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51st Annual Convention of the International Studies
Association
February 17-20, 2010 New Orleans (EUA)
ESDP missions and the promotion of international security
Maria Raquel Freire1 ([email protected])
Paula Duarte Lopes2 ([email protected])
University of Coimbra - Portugal
Work in progress, please do not cite without authors
permission.
Abstract
The European Union has assumed part of the responsibility for
the maintenance and
promotion of international security through the creation of ESDP
Missions. These
have been deployed both near and far from EU borders, suggesting
an unequivocal
concern with international security beyond EU's closer sphere of
influence. This
paper argues that these have, so far, complied with the UN
normative framework,
although reflecting an increasing regional European logic
towards the understanding
of international security and the path to secure it.
1 Maria Raquel Freire acknowledges the support provided by the
Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra (Portugal) and the
International Studies Association. 2 Paula Duarte Lopes
acknowledges the support provided by Fundao Calouste Gulbenkian,
the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra (Portugal) and
the International Studies Association.
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in our present world and into the foreseeable future, there is
no such
thing as international noninvolvement in violent conflicts.
There is, rather,
a choice between legitimate involvement and other, more ominous
forms
of intervention. (Kofi Annan, 1996)
Introduction
The concept of security in a post-post-cold war period has not
only broadened but
also deepened, beyond the mere existence of threats to a state.
Its broadness is
reflected in the consideration of distinct dimensions of
security beyond territorial
integrity, such as economic or environmental security
(Homer-Dixon, 1994). The
concept of security has also deepened in the sense that it
includes actors as subjects
of security besides the state, such as the individual (human
security) (UNDP, 1994) or
society (societal security) (Weaver, Buzan and Wilde, 1997).
Additionally, the
strategies to pursue peace and security have also evolved and
currently peace missions
have become a central stabilizing element, recurrently employed
towards the
promotion of international peace and security. International
security is here
understood in the terms of the United Nations (UN) Charter (UN,
1945), i.e.
international peaceful stability. The UN approach has been
informed by Peace
Studies in its commitment to promote peace not only through
keeping peace
(negative peace), but also through promoting structural
conditions for peace (positive
peace) (Galtung, 1969).
The UN security framework has become the underlying reference to
worldwide peace
and security strategies. Article 24 of the UN Charter confers on
the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, and
UN peace missions have become a strategy for this effect.
However, the United
Nations Charter does not foresee peace missions as such,
although it contains
elements and principles that reflect the spirit within which
these are envisaged. The
reasoning agreed to frame peace missions has been somewhat
between Chapter VI
(pacific resolution of disputes) and Chapter VII (peace
enforcement measures when
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peace is threatened or violated or when there are acts of
aggression), being called
Chapter VI .
As the world changed, so did the roles different actors played
in this type of peace
and security strategies. In fact, not only individual states,
regional arrangements and
international organizations have participated in peace missions
with or without the
UN, but also, the UN has given a clear sign urging the
involvement and initiative of
other parties, concerning the deployment of peace missions (UN,
2000). As a result,
the UN security regime has not only become the binding option
for security
cooperation, but it also became a source of legitimacy for peace
missions and an
accepted reference for regional and state behavior concerning
(inter)national security.
And although the relation between the UN security framework and
regional
arrangements is established in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter,
this relation has
become an uncertainty concerning their consisten[cy] with the
Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations (Article 52). Chapter VIII
emphasizes the role
regional arrangements may have on achieving pacific settlement
of local disputes
() before referring them to the Security Council (Article 52).
This already reflects a
concern with regional dynamics, recognizing roles and assigning
accountability to
regional actors. Additionally, the UN Security Council shall,
where appropriate,
utilize () regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its
authority (Article 53). If the initiative for this type of
intervention originates with
regional actors, then formal Security Council authorization is
required (Article 53).
