Exploring the prospects for collaborative transboundary water …paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_30369.pdf · Exploring the prospects for collaborative transboundary water gov-ernance

Exploring the prospects for collaborative transboundary water gov-

ernance in the Mackenzie River Basin, Canada

Working paper presented at the International Political Science Association 23rd

World Congress,

Montreal, QC, Canada – 24 July 2014

Michelle Morris

PhD Candidate

University of Waterloo

Department of Environment and Resource Studies

200 University Avenue West

Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1 CANADA

[email protected]

Dr. Rob de Loë

Professor and University Chair in Water Policy and Governance

University of Waterloo

Department of Environment and Resource Studies

200 University Avenue West

Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1 CANADA

[email protected]

© Morris, M. and de Loë, R.C., 2014

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1.1 Introduction

When political boundaries intersect water bodies, significant challenges can result for

governments, environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), and industries that

manage, use and value water. Institutional fragmentation, conflicting values and uses of water,

sovereignty and power dynamics make transboundary water governance challenging. Climate

change, population growth and increasing industrial development further complicate water

management and create the need for adaptive and flexible approaches to governing

transboundary waters. These kinds of challenges exist to different degrees in international and

sub-federal transboundary water bodies throughout the world.

A number of principles have been identified to inform the creation of transboundary water

management agreements that may address some of the challenges associated with transboundary

water governance. Strong transboundary water management agreements include formalized

mechanisms for cooperation, data sharing, prior notification, monitoring, flexibility, public

involvement, dispute resolution, sustainable funding, and adequate ecosystem protection (Draper 2007; Green, et al. 2013; McCaffrey 2007; Muys, et al. 2007). Ideally, these governance

mechanisms also contribute to a basin-wide approach to governance (Grey and Sadoff 2003). A

basin-wide approach is desirable to coordinate between various jurisdictions, provide an

overarching perspective that extends beyond the vision of single jurisdictions and ensure

cumulative effects at the scale of the basin are considered. In large transboundary basins,

engaging with multiple local and regional governance activities within a transboundary basin can

contribute to a basin-wide perspective while respecting the autonomy of jurisdictions involved.

Implementing the ideal features of transboundary water management agreements requires

appropriate governance mechanisms, such as coordinating linkages among the multiple levels at

which water is governed in transboundary watersheds.

Collaborative processes of governance have been adopted at multiple levels in transboundary

basins around the world, including the Great Lakes Basin shared between Canada and the U.S.

(Akamani and Wilson 2011), the U.S. portion of the Columbia River (Cosens 2010; Heikkila and

Gerlak 2005), and the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia (Margerum 2008). Collaboration is a

form of governance that requires interdependent actors to “constructively explore their

differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible”

(Gray 1989, 5). It is premised upon the fact that for many complex problems no single actor

possesses the necessary skills, resources, expertise or authority to solve problems (Bryson, et al. 2006). Collaboration encourages sharing resources and learning between state and non-state

actors even in contexts in which the stakes of decision making are high and where power

asymmetries exist (Ansell and Gash 2007; Emerson, et al. 2012). In transboundary basins,

collaborative forms of governance are valued because they may enable more adaptive, inclusive

and flexible governance (Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et al. 2008). There is a need, and a

desire, to engage with regional and local levels of governance to support feedback between them

so that transboundary water governance reflects the needs and priorities of local communities

(Cosens 2010); ideally, local and regional governance initiatives inform policy decisions and link

up with actors who have the authority to coordinate at the scale of the basin.

Scholars emphasizing power dynamics in transboundary water governance note that cooperation

may actually disguise marginalization (Zeitoun, et al. 2011). Therefore, collaboration may not

always be as positive as it seems. Power dynamics are an important concern in collaborative

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processes – but they have not been assessed in the collaboration literature to the extent evident in

the transboundary water governance literature. In transboundary contexts, the most effective uses

of power are often the least obvious (Zeitoun and Warner 2006); this consideration should also

inform assessments of power dynamics in collaboration. Although on the surface there may

appear to be cooperation, power dynamics may result in marginalization that undermines

cooperation and works against an inclusive, basin-wide approach. As such, it is important to

consider the specifics of cooperation to understand if all actors are having their needs met

through collaborative, basin-wide approaches to transboundary water governance.

In this paper, we explore two related questions: How do power dynamics impact different levels

of collaboration in transboundary water governance; and, what are the power-related constraints

and opportunities associated with a collaborative, basin-wide approach to transboundary water

governance? We answer these questions using evidence from a preliminary analysis of several

cases of collaboration in Canada’s Mackenzie River Basin (MRB). These cases allow us to

explore the ways in which power dynamics may pose challenges to implementing transboundary

agreements, and to creating a basin-wide approach to governance.

The MRB drains approximately one fifth of Canada’s land mass. It is a jurisdictionally complex

basin in which territorial, provincial, federal and indigenous governments have important

responsibilities for water. The MRB is also ecologically complex; it has been described as one of

the largest intact ecosystems in North America (Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy 2013). Numerous ENGOs are interested and involved in various aspects of governance for water

in this basin because of the immense ecosystem services it provides (Anielski and Wilson 2007;

WWF-Canada 2009). At the same time, the MRB is the site of increasing resource development

within Canada, including fossil fuel extraction and hydroelectric development. Development

pressures, coupled with social and environmental changes resulting from climate change, are

creating significant governance challenges in this basin (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2012).

Six individual bilateral water management agreements are expected to be completed between the

provinces and territories that are part of the MRB by the end of 2014. These bilateral agreements

are being developed within a larger framework: the 1997 Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary

Waters Master Agreement (Government of Canada, et al. 1997). A basin-wide approach to

governance for water in this basin could help to ensure that the cumulative effects of

development and climate change inform management decisions. Furthermore, collaboration that

extends beyond consideration of flows and water quality at the border may be vital to ensuring

adequate protection of the rights of indigenous peoples in the basin and the ecological integrity

of the MRB (de Loë 2014).

Within the MRB, a number of collaborative forms of governance have been adopted at local,

regional and basin levels. Power dynamics between the provincial, territorial, federal and

indigenous governments, ENGOs organizations and industry actors, have important impacts on

the ways in which water is governed in this basin. They also speak to the kinds of issues that

actors involved in water governance may have to resolve or manage as the bilateral water

management agreements are implemented. Key pieces of evidence considered in this paper relate

to the actors present in collaborative processes, constraints on decision making and values that

influence decision-making in this basin.

