the economic

explanation in general cf. R. Meiggs, Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972), pp. 24ff. 8 Lenschau, art. cit. ; H.T. Wade-Gery (in lectures). 9 D.M. Pippidi, / Greci net Basso Danubio (Milan 197 1), p. 50.

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W.G. Forrest

occupation of Egypt.10 But, between 525 and 499, Ionians were not at war with Persia: how would they be affected? There is no reason to think that

Egyptians or their new Persian masters would want less Greek oil or wine, fewer Greek pots or putains than they had wanted before. Indeed it seems not unlikely that the restriction of Greek trade to Naukratis earlier im-

posed by Amasis was now lifted.11 Our only evidence is Herodotos, who says, at in: 139, that crowds of Greeks followed in Kambyses' train, some for trade, some as soldiers, some as tourists. This smacks more of a Gold Rush than a Great Depression.

But the decisive point on the economic side in general is another simple statement by Herodotos, at v:28. 'Miletos at this same time had reached the peak of her prosperity and was the glory of Ionia.' It was not poverty or weakness that prompted the Ionian Revolt.

A second explanation merits and has been given more weight by many: that it was general discontent with tyranny, particularly with an externally imposed tyranny, a desire for 'freedom,' that caused the trouble.12 But it can scarcely be said that Herodotos himself has overlooked this factor. The dependence of the tyrants on Persian support and their domestic

unpopularity had been stressed by Histiaios at the Danube in 5 14 (iv: 137). Now Aristagoras gives up his tyranny in Miletos and introduces isonomia 'so that the Milesians should join with him willingly' (v:37). Willingly. The

Mytilenaians too liked the idea of isonomia well enough, or disliked their tyrant well enough, to stone him to death. The Milesians again would not take Histiaios back 'once they had had a taste of freedom' (vi:5). The Persians themselves after the final defeat of the Ionians at Lade showed that they had learnt their lesson, recognized the force of Greek feeling, and through Mardonios 'set up democracies in the cities' (vi:43). Once again, Herodotos' style blunts the impact of these remarks and, more regrettably, he assumed that everybody would know why tyrants were obnoxious, and why, or rather what, freedom was desirable. But the remarks are there and the historian is entitled to press them. But not too far. The tyrants had been tolerated for quite some time and the Ionians had even let slip an obvious opportunity for revolt in 5 14- 13 when none, it seems, rushed to join Byzantion and its neighbours in immediate reaction to Dareios' northern disgrace (v:26); in 499 only one city killed its tyrant and not all need have rallied to Aristagoras' call. Ephesos, for

10 J. Boardman, The Greeks Overseas2 (Penguin 1973), p. 103. 1 1 There is no ambiguity at Hdt. 11: 178-9 (against R.M. Cook, 'Amasis and the Greeks in

Egypt,' Journal Hell. Stud. 57 [1937], pp. 227-37). Tne restriction was imposed by Amasis, lifted some time before Herodotos' visit. This invasion is one suitable moment.

1 2 Most attractively and adventurously by J.L. Myres, 'Persia, Greece, and Israel,' Palestine Exploration Quarterly 85 (1953), pp. 8-22.

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example, for all its original geographical involvement, was not engaged in the final campaign.13 Ionia 'seething with discontent' is perhaps too colourful. All that can be said is that there was something there which Herodotos described but did not fully define, something to which our two adventurers could appeal.

We are back with our two adventurers, only to leave them again at once to point to Herodotos' one serious mistake, or rather the mistake which he did nothing to prevent the reader from making, that of seeing the revolt as a revolt against Sousa, not in large part as a squabble with Sardis. He did not invent but he did sanctify the view of the great campaigns of 480 and

479 as a clash of Greek and barbarian. Aeschylus certainly and

Phrynichos probably had laid the foundations; and perhaps it could be said that Dionysios of Miletos had done the same, if we knew anything of his Persika or of his date.14 But it was Herodotos who fixed the story for all time. He can hardly be blamed. It was, after all, a Great Event. All those who fought on one side were Greek and most of those who fought on the other were barbarian. Those Greeks, the majority, who were not among 'those who had the best thoughts for Greece/ could be recorded but were

easily forgotten in the glamour of the Great Event, which carried him

away as it carries us still. 'We stood alone,' said Winston Churchill, to which one who remembered the Commonwealth added 'Yes, the whole

500,000,000 of us.' But the myth survives.

