The Great Flood of 2011: Accountability and Governance Issues 1 Angthong Province Source: http://blogs.voanews.com/photos/2011/09/16/september-16-2011/ Bangkok Source: The Nation, Rangsit and Nonthaburi residents rally for help, November 16, 2011 Minburi Market Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show-new.php?id=1&pid=12012 Ramon C. Sevilla, PhD. APTU Thammasat University March 18, 2012
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The Great Flood of 2011: Accountability and Governance Issues
1
Angthong Province Source: http://blogs.voanews.com/photos/2011/09/16/september-16-2011/
Bangkok Source: The Nation, Rangsit and Nonthaburi residents rally for help,
PM calls for more early-warning systems THE NATION September 29, 2011 10:30 am
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra on Sept. 28th instructed all
governors to implement the "2Ps 2Rs" in fighting off disasters in
their provinces
Too Late!!
19
ACCUSATION:
Democrat MP Apirak Kosayodhin accused the Yingluck government that while
it set up the Flood Relief Operations Command (FROC) in October 2011, it had
done nothing else since the flooding began in August.
Source: “MPs clash over crisis response”, Bangkok Post, November 25, 2011
RESPONSE:
Natural Resources and Environment Minister Preecha Rengsomboonsuk said
Bangkok was flooded because the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
(BMA) was not prepared to handle run-off from the North as its drainage
system was for rainwater only.
Source: “MPs clash over crisis response”, Bangkok Post, November 25, 2011
After the flood, in a parliamentary session
discussing the government’s performance:
20
According to Smith Dharmasarojana, former director-general of the
Meteorological Department, and Pramote Maiklad, former director-general of
the Royal Irrigation Department:
• last year's flood crisis was not an accident but the
result of mismanagement by up to 20 state agencies
. "Do not say the flood was an accident," Mr Smith said. "It was not an
accident. Do not say that nature punished us. It is clear that what caused the
flooding were mistakes by state authorities.“
Mr Pramote:
"Thailand today does not have a system to drain floodwater or water run-off
into the sea," he warned. "We do not have a feasible plan either. What we
have done in the past was drain run-off into natural waterways and canals dug
in the reign of King Rama V.“ Source: Bangkok Post, Yingluck sets up new flood committees, February 29, 2012
Two experts say: Flood was not an accident
21
• Thirachon also alleged that some politicians
ordered RID officials not to open sluice gates in
certain provinces so that farmers could finish
harvesting their paddy. The rice fields should have
served as water catchment areas in order to protect
the industrial estates.
• Mr Theerachon insisted that BMAl worked to its
utmost capacity to open sluice gates and water pumps
to protect the capital.
Source: Bangkok Post, 'Amateurs' blamed for flood damage, January 17, 2012.
Thirachon Manomaipiboon
Bangkok Deputy Governor Photo Source: Pattaya Today, All districts in Bangkok still ‘at
risk’, November 2, 2011
BMA blames the flood on “amateurs” • BMA Deputy Governor Thirachon Manomaipiboon blamed the government for
appointing inexperienced amateurs in the FROC to manage last year's floods for
ignoring the advice of experts and causing damage far greater than there should
have been.
• Khlongs 1-13 were originally designed upon engineering principles used for over a
hundred year to drain water from the North into Bang Pakong river in Chachoengsao
province.
• But the FROC ordered Khlong Rapeepat, Khlong Rangsit Prayoonsak and Khlong Hok
Wa to be closed which prevented water from flowing into BMA’s downstream floodway,
Mr Theerachon said.
22
Thirachon’s accusations are
serious.
Why is there no move to conduct a serious
investigation?
23
1. Bangkok is located in the flood plain near the mouth of the
main river.
• Bangkok (BMA) therefore blocks the runoff from the north
2. Flat Terrain (slope gradient small)
• In Western Bangkok, Seri Suparathit of the Rangsit University Centre on
Climate Change and Disaster, explained that opening the gates at at Khlong
Mahasawat (east-west) and Thawee Watthana (north-south) at 1 metre could
worsen floods in Thon Buri unless more pumps are deployed.
Source: Opening sluice gates higher 'problematic‘, Bangkok Post, November 21, 2011
• In the Western part of Bangkok, it is difficult to push water to the sea as most
canals ran parallel to the coast, according to PM Yingluck.