We begin with a brief literature review to situate this research in the context of transboundary

water governance and collaborative environmental governance literatures. We then turn to

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methods used to inform this research, characteristics of the MRB and preliminary findings

related to the ways in which power dynamics impact collaboration for water governance in the

MRB. The paper concludes with observations regarding the implications for a collaborative,

basin-wide approach to transboundary water governance in the MRB.

1.2 Literature review

Basin-wide approaches to transboundary water governance are desirable for ecological,

economic and social reasons (Grey and Sadoff 2003). First, the hydrological boundaries often do

not match up with the political boundaries. This mismatch means that jurisdictions are not

obliged to take a holistic perspective regarding the multiple water and land uses that can impact

water quality and quantity, and particularly those that may impact a downstream jurisdiction.

However, jurisdictions may agree to align policies with their neighbors – or at least consider a

neighbouring jurisdiction’s interests when formulating domestic policy to avoid externalizing

environmental degradation downstream (Draper 2007; Gerlak, et al. 2009). Economic reasons

for a basin wide approach are mainly utilitarian; cooperation over water resource development

can yield mutual benefits and positive-sum gains. Oft-cited examples include US-Canada

cooperation over hydroelectric facilities and flood control in the Columbia River Basin (Cosens 2010; Giordano and Wolf 2003) and South Africa’s cooperation with Lesotho regarding

hydroelectric facilities in the Orange River Basin (Turton and Funke 2008). Undertaking joint

management may also help to avoid conflicts that could arise when new water uses or pressures

on water become apparent (Kliot, et al. 2001). In large basins, it may be difficult to include all

relevant interests at the scale of the basin, which necessitates a multi-level approach to basin-

wide management that considers the input of local and regional scales (Cosens 2010). Although

a basin-wide approach is desirable, it has also been elusive (Waterbury 1997). A number of

factors complicate achieving a basin wide approach, including power dynamics between

different actors involved in transboundary water governance.

Multiple forms of power can impact interactions over transboundary waters. Traditionally,

material capacity and geographic position have been central considerations (Dinar 2009). That is,

financial, technical, and military resources provide an advantage, as does where a particular

jurisdiction is located on a transboundary water body. An upstream jurisdiction has an advantage

relative to a downstream jurisdiction but financial and technical capacity also has an important

mediating role that impacts whether upstream advantage is used. For instance, a downstream

jurisdiction with superior financial and technical capacity may construct hydraulic infrastructure

before an upstream neighbour. Additional forms of power that impact transboundary water

governance include the role of dominant ideas and the ability to determine the scope of factors to

be considered in discussions about water governance (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Zeitoun, et al.

(2011) point out that less apparent exercises of power can limit the scope of discussions and

impose ideas about how water should be managed and valued, resulting in situations that, while

apparently cooperative (or collaborative), favour more powerful actors. Drawing on Gramsci’s

theory of hegemony and Lukes’ power theory, Zeitoun and Warner (2006) argue that a hydro-

hegemon, the most powerful state in a transboundary river basin, can set agendas, construct

knowledge, and sanction discourse about how transboundary waters should be governed in ways

that may undermine a less powerful jurisdiction’s interests.

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Scholarship concerned with power has contributed to important insights regarding transboundary

water governance, but it usually has a state-centred focus. As such, it has not addressed power

struggles within jurisdictions that can impact the positions jurisdictions assume in interactions

over transboundary waters (Suhardiman and Giordano 2012). Evidence suggests that struggles

over water that occur within and without jurisdictions are important considerations in the context

of transboundary water governance (Blatter and Ingram 2000). For instance, Feitelson (2002)

points out that dominant domestic discourse can shape policy preferences in transboundary

contexts. Conca (2006) demonstrates that international water discourses can influence domestic

strategies and that civil society can have an important role in constructing water discourses that

inform water policy within jurisdictions. Others reveal that domestic ENGOs play important

roles within states that can encourage more sustainable water management practices that

positively impact downstream communities (Zawahri and Hensengerth 2012). Non-state actors

such as ENGOs or industry groups may play critical roles in and at different levels that may

contribute to a basin-wide approach to transboundary water governance and should be

considered.

Power analysis of transboundary water governance has also focused on sovereign states in the

international system. There has been much less attention to the power dynamics between sub-

federal governments. Admittedly, there are important contextual differences between sub-federal

governments and sovereign states in the international system. For instance, threats of military

force are rare between sub-federal governments. However, military conflicts over water are also

very rare between sovereign states (Yoffe, et al. 2003). Anarchical conditions do not exist within

federal states as they do in the international context, but the presence of a federal government

does not necessarily prevent abuses of power or level power dynamics between sub-federal

governments. In federations such as Canada, where the federal government has assumed a non-

interventionist role regarding sub-federal policy matters in the environmental domain, provincial

and territorial governments view their environmental jurisdiction much like sovereign states.

There is value in exploring power dynamics within federal states and between the multiple, state

and non-state actors involved in governance for water, while recognizing the power dynamics

within countries are much different than between them.

The emerging literature that explores the role of multi-level, collaborative approaches to

transboundary water governance speaks to the roles of non-state actors in water governance.

Collaboration in transboundary water governance can take a variety of forms, such as joint

monitoring programs at the local level (Raadgever, et al. 2008), submitting recommendations to

government regulators, or becoming involved in basin-wide planning activities (Berardo and

Gerlak 2012). There are many different forms of collaboration that emphasize, to different

degrees, the role of the state, deliberativeness, and consensus-based decision-making (Booher

and Innes 2010; Leach 2006; Selsky and Parker 2005). Collaboration typically involves a variety

of state and non-state actors sharing resources, learning from one another, and working together

on shared problems. Collaborative environmental governance includes a normative commitment

to furthering social and ecological sustainability through deliberation and dialogue (Bäckstrand,

et al. 2010; Glasbergen 1998). Idealized forms of collaborative environmental governance are

expected to work well even in contexts in which the actors participating have much different

resources to participate, access to decision makers, and abilities to construct and impose

dominant ideas and values.