Although peace missions are not explicitly envisaged in the UN
Charter, they fit with
its purposes and principles. Consequently, as peace missions
gained new dynamics,
including regional actors and ad-hoc arrangements, Chapter VIII
constitutes the basis
for framing regional participation in these missions. Still, the
variety of peace missions
(mandates and leading actors) as well as the inter-institutional
cooperation results in a
complex articulation of different interests and procedures
creating a dynamics of
variable geometry concerning who, how, when and where. The who
and the how are
addressed in Chapter VIII, although the complexity of different
actors with
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concurrent missions on the field might end up questioning UN
purposes and
principles. The when is ideally decided on a needs-base and the
where depends on a
conjugation of different variables. Chapter VIII seems to
explicitly envision regional
involvement concerning local disputes, almost as a subsidiarity
principle. However,
current trends include an increasing number of regional
arrangements involved
beyond local dynamics (out-of-area missions). Regionalization is
here, therefore,
understood as missions constituted at a regional level, and not
necessarily geared to
their own region.
Regional peace missions have emerged as an alternative to an
overburdened UN, by
allowing an increase in human and material resources beyond the
UN strained budget
and human-power framework. Certain European Common Security and
Defence
Policy (CSDP) missions constitute a clear example of this
dynamics. On the one
hand, the European Union (EU) deploys missions within its
neighborhood (e.g.
mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo or Moldova/Ukraine), but
also out-of-area,
such as those in Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, Afghanistan or
Indonesia (Aceh).
This paper argues that the European Union has assumed part of
the responsibility for
the maintenance and promotion of international peace and
security through the
creation of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
missions. And although
the EU has deployed both near and far from its borders, it is
argued that these
missions have, so far, been framed within the UN peace and
security normative
framework. The argument is sustained by the EUs political
commitment to this
peace and security strategy as well as by the EU and its member
states participation in
CSDP missions. Through the analysis of EUs political commitment
and
participation, the paper concludes that CSDP missions have been
contributing to the
UN security framework. Additionally, it is becoming visible a
specific European
approach to international peace and security strategies and
interventions.
Note on methodology
It should be noted that the information used in this paper is
based exclusively on
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available data from official documents. The remaining
information was not available
in the official sources remotely accessed. Consequently, this
paper provides the first
brushes of a much more complex and intricate picture to be
further analyzed. Most
of the analysis is based only on the 12 CSDP ongoing missions on
December 31,
2009.
Table 1 CSDP missions active on December 31, 2009
CSDP Mission Date of
Decision
info on
HR?*
info on
FR?**
EUPM/BiH March 2002 yes yes
EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH July 2004 yes no
EUJUST LEX/Iraq March 2005 no yes
EUSEC RD Congo May 2005 no no
EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories November 2005 no yes
EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine November 2005 no yes
EUPOL AGHANISTAN May 2007 yes no
EUPOL RD Congo June 2007 yes no
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau February 2008 yes no
EULEX Kosovo February 2008 no no
EUMM Georgia September 2008 yes yes
EUNAVFOR Somalia November 2008 no yes
* Human Resources ** Financial Resources
Source: Based on information collected from each missions
associated Council Joint Action.
Additionally, it should be noted that the information available
for each mission is
most of the times not fully comparable, since the documents do
not follow the same
template and detail level. Consequently, this paper only focuses
on the number of
missions as its analytical variable, e.g., the number of
missions deployed in Africa, the
number of missions Portugal participated with human resources,
the number of
missions Malta participated with financial resources, and so on.
Furthermore, it was
only possible to obtain human and financial resources
information on two CSDP
ongoing missions: EUPM/BiH (Council Joint Action, 2002) and EUMM
Georgia
(Council Joint Action, 2008/736). As a result, the analysis
always refers to the group
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of missions for which there was data available, i.e., when
referring to the number of
missions Cyprus participated financially and the number of
missions it participated
with human resources, the reference group of missions is not the
same. This
constitutes a methodological problem which will be overcome in
the next phase of
this research project. The information gathered does, however,
provide, as mentioned
above, a first take at a complex, multi-layered and intricate
dynamics.
