Epa Cases Incomplete

1 | E L E C T I O N L A W A T T Y . A N I C I A M A R Q U E Z

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

MAY 07, 2001 | KAPUNAN, J.

Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San

Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then

applicable was the 1935 Constitution.

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps

and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the

United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth

Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others,

"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said

provision of law reads:

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with

the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following

circumstances is present:

The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or

The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance

incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino

citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of

his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall

be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his

naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S.

Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through

repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative

of the Second District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin

of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House

of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not

qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born

citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.

HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring

respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. MR

was denied.

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari. Petitioner asserts that:

1. respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost

his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and

had to reacquire the same by repatriation.


2. Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens

are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or

perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen

when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the

innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

ISSUE: WON respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,

can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: YES. Cruz can still be considered as a natural-born Filipino.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship

upon reaching the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These

ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born

citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a

particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the

Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine

citizenship."

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through

naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised

Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by

Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the

qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.

The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from

its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant

has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3)

has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)

committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government

announced policies.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the

manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three

modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by

naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As

a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by

Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for


reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.[16] Under this

law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess

certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their

citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the

allied forces in World War II;(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any

other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic

necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of

the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath

in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a

naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a

naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen

before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-

born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the

Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine

citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine

citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the

same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited

provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born

citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing

that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he

lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had

to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. Article III, Section 4 of the 1973

Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a

Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his

Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which

were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before

January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected

Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/may2001/142840.htm#_edn16


obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire

Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973

Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an

act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the

effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the

majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of

Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with

paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only

naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the

enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes

of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance

with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the

process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born

Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons

who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is

clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the

reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the

reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through

naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-

born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member

of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of

all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.

The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.

In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and

annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for

the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the

correctness of the assailed decision.

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.

LEE, respondents.

June 28, 1996 | J. Panganiban

G.R. No. 123755

Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon.

Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be

disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a

citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. COMELEC 2nd

Division granted the petition and declared Frivaldo disqualified. MR filed by Frivaldo remained

unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was

voted for during the elections held on said date. Three days after election, COMELEC en banc

affirmed the decision of the 2nd

Division.


Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

RaulR.Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

Lee filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor

of Sorsogon. Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to

reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial

candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the

evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of

the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that he took his oath of

allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which

he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As

such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and

received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal

impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred

that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor— not Lee — should

occupy said position of governor.

Comelec 1st Division promulgated the resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the

highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and

that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and xxx having reacquired his

Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree

No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon." Thus, proclamation of

Lee was then annulled. Canvassers had to reconvene again to proclaim Frivaldo as the duly

elected Governer of Sorsogon. MR of Lee was then denied. On February 26, 1996, the present

petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued

on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status

quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following

propositions".

"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the

exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted

without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;

Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and

rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;

Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof

retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and


Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's

proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."

G.R. No. 120295

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo

assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the

Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereunder, the Comelec had no jurisdiction to

issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by law," i.e.,

"not later than fifteen days before the election."

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a

certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under

Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of

candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election."

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for

disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a

jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.

ISSUES:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of

citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it

be given retroactive effect? If so, from when? (Repatriation is valid and legal. It may given

retroactive effect from the time of application.)

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing

bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon? (No)

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317

considering that : said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo

warranto case"? (Yes)

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing

jurisprudence? (No)

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the

assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of

Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of

the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"? (No)


The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue

in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a

qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:

"Sec. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where

he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write

Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the

sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

xxx xxx xxx

Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by

naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 and during the oral

argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that

the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several

members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his

political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court

because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.

FRIVALDO’S CLAIMS:

1. Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by

the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in

1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee.

2. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding

and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote

from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to

boot.

3. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of

reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor

General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time,

as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his

able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the

provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.

4. He insists that he—not Lee—should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of

Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since,

clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and

since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.

LEE’S CLAIMS:

First. P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that "then President Corazon

Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,

forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses


a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of

prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the

1987 Constitution," adding that in her memorandum dated March 27,1987 to the members of the

Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725,

President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings

within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No.

270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."

COURT SAYS:

The memorandum cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law

sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent

ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made

because then President Aquino in her memorandum — based on the copy furnished us by Lee —

did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being

rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number

or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by

implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and

unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent

that they cannot co-exist." At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the

Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending

whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words,

the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress — once created—to

deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said

so instead of referring the matter to Congress.

Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation

proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995x x x

(and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x," which "prevented a judicious

review and evaluation of the merits thereof."