Unfortunately, in Herodotos' mind and even more in ours, the distinc- tion crept backwards to sharpen and falsify the picture of the revolt, to make one forget the ease with which Greeks mingled with barbarians and to ignore among much else such obvious things as the total mixture of Karian and Greek in Herodotos' own Halikarnassos that a glance at its

fifth-century prosopography makes so clear.15 The sentiment is too

strong. But consider the facts. There never has been a race so skilled at infiltra-

tion as the Greeks. There has never been an empire within their reach that

they have not contrived to use to their advantage. Under Apries in Egypt they had ideas above their station. Cato read the signs in Rome but failed; and 'I, Claudius' is an adequate commentary on the results. To Constan-

tinople, of course, they had some proper claim, which they did not fail to

exploit, while making sure that Constantinople's enemies also had suitable advisers. Nor did 1453 take Constantinople entirely from them for the

1 3 Ephesos, like the other absentees from Lade, may have been recaptured by Artaphernes and Otanes with Klazomenai, but there is no sign of a Persian garrison when the Chians arrive ( vi : 16).

14 R. Drews, The Greek Accounts of Eastern History (Harvard 1973). 15 E.g. in W. Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscr. Graec.3 no. 46.

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W.G. Forrest

Phanariots could not be ignored by any Ottoman. More recently, Greek names have been significant in Alexandria, in British India, and in the

Belgian Congo. More recently still, one has even appeared in the highest if not the most reputable circles of American politics.

This is not a bad record, and it would be surprising if the same had not been true of the Persian Empire, as, of course, it was. Greek artists and artisans helped with the imperial building program. Pliny the Elder (NH 34.68) may have gone too far in seeing the well-hidden hand of Tele-

phanes of Phokaia behind the sculptures of Dareios and Xerxes, and a humbler modern view of the status of Greeks who worked at Pasargadai and Persepolis may well be correct. But they were not mere labourers or craftsmen, being, at the very least, skilled foremen.16 It is surely right to stress the overall eastern planning of the great palaces as it would be right to stress the typically collegiate features of St Catherine's, Oxford, but it took more than a Swedish bricklayer to bring a touch of Stockholm to the banks of the Cherwell. Again Greek engineers were needed to build

bridges, like Mandrokles of Samos for the Bosporos (Hdt. iv:87-g); Greek explorers like Skylax of Karyanda for the Indus (iv:44); Greek doctors like Demokedes of Kroton (111:131-8), royal physician, later the first Persian cita agent in the west, preferring, however, not to come in for the gold. Even a purveyor of ready-made cloaks was found in Syloson (m: 140). And then, at the heart of politics, was Histiaios, by no means the only Greek to see submission to the king not only as a way to greater safety for himself, his city, or both, but as offering a chance of still further advancement within the Persian system, again for self or city or both -

Artemisia, Demaratos, the Regent Pausanias, or, in a rather different world, Alkibiades, Lysander, Agesilaos.

But imperial peoples do not always welcome such interference. The Egyptians under Amasis resented the 'Haunebu who were traversing the northland'; Cumanus did not share power happily with Felix; and Nasser did not love the Alexandrian Greeks. Blue-blooded Persians were no happier at the prospect of contamination; Pharnabazos was quick to put paid to Alkibiades1 thoughts of direct access to the king; Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos did not like Lysander's special relationship with Kyros; and earlier generations had shown similar suspicions. It is hard not to see something of such rivalry behind Oroites' murder of Polykrates, muddied though the story is by the accession of Dareios (111:120-6); and behind Megabazos' intrigue against Histiaios, somewhat misguided as it turned out, it is clear (v:24). Megabates' punishment of Skylax need not show

1 6 C. Nylander, Ionians in Pasargadae (Uppsala 1 970). Cf . the excellent general summary in Board man, The Greeks Overseas, pp. 98-105.

