MARTINEZ VS CA
G.R. No. 170409
FACTS: Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr.
who during his lifetime inherited the properties from his mother,
Rosa Martinez Emitao, who in turn inherited them from her own
mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged that
sometime in 1992, petitioner, Gregoria Merquines, represented
herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the descendants of
Celedoniaand under that name applied for free patents over the
properties with the CENRO. Unbeknownst to private respondents, the
corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name of Gregoria
Martinez. When private respondents later filed an application for
land registration over the same properties, petitioner opposed the
same. This impelled private respondents to file the instant
complaint.The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free
patents and land titles should be annulled due to fraud and
misrepresentation in their procurement. The trial court rendered a
decision ordering the cancellation of petitioners titles. Before
the Court of Appeals, She argued the titles secured were already
indefeasible in view of the lapse of one year from the issuance of
the titles.Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles
issued to petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument
is untenable since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of the free patents and the titles.ISSUE:
Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible
and incontrovertible following the lapse of one year from their
issuanceRULING:No, the titles of the petitioner are not considered
indefeasible and incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one
year from their issuance since the certificate of title in this
case has been issued on the basis of free patent procured through
fraud manifested in the facts that Gregoria Merquines has
misrepresented herself as Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one
of the descendants of Celedonia.Under the recent jurisprudence, a
certificate of title issued on the basis of free patent procured
through fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled since
such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility. Furthermore, the
principle of title is unavailing where fraud attended the issuance
of the free patents and titles. The petition is denied.
CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA132 SCRA 718FACTS:Petitioner, Juliana
Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano De Vera, were first cousins,
"both orphans, who lived together under one roof in the care of a
common aunt. In year 1951, Mariano De Vera died. His widow
administered his property until her death in 1966. De Veras nephew
(Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator of De Veras estate.
Prior to the widows death, she made an inventory showing that De
Veras property (located in Calasiao, Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq.
m (more or less). Estrada however noticed that the Torrens title
under De Vera indicated that his property measures 8752 sq. m. He
learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being occupied by
Juliana. Estrada sued to evict Juliana.
Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept
of an owner of the land since 1921; that theyve been paying taxes;
that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only
took them to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set
in.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor
of De Veras estate
RULING:
No. The inclusion of Julianas land in De Veras title was
erroneously done. It was shown that Juliana, an unlettered woman,
agreed to have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the purposes of
Mariano obtaining a loan during de Veras lifetime; that when de
Vera registered his portion of land adjoined to that of Juliana,
the latters land was erroneously included.
The error is highlighted by the fact that de Veras widow, in her
inventory before she died, attested that de Veras portion of land
is only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The discrepancy approximates the
portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By that, the
only portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Veras estate is
that which was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A
recalculation must however be made to specify the exact measure of
land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by Juliana
(portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m. should go to
de Veras estate.In the case at bar, the principle of
indefeasibility applies only in the claimed portion or property
wherein it can be adjudged not on the illegally included area.
IGLESIA VS CFI OF NE208 PHIL 441FACTS: This petition seeks to
reverse the decision of the respondent court in the case of
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Register
of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and the National Treasurer of the
Philippines. The respondent court upheld the primacy of the
respondent banks title and ordered the cancellation of the
petitioners title. Petitioner raised the sole issue of: which of
the two titles is superior, an earlier title secured
administratively or a latter title secured thru judicial
proceedings?.
The property in question is covered by T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in
the name of the plaintiff, and T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the name of
defendant Iglesia ni Kristo; that said property was acquired by the
plaintiff in a foreclosure sale from Emilio Libunao in whose name
the same was previously registered by virtue of a homestead patent;
that defendant acquired the said property from Victoria Maravilla
who was the registered owner of a parcel of land including the land
in question under O.C.T. by virtue of a decree/decision, of the CFI
of Nueva Ecija . The lower court declared the title of Iglesia ni
Kristo as null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the respondent Court denied it. Failing to
obtain a reversal of the decision, the petitioner filed this
petition for review oncertiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that title
acquired earlier by homestead is superior to that secured in a
subsequent land registration proceedings.
Ruling: The petitioner contends that the land covered by the
conflicting titles had been possessed by Victoria Maravilla and her
predecessor Mariano Padilla even several years before the
Revolution of 1896 and that is why it was adjudicated as private
land and ordered registered in her name in Land Registration Case
No. 3244, LRC. With this as factual background, the petitioner
attacks the validity of the homestead patent and title issued to
the respondent banks predecessor, Emilio Libunao.
In case of Lahora vs Dayang-hirang: "The rule in this
jurisdiction, regarding public patents and the character of the
certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that
where land is granted by the government to a private individual,
the corresponding patent therefor, is recorded and the certificate
of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is
automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration
Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the
safeguards provided in Section 38 of said Act. In other words, upon
the expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of
title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding." Applying the case of
Pajomayo, Et. Al. v. Manipon, Et Al., (39 SCRA 676) Supreme Court
held that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the
Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496,
the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the
force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration
Act. Supreme Court should add that the Director of Patents, being a
public officer, has in his favor the presumption of regularity in
issuing the questioned homestead patent.
HEIRS OF SPS, LIM VS. RTC JUDGE G.R. No. 173891FACTS:Amparo
E.Caosa(respondentCaosa) filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court ofQuezonCityseeking the reconstitution of the original
Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) No. 169395 of the Register of
Deeds of the same city. The trial court hadex partepresentation of
evidence before the branch clerk of court.Convinced that the
jurisdictional requirements were complied with and finding merit in
the petition, the trial court ordered the reconstitution of the
original and owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395.Petitioners
filed a verified petition for the annulment of the trial courts
decision. According to petitioners, their
parents,spousesLucianoP.LimandSaludNakpilBautista, are the
registered owners of a parcel of land. They acquired it from
Domingo L. Santos. The lot contained an area of 795 square meters
more or less and wascoveredbyTCT No. 27997.Furthermore, they
alleged that their parents had been in actual physical possession
of the property. A fired razed QuezonCity Hall, the records
destroyed was the original copy of TCT No. 27997 and thus, one of
the petitioners applied for and was issued a reconstituted title,
TCT No. RT-97223, in September 1994.Petitioners claimed that when
respondentCaosafiled a petition forthereconstitutionofTCT No.
169395. They insisted that the petition for reconstitutiondid not
comply with the requirements found in Sections 12 and 13 of
Republic Act (R.A.)No. 26 as it failed to state specifically the
boundaries of the property subject of the petition as well asthe
names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property.
Petitioners considered these circumstances as extrinsic fraud.
Caosaallegedthat there was no fraudand that the jurisdictional
requirements of notice and publication had been complied with.The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners sought
reconsideration of the resolution, but their motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have personality and right
to be notified of the reconstitution proceedings nor do they have
any right to file the petition for annulment of judgment.