• Drainage system in the West not as good as in Eastern Bangkok
Source: The Nation, “PM hopeful but governor fears a second wave”, November 1, 2011
Let us try to understand the hydrological characteristics of
Chao Phraya River flood plain. Drainage Problems: Runoff must
be drained fast, but……..
24
Source: Flood Mitigation and Management in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Power Point Presentation by Vichai Somboon and
Surat Jaroenchaisakul, Department of Drainage and Sewerage, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, no date.
“A river basin is an area of land drained by a river and its tributaries. “ Source: http://www.geography.learnontheinternet.co.uk/topics/rivertheory.html
Bangkok is part of the Chao Phraya River Basin
25
Source:
http://sammyboy.com/showthread.php?10
3116-Latest-flood-map-at-Bangkok-its-
serious.....
Chao Phraya River
Basin Flood Plain
A flood plain is an area near a
river or a stream which floods
easily. Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Floodplain
How do we know this is a flood
plain?
• by looking at the pattern of
flooded areas, Oct 18 2011
flood
• Bangkok is part of the flood
plain.
26
Source: Flood Mitigation and Management in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Power Point Presentation by Vichai Somboon and
Surat Jaroenchaisakul, Department of Drainage and Sewerage, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, no date.
27
Coverage of 2.5 to 3 meter dike along river and canal. Protection up to +2.5 MSL
Source: Flood Mitigation and Management in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Power Point Presentation by Vichai Somboon and
Surat Jaroenchaisakul, Department of Drainage and Sewerage, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, no date.
28
General Principle in draining Bangkok – low water level in canal
Source: Flood Mitigation and Management in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Power Point Presentation by Vichai Somboon and
Surat Jaroenchaisakul, Department of Drainage and Sewerage, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, no date.
29
General Principle in draining Bangkok – high water level in canal
Source: Flood Mitigation and Management in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Power Point Presentation by Vichai Somboon and
Surat Jaroenchaisakul, Department of Drainage and Sewerage, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, no date.
30
In the 2011 flood, Chao Phraya River water peaked October 15th at 2.29 metres
against the 2.5-metre flood barrier height. Source: The Nation, The worst apparently over: Agriculture Minister,
City close to losing last line of defence , October 13, 2011.
52
Final Path of
Water in the West
to the sea. Source: http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/264872/
61
The Plan to drain the floodwater: FROC’s strategy
• There are three outlets for the northern run-off. East, through Bang Pakong
River. West, through Tha Chin River, and through the Centre, via Bangkok's
canal system into the Chao Phraya.
• The east and west of Bangkok is the responsibility of the central government
(RID). The Pheu Thai-led government said they have been letting the water
through, but there was too much of it. However, the Democrat-led opposition
claimed that the government hadn't been letting the water through.
• Bangkok is the responsibility of the BMA, controlled by the Democrat Party.
• Governor Suhumbhand reports (Oct 7) that BMA “has already opened 90%
of its water sluice gate”. The city can drain 1 million cubic meters per day to
the sea but at this time it was difficult to speed up draining as the water levels
in all waterways in the city are very high. Comment: why? From rain? Source: Bangkok Post, Flood waters bear down on capital, October 8, 2011.
62
Source: Bangkok Post, More areas at risk due to lack of organization, November
6, 2011
Source: The Nation, Bangkok kept on edge, October 12, 2011
63
Source: The Nation, Can Bangkok make it?, October 14, 2011.
The huge
amount of
flood water
that needs to
be drained: 16
Billion cubic
meters and the
capacity of
floodways.
How much can
BMA canal system
add to this if utilized
properly?
16,000 m M 3
64 Source: The Nation, Experts play down risk to Bangkok, October 13, 2011.
Low Tide
High Tide
65
• On Wednesday, Oct 19, PM Yingluck asked BMA Governor Sukhumbhand to
open the flood gates of all Bangkok canals. Two days before, Monday, Oct 17,
the water level in Bangkok's canals was very low. There was also low tide in the
Chao Phraya. Boat operators at Saen Saeb canal had to cancel operations
because of low water level.
• The governor replied (Oct 19) that they had to remain closed in anticipation
of rainfall. Why? Were the BMA pumps not working? Why not pump all the water out of
the khlongs?
• The BMA's strategy was to construct flood walls to divert the northern run-
off from Bangkok.
Did BMA’s failure to open the gates as instructed cause unnecessary
damage?