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The collaboration literature has assessed some power dynamics in collaborative processes, but

not in a systematic or theory-informed way. There has been some attention to framing (Gray

2004), resources and legitimacy (Purdy 2012) and other have raised questions about whether

collaboration is actually inclusive of marginalized interests (Kallis, et al. 2009). Evidence from

collaborations in South Africa, Canada and Australia suggest that the state is sometimes

unwilling to share its decision-making authority with collaborative groups (Mirumachi and van

Wyk 2010; Norman and Bakker 2009; Holley, et al. 2012). However, many authors assume that

well-managed collaborative process will resolve challenges of power dynamics (Innes and

Booher 2010; Purdy 2012). The extant literature evaluating power in transboundary water

governance suggests that it is necessary to investigate the ways in which power dynamics

manifest and impact multi-level collaborative processes.

There are a number of different approaches to conceptualizing power within the social sciences.

In this paper, we conceive of power as the ability to make or prevent changes in policy or

practice. We are particularly interested in ways in which power contributes to or complicates

achieving a collaborative, basin wide approach to transboundary water governance. This ability

is informed by a number of different dimensions of power (Lukes 2005). In an observational,

decision-making dimension, power is exercised by securing policy preferences in decisions.

Several factors may contribute to an actor’s ability to prevail in decision-making in a

transboundary context, including technical and financial resources, geographic position, and

actors involved in making the decision. At a less apparent level, power’s second dimension can

be exercised to determine the scope of the decision-making agenda, for instance, by excluding

from consideration issues potentially harmful to a dominant actor’s interests. Determining the

scope of agenda, the sources of information used, whose rights are recognized and appealing to

international norms or external actors in collaborative processes are some of the ways that

bargaining power is operationalized. A deeper, more effective, and more difficult to identify use

of power is the ability to construct and impose values and ideas to prevent individuals or groups

from articulating policy preferences inconsistent with a dominant group’s interests. This form of

power can manifest in framing decision contexts or issues in ways consistent with a particular

agenda. We highlight indicators used to identify each dimension of power in Table 1. This

typology of power is consistent with what others have used to assess power in transboundary

contexts (Zeitoun and Warner 2006) and in natural resource management contexts (Caine and

Krogman 2010; Raik, et al. 2008).

1.3 Methods

We used a multiple case study approach to conduct this research. Using a qualitative, multiple-

case study design allowed us to evaluate the prospects for collaborative, basin wide approach to

transboundary water governance in the MRB because it allows for an in-depth exploration of

causation and a comparison between different cases (Gerring 2007; Yin 2003). We selected

cases according to several criteria. All cases are within the geographic boundaries of the MRB.

Second, the cases involved state and non-state actors in governance for water within MRB.

Finally, data accessibility and the willingness of key informants to participate was the final

criterion upon which the cases were selected for inclusion in this study. The cases that meet these

criteria are identified in Table 2 and include the Phase 2 Management Framework for the Lower

Athabasca River; the Peace-Athabasca Ecological Monitoring Program; the Slave River and

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Delta Partnership; and, the Mackenzie River Basin Board. They will be discussed in more detail

in Section 1.4.1.

Data sources included semi-structured interviews with twenty-seven individuals involved in

various aspects of governance for water in this basin. Interviews were conducted between August

2012 and May 2014. The second author’s involvement in the Northwest Territories’ Strategic

Advisory Group of Experts regarding transboundary negotiations provided access to a number of

senior officials within the government of the Northwest Territories, including the Minister of

Environment and Natural Resources and Finance. These key informants provided crucial

perspectives that informed this work. Others interviewed included individuals working within

industry, ENGOs, with provincial and territorial governments, and indigenous governments.

Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed immediately following interviews. Interview

participants were provided with an opportunity to review the transcript to add or clarify any

points they desired. Other data sources used to inform this research include policy documents,

transcripts of regulatory hearings and published studies, which were reviewed to consider if and

how they revealed the power dynamics at play in various collaborative processes. Additional

sources of insight included personal observations made at meetings and regulatory hearings

attended by the first author.

We analyzed data using a framework developed from a synthesis of insights related to power

theory and empirical identifications of power in transboundary water governance and

collaboration (see Table 1). Indicators speak to the first, second and third dimensions of power,

which we refer to as material, bargaining and discursive power. Policy documents, press

releases, and interview transcripts were coded in using the qualitative data analysis software

NVivo, according to the indicators identified in Table 1. After we completed this stage, we

considered the results of coding and the potential implications for collaborative, basin-wide

approaches to transboundary water governance.

Table 1: Power indicators

Form Source Identification/Evidence

Material

power

Geographic position, financial and technical

capacity

Capacity to make and implement decisions

Participants invited/allowed to collaborate

Ability to prevail in decision-making

Gross Domestic Product, Population

Water infrastructure

Legislative and regulatory competence

Participant selection

Which actor prevails in decision making?

Bargaining

power

Ability to control decision-making agenda

Ability to control or determine information used

Legal rights & recognition

Support from external actors/international norms

Determine if all participants are satisfied with the

scope of the decision-making agenda

Identify the parameters of collaboration and how

information is obtained and processed

Recognition of legal rights

Appeals to legal norms or external institutions

Discursive

power

Ability to construct and represent a particular idea

or discourse about water should be managed and

valued

Ability to manage meanings or how a particular

problem is framed

Determine if there is a dominant representation of key

decisions

Idenitfy which actors are responsible for the dominant

representation

Determine whether actors contest the representation

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1.4 The Mackenzie River Basin, Canada

The MRB is a large, northward draining watershed (Figure 1). Its headwaters begin in the Peace

and Athabasca sub-basins, which emerge in the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta,

respectively. The Peace and Athabasca Rivers meet at the Peace-Athabasca Delta in Alberta, a

UNESCO World Heritage Site and a RAMSAR wetland of international significance.

Approximately 80% of the delta is located within Wood Buffalo National Park (Prowse, et al. 2002). At the delta, the Peace River turns north to become the Slave River, which flows into the

Northwest Territories and discharges into Great Slave Lake. The Mackenzie River drains Great

Slave Lake’s northwestern corner, and receives flows from the Liard and Peel Rivers, which

flow from upstream British Columbia and the Yukon, respectively, before discharging into the

Arctic Ocean’s Beaufort Sea. The MRB contains numerous large freshwater lakes and boreal,

tundra and delta ecosystems. Deltas in the basin provide important staging and breeding grounds

for a significant number of migratory birds, including the endangered Whooping Crane, which

resides for part of the year in the Peace-Athabasca Delta (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2003).