Ruling:
Petitioners are not real parties-in-interest because the
reconstitution of the original and duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395
will have no effect on their property, the latter being different
from, and not even a part ofthe property covered by the
reconstituted title.One having no right or interest of his own to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party
plaintiff in an action, thus petitioners petition for annulment of
judgment was rightfully dismissed.Petitioners impute error to the
Court of Appeals when it dismissed theirpetitionafterit concluded,
on the basis of its simple comparison ofpetitioners and
respondentsTCTs, that the properties covered by the two titles are
entirely different.Petitionersarguethatthe Court of Appeals should
have conducted a trial and received evidence; and having failed to
do so, its conclusion was allegedly not only flawed but was also
arrived at with grave abuse of discretion and without due
process.Supreme Court does not agree.The Court of Appeals did not
dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment outright.In fact, it
required respondentCaosato file her answer, and even allowed the
filingofanamendedanswerproofthat itwas predisposed to considerthe
arguments of both parties before it even decided to finally dismiss
the petition.Mere filing of a petition for annulment of judgment
does not guarantee the holding of trial or reception of evidence. A
petition forannulmentofjudgmentmay in fact be dismissed outright if
it has no primafaciemerit.With more reason that the Court of
Appealsmay dismiss a petition even without ahearing if it finds
thatbased on the averments in the petition and the responsive
pleading, the annulment of the assailed judgment is not
warranted.
TAPUROC VS LOQUELLANOG.R. No. 152007FACTS:On September 19, 1996,
petitioners filed a complaint against respondents, the complaint
alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc and all the
successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe are the
co-owners, co-heirs of the original owners of a parcel of land with
an area of 5,795 square meters situated in Booy, Tagbilaran, Bohol;
that in 1992, when petitioners decided to partition the subject
property, they discovered from the Office of the City Assessor that
the title covering the land was already in the name of a certain
Evans Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of the
latter by their predecessors-in-interest in 1967; that said Deed of
Sale is a forged document because the alleged vendors therein, did
not sign the conveying deed; and that one of the alleged vendors,
Antonia Ebe, had already passed away in 1960, ong before the
purported Deed of Sale was said to have been executed in 1967.
Hence, Petitioners, pray for the nullification of the same Deed of
Sale, the cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto and the
restoration of the previous title in their names, plus
damages.Respondents assert that they had been in open, continuous,
and peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of
said sale, and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due
thereon. On June 7, 1999, the trial court finding that the evidence
adduced by the petitioners insufficient to establish their claim
that the questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. A motion for
reconsideration was filed with the CA, which affirmed the decision
of the trial court, ruling that petitioners are barred from filing
their petition due to laches.ISSUE: Whether or not the recourse of
the petitioners is valid.RULING: No. The recourse must fail. As it
is, the petitioners call for a review of the facts of the case.
Their action calls for the determination of the truth or falsehood
of an alleged fact, a matter not for this Court to resolve. It
appears that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document, having
been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap. Being a
notarial instrument, the deed in question is a public document and
as such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution. More
so, as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery
is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
it. Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden.A
Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question on the
validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not,
can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. The title represented by the certificate cannot be
changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a
collateral proceeding. The action for the declaration of nullity of
deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran
City is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a
Torrens certificate of title. Petition was denied.
NATALIA REALTY VS VALDEZ173 SCRA 534FACTS: Petitioner, Natalia
Realty, filed separate ejectment cases against respondents with the
RTC of Rizal for allegedly unlawfully occupying parcels of lands
which were covered by the petitioners transfer certificates. The
respondents file a consolidated answer moving to dismiss said case
based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.Then the trial court
rendered a summary judgment upon finding that there is no valid
issue raised by the respondents, but only conclusions that they
have been in actual possession of the subject lands for more than
30 years. They were then ordered to vacate the lots and to pay
monthly rents. So the respondents filed an appeal with the
Intermediate Appellate Court. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents
have a valid claim over the disputed land?RULING: The Supreme Court
approved the ruling of the lower court that the certificate of
title issued to the petitioners in accordance with the Land
Registration Act is indefeasible after the expiration of one year
from the entry of the decree of registration. After the lapse of
one year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and
is binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or not
they were notified of or participated in the registration
proceedings. The said titles were issued to the petitioners more
than 30 years ago. Furthermore, the SC averred that, under the law,
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree 20 expressly
provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to
collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in
a direct proceeding in accordance with law.Appellants' claim of
acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126
of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered
under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws.
Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered
land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by adverse possession.Consequently, proof of possession by
the defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential. There is
nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may be said to
justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the ownership of
said lands to them and their successors by title. Apparently,
appellants were misled or induced to believe that they acquired the
parcels of land in question when the whole country was declared by
the previous regime as a land reform area.
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION VS CA201 SCRA 165FACTS:On August
27, 1974, Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (Widora) filed an
application for registration of title of a parcel of land. It
alleged that the parcel of land has an area of 156 hectares, more
or less; and that the applicant acquired said property from the
heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro on December 12, 1954. Dolores Molina
filed an opposition, claiming ownership over 12 to 14 hectares and
praying for a decree of registration over said portions of Lot 8.
Same with Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) filed a
motion to dismiss the case alleging, among others, that respondent
court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being applied for
having been already registered under the Torrens System and in the
name of Ortigas under TCT 77652 and TCT 77653. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas, holding, among
others, that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their face show that they
were derived from OCT 337, 19, 336, 334, pursuant to Decree 1425;
Ortigas then filed a motion for reconsideration praying the
respondent court to reconsider its order of March 30, 1988 on the
ground that it had no jurisdiction over the application for
registration, the parcels of land subject thereof being already
covered by Torrens Certificates of Title. Not satisfied, respondent
Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment of the
March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders of the trial court. It also
prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the land
registration case,the trial court then rendered the decision in
favor to Ortigas.ISSUE: Do a Torrens Certificate of Title be
subjected to a collateral attack?RULING:Ortigas alleges that Decree
1425 embraces the lots covered by its TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653
which are identical to the lots applied for by petitioner. On the
other hand, petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 covers a
17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila while the lot applied
for is alienable and disposable as certified by the Bureau of Lands
and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area of 156 hectares
located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana,
Manila. Hence, the necessity of a trial on the merits to ascertain
the disputed facts. Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration
issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the basis for
the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the
corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds
the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240 [1962]).
Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering
the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate of title
issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor
bind the land and is null and void.
ESLANISLAO VS. HONRADA114 SCRA 748FACTS;This is a petition for
review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals granting ex-parte the cancellation of
title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro
Asedillo.In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses
Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No.
N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original
Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register
of Deeds covering a parcel of land with an area of 51,852 square
meters.By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No.