• On Thursday, Oct 20, Governor Sukhumbhand appointed Dr Pramote
Maiklad as the BMA's adviser on the flood situation. Pramote advised
that all water gates should be opened and the floodwater allowed to flow
through the canals of Bangkok into the Chao Phraya and out to sea but it
should be carried out carefully and the situation closely monitored
afterward.
• by doing so, Bangkok would help provide an outlet for the huge mass
of floodwater in the north of the capital
66
• On Thursday October 20, Sukhumbhand succeeded in convincing all that
Bangkok flood gates were opened to help ease floods in the north of Bangkok. It
was hours later that they found out they were closed. Perhaps Sukhumbhand may
have given an order but the officers failed to comply?
Source: The Nation, “Reflection on floods: The mirror has two faces”, October 24, 2011
• On Friday, Oct 21, PM Yingluck invoked the provisions of the Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation Act (2007). This Act gave the prime minister full
authority over the crisis. Those who refuse to follow orders can be prosecuted for
negligence of duty.
• On Oct 21, MR Sukhumbhand said the flood gates had been open all the time,
but added they they could not be fully opened as he had to protect Bangkok from
flooding . On Oct 24, it was reported that its sluice gates were only about halfway
open because the city wants to manage the flow of floodwaters. ???? Source: The Nation, “Expect to be flooded for a month, MP tells Bangkok”, October 24, 2011
• The decision meant that that floodwater from the inundated provinces north of
the capital did not have a major outlet. The governor said his responsibility was
Bangkok, not the provinces. He continued with the strategy to divert the northern
run-off to the east and west. Source: Bangkok Post, Mismanagement political intrigue? Cruel fate?, October 30, 2011.
67
• But on Oct 26 high tides pushed up the water level in the Chao Phraya.
• The window of opportunity was closed.
Source: The Nation, Curbs on water in Thon Buri, Nonthaburi, Samut Prakan, October 30, 2011
• On Friday, Oct 28, water being released into Bangkok's canals coupled
with high tides caused the Chao Phraya to overflow its embankments.
Source: Bangkok Post, Mismanagement political intrigue? Cruel fate?, October 30, 2011.
Overflowing Chao
Phraya River due to
high tide at Sanghee
Bridge
68
Government Response to Floods:
1. Thailand does not have a long operating disaster management
organizational infrastructure. In 2002, the Department of Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) (Ministry of Interior - MOI) was
established as the principal agency for disaster management coordination
among all agencies concerned at all levels (see next page diagram*). Source: Panya Consultants (2009), Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, Final Report, Main
Report, March, pp. 5-8 to 5-11.
Comments:
• does the DDPM have any power? The organizational structure looks
extremely complicated.
• what experience has been gained since 2002 to streamline (improve the
efficiency and effectiveness) of DDPM?
• the lines of authority and chain of command are not clear. (see next page).
• where is the Emergency Operation Centre for Flood, Storm, and
Landslide? Where is the FROC?
• The issue of clear authority and chain of command as well as its legal
force is an important planning issue when designing organizational
structures!! (Someday, some of you will be helping design organizations.)
69
Procedurally, there is a tradition of
• overlapping water management authority,
• no coordination in planning and implementation
among the different water related agencies.
• “In a crisis, the result shifts from inefficiency to utter
chaos.”
Source: Bangkok Post, What Water Management?, October 21, 2011
70
71
2. PM Yingluck sworn in August 10th, 2011 as the newly elected Prime Minister.
• Toured flooded provinces beginning August 12, assigned cabinet members and
members of parliament to visit affected people, pledged support to local administration
organisations.
• The 24/7 Emergency Operation Center for Flood, Storm and Landslide was set up on
August 20 under the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Department of the Ministry of
Interior to coordinate warning and relief efforts. Interior Minister Yongyuth Wichaidit
was appointed as the head of the Emergency Operation Center. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Thailand_floods
• The RID issued a warning of disaster as storms came in September and October.
• 28 out of 33 big dams showed more than 80 percent capacity.
• RID alerted farmers and authorities in Central Region and lower North to organise an
early rice harvest to save crops.
• Hydrology and Water Management Office declared a red alert – a highest critical level 3
– on water management on September 5th, 2011 but the government did not
acknowledge the crisis at hand.
• First week of October, Bhumibol Dam opened its emergency spillway for five
consecutive days. Source: The Nation, “Lethargy over water woes will hurt govt”, October 11, 2011
72
• Early morning Thursday October 6th, run-off was approaching Ayutthaya .