The ecosystems in the MRB provide habitat for species including moose, caribou, beaver and

muskrat, which are important components of the traditional livelihoods of the basin’s indigenous

peoples. The MRB has been recognized for its international significance in an era in which

freshwater ecosystems are among the most rapidly degrading in the world (Millennium

Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy 2013).

The MRB’s ecological complexity is matched by its jurisdictional complexity. There is

overlapping and fragmented jurisdiction for water in this basin. The provinces and territories

have the majority of decision-making authority for water in Canada; they are responsible for

water allocation, land use planning and energy development. Canada’s federal government also

has important water related responsibilities for fisheries, navigation, and federal lands in the

MRB. In addition to the provincial and federal governments, indigenous governments also have

important rights and responsibilities to water in Canada (Phare 2009). Some indigenous

governments in the MRB have historic treaties with the Crown, such as Treaty 8 First Nations,

while others such as the Sahtu Dene, Inuvialuit and Gwich’in, have modern land claim

agreements; both forms of agreement are constitutionally protected, meaning that indigenous

governments must be considered in discussions of water governance in Canada.

For over three decades the basin governments have been encouraged to negotiate bilateral water

management agreements (Mackenzie River Basin Committee 1981). The jurisdictions did

complete the Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters Master Agreement (the Master

Agreement) in 1997, which articulated a number of non-binding principles to guide governance

in the basin, including cooperation, sustainability, ecosystem integrity, the prevention of harm

and jurisdictional autonomy (Government of Canada, et al. 1997). The Master Agreement also

contained provisions for the creation of bilateral water management agreements, but they were

not immediately forthcoming after the agreement was signed in 1997. Key decision-makers

within the basin have uneven levels of satisfaction with the way that the Master Agreement has

been implemented; the government of the Northwest Territories, the most downstream

jurisdiction, has been advocating for a renewed commitment to implementing the Master

Agreement and has prioritized completing bilateral water management agreements (de Loë and

Morris 2014). Bilateral water management agreements are intended to encourage cooperative

watershed management and sustain the ecological integrity of the MRB by establishing specific

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commitments related to water consumption, flows, quality, groundwater, and aquatic ecosystem

health (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2009). The bilateral water management agreements will be

crucial to implementing the Master Agreement and contributing to a basin-wide perspective on

governance in the MRB (Saunders 2012).

Figure 1: The Mackenzie River Basin

Industrial developments in upstream jurisdictions British Columbia and Alberta, coupled with

climate warming, are key drivers of change in the MRB (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2012).

Changes in the timing of freeze-up, thaw and peak river flows have been observed in the MRB

and are anticipated into the future (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2012). Freshwater supplies in

many of the MRB’s sub-basins are expected to decline as a result of climate warming (Wolfe, et

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al. 2011), which may also pose challenges for the industries and communities that depend upon

current supplies of water. Hydroelectric development and fossil fuel mining in upstream

jurisdictions British Columbia and Alberta, respectively, are among the most significant

industrial developments in the MRB. Two existing hydroelectric facilities operated by a crown

corporation, BC Hydro, on the Peace River in BC, provide approximately 30% of the province’s

generation capacity (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2003). When British Columbia constructed

the W.A.C. Bennett Dam in 1968, environmental changes observed over 1000km downstream at

the Peace-Athabasca Delta encouraged governments to coordinate and communicate regarding

planned development (Creery 1979). Currently, many downstream residents, including

indigenous peoples with rights to fish, trap and hunt in the Peace-Athabasca Delta, are concerned

that upstream flow regulation has been a contributing factor in a multi-decadal drying event

experienced in the Peace-Athabasca Delta (Carver 2012). However, others suggest climactic

factors rather than upstream flow regulation are the main contributors to changes experienced in

the delta (Wolfe, et al. 2008). Regardless of the cause, the Peace-Athabasca Delta, which is an

important area in which indigenous peoples exercise their treaty rights, will continue to be a

source of concern. In fact, B.C. Hydro is currently proposing to construct a third dam

downstream its existing facilities on the Peace River, which has resulted in significant local and

downstream concern.

Oil sands mining within Alberta is another major industrial project in the MRB. The Athabasca

sub-basin in Alberta contains the world’s third largest proven oil reserve (Alberta Energy 2014).

To date, oil sands mining has converted over 600km2 of boreal forest into open-pit surface mines

(Jordaan 2012). The majority of oil sands mining is expected to take place using in-situ steam

assisted gravity drainage. Surface and in-site has resulted in the fragmentation of terrestrial

ecosystems but it has also impacted water resources within the Athabasca sub-basin. The nature

and extent of pollution resulting from oil sands mining is currently a matter of scientific debate.

Recent studies have linked oil sands mining with the presence of contaminants downstream,

including mercury, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and arsenic (Kelly, et al. 2009; Kelly, et

al. 2010; Kurek, et al. 2013). Others, however, suggest that contaminants attributed to oil sands

mining are deposited via natural sources in the air and water (Hall, et al. 2012; Wiklund, et al. 2012). Numerous downstream communities in Alberta and the Northwest Territories are

concerned about the risks posed by upstream oil sands mining.

A number of multinational oil companies have invested in mining Alberta’s oil sands, including

Total, Shell, Suncor, Canadian Natural Resources Limited and Imperial Oil. The scale of

investment in and production from the oil sands is staggering. Within the past decade,

approximately $100 billion has been invested in developing oil sands, a figure that is expected to

more than triple within twenty-five years (Burt, et al. 2012). Within ten years, oil sands mining

is expected to double production from 1.8 to 3.6 billion barrels of oil per day (Burt, et al. 2012).

The stakes of development are quite different for the actors involved in governance for water in

the MRB. Upstream jurisdictions such as British Columbia and Alberta (which is downstream of

British Columbia but upstream of the Northwest Territories) have interests at stake in developing

resources within their territories according to the internal policy agendas. The downstream

Northwest Territories is also interested in resource development, but is concerned with the

impacts of upstream developments, and with its relationships to Aboriginal partners1 in the

Northwest Territories. The Northwest Territories’ ability to achieve its policy objectives, as

stated in its Northern Voices, Northern Waters watershed stewardship strategy, “the waters of the

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Northwest Territories will remain clean, abundant and productive for all time” (Government of

the Northwest Territories 2010), is contingent upon effective transboundary water governance

and its relationship with its upstream neighbours. British Columbia has advantage relative to

Alberta and the Northwest Territories on the Peace-Slave Rivers, while Alberta has advantage

relative to the Northwest Territories on the Athabasca-Slave portion of the basin. Upstream

advantage is bolstered with significant material and technical resources; British Columbia and

Alberta are by far the more populous provinces and territories in the MRB. In 2011, the

provinces of B.C. and Alberta had populations of 4.4 and 3.6 million, respectively, whereas the

NWT had 41 462 inhabitants (Statistics Canada 2012a); Alberta and B.C. had GDPs of $295 and

$217 billion, respectively whereas the NWT’s was $4.7 billion (Statistics Canada 2012b).