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more than ill tempered contempt for Greek dignity. But the quarrel with

Aristagoras which it provoked brought out the real question, 'Who is the master now?,' and Aristagoras' straight answer is more than enough to

explain Megabates' betrayal of the expedition to the Naxians, an extreme reaction, perhaps, but by no means as incredible as it has seemed to many. It is yet another Herodotean 'personal whim' which on reflection is neither whimsical nor even entirely personal. Then finally there is Ar-

taphernes. That Dareios should trust a Greek to sort out trouble in a Persian province was bad enough; but that his own brother should trust a Greek to solve his problems was intolerable. He was prepared to take

quick and unauthorized action at once and, in killing Histiaios, even more

desperate action later, not in a fit of temper against a rebel, but because he, and Harpagos, were still afraid that Histiaios 'might rise again to a position of influence with Dareios' (v:2g).

It was not, of course, that things were quite so simple, for blood is sometimes not as thick as ambition. Vespasian could bring himself to talk to Narcissus;17 Megabates saw Aristagoras as a threat but Pausanias as a

possible son-in-law (v:32); Oroites' offer to Polykrates must have seemed

plausible even if entirely insincere; and as for Pharnabazos and Al- kibiades! Histiaios, too, could intrigue with Persians against Persians. The

treachery of a messenger he sent to Sardis from Chios led to the execution of many Persians with whom he had had previous discussions 'on these matters' and this was no small affair, the removal of a few insignificant dissidents. 'Sardis was in chaos' (vi:4).

But above all this confused conflict was the Great King himself, Dareios. It was he who had to choose between Greek and Persian and it is clear that he was at the very least open-minded. He it was who wrote the famous letter to his satrap chiding him for his interference with Apollo, 'ignoring my family's attitude to the god,'18 who patronized Mandrokles, Skylax, Demokedes - and Syloson, who was even a keen reader of the sports pages in the western press (in: 137). He had trusted Histiaios and, unlike Sargon in his brusque treatment of an earlier Greek trouble-maker,19 still trusted him so much that nothing that he did after leaving Sousa destroyed his faith or so blackened Histiaios' name in the family circle that it could not be used by Artabanos in 480 as an example of loyalty (no one would use

Quisling among Norwegians in similar circumstances). That is what we have to hold on to. Nothing that Histiaios did after leaving Sousa was

blatantly, demonstrably against the King of Kings.

1 7 Suetonius Vesp. 4. 1 . 18 R. Meiggs and D.M. Lewis, Greek Hist. Inscr.y no. 1 2, w. 26-8.

19 D.D. Luckenbill, Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia (Chicago 1926-7), nos. 30, 62,

194-

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The conclusion can be brief. The Ionian Revolt must be seen as a

struggle for power within the Persian Empire as well as against it. For the

leading figures, the question was who was to control Ionia for Dareios, Artaphernes or the two adventurers. Let Aristagoras get the credit for

subjecting Naxos and who could know what might happen; let Histiaios

get freely down to the coast and who could be sure that he might not keep his promise to the king. 'I don't agree/ he had said, 'that the Milesians and

my lieutenant are causing troubles that affect your interests ... if they have I shall fix it' (v: 106), and nothing that he did thereafter can have seemed

wholly inconsistent with that aim. First he had to persuade the Chians: the

story of the tattooed slave, we might guess, did very well in an audience where it was scarcely verifiable. But failure in Miletos led to a change of

plan, to less direct pressure on the Milesians through their corn supply (in what else could the captains of laden ships usefully 'obey him' but the

disposal of their cargo?). Then, after Lade, a tricky situation, no doubt a touch of panic, but still perhaps the thought of some sort of bargaining- counter in the north. Then a bit of bad luck and death, but belief to the last that everything could be explained - to Dareios. That is the story, much as Herodotos tells it, and not an absurd story. It is a story which does demand concentration on court politics, on personal intrigue, on 'personal griefs.' It would not make sense unless there was strong feeling among the Ionians against some of their tyrants, the feeling which Herodotos records; and it would be absurd to deny that the eleutheria for which many of them fought was national as well as domestic. We may argue, if we wish, about the proper balance between these elements. My only point is that, in any answer, one element, the personal ambitions of two men, must keep something like the prominence which Herodotos gives it. Herodotos was unkind to Aristagoras and Histiaios, Samians from whom he took much of his story never like Milesians;20 and we may prefer to see both as shrewd political operators, each forced to take an almighty risk and each unlucky in the end. But operators they remain. No one should follow de Sanctis in

comparing either with a Washington or a Mazzini.21 There remain hard criticisms of Herodotos' account, the missing year