Between saving the Asian Highway or the Rojana Industrial Estate, Transport
Minister Sukumpol Suwanatat took swift action to save the country's electronics
hub.
• If the Rojana industrial estate is flooded, others such as the Map Ta Phut
Industrial Estate would suffer a downstream effect because it is a key
supplier of industrial parts to the other industrial estates, according to
Science and Technology Minister Plodprasop Suraswadi.
Source: Bangkok Post, Highway sacrificed to protect industry, October 8, 2011.
• On Friday, October 7th 2011, PM Yingluck appeared on national TV to inform
the public of the flood situation and formed the National Flood Relief Centre
(FROC) led by Justice Minister Pracha Promnok. The centre, activated on
Saturday October 8th, took over Yongyuth's 24/7 Emergency Operation Centre
for Flood, Storm and Landslide.
Source: The Nation, “Lethargy over water woes will hurt govt”, October 11, 2011
73
Asia Highway
Source: The Nation, October 7, 2011.
74
3.0. The implementation of The Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007
on October 21, 2011 gave the Prime Minister the full authority over state
officials around the country, including the BMA (Article 31) . However, it
did not render the FROC any more effective because its provisions were not
fully utilized by the Prime Minister.
• Those who refuse to follow orders can be prosecuted for negligence of
duty. The prime minister becomes director of the relief operation. Source: Bangkok Post, “PM invokes natural disaster law”, October 21, 2011
• The central government via FROC by issuing a disaster warning for the
capital could have taken control (but did not) over the BMA’s sluice gates
to coordinate flood control and drain run-off into the sea in the most
timely and efficient manner.
• In past cases of disaster, provincial governors were the main enforcers
of the law. Source: The Nation, Powers and limitations of Disaster Act, October 22, 2011
75
• as mandated by the disaster law, all relevant agencies must comply with
uniformity to the FROC, such as the issue of opening sluice gates to regulate
the water flow.
Source: The Nation, PM steps up control, October 22, 2011
• The act has a more limited mandate than the emergency decree. The
disaster provisions apply mainly to civilian officials and the prime minister is
obligated to issue a separate order to involve the military in flood control.
Source: The Nation, Powers and limitations of Disaster Act, October 22, 2011
• under Section 31 of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act, any person
is prohibited from disrupting the authorities' disaster management works and
gives powers to local administrative officials to remove or destroy any
structures that obstruct disaster control operations. Did FROC use these
powers effectively to remove obstructions like slum housing along khlongs,
and arrest anyone destroying sandbags? Is there legal backing to FROC’s
powers?
Source: Source: Bangkok Post, “Gov’t makes barriers off limits, Public prohibited from interfering in relief work”, October 24, 2011
76
4. Establishment of the FROC (Flood- Relief Operation Command)
4.1. main purpose was to enable representatives of numerous government
agencies to work in an “integrative approach” to the flood problem.
• It is an ad hoc (a reaction to the flood crisis), not proactive organization. A
Task Force (temporary arrangement). The disaster caught the government
completely by surprise and “showed it lacked sufficiently constructive
forethought involved, long before any suggestion of an impending flood
scenario.”
Source: Bangkok Post, Crisis management versus political expedience, November 9, 2011
4.2. By this time floods have ravaged 28 provinces and affected the lives of more
than 2.69 million people. The death toll from the disaster has reached 252. PM
Yingluck supervised overall flood-relief operations, Justice Minister Pracha
Promnok has been named director of the Flood-Relief Operation Command and
Science and Technology Minister Poldprasop Suraswadi, the Chief of Operations.
• IS THIS THE JOB OF THE PRIME MINISTER? Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Flood-war-room-set-to-swing-into-action-30167143.html
77
4.3. Lack of suitability and lack of experience of FROC officials in disaster
management. Everybody was new to the job.
• When PM Yingluck Shinawatra informed the country in a national televised
address on Oct. 7, 2011, she admitted her government was almost at its wits'
end dealing with the disaster. Source: Bangkok Post, Flood waters bear down on capital, October 8, 2011.