In addition to the differences between provincial and territorial governments there are also

significant historical inequities resulting from Canada’s colonial relationship with indigenous

peoples. This historical injustice has played out in various ways in governance for water in the

MRB, such as through devaluing or failing to recognize traditional ecological knowledge in

management discussions (Stevensen 2012). There are also significant differences between the

ENGOs and industry actors participating in governance for water in the basin. For instance,

multinationals such as Shell and Suncor and others have significantly more resources at their

disposal to fund technical studies and participate in governance activities than ENGOs dependent

on donations for funding. These are some of the surface differences between the different groups

participating in governance; a more nuanced discussion will be presented in the next section of

this paper.

1.4.1 Collaboration in the MRB

Various kinds of collaborative activities take place in the MRB. Table 2 identifies the four

collaborations we discuss in this paper. In this section, we will briefly discuss the purpose,

composition and activities of the four cases of collaboration we analyzed. We will then turn to

the preliminary findings of our power analysis, followed by a conclusion which explores the

implications for a collaborative, basin-wide approach to transboundary water governance in the

MRB.

1.4.1.1 The Peace Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program

The Peace Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program (PADEMP) was formed in 2008 at

the leadership of Parks Canada, the federal agency with jurisdiction in Wood Buffalo National

Park, and the chair of PADEMP. Parks Canada was a logical choice to lead the group because

the majority of the Peace-Athabasca Delta falls within Wood Buffalo National Park, which has

the Athabasca River as its eastern border. PADEMP was formed in recognition that there was a

need for consistent, ecosystem-based monitoring that included local residents in determining

monitoring priorities. Further, the conveners of PADEMP recognized that collecting baseline

information about the state of the delta would be critical to measure the extent of future changes

anticipated as a result of climate change, hydroelectricity generation and oil sands mining. From

the very early stages, indigenous partners were included because Parks staff wanted to design the

program with them, rather than inviting them to participate as an afterthought.2 PADEMP has

developed its monitoring and reporting programs based on western science and traditional

ecological knowledge. The group includes representation from 11 indigenous partners, 4 federal

agencies, the government of the NWT and the government of Alberta, as well as two ENGOs,

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WWF-Canada and Ducks Unlimited. Key work undertaken by PADEMP includes relationship

building between the partners, collecting and synthesizing existing information on the delta,

work on developing a Vulnerability Assessment Report for the Peace-Athabasca Delta and

coordinating activities with other monitoring groups in the area (Macmillan 2013).

1.4.1.2 The Slave River and Delta Partnership

The Slave River and Delta Partnership (SRDP) was created in 2010 as a part of the NWT’s water

stewardship strategy and to address local community concerns about the impacts of upstream

developments on ecosystem health. Specific goals of the SRDP include supporting community-

based ecosystem monitoring and including traditional and local knowledge (Aboriginal Affairs

and Northern Development Canada and Government of the Northwest Territories 2012). Local

community members had been concerned for many years about the impacts of development such

as pulp mills and hydroelectric facilities and more recent developments taking place in Alberta’s

oil sands.3 The SRDP was modeled on PADEMP as a community based model that has

incorporating local traditional knowledge as a key criterion of success.4 The SRDP includes local

indigenous governments, members of the public and a research institute and is open to anyone

who wants to participate. Members of the SRDP help to determine key monitoring priorities and

also undertake monitoring. To date, monitoring has focused on water quality, fish health and

general aquatic ecosystem health.

1.4.1.3 The Phase 2 Framework Committee

The Phase 2 Framework Committee (P2FC) was formed in 2008 to provide the government of

Alberta with recommendations for cumulative oil sands water withdrawals for the Lower

Athabasca River. Several regulatory hearings had highlighted the need to develop an

environmental flow policy for the Athabasca River, and the P2FC was created to address that

need. The P2FC included representation from Total, Shell, Canadian Natural Resources Limited,

Imperial Oil, Suncor and Syncrude, the federal government, the province of Alberta, one Metis

and one First Nations group and three ENGOs (Ohlson, et al. 2010). It produced non-consensus

recommendations to the government of Alberta in 2010. It also identified knowledge gaps and

developed an adaptive management strategy that has informed ongoing monitoring in the

Athabasca River. Although its specific recommendations have not yet been implemented it has

been used to inform the development of Alberta’s surface water quantity framework, which is

part of the Lower Athabasca land use plan, part of the Alberta government’s province-wide land

use planning strategy.5

1.4.1.4 The Mackenzie River Basin Board

The Mackenzie River Basin Board (MRBB) is the oldest of all of the collaborative groups we

studied. It was formed in 1997 through the Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters

Master Agreement, which also details the key roles and responsibilities of the MRBB. Key roles

include coordinating information sharing among jurisdictions, developing state of the

environment reports and including traditional knowledge and communicating with indigenous

peoples in the basin in culturally appropriate ways. The MRBB has 13 members – one

representative per province and territory, one Aboriginal member per province and territory, and

three representatives from the federal government from all three provinces, the two territories

and the federal government as well as five Aboriginal members. To date the MRBB has

12

produced two State of the Aquatic Ecosystem Reports, a Bi-lateral Water Management Guidance

Document, and a report on best practices in incorporating traditional knowledge into

environmental monitoring and assessments. It has also supported the development of bilateral

water management agreements and completed early work on developing a hydrology model of

the basin.