COURT SAYS:

We are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and

the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by

Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude

that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under

P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. At any rate,

any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the

Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless

it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification

prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election.

COURT SAYS:

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

a citizen of the Philippines;

a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;


a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect." In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election

day."

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time

when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at

least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty

three years of age on election day).

An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and

on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his

citizenship on June 30, 1995—the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective

officials) began—he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to

discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was

already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give

spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such

law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)construction, it

should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of

"ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates.

Other contentions raised against Frivaldo

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral

argument to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the

candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39,

apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of

qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law a "voter" must be a

citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a

validly registered one — if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.

COURT SAYS:

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the

law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the

requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE

qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended

CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter

presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as

another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to

require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to

govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x

x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code

requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually.

Hence, registration—not the actual voting—is the core of this "qualification."

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the

date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of

candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter, presumably including the

defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a

candidate. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation"


of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be

taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation

(8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken

his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the

candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the

immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-

declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of

Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994. It is true

that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the

contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the

statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a

new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly

recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by

marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail

of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status"

and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a

Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such

provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens

before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women—the

right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not

exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new

right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now

desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such

former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of

naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine

citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit

Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino

citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August

17, 1994? While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an

American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given

retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995

is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994.

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to

applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee

decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time,

then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo—having already renounced his

American citizenship — was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This being so,

all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification— whether at the date of

proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate

of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot. Based on the foregoing, any question

regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is


considered as having been repatriated—i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored — as of August 17,

1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the

retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40

of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local

position?"

COURT SAYS: No. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he abandoned

and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." By

the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his

oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and

in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine

Government."

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995,

there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo.

COURT SAYS: No.

The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a

Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However,

there is no record of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for

the May 8, 1995 elections.

Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative

case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such

citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and

again, as the occasion demands.

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction

Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC

No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the

Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee

reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317

questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 — "beyond the 5-day reglementary

period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or

a quo warranto action."

COURT SAYS: No. This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution has given the

Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the

elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials." Instead of


dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional

prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the

Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations —of which

SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one. The proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot

deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity.

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within

ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6)

days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired

jurisdiction over the same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid

First, the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino

vs. COMELEC, Lee is "a second placer, xxx just that, a second placer."

Labo case as used by Lee is not wholly applicable. Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical

situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy

was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration,

for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in

1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.

Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of

Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring

such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other words, that the voters intentionally

wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has

any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and not Lee—should be proclaimed, since in

losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Laboagain, "obviously not the choice of the people"

of Sorsogon.

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship

and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he—not Lee —

should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be

corrected.

The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second

Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995

disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond

the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads

as follows:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.— A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a

certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under


Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of

candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election"

It is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the

Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:

"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified

and he is voted for and receives the -winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing

of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (Italics supplied)

WARNING! There is a brief refutation of Justice Davide’s dissenting opinion in the full

case. You may want to check.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be

possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and atthe start of the

term of office to which he has been elected.

P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or

repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have

been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or

curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the

legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his

citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his

repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the

pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in

contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of

the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore,

since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted toAugust 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of

Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well.

Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the

people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In any

action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert

utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority,

for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the

choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the

petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to

constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to

the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic

institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and

promote. The real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal

technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick

in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Concededly, Frivaldo sought American

citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. And let it not be overlooked, his


demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite

several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal

technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines

even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility

of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have

given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most

powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and

serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal

interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and

above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be

governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

MAY 26, 2009 | MENDOZA, J.

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates

for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for

disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a

citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

COMELEC 2ND

DIVISION: granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of

the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen.

Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under

Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he

was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,

San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under

US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his

Filipino citizenship. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano

is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship. The Commission

then declared respondent Manzano disqualified as candidate fro Vice-Mayor Makati City.MR

was filed but remained pending even until after the 1998 elections. Accordingly, pursuant to

Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers

tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the

winner.


Sometime later, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Petitioner’s

motion was opposed by private respondent. The motion was not resolved. Instead, COMELEC

en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the

COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent

qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

COMELEC’S BASIS FOR REVERSAL: Respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in

San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States

Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen

by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the

time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an

American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the

Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,

however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine

citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact

that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in

the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under

American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of

August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati. This is a

petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and

to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City.

Procedural Issue: WON petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit

considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by

Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner’s motion for leave to intervene granted.