• Pracha Promnok is a Police General and Minister of Justice and Party Chief
Advisor of Peau Paendin, while Plodprasop Suraswadi was former director-
general of the Department of Fisheries, former director-general of
Department of Forestry, former director of Chiang Mai Night Safari and
former director of the National Disaster Warning Center. Source: http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0802027
• Tirachai Wuthitham, secretary to Justice Minister Pracha Promnok, who heads
FROC reported that the FROC never had a systematic plan to battle the crisis
and has simply tackled problems as they have arisen on a day-to-day basis. Source: The Nation, Aide to Pracha admits lack of planning at FROC, November 20, 2011
• PM Yingluck and other officials did not heed recommendations from advisers
or was late to implement them, which aggravated the intensity of the flood
crisis. Source: Bangkok Post, “Crisis response exposes leadership failure”, November 3, 2011
78
4.4 “Panic mode” disaster management
• on Sunday October 9, PM Yingluck demanded the governors of ten
provinces under severe flooding to come up with comprehensive measures
for dealing with the situation by 6 pm Monday, October 10th.
• comment: how can they possibly do this when this is the first time a
flood of this magnitude occurred in recent years? Do these provinces
have disaster management planning capacity?
Source: The Nation, “PM demands 10 provinces to submit comprehensive flood measures by 6 pm”, October 9, 2011
• Former Pathum Thani
Governor Pheerasak
Hinmuangkao fainted under
the weight of stress a few
days after he was transferred
to the post of Interior
Ministry's inspector general.
Source: The Nation, Pathum Thani's ex-governor faints
from stress. October 26, 2011
79
• But: according to the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act, B.E. 2550
(2007), Section 56: all Provincial Governors and BMA Governor "shall
finish the formulating of the Disaster and Mitigation Plan in accordance to
this Act within two years after this Act is enforced" (i.e., by 2009).
• Comment: Did these plans exist? From the way the crisis has
unfolded it seemed: there were no plans, there were no provisions for
coordination (especially with BMA).
Source: Bangkok Post, “ Canals Built to take Localised Floods”, October 30, 2011.
80
4.5 FROC internal organization was chaotic
4.5.1 Politics over expert knowledge: flip-flopping between optimistic and
pessimistic forecasts on scope of Bangkok flooding and lack of advanced
information about areas at imminent risk of flooding.
Source: Takeshi Fujitani (2011),” Experts, officials disagree on scope of Bangkok flooding”. November 2,
4.5.2 Lack of clear information: “Since the start of the flood crisis in July,
the authorities: FROC, City Hall and bureaucrats did not give the public a
clear picture of what was going on, the possible courses of action, which
ones they would choose to implement and why.”
• it created a widespread sense of anxiety, confusion and uncertainty
Source: Bangkok Post Opinion, Lost in Flood, Information, November 15, 2011.
• there was no warning from the government or local authorities that
floodwater in Bang Bua Thong district would rise to more than 1 metre,
leaving no time for many residents to prepare for the flooding. Source: Bangkok Post, Govt slammed for lack of boats, relief , Furious residents claim response was too slow, October 21, 2011
81
• examples of conflicting information: When the Nava Nakorn Industrial
Estate was flooded on Monday, October 17th, FROC spokesman Wim
Rungwattanajinda told people to evacuate in seven hours, but Pol Gen Pracha
said that moving belongings to high ground should suffice. This left the
public confused.
• Bangkok residents were relieved to hear that the capital was declared safe,
with massive floodwaters moving past on Sunday, October 16th. On Monday,
they were told Bangkok was actually still at risk.
Source: Bangkok Post, Govt wrestles with telling truth or lies about floods, October 19, 2011
• a senior official spoke of "secret" plans relating to the handling of flood
that cannot be revealed. As a result, people lose faith in the pronouncements
of politicians, regardless of their political affiliation.
Source: Bangkok Post Editorial, Bangkok Not Waterproof, October 22, 2011
• BMA Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra backtracked from his vow that the
capital could escape massive flooding, saying he never promised the capital
would not be inundated.
Source: The Nation, “Evacuation centres ready: city officials”, October 10, 2011
82
• When Ban Prao floodgate in Pathum Thani's Sam Kok district was not going
to be finished on time, Minister Plodprasob, FROC’s chief of flood relief
operations announcement on TV on Thursday evening October 13th, that people
in those northern Bangkok districts should start moving their belongings as
flood water as high as one metre could be heading towards these districts caused
widespread panic. Justice Minister Pracha Promnok, FROC Director had to
come out to allay fears, telling the media that no evacuation order had been
issued, or even suggested.
• PM Yingluck defended Plodprasob's "good intention", but FROC stated
that public announcements concerning the flooding were to come from
Pracha alone.