Table 2: Collaboration in the MRB

Collaboration Purpose Membership

Peace-Athabasca Delta Ecological

Monitoring Program

2008-current

Develop an integrated ecological

monitoring program to measure,

evaluate and communicate the state

of the Peace-Athabasca Delta

Designed to incorporate traditional

knowledge and western science

Government of the Northwest

Territories, Government of Canada

Local college

First Nations & Metis groups

Local citizens

Slave River and Delta Partnership

2010-current

Community-based monitoring of

the Slave River and Delta

Designed to address community

concerns about ecosystem health,

integrate traditional and local

knowledge and science

Government of Canada,

Government of the Northwest

Territories, Government of Alberta

WWF-Canada and Ducks

Unlimited

11 local First Nations & Metis

groups

Phase 2 Framework Committee

2008-2010

Designed to make

recommendations for cumulative

water withdrawal rules for oil sands

mining facilities for the Lower

Athabasca River

Government of Canada,

Government of Alberta

Regional Municipality of Wood

Buffalo

Fort McKay First Nation, Fort

Chipewyan Metis

WWF-Canada, Alberta Wilderness

Association, South Peace

Environmental Society

Shell, Syncrude, Suncor, Total and

Canadian Natural Resources

Limited

Mackenzie River Basin Board

1997-current

Coordinate information exchange,

complete State of the Aquatic

Ecosystem Reports, recommend

water quality and quantity

objectives, integrate traditional

ecological knowledge, encourage

the completion of bilateral water

management agreements

Government of Canada,

Government of Alberta,

Government of the NWT,

Government of British Columbia,

Government of Saskatchewan,

Government of Yukon

5 Aboriginal members

1.4.2 Power analysis

In this section, we detail key preliminary findings of our power analysis. We do not provide a

comprehensive consideration of all aspects of power identified in the framework that guided this

power analysis, but instead focus on power dynamics particularly pertinent to adopting a

collaborative, basin-wide approach to transboundary water governance. Power dynamics were

evident in the participants who participated in each collaborative, the scope of the agenda of

collaboration, and the values informing management decisions in the MRB.

13

1.4.2.1 Material power

Informants who participated in the P2FC process were the only respondents who indicated they

had adequate resources to carry out their work.6 The P2FC was primarily funded by industry and

had a budget of $4.6 million (Cumulative Environmental Management Association 2010), which

enabled the group to hire facilitators, undertake technical studies and support travel to and from

meetings. The P2FC’s budget stands in stark contrast to the MRBB’s operating budget at $280

000, which several informants suggested is contributing to the MRBB’s ineffectiveness in the

basin.7 Although the government of the Northwest Territories has been advocating for increases

to funding for several years8, the jurisdictions have been unable to agree on an acceptable

funding arrangement (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2013). Participants in PADEMP and SRDP

noted that financial capacity is an issue for all of the partners in the program.9 Financial

constraints require some creativity in terms of acquiring resources to conduct monitoring.

PADEMP, for instance, has struggled to secure year to year funding, making long-term planning

quite difficult.10

The SRDP and PADEMP address funding deficiencies by pooling resources

conduct joint monitoring when it is feasible to do so.11

Given their geographic proximity, shared

commitment to incorporating traditional ecological knowledge and overlapping membership, the

SRDP and PADEMP are better able to cooperate than some of the other collaborative activities

currently existing in the basin.

While adequate funding is necessary it is far from sufficient to secure the participation of all

actors who have an interest at stake in a particular collaboration. In the case of the P2FC, many

First Nations opted out because of perceived problems with the industry-funded group. This was

a deficiency that several interviewees noted12

; the perspectives of many of the local First Nations

were not presented within the P2FC process. Instead, First Nations provided their input via a

separate consultation with the province of Alberta.13

This is in stark contrast to the PADEMP and

the SRDP, which have prioritized including local indigenous peoples. For instance, participants

representing First Nations and Metis report being much more comfortable with the PADEMP

model than others models existing in the basin.14

PADEMP, however, is not inclusive of all

actors in the basin. PADEMP has not invited industry to participate, despite the fact that industry

may be able to supplement PADEMP’s resources. Reasons for excluding industry are complex.

One key informant reported that an industry presence may discourage participants from sharing

information freely for fear that industry will use discussions within PADEMP to inform their

own agendas. Another concern the interview respondent reported was that PADEMP members

wanted to set objectives for the group and provide a good basis for protecting the ecological

integrity of the PAD before inviting industry.15

There was a concern that industry may influence

the process in a way that weakens or limits the scope of PADEMP’s objectives and that would be

undesirable.

Additional notable absences within PADEMP include the province of BC and BC Hydro, which

have important roles as flow regulators on the Peace River. The province of BC has not been

invited to participate in PADEMP.16

However, British Columbia has a historical pattern of

declining to become involved in any official discussions about the Peace-Athabasca Delta; this

pattern has persisted for several decades, since the construction of the first dam on the Peace

River. After the W.A.C. Bennett Dam was constructed in 1968, the province of Alberta and the

federal government undertook a series of technical studies to try to rehabilitate the delta without

the involvement of BC (Prentice, et al. 1998). In 1989, an interjurisdictional agreement was

struck to investigate the state of the Peace, Athabasca and Slave River systems. The governments

14

of the NWT, Alberta and Canada participated in this study but British Columbia did not

(Northern River Basins Study Board 1996). As an upstream jurisdiction, British Columbia has

significant capacity to alter the flows of the river and its absence in these interjurisdictional and

collaborative forums is notable. Given its upstream position, from a strictly self-interested

perspective, British Columbia may not view participating in discussions about the Peace-

Athabasca Delta as within its interests. However, it is necessary to contribute to a basin-wide

approach to governance. In the future, it may be necessary for British Columbia or BC Hydro to

participate in PADEMP.

Key informants involved in the MRBB reported that the composition of the group has an

important impact on the ways in which it works. Although the MRBB provides equal

membership for the provinces and territories and includes representation for indigenous peoples,

several informants reported that the MRBB’s majority composition of bureaucrats has created

challenges, particularly for adopting a basin-wide perspective.17

A former Executive Director

reported that at times representatives of the various provinces and territories struggled with

considering the interests of the basin as a whole as opposed to their individual jurisdiction’s

interest.18

Other key informants noted that giving the Board more independence from

governments may be necessary for the MRBB to adopt a basin-wide perspective.19

1.4.2.2 Bargaining power

The ability to set the agenda is a significant source of power. There are many factors that

contribute to agenda setting including the nature of the information used and considered in

discussions of governance, the extent to which existing or claimed rights are recognized and the

interests at stake in each discussion. Agenda setting can determine which information is

considered relevant, whose rights and recognized and which interests are protected.

