EUROPEAN MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY European Maritime Safety Agency Pollution Preparedness and Response Activities October 2010 EMSA’s Contribution to the Mid-term Report 2007-2009 regarding Regulation No. 2038/2006/EC on the Multi-annual Funding of the Agency’s Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response Activities
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EMSA - European Maritime Safety Agency - Pollution Preparedness and Response Activities - October 2010
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on the Multi-annual Funding of the Agency’s Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response Activities
European Maritime Safety Agency
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Table of ContentsExEcutivE Summary 7
1. rEport objEctivES 10
2. GEnEral FramEwork 10
2.1. EMSA’S POLLUTION PREPAREdNESS ANd RESPONSE TASkS 10 2.2. EMSA’S ACTION PLANS, WORk PROGRAMMES ANd 5 YEAR STRATEGY 11 2.3. MULTI-ANNUAL FUNdING REGULATION ANd FRAMEWORk 12 2.4. OPRC 1990 ANd ThE ASSOCIATEd hNS PROTOCOL 2000: TIEREd RESPONSE 13 2.5. ThE FATE ANd BEhAvIOUR OF OIL IN ThE MARINE ENvIRONMENT 16 2.6. 2004 OIL ACTION PLAN: EvALUATION ANd ASSUMPTIONS 17 2.7. SUMMARY OF GENERAL FRAMEWORk 19
3. pollution prEparEDnESS anD rESponSE activitiES: 2007-2009 20 3.1. OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE 20 3.1.1. Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessels 20 3.1.1.1. Building up the Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessels 21 3.1.1.2. Maintaining the Network: drills and Exercises 24 3.1.1.3. Improvements to the Network Service 26 3.1.1.4. Summary of Network Coverage 27 3.1.1.5. Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessels: Financial Summary 28
3.1.2. CleanSeaNet Satellite Service for Oil Spill Monitoring 29 3.1.2.1. CleanSeaNet: Service Implementation and Improvements 31 3.1.2.2. The Operational Use of CleanSeaNet 32 3.1.2.3. Support to CleanSeaNet Users 36 3.1.2.4. Co-operation with External Organisations 37 3.1.2.5. CleanSeaNet Summary 37 3.1.2.6. CleanSeaNet: Financial Summary 37
3.1.3 MAR-ICE Network: Information Service for Chemical Emergencies 38 3.1.4. Support provided to Coastal States and the Commission for Accidental Spills 39
3.2. CO-OPERATION ANd CO-ORdINATION 40 3.2.1. Consultative Technical Group for Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response 40 3.2.1.1. CTG MPPR Activities 41 3.2.2. Regional Agreements and the International Maritime Organization 42 3.2.3. Inter-Secretariat Meetings: EMSA, Regional Agreements and dG Environment 43 3.2.4. Collaboration with Industry 43
3.3. INFORMATION 44 3.3.1. EMSA Activities in the Field of Oil Spill dispersant Use 44 3.3.2. Inventories of MS Policies and Operational Response Capacities 44 3.3.3. Information dissemination 45 3.3.4. EMSA Informational video 45 3.3.5. Co-operation & Co-ordination and Information Activities: Financial Summary: 46
3.4. SUMMARY OF ACTIvITIES IMPLEMENTEd dURING 2007 -2009 46 3.4.1. All Activities: Financial Summary 2007-2009 47
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
4. coSt EFFiciEncy anD aDDED valuE oF EmSa activitiES 48 4.1. NETWORk OF STANdBY OIL SPILL RESPONSE vESSELS: COST ANALYSIS 48 4.1.1. Setting-up and Maintaining the Service 48 4.1.2. Cost Efficiency of Approach to Set-up the Network 49 4.1.3. Summary of Setting up and Maintaining the At-sea Oil Recovery Service 52
4.2. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIvENESS OF ThE NETWORk 52 4.2.1. Scenario Analysis 52 4.2.2. Operational Effectiveness: Erika and Prestige Scenarios 54 4.2.3. Operational Effectiveness: Overall Results 55 4.2.4. Indicator Analysis 55 4.2.5. Summary of the Potential EMSA Contribution for each Scenario 58 4.2.6. Operational Effectiveness: Conclusions 59
4.3. CLEANSEANET: COST ANd OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY 59 4.4. SUMMARY OF COST EFFICIENCY ANd AddEd vALUE OF EMSA ACTIvITIES 63
5. FEEDback From uSErS / intErEStED partiES 64 5.1. EvALUATIONS OF ThE IMPLEMENTATION OF ThE TASkS GIvEN TO ThE AGENCY IN ThE FIELd OF POLLUTION PREPAREdNESS ANd RESPONSE 64 5.2. INTERNAL AUdIT OF ThE EMSA STANd-BY OIL SPILL RESPONSE vESSEL NETWORk 64 5.3. EvALUATION OF ThE AGENCY – FINALISEd APRIL 2008 64 5.3.1. Summary of the Evaluation of the Agency - 2008 66
5.4. STAkEhOLdER CONSULTATION IN PREPARATION OF ThE MULTI-ANNUAL FUNdING MId-TERM REPORT - MARCh 2010 66 5.4.1. Summary of Feedback from the 2010 Stakeholder Consultation 67
5.5. EvOLUTION IN STAkEhOLdERS PERSPECTIvES OF EMSA’S POLLUTION PREPAREdNESS ANd RESPONSE TASk 68
6. EuropEan riSk Evaluation anD implicationS For EmSa activitiES 69 6.1. dISTRIBUTION OF MEMBER STATE OIL SPILL RESPONSE vESSELS 69 6.2. ENvIRONMENTAL ASPECTS 70 6.3. MERChANT ShIPPING: ACCIdENT PATTERNS 71 6.4. ACCIdENTAL OIL SPILLS 73 6.5. MERChANT ShIPPING: TRAFFIC PATTERNS 75 6.6. MERChANT ShIPPING: TANkER TRAFFIC PATTERNS 75 6.6.1. Tanker Traffic Patterns by Number of Voyages 76 6.6.2. Tanker Traffic Patterns by Quantity of Oil Transported 79
6.7. OThER INdICATORS 81 6.8. TRENdS IN SPILL FACTORS 83 6.9. SYNOPSIS OF OIL SPILL PREPAREdNESS ANd RESPONSE FACTORS 85 6.10. SUMMARY 86
Table 4.10 Cleanseanet: Summary of Economic Advantages 61
Table 6.1 Synopsis of Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Factors 85
Table 7.1 Expected Utilisation of MAF Regulation Financial Envelope 88
List of Tables
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
List of FiguresFigure 1.1 Network of Standy Oil Spill Response vessels: Coverage from “Ready to Sail” 8Figure 2.1 Overview of OPRC 1990 and HNS Protocol 2000 Ratification by Coastal States 13Figure 2.2 OPRC 1990 and OPRC-HNS Protocol 2000: Ratification across Europe: September 2010 14Figure 2.3 Overview of the Regional Agreements: 2009 15Figure 2.4 Fate of Oil Spilled at Sea showing the Main Weathering Processes 16Figure 2.5 2004 Oil Action Plan: Large Tanker Spills 1984 – 2004 17Figure 2.6 2004 Oil Action Plan: Indicative distribution of At-Sea Response vessels in MS: 2004 18Figure 2.7 2004 Oil Action Plan: Indicative Tanker Trading Patterns 19Figure 3.1 The EMSA Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessels in 2009 24Figure 3.2 Number of Acceptance Drills and Quarterly Drills per Year 24Figure 3.3 Number of EMSA vessels Participating in At-sea Response Exercises: 2007-2009 26Figure 3.4 Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessels: Estimated Coverage of 2004 Oil Action Plan Tanker Trading Patterns 28Figure 3.5 Three Possible Oil Spills South of Cyprus detected by CleanSeaNet on 18/06/2007 30Figure 3.6 CleanSeaNet: Planning Regions 31Figure 3.7 Number of Possible Spills detected per Planning Region: 2008-2009 33Figure 3.8 CleanSeaNet Verifications– From 16 April 2007 until 31 December 2009 34Figure 3.9 CleanSeaNet detection of an Unreported Spill, Ireland, 2009 35Figure 3.10 Introduction to CleanSeaNet for Duty Officers - EMSA 36Figure 3.11 The BG dublin lost a container with hNS in heavy seas 38Figure 3.12 Ratification of CLC 92, Fund 92 and Supplementary Fund 2003 at end of 2009 39Figure 3.13 Overview of the main Regional Agreements and ENP Countries at end of 2009 42Figure 3.14 EMSA’s Executive director Willem de Ruiter at the 2009 INTERSPILL Conference 43Figure 3.15 EU Member States Oil Pollution Response vessels: 2009 Inventory 45Figure 3.16 Relative Utilisation of Commitments and Payments by Major Activity: 2007-2009 47Figure 4.1 Theoretical Amount of Pollutant Recovered by EMSA vessels 55Figure 4.2 Theoretical Economic value of the EMSA Network to Individual Member States 56Figure 4.3 Theoretical Reduction in Length of Coastline Affected following EMSA Assistance 57Figure 4.4 CleanSeaNet Results 2009 62Figure 4.5 CleanSeaNet Monthly Satellite Coverage: 2009 63Figure 5.1 Member States’ Assessment of overall EU Effectiveness Prior To and After EMSA 66Figure 5.2 Consultation Paper: Scoring of Activities by Stakeholders 67Figure 6.1 Indicative distribution of National Oil Spill Response vessels in 2009 69Figure 6.2 distribution of Particularly Sensitive Seas Areas (PSSAs) and Natura 2000 Sites 70Figure 6.3 Numbers of Shipping Accidents: 2007-2009 71Figure 6.4 Indicative distribution of Accidents: 2009 72Figure 6.5 Main Ship Sourced Oil Spills: 2007-2008 73Figure 6.6 Large Oil Tanker Spills since 1984 74Figure 6.7 Incidence of Oil Tanker Spills >700 tonnes by Cause: 1970-2009 74Figure 6.8 Vessel Traffic Density around Europe: Feb – May 2010 76Figure 6.9 Number of Tanker voyages: 2009 77Figure 6.10 Number of Tanker voyages: Changes between 2004 and 2009 78Figure 6.11 Quantity of Oil Transported: 2009 79Figure 6.12 Quantity of Oil Transported: Changes between 2004 and 2009 80Figure 6.13 Tanker Age Profile per Region for Quantity of Crude Oil Transported: 2009 81Figure 6.14 Tanker Age Profile per Region for Quantity of Crude Oil Transported: Changes 2004-09 82Figure 6.15 Single hull Tankers: Number of voyages: 2009 82Figure 6.16 Offshore Facilities around Europe & the EMSA Network of Stand-by Spill Response vessels 84Figure 7.1 Network of Standby Oil Spill Response vessels: Coverage from “Ready to Sail” 87
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid –term Report
ExECUTIvE SUMMARY
In accordance with the Regulation on the Multi-annual
Funding of the Agency’s pollution preparedness and
response activities, a Mid-term Report will be submitted to
the European Parliament and the Council by 31st december
2010 by the Commission on the basis of information
provided by the Agency. This Mid-term Report covers
the period 2007-2009. The information contained herein
constitutes EMSA’s provision to the Commission.
The European Maritime Safety Agency has undertaken
a wide range of activities in the field of marine pollution
preparedness and response during the period 2007-2009.
The activities are presented in detail under the three
main themes of operational assistance, co-operation &
co-ordination, and information. It should be noted that
previously published individual Annual Reports are also
available for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 through the
Agency website.
As can be expected, the main expenditures relate to the
operational services, in particular the Network of Stand-by
Oil Spill Response vessels and CleanSeaNet, the oil spill
satellite detection and monitoring service.
Analysis has been undertaken on the cost-efficiency
of the approaches implemented to provide these two
main operational services at the European level. The
conclusion of the analysis is that the Agency has set-up
and maintained these services in a cost efficient manner
at the European level. This conclusion is supported by the
various evaluations of EMSA activities in this field as well
by stakeholder feedback. The added (operational) value
of such a framework has been confirmed. The technical
specifications of the at-sea oil recovery service provided
through the Network of Standby Oil Spill Response vessels
have been recognised as being fit for purpose.
It must be highlighted that the purpose of the Network
is to “top-up” Member States’ response capacity when
affected by a spill. The primary responsibility to respond
to an incident is, and remains, with national authorities.
Accordingly, the Agency provides a “European” tier of
response capacity that is aimed at assisting coastal States.
As shown in the map on next page, the Network currently
provides a level of operational coverage that is broadly
similar across Europe.
The time needed for the vessels to be “ready to sail” varies
between contracts. Accordingly, a mobilisation time of
up to 24 hours, for discharging any cargo and for loading
specialised response equipment, should be kept in mind
before the vessel is “ready to sail”.
With regard to more general feedback from stakeholders,
primarily Member States and their marine pollution experts,
the conclusion is that there has been a positive evolution
of their perception with respect to the scope of activities
undertaken by the Agency. EMSA has implemented complex
and challenging projects in an effective manner. Whilst
there is always room for improvement, the overall sense
is that the Agency provides added value to the pollution
preparedness and response mechanisms of Member States.
The 2004 Action Plan for Oil Pollution Preparedness and
Response identified a number of assumptions regarding
oil spill risk factors around European waters. This analysis
remains valid with certain exceptions. The main conclusion
is that the risk factor overview across Europe is complex.
Each area has its own profile wherein different specific
elements are more or less significant. Additional issues that
need to be considered include the following:
• The potential threat posed by the relatively high
concentration of single hull tankers trading in the East
Mediterranean and Black Sea areas;
• The increase in ship to ship transfers of oil and the
general lack of detailed information on the scale of these
activities;
• The development of the Arctic in general and the increase
in shipping and oil/gas exploration activities in particular;
• Particularly in the wake of the deepwater horizon incident,
the potential threat posed by offshore oil facilities;
• The increasing importance to make EMSA pollution
preparedness and response resources and activities
available to neighbouring countries in adjacent seas.
European Maritime Safety Agency
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid –term Report
With the aforementioned issues in mind, the Agency intends
to continue the broad line of activities that it has undertaken
to date, adapting where appropriate. CleanSeaNet is, as of
2011, already in a phase of service upgrading whilst Co-
operation & Co-ordination and Information activities will
continue in the same vein.
Such actions will have to be carried out within the
existing financial envelope, as provided by the EU Budget
Authorities. It is worth noting that given the utilisation of
budget appropriations to date, there is very limited scope
for any major new activities to be implemented within the
remainder of the financial envelope available through the
existing Multi-annual Funding Regulation.
The Multi-annual Funding (MAF) Regulation itself has
proven to date to be a very useful tool for enabling the
Agency to implement its activities in the field of pollution
preparedness and response. The complex nature of some
of these activities, combined with the need to have multi-
annual contracts with industry allowing, for example, the
Agency to benefit from one-off investments in pre-fitting
vessels for oil recovery services and to create economies of
scale for satellite based services, has been greatly facilitated
by the MAF Regulation.
The (cost efficient) sustainability of the operational services,
which is a key factor in their added value, is only possible
through the budgetary framework provided by the MAF
* disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU Institutions
Figure 1.1 - network of Standy oil Spill response vessels: coverage from “ready to Sail”**(** As of 17th June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party)
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
Regulation. accordingly, it is strongly recommended that
the financial envelope be renewed beyond its expiry
date in 2013.
Based on the continuation of the services described at the
level indicated it is possible to estimate the overall utilisation
of the Multi-annual Funding financial envelope of EUR 154
million over the period 2007-2013. The table below shows
results of the projected utilisation.
Whilst the utilisation rate for Commitment Appropriations
is very good, the projected utilisation of Payments
Appropriations is lower. A number of factors influence the
rate of payments. For example, with respect to the Network
of Standby Oil Pollution Response vessels, if there is a delay
regarding a new contract entering the operational phase
of the service, there is a reduction in payments for that
year. Similarly, if a satellite image provider does not deliver
the product in a timely manner then there is a reduction in
payment.
In addition, 4-year contracts signed (committed) in 2013
will trigger payments up to 2017 which will fall outside
the current Financial Perspectives. The “rolling” effect
of renewed or replacement contracts could even out
such effects. The balance could only be achieved if the
aggregated value of contracts running into 2007 were the
same at the end of 2013. Clearly, this is not possible as the
Agency was in the “building up” phase in 2007 compared to
a significantly more mature structure expected by the end
of 2013. It is worth noting that in 2005 the Agency started
making commitments and initial payments in relation to
the first set of 3-year Standby Oil Spill Response Vessel
contracts. 2006 saw similar actions with respect to setting
up the CleanSeaNet service, also based on 3-year contracts.
Accordingly, payments for these two main activities are
spread over a number of years, some of which fall into the
period covered by the Multi-annual Funding Regulation.
ExPECTEd UTILISATION OF MAF FINANCIAL ENvELOPE
Utilisation compared to- Actual amounts for 2007-09- Amount projected for 2010- Amount requested for 2011 and- Amount estimated for 2012-13
Commitments Payments
2007 23,979,706 15,314,262
2008 17,094,428 15,452,978
2009 18,766,800 17,302,982
2010 20,241,742 13,332,883
2011: Requested 23,000,000 20,000,000
2012: Est. 21,000,000 21,000,000
2013: Est. 25,600,000 20,000,000
TOTAL 149,682,676 122,403,105
MAF Envelope 154,000,000 154,000,000
difference 4,317,324 31,596,896
Utilisation (%) 97.20 79.48
TABLE 1.1 - ExPECTEd UTILISATION OF MAF REGULATION FINANCIAL ENvELOPE
European Maritime Safety Agency
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2. GENERAL FRAMEWORk
2.1. EMSA’S POLLUTION PREPAREdNESS ANd RESPONSE TASkS
The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) was
established1 to address a wide range of maritime issues
with the overall purpose of ensuring a high, uniform and
effective level of maritime safety, maritime security (limited
role), prevention and detection of pollution and response to
pollution by ships within the European Community.
In 2004, the Agency was given tasks2 in the field of marine
pollution preparedness and response. The initial framework
for these activities was described in the 2004 Action Plan
for Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response3 (2004 Oil
Action Plan). This Action Plan is updated annually as part
of the annual Work Programme, given that both documents
follow the same procedure and are approved by the EMSA
Administrative Board. With the adoption of directive
2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution4, the task of detecting
and monitoring spills was elaborated and incorporated into
the Action Plan.
On the basis of a Commission proposal, the European
Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation
2038/2006/EC which reserves a financial envelope for the
implementation of these tasks for the duration of the 2007-
2013 Financial Perspective. As part of the provisions of this
multi-annual financing framework, the Commission, on the
basis of information provided by the Agency, will submit
a Mid-term Report to the European Parliament and the
Council by 31st december 2010. Activities of the Agency
are presented, and described in more detail, in three main
categories, namely:
• Operational assistance;
• Co-operation and co-ordination;
• Information.
1 See Founding Regulation 1406/2002/EC, Article 1 (Objectives).2 See Regulation 724/2004/EC, Article 1 amending the Founding Regulation.3 EMSA Action Plan for Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response as adopted by the Agency’s Administrative Board in October 2004. It can be downloaded from the EMSA website: www.emsa.europa.eu.4 Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements (OJ L 255, 30.09.2005, p. 11).
1. REPORT OBjECTIvES
In accordance with the Regulation on the Multi-annual
Funding of the Agency’s pollution preparedness and
response activities, a Mid-term Report will be submitted to
the European Parliament and the Council by 31st december
2010 by the Commission on basis of information provided
by the Agency. This Mid-term Report covers the period
2007-2009. The information contained herein constitutes
EMSA’s provision to the Commission.
At the November 2009 meeting of the Agency’s
Administrative Board, it was agreed that the Multi-annual
Funding Mid-term Report should:
• Provide an appropriate level of information to support
the Commission submission to the European Parliament
and the Council;
• Be primarily a review of activities undertaken during
the period 2007-2009 with appropriate financial analysis
including, where pragmatic, cost-efficiency aspects;
• Consider the actual (and potential future) situation with
respect to the initial assumptions identified when setting-
up various Agency activities e.g. CleanSeaNet and the
Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessels;
• Consider the “added value” to date of EMSA’s operational
services and other activities to the Member States and
the Commission;
• Identify, where relevant, any refinements/improvements
to the activities in order to bring them into line with the
evolving pollution preparedness, detection and response
environment;
• Identify, where appropriate and in line with Article 8 of
Regulation 2038/2006, any potential recommendations or
modifications to the budgetary/legal framework keeping
in mind any evolutions in the pollution preparedness,
detection and response field.
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
• The requesting state will have the equipment at its
disposal under its command and control;
• EMSA’s operational role should be conducted in a cost-
efficient way;
• EMSA’s activities should respect and build upon existing
co-operation frameworks and regional agreements. In
addition, EMSA should strengthen existing arrangements
and should create coherence within the European Union.
The pollution preparedness and response activities of
the Agency are intended to cover large accidental spills.
however, since the very beginning, the Agency was also
tasked to provide assistance in addressing illegal or
deliberate discharges:
“The Agency will also assist the Commission and the Member
States in their activities to improve the identification and
pursuit of ships making unlawful discharges6“.
With the adoption of directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source
pollution7 this task was further elaborated and technical
assistance “such as tracing discharges by satellite
monitoring and surveillance” was explicitly added.
the 2007 action plan for HnS pollution preparedness
and response
Initially the Agency concentrated its activities on tasks
related to oil pollution. It was also recognised early on
that further actions would be necessary to address marine
pollution caused by hazardous and noxious substances
(HNS). This issue had already been identified in the 2004
Oil Action Plan. Accordingly, and following the first HNS
Workshop with experts from the Member States and the
Commission in February 2006, the Agency developed
the action plan for HnS pollution preparedness and
response (2007 hNS Action Plan), which was adopted by
EMSA’s Administrative Board in june 2007.
The 2007 hNS Action Plan provides:
• A concise overview of existing available information
in the field of preparedness and response to HNS
marine pollution, including information on: seaborne
transportation of hNS, past hNS incidents, challenges
and impacts of hNS marine pollution, existing hNS
6 Regulation 1406/2002/EC, Article 2(f).7 Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements (OJ L 255, 30.09.2005, p. 11).
2.2. EMSA’S ACTION PLANS, WORk PROGRAMMES ANd 5 YEAR STRATEGY
the 2004 action plan for oil pollution preparedness and
response
To implement the tasks given, as introduced in the previous
paragraph, the Agency developed a framework of actions
as presented in the 2004 action plan for oil pollution
preparedness and response. When developing this Action
Plan, Member States’ pollution response experts were
consulted through a dedicated workshop in june 2004.
The Oil Action Plan was subsequently approved by
the Agency’s Administrative Board, comprised of
representatives from the EU Member States, EFTA coastal
States, the European Commission and the industry sectors
most concerned, at its meeting in October 2004. As
previously described the Oil Action Plan is updated as part
of the Agency’s annual Work Programmes and adopted by
the Administrative Board.
The Oil Action Plan described the existing structures and
activities in Europe for pollution response at Member State
level and in the context of co-operation by means of the
Regional Agreements. In addition, it outlined the marine
pollution risk in European waters by identifying the main
tanker routes and the growing density of seaborne traffic.
It identified the “top-up” philosophy behind developing
operational pollution response activities at an EU level,
and highlighted the need for added value. It is worthwhile
repeating the underlying principles5:
• EMSA should not undermine the prime responsibility
of Member States for operational control of pollution
incidents, nor should it replace existing capacities of
coastal States. The Agency feels strongly that Member
States have their own responsibilities regarding response
to incidents;
• EMSA’s operational tasks should be a “logical part” of
the oil pollution response mechanism of coastal States
requesting support and should “top-up” the efforts of
coastal States by primarily focussing on spills beyond the
national response capacity of individual Member States;
• EMSA’s equipment should be channelled to requesting
states through the existing Community mechanism in the
field of civil protection;
5 EMSA Action Plan for Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, October 2004, p.55-56.
European Maritime Safety Agency
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be strengthened by increasing follow-up actions at national
level with regard to enforcement. A number of polluters
remain unchallenged.
The 5-Year Strategy includes the objective that EMSA
should further support the strengthening of the illegal
discharge enforcement chain. To that effect, the Agency
could develop, in close collaboration with the enforcement
community in the Member States, new actions in the areas
identified by Article 10 of the Directive (for example,
common practices and guidelines).
2.3. MULTI-ANNUAL FUNdING REGULATION ANd FRAMEWORk
Already in the early days of implementing its legal task in the
field of ship-sourced pollution and the execution of its 2004
Oil Action Plan for setting-up its operational assistance,
the Agency was confronted with limitations of budget
and budget structure. The “annuality” of the European
Community/EMSA budget was difficult to reconcile with
the need to conclude multi-annual contracts with industry.
Such contracts are needed in particular for stand-by oil
spill response vessel arrangements and for organising
CleanSeaNet.
The European Commission recognised that the Agency
should be able to enter into long-term financial
commitments in order to offer adequate and sustainable
operational support to the Commission and the Member
States, using services provided by industry. Therefore, in
2005, the Commission proposed8 the creation of a multi-
annual financial framework for the pollution response
activities of the Agency, reasoning that “the development
and extension of anti-pollution activities will require long-
term investments and adequate financial security”.
On the basis of a Commission proposal, the European
Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation
2038/2006/EC, which reserves a financial envelope for
the implementation of these tasks for the duration of the
current 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives. As part of the
provisions of this multi-annual financing framework, the
Commission is requested to present a Mid-term Report on
EMSA’s financial execution of its plan and the status of all
funded actions, covering the years 2007-2009.
8 COM(2005) 210 final/2: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a multiannual funding for the action of the European Maritime Safety Agency in the field of response to pollution caused by ships and amending Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002.
pollution preparedness and response mechanisms, and
options and limitations of response methods to such
incidents;
• A framework document defining the Agency’s role and
activities in this field in order to make an “added value”
contribution at European level and strengthen existing
hNS preparedness and response capabilities.
the 5 year Strategy
More recently, in March 2010, the Administrative Board
adopted the EMSA 5 Year Strategy. It indicated that a
review of the marine pollution preparedness, detection and
response activities will be undertaken on the basis of a new
risk assessment, updating that conducted for the 2004 Oil
Action Plan, and based in part on the experience gained
and insights acquired over recent years. The 5-Year Strategy
indicates that, in order to be able to make an educated
decision regarding the optimal size of the Network of Stand-
by Oil Spill Response vessels, the following information
needed to be available:
a. The costs of the system; in particular those of increasing
or decreasing the density of EMSA contracted response
vessels along the EU coastline;
b. The benefits of the system; in particular the performance
that can be expected – in terms of tonnes of pollutant
substance recovered at sea – of the present network of
contracted response vessels in case of a large accidental
spill?;
c. The chance of occurrence and what are the consequences
of a large accidental spill in the various sea basins that
form the EU coastline?
As regards combating the effect of accidental spills of
hazardous and Noxious Substances, the Administrative
Board, following the adoption of the 2007 hNS Action Plan,
has already implemented the policy line that EMSA should
continue to focus on developing a deeper knowledge of
“what to do and what not to do” in case of marine chemical
incidents. EMSA shall thus serve as a knowledge-tool
providing technical assistance to Member States in case of
a chemical emergency.
By setting up CleanSeaNet, the European satellite based
oil detection and monitoring service, in 2007, the Agency
met the requirements of Article 10.2.a) of directive
2005/35/EC. The good performance of the service could
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
(IMO). The IMO is the specialised agency of the United
Nations with responsibility for safety and security at sea and
the prevention of marine pollution from ships.
In the field of marine pollution response, the “tiered
response” approach founded on co-operation / mutual
support was outlined in OPRC 1990. A similar approach
is adopted in the associated OPRC-hNS Protocol 2000
regarding so called chemical spills. The OPRC Convention
was initially established (following the Exxon valdez incident
in 1989) and entered into force on 13th May 1995. The hNS
Protocol entered into force on 14th june 2007.
The chart below illustrates a timeline of ratifications of the
OPRC Convention and hNS Protocol by European coastal
States with reference to major incidents. It is clear that the
Erika and Prestige incidents accelerated the ratification of
both legal instruments.
In 2010 and in accordance with the Regulation on the Multi-
annual Funding of the Agency’s pollution preparedness
and response activities, a Mid-term Report will be
submitted to the European Parliament and the Council by
31st december 2010 by the Commission on the basis of
information provided by the Agency. The Mid-term Report
covers the period 2007-2009. The information contained
herein constitutes EMSA’s provision of information to the
Commission as mentioned above.
2.4. OPRC 1990 ANd ThE ASSOCIATEd hNS PROTOCOL 2000: TIEREd RESPONSE
For many countries, the international legal framework for
marine pollution preparedness and response begins with
the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Co-Operation, 1990 (OPRC 1990). To
date, the Convention has been ratified by more than 100
countries through the International Maritime Organization
Figure 2.1 – Overview of OPRC 1990 and HNS Protocol 2000 Ratification by Coastal States
European Maritime Safety Agency
14
More specifically, Article 6 of the OPRC 1990 Convention
relates to national and regional systems for preparedness
and response. It details that parties to OPRC 1990 will
establish a national system for responding promptly and
effectively to oil pollution incidents including the designation
of a competent national authority and the establishment of
a national contingency plan.
This Article also indicates that countries will, within their
capabilities, establish a minimum level of pre-positioned
oil spill combating equipment commensurate with the
risk involved. Unfortunately, OPRC 1990 does not define
a minimum standard nor does it indicate an appropriate
methodology to be used in determining equipment levels on
a case by case basis. The Convention provides a great deal
of flexibility regarding its implementation by Contracting
Parties. It does not provide any mechanisms to verify that it
has been implemented appropriately.
The map above indicates the status of ratification of OPRC
1990 and the OPRC-hNS Protocol 2000 across Europe. For
reference, by the end of 2009, most countries had ratified
OPRC 1990 and 12 had ratified both legal instruments.
Both legal instruments provide a framework for the
development of national and regional capacity to respond to
incidents involving oil and/or hNS. It should be highlighted
that such requirements do not exist in EU legislation. Parties
to the conventions are required, amongst other elements,
to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents,
either nationally or in co-operation with other countries.
The OPRC convention calls for the establishment of
stockpiles of oil spill combating equipment, the holding
of oil spill combating exercises and the development of
detailed plans for dealing with pollution incidents.
* disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU Institutions
Figure 2.2 - OPRC 1990 and OPRC-HNS Protocol 2000: Ratification across Europe: September 2010**(** Malta has ratified both OPRC 1990 and the HNS Protocol 2000)
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
The map below shows individual countries cross referenced
with the most relevant European Regional Agreements9,10.
Countries that are part of the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) are also indicated.
Such co-operation between countries is reflected through
the tiered response approach whereby resources/means
are utilised in proportion to the scale of an incident.
From a contingency planning perspective, there are three
tiers reflecting the scale of incident. Based on these the
corresponding quantity of resources needed to mount an
appropriate response are identified. By way of an example,
a small spill in a location lacking sensitive economic
or environmental resources and amenable to clean-up
operations would be classed as a Tier 1 incident. In the
same vein a significant incident threatening large scale
damage would fall into the Tier 3 category.
9 The Lisbon Convention has not entered into force yet.10 The European Union is not (yet) a Contracting Party to the Bucharest Convention.
As described later in the Report, these are key points
that need to be considered when defining the activities
of the Agency in providing additional means of support to
Member States affected by an oil spill.
Both the OPRC Convention and the OPRC hNS Protocol
facilitate international co-operation and mutual support.
Parties to either are required to provide assistance to
others in the event of a pollution emergency and provision
is made for the reimbursement of any assistance provided.
One modality for such co-operation frameworks are the
Regional Agreements e.g. the Bonn Agreement. There are
also a number of sub-regional agreements on a bilateral
(or multilateral) basis. Some of these Regional Agreements
were established a long time ago, predating the OPRC 1990.
Some countries, due to their geographical location, have
become Contracting Parties to two or more of Regional
Agreements.
* disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU Institutions
Figure 2.3 - overview of the regional agreements: 2009**(** Malta is a Contracting Party to the Barcelona Convention)
European Maritime Safety Agency
16
known as “weathering” of the oil, one of the key issues to
consider is that the more volatile compounds will evaporate
during the initial phase of the incident. These volatile
components are often also the more toxic compounds
present in an oil (for example, aromatic compounds like
benzene) and they may be present in substantial quantities
in refined products like kerosene and gasoline. Heavier oils
and products (for example, heavy fuel oils used by ships)
have little volatile components, undergo little evaporation
and are likely to persist for extended periods in the
environment.
In parallel, the oil slick will have a tendency to spread as
well as emulsify. due to the mixing effect of the sea, water
becomes suspended in the oil increasing dramatically the
volume of pollutant by a factor of three and four. The
emulsion is often referred to as “chocolate mousse” of
account of its appearance. As a very viscous substance, it
is more persistent in the marine environment than oil which
has not emulsified. It also poses threats with respect to
economic and environmental resources and can be difficult
to clean-up, both at-sea and on the shoreline. The diagram
below illustrates the fate and behaviour oil in the marine
environment.
Tier 1 incidents require a rapid “on the spot” reaction,
e.g. using dispersants or at-sea oil recovery, to mitigate
the potential socio-economic and environmental damage.
Taking into account the need to react quickly and the
relatively small scale of Tier 1 incidents, it is clear that the
affected Member State should provide the operational
response. Reacting to larger scaled Tier 2 & 3 incidents
reasonably entails the mobilisation of and coordination
of other resources, by the affected Member State, from
further afield.
2.5. ThE FATE ANd BEhAvIOUR OF OIL IN ThE MARINE ENvIRONMENT
Crude oils vary widely in their physical and chemical
properties, whereas many refined products such as gasoline
and diesel tend to have well-defined properties. Residual
products such as intermediate and heavy fuel oils, which
contain varying proportions of non-refined components,
blended with lighter refined components, also vary
considerably in their properties.
When oil is spilt in the marine environment a number of
physical and chemical effects can be noted. Commonly
Figure 2.4 - Fate of oil Spilled at Sea showing the main weathering processes (Source itopF)
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
should be a “second line” of response; Member States
should provide the “first line defence” of their own
coastlines.
EMSA resources should:
• Be under the operational command of the affected
Member State;
• Take into account “state of the art” at-sea oil recovery
technology;
• Be provided in a cost efficient manner relative to the task.
2.6. 2004 OIL ACTION PLAN: EvALUATION ANd ASSUMPTIONS
In the 2004 Oil Action Plan, a number of factors were
considered when assessing the risk of accidental oil spills
and the potential impacts that might arise. key to that
review were: the location of major historical spills; the
stationing of Member State response vessels; and tanker
trading patterns around Europe. The following maps show
the status of these factors at the time the Action Plan was
written.
The fate and behaviour of oil spilt in the marine
environment, and the associated operational implications,
have to be considered by Member States when determining
their response approach, as reflected in their national
contingency plans. The Agency has also taken into account
these, and other issues, when designing the framework for
the provision of additional response means in support of
Member States.
keeping in mind the concepts of tiered response, the
sharing of responsibilities between Member States and the
support to be provided by the Agency as well as the legal
framework of its task, it is logical that EMSA:
• Should provide a “European” tier of response resources
available as a “reserve for disasters”. The Agency should
assist Member States responding to an incident beyond
national capabilities;
• The Agency’s operational support should be a logical
part of the oil pollution response mechanisms of Member
States and should primarily “top-up” the resources of
Member States when responding to incidents. Resources
East Med 1 Operational Tankship Tanker Mistra Bay 1805
2006 Atlantic 1 Operational Lamor AB Tanker Galp Marine 3023
East Med 1 Operational Falzon Tanker Santa Maria 2421
2007 Atlantic 1 Operational james Fisher Tanker Forth Fisher, Galway
Fisher & Mersey Fisher
N.B. Maximum 2 of 3 tankers can be mobilised simultaneously
2 x 4754
West Med 2 Operational Mureloil & Tankship
Tanker Bahia Tres & Salina Bay
3800 & 2421
Aegean / Black Sea
1 Operational EPE Tanker Aktea OSRv 3000
2008 Black Sea 1 Operational GSP Supply
ShipGSP Orion 1334
North Sea 1 Operational dC Industrial dredger dC vlaanderen 3000 & Interballast III
2744 & 1886
Atlantic 1 Operational Remolcanosa Supply Ship
Ria de vigo 1522
2009 Baltic North 1 Preparatory Arctica
Icebreaking (Ex-Finstaship)
Ice Breaker
kontio 2033
Atlantic / Channel 1 Preparatory Aegean Bunkers At Sea
Tanker Sara 6658
SUM
MA
RY 14 contracts have been awarded since 2005
1 contract has expired
11 contracts are in the Operational Phase
2 contracts are in the Preparatory Phase
14 vessels can be mobilised simultaneously
42,184 m3 of Storage Capacity can be mobilised simultaneously
2 additional vessels will be available following completion of Preparatory Phase
Additional 8,691 m3 of Storage Capacity will be available
Regarding actual mobilisation of one or more of the
vessels, it should be highlighted that coastal States have
been informed in advance of any incident of the terms and
conditions (including information on daily hire rates for the
vessels) of utilising vessels from the Network. As mentioned
earlier, the model incident response contract was developed
by the Agency in consultation with the Member States.
TABLE 3.1 - NUMBER OF CONTRACTS AWARdEd PER YEAR
European Maritime Safety Agency
24
More technical and operational specifications of the
contracted services are available from the Agency website:
http://www.emsa.europa.eu.
3.1.1.2. Maintaining the Network: drills and Exercises
In order to maintain the appropriate level of service during
the Stand-by Period of the contracts, the companies and
vessels concerned carry out a range of different types of
activities. The primary tools are the vessel/crew drills, which
take place on a quarterly basis. Each drill verifies that the
basic capability of the vessel, specialised equipment and
crew is at an appropriate level in accordance with criteria
developed by the Agency. The number of drills has increased
from 16 in 2007 to 47 drills (including 5 Acceptance drills) in
2009 in line with increase in vessels under contract. These
Figure 3.1 - The EMSA Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response Vessels in 2009**(** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party)
Figure 3.2 - Number of Acceptance Drills (A Drills) and Quarterly Drills (Q Drills) per Year
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drills are observed by EMSA staff in order to ensure that
the contracted service is being provided. By the end of
2009, a “drill and Exercise Attendance Policy” had been
established in order to best use Agency resources in the
management of the Network and associated contracts. To
date, 2 Acceptance drills have had to be repeated, whilst all
quarterly drills have been undertaken satisfactorily.
In addition, a range of notification, desktop and at-sea
operational exercises were conducted. These types of
exercise are, aside from being a useful method of maintaining
pollution response skills, an important tool for identifying
potential areas that could be improved. International
exercises in particular greatly assist the integration of
Exercise and Location Month / Year Participating Countries N° of vessels
EMSA vessel and Contractor
Malta/EMSA, Malta May 2007 Malta 6 Mistra Bay, Tankship Management
Gascogne, France june 2007 France and Spain 8 Ile de Brehat, Louis dreyfuss armateurs
Balex delta, Estonia Sept 2007 8 hELCOM Countries 21 Otilia and Tinka, Lamor
Ramogepol, Italy Sept 2007 Italy 14 Santa Maria, Falzon Service Station
Greece/EMSA, Greece Nov 2007 Greece 9 Santa Maria, Falzon Service Station
Blue Waters, Portugal Nov 2007 Portugal 3 Galp Marine, Lamor
Mediterraneo, Spain june 2008 France, Italy and Spain 13 Santa Maria, Falzon Service Station
Polmar Manche, France june 2008 France 5 Ile de Brehat, Louis dreyfuss Armateurs
Balex delta, Russia Aug 2008 8 hELCOM Countries 14 Otilia, Lamor
dargue, Portugal Sept 2008 Portugal 6 Galp Marine, Lamor
Malta, Malta Oct 2008 Malta 10 Mistra Bay, Tankship Management Santa Maria, Falzon Service Station Aktea OSRv, Environmental Protection Engineering
Austral, Portugal Nov 2008 Portugal 4 Galp Marine, Lamor
Euronyme, France May 2009 Italy, France and Spain 17 Salina Bay, Tankship Management Bahia Tres, Mureoil
Mero, Madeira june 2009 Portugal 5 Galp Marine, Lamor
Polmar, France june 2009 France and Spain 4 Ria de vigo, Remolcadores Nossa Terra Mersey Fisher, james Fischer Everard
Balex delta, Latvia Aug 2009 8 hELCOM Countries 11 OW Copenhagen, Lamor
Rodelta, Romania Aug 2009 Black Sea Commission Countries
Espadarte, Portugal Oct 2009 Portugal 5 Galp Marine, Lamor
Maltex 2009 Nov 2009 Malta 10 Mistra Bay, Tankship Management Santa Maria, Falzon Service Station Aktea OSRv, Environmental Protection Engineering
TABLE 3.2 - INTERNATIONAL ExERCISES PERFORMEd FOR ThE PERIOd 2007-2009
EMSA’s resources with the response mechanisms of
Member States, improving the necessary coordination and
cooperation of the “EMSA” vessels with the Member State
response units. The international exercises carried out for
the period 2007-09 are summarised in the table below.
The map (Figure 3.3) on next page shows the geographical
distribution of EMSA participation in international exercises
for the period 2007-2009. A general remark would be that
the Agency has been able to be involved across Europe
with the notable exception of the North Sea area, where
EMSA contracted vessels only became operational towards
the end of 2009.
European Maritime Safety Agency
26
response chain, namely contingency lightering. It should
be noted that the scale of actions varies widely depending
on the margin for improvement of an individual vessel/
equipment. Given the range of different vessels types
and equipment combinations, each potential action had
to be analysed to be “fit for purpose”. After exploring, in
close co-operation with the contractors, the feasibility for
the different technical proposals, a range of actions were
implemented. The major projects are summarised in the
table on the next page.
3.1.1.3. Improvements to the Network Service
Based on the experience gathered during the first
years of running the Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessel
service, options were explored to achieve a higher level
of performance in terms of oil recovery capacity and cost
efficiency. With this in mind, the Agency undertook specific
actions in the period 2007-2009 to, firstly, improve the
technical capacity of the contracted vessels and, secondly,
address issues associated with the at-sea oil recovery
Figure 3.3 - Number of EMSA Vessels Participating in At-sea Response Exercises: 2007-2009**(** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party)
* Number of participating EMSA vessels is indicated in the circles
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
• The estimated vessel speed has been set at 10 knots. It
should be noted that all vessels are able to reach a speed
of at least 12 knots;
• One EMSA vessel would arrive on site within 24 hours.
The 2004 Oil Action Plan included an overview of tanker
trading patterns of the time and reproduced on the next
page (figure 3.4). The darker/thicker lines reflect the more
important cargo routes. The overlap of Network coverage
with tanker routes is shown.
Significant gaps remain with regard to western and eastern
Mediterranean. Along the Atlantic coastline, the Bay of
Biscay is insufficiently covered, though this area is subject
to an on-going tender in 2010 for an additional vessel.
The potential considerations regarding the way forward for
the sustainability of the Network and its level of assistance
to support Member States responding to an incident are
addressed in more detail later.
EMSA Contractor and vessel Improvement Modification
Lamor Corporation Ab.Baltic “pool” of vessels
• Increasing, by more than 100%, the oil recovery pumping capacity.
• Modification of the decanting system and installation of additional Oil in Water Monitors.
Louis dreyfus Armateursvessel: “Ile de Bréhat”
• Increasing, by more than 100%, both the oil recovery and discharging pump capacities. Piping modifications.
• Modification on the decanting system.
Lamor Corporation Ab.vessel: “Galp Marine”
• Increasing, by more than 100%, the oil recovery pumping capacity.
• Modification of the decanting system. Installation of drop lines -loading on top- and additional Oil in Water Monitors.
Tankship Management Ltd.vessel: “Mistra Bay”
• Additional self-inflatable boom to improve crew safety conditions during booms operation.
• Modification of the decanting system. Installation of drop lines - loading on top - and additional Oil in Water Monitors.
• Modification on the decanting system. Installation of drop lines -loading on top- and additional Oil in Water Monitors.
GSPvessel: “GSP Orion”
• Increasing oil recovery rate of “boom and skimmer” system twofold through addition of heavy duty multi-skimmer
Remolcanosavessel: “Ria de vigo”
• Increasing oil recovery rate of “boom and skimmer” system twofold through addition of heavy duty multi-skimmer
3.1.1.4. Summary of Network Coverage
As the vessels are stationed all around the European
coastline, the Network provides a reasonably consistent
basic level of coverage to all coastal States apart from the
western Mediterranean, the Adriatic and the far eastern
Mediterranean. This latter area is subject to an on-going
tender in 2010 for an additional vessel. It is for individual
Member States to determine for themselves the response
capacity they require to provide adequate protection for
their coastlines. When assessing the required capacity,
the resources available through the Agency should be
considered appropriately i.e. as “top-up” response capacity.
The following map shows those maritime areas where at-
sea oil recovery services can be provided by the Agency,
taking into account certain factors:
• Following the signature of the Incident Response Contract
by the requesting Member State, the vessel required a
certain amount of time to be ready to sail fully equipped
from the “home” port;
TABLE 3.3 - SUMMARY OF IMPROvEd PROjECTS
European Maritime Safety Agency
28
3.1.1.5. Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response
vessels: Financial Summary
2007-2009 Commitments (€)
Payments (€)
Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessels 46,363,654.42 34,559,298.86
Exercises 1,157,500.00 1,082,555.37
Improvement Projects 5,324,730.86 4,547,630.50
Subtotal 52,845,885.28 40,189,484.73
Figure 3.4 - Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response Vessels: Estimated Coverage of 2004 Oil Action Plan Tanker Trading Patterns**(** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party)
* disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU Institutions. The range is shown as the area which a vessel can reach at an estmated speed of 10 knots
systems at national or regional level, strengthens Member
States response to illegal discharges and supports response
operations to accidental spills.
CleanSeaNet offers all EU Member States, candidate
countries and EFTA Member States (hereafter referred to
12 Ref.: Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP) 2007 – Report No.n° 75 Estimates of Oil Entering the Marine Environment from Sea-Based Activities, Page 61. This 45% rate includes legal discharges below 15 parts of oil per million parts of waters (i.e. ppm) per nautical mile.
European Maritime Safety Agency
30
As time is critical for confirming a possible spill and
catching polluters in the act, the shortest possible delay
between satellite detection and alert is essential for a
rapid response by coastal States. CleanSeaNet detection
results are therefore reported to the affected country in
Near Real Time (NRT), which was successfully reduced in
CleanSeaNet to less than 30 minutes after satellite image
acquisition. EMSA and industry partners in collaboration
met the challenge of developing a complex processing and
analysing chain capable of meeting this time requirement. It
is of utmost importance that coastal State administrations
are immediately informed of any potential spill with the
aim of increasing the likelihood of catching a polluter red-
handed. Each coastal State has access to the CleanSeaNet
service through a web based application which disseminates
all the CleanSeaNet data and products to the users.
In the case of a detected oil spill, an alert is delivered to the
relevant coastal State operational contact point responsible
5 receiving ground stations throughout Europe (in Norway,
Italy and the Azores), the service is able to monitor wide
areas at regular time intervals in a cost efficient way. By
having access to several satellites, the main disadvantage
of polar orbiting satellites – that they cannot provide
a permanent coverage - is somewhat compensated. In
general, each point in the Mediterranean can be monitored
every second day (with an increasing frequency towards
higher latitudes).
Member States define their national coverage requirements
in terms of areas to be monitored and number of images
to be received each month. Coastal States’ requirements
for monitoring take into account national knowledge of sea
areas where illegal oil discharges are known to take place,
areas of high traffic density, environmentally sensitive areas,
and other factors which influence national monitoring
requirements and planning. European waters have been
divided in 10 planning regions.
Figure 3.5 - Three possible Oil Spills South of Cyprus detected by CleanSeaNet on 18/06/2007
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
pollution monitoring. Based on feedback received during
the consultation as well as from other relevant organisations,
such as the European Space Agency, EMSA launched a
procurement process in April 2006.
As a result of the procurement process, EMSA agreed a
number of contracts for a three year period. There are two
different types of contract which underpin the CleanSeaNet
service:
1) for the acquisition of satellite image licences;
2) for the provision of oil spill monitoring services14.
• The following contracts were agreed for satellite image
licenses:
- Contract for licenses for the European Space Agency’s
ENvISAT satellite was signed on 18 december 2006
between EMSA and Eurimage S.p.A.15;
14 Services include the provision of the telecommunications network and of the service chain, including acquisition of images through a ground station, processing, analysis, and alerting.15 This contract also allows the acquisition of images from ESA’s ERS-2 satellite, though in practice this option has not been implemented.
for monitoring of ship sourced pollution at national level.
The alert message can be transmitted via phone call, email,
fax or SMS.
To date EMSA delivers the CleanSeaNet service to 24
European coastal States: Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus;
Sweden; United kingdom. The service may expand to other
countries in the future.
3.1.2.1. CleanSeaNet: Service Implementation and
Improvements
In 2006, EMSA consulted industry and the national
authorities of the EU Member States and coastal EFTA
States in order to collect information on existing operational
surveillance resources and further requirements for oil
Figure 3.6 - cleanSeanet: planning regions
European Maritime Safety Agency
32
EMSA services like SafeSeaNet and LRIT, and will provide
the backbone for future services and data integration to
provide coastal States with enriched and comprehensive
information from a single access point.
More specifically, the main improvements for the 2nd
generation of CleanSeaNet will be the capacity to acquire
flexible images, from 200 km up to 1,400 km long, instead
of fixed frames. The improved web interface offers a spill
centric approach in parallel to the existing image centric
one. The NRT requirements will depend on the length of the
segment to be acquired, the reference remaining 30 minutes
for delivery to the end user following satellite overpass for
a 400 km long acquisition. In addition, each time a recent or
on-going spill is detected with a potential source connected
to it or in its vicinity, the users will be informed immediately
without waiting for the detailed analysis of the image done.
3.1.2.2. The Operational Use of CleanSeaNet
CleanSeaNet entered into operation in April 2007. At this
time 12 coastal States already had experience with using
satellite images for oil spill detection and about 1200
images were ordered by the individual coastal States
administrations. Today 24 coastal States are using the
CleanSeaNet service, which provides around 2300 images
per year to the combined users. Only Norway supplements
the satellite oil spill monitoring service with own images,
all other coastal States rely on the CleanSeaNet service
for their national needs. In most cases, each satellite scene
covers the waters of more than one country. Therefore,
by ordering 6,391 images between 16 April 2007 and 31
December 2009, EMSA was able to fulfil 11,886 national
requests. 5,816 scenes (91% of the 6,391 ordered images)
were successfully delivered. These 5,816 satellite scenes
(3,286 ENvISAT and 2,530 RAdARSAT) acquired and
analysed more than 839,400,000 km2 of sea surface. To
cover the same area with aerial surveillance would have
required more than 50,000 flight hours.
It should be noted that less images were delivered in 2009
compared to 2008. This is due to Member States, based
on their experience, fine-tuning their requests for images
bringing it more in line with their follow-up capacity.
- Contract for licenses for the Canadian Space
Agency’s RAdARSAT-1 and RAdARSAT-2 satellites
was signed on 2 February 2007 between EMSA and
MdA Geospatial Services Inc.
• The following contract was agreed for the provision of oil
spill monitoring services:
- A contract for the provision of oil spill monitoring
services was signed on 18 december 2006 between
EMSA and a consortium of 3 companies: kongsberg
Satellite Services AS, Telespazio S.p.A and Edisoft.
due to intensive use of CleanSeaNet by Member States,
additional commitments and payments were made in 2008
and 2009 to meet the operational demand. The service has
been extended several times. Some of the key developments
include: the delivery of RAdARSAT 2 images launched in
december 2007; the entry into service of the Azores ground
station; the provision of vessel traffic information (initially
from regional AIS servers and now via SafeSeaNet); the
provision of vessel detection information, and the link to
backward and forward propagation oil spill models. As a
result, CleanSeaNet is the most comprehensive oil spill
monitoring service in Europe today.
The CleanSeaNet public procurement processes for a
sustainable service stimulated competition in the European
market. The number of ground stations capable of providing
the requested service has doubled since the CleanSeaNet
definition phase in 2005. The NRT requirement (30 min.
service delivery time) was a key driver for the further
technical development of the European ground-stations.
With this, EMSA set a new benchmark for the NRT delivery
of satellite based services worldwide.
While in 2007 the priority was to set up the service, in
2008 priority was given to strengthening the service and
improving its quality. In 2009 the 2nd generation of the
CleanSeaNet system and contracts were designed. The
updated CleanSeaNet service will be phased-in towards
the end of 2010 and fully operational as of February 2011.
The new system is based on a review of the “operational
user needs” in order to improve the efficiency, quality and
usability of the service. The 2nd generation CleanSeaNet
data system will be hosted in-house, linked with other
33
Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
• EMSA and the CleanSeaNet service providers have
worked together to improve methods of discriminating
between oil spills and look-alikes and reducing the
number of false alarms. This is one of the outcomes of
the regional workshops organised by the Agency in 2008
and 2009.
The chart below indicates the number of possible spills
detected in 2008 and in 2009 per planning region.
It is important to note that CleanSeaNet detections are not
“oil spills” but “possible oil spills”16. discrimination between
16 A SAR sensor “illuminates” the ocean surface and processes the back scatter signal. This signal contains information on the level of roughness of the sea surface. The dampening effect of floating oil films enables oil slicks to be detected. Other products or natural phenomena, such as very low wind speeds, are detected as well.
Detection of illegal oil Spill Discharges
From 16 April 2007 until 31 december 2009, a total of 7,193
possible oil slicks were detected on the delivered satellite
scenes. On average 1.24 possible oil spills were detected on
each SAR image. Comparing 2009 with 2008, the number of
possible spills detected per image has decreased from 1.4
to 1.0.
Two of the possible reasons for the decrease are:
• In some areas, there may have been a deterrent effect
resulting from intensive aerial and satellite surveillance
activity. It is important to highlight that the Agency’s oil
pollution monitoring service should not be considered
as a stand-alone service, but as a means of reinforcing
national operational response chains;
TABLE 3.5 - NUMBER OF IMAGES dELIvEREd PER SATELLITE
Satellite 2007 2008 2009 Total
ENvISAT 739 1309 1238 3286
Radarsat 1 568 958 476 2002
Radarsat 2 0 130 398 528
Total delivered images 1307 2397 2112 5816
Figure 3.7 - Number of Possible Spills Detected per Planning Region: 2008-2009
European Maritime Safety Agency
34
ordered scenes is part of the national response chain and is
done by coastal States independently of EMSA.
administrative or judicial follow-up
The analysis of feedback provided by the Member States
on individual possible spills detected by CleanSeaNet
indicates that the service is effective for the detection of oil
and the identification of possible polluters18. In particular,
when a linear potential spill is connected to a vessel, and
when AIS information or vessel traffic monitoring systems
allow a clear identification of the vessel, there are sufficient
grounds to trigger a Port State Control inspection. Some
Member States have successfully fined the polluters based
on evidence collected during such inspections.
Nevertheless, directive 2005/35/EC on ship source
pollution does not establish any legal obligation for
reporting administrative or judicial follow-up. Therefore,
figures on Port State Control inspection and/or prosecution
of identified polluters as a result of CleanSeaNet detections
are not available.
18 AIS information from SafeSeaNet directly available within CleanSeaNet allows the identification of possible polluters.
oil spills and look-alikes requires more information and most
often on site verification. Therefore, on site verification by
the Member States is necessary in order to measure the
performance of the service.
Throughout the first three years of operations, the rate of
confirmation, i.e. the number of spills confirmed against the
number of possible spills checked on site, has remained
steady at 27%. Nevertheless, the overall confirmation rate
hides significant variations between those planning regions
where aerial surveillance17 is important and those employing
other means of verification. The highest confirmation rate
(65%) was observed in the Western Mediterranean Sea,
and demonstrates the potential of the CleanSeaNet service
when used in combination with aerial surveillance.
The way CleanSeaNet is implemented in each national
operational chain differs. Some coastal States plan aerial
or vessel support each time a scene covers their waters,
while some make a case-by-case evaluation of the need to
send resources on site. Planning aerial or vessel support for
17 Fixed wing aircraft appear to be the most suitable assets to observe oil spills at sea. In 2009, the overall rate of confirmation reached 37% for verifications by aircraft and was only at 6% for verifications by merchant vessels.
Figure 3.8 - CleanSeaNet verifications - From 16 April 2007 until 31 December 2009
35
Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
Consequently it becomes more and more risky for ship
masters not to report accidental spills that they may have
caused. The detection by CleanSeaNet of an unreported
spill during a ship-to-ship operation off Ireland in February
2009, and subsequent cooperation with the Irish authorities,
is a good illustration (Figure 3.9).
Support to Aerial Surveillance Operations of Member
States and regional agreements
The Agency supports dedicated surveillance operations
organized by Member States and Regional Agreements in
European Waters. Examples include CEPCO (Coordinated
Extended Pollution Control Operations) and SuperCEPCO
operations. These consist of intensive campaigns of aerial
surveillance flights over a given maritime area. Since the
entry into operations of CleanSeaNet, the Agency has
supported eight operations (two in the North Sea, five in
the Baltic Sea and one in the Mediterranean Sea).
monitoring accidental spills and emergency operations
In case of accidental pollution, emergency satellite support
to national response operations can be triggered via direct
tasking of the EMSA CleanSeaNet emergency procedures or,
for major oil spills in European waters, via the “International
Charter on Space and Major disasters”19 for which EMSA
acts as project manager.
during the reporting period 2007-2009, CleanSeaNet
provided support for eight accidental spills. In cases where
no pollution was visible on the satellite image, this enabled
decision-makers to re-prioritise aerial surveillance to target
other areas, thereby reducing the need for unnecessary
flights. In one case, the Agency support was provided
through the activation of the Charter.
It is interesting to note that in areas regularly covered by
the service, significant pollution is likely to be noticed.
19 The International Charter was established and became operational in 2000. It “aims at providing a unified system of space data acquisition and delivery to those affected by natural or man-made disasters through Authorized Users”. Space agencies of nation states sign up to the Charter on a voluntary basis. For more information, see: http://www.disasterscharter.org/
Figure 3.9 - CleanSeaNet detection of an Unreported Spill, Ireland, 2009
European Maritime Safety Agency
36
3.1.2.3. Support to CleanSeaNet Users
the cleanSeanet user Group
CleanSeaNet aims to contribute to and improve the efficiency
of national and regional response chains by strengthening
operational pollution response. EMSA therefore set up the
CleanSeaNet User Group with the purpose of:
• Establishing a strong link with experts and operational
users in the coastal States;
• Fostering cooperation between the Member States,
sharing of experience and disseminating best practices.
User Group meetings are held back to back with the European
Group of Experts on Satellite Monitoring of Sea-based Oil
Pollution (EGEMP). At CleanSeaNet User Group meetings,
EMSA and the Member States have the unique opportunity
to define jointly, based on the recommendations from the
experts, the future improvements and developments of the
CleanSeaNet service.
training and workshops
In 2007, EMSA provided initial CleanSeaNet training
to enable coastal States to begin using the service
operationally. The same year, the Agency also organised
two workshops: one on the implementation of directive
2005/35/EC on sanctions for ship-source pollution and one
on the exchange of best practices in dealing with illegal
discharges and the gathering of evidence.
For 2008 and 2009, the training plan was defined jointly with
the Member States in the framework of the User Group.
The CleanSeaNet training plan was twofold:
• A training course “Introduction to CleanSeaNet for duty
officers”. The aim was to provide a basic introduction
to CleanSeaNet. The 89 participants in the five training
sessions organised in 2008 and 2009 were typically
officers who receive CleanSeaNet alert reports, who
use the CleanSeaNet web browser and/or who provide
feedback on verification activities to EMSA;
• Regional workshops on “Image Analysis and Ancillary
data for Improved Spill detection”. The aim was to
improve the reliability of CleanSeaNet satellite image
analysis for oil spill detection by taking into account the
marine environment and other local conditions in the
analysis. EMSA organised three workshops in 2008 and
2009: one for the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea,
one for the Atlantic and North Sea, and one for the Baltic
Sea.
Figure 3.10 - Introduction to CleanSeaNet for Duty Officers
37
Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
3.1.2.5. CleanSeaNet Summary
The existing integrated remote sensing capabilities from
satellite and aircraft allow reliable and efficient monitoring
and detection of oil spills. The combination of the early
alerts by SAR satellite surveillance with in depth analysis of
the potential spills by the different aircraft sensors provides
the necessary information for the decision making process
on response operations by the coastal States. however, this
requires a well-coordinated surveillance strategy between
the partners.
With the CleanSeaNet service of the European Maritime
Safety Agency and the national response activities,
a harmonised pan-European system is in place which
efficiently detects spills and identifies potential polluters.
however future developments for linking models and
vessel tracking information has the potential to ultimately
improve the collection of evidence and therefore will, with
its deterrence effect, lead to a reduction of illicit oil spilling
in European waters.
In summary, the EMSA CleanSeaNet service provides
sustainable and cost efficient oil spill monitoring services
needed by coastal States to support their oil spill response
activities and to undertake follow up actions against
polluters.
3.1.2.6. CleanSeaNet: Financial Summary
It worth noting that in 2006, i.e. before the Multi-annual
Funding Regulation came into effect, the Agency made
the commitments and initial payments in relation to the
3-year contracts that established the CleanSeaNet service.
Payments for these contracts were spread over a number
of years, some of which fall into the period covered by the
Multi-annual Funding Regulation.
3.1.2.4. Co-operation with External Organisations
Strategic co-operation with external organisations allowed
EMSA to draw on the best available new technologies in
Europe for the development of improved information
products in CleanSeaNet.
In 2007 EMSA and the European Space Agency (ESA)
signed an agreement to support each other in the field of
exploitation of satellite data for maritime safety and security.
This agreement was renewed and extended in july 2010.
Close cooperation between the two Agencies has been
essential to the successful development and continuous
improvement of the service. Since 2009, CleanSeaNet has
been recognised as an operational GMES20 service and, as
such, it receives the licences for ENvISAT data free of charge
from ESA. As a GMES service, CleanSeaNet benefits from
the GMES Space Component data Access Grant (GSCdA)
which provides satellite data free of charge to GMES
services (equivalent to approximately EURO 150,000/year).
ESA has become a key partner for CleanSeaNet emergency
acquisitions in response to accidental spills.
In 2007, the Institute for Protection and Security of the Citizen
(IPSC) of the European Commission joint Research Centre
(jRC) and EMSA signed a Memorandum of Understanding.
Under this framework, the jRC conducted, between 2007
and 2009, research and development on new methods and
technologies in support of CleanSeaNet. Work included the
development of an automatic oil spill detection algorithm, a
feasibility study on the operational use of the MOdIS optical
satellite images for oil spill detection, and the development
of main maritime traffic routes and maps of ancillary marine
data maps for the European Seas in order to improve the
satellite oil detection reliability.
20 The EC and ESA are developing the GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) initiative. The objective of GMES is to provide Europe with reliable, timely information on environmental and security issues on a sustainable basis, in support of public policy-makers’ needs. The development of the GMES Space Component co-ordinated by ESA will ensure that EMSA will have guaranteed long term access to appropriate satellite observations. The new Sentinel-1 satellite in particular should ensure the continuity of the Envisat radar observations, a primary source of CleanSeaNet satellite scenes.
Support to CleanSeaNet Users 358,270.53 223,995.50
CleanSeaNet Service development 2,673,615.53 2,283,212.01
Subtotal 5,891,832.46 7,178,938.65
European Maritime Safety Agency
38
3.1.3 MAR-ICE Network: Information Service for Chemical Emergencies
The establishment of a network of experts, who can support
and advise the Member States during the response to a
chemical spill, was outlined in the 2007 hNS Action Plan as
a priority activity for the Agency. EMSA undertook a careful
analysis to determine the best approach to implement this
task. Based on this analysis and in close cooperation with
the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) and the
Centre of documentation, Research, and Experimentation
on Accidental Water Pollution (Cedre), the MAR-ICE service
was developed by the Agency in 2008. The MAR-ICE
Network is based on CEFIC’s voluntary ICE (Intervention in
Chemical transport Emergencies) network, which provides
similar assistance for land-based chemical spills through
experts from chemical companies who are familiar with the
chemical substances involved in the incident.
Following the signing of a MoU by CEFIC, Cedre and EMSA
and the approval of the MAR-ICE Implementation Plan in
late 2008, the MAR-ICE Network became operational in
january 2009. The 24/7 service is provided free of charge
to the EU Member States and coastal EFTA States.
The MAR-ICE service can advise and support Member
States upon request with timely information on scientific,
technical, and operational aspects of an hNS spill, by
providing remote product specific information on chemical
substances, as well as information on the fate of a substance
in the marine environment, where available. The MAR-ICE
Network aims to strengthen the rapid information transfer
regarding chemical substances involved in marine pollution
emergencies, and address a common gap in this field
identified across the EU.
The service has been used successfully five times to date for
exercises and real incidents. EMSA monitors and evaluates
the operation of the service on an annual basis. These
reviews underpin modifications to the service.
Figure 3.11 - the BG Dublin lost a container with HnS in heavy seas (The diagram shows a screen shot of the CHEMMAP simulation provided through MAR-ICE)
39
Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
State(s). This co-operation ensures fast delivery of satellite
images. CleanSeaNet can also supplement coverage with
additional images. The costs of these emergency activities
for EMSA, aside from staff missions, are covered by existing
running contracts.
It should be noted that for accidental incidents involving
tankers there is an international compensation regime in
place for the victims, be they governments or individuals,
of such spills. The regime is structured through three main
legal instruments: CLC 9221, Fund 9222, and Sup. Fund
200323. Respecting the ceilings identified in these legal
instruments, financial compensation is available, on a “pay
to be paid” basis, for actions deemed technically reasonable
within the context of the tanker spill.
Short descriptions of incidents involving significant
assistance provided by the Agency in the period 2007–2009
are shown in the table on the next page.
21 Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969.22 Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971.23 Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992.
3.1.4. Support provided to Coastal States and the Commission for Accidental Spills
In accordance with the EMSA Regulation as amended, the
Agency can provide, following requests from a Member
State or the Commission, operational spill response
assistance for oil pollution accidents in terms of:
• At-sea oil recovery services mobilising the network of
EMSA contracted oil spill response vessels;
• Satellite imagery using the CleanSeaNet service and
• Pollution response expertise available through Agency
staff.
Such assistance can be requested through the Monitoring
and Information Centre (MIC) of the European Commission
or, when just using CleanSeaNet to cover smaller accidents,
directly from the Agency. Additionally and through prior
agreement, in the event of a major spill in European waters
and/or adjacent high seas the MIC, as an Authorised User,
can activate the International Charter for Space and Major
disasters, In such a case, EMSA will be nominated as the
Project Manager with responsibility for co-ordinating the
emergency delivery of satellite images to affected coastal
Figure 3.12 - Ratification of CLC 92, Fund 92 and Supplementary Fund 2003 at end of 2009
* disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU Institutions
European Maritime Safety Agency
40
the Community framework for co-operation in the field of
accidental or deliberate marine pollution for the period 1
january 2000 to 31 december 2006. It set the legal basis
for the role of the European Community in the field of
preparedness and response to marine pollution.
The role of the Community Framework for Co-operation
was to:
• Support and supplement Member States’ efforts at
national, regional, and local levels for the protection of
the marine environment;
• Contribute to improving the capabilities of the Member
States for response in case of incidents involving spills;
• Strengthen the conditions for and facilitate efficient
mutual assistance and co-operation between Member
States in this field;
• Promote co-operation between Member States in order
to provide for compensation for damage in accordance
with the polluter-pays principle.
3.2. CO-OPERATION ANd CO-ORdINATION
during the period under review, the Agency has continued
its co-operation and co-ordination activities with the
pollution response experts of Member States and with
the main Regional Agreements (as described in an earlier
chapter). At the request of the European Commission,
the Agency has taken over some of the activities of “The
Community framework for co-operation in the field of
accidental or deliberate marine pollution”. These are now
carried out under the umbrella of the Consultative Technical
Group for Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response as
detailed below.
3.2.1. Consultative Technical Group for Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response
In december 2000, the European Parliament and the
Council established, through decision No. 2850/2000/EC,
incident, Date and location Assistance provided by Agency Services:
• Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response Vessels; • CleanSeaNet; • Expertise (onsite or remotely)
m/v Don pedro
Sinking / oil spill, 11 July 2007, off Ibiza, Spain
• 2 SAR satellite scenes acquired to support the response by the Spanish authorities.
m/v new Flame
Sinking / oil spill, 12 Aug 2007, Gibraltar
• M/T Mistra Bay: Sept 2007 – July 2008 on standby and monitoring.
• 11 SAR satellite scenes acquired in August 2007. Additional scenes to monitor the area during dismantlement operations in August 2008.
numerous vessels
4 sunk, 6 grounded, oil and chemical spill,11 November 2007, Kerch Strait
• 11 SAR satellite scenes acquired over the area.
M/T Heibei Spirit
7 December 2007, South Korea
• Onsite provision of expertise.
Statfjord a oil platform
Oil spill, 12 December 2007
• International Charter: Space and Major Disasters activated. EMSA appointed as project manager.
Sinking, 12 january 2009, 250 nautical miles off northern norway
• 8 SAR satellite scenes acquired.
Aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetzov
Oil spill,14 Feb 2009, Celtic Sea
• Initial detection and alert of the Irish authorities by CleanSeaNet duty multi-skimmer.• 15 SAR satellite scenes acquired between 14 February and 8 March 2009 to monitor the spill.• Galway Fisher, 17 -18 Feb 2008, mobilisation and standby.
from the EU Member States, coastal EFTA and EU Candidate
States, as well as representatives from the European
Regional Agreements, the Commission and EMSA.
One of the main considerations of the group was to build
upon the results of activities carried out in the preparedness
and response field in the past. The main objective of the CTG
MPPR is to provide a Community level platform for Member
States, contributing to the improvement in preparedness
for and response to accidental and deliberate pollution
from ships. The CTG MPPR provides Member States with
the opportunity to present initiatives for consideration by
the group as well as making active contributions to issues
most appropriately addressed at a European level. At its
first meeting in 2007, the CTG MPPR Rules of Procedure
and the CTG MPPR Rolling Work Programme were adopted,
according to which the group meets once a year at the
EMSA offices and decides upon and implements priority
actions and projects identified by the group. CTG MPPR
projects include workshops, reports, technical studies and
trainings.
3.2.1.1. CTG MPPR Activities
Between 2007 and 2009, the main activities under the
umbrella of the CTG MPPR were meetings, workshops and
24 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, to the European Economic and Social Committee and to the Committee of the Regions “Co-operation in the field of accidental or deliberate marine pollution after 2007”, 22 December 2006, COM(2006)863 final.
European Maritime Safety Agency
42
In parallel, the operational services of the Agency i.e.
the Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessels and
CleanSeaNet participate in the relevant exercises and at-
sea operations as described earlier.
Within the framework of the 2007 hNS Action Plan, EMSA
continued its co-operation with the IMO on issues of
common interest. The Agency regularly participates and
contributes, as part of the European Commission delegation,
to the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC)
OPRC/hNS Technical Group meetings, which are the main
technical IMO forum on marine pollution preparedness and
response. These meetings are held approximately every 9
months at the IMO headquarters and EMSA has regularly
prepared relevant papers to these meetings.
In addition to contributing to the MEPC OPRC/hNS technical
meetings, EMSA hosted a training session in early 2008 for
the coastal EU Member States on the newly organised IMO
model courses on hNS marine pollution. Participants and
EMSA provided feedback to IMO, which was appreciated
and greatly contributed to the improvement of the final
version of the hNS model courses.
3.2.2. Regional Agreements and the International Maritime Organization
With respect to the European Regional Agreements, e.g.
helsinki Convention, Bonn Agreement and Barcelona
Convention, the Agency also provides technical support
to the European Commission, as part of the Community
delegation, during the relevant technical meetings. For
example, EMSA regularly participates in the hELCOM
Response Group and the Working Group on Operational,
Technical and Scientific Questions concerning Counter
to these meetings by preparing papers, participating in
discussions and also being involved in the various operational
exercises organised around Europe. Prior to the accession
of the European Union to the Bucharest Convention, the
Agency is also participating in the upcoming relevant Black
Sea Commission meetings.
A similar approach is also implemented with regard to the
International Maritime Organization’s OPRC-hNS Technical
Group.
* disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU Institutions
Figure 3.13 - overview of the main regional agreements and Enp countries at end of 2009**(** The Lisbon Convention is not yet in force. The European Union is not (yet) a Contracting Party to the Bucharest Convention. Malta is a Contracting Party to the Barcelona Convention.)
43
Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
major marine pollution conference and exhibition event
in Europe, namely INTERSPILL. EMSA is a member of
the event’s Steering Committee together with the main
European Oil Spill industry trade associations (NOSCA,
UkSpill, SYCOPOL, SRGh) and the International Petroleum
Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA).
Through an MoU, the Steering Committee members have
agreed to organise the conference and exhibition on a
“not for profit” basis. The Agency continued its active
role in the Conference Programme Committee with the
aim of promoting EU and EFTA Member States’ issues
and representation at the event. The 2009 INTERSPILL
conference was held in Marseilles, France and, in addition
to providing information on the Agencies’ activities at a
conference stand, the staff presented five papers including
a keynote speech by EMSA’s Executive director at the
opening ceremony.
In 2007, the Agency approached the Chemical Industry,
through the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC),
in order to explore issues of common interest regarding
marine pollution from chemicals (hNS). In 2008, CEFIC and
EMSA cooperated closely in identifying the best way to
establish the MAR- ICE Network, as previously described in
more detail above.
3.2.3. Inter-Secretariat Meetings: EMSA, Regional Agreements and DG Environment
The initiative of holding informal meetings with the
Secretariats of the various Regional Agreements and the
European Commission continues. These meetings have
taken place once a year since 2005 and alternate between
EMSA’s headquarter in Lisbon and a host country from the
Regional Agreements. These meetings aim at exchanging
information among the different parties regarding on going
activities linked to marine pollution preparedness and
response, as well as to identify common activities to be
undertaken in this field.
3.2.4. Collaboration with Industry
When identifying activities to be undertaken in collaboration
with industry bodies in the field of pollution preparedness
and response, it is necessary to keep in mind the role of
EMSA in other maritime fields, especially where the Agency
provides support to the Commission and Member States on
regulatory issues.
In 2007 through to 2009, the Agency, recognising the
importance of sharing spill response experience and
disseminating best practice, continued to support the
Figure 3.14 - EMSA’s Executive Director Willem de Ruiter at the 2009 INTERSPILL Conference
European Maritime Safety Agency
44
feedback was received from users in the Member States
and from the Commission. This feedback was considered
in a public procurement procedure to update and improve
the EMSA dispersant ‘tool’. The new EMSA software, called
Dispersant Usage Evaluation Tool (DUET), was completed
in 2009 and a dedicated training was provided to Member
States and coastal EFTA States experts in early december
2009. The Report on the Applicability of Oil Spill dispersants
was also updated in 2009. Subsequently, dUET will be
distributed to the Member States and EFTA coastal State
Maritime Administrations in 2010.
Following the 1st EMSA dispersants workshop in 2005,
a desire for standardisation and harmonisation among
Member States with respect to dispersant testing and
approval methods had been emphasised. EMSA, in close
cooperation with experts from the Uk (CEFAS), Norway
(Sintef), France (CEdRE) and an independent consultant,
prepared a discussion paper summarising in detail the
current status of dispersant testing and approval procedures
in the EU. The document’s findings were discussed in detail
at the 2nd EMSA workshop on dispersants, which was held
in May 2008 in Lisbon. The main outcome of this workshop
was the agreed way forward towards a more harmonised
approach for dispersant testing and approval procedures
through setting-up a Technical Correspondence Group
(TCG dispersants) facilitated by the Agency. Nomination of
experts by the Member States to the TCG dispersants has
been completed and the terms of reference were agreed
upon in 2009. Work on this issue will continue in 2010.
3.3.2. Inventories of MS Policies and Operational Response Capacities
In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2038/2006, the
Agency is tasked to “draw up on a regular basis a list of
the private and state pollution response mechanisms and
response capabilities in the various regions of the European
Union”.
The following inventories have been published by the
Agency in fulfilling this requirement:
• In 2007, EMSA published the revised “Inventory on
Member State policies regarding the use of oil spill
dispersants”, which was first compiled in 2005;
• In 2008, EMSA published the “Inventory of capacities for
responding to pollution incidents involving hazardous and
noxious substances (hNS)”;
3.3. INFORMATION
Within the framework of its two Action Plans (the 2004 Oil
and the 2007 hNS Action Plans), the Agency aims to collect,
analyse and disseminate information on best practices,
techniques and innovation in the field of marine pollution
preparedness and response.
The Agency’s work under this heading includes activities
undertaken in the period between 2007 and 2009 in the
areas of:
• hNS (chemical) marine pollution preparedness and
response;
• The use of oil spill dispersants;
• The publication of inventories of Member States
preparedness and response resources;
• Information dissemination.
3.3.1. EMSA Activities in the Field of Oil Spill Dispersant Use
In accordance with the 2004 Oil Action Plan, the Agency is
to address the issue of the usage of oil spill dispersants and
their implications. Once oil has been spilled into the sea,
the primary goal of any response actions is to mitigate the
socio-economic and environmental impact by removing the
spilled oil from the water surface as fast as possible. The
purpose of oil spill dispersants is to transfer the oil from the
sea surface, in the form of very small droplets, into the water
column where there is a significant dilution effect. When
used in an appropriate and timely manner, dispersants can
remove a significant amount of oil from the water surface
with a consequent benefit of reducing the risk of oiling of
sea birds and mammals as well as shorelines.
With regard to oil spill dispersants, EMSA focuses on
supporting Member States with relevant information and
support tools (e.g. software) to allow for science based
decisions to be taken by the responders/authorities as
appropriate in the respective country or region.
In 2007, the Agency distributed to the EU Member
States and EFTA countries the Operational Manual on the
Applicability of Oil Spill Dispersants. This included a decision
support software ‘tool’ as well as an Overview Report on the
Applicability of Oil Spill dispersants, which provided useful
information on the use of dispersants. This Operational
Manual was well received and after a period of utilisation,
45
Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
tool for the Agency in the context of disseminating
information on its tasks and activities, as well as facilitating
the understanding of its work by the general public. For
example, the Agency participated in the World Fishing
Exhibition (WFE) in September 2009. This is one of the
most important exhibitions in the fishing sector and attracts
tens of thousands of visitors from around the world. The
event was organised by the Municipality of vigo, Spain,
from 16-19 September. EMSA shared an exhibition stand
with the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) and
the European Commission’s dG-MARE. during a special
Europe day on 18 September, the Executive director made
a presentation on the Agency’s activities and the fishing
industry.
In conjunction with exhibitions and oil spill exercises, when
possible, “open ship” days and tours are held on board
the EMSA chartered oil spill response vessels. visitors are
given the opportunity to go on guided tours of the vessel
(from deck to the bridge) and see demonstrations of oil spill
response equipment (booms and sweeping arms).
3.3.4. EMSA Informational Video
EMSA produced two informational videos in 2009, one
covering the Agency’s overall tasks, and one presenting
its oil spill response services. The latter provides a
comprehensive overview of the Network of Stand-by Oil
Spill Response vessels. The focus is on the operational
aspects of the program. It gives a brief overview of
the concept (new capacities, cost efficiency, “top-up”
philosophy, and activation upon request by Member State,
under MS direction) and introduces the contracted vessels.
• In 2009, EMSA published the revised “Inventory of EU
Member States Oil Pollution Response vessels”, which
was first compiled in 2004 and updated in 2006.
These inventories are based on Member States’ responses
to questionnaires and are intended to provide a general
description of the status of preparedness and response
capacities of all coastal EU Member States and EFTA
Contracting Parties (Iceland and Norway) to marine spills
of oil and hNS. They include descriptions of response
equipment, the competent authorities, the policies, and
the preparatory arrangements of each Member State in the
field of marine pollution preparedness and response.
3.3.3. Information Dissemination
Other activities promoting the dissemination of marine
pollution specific information include the development by
the Agency of an “Inventory of R&d projects relevant to
marine pollution preparedness, detection and response”
in November 2009. This provides brief information on 256
European research and development (R&d) projects linked
to marine pollution preparedness, detection and response,
as well as information on European Community financial
instruments that provide funding opportunities for R&d
projects and activities in this field. This inventory has been
published on the pollution preparedness and response
section of the Agency’s website, which is updated regularly
with relevant documents and links in this field to assist
experts and public alike.
EMSA regularly participates in relevant conferences and
exhibitions. Participation in such events is an important
Figure 3.15 - EU Member States Oil Pollution Response Vessels: 2009 inventory
European Maritime Safety Agency
46
Response vessel Network. The overall objective was to
provide the Agency’s Executive director and Administrative
Board with an independent assurance on the adequacy and
effectiveness of the internal control system regarding the
network of contracted vessels. The overall finding of the
AS is that the internal control system in place provides
reasonable assurance25 regarding the achievement of the
business objectives set-up for the vessel network.
The next chapter undertakes, in line with the EMSA
Regulation as amended, to analyse the cost efficiency of the
main expenditure activities i.e. the Network of Standby Oil
Spill Response vessels and CleanSeaNet.
25 IAS Explanation: “Even an effective internal control system, no matter how well designed and operated, has inherent limitations - including the possibility of circumventing or overriding of controls - and therefore can provide only reasonable assurance to management regarding the achievement of business objectives and not absolute assurance.”
2007-2009 Commitments Payments
Co-operation and co-ordination 564,458.95 347,445.45
Activities in the field of HNS response 79,100.00 37,564.23
3.3.5. Co-operation & Co-ordination and Information Activities: Financial Summary
3.4. SUMMARY OF ACTIvITIES IMPLEMENTEd dURING 2007 -2009
The marine pollution preparedness and response activities
of the Agency during 2007-2009 have been presented in
the three categories of Operational Support, Co-operation
& Co-ordination and Information along with an indication
of their cost in terms of commitment and payment
appropriations.
By way of information, it should be noted that in 2009, the
Internal Audit Service (IAS) of the European Commission
undertook a specific audit of the EMSA Stand-by Oil Spill
Name of Event Location date
EURISY Workshop Tallin, Estonia 17-18 September 2007
dG TREN day Brussels, Belgium 20 September 2007
SaferSeas Conference Brest, France 10-12 October 2007
Civil Protection Forum Brussels, Belgium 22-23 November 2007
SeaSAR conference Frascati, Italy 21-25 january 2008
Brest Maritime Festival (in cooperation with dG TREN) Brest, France 11-17 july 2008
Italian Coast Guard Forum Genoa, Italy 6-7 May 2009
INTERSPILL Marseilles, France 12-14 May 2009
Symposium Earth Observation Business Paris, France 10 September 2009
World Fishing Exhibition vigo, Spain 15-19 September 2009
Introducing Community Agencies to Candidate Countries Sintra, Portugal 25-27 November 2009
TABLE 3.8 - PARTICIPATION IN ExTERNAL EvENTS BY ThE AGENCY: 2007 TO 2009
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
3.4.1. All Activities: Financial Summary 2007-2009
The figure below shows the relative utilisation of
commitments and payments by major activity for the period
2007-2009.
2007-2009 Commitments Payments
Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessels 46,363,654.42 34,559,298.86
Exercises 1,157,500.00 1,082,555.37
Improvements 5,324,730.86 4,547,630.50
CleanSeaNet Operations 2,859,946.40 4,671,731.14
Support to CleanSeaNet Users 358,270.53 223,995.50
CleanSeaNet Service development 2,673,615.53 2,283,212.01
Co-operation and co-ordination 564,458.95 347,445.45
Activities in the field of HNS response 79,100.00 37,564.23
Information dissemination 50,054.79 61,138.64
Related missions 475,052.70 379,498.10
Total 59,906,384.18 48,194,069.80
* These payments were also used to execute contracts launched in previous years: 2005: 3 contracts - EUR 16,400,594 commitment appropriations 2006: 2 contracts - EUR 7,128,294 commitment appropriations
** These payments were also used to execute contracts launched in previous years: 2006: 3 contracts - EUR 3,963,610 commitment appropriations
Total 13,685,209 12,730,800 13,773,475 40,189,485 13,396,495 € 1,381,082
* The specialised response equipment is expected to be used for renewed contracts. Accordingly, renewed contracts incur no additional equipment expenses.
** There are no additional pre-fitting costs when a contract is renewed as the vessels are already adapted for the specialised oil pollution response equipment.
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
appreciated that the information below is based on best
efforts regarding the cost of building new vessels. It can be
expected that different Member States could have different
perspectives on the costs estimations. The table below
summarises the essential estimated costs for building a new
dedicated pollution response vessel.
Based on the previous tables, the average cost per vessel
per year and associated storage capacity can be estimated
for the period 2007-2009.
The estimated equivalent cost for a dedicated pollution
response vessel might be calculated as follows. It must be
TABLE 4.4 - NEW POLLUTION RESPONSE vESSEL: ESTIMATEd COST
Cost Element
Price of acquisition € 36,000,000
Capacity 2,000 m3
Operational yearly costs € 1,800,000
Amortization period 25 years
Total Cost over 25 years € 81,000,000
Average cost per vessel per year € 3,240,000
The table below compares the estimated costs of the
two approaches to providing an at-sea oil recovery at the
European level.
TABLE 4.5 - COMPARISON OF EMSA NETWORk APPROACh vS. BUYING NEW POLLUTION RESPONSE vESSEL
Estimated Average per vessel
dedicated vessel Approach
EMSA Approach difference Comparison
All investment and running costs per year
€ 3,240,000 € 1,381,082 - € 1,858,918 EMSA approach costs almost 60% less per year
Whilst it should be kept in mind that the figures shown above
are estimates it can still be concluded that the approach
implemented by the Agency is more cost efficient on a
yearly basis as well providing more storage capacity per
vessel. An additional advantage of the stand-by contract
template is the weaker economic commitment required.
In line with any Agency policy objectives, the number of
ships in the Network can be adapted reasonably quickly.
The increased efficiency of prevention policies and the
political wish to decrease the dependency on hydrocarbons
as energy source are the main factors that could contribute
to such a scenario.
A recognised weakness of the EMSA model is its
dependency on the availability and location of commercial
vessels. By way of comparison, a dedicated vessel of a
Member State can in principle be stationed wherever the
relevant authority wishes. The Member State can, more
or less, place the vessel in an optimum position in light of
its national contingency plan. The EMSA approach is more
broad-brush as it is dependent on suitable vessels operating
in suitable areas. The importance of this effect is diluted
when considering that the overall task for the Agency is to
provide “top-up” resources to support Member States.
European Maritime Safety Agency
52
4.2. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIvENESS OF ThE NETWORk
Arguably, the most important aspect for consideration is
the operational effectiveness of the Network in relation to
its objective of providing a “reserve for disasters” of at-
sea oil recovery capacity to support coastal States during
an oil spill. This should be analysed with respect to the
potential cost benefit of such a Network. An appropriate
analogy would be that of an insurance premium (the annual
expenditure on the Network) providing coverage in the
event of accident (the financial benefit to the affected
coastal State resulting from reduced impact due to oil
recovered at sea by EMSA vessels).
It is worth noting that the main aim of recovering oil at
sea is to reduce shoreline impact. A traditional “rule of
thumb” is that one tonne of oil recovered at sea equates
to a reduction of 10 tonnes of shoreline waste. This is turn
reduces the socio-economic and environmental shoreline
impact as well as remedial measures required to clean-up
and restore the affected areas.
4.2.1. Scenario Analysis
As part of understanding the potential operational
effectiveness of the Network during an incident, an internal
study has been carried out with respect to different spill
scenarios. The objective of this study is to analyse the
benefits and limitations of the Network. A description and
summary of the study’s findings are presented below.
With regard to scenarios, both past and new spills have
been analysed. For past spills, some of the most significant
incidents that occurred in EU waters were included.
Additionally scenarios have been developed based on the
new pipelines that are expected to be operational in the
next few years as well as for hypothetical accidents that
have not occurred to date e.g. a large spill in the Baltic Sea.
With respect to the analysis results two specific incidents
(Erika and Prestige) are presented in more detail along with
the overall results of all the scenarios. The table on the
following page summarises the scenarios analysed.
In addition, it should be noted that a dedicated response
vessel should have a quicker mobilisation time, as it is, in
principle, permanently “ready to sail”. The EMSA approach
has established contracts with a 24 hour period for the
vessel to cease its commercial activity load the specialised
oil response equipment and be “ready to sail”. Such a step
fits well with the concept of providing a “European Tier”
of resources to top-up the resources of Member States
responding to an incident.
4.1.3. Summary of Setting up and Maintaining the At-sea Oil Recovery Service
Setting up the Network of the Stand-by Oil Spill Response
vessels throughout European waters has been achieved
on the basis of relatively small budget, certainly within the
context of merchant shipping. In general the values of the
majority of the contracts were between EUR 3.5 million and
EUR 4 million for a single vessel for a 3 year period.
The total value of the contract is a result of tendering in
a free market. Offers cover a range of different types of
vessels in various technical conditions and oil tank storage
capacities. Financial conditions of the contracts also depend
on the type of commercial activity of the bidding company,
its economic condition and realities of the local shipping
market. The Agency, applying strictly the EU procurement
regulations, awarded the contracts to those companies
which presented the most suitable offers in terms of the
technical and financial conditions.
One particular point of competition during procurement
procedures is the vessel’s daily hire rate for at-sea oil
recovery operations. This is also the rate that the Member
State requesting assistance would pay to the contractor. As
the EMSA contractor rates are competitive at the “point
of use” the Member State could expect to be reimbursed
by the polluter/Protection & Indemnity (P&I) Club for
reasonable use.
Based on the analysis above it can be concluded that the
Agency is meeting the challenge of providing an at-sea oil
recovery service at the European level in a cost efficient
manner.
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
• Reduction in length of coastline polluted.
The pollutant recovered at sea by EMSA vessels could,
under certain circumstances, reduce the length of
coastline polluted. In order to estimate the potential
reduction, trajectory modelling software was run with and
without EMSA intervention and the length of polluted
coastline measured in both cases.
It should be noted that modelling has been carried out
only for the new scenarios. For past spills, it has proven
not to be feasible to recreate the circumstances of the
spill with sufficient accuracy in the model environment.
operational limitations of the network
When considering the results of the analysis certain
elements should be kept in mind, these include:
• EMSA vessels, although they have large on board storage
capacity, are of relatively deep draught and accordingly
cannot operate in shallow waters;
• If weather conditions are extremely poor (above Beaufort
5-6) the at sea oil recovery systems do not function
efficiently. If these weather conditions were to last for the
whole “window of opportunity” no vessel would be able
to recover oil at sea;
The main methodological considerations are described
below.
To carry out this analysis, the performance of the EMSA
Network has been measured in the different spill scenarios
using three main indicators:
• Amount of pollutant (oil/water mixture) recovered at sea;
• Net economic value (financial benefit to the requesting
Member State).
Although not all the negative effects of a spill can be
measured in Euro (i.e. social and environmental aspects),
the economic value for the Member States has been
estimated for the cases where data was available using
the following formula:
Net Economic value to affected MS =
Cost saved for MS due to EMSA Response Contribution –
EMSA Investment– MS Charter Cost
As it is impossible to know precisely when the next
large spill will occur, the investment by the Agency of
Community funds has been estimated using the maximum
duration of a vessel Availability Contract as the basic
timeframe, i.e. 6 years;
TABLE 4.6 - SUMMARY INFORMATION REGARdING ThE SCENARIOS ANALYSEd
Area Incident date Incident area Pure oil spilled (tonnes)
distance from shore (nm)
Length of coastline affected (km)
Type of oil
Atl
anti
c C
oast Prestige 13 Nov
2002Cape Finisterre,
Galicia, Spain63,000 140 1,900 IFO 650
Aegean Sea 3 dec 1992 La Coruna, Galicia, Spain
15,000 0 300 Brent Blend, (Light crude)
Erika 12 dec 1999
Brittany, Bay of Biscay, France
19,000 60 400 hFO
Bal
tic
Sea
Baltic Carrier 29 Mar 2001
kadet fairway, jutlans islands,
denmark
2,700 16 50 hFO
hypothetical Scenario
Copenhagen
dec 2008 Copenhagen, denmark
50,000 60 57 hFO No.6
Med
iter
rane
an
Sea
haven 11 Apr 1991
Genoa, Italy
144,000 2 110 Iranian crude oil
hypothetical Scenario
Alexandroupoli
dec 2008 Alexandroupoli, Greece
50,000 25 34 hFO No.6
Bla
ck S
ea
Nassia 13 Mar 1994
Bosporus Strait, Turkey
33,000 0.3 No info available Crude oil
hypothetical Scenario
Burgas
dec 2008 Burgas, Bulgaria
50,000 60 171 hFO No.6
European Maritime Safety Agency
54
• The results indicate the positive net benefit that the EMSA
vessels would have made in contributing to the mitigation
of the financial impact of the two incidents;
• With regard to the Erika incident, the combination of
negative circumstances would clearly decrease the
efficiency of the at-sea oil recovery by EMSA ships. These
circumstances include:
- Reduced window of opportunity due to the winds
and currents;
- Extremely bad weather spreading the oil into small
patches over a very large area;
- Limited efficiency of oil tracking systems (slick
detection systems or satellite) in poor weather
conditions;
4.2.2. Operational Effectiveness: Erika and Prestige Scenarios
Two incidents, the Erika and Prestige, are presented in more
detail due to their particular relevance to the history of
tasks assigned to the Agency in the field of marine pollution
preparedness and response.
Based on the study, the results of the Erika and the Prestige
scenarios are compared below.
From the analysis, a number of conclusions can be identified
as detailed below:
• EMSA vessels will, during an incident, be under the
operational command of the requesting Member State.
Effective deployment and tasking of EMSA vessels, and
the associated efficiency and recovered amount, will
largely depend on the decisions of the Member State
personnel appointed to implement and coordinate
response operations;
• The availability of discharging facilities is currently out of
EMSA control and could be a bottleneck. It would appear
that the (un)availability of discharging facilities is a common
problem around Europe. Appropriate arrangements
to ensure access to sufficient and technically suitable
discharging facilities should be established before the
incident26.
26 In the event of an emergency, Member States often have the possibility to use any facility needed to deal with a disaster through various civil protection mechanisms. However, it is obvious that if all the necessary steps to prepare the appropriate facilities are taken before the incident this potential bottleneck could be overcome more easily.
TABLE 4.7 - COMPARISON OF ThE ERIkA ANd PRESTIGE SCENARIOS
Erika Prestige
Oil Spilled 20,000 tonnes 63,000 tonnes
Pure oil recovered by EMSA 5,854 tonnes (26%) 33,177 tonnes (53%)
Window of Opportunity 11 days >21 days
daily hours recovering oil Oil spread over a large area in small patches (more time chasing than recovering)
Oil slicks more concentrated
Average Individual Storage capacity of EMSA vessels mobilised
2,775 m3 3,546 m3
Average Recovery rate 192 tonnes/day 557 tonnes/day
Solid waste avoided onshore 33% 83%
Net Economic value to the Affected Member State
€ 96 million € 584 million
- despite the fact that none of these negative (natural)
circumstances can be altered the operational
contribution of the EMSA vessels would still have a
significant positive financial impact. This net benefit
is projected to be EUR 96 million;
• With regard to the Prestige, the conditions for at-sea oil
recovery were generally good. This is reflected in high
daily oil recovery rates and the relatively long “window
of opportunity” to undertake operations. Clearly such
conditions build towards a very positive outcome with
regard to the amount of pollutant recovered;
• The projected net financial benefit of EUR 584 million is
significant.
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
The three main indicators of the performance of the
EMSA network indicated at the beginning of this study
i.e., pollutant recovered, economic value and reduction
of polluted coastline, are included together with other
relevant data like the potential capacity that could be
mobilised by EMSA and the relevant Member States. The
window of opportunity is also indicated as it helps to put in
perspective the indicators analysed.
4.2.4. Indicator Analysis
keeping in mind the three major indicators mentioned at
the beginning of this section, a more detailed view of the
results is presented below.
Pollutant27 Recovered at Sea
There was sufficient data for all scenarios to apply the
methodology and arrive at projected results regarding the
effect of the EMSA vessel intervention and the associated
increase in oil recovery at sea.
27 The word “pollutant” refers to the mixture of oil and water that is floating in the sea following the spill of pure oil. Accordingly, readers familiar with the incidents analysed will notice that the amount of pollutant at sea indicated in this report is greater than the amount of pure oil spilled due to the emulsification effect.
It should be noted that the very positive result that could
be achieved for an incident such as the Prestige is partly
due to the fact that the EMSA Network was designed
considering specific lessons learnt from the Prestige, as
indicated in the 2004 Action Plan. In this case, the at-sea
mechanical recovery was the best response option in view
of the “window of opportunity” available.
4.2.3. Operational Effectiveness: Overall Results
The extensive analysis carried out for each of the scenarios
produced a large amount of data and lessons learnt. All
the information gathered is very valuable but needs to
be rationalised, organised and presented appropriately if
strategic decisions are to be made. Accordingly the most
relevant results of each scenario have been extracted and
summarised in table 4.8.
It is worth mentioning that oil recovery at sea is not an exact
science where there is only one solution to one problem.
Accordingly, the different values estimated for the above
mentioned indicators should be taken as an order of
magnitude of the potential that the Network has and not
as an exact figure.
Figure 4.1 - Theoretical Amount of Pollutant Recovered by EMSA Vessels
European Maritime Safety Agency
56
Economic value
This indicator analysis is restricted to those incidents where
cost data was available.
From the chart below the following conclusions can be
made:
• In addition to the beneficial social and environmental
effect, the EMSA network would also be economically
valuable for the Member States;
• The economic value would be significant for most of the
cases, in the Prestige case alone reaching almost EUR 600
million;
• In the Erika case, where the bad weather conditions
decreased the efficiency of the oil recovery operation, the
economic value would still approach EUR 100 million;
• In the Aegean Sea case where the claimed amount was
relatively low for this scale of incident, the economic
value would still be positive;
• From these results it can be concluded that, even when the
efficiency of the operation is affected, at-sea mechanical
recovery not only limits the environmental damage but
also the economic loss. This conclusion reinforces the
general concept behind the EMSA service and most EU
countries’ oil pollution response mechanisms.
From the chart on previous page the following conclusions
can be made:
• EMSA vessels are expected to recover between 10% and
60% of the pollutant at sea in the scenarios studied. This
wide range reflects the different circumstances that affect
the efficiency of the oil recovery operation, especially the
“window of opportunity” available to recover oil at sea;
• The intervention of EMSA vessels can avoid a substantial
amount of pollutant washing ashore or affecting the water
column resources e.g. fisheries. For example in the Erika
incident, it was estimated that each tonne of pollutant
which reached shore produced 11 tonnes of solid waste.
Therefore, the intensity of the pollution and its associated
environmental damage will be significantly reduced;
• Where there is a limited “window of opportunity”
(Alexandroupoli and Copenhagen scenarios) or there are
extremely bad weather conditions (Erika) the efficiency of
the at-sea oil recovery operation would drop significantly;
• The most efficient EMSA contribution would take place in
the Prestige scenario. This reflects the fact that the EMSA
network was designed taking into account the lessons
learnt from this incident. The six EMSA vessels mobilised,
with a combined storage capacity above 20,000 m3,
would recover up to 70,000 tonnes of pollutant. The
performance of the EMSA vessels in this incident was
adjusted to ensure equivalency with that of comparable
vessels that actually participated in the real incident.
Figure 4.2 - Theoretical Economic Value of the EMSA Network to Individual Member States
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
Reduction of Length of affected Coastline
This indicator analysis is restricted to the identified
hypothetical scenarios. It has not proven to be feasible to
model actual incidents with sufficient precision.
The chart below shows the theoretical length of coastline
affected without EMSA intervention (blue). The theoretical
effect of EMSA intervention is shown by the percentage
of oil recovered resulting in the final length of coastline
affected (red).
From the chart the following conclusions can be made:
• No general rule can be provided with regard to the
effect of the at-sea oil recovery operation in the length
of affected coastline. Any change in one of the dynamic
variables affecting the length of polluted coastline would
significantly alter the result regardless of the amount
collected at sea;
Figure 4.3 - theoretical reduction in length of coastline affected following EmSa assistance
• For two of the cases studied (Burgas and Copenhagen),
the reduction of length in percentage is higher than the
percentage of pollutant recovered. For example, in the
Burgas scenario, where 45% of pollutant is recovered, the
reduction of polluted coastline is 60% ((171-69)/171);
• In the two cases indicated in the point above, the
coastlines concerned have shaped irregularly. Burgas has
an important bay and Copenhagen is in the middle of an
archipelago with many different pieces of land of different
shapes interfering with the drifting of the oil;
• In the case of Alexandroupoli with a straight coastline and
the current directing the oil to the coast, the reduction
would be insignificant although the intensity of pollution
would be reduced. Once an area was cleaned, the
pollutant would tend to spread in order to fill the cleaned
area;
• It appears from these three cases that the more regular
the shape of a coast is, the less important the reduction
in length of coastline polluted will be. This is a tentative
conclusion, and should not be taken as a general rule.
European Maritime Safety Agency
58
overall financial benefit to the affected Member State.
With a range of approximately EUR 100 million to EUR
600 million, the specific characteristics of an incident (e.g.
weather conditions, window of opportunity, location,
oil type and quantity spilt) have a major influence on the
operational effectiveness of the EMSA vessels undertaking
at-sea oil recovery operations and the associated financial
benefit.
EMSA intervention in the incident with the least favourable
conditions, i.e. the Erika, would still have resulted in an
overall positive financial benefit to the affected Member
State. The length of coastline affected would be reduced
except in circumstances where the spill occurred very close
to shore and the associated window of opportunity is very
short.
4.2.5. Summary of the potential EMSA contribution for each Scenario
The table below shows the analysis results for each
scenario. It is important when considering these results to
keep in mind the complexity (number of range of variables/
assumptions) that have been covered. This, by its very
nature, creates a level of uncertainly within the calculations.
Accordingly, a prudent approach is to interpret the values
by order of magnitude as opposed to their precise value
e.g. the positive financial benefit of the EMSA intervention
during the Erika would have been at the scale of EUR 100
million as opposed to precisely EUR 97 million.
It is clear for those scenarios where there is cost data for
analysis, that the EMSA Network would make a positive
Nassia 11,326 0 60,000* 21,065 No info N/A 35% 10 No info***
* This amount of pollutant (oil/water mixture) following emulsification of the oil. The amount excludes any oil that evaporated, burned, dispersed or the part of the cargo that remained on board. Additionally, the maximum amount recoverable by specialised vessels at sea would be lower due to the oil sinking or drifting to shallow waters.
** All the pollutant recoverable in open sea was contained by specialised national vessels.
*** For these incidents, no cost data was available for comparative analysis.
In general, the average individual capacity that could be
mobilised is quite regular across the regions. The EMSA
Network has an average individual storage capacity
considerably higher than other response vessels in Europe.
This allows them to spend more time recovering oil at sea.
In addition to the social and environmental beneficial effect,
the EMSA network would also be economically valuable for
the Member States. The estimations made for the cases
analysed show values of at least EUR 100 million reaching
more than EUR 500 million in one of the scenarios.
The amount of Community funds that have been invested
to date in setting up and maintaining of the service and
the expected potential benefits to affected Member States
compares favourably with the “insurance coverage” analogy
identified at the beginning of the analysis of operational
effectiveness.
Considering the environmental, social and economic
benefits identified for most of the scenarios analysed, it can
be concluded that the Network of stand-by oil spill recovery
vessels is a powerful tool in the hands of the Member States
to combat large oil spills. In all the areas analysed EMSA
would be able to mobilise, upon request, a higher capacity
than that available from national resources. Accordingly,
EMSA is meeting the challenge to “top-up” Member State
oil pollution response capacity in a cost efficient manner.
This European tier of response resources serves as a
valuable reserve for disasters both from the environmental
and economic point of view.
4.3. CLEANSEANET: COST ANd OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
The Agency has set up and operates a state-of-the-art
satellite oil detection and monitoring service covering all
European waters for an overall cost of EUR 2.7 million
per year including development, implementation and
maintenance of the service, satellite image licence prices,
processing and analysis of the images and the yearly fixed
costs.
It is unfortunately not possible to compare the cost-
efficiency of CleanSeaNet to national pre-existing services
as when CleanSeaNet entered into operations in April 2007,
only 12 Member States had prior experience with the use of
SAR satellite imagery to detect marine oil pollution and few
had contracted services with the industry.
4.2.6. Operational Effectiveness: Conclusions
EMSA vessels will be under the operational command of
the requesting Member State. The efficiency and recovered
amount will largely depend on the decisions of the
appointed personnel responsible for the operation.
In general, the type, size and location of the EMSA vessels
are suitable to deal with major oil spills where at-sea oil
recovery is possible. All the lessons learnt in past spills
have been considered when designing the Network. The
estimated operational performance in the new scenarios
confirms the suitability of the design concept.
With regard to the equipment specifications, this has been
designed to cope with high viscosity oil and bad weather
conditions (up to Beaufort 5 approximately) keeping mind
the experience of past spills. The two shortcomings that
could be addressed are the replacement of the flexible
sweeping arms in the Southern Baltic by rigid arms and the
addition of a set of rigid sweeping arms to the arrangement
based in Cobh (Ireland).
The availability of discharging facilities for oil recovered
at sea is out of EMSA control and could be a bottleneck.
It seems that the availability of discharging facilities is
a common problem around Europe. EMSA has already
partially addressed this issue by including a “Lightering
Clause” in the vessel contracts. It indicates that the
Contractor, if requested by the affected Member State,
would try to find a suitable lightering vessel. Appropriate
arrangements to have sufficient receiving tankers/barges
with appropriate capacity to discharge the recovered oil
should be in place before the incident28. Consideration
could be given to the establishment of an arrangement
to guarantee the availability of discharging facilities in
sufficient number and capacity in order to mitigate one of
the potential bottlenecks that may appear during a large-
scale incident.
The analysis shows that the distribution of the vessels
along the EU coastline shows some gaps in the Northern
Baltic, Bay of Biscay, Eastern Mediterranean and Black
Sea. however, as indicated, the new vessels that will be
operational this year and the new procurement procedure
launched in 2010, if successful, will contribute to minimise
these gaps.
28 In case of emergency, Member States have normally the possibility to use any facility needed to deal with a disaster. However, it is clear that if all the necessary steps to prepare the appropriate facilities are taken before the incident this potential bottleneck could be overcome easier.
European Maritime Safety Agency
60
Consequently, the entry into operation of CleanSeaNet
set a new quality and price benchmark for satellite based
near real time oil pollution detection and monitoring. With
CleanSeaNet, the results of the investments in European
industry by the European Commission in the framework
of research programs and by ESA were consolidated and
carried forward successfully. The overall budget allocated
and used for the CleanSeaNet activities between 2007 and
2009 is presented in the table below:
In addition, most of these 12 national administrations were
using satellite-based oil detection services either through
European Research Framework Programmes (FP5, FP6 and
FP7) or through ESA’s Global Monitoring for Environment
and Security (GMES) projects such as Marcoast. In addition
to being highly subsidised by public money, these precursors
of CleanSeaNet benefited from private industry R&D
investments. Furthermore, the Near Real Time performance
was much lower.
2007-2009 Commitments* Payments
CleanSeaNet 2,859,946.40 4,671,731.14
Support to CleanSeaNet Users 358,270.53 223,995.50
CleanSeaNet Service development 2,673,615.53 2,283,212.01
5.3. EvALUATION OF ThE AGENCY – FINALISEd APRIL 2008
The overall objective of the evaluation was to assess the
relevance of the Regulation and the effectiveness and
efficiency of EMSA in fulfilling its objectives and tasks. The
Final Report is available through the EMSA website.
The overall conclusion from the Final Report was that the
establishment of EMSA has filled a gap in the maritime
safety area in the European Union. The Agency had quickly
grown in terms of its tasks and importance to become a
significant actor in the maritime safety area. The Agency
had added value to the sector in general, and, in particular,
to its two main stakeholders, the Member States and the
Commission.
Established in 2002, the Agency had rapidly delivered useful
outputs to its stakeholders. In general, EMSA’s stakeholders
are therefore also satisfied with its performance.
EMSA developed the Action Plan for Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response in 2004. This plan summarised
the situation at the time in Europe with regards to pollution
preparedness and response. It also served to establish
specific action items to be implemented. More specifically
the Final Report also indicated, amongst other comments,
that:
• The Action Plan contains a thorough analysis of the
existing situation with respect to existing structures, risk,
lessons learnt, and operational capacities in Member
States;
• The Action Plan clearly states that EMSA’s capacity should
be based on a “top up” philosophy (i) focusing on spills
beyond the national response capacity and (ii) not replacing
existing capacities of coastal States. This philosophy can
be seen as part of a “tiered response system”, which is
also advocated by the International Convention on Oil
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation
(OPRC), 1990. In this view, EMSA’s capacity can be seen as
a European tier “on top of” the national tier, the national
tier being the first line of response. Another perspective
on the top up philosophy expressed by stakeholders is
“gap filling”, i.e. that EMSA should fill a gap in terms of
the existing national and private capabilities compared
to some benchmark for when the overall capacity can
be considered “complete”. The Action Plan is not very
specific with regard to benchmarks and the operational
5. FEEdBACk FROM USERS / INTERESTEd PARTIES
5.1. EvALUATIONS OF ThE IMPLEMENTATION OF ThE TASkS GIvEN TO ThE AGENCY IN ThE FIELd OF POLLUTION PREPAREdNESS ANd RESPONSE
As can be expected, the Agency has been subject to
a number of evaluations, audits and feedback from
stakeholders during the period 2007-2009 in relation to
its marine pollution preparedness, detection and response
activities. Those of particular relevance include:
• dedicated Audit by the Internal Audit Service (IAS) of the
Commission in 2009 regarding the Network of Stand-by
Oil Spill Response vessels;
• The Evaluation of the Agency of April 2008 as required
by Regulation EC 1406/2002 as amended. The evaluation
was undertaken by an external consultant (COWI A/S);
• Stakeholder Consultation March 2010.
The 2008 Evaluation of the Agency, combined with the
2010 Stakeholder Consultation, demonstrate the positive
evolution in Stakeholders’ perspective of EMSA’s capacity
to implement complex projects that bring added value to
the marine pollution activities of Member States.
5.2. INTERNAL AUdIT OF ThE EMSA STANd-BY OIL SPILL RESPONSE vESSEL NETWORk
In 2009, the Internal Audit Service (IAS) of the European
Commission undertook an audit of the EMSA Stand-by Oil
Spill Response vessel Network. The overall objective was to
provide the Agency’s Executive director and Administrative
Board with an independent assurance on the adequacy and
effectiveness of the internal control system regarding the
network of contracted vessels. The overall finding of the
IAS is that the internal control system in place provides
reasonable assurance29 regarding the achievement of the
business objectives set-up for the vessel network.
29 IAS Explanation: “Even an effective internal control system, no matter how well designed and operated, has inherent limitations - including the possibility of circumventing or overriding of controls - and therefore can provide only reasonable assurance to management regarding the achievement of business objectives and not absolute assurance”.
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
through CleanSeaNet. Most Member States have
indicated that EMSA has been very effective in performing
this task and that this has led to cost-savings in national
administration and, in some cases, also to better quality
of satellite images procured.
With regard to stakeholder feedback, the Final Report
continued:
• Following international conventions, protection of the
national shorelines is a national responsibility and not a
task for EMSA.
It should be noted that the prime responsibility for
pollution response is, and remains, with the Member State.
The Agency only “tops up” and is able to put additional
resources under the operational command of the Member
State affected by the oil spill.
The Final Report continued:
• There are no agreed standards at the EU level on how
much an individual Member State is required to have in
terms of own capacity, which makes it difficult to establish
a benchmark from which EMSA can “top up” the efforts.
The current system invites countries to take a “free ride”
relying on EMSA to fill the gap;
• Most Member States find that, given the task, EMSA
has dealt with it in an effective way. … the oil pollution
response vessels is one of the EMSA activities, which
are rated highest by Member States in terms of overall
effectiveness gains at EU level. However, a few Member
States question the way that EMSA operational measures
have been implemented, i.e. the contracting of stand-by
vessels, and think it is not the best operational solution.
The concern expressed by a few Member States relates
primarily to the operational task of providing additional
oil response capacity in specific areas, where Member
States have heavily invested in national resources. This
situation applies particularly to the Northern countries and
differs greatly from the Southern countries. Especially, the
countries surrounding the Baltic Sea Basin questioned the
relevance of carrying out this task at EU level in this area.
• Those in favour of having an EU-financed oil spill response
capacity organised by EMSA argue that no Member State
has the sufficient means to combat a major oil spill and
additional capacity is necessary to avoid major disasters.
implications of the “top-up” philosophy;
• EMSA developed a contractual framework consisting of
a vessel availability contract and an incident response
contract which was considered a pragmatic and well
devised scheme;
• The section on EMSA’s activities in the Action Plan
contains information on areas of priority, general criteria
and regional requirements. However, the Action Plan
is not clear regarding the longer term priorities and
targets and how they may be implemented over time.
Rather, the Action Plan, updated annually in the work
programmes, has provided the implementation plan
for the following year, which has then been approved
by the Administrative Board. This is in line with the
applicable planning and budgeting procedures. However,
the combination of uncertainty about the operational
implications of the “top-up” philosophy and the lack of
long term priorities provides a weak basis for assessing
annual plans and activities of EMSA as an actor in this
complex environment. Long-term planning would serve
to clarify roles and expectations and would be well in line
with the multi-annual budgeting framework, which was
established in 2006.
With regard to above-mentioned point, it should be noted
that the 2004 Oil Action Plan established specific targets
to be implemented in the near term. Annual updating of
the Work Programme and its approval by the Agency’s
Administrative Board assures the adaptation of EMSA’s
actions in the field of pollution preparedness, detection
and response to the evolving needs. In addition, such
“annuality” is in line with the applicable planning and
budgeting procedures.
The Final Report also provided some stakeholders feedback
associated with a questionnaire as follows:
• In response to the following question in the questionnaire:
“To which extent has EMSA contributed to reducing
the effects of potential oil spill accidents?” almost one
quarter of Member States regarded EMSA contribution
as low/non-existing. On the other hand, more than one
third assess EMSA’s contribution to be high or very high.
It is fair to say that Member States are divided on this
issue;
• The Member States are generally in favour of EMSA
taking on a coordinating and advisory role at the EU level;
• The Member States are generally very positive towards
EMSA conducting the task of providing satellite imagery
European Maritime Safety Agency
66
No 2038/2006 on the actions of the Agency in the field
of pollution preparedness and response to ship-sourced
pollution, EMSA consulted its key stakeholders on the
implementation of its tasks. The focus of this consultation
was to obtain feedback on the way EMSA has implemented
these tasks during the period 2007-2009, as well as to
receive comments regarding the outlook for EMSA’s work
in this field beyond 2013.
Within this framework, a consultation paper30 was
developed and distributed to all stakeholders, informing
them of the implementation of EMSA’s tasks in the field
of pollution preparedness and response in the period of
2007-2009. This consultation paper presented a summary
of the tasks assigned to the Agency in this field and their
implementation. In addition, a feedback form with specific
questions regarding the implementation of EMSA’s tasks
was distributed for comments in writing to be returned to
EMSA.
In order to present the consultation paper and discuss
the feedback provided by the stakeholders, two