Political commitment
The European Unions interventions towards the promotion of
international peace
and security reflect its political commitment to the UN security
framework. This is
visible in relation to the fundamental guidelines underlying UN
peace missions,
including horizontal and vertical cooperation,3
multi-dimensionality (Secretary-
General, 1992), consent of the parties, impartiality concerning
the dispute, and
refraining from the use of force.4 Additionally, the EU
incorporates in its missions a
normative dimension associated with the UNs liberal peace
project (rule of law,
democracy, good governance, transparency) (Richmond, 2009, 2005;
Chandler, 2006).
Institutionally, the EUs role in international peace and
security has undergone several
consolidating phases within the UNs Chapter VIII spirit starting
with the integration
efforts in the 1940s, which included a security concern, up to
the Treaty of Lisbon.
The European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has its
direct roots in
the Second World War. Western European governments developed
efforts to replace
age-old rivalries between their countries with dialogue, and
revisionism with
compromise, setting up new international institutions. The first
attempt to prevent
violent conflict through European integration was evident in the
Brussels Treaty
(1948), which established the Western European Union (WEU).5 The
main idea
underlying WEU was the commitment to mutual defence should any
of the
3 Horizontal cooperation with both other states and missions;
vertical cooperation with local agents as well as under the UN
aegis. 4 For more on the holy trinity see Bellamy, Williams and
Griffin, 2007). 5 The Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural
Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, or the Brussels Treaty
for short, was agreed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
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signatories be the victim of an armed attack in Europe.6 The
efforts to create a
reliable security community were not circumscribed to Europe.
The United States of
America (USA) were very much involved from the beginning,
conferring the
negotiations a transatlantic approach. As a result, the North
Atlantic Treaty (1949)
was signed in Washington, D.C., between the Brussels Treaty
signatories, the USA
and Canada.7 The basic idea underlying the WEU was maintained:
the signatories
agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them () shall
be considered an
attack against them all and () each of them () [will take] such
action as it deems
necessary (...) to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area
(NATO, 1949: Art. 5). The need to provide military and political
structures to uphold
the Washington Treaty led to the creation, in 1950, of the North
Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
Germany, however, was not a signatory of either the Brussels
(WEU) or the
Washington (NATO) treaties. Its importance towards international
peace and
security, however, led to the signing of the European Defence
Community Treaty
(1952) by the six founding members of the European Coal and
Steel Community
(later founders of the European Community, 1957). However,
France did not ratify
the Paris Treaty due to domestic political opposition and the
project was aborted.
Instead, a more traditional military alliance was consolidated.
The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949, pooled the military
capabilities of its
members rather than integrating them, and it centered on the
USA. Germany joined
in 1954.
It was only in the 1970s that a first cautious step towards a
common European
foreign policy was taken. The Luxembourg Report (October, 1970)
established the
European Political Cooperation to allow member states of the
European
Community to discuss and co-ordinate their positions on foreign
affairs and, where
appropriate, act in concert (White, 2001: 71). The EPC, which
somewhat belatedly
6 From the WEU website www.weu.int, accessed January 15, 2010. 7
Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were also invited and
agreed to join the Washington Treaty.
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translated Western Europes desire to define a common identity on
the world stage
and to play an active role on it, evolved at the time when
East-West negotiations in
the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE)
were ongoing. In October 1987, the Hague Platform on European
Security
recognized the coexistence of the European and Atlantic vectors
while affirming that
the European identity in security matters was complementary to
NATO.
The end of the Cold War engendered profound transformations in
international
politics by allowing the emergence of several new states in
Europe and eliminating
the Soviet threat. The new more permissive international
environment, together with
the declining geopolitical importance of Europe for the sole
remaining superpower,
created an opening for a more autonomous EU security and defence
policy. The
Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 contributed to the
reinvigoration of the
security dimension within the EU. It transformed the European
Political Cooperation
into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with an
intergovernmental
character, and envisaging the option to resort to the WEU to
implement the defence
tasks decided within the EU framework.