44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
91137 was issued on September 18, 1961.On October 19, 1965, Ching
Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. His
legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of
the estate of deceased Ching Leng. Alfredo Ching was appointed then
asthe administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and
letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966. Thirteen years
after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on
December 27, 1978 by Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case
No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and
cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession.
Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay
City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441
Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's
complaint). The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro Asedillo,
declaring him to be the true and absolute owner of the property and
ordering alfredo ching to surrender the title to the Registry of
Deeds for its cancellation. The title over the property in the name
of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title
was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo who subsequently sold the
property to Villa Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979.
Upon knowing, Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He
filed a verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as
null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the
court on May 29, 1980.ISSUE: Where to file an action for the
cancellation of a title?RULING:An action to redeem, or to recover
title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or
an action against the whole world, like a land registration
proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam,
so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but
it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual
only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.Private
respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title
being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant
Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years
after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475) the decision of the
lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack
of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have
been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality.
His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal
relations, was lost through death.The complaint for cancellation of
Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land
registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land
registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in
connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P
(Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748).Section 112 of the same law
requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was
already in the other world when the summons was published he could
not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for
cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v.
Honrado, supra).The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's nameafter
one year from the date of the decreeis not to set aside the decree,
but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of
justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value.
FERRER VS. BAUTISTA231 SCRA 748FACTS:Under controversy is a
strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay,
La Union. Petitioner claims its ownership by virtue of accretion,
she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT No. T-3280, which is
immediately north of the land in question. On the other hand,
private respondents equally assert ownership over the property on
account of long occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title
No. P-168, in the name of respondent Magdalena Domondon, pursuant
to Free Patent No. 309504 issued on 24 January 1966 .On 23 March
1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III
of the then Court of First Instance of La Union to "Quiet Title to
Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano Balanag and
Magdalena Domondon. The case was denominated Civil Case No.
A-514.
Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with
the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint
forreivindicacion(Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965,
against private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also
handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint,
without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority to
cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of
Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack.
Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied.
Petitioner claimed that the respondent judge committed an error
in outright dismissing on the ground of collateral attack on Free
Patent Decree No. 309504 being an abuse of judicial discretion and
an excess of his jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not a void title can be subject to collateral
attack.
RULING: Yes. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a
free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and
which has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued
or conveyed by him would be null and void. The nullity arises, not
from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's
authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and not
those that are privately owned.
Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or
title over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at
the time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and
not a part of the disposable land of the public domain.
Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year
after it is issued pursuant to a public grant, the rule does not
apply when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare the
nullity of that void title does not prescribe; in fact, it is
susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral attack.
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS IAC
157 SCRA 380
FACTS:On December 2, 1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and
Engracia Lizards, as owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo. San
Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710 square
meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses
Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit ,herein
private respondents, as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang
Mabiling Muli." This sale with right to repurchase was recorded in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 6,1971
under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972 the sale was made absolute
by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private
respondents for the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid
upon the execution of the instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng
Bilihan Tuluyan," after being credited with the P30,000.00
consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the
balance of P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the
certificate of title is issued. From the execution of said
Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in peaceful, adverse
and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No.
T-1728 covering the property in question was issued to and in the
name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the
private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing
the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National
Grains Authority (NGA).
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the
Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea
Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property
involved in this case, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of
P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.
The Provincial Sheriff then caused the issuance of the notice of
sale of the property in question, scheduling the public auction
sale. The petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that
a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by
the Provincial Sheriff.
On July 10, 1974, NGA in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the
mortgagor sold the subject real property in favor of itself. By
virtue of the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the name
of the petitioner on July 16, 1974. A month after, the private
respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas spouses
had been issued covering the property in question and that the same
property had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private
respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the NGA the amount of
P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses
under the terms of the absolute deed of sale but the petitioner
refused to accept the payment and claimed ownership of the property
in question and has no intention of disposing of the same. The
private respondents are in possession of subject property were
asked by the NGA to vacate it but the former refused. Petitioner
filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents in the
Municipal Court of Victoria, Laguna, but the case was
dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before
the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City,
Branch III, San Pablo City, against the NGA and the spouses Vivas
and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be declared the
owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in
possession of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner
of the said property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the
ownership to them under such terms and conditions as the court may
find just, fair and equitable under the premises.
In its answer to the complaint, the National Grains Authority
maintained that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value of
the property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the title
is now indefeasible, hence, cause of action of Nena Magcamit has
already prescribed.
After due hearing, the trial courtrendered its decision in favor
of National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in
question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same and
ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to
defendant National Grains Authority.
The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision
of the trial court to the Intermediate Appellate Court which
rendered its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of
the trial court ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a
deed of reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration
and cancellation of transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision but the same was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Grains Authority is the
rightful owner of the disputed land.
RULING:Yes. In this case, it will be noted that the third party
NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has
obviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed
of absolute sale with the suspensive condition is not registered
and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo
and private respondents.
It has been invariably restated by this Court, that the real
purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop
forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su
casato," avoid the possibility of losing his land. An indirect or
collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not allowed.
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a
certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full
knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered as
guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the
defrauded owner so long as the propertyhas not passed to the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value. Unquestionably, therefore, the
NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent
mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent
purchaser for value in the public auction sale.ROXAS ET. AL VS
TAGAYTAYFACTS: On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and
Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and
Eusebio Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformityin
which she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and adjudication
made therein. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia
Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, an OCT was
issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her free patent
application.Respondents filed with the RTC for reconveyance. The
RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents. The CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the
respondents is proper.
RULING:Yes, it is proper. The essence of an action for
reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title are
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of
the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in another person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a
better right. In an action for reconveyance, the issue involved is
one of ownership; and for this purpose, evidence of title may be
introduced. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel
One, covered by OCT of which respondents' northern one half portion
formed a part, was not owned by Maxima at the time she sold the
land to petitioners. An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10
years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the
deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.Records show that while the land was registered in the
name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant complaint for
reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus
still within the ten-year prescriptive period.
DIGRAN VS AUDITOR GENERAL 64 OG 19FACTS:
On June 22, 1909, RupertaCabucos bought from, and fully paid to
the Government, Lot No. 638 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
situated in Cebu City for which a formal deed of conveyance was
executed in her favor on November 27, 1915 by the Friar Lands
Agency. On February 28, 1916 Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-3918 (T-320) was issued to her. The Banilad Friar Lands Estate
was among the friar lands acquired by the Government for resale to
actual tenants or occupants pursuant to Act 1120 of the Philippine
Commission.
Sometime in 1914 or 1915, without prior expropriation
proceedings, the government constructed Mango Avenue, a municipal
road, passing through Lot No. 638. A claim for compensation was
filed with the Municipality of Cebu but it was still unpaid when
World War II broke out.RupertaCabucos died in 1940. In 1951 her
heirs subdivided Lot No. 638 into eight lots.