In the cases of the P2FC, PADEMP and the MRBB, several interviewees reported that they were

unsatisfied with the collaborative group’s scope. The P2FC, for instance, conducted its

deliberations and made its recommendations assuming a high growth scenario for oil sands

mining. A respondent working within the ENGO sector reported that this was a deficiency of the

process because scaling back the growth of Alberta’s oil sands industry was plausible and

desirable from the ENGO’s perspective.20

However, the scope of the decision-making agenda

was set by the province of Alberta and was not a topic of discussion within the P2FC (Ohlson, et

al. 2010).

In the case of PADEMP, key informants reported that determining PADEMP’s mandate was one

of the most difficult decisions the group had to make.21

Some members felt that PADEMP

should play an activist role within the basin and provide advice to governments regarding

necessary measures to protect the health of the Peace-Athabasca Delta. Some government

members, however, were wary of participating in a group that would make recommendations to

government and so resisted PADEMP assuming that role. As a result, PADEMP has played an

information generating and dissemination role instead of an advocacy role, which some members

feel may be necessary to protect the delta.22

The MRBB’s mandate was determined by the 1997 Master Agreement. However, according to

several key informants, the ways in which the governments have implemented that agreement

with respect to the MRBB’s role has been inconsistent with the agreement’s original intent. The

MRBB has arguably not come close to approaching the limits of its mandate, which could

15

include advocating for a basin-wide perspective in management decisions within the provinces

and territories to enable ecological integrity and cooperative management (Donihee, et al. 2000).

Instead, the MRBB has played a facilitating and coordinating role, much like PADEMP. The

Master Agreement states that the MRBB can recommend uniform water quality and quantity

objectives to the jurisdictions, a role it has not assumed to date. One respondent representing

Alberta reported that the MRBB should not even be thinking about policy within jurisdictions.23

This perspective suggests that some of the jurisdictions may not be willing to allow the MRBB to

play the role that its original negotiators envisioned. Indeed, an individual involved in the

original negotiations of the Master Agreement noted that the cooperative intergovernmental era

in which the Master Agreement was negotiated does not currently exist in the context of the

MRB.24

1.4.2.3 Discursive power

Our preliminary findings regarding discursive power are less solid than findings related to

bargaining power and material power. Here we offer tentative findings. Throughout the interview

process it became apparent that there are contrasting visions for ecological integrity,

sustainability and energy development within the basin. It was also evident that although

collaborative processes are locally important to many of the actors involved, key decisions

regarding the fate of the MRB are not made in collaborative forums. Consistent with the each

jurisdiction’s desire to ensure its autonomy to make resource development decisions within its

own territory, key decisions are made within jurisdictions and not in multi-actor,

interjurisdictional processes. The challenge is that these decisions may be made in a piecemeal

fashion, without considering how each decisions contributes cumulatively to impacts within the

MRB.

In this section, we present an initial analysis of arguments made to support or justify resource

management decisions within the MRB. This analysis reveals a preference for economic growth

and associated benefits over core principles related to ecological integrity and sustainable water

management articulated in the Master Agreement. This is complemented by what we heard in

interviews. For instance, one interviewee from the NWT noted that challenging the economic

models underpinning hydroelectricity development and oil sands mining in the upstream

jurisdictions is not an option that is available to them.25

Adopting a basin wide perspective with

that is consistent with the Master Agreement may require a more ecologically sensitive approach

to decision-making in the basin.

Regulatory approvals, such as the most recently approved surface mine in Alberta’s oil sands,

suggest that the values and benefits associated with expanding development prevail over

environmental values. In December 2013, Shell Canada’s proposal to expand the Jackpine Mine

in Alberta’s oil sands received final approval. The Joint Review Panel (2013, 2) that

recommended conditional approval to the governments noted that, “the Project, in combination

with other existing, approved, and planned projects, would likely have significant adverse

cumulative environment effects on wetlands; traditional plant potential areas; old-growth forests;

wetland-reliant species at risk and migratory birds; old-growth forest-reliant species at risk and

migratory birds; caribou; biodiversity; and Aboriginal traditional land use . . . rights, and

culture.” The panel also noted that many of these effects would be irreversible and Shell’s

mitigation plan was inadequate. This is by definition unsustainable. However, despite these

impacts, approving the project was justified because of the “significant economic benefits”

16

anticipated to accrue to Alberta and Canada resulting from increasing oil sands mining (Joint

Review Panel 2013, 2).

Similar arguments are made in support of BC’s proposed third dam on the Peace River, which, if

approved, would be constructed to maximize storage provided by the two existing dams. The

Joint Review Panel charged with reviewing the potential economic, environmental, social,

cultural and heritage impacts of the dam noted that it will provide clear economic benefits

resulting from BC’s increased ability to benefit from energy at relatively low cost and from the

employment opportunities for individuals, small businesses and indigenous peoples in the local

area. It also noted that the area in which the project would proceed “is currently undergoing

enormous stress from resource development . . . combined with past, present and reasonably

foreseeable future projects [the Project] would result in cumulative effects on fish, vegetation

and ecological communities, wildlife, current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes,

and heritage” (Joint Review Panel 2014, v). The Joint Review Panel did not make a clear

recommendation for approval or rejection but did suggest a number of conditions for project

approval. The province of BC will issue its decision later in 2014. However, BC Hydro’s

proposed rationale for the project is very clear: the cumulative environmental impacts are

justified in light of the economic benefits anticipated from building the dam (BC Hydro 2013).

In both of these cases, upstream provinces, with the federal government, have the authority to

accept or reject energy developments. Downstream jurisdictions can intervene in regulatory

proceedings and engage in discussions with provincial decision-makers but they do not hold a

veto on development decisions. Some observers suggest that an interjurisdictional discussion to

determine an appropriate pace of development and regulations for extractive and hydroelectric

industries will be a necessary component of effective transboundary water governance in the

MRB moving forward (Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy 2013). A key informant

suggested that for governance in the basin to be effective, the jurisdictions must change from

viewing economic development and ecological integrity as necessarily at odds and ensure that

development occurs within a context in which necessary measures to protect ecosystems are in

place. Adopting such an approach will likely meet with the entrenched preference for proceeding

with development regardless of environmental impacts if the economics benefits are perceived as

sufficient.