• BMA Governor Sukhumbhand then told Bangkokians to listen to flood
updates concerning the capital from him only. Source: The Nation, Conflicting updates cause flood of confusion, October 15, 2011.
• in the place of unified command, you end up with a contest of power which
creates more uncertainty.
Asked by reporters whether the people should listen to the FROC or the BMA,
the Minister Plodprasop said, "I am 176cm tall, but the governor's not as tall as
me. "I am taller so people have to listen to me. What do you expect my response
to be?" Source: Bangkok Post, “All districts in Bangkok still 'at risk'”, November 2, 2011
83
• Bangkok businesses say unclear and inadequate flood information is
making it harder for them to make preparations. Both the FROC and the
BMA have failed to provide clear forecasts about how much water could
arrive in the capital and when, said Chai Srivikorn, president of
Ratchaprasong Square Trade Association.
Source:Bangkok Post, “City firms decry information gap”, October 28, 2011
84 Source: The Nation, Conflicting flood info frustrates private sector, October 28, 2011
Source: The Nation, October 16, 2011
Did Big Business know
something that the rest
of the public didn’t
know? Note the
height of sandbag wall
around office buildings
at Silom Road!!!!
Source: The Nation, October 20, 2011
85
• “infantalizing” the public by keeping them in the dark because the
government fears that telling the truth might cause panic.
• An ABAC poll showed that the FROC had failed in credibility. On a scale of
0 to 10, FROC scored only 3.6, reflecting growing public impatience with the
government's approach to the crisis.
• Sources at the flood relief operation centre at Don Mueang airport said that
concerned ministers and authorities were at loggerheads about how to deal with
the floods.
• Some wanted to tell the truth to the public, while others thought playing it
close to the chest was the best policy. The conflict between Science and
Technology Minister Plodprasop Suraswadi and Justice Minister Pracha
Promnok is a case in point. Mr Plodprasop's recent flood alert was retracted by
Pol Gen Pracha, head of the flood relief centre, who thought that telling the
truth would hurt the government's image. Source: Bangkok Post (2011), “Govt wrestles with telling truth or lies about floods”, October 19.
86
4.5.3 Lack of systematic opeational procedures caused more chaos and
frustration.
Protesting residents at Don Muang claimed they were told by their local MP,
Karun Hosakul, that the government's Flood Relief Operations Command
(Froc) had consented to their demand to make a hole in the big bag flood
barrier and release some of the water occupying their homes – but FROC
denied it gave permission.
People gather at the big bag barrier in Don
Mueang on Nov 13, 2011
Source: Bangkok Post, Messy handling of big bag floodwall protest,
November 14, 2011
87
4.6. Failure of FROC to secure cooperation of BMA
4.6.1 BMA was uncooperative from the very beginning. BMA officials started to
join the team at FROC only in the second week. Source: Bangkok Post, “Drainage system not up to task”, October 30, 2011
• Before issuing the disaster warning for Bangkok (Disaster Mitigation Act of
2007), Yingluck chaired a high level meeting to assess the situation, particularly the
runoff heading toward the capital. BMA Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra was
absent. Source: The Nation, PM steps up control, October 22, 2011
• In the early part, Bangkok Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra insisted that his
administration was capable of managing the situation in the capital and told the
Pheu Thai-led government to focus its attention elsewhere. Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Flood-war-room-set-to-swing-into-action-30167143.html
4.6.2 BMA’s reluctance to open water gates in the eastern part of the city to drain
floodwater out to the sea, caused the flood crisis in the Central Plains to ease only
slowly.
Source: Bangkok Post, “Yingluck says city ill prepared for floods”, October 12, 2011
88
• Asked if the refusal to open the inner canals (BMA) would affect the water
level in Khlong Rangsit, MR Sukhumbhand said Khlong Rangsit was not his
responsibility but the government's. !!!!!
Source: Bangkok Post, “Latest plan to save Bangkok Published”, October 20, 2011
• Acknowledgement by FROC Chief of Operations, Plodprasop that FROC and
BMA were not cooperating well enough in terms of watergate management so
that drainage from flooded upstream provinces can be speeded up into the Gulf
of Thailand.
Source: Bangkok Post, “Scared City Folk Prepare for the Worst in Bangkok”, October 9, 2011
4.6.3 BMA contradicting FROC. Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra,,said he
did not believe information from the government-run Flood Relief Operations
Command (FROC) indicating that the flow of water from the North was
slowing.