On February 16, 1963 Raymunda S. Digran, a daughter of Candida
Samson, became administratrix of the estate of RupertaCabucos. On
February 18, 1963 the Deputy Auditor General, as stated, denied the
claim. This decision was the subject of two motions for
reconsideration, the later one having been denied on June 10, 1963.
On July 9 of the same year Raymunda S. Digran appealed to this
Court from said decision altho on July 1, 1963 she filed an amended
claim for compensation with the Auditor General. On August 7, 1963
the Auditor General desisted from rendering a decision on the
amended claim on July 1, 1963 for the reason that the case was
already sub judice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of RupertaCabucos are entitled
to compensation for Lot No. 638-B, the road lot.
RULING: The Government denies the obligation to give due
compensation for Lot No. 638-B mainly on the grounds that
RupertaCabucos' title over Lot No. 638 was subject to the
Government's reservations for public use, such as rights of way and
other public servitudes under Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120
and Section 39 of Act 496; and, that the right to enforce the claim
for compensation is barred by prescription and laches.
The grounds relied upon by the Government, stated above, lack
merit. Firstly, Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 sanction no
authority for the Government to take private lands covered by said
Act for public use without just compensation. Sections 19, 20 and
21 state:
SEC. 19. No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any
exclusive rights to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other
irrigation works, or to any water supply upon which such irrigation
works are or may be dependent, but all of such irrigation works and
water supplies shall remain under the exclusive control of the
Government of the Philippine Islands and be administered under the
direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for the common
benefit of those interests dependent upon them. And the Government
reserves as a part of the contract of sale in each instance the
right to levy an equitable contribution or tax for the maintenance
of such irrigation works, the assessment of which shall be based
upon the amount of benefits received, and each purchaser under this
Act, by accepting the certificate of sale or deed herein provided
to be given, shall be held to assent thereto. And it is further
provided that all lands leased or conveyed under this Act shall
remain subject to the right of way of such irrigation canals,
ditches, and reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may
hereafter see fit to construct.
SEC. 20. All persons receiving title to lands under the
provisions of this Act shall hold such lands subject to the same
public servitudes as existed upon lands owned by private persons
under the sovereignty of Spain, including those with reference to
the littoral of the sea and the banks of navigable rivers and
rivers upon which rafting may be done.
SEC. 21. The Civil Governor, when authorized by resolution of
the Commission, may by proclamation, designate any tract or tracts
of said lands as nonalienable, and reserve the same for public use,
and thereafter such tracts shall not be subject to sale, lease, or
other disposition under this Act.
Section 19 withholds from a purchaser of a friar land exclusive
right to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or
to any water supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be
dependent which were already existing at the time of purchase. It
also subjects the land so purchased to the right of way of such
canal, ditch, reservoir or irrigation works. Section 20 holds the
friar lands subject to public servitudes also imposed on other
lands owned by private persons. Section 21 gives the Civil
Governor, upon resolution of the Philippine Commission, the
authority to designate any tract or tracts of friar land as
non-alienable and reserve the same for public use. Needless to say,
the road construction through Lot No. 638-B is not the servitude
contemplated in Sections 19 and 20, above quoted. Moreover, it has
not been shown that Lot No. 638-B was declared nonalienable by the
Civil Governor prior to sale to, and purchase by, Ruperta Cabucos
so as to prevent her from acquiring ownership thereover.
Ozaeta v Palanca, 63 OG 36, p. 7675
FACTS: Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application
for a parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted
and now covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda,
Bulacan. Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of
Possession against spouses Francisco and BasilisaEsconde, as they
have been occupying the said land. Subsequently, on March of 1978
the opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge
Bautista. Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same
branch presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of
Possession against the spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a
motion to quash which was denied.Petitioner then filed complaint
for conveyanceagainstDelfin which was rebutted by the latter via
motion to dismiss on the ground that (1) the cause of action, if
any, is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint fails to state
sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance and (3) the
plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the case.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder to motion to dismiss and
motion for leave of court. The sheriff then, upon the courts order,
delivered possession to Delfin however he was barred in entering
the premises. Delfin filed a motion for an Alias writ of possession
which was granted. The sheriff turned over the possession to the
representative of Delfin, however, when the latter went to the
premises he was again barred by the petitioner. Then, Delfine asked
for demolition and he moved for a second alias writ of possession
which was again, granted. Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance
filed by the petitioner was dismissed. After which motions and
motions have been filed. The second resolve the issue, a temporary
restraining order directing the sheriff and Delfin to refrain from
enforcing and/or carrying out the third alias writ of possession.
Petitioner then filed motion to amend the resolution and TRO,
either nullifying third alias writ of possession served orto issue
a mandatory injunction which was denied by the said court.
ISSUE: Whether or not action for reconveyance is the proper
remedy.
RULING: An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable
remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the
purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land
to him. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a
landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered
under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year
from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the
property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to
re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration, but only to show that the person who secured the
registration of the questioned property is not the real owner
thereof. An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek to
set aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible
and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the
land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance
is not the proper remedy. There was no proof of irregularity in the
issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was
it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of
said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic fraud
could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions, the
Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered
owner that: "Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity
follows the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as
an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no
enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the
disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy." An action
for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be
filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an
original certificate of title.
ELISEO FAJARDO, JR., and MARISSA FAJARDO vs. FREEDOM TO BUILD,
INC.
G.R. No. 134692 August 1, 2000
Facts:
Freedom To Build, Inc., an owner-developer and seller of
low-cost housing, sold to petitioners, a house and lot in Barangka,
Marikina, Manila. The Contract to Sell and the Transfer Certificate
of Title covering the lot issued in the name of petitioners
contained a Restrictive Covenant providing prohibitions such as
easement of two meters in front, second storey expansion to be
placed above the back of the house and should not extend forward
beyond the apex of the original building, and the 2nd floor
expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the front property line
and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house. Petitioners,
despite repeated warnings from respondent, extended the roof of
their house to the property line and expanded the second floor of
their house to a point directly above the original front
wall.Respondent filed an action to demolish the unauthorized
structures. The RTC ruled against Spouses Fajardo and directed them
to immediately demolish and remove the extension of their expanded
housing unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by the
Restrictive Covenant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. The spouses filed petition for review before the
Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether the provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are
valid.Whether respondent has the personality to enforce the
provisions of the covenant.