However, this institutional framework revealed its limits in
regards to the Balkans. Its
failure to stop the bloodshed in Croatia and Bosnia brought into
focus a sequence of
serious security-related shortfalls of the EU. Its defence
institutions, founded on the
priority of territorial defence, were inadequate for the new
intra-state wars. In
addition, it lacked deployable, professional armed forces, had
no common strategic
culture and, above all, was incapable of projecting significant
forces abroad (Haine,
2006). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), finally, gave the EU a
recognisable foreign
policy for the first time (Keane, 2005: 91), incorporating the
Petersberg Tasks of the
WEU humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks
of combat
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.8 Moreover,
it established the
post of High Representative for the CFSP to give greater
coherence to EUs foreign
policy. 8 These had been set out in the Petersberg Declaration
adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union in
June 1992.
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Washington supported the strengthening of the CFSP because the
process was
expected to be confined to the formation of a European Security
and Defence
Identity (ESDI) within NATO.9 Consequently, the Atlantic
Alliance agreed, at the
Berlin Summit (1996), to give the WEU access to its capabilities
should the EU
decide to avail itself of the institution to carry out military
operations in which
NATO as a whole was not involved. It seemed at the time that the
WEU would
become the somewhat loosely attached defence arm of the EU and
the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
Yet, these institutional arrangements failed to inject
noticeable dynamism into EU
security policy. Brussels inability to secure a diplomatic
solution to the onslaught of
Serbian forces against Albanians in Kosovo, in the late 1990s,
once again showed up
the dependency of the Europeans on American war-fighting
capabilities. The
breakthrough in this process came at the St. Malo Franco-British
Summit in
December 1998. Both governments declared their support for the
development of an
autonomous European defence capacity as long as it would not put
in jeopardy the
relationship with NATO.
At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the basic
ESDP institutional
infrastructure was created. It was further agreed a headline
goal for the establishment
of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which was to have 60,000 troops
deployable within
60 days for at least one year (Helsinki Presidency, 1999).
Already in the lead-up to the
Summit, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was appointed as
High
Representative for the CFSP, and the WEU was incorporated into
the EU.10 Taken
9 ESDI was a careful two-way bargain by which the US agreed to
support European efforts to gain greater military credibility in
exchange for which Europeans committed to pursue their military
ambitions inside NATO, thereby granting an element of US political
control. (Sangiovanni, 2003: 196; see also Webber et al. 2002) 10
According to the WEU decisions in Marseille in November 2000, the
WEU maintained its collective defence obligations as well as
minimal structures and residual functions to support the transition
process (WEU Council of Ministers, Marseille Declaration, November
13, 2000: paragraph 1).
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together, these decisions promised to give the EU the hammer and
anvil necessary
to help forge the implementation of the Petersberg tasks (Keane,
2005: 91).
Despite the Helsinki breakthrough, civilian crisis management
capabilities were still
missing. Smaller member states, such as Sweden and Finland,
insisted on balancing
the militarization of the EU with the creation of civilian
instruments designed to
allow the Union to play a constructive role in peacebuilding.
Hence, the June 2000
Santa Maria da Feira European Council concentrated on ESDP
interventions in the
areas of rule of law, civil administration, civil protection and
policing. With the
establishment of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis
Management
(CIVCOM), the EU created a civilian counterpart to the military
working parties
created at the Helsinki summit. The civilian profile of European
foreign policy was
further strengthened by the adoption, one year later, of the EU
Programme for the
Prevention of Violent Conflicts. Its main rationale is to
complement the reactive
ESDP centered on crisis management and post-violent conflict
stabilization with
proactive violent conflict prevention (Keane, 2005: 92).
The Treaty of Nice (2000) specifies provisions on the
participation of non-European
NATO members and EU candidate countries in ESDP operations and
spells out
permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation and cooperation
(European
Council, 2000: Annex VI, titles III and IV). More generally, the
Treaty reaffirms the
EUs determination to develop a coherent and effective approach
to crisis
management. At the end of 2002, the Berlin Plus arrangements
were concluded,
institutionalizing a strategic partnership between NATO and the
EU concerning crisis
management.11 The ESDP, finally, had access to NATO assets,
notably its planning
capabilities. Soon after, the EU sought the support of the
Alliance to put European
soldiers on the ground in Macedonia in its first-ever military
operation (Concordia).