1.5 Implications: the prospects for a collaborative approach to trans-boundary water governance in the Mackenzie River Basin

Given the kinds of collaborative activities currently occurring in the MRB there is clearly an

appetite for collaboration in this basin. Collaborative groups may have a more formalized role to

ensure that local concerns are considered at the scale of the basin as the bilateral water

management agreements are completed. Based on evidence we collected regarding collaboration

in this basin we offer some preliminary observations regarding power-related challenges to

adopting a collaborative, basin-wide approach to transboundary water governance.

First, it is absolutely necessary that the basin jurisdictions and participants in collaborative

processes commit early to involving indigenous governments in governance in the basin.

Indigenous governments have constitutionally protected rights to water and rights that are

untested in the courts that make them essential decision-makers in the context of governance for

water in the MRB (Phare 2009). The recent decision of Canada’s Supreme Court, which linked

17

Aboriginal title to a specific land area in British Columbia, only reinforces the critical role of

Canada’s Indigenous peoples (Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44). A

commitment to collect and use traditional knowledge in a way that informs monitoring priorities

and respects traditional knowledge is vital. The MRBB has historically struggled with

incorporating traditional knowledge and values (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2012) but has

recently directed much of its energy to improving its efforts in this regard. PADEMP proves it is

possible to do this work. Moving this work forward and scaling it up to the basin scale is

desirable.

Including and considering the interests of upstream jurisdictions will continue to be necessary.

However, it is also necessary for upstream jurisdictions to be sensitive to the perceived and real

impacts of their development activities. British Columbia’s historic unwillingness to engage in

any official discussions about the Peace-Athabasca Delta has created mistrust with many of the

downstream communities. However, the tide may be turning. In its submissions to the Joint

Review Panel in January 2014, BC Hydro indicated that it is willing to discuss the prospects of

providing pulse flows to recharge the Peace-Athabasca Delta with the province of Alberta. The

extent of these discussions is currently unclear but the Joint Review Panel reviewing BC’s

proposed dam recommended moving these discussions forward (Joint Review Panel 2014).

Broadening the parameters of these discussions to include local indigenous governments, Parks

Canada, and the government of the Northwest Territories would be a huge benefit to a basin-

wide approach to governance in the MRB.

Sharing decision-making authority or encouraging greater independence in multi-actor multi-

jurisdictional forums such as the MRBB and PADEMP will likely continue to be a challenge.

Even when institutions are designed to enable active roles in governance, political will can

render them relatively ineffective. Arguably the MRBB could play a much greater role in the

basin than it has to date, and its ability to do so is dependent on the extent to which governments

involved are willing to modify the current arrangement. The bilateral agreements may encourage

a more active engaged role for the MRBB but it is worth noting here that the existence of an

agreement does not ensure its implementation; the jurisdictions unwillingness to fully implement

the Master Agreement for over 17 years proves this point. Good intentions can be watered down

as other priorities take precedence. However, enabling a more inclusive approach to governance

that involves local communities, such as the PADEMP and SRDP, may help to ensure that

political priority does not wither away. Several key informants involved in these programs that

they were empowering the local community concerned with downstream contamination and

many of them continue to engage in regulatory hearings to provide their perspectives.

Participants may hold governments accountable to their own commitments.

A shift in perspective from prioritizing jurisdictional autonomy to considering sustainable water

management and ecological integrity will be necessary moving forward. Given the values

uncovered in our preliminary review of the justification of development decisions, this will

continue to be a challenge. However, participants in groups such as PADEMP and the SRDP

may encourage decision-makers to consider a more holistic perspective that prioritizes ecological

integrity. The information they generate may be used to inform development decisions and will

provide a necessary basis with which to measure change in the region and a platform from which

each participant can advocate for a basin-wide approach.

18

The institutional infrastructure to adopt a multi-level, basin-wide approach to transboundary

water governance in the MRB exists. Political will and prioritization is necessary to fulfill the

promise of the Master Agreement, to effectively implement the upcoming bilateral water

management agreements and to empower collaboration in the basin. Whether the jurisdictions

will capitalize on this opportunity to develop a more collaborative, basin wide approach to

transboundary governance remains to be seen. Certainly, challenges associated with inclusive

participation, agenda setting and values will remain. However, we remain optimistic that,

although governance in this basin will be far from simple or easy, it may more effectively

address the concerns of basin residents through collaborative processes occurring at multiple

levels in the basin. It may not be possible to level power asymmetries but revealing them is an

important first step to working well despite them.

19

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1 Canada’s Constitution Act uses the term ‘Aboriginal’ to identify three distinct indigenous groups within

Canada: Inuit, First Nations and Metis. Elsewhere in this paper we use the terms ‘indigenous peoples’ or ‘indigenous

governments’. We use the term Aboriginal where it is locally appropriate. For instance, in many official government

documents the term Aboriginal is used. 2 Confidential interview, 30 October 2013. 3 Confidential interview, 24 October 2013. 4 Confidential interview, 24 October 2013. 5 Confidential interview, 13 January 2014; Confidential interview A, 16 January 2014. 6 Confidential interview, 13 January 2014; Confidential interview A, 16 January 2014; Confidential interview

B, 16 January 2014; Confidential interview, 28 January 2014 7 Confidential interview, 8 August 2012; Confidential interview, 5 September 2012; Confidential interview,

13 September 2012. 8 Confidential interview, 13 August 2012; Confidential interview, 5 September 2012. 9 Confidential interview, 24 October 2013; Confidential interview, 30 October 3013; Confidential interview,

31 October 2013; Confidential interview, 22 April 2014. 10 Confidential interview, 30 October 2013. 11 Confidential interview, 24 October 2013; Confidential interview 30 October 2013. 12 Confidential interview, 13 January 2014; Confidential interview B, 16 January 2014. 13 Confidential interview, 13 January 2014. 14 Confidential interview, 22 April 2014. 15 Confidential interview, 22 April 2014. 16 Confidential interview, 30 October 2013. 17 Confidential interview, 8 August 2012; Confidential interview, 28 August 2012. 18 Confidential interview, 28 August 2012. 19 Confidential interview, 5 September 2012; Confidential interview, 13 September 2012. 20 Confidential interview B, 16 January 2014. 21 Confidential interview, 30 October 2013; Confidential interview, 22 April 2014. 22 Confidential interview, 22 April 2014. 23 Confidential interview, 13 August 2012. 24 Confidential interview, 7 August 2012. 25 Confidential interview, 15 November 2013.