HELD:
The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid since they
are not synonymous with easements. Restrictive covenants on the use
of land or the location or character of buildings or other
structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or
rights but it can also be contended that such covenants, being
limitations on the manner in which one may use his own property, do
not result in true easements,but a case of servitudes (burden),
sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal
negative easements, which is the most common easement created by
covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner of the
land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be
entitled to do. The provisions in a restrictive covenant
prescribing the type of the building to be erected are crafted not
solely for creating easements nor as a restriction as to the type
of construction, but may also be aimed as a check on the subsequent
uses of the building conformably with what the developer originally
might have intended the stipulations to be. Broadly speaking, a
suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive covenant can only
be made by one for whose benefit it is intended.It is not thus
normally enforceable by one who has neither right nor interest in
the land for the benefit of which the restriction has been imposed.
Thus, a developer of a subdivision can enforce restrictions, even
as against remote grantees of lots, only if he retains part of the
land.There would have been merit in the argument of petitioners -
that respondent, having relinquished ownership of the subdivision
to the homeowners, is precluded from claiming any right or interest
on the same property - had not the homeowners' association,
confirmed by its board of directors, allowed respondent to enforce
the provisions of the restrictive covenant.The decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed.
REMEDIES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATIONA. APPEALa.
Reglementary period: 15 days from receipt.i. As against the
government.
REPUBLIC VS SAYO 191 SCRA 71
FACTS: The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an
original application for registration of a tract of land. The land
was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of
Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of
Republic Act No.236. The Government including the heirs of Liberato
Bayaua opposed such registration. An order of general default was
thereafter entered against the whole world except the oppositors.
The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until a compromise
agreement was entered into by and among all the parties. Under the
compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants)
renounced their claims and ceded portions of land in favor of
Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development, Heirs of Liberato
Bayaua, and Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc. Under the
compromise agreement, 5,500 hectares was adjudicated to and
acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of
this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to
their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees.
The parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior
claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. On March
5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with
its terms. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that
decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and
rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy in
confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of
land?
HELD: The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest
Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not
supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private
respondent. It was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the
execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the
Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is
the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our
holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting
as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are
not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor
General." It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null
and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however
indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that
the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by
competent evidence their respective claims to the
property.WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained
of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109
subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which
shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein, receiving
the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as
such evidence and the law may warrant.
REPUBLIC VS CA135 SCRA 156FACTS: In 1961, the CFI of Quezon
rendered a decision, ordering the registration of 885 hectares of
public forestland in favor of the Maxinos. The decision became
final and executory so a decree of registration and an OCT were
issued. Eight (8) years after the decision was rendered, the
Republic of the Philippines filed with the same CFI an amended
petition to annul the decision, decree, and title on the ground
that they are void because the land in question was still a part of
the unclassified public forest. The Maxinos opposed the petition.
The CFI judge denied the petition and when appealed, the same was
dismissed on the ground that the order had allegedly long become
final and unappealable so the Government was estopped thru the
registration made by its agents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing
the registration order?
RULING:No. The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of
land involved in the present case is a part of a forestland, thus
non-registerable. As to the ruling of CA that the government was
estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously registered by
its own agency, the Court ruled otherwise basing on its decision in
Government of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga, (50
Phil. 975, 980), where it held that the Government should not be
estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents.
GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS 168 SCRA 503
FACTS:A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that
12 parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion
later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Gomez et al
her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On
5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the
subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision became final and
executory hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of
registration over the lots adjudicated.GLRO Chief Silverio Perez
opposed the adjudication and petitioned for its setting aside. He
discovered that the 12 parcels of land were formerly part of a
titled land which was already granted by homestead patent in 1929.
Under the law, land already granted by homestead patent can no
longer be the subject of another registration. The lower court
granted Silverios recommendation. Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and
32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) which provides that after
judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith
issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the
issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title.
That once the judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30,
the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course.
ISSUE:Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial
ruling on approving the adjudication even after it had become final
and executory.
HELD:Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of
land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become
final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the
expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. The Supreme Court has held that as long as a final
decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission
(now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from
date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated
and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering
it.
Republic vs. Estenzo158 SCRA 282FACTS:On 11 November 1961, the
Land Tenure Administration, representing the Republic, initiated
and prosecuted expropriation proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte for the acquisition of some 591.0654 hectares of
private agricultural lands situated in San Isidro, Leyte, and owned
by respondents Espeletas, Martinezes and Pachecos, for resale to
tenants, pursuant to Republic Act No. 1400.chanroblesvOn 14 June
1962, the lower court rendered a decision condemning the said land
for P411,995.78.1The Republic, having already paid the partial sum
of P206,850.00, was, accordingly, ordered to pay the balance of
P205,145.78, plus the further sum of P20,000.00 for a farmhouse,
copra drier and warehouses, or a total of P225,145.78. This was
supplemented by an amendatory order providing for payment of 6% per
annum interest starting 14 June 1962 on the unpaid balance.
Implementing orders, the last of which was dated 28 July 1962, were
thereafter successively issued.chanroblesiCame 12 April 1963 and
the balance of P143,150.00 still remained unpaid despite an order
directing payment thereof. Respondents-landowners then filed a
motion in the lower court imploring the latter to (1) annul its
amended decision of 24 August 1962 on the ground that its basis -
the compromise agreement - was secured through fraud;and (2)
resuscitate its original decision of 14 June
1962.chanroblesvanrobThe Republic went to the Supreme Court on a
petition forcertiorariand prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction.Before the Supreme Court could rule on the petition,
however, the parties entered anew into another compromise
agreement. The Republic, now represented by the Land Authority,
covenanted to satisfy on or before 31 August 1964 the balance of
P143,150.00 plus 6% per annum interest from 24 August 1962.