Source: The Nation, “PM hopeful but governor fears a second wave”, November 1, 2011
89
4.6.4 Lack of unified command. Yingluck seemed not to want to exercise
control or have a direct confrontation with BMA over water management.
In response to Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's move to use the Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation Act 2007 and order for the BMA to open watergates so
that flood water can be let through to the sea, Sukhumbhand said the government
had not notified the BMA to open watergates 100 per cent but had let the agency
exercise its own judgement.
Source: The Nation, “Bangkok water gates not fully opened: Governor”, October 23, 2011.
4.6.5 Continued bureaucratic approach in doing things. For example to secure
more pumps from RID, BMA sent a letter to the wrong ministry therefore taking a
long time to arrive plus causing interagency misunderstandings. Source: Bangkok Post, “Dispute over pumps for Thon Buri”, November 4, 2011
• Chart Thai Pattana advisory chairman and former prime minister Banharn Silapa-
archa in a press conference advised BMA governor to phone the RID chief directly
if the BMA urgently wanted more water pumps.
Source: Bangkok Post, Sukhumbhan advised to phone RID, November 5, 2011.
90
The conflict between the central government and the Bangkok
authority heightened yesterday when the governor and the chief of
the irrigation department engaged in a war of words during a
meeting on flood control.
Source: The Nation, Irrigation dept chief slams governor over accusation, November 5, 2011.
4.7 Failure to understand hydraulic properties of entire system of canals.
• City Hall’s reluctance to open water gates in the eastern part of the city to
drain floodwater out to the sea caused the flood crisis in the Central Plains to
ease only slowly. BMA Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra, explained that
he decided not to fully open the water gates for fear that it would cause
severe flooding in Samut Prakan province, not just to safeguard the capital.
Comment:
• was he overly cautious because of poor operational procedures and
coordination with non-BMA agencies? Source: Bangkok Post, “Yingluck says city ill prepared for floods”, October 12, 2011
• In fact: canals in Samut Prakan have been ready to receive flood water
drainage from Bangkok for almost three weeks but little volume of water
was discharged from Bangkok's watergates. Samut Prakan, the last area
before flood water flows to the sea, has 9 pump stations and could drain
about 40 million cubic metres per day of water into the Gulf of Thailand.
Source: The Nation, “Samut Prakan ready to take Bangkok overflow : experts”, October 22, 2011
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• Pramote Maiklad, a former director general of the RID, said the BMA might
be confused about how water flows and urged the Bangkok administration to
work closely with RID, which knows which gates should be opened or closed. (comment: BMA may not understand hydraulics of entire Chao Phraya basin since it takes care only
of BMA drainage.)
Source: The Nation, “Irrigation dept defends closure of sluice gates”, October 27, 2011
5.0 FROC capitulates to BMA? Flood Relief Operations Command announced
on October 23 that all parties in the government sector agreed that floodwater
from Bangkok's northern outskirts had to be drained through canals in the eastern
districts of the capital and Samut Prakan province into the sea. Source: Source: Bangkok Post, “Gov’t makes barriers off limits, Public prohibited from interfering in relief work”, October 24, 2011
• was this due to BMA’s reluctance to share the flood burden?
• “If Bangkok is crippled, the economy will be crippled. If the economy is
crippled, who will suffer most? Certainly not big businesses, but the
ordinary people, the workers, the people who send their money home to the
provinces.” BMA Governor Sukhumbhand rejected criticism that flooding
north of the city was made worse because city officials waited too long to
open Bangkok’s canal system. Bangkok and its vicinity account for about
half of Thailand’s industrial output, according to government statistics. Source: Daniel Ten Kate and Suttinee Yuvejwattana, ‘Mob Rule’ Threatens Bangkok’s Business Areas With Floods, Governor Says, Nov
Oct 8, 2011 http://www.mysinchew.com/node/64817?tid=10
Where is EQUITY?
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The floods have:
“underlined Thailand's urban-rural divide which has underpinned a broader
national polarisation and conflict since Thaksin's departure. Downstream
provinces were awash in order to divert waters away from central Bangkok. The
Thai capital was kept mostly dry at the expense of its surrounding areas. If
Bangkok shares some of the flooding, economic damage will mount but a sense of
equality and justice will prevail. When the floods go through the capital, they will
find faster release into the Gulf of Thailand.” Source: Thitinan Pongsudhirak(2011), The politics behind Thailand's floods. The Guardian, October 21, 2011