Held: Yes, he has personality.

Section 1, Rule 8 of Rules of Procedure. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. : Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such

action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

Section 3. Discretion of Commission.: In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and

whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the

race at the time he sought to intervene. At the time petitioner sought to intervene in the

proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the

election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out

only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at

that time. Nor is petitioner’s interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion

for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered

the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to

intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is


clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which

provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the

winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,

upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even

after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was

tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for

certiorari.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE: WON private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship

and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

HELD: He is not disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor.

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local

Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as “disqualified from running for

any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship.” This provision is incorporated

in the Charter of the City of Makati.


DUAL CITIZENSHIP DUAL ALLEGIANCE

It arises when, as a result of the

concurrent application of the different laws

of two or more states, a person is

simultaneously considered a national by the

said states.

For instance, such a situation may arise

when a person whose parents are citizens of

a state which adheres to the principle of jus

sanguinis is born in a state which follows

the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso

facto and without any voluntary act on his

part, is concurrently considered a citizen of

both states. Considering the citizenship

clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is

possible for the following classes of citizens

of the Philippines to possess dual

citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign

countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and

alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children

are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s

country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or

omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which

a citizen of the Philippines may, without

performing any act, be also a citizen of

another state; but the above cases are clearly

possible given the constitutional provisions

on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to

the situation in which a person

simultaneously owes, by some positive act,

loyalty to two or more states

Involuntary Voluntary

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: “Dual allegiance

of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.” This provision was

included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople.

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional

Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their


allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual

citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring

to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this

disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict

process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it

should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine

citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their

condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on

September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus

sanguinis,while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at

least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the

COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,

private respondent “effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law,” so that now

he is solely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is

not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was

made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been

made when he reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American

citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of

the United States, which provided that “A person who is a national of the United States, whether

by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in

a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over

foreign territory.” To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme

Court inAfroyim v. Rusk as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign

relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private

respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American

citizenship. Private respondent’s certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the

following statements made under oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF “NATURAL-BORN” OR “NATURALIZED”) NATURAL-BORN

. . . .

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY

OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I

WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED

AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF

VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,

effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.

COMELEC it was held


Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an

American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American

passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit

in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual

citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American

nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.

COMELEC applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,

possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there

is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be “express,” it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either “express” or

“implied.”

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that

he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support

the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so

without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are

concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said

before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when

considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,

practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no

doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under

oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his

Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.

AMADO F. GADOR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AS REPRESENTED

BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HON. LEONARDO PEREZ,respondent

January 22, 1980 | FERNANDEZ, J

This is a petition for mandamus with a prayer of preliminary injunction seeking the relief from

respondent COMELEC to immediately include his name among the list of candidates for Mayor

of the City of Ozamis which shall be printed and distributed soon to all voting centers in the City

of Ozamis.

The petition alleges that, Gador, the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City

of Ozamis as Independent for the January 30, 1980 local election. However, he only filed his

certificate of candidacy (COC) on January 7, 1980 at the Election Registrar of Ozamis. In view

of the filing of his COC, he wired on two occasions (Jan.8 and 11) the COMELEC Chairman,

informing him of his filing and requesting for the approval of his candidacy.


Unfortunately, while petitioner is in the thick of his campaigns and asking about the status of his

candidacy, it came to his knowledge that the resolution of the COMELEC for the extension of

time for filing of COCs from January 4 to January 10 had been denied by the President.

ISSUE: WON the COC of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid.

HELD:

Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy

shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the

petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of

candidacy.

The Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond

January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES, QUEZON,

VIVENCIO G. LIRIO respondents.

December 4, 1985 | TEEHANKEE, J

Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had filed on Jan. 4, 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy

in the Jan. 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn certificate of candidacy (COC) as independent for

the office of vice-mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. Later on the very same day,

Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said COC "for personal

reasons."

Upon knowing of his companion’s withdrawal, Crisologo Villanueva on Jan. 25, 1980 filed his

own sworn COC in substitution of Mendoza for the said office. Results of the elections showed

Villanueva to be the clear winner over Lirio, the respondent with a margin of 452 votes.

However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers considered the votes for Villanueva as stray votes

and was thus disregarded by virtue of the Provinicial Election Officer’s erroneous opinion that

since petitioner’s name does not appear in the list of candidates, then his candidacy was not duly

approved by the COMELEC and his votes cannot be legally counted. Lirio was then proclaimed

to be the winner.

Villanueva then filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation and that he be proclaimed

as the true winner.

Respondent Comelec issued a resolution denying the petition on two grounds: 1) He could not

validly substitute Mendoza because his withdrawal was not under oath as required under Sec.27

and 2) The withdrawal was made not after the last day for filing COCs, as contemplated under

Sec. 28, but on the very same day.

The 1978 Election Code provides:


SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdraw ... unless the candidate files with the office which

received the certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal ...

SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should ...

withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for the office for which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before midday of election ...

ISSUE: WON Villanueva has validly substituted Mendoza in his candidacy giving him the right

to be proclaimed as the winner for the Vice Mayoralty position.

HELD:

Villanueva has validly substituted Mendoza and justifiably the rightful winner in the Vice

Mayoralty position.

1.)The first ground should be rejected because the fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn

is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner

as the substitute candidate. Also, his unsworn withdrawal filed later on the same day had

been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection. His name did not even

appear among the list of candidates while petitioner as substitute candidate circularized formal

notices of his candidacy to all chairmen and members of the citizen’s election committees.

As likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal requirement

that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to

observe the requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity."

2.) Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of

candidacies on Jan. 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and

purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made substantially and

in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec.

The Court once again reiterated the need to respect the will of the electorate instead of

defeating the same through the invocation of formal or technical defects.

JOEL G. MIRANDA vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS

MELO, J.:

FACTS:

On March 24, 1998, Jose “Pempe” Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City,

Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May

11, 1998 elections.


On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due

Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed as SPA

No. 98-019. The petition was GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution dated May 5, 1998

(pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose “Pempe” Miranda.

On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner

Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a

substitute for his father, Jose “Pempe” Miranda.

During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private respondent vied for the

mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent

who got only 20, 336 votes.

On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution

with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order,

which was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the nullification of petitioner’s

certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose

“Pempe” Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and

denied due course.

On May 16, 1998, Comelec’s First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio.

Private respondent moved for reconsideration. On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc

rendered the assailed decision aforequoted, resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration,

thus nullifying the substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the

mayoralty post of Santiago City.

On December 9, 1998, petitioner sought this Court’s intercession via a petition for

certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of

preliminary injunction. On December 11, 1998, the Court resolved to issue a temporary

restraining order and to require respondents to comment on the petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the annulment of petitioner’s substitution and proclamation was issued without

jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (NO)

2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent was

issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. (YES)

HELD:

1. The Court finds that the Comelec’s action nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of

petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound.

Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 of the Omnibus

Election Code. While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or

accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been

disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of


the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the

Code.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a

candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is

excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of

candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much

in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course

and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they

could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy

have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.

More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any

person, but only “an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party” may be

substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court

explicitly ruled that “a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy” (p.13).

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much

the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any

stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

The law clearly provides:

SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office

unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical

to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of

candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult him into office. Only

the candidate who had a valid certificate of candidacy may be substituted.

2. The invalidation of petitioner’s supposed substitution of Jose “Pempe” Miranda brings about

the disqualification of petitioner in the mayoralty race. In this regard, what was said in Nolasco

vs. Commission on Elections (275 SCRA 763 [1997]) may be recalled:

Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second

highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning

candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes v.

Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]), viz.:

‘x x x x x x x x x

‘We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in denying petitioner

Julius O. Garcia’s petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U.

Reyes.

‘That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed

winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability

caused by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this

Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to

substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second

placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He

could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes

the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not

prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.


‘Garcia’s plea that the votes case for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for

Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason

can be treated as stray, void and meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified

cannot retroact to the date of the elections as to invalidate the votes cast for him.’

Consequently, respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to

follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]).

(pp. 782-783)

Thus, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the

above-cited settled ruling consistently applied by this Court since the case of Labo vs. Comelec

(176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Aquino vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 [1995], Reyes vs. Comelec (254

SCRA 514 [1996]); and Nolasco vs. Comelec (275 SCRA 763 [1997]).

Even as the Court cannot accede to the contention that, in view of the election results

pointing to petitioner as the electors’ choice for the mayoralty post, we should now close our

eyes to the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the matter, nevertheless, the

Court duly notes that the said election results point to the fact that private respondent was not

then the choice of the people of Santiago City, Isabela. This Court has no authority under any

law to impose upon and compel the people of Santiago City to accept private respondent as their

mayor. The law on succession under section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the

Local Government Code, would then apply.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall

be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the

total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.

AMADO S. BAGATSING, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, and JAIME LOPEZ, petitioners, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE L. ATIENZA, respondents.

G.R. No. 134047 | December 15, 1999 | KAPUNAN, J.

Petitioners Amado S. Bagatsing, Ernesto M. Maceda and Jaime Lopez and herein private

respondent Jose L. Atienza were candidates for the position of Mayor of Manila in the May 11,

1998 elections.

On May 18, 1998, seven (7) days after the elections, petitioners filed with the COMELEC

a complaint for disqualification against private respondent, docketed as SPA No. 98-319, on the

ground that the latter allegedly caused the disbursement of public funds in the amount of Three

Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand (P3,375,000.00) Pesos, more or less, within the

prohibited forty-five-day period before the elections in violation of Article 22, Section 261 (g)

(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the

Philippines. The alleged disbursement was intended to be distributed in the form of financial

assistance to the public school teachers of the City of Manila who manned the precinct polls in

that city during the elections.

On May 20, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an order suspending the

proclamation of private respondent. On May 21, 1998, private respondent filed a Motion for

Reconsideration and sought to set aside the afore-quoted order directing the suspension of his

proclamation as mayor.

On June 4, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division)* handed down a resolution granting the

motion for reconsideration, ratiocinating thusly:


The Commission En Banc finds correct respondent's reliance on COMELEC Resolution No.

2050 for his cause. The Resolution, promulgated by the Commission in order to formulate the

rules governing the disposition of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the

Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act 6646 otherwise known as the

Electoral Reform Law of 1987, pertinently provides:

2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed

after the elections against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be

dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary

investigation to the Law Department of the Commission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after the elections but before proclamation of the respondent

candidate, the complaint shall nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However,

the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before

proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding

information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition

for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the Court before which the criminal

case is pending and the said Court may order the suspension of the proclamation, if the evidence

of guilt is strong.

That same day at around eleven o’clock in the morning, petitioners filed a Motion to

Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation of Respondent. In the afternoon of the same day,

petitioners likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Second Motion to Suspend

Immediate Intended Proclamation of Respondent before COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, the City Board of Canvassers of Manila reconvened at three o’clock in the

afternoon of the same day, June 4, 1998, and proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected

Mayor of the City of Manila.

On June 25, 1999, without waiting for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration

pending before the COMELEC en banc, petitioners filed the instant petition to set aside the June

4, 1998 resolution of the COMELEC's First Division.

Records reveal, however, that said motion for reconsideration pending before the

COMELEC en banc was denied in its Order of July 2, 1998 at the instance of herein petitioners

themselves for the reason that they had already filed a petition before this Court docketed as G.R.

No. 134047.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated June 4, 1998 dismissing the

petition for disqualification and referring the case to the COMELEC’s Law Department for

preliminary investigation, based on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 has been issued with grave

abuse of discretion.

HELD: No. COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 covers two (2) different aspects:

First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election

which must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts

complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in a finding before the

election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint was

not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the

parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary

investigation.


Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the election

against a candidate (a) who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who has already been

proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case

but shall be referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.

However, if before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and

the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant

may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before

which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the

proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.

Petitioners contend that Resolution No. 2050, upon which the COMELEC anchored its

dismissal of the disqualification case, is no longer a good law since it has been nullified in toto

by this Court in Sunga v. COMELEC.[

Contrary to petitioners' contention, nowhere did the Court strike down COMELEC

Resolution No. 2050 in Sunga. There, we held that:

xxx We discern nothing in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the

dismissal of a disqualification case filed before the election but which remained unresolved after

the election. What the Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer the

complaint to its Law Department for investigation to determine whether the acts complained of

have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. The findings of the Law

Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This is totally

different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a

disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that filed

after the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the

same Resolution to be dismissed as a disqualification case.

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing

of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word

'shall' signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty

which must be enforced. The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to

proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright

dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v.

Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires.

The ruling in Sunga is not applicable to the case at bar. There, the complaint for

disqualification was filed prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. Under Section 6 of R.A. 6646,

where the complaint was filed before the election but for any reason, a candidate is not declared

by final judgment before the election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the

winning number of votes in such election, the COMELEC shall continue with the trial and

hearing of the case. Thus, the facts in Sunga fall under the contemplation of Section 6, namely:

(1) the complaint for disqualification was filed before the election; (2) for any reason, the issue

of disqualification was not finally resolved before the election; and (3) the candidate sought to be

disqualified is voted for and received the winning number of votes. Consequently, the

COMELEC should have continued with the hearing and decided the case on the merits. Instead,

COMELEC erroneously dismissed the disqualification case and referred the matter to the Law

Department for preliminary investigation of the criminal aspect of the case. The deleterious

effect of the premature and precipitate dismissal was pointed out by this Court, thus:

xxx A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of

punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the


investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if

the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the

erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case

based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election. This

scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the

law.

In sharp contrast, the complaint for disqualification against private respondent in the case

at bar was lodged on May 18, 1998 or seven (7) days after the 1998 elections. Pursuant to

paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050, the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case

and shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the COMELEC.

Under this scenario, the complaint for disqualification is filed after the election which may be

either before or after the proclamation of the respondent candidate.

The COMELEC in Sunga obviously misapplied Resolution No. 2050 in dismissing the

disqualification case therein simply because it remained unresolved before the election and, in

lieu thereof, referring it to its Law Department for possible criminal prosecution of the

respondent for violation of the election laws. Notably, there is nothing in paragraph 1 of

Resolution No. 2050 which directs the dismissal of the disqualification case not resolved before

the election. It says the COMELEC “may motu propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer

the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as an instrument of the latter in the

exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving

criminal infractions of the election laws.” The referral to the Law Department is discretionary on

the part of the COMELEC and in no way may it be interpreted that the COMELEC will dismiss

the disqualification case or will no longer continue with the hearing of the same. The reason for

this is that a disqualification case may have two (2) aspects, the administrative, which requires

only a preponderance of evidence to prove disqualification, and the criminal, which necessitates

proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. Where in the opinion of the COMELEC, the acts

which are grounds for disqualification also constitute a criminal offense or offenses, referral of

the case to the Law Department is proper.

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO

P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House

of Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.

G.R. No. 150605 | December 10, 2002 | PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Codilla and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of

Representative of the 4th

legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that

time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting

Representative of the 4th

legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz,

a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition

for Disqualification against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters

of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code.

It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City

Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga

and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for

him.


At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to

hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates

for district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the

winning candidate.

Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the

Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that

petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin

was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a

new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void.

Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation.

Instead, she filed a “Comment and Manifestation”with the COMELEC en banc questioning the

procedure and the manner by which the decision was issued. In addition, respondent Locsin

requested and was issued an opinion by House of Representatives Executive Director and Chief

Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to

nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed office

since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of

the House. Relying on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to

the House during its regular session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that she will not

only disregard but will openly defy and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her

to vacate her position.

Petitioner Codilla was subsequently proclaimed by the Provincial Board of

Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th

legislative district of Leyte, having

obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest number of votes cast in the district. On

the same day, petitioner took his oath of office before Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of

the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City

On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent

Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc

resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-

elected Representative of the 4th

legislative district of Leyte. Petitioner also served notice that “I

am assuming the duties and responsibilities as Representative of the fourth legislative district of

Leyte to which position I have been lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf of my

constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and privileges intended for the position of

Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be accorded to me, including all physical

facilities and staff support.” On the basis of this letter, a Memorandum dated October 8, 2001

was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy Secretary-General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker

De Venecia, stating that “there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly promulgated –

and now final and executory – COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x x x.”

These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of

the COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001, no action was taken by the House on

the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-

NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter addressed to respondent Speaker De Venecia.

In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter dated October 30, 2001, stating that:

“We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it.

However, Rep. Locsin has officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted in the

HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall ‘openly defy and disobey’ the


COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the decision would result in the

spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same congressional seat, a legal situation,

the only consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSE’s liberty to take action.

In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC decision is

a matter that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which,

hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously.” (emphases supplied)

Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.

Issues:

1. Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid. (No)

2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case. (Yes)

3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty. (Yes)

HELD:

1. The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had

not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification

of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial

factual basis.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final

judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered “stray.”

Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day

and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to

disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. For in voting for a candidate who

has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him

bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the

candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the

powers of government.

This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner

has not been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after

the elections. Likewise, Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.

More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine

that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed

winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.In every election, the people’s choice is the

paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the

majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast

in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place.

In Domino v. COMELEC, this Court ruled, viz:

“It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to

suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed

winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively

declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the

second placer would have received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment for

the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/134015.htm


because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have

substantially changed.

2. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the

Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying

petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case

pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to

review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since

respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.

3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction

on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelec’s) Decision be

obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office

which merits recognition regardless of personal judgment or opinion.

Epa Cases Incomplete

Documents

foreign country

rendering of service

armed forces

filipino citizenship

respondent cruz

filipino citizen x x

respondent teodoro cruz

republic act