Respondents-landowners, for their part, agreed to renounce "any and
all further claims against the former which had been recognized and
ordered paid" by the lower court in its order of 26 April 1963 "in
the event (of) full payment of said compromise price . . . on or
before said date," The Republic failed again to pay its obligation
in full, as per agreement. Out of P143,150.00, it was able to pay,
as of 31 August 1964, P85,260.65 on the principal and P17,010.98 on
the interest, or a total of P102,271.63 only.This precipitated the
filing of respondents-landowners' motion, dated 10 November 1964,
in the lower court praying for issuance of an order directing the
Sheriff of the City of Manila to enforce the writ of execution of
28 July 1962.nroblesvirtualawThe Republic moved for reconsideration
of the lower court's order alleging, in addition to the two basic
arguments previously raised in its oposition to
respondents-landowners' motion of 10 November 1964, that the
garnishment of the funds of the Land Authority violates Sections 14
and 2110of Republic Act No. 992, otherwise known as the Revised
Budget Act, because the money garnished was appropriated by
Congress "for the operation and maintenance of the nineteen (19)
Settlement Projects and twelve (12) Agencies under the
administration of . . . (the) Authority, pursuant to the provision
of R. A. 3844, (and) to cover salaries of personnel, travelling,
supplies and materials and other administrative expenses," and are,
therefore, not funds for the payment of expropriated estates. This
was opposed by respondents-landowners who argued that Sections 14
and 21 of Republic Act No. 992 "refer to voluntary expenditure
and/or payment by the government official charged with custody of
such funds but are not applicable to forcible seizure through
garnishment pursuant to a writ of execution," as in the case at
bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrHence, this present petition
forcertiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction.ISSUE:
whether the lower court acted without or excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discreton in hearing the case.lnrobHELD: The
first plea of herein petitioner, that the Court of First Instance
of Leyte lacked jurisdiction to act in the case because of Section
154 (3) of the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), enacted on
8 August 1963, is plainly without merit. Said Section 154 (3)
provides that -Expropriation proceedings instituted by the Land
Tenure administration pending in the Court of First Instance at the
time of the effectivity of this Code shall be transferred and
continued in the respective Courts of Agrarian Relations whereby
the Republic undertook to pay the balance of the expropriation
price with interest on or before 31 August 1964. Whatever writ of
execution could be issued by the respondent judge must necessarily
be predicated on the second compromise, and conform to the terms
thereof.chanroblesvirand that it is undeniable that the petitioner
Republic had not made full payment of P143,150.00, plus legal
interest from 24 August 1962, on or before 31 August 1964. Such
default, however, only entitled respondents to demand execution on
the basis of the compromise approved by this
Court.chanroblesblesvirtualThe lower court was, therefore, already
divested of its control over the cause when the motion of 12 April
1963 was filed; it was already shorn of its jurisdiction when its
controversial order of 26 April 1963 was issued pursuant thereto,
ordering payment of the original award made in 14 June 1962. All
that the lower court could do under the circumstances was to
enforce the amended decision of 24 August 1962. Instead of a motion
for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the proper move for
respondents-landowners would have been to file a separate and
independent civil action to set aside, by annulment or rescission,
both the first compromise agreement and the amended decision
embodying the same.chanroblesvirtualawl libraryanroblesvirtualawThe
writs ofcertiorariand prohibition are granted, and the respondent
Court of First Instance of Leyte restrained from further proceeding
in its Civil Case.The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
made permanent. No costs. Let a copy of this opinion be sent to the
Honorable, the President of the Philippines, through the Secretary
of Justice.
HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS VS DE BANUVAR 25 SCRA 316
Facts: Respondent court confirmed the titles of La Urbana, Inc.
over lots in questions with reservations, and ordered the
registration of these lots in favor of the Benuvar. A petition for
reconstitution was made. At the pendency of the reconstitution
proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from Santiago
de Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for the latter.
The petitioners opposed, on a claim that they have been in actual,
adverse, open and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the
said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial, long
before the second world war. For "lack of proper notices," the
respondent court denied the petition. However, in its later order
the court reconsidered and granted the petition.The petitioners
interposed an appeal from this last order. Respondent court
dismissed the appeal "for failure to post the required bond," but
withheld action on the motion for immediate execution as to lot 1
"until after this order dismissing the appeal shall have become
final." The herein petitioners then filed a petition for
mandamuswith the Court of Appeals, to compel the trial court to
give due course to their appeal. This petition was finally
dismissed.De Banuvar filed a motion for the issuance of a decree
over lot 1.The petitioners opposed and contended that the decision
is not final and executory because La Urbana, Inc. appears to have
appealed from the said decision by virtue of a notation the counsel
received the same "Con mi excepcion making the execution of the
said decision impossible. De Banuvar asserted that the issuance of
the decree is but a ministerial duty of the respondent
court.Respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of
De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the
decision in the land registration case had already become final and
executory. Issue: Whether or not the decision is not yet final and
executory because the La Urbana, Inc. appealed therefrom, as may be
seen from the notation of the reconstituted decision stating,
"Recibi copia. Con mi excepcion.Ruling: This contention is without
merit.Supreme Court held that the decision of March 24, 1938 had
long become final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
The certification of the acting provincial land officer of Masbate,
dated March 8, 1960, recites that no "appeal has been taken by the
Director of Lands or any private oppositors from the decision
rendered." The notation found at the foot of the last page of the
reconstituted decision, showing that the La Urbana, Inc. excepted
from that decision, did not have the effect of perfecting an
appeal. An appeal was not perfected by the mere notation, "Con mi
exception." The judgment rendered in a land registration case
becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from
the date on which the party appealing receives notice of the
decision.The requirement contained in the decision of March 24,
1938 regarding the segregation of a portion of lot 1, subject of an
agreement between the Director of Lands and the applicant, while it
does leave something yet to be done, does not detract from the
finality of the decision, because the segregation adverted to
refers to a defined and delimited portion of the said parcel and
may be accomplished anytime after the decision became final and
executory.
NIETO V. QUINES6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)
FACTS: Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the
Bureau Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands
in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land
applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated as
Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were
completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the
Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan.
Relying upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of
Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral
proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein.
However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots
including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on
August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was
awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the
award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands nor any of
his representatives appeared during the bearing to inform the court
that it was under homestead application. On August 29, 1930,
pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the
original certificate of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead
patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines, and
pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan, on September
15, 1930 issued Original Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name.
Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register
Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of
Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her the cadastral
court including Lot No. 3044. Floretino sold the said land to
Arturo Nieto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral
proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from
homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?
HELD: The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail
because a cadastral proceeding is onein remand any decision
rendered therein by the cadastral court is binding against the
whole world, including the Government. As a general rule,
registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of thirty-day
period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party
of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership
without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The
prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of
right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the
Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special
provision providing for fraud."Under the foregoing pronouncement,
the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon
the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or
adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having
been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary
for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition
the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.
NIETO V. QUINES6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)
FACTS: Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the
Bureau Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands
in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land
applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated as
Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were
completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the
Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan.
Relying upon the assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of
Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral
proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein.
However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots
including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on
August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was
awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the
award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands nor any of
his representatives appeared during the bearing to inform the court
that it was under homestead application. On August 29, 1930,
pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the
original certificate of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead
patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines, and
pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan, on September
15, 1930 issued Original Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name.
Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register
Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of
Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her the cadastral
court including Lot No. 3044. Floretino sold the said land to
Arturo Nieto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral
proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from
homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?
HELD: The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail
because a cadastral proceeding is onein remand any decision
rendered therein by the cadastral court is binding against the
whole world, including the Government. As a general rule,
registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of thirty-day
period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party
of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership
without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The
prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of
right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the
Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special
provision providing for fraud."Under the foregoing pronouncement,
the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon
the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or
adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having
been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary
for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition
the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.