11 It should be noted, however that the Berlin Plus agreement is
not a public document and has never been ratified by national
parliaments. (ESDA, 2009: 1)
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As the EU takes the first steps on the field with peace
missions, it also feels the need
to have a coherent and structured strategy concerning security
issues as an anchor to
its role in building peace. Consequently, in 2003, the EU member
states agree on a
European Security Strategy, which sets the general guidelines
for common external
action (Haine, 2003), expanding the Petersberg Tasks by adding
joint disarmament
operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism
and security sector
reform to the task list of the ESDP. Furthermore, following this
consolidation effort,
the EU defence ministers also created, in 2004, the European
Defence Agency
(EDA), aiming to support the member states and the Council in
their effort to
improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis
management and to
sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future
(Joint Action, 2004).
The EDA also plays the role of systems integrator, assisting in
the definition of
defence requirements and the coordination of procurement across
the EU (Witney,
2004).
These developments have culminated in the Treaty of Lisbon
(2007), which replaces
the ESDP by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),
enhancing
institutional prerogatives that seek to overcome the EUs
inter-institutional
limitations concerning consistency and cohesion. The creation of
the post of High
Representative, who accumulates the functions of the former High
Representative for
CFSP and of the Commissioner for External Relations, is such an
example.
Additionally, the Treaty of Lisbon institutionalizes the scope
of the previous peace
missions, further extending the so-called Petersberg tasks,
including military advice
and assistance task, peace-making and post-conflict
stabilisation; conflict prevention
and post-conflict stabilization missions (ToL, 2007: Article 28
B, paragraph 1).
Further, the European Defence Agency is now included within the
legal framework
of the CSDP (ToL, 2007: Article 28 D), demonstrating a bigger
commitment by EUs
member states, regarding the development of EU operational
capabilities (Dagand,
2008).
The EUs institutionalization of its role concerning peace and
security has been
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gradual but consistent, demonstrating a firm commitment both
from the individual
member states and from the EUs institutions, resulting in the
enhancement of
human and material capabilities. This has allowed the EU to take
more
responsibilities within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN,
including its direct
involvement in out of area dynamics.
Commitment and participation
To date, the EU deployed a total of 23 ESDP/CSDP missions
(fourteen civilian, six
military and three civilian-military). On December 31, 2009,
eleven missions had been
completed.12 In a short period of time, the EU has gained
considerable experience in
international crisis management.
On January 1, 2003, the first EU civilian crisis management
operation under ESDP,
the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was deployed in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It
had initially about 500 police officers and was mandated to
improve local law
enforcement (European Council, 2002). Code-named Concordia, the
EUs first
military mission replaced the NATO operation Allied Harmony. On
March 31, 2003,
350 EU soldiers arrived in the former-Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (European
Council, 2003a). The then NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson
(2003: 512)
described the transition from NATO to the ESDP mission in
Macedonia as an
example of successful cooperation between Europes two leading
security institutions,
illustrating that transatlantic relations were a positive sum
game. In December 2003,
Concordia was followed by PROXIMA, the EUs second police
mission.
In June of the same year, following a request by the United
Nations (UN), the EU
sent 1,500 troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo with the
aim of preventing a
large-scale humanitarian and civil crisis in the North-eastern
region of the country
(European Council, 2003b; Council Joint Action, 2003). Operation
ARTEMIS, which
12 CONCORDIA (2003), EUPOL PROXIMA (2003-2005) and EUPAT
(2005-2006) in Macedonia; ARTEMIS 2003), EUPOL Kinshasa (2004-2007)
and EUFOR (2006) in RD Congo; EUJUST THEMIS (2004-2005) in Georgia;
EU support to AMIS (2005-2007) in Sudan, Darfur; Aceh Monitoring
Mission (2005-2006) in Indonesia; EUBAM Rafah (2005-2007) in
Palestinian Territories (suspended); and EUFOR Tchad/RCA
(2007-2009).
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lasted until September, was an autonomous European mission,
i.e., it was not
dependent on NATO assets. In addition, it was the first EU
military operation
outside Europe and, thus, the first concrete step towards
implementing the European
Security Strategy. It demonstrated that the ESDP had evolved
from a regional crisis
manager confined to Europe to an actor with the ambition to
become a global
security player. The significance of ARTEMIS for the EU was
described by the then
High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, as when there
is political will,
things get done (Solana, 2003: 11).
Within a year, the EU deployed both civilian and military
operations in Europe and
beyond, in coordination with NATO, the UN or autonomously. It
was the beginning
of what became an enlarged EU presence in different areas around
the globe, with its
involvement stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East,
Africa and South-East
Asia. In the process, the EU managed to make good progress in
translating its
ambitions into reality and in matching commitments with
capabilities without over-
stretching itself. However, resources are not unlimited and
decisions and actions are
not unrestrained.
It should be noted that the first ESDP mission (EUPM B-H)
followed from the UNs
International Police Task Force, illustrative of UNs
regionalization trend of its peace
operations. In fact, EU missions have mostly been deployed in
parallel to other
international organizations missions, such as the UN, NATO, the
Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union.
Moreover, the
EU has also included a transnational approach to its missions,
beyond its member
states. For instance, Canada, Croatia, Norway, Switzerland and
Turkey are recurrent
partners in ESDP/CSDP ongoing missions. Additionally, Iceland in
Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro in Somalia and New Zealand in
Afghanistan have also
partnered with the EU. It should also be highlighted that on
previous EU missions in
Africa, countries such as Albania, Brazil and Russia have also
been partners.
The EU has deployed essentially civilian missions (fourteen, six
of which have already
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been concluded). These civilian missions mandates focus
essentially on police
training and advisory, border monitoring and rule of law. The EU
military missions,
mostly concentrated in Africa with the exception of ALTHEA and
CONCORDIA
(Balkans), have been to date six, with two still ongoing.13 From
2005, the EU has also
deployed civilian-military missions, one in Darfur (already
concluded), one in Guinea-
Bissau (2008) and another in RD Congo (2005). The military
dimension of civilian-
military missions has mainly focused on security sector reform
and military advisory,
thus not involving hard military human and material resources.
It is also interesting to
note that the budgets of civilian-military missions are not
fundamentally higher than
those of civilian missions, further confirming the
non-militarized nature of the
former.
Based on the information available, all EU member states
participate, at one time or
another, financially or with human resources, in different
ESDP/CSDP missions. It is
clear, however, that this participation is not homogenous. For
instance, for the two
missions with information on human and financial resources
breakdown EUPM
(Council Joint Action, 2002) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and EUMM
Georgia (Council
Joint Action, 2008/736) in the first case, all member states
contribute financially
but four do not match this contribution with human resources; in
the second, the 22
contributing countries coincide in both human and financial
resources. This draws
attention to the disparities found regarding the ways different
member states decide
to get involved. Although ESDP/CSDP missions are a result of an
inter-
governmental decision, influenced by national interests, the
actual characteristics of
each mission headline goals, lessons learnt, and enhanced
capabilities also have a
bearing on each members decision to participate or not and how
this participation is
put in practice.
Thus, the individual countries do not all participate in the
same type of missions, in
the same time frames, with the same resources, in the same
geographical areas. For
instance, regarding missions with information concerning human
resources deployed, 13 Of the six EU military missions, three have
been in collaboration with NATO and the other three with the
UN.
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most EU member states participate in EUMM (Council Joint Action,
2008/736) in
Georgia and EUPM BiH (Council Joint Action, 2002) and EUFOR
ALTHEA BiH
(Council Joint Action, 2004) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Georgia,
this number reaches
81% and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 85% of EU member states are
involved in EUPM
and 74% in EUFOR ALTHEA.14 On the contrary, most EU member
states do not
participate in EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (Council Action, 2008/112)
or EUPOL RD
Congo (Council Joint Action, 2007). Only 22% participate in the
former and 33% in
the latter.
Regarding information available concerning who contributes
financially, the missions
with most countries contributing are EUPM BiH (100%) and EUMM
Georgia and
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (2005) with 81%. On the contrary, only
56% and
63% of EU member countries contribute financially towards EUPOL
COPPS (2005)
in the Palestinian Territories and EUJUST LEX (2005) in Iraq,
respectively.
Nevertheless, it seems that more than 50% of EU members usually
contribute
financially to ESDP/CSDP missions, reflecting the individual
commitment towards
EUs international role in peace and security.
Despite this aggregated picture, some states are clearly bigger
contributors than
others, concerning the number of missions they get involved
in.15 For instance,
regarding human resources, France, Germany, Italy and Spain are
involved in all
missions considered here whereas Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark,
Latvia, Luxemburg,
Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia only participate in one or two
missions. Concerning the
missions for which there is financial information, France,
Germany and Italy also
contribute towards all missions, but so do Great Britain and The
Netherlands.
Additionally, Belgium and Denmark contribute financially to all
but one of these
missions. This crude image of ESDP/CSDP missions reveals a clear
heterogeneity of
EU member states participation, both in terms of human resources
and financial
contributions. This heterogeneity will be further researched,
testing the hypothesis
14 All the numbers used in this analysis are based on
information available by December 31, 2009. 15 An analysis of this
nature begs a further breakdown concerning persons deployed and
euros made available. This will be developed at a later stage of
the Project.
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16
that the type of human resources and amount of financial
contributions also vary
across the EU member states spectrum.
Triangulating commitment, politics and participation
Since the end of the 1990s, there has been a trend towards
regionalization, mostly
visible by the increased number of peace missions led by
regional organizations (e.g.
European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, African
Union); by ad hoc
coalitions; by key states in the region taking the political and
military lead of UN
operations (e.g. Brazil in Haiti); and by leading regional
powers assuming the burden
within their own regions (e.g. Australia in the South Pacific)
(Cottey, 2008). In the
European Union case, this trend is visible, as discussed above,
through the number of
ESDP/CSDP missions deployed near and far European borders as
well as through
the number of member states involved in these missions. This
process has
strengthened the possibility for these actors to establish peace
missions solely with
their own contributions, besides creating the conditions for
hybrid missions.16
The relation between UN peace interventions framework and
regional arrangements,
be them a state, a group of states or ad hoc coalitions is not
clear. This suggests that
non-UN-led peace missions, instead of acting in a complementary
way to the UN
collective security system, may become local agents of the
regional hegemon in
question (Bellamy and Williams, 2004: 194). This does not
necessarily impair,
however, the level of success of these missions; what it does
impair is the way these
missions inter-relate with the UN, clearly running the risk of
challenging the UN
international security framework.17 As a result, regionalization
has the potential to
distort the UN principles and purposes for which peace missions
were created in the
first place. Regionalization may easily contribute to the
military robustness envisaged,
but it may also imply the instrumentalization of peace forces,
undermining the
legitimacy of the UN. This instrumentalization can facilitate
the regional and/or
16 Hybrid missions refer to UN missions in collaboration with
other regional organisations or arrangements (Pugh, 2008: 418). 17
For concrete examples see Bellamy and Williams, 2004: 196.
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17
national appropriation of UN language and practice in order to
pursue narrower and
self-interests.
The EU clearly illustrates this dynamics of regionalization;
however, there are
indicators suggesting that its role in international peace and
security, despite its
regional and individual member states interests, has been
contributing to the UN
purposes and principles. This contribution is illustrated by the
EUs political
commitment towards international peace and security; the EUs
commitment to
participation, including its individual member states records;
the articulation with
other non-EU countries and international organizations,
including the UN; and also
by the level of commitment intrinsic to CSDP mandates and the
way they closely
accompany the evolution of the situation in the field.
Concerning political commitment, as analyzed above, the EU has
equipped itself with
institutional, legal and operational capabilities to better
respond to crises situations on
its own, with allies or in articulation with other international
organizations. The
European Security Strategy, the European Defence Agency, the
High Representative
and the European Common Security and Defence Policy are but the
most relevant
examples of this institutionalized commitment. As well, the
increasing number of
missions deployed by the EU and its member states human and
financial
commitment reveals that the political commitment is being
matched by actual
participation. These demonstrate the resolve of the EU to
actively participate and
contribute towards international peace and security, beyond its
own borders and
neighborhood.
This role is also clearly acknowledged by other international
organizations, such as
NATO and AU, and by the UN itself. For instance, CONCORDIA
(FYROM) has
been led by the EU after NATO and currently in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO and
the EU are collaborating under the Berlin Plus arrangements in
EUFOR ALTHEA
BiH. It should be noted that the first ESDP mission was actually
followed from the
UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Further, Operation ARTEMIS in RD Congo
and
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18
EUFOR Tchad/RCA, both military missions, are articulated with UN
missions on
the field. Still in cooperation with the UN, the EUBMM
Moldova/Ukraine is in
collaboration with United Nations Development Program and, in
Georgia, the EU
collaborates with UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and
OSCE. These
varying inter-institutional relations constitute a clear example
of the international
recognition and legitimacy conferred to the EU by other
international organizations.
Moreover, individual states also have recognized the EUs role in
building peace, by
partnering with the EU in various peace missions, such as
Brazil, Canada, New
Zealand, Norway or Russia.
Additionally, the dynamics associated to EUs involvement in
different crisis
management scenarios indicates awareness and flexibility in
regards to rendering EUs
commitment operational. This is reflected in the subsequent
and/or concurrent
missions deployed in the same geographical area and their
respective mandates. For
instance, the first ever ESDP mission deployed in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), a
civilian mission, was two years later complemented by a military
one (EUFOR
ALTHEA), both still operational. In neighboring FYROM, there
were different
missions and mandates, mostly sequential, though overlapping
between them for a
short period of time. Consequently, the EU presence adopted a
clear concern with
continuity and stability, easing the transitions between
military (CONCORDIA) and
civilian missions, EUPOL PROXIMA followed by EUPAT. The latter
two are
related to police issues, but the change of mandates reflects
willingness to better
respond to the needs in the field. In RD Congo, the EU is
present since 2003 with
both civilian and military mandates. The first mission (ARTEMIS)
was a military one,
which was followed a year later by EUPOL Kinshasa (civilian),
this coincided with a
seven month long military mission (EUFOR RD Congo) as well as
with EUSEC RD
Congo, which is still ongoing and has a civilian-military
mandate. Also ongoing is
EUPOL RD Congo with just a civilian nature. It is interesting to
notice that there has
been an alternate approach between military and civilian means,
but acknowledging
the need for a combination of these approaches whenever needed.
This is clearly
reflected in the civilian-military EUSEC RD Congo mission, still
ongoing.
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19
Concluding remarks
This analysis clearly demonstrates the international role the EU
plays in the
promotion of international peace and security. Although it does
not provide a
definitive conclusion regarding its contribution towards the UN
peace and security
framework, it unquestionably provides a solid basis towards
future research on this
matter. This should be pursued through a multi-level (UN, EU and
member states)
and multi-track (articulation between missions, independently of
actors or mandates)
approach in order to grasp the complexity of these dynamics. In
the case of the EU,
it is fundamental to further analyze the type of contributions
by member states,
regarding human and financial resources, since the
inter-governmental decision
making procedure prevails. This unpacking allows for a better
understanding of the
European regionalization dynamics within Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter. This
analysis suggests that the EUs role in promoting international
peace and security
constitutes a building block towards the UN framework, rather
than a stumbling
stone. Nevertheless, there is an indication that the EU has been
shaping its own
approach towards crisis management. This approach denotes a
clear intention to
combine forces to play an enhanced role in the promotion of
international peace and
security, focusing on preventive action and crisis management,
in civilian and military
missions. It thus comes as no surprise that civilian crisis
management has proven
fertile ground for the affirmation of the CSDP.
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