(Lade 495 or 494?), the incomplete catalogue of the states involved (was the revolt pan-Ionian? were any Dorians concerned?).22 There are hard questions to be asked, why were tyrants disliked? how much patriotic

20 B.M. Mitchell, 'Herodotus and Samos,'/ottra. Hell. Stud. 95 (1975), pp. 75-91- 21 G. de Sanctis, Problemi di Storia Antica (Bari 1932), p. 63ff. 22 Above, n. 13. On the Dorians, Herodotos' silence is unfortunate either way. But,

specifically, were Halikarnassians, for example, merely assumed to be included among the Karians of v: 104? Was there a Persian campaign against the Rhodians (Fr. Gr. Hist. 532 f 1 b-c [32] and d with Komm.)?

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feeling was there: but these are real criticisms and real questions. Here, however, and in many another Herodotean story, we shall have a better chance of seeing what they are, and perhaps of answering them, if we clear our minds of the blanket belief that Herodotos was obsessed by the role of the individual, if we pause to ask precisely what Herodotos thinks he is explaining, whether he gives a good explanation of it - and whether it was worth trying to explain.

He was childish, it is said, to think that imitation of a grandfather and dislike of Ionians could be enough to prompt Kleisthenes to change the tribal structure of Athens. Childish he would indeed have been. But he is not explaining the change in tribal structure. Kleisthenes of Sikyon had

merely changed the tribal names and it is not implausible to believe either that the Athenian learnt from him that names could be used in prop- aganda or, given Peisistratos' leanings towards Ionia, that there might seem to be a case for advertising the new Athens' independence of it.23 Kleisthenes' motive for tribal reform is clearly given, to win the support of the demos which he had previously ignored by giving them a share in

everything.24 As in the case of Aristagoras' abdication in Miletos the

political explanation, regrettably, is not analyzed. But it is there; and it is

by no means unwelcome to have heard on the side that Kleisthenes

despised Ionians. Sometimes the charge will stand. No amount of rereading of 111:39-43

can detect anything but a personal explanation of Amasis' break with

Polykrates. That may well be sufficient. But the hard-headed irreverent Amasis of 11: 1 73-5 did not take the decision for the reason that Herodotos

gives. Perhaps it is true that he and not Polykrates took it, and that he took it more or less alone; but not because he feared the jealousy of the gods. Sometimes we may even find that the individual has been curiously played down. Why did Miltiades wait at Marathon until the day of his official command came round (vi: 110-14)? Surely it was that, with something approaching a majority of the generals against him, he felt personally more secure in giving orders when none could deny his right to do so than in exploiting a technical authority which some might question. But Herodotos does not say so, nor does he say who was responsible for the tactical arrangement of the army on the great day - 'this is what hap- pened.'

23 It is not disreputable to believe that Kleisthenes' family had transferred their affection for Kroisos while he was sitting on Ionians to Kroisos' successors, the Persians; that,

among other things, they opposed helping Aristagoras. Hence, perhaps, some of Herodotos' disapproval of the Revolt.

24 Reading at v:6g, after Stein, tov ... ot)/jlov irporepov dTraxTfievov totc {fieraoL oovc,) t<hv TTCtVTtoV....

321



W.G. Forrest

But this is not the place to refight Marathon or to explore Aegean politics. These last examples are cited only to warn against the temptation to go away and search for some new blanket belief. Such things may be

comforting, but they are very un-Herodotean.

New College, Oxford

322



Forrest, W. G._motivation in Herodotos. the Case of the Ionian Revolt_Int. Hist. Rev., 1, 3_1979_311-322

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