TALAVERA VS MANGOBA 8 SCRA 837, 1963
FACTS:On December 2, 1957, Talavera filed before the CFI of
Nueva Ecija for the recovery of sum of money against Victor Mangoba
and his cousin Nieves Safiru, allegedly representing the costs of
B-Meg Poultry Feeds, which latter received from former. Defendants
presented separate Answers, wherein they admitted some and denied
other allegations in the complaint. Both also interposed separate
counterclaims of P1,000.00 each. In the hearing scheduled on March
10, 1958, neither Mangoba et,. al nor their counsel appeared, so
that the trial court received Talaveras evidence in their absence.
On March 18, 1958, a decision was rendered in favour of
Talavera.Appellant claims that the above decision was received by
him on March 25, 1958 and the next day, wherein it was stated that
the failure to appear at the hearing was due to accident or
excusable negligence, counsel having been ill of March influenza
which was evidenced by a medical certificate. Counsel for appellant
asked the Court to hear the motion for new trial on April 2, 1958,
however, one day ahead of the date, the trial court denied said
motion. In the appeal brief, appellant contends that in denying the
motion for new trial, the courta quodeprive him of his day in
court.
RULING:Generally, courts are given the discretion to grant or
not, motions for new trial and appellate courts will not delve into
the reasons for the exercise of such discretion. In this particular
case, however, it was shown that the absence of counsel was
explained and immediately upon receipt of the decision, a motion
for new trial, accompanied by an affidavit of merit, and a medical
certificate, were presented. Said motion for new trial could well
be considered as motion to set aside judgment or one for relief,
since it contained allegations purporting to show the presence of
good defenses. The ends of justice could have been served more
appropriately had the lower court given appellant the chance to
present his evidence at least. Furthermore, it appears that
payments had been made by appellant to appellee, which were duly
received and receipt for. This particular circumstance merits
consideration. After all, court litigations are primarily for the
search of truth, and in this present case, to find out the correct
liability of defendant-appellant to appellee. A trial, by which
both parties are given the chance to adduce proofs, is the best way
to find out such truth. A denial of this chance, would be too
technical. The dispensation of justice and the vindication of
legitimate grievances, should not be barred by technicalities
(Ronquillo v. Marasigan, L-11621, May 21, 1962; Santiago, et al. v.
Joaquin, L-15237, May 31, 1963). Had not the trial court resolved
the motion for new trial, one day before the date set for its
hearing, the defendant-appellant could have presented the documents
(receipts of payments), itemized in his brief, to counteract
appellant's claim. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from is hereby set aside, and another entered, remanding
the case to the court of origin, for the reception of appellant's
evidence and for the rendition of the corresponding decision. No
pronouncement as to costs.
ANTONIO VS RAMOS2 SCRA 731, 1961
FACTS:On January of 1953, Dominga Antonio et., al. filed for
recovery of a parcel of land against Jose, Leonora and Nicolas
Francisco. Only Francisco was able to answer, thus, declaring
Nicolas and Leonora in default. On the date of trial, neither
Francisco not his counsel appeared despite early notice. Hence,
evidence was presented by the plaintiffs. On August 23, 1956 a
judgment has been redndered in favour of the Antonios. Francisco
filed a motion for a new trial on September of 1956, praying that
the decision dated August 23 of 1956 be set aside, alleging that
their failure to appear during the hearing of the case was due to
accident, mistake and excusable negligence which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against(Counsel lost the envelope containing
the notice to the trial before he has the opportunity to open the
same). This, however, was denied by the court. Francisco appealed
to the CA, denied. Appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:Whether or not the omission of counsel constitute an
excusable mistake and negligence, so as to entitle his client, the
appellant herein, to be heard.
RULING:The allegation of counsel that he forgot to note the
notice of hearing in his calendar is flimsy. It does not constitute
the accident, mistake or excusable negligence, contemplated by the
Rules of Court. The exercise of ordinary prudence on his part could
have guarded against or avoided such mistake or negligence. Counsel
did not exercise ordinary prudence because he did not perform his
routine job or duty of noting down the notice of hearing in his
calendar. On this point, the learned trial judge
commented:Considering the motion for new trial and the opposition
thereto, the court believes the negligence of the counsel is not
excusable in view of his admission that he received theregistry
noticefrom the court on May 24, 1956, and that it was duly
registered and thatits envelope shows it came from the courtwhich
made the envelope and its contents so important that he should have
immediately opened the same and not just put it aside, that he
misplaced the same is also indicative of his recklessness (See
Gonzales vs. Amon, L-8963, Feb. 29, 1956). Furthermore counsel for
the defendant Nicolas Francisco had all the time from March 24,
1956, until the date of the trial on Aug. 20, 1956 to inquire from
the Court records or Clerk of Court about the nature of the
registered notice that was sent to him on March 24, 1956, if he
really misplaced the same. This is what a diligent counsel should
do as required by ordinary prudence. All he had to do was examine
the records of this case. This Court noted that since it reconvened
June 18, 1956, counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco has been
appearing in Court almost every week if not everyday. He had
therefore, ample opportunity to verify the nature of the said
registered notice of hearing which he allegedly misplaced upon his
receipt thereof on March 24, 1956. Little need be added to these
observations of the trial court, except to state that lawyers
should always be vigilant and alert, in order to properly safeguard
the rights and interests of their clients. Upon the lawyers
specially devolve the duty to evaluate the urgency and importance
of registered letters coming from the courts where they daily ply
their trade.
PEOPLE vs DELA CRUZ207 SCRA 632 (1992)
FACTS: In the early dawn of March 19, 1990, Cesar Soliven was
standing at the corner of the McArthur Highway and Felomina St. in
Aguilar, Pangasinan waiting for a ride back to his residence in
Barangay Pagomboa after spending the night around the poblacion
during the eve of the town's fiesta (pp. 3-4, tsn, May 9, 1991).
While standing at the aforementioned place, a man smelling of
liquor, who was identified later on as Eduardo dela Cruz (appellant
herein), stood beside him. Subsequently, Merly Caburnay, a neighbor
of Soliven, passed by, proceeding towards the direction of Barangay
Pogomboa. Appellant, who appeared drunk followed the girl but
Soliven did not mind. Instead, he went home.Early the following
morning, Soliven, while in his house, heard the cry of Carmelita
Caburnay, mother of his neighbor, Merly. When he went out of the
house, he learned that Merly was raped and her dead body was found
in a nearby ricefield (pp. 5-6, tsn,id.). Prior to Soliven's
knowledge of the happening, Mayor Domingo Madrid of Aguilar was
already informed of the discovery of the dead body of the victim
and was able to proceed immediately to the crime site. There, the
Mayor was informed that a man walking suspiciously has [sic] just
left the place. So, Mayor Madrid lost no time, took a tricycle and
overtook the man. The man was identified as appellant and he was
found with dirty clothes, his maong pants torn and his T-shirt
stained with blood. He also bore scratches on his neck and arms.
When asked to explain his dirty appearance and the presence of
dried straws of palay at the back of his pants, appellant only
answered that on his was home, he felt sleepy and lied down for a
while on the field. Because of his unsatisfactory explanation, the
police arrested him on that same morning on suspicion that he was
the perpetrator of the crime. (pp. 4-8, tsn, March 14, 1991).Four
days later, Cesar Soliven was invited to the police headquarters
for the purpose of identifying the man he saw in the early dawn of
March 19, 1990 following the victim Merly Caburnay. Standing in
front of the prison cell, Soliven pointed to appellant, who was
among the four men inside the cell, as the person he saw. The
victim, Merly Caburnay, was at the time of the crime only ten years
oldwhile the accused was forty-eight years old. In his defense, the
accused asserted that on 18 March 1990 he was invited by one Andoy
Versoza, his landlord, to cook and prepare food for the latter's
visitors. At around 6:00 p.m. of the said date, he, together with
his two aunts, went around the plaza and watched some shows until
midnight. Thereafter, he drank a bottle of gin and another bottle
of beer until 1:00 a.m. of the following day. They then strolled
about the plaza for two hours. Afterwards, they rested for awhile
near the highway beside the church and at about 5:00 a.m., they
attended mass. When he was advised by his aunts to go home, he
decided to walk because he had no more money. Along the way, he was
arrested by the police for raping and killing Merly Caburnay. He
vehemently denied having committed the crime. He likewise claimed
that there were no rice stalks at the back of his pants when he was
arrested.Although the prosecution did not present any eyewitness,
the trial court found the circumstantial evidence as sufficient for
conviction. Moreover, the defense has not shown any improper or
ulterior motive on the part of Soliven for testifying against the
accused. It is settled that where there is no evidence, and nothing
to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was
actuated by any improper motive, the presumption is that he was not
so actuated and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and
credit. Nor is the non-presentation of the victim's companions of
any help to the cause of the accused. In the first place, it was
never established that the two companions were with the victim when
she was on her way home or when she was raped and killed. It was
duly established that, after obtaining permission from her mother,
she went "to the fiesta in Aguilar" with her cousin and her
mother's sister-in-law,and that immediately before the incident the
victim was walking alone but "was following persons." Accordingly,
her two companions, who were not eyewitnesses, could not have
testified on the rape and killing of the victim. In any event, the
prosecution has the prerogative to determine who should be
presented as witnesses on the bases of its own assessment of their
necessity. Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall
be made at the time such evidence is offered, or as soon thereafter
as the ground for objection shall become apparent, otherwise the
objection shall be considered waived.Moreover, the bloodstains on
the pants of the accused were testified to by Dr. Wilma
Flores-Peralta28and Mayor Domingo Madrid. Finally, the presence of
scratches on his neck and arms was not satisfactorily explained by
the accused. Taken together with the other circumstances present
here, this fact serves to buttress the prosecution's case.
ISSUES: (a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and(c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: It is settled that for alibi to prosper, the requirements
of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he
must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time the same was committed.31In this case, the place
where the accused claims to be32is more or less ten meters away
from the scene of the crime )a ricefield in Barangay
Pogomboa).33Furthermore, the place where he was questioned by Mayor
Madrid of Aguilar and apprehended by the police authorities is
twenty meters away from the place where the naked body of the
victim was found.34Hence, the physical impossibility of the
accused's presence at the crime scene, which is necessary is order
that the defense of alibi may be considered, is lacking.The accused
committed a heinous crime. He was not content with unleashing his
bestial lust upon the tender and frail body of a 10-year-old; he
also brutally inflicted upon her severe injuries which caused her
untimely demise. Another life was lost because a beast in man's
clothing was on the loose. He must pay for what he did in prison, a
place which, unfortunately, is definitely much better than what he
truly deserves.WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the
challenged decision of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. L-4227 is hereby
AFFIRMEDin toto, with costs against the accused-appellant Eduardo
dela Cruz y Laoang.
REPUBLIC V DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS: Private respondent Norma Leuenberger, inherited the whole
of Lot No. 140 from her grandmother. In 1952, she donated a portion
of Lot No. 140, about 3 ha., to the municipality for the purpose of
high school and had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision. However, in
1963, she discovered that more or less 4 ha. of the parcel of land,
was used by petitioner, as a cemetery from 1934. On 1963,
respondent wrote the Mayor of the municipality regarding her
discovery, demanding payment of past rentals and requesting
delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied by petitioner. On
1964, respondent filed a complaint in the CFI for recovery of
possession of the parcel of land occupied by the municipal
cemetery. However, the petitioner defended its alleged ownership of
the subject lot, having bought it from Simeona Ditching in 1934.
The lower court decided in favor of the Municipality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from
questioning the possession and ownership of the petitioner which
dates back to more than 30 years.
RULING: It is certain that petitioner failed to present before
the Court a Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the land in
question which is included in the TCT in the name of private
respondent Norma Leuenberger. Thus, it has been held that where the
land is decreed in the name of a person through fraud or mistake,
such person is by operation of law considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the persons from whom the property
comes. The beneficiary shag has the right to enforce the trust,
notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title and the
trustee and his successors-in-interest are bound to execute the
deed of reconveyance.
GARCIA VS MENDOZA203 SCRA 732 (1991)
FACTS: Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her
husband, Cirilo Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in San
Carlos City, Pangasinan on April 24, 1938. They subsequently sold
it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps. Dulcesimo
Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario, who then took
possession of said lot. On February 23, 1988, the cadastral court
issued a decision adjudicating Lot No. 32080 in favor of Dominador
G. Mendoza, their son.Garcia claims that there was actual fraud
because Mendoza falsely claimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza,
inherited the property from Hermenegildo Mendoza; that Mendoza made
it appear that Lot 32080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo
Mendoza, who had been in possession of the lot since October 15,
1987, and subsequently, donated the same to his son, Mendoza. The
petitioners filed with the court a petition for review of judgment
but denied, so they appealed. Mendoza countered that a petition for
relief from judgment under Sec. 38, Act No. 496, does not apply to
a cadastral proceeding.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the remedy of petition for review of
judgment exists or is warranted by Act No. 2259 (Cadastral
Act).
HELD: The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners. Sec. 11,
Act 2259 clearly states that except as otherwise provided by the
Cadastral Act, all the provision of the Land Registration Act are
applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to the decree and
certificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral
Act.
RUBLICO VS ORELLANO30 SCRA 511 (1969)
FACTS: Fausto Orellana, filed his answer in Cadastral Case No.
IL-N-2, L.R.C. Record No. N-211 for Lots Nos. 1664 and 1665, with
the Court of First Instance of Lanao, claiming ownership and
praying that the said lots be adjudged and decreed in his favor. On
20 November 1964, the court a quo approved the report and
recommendation of the clerk of court and rendered judgment
adjudicating Lots 1664 and 1665 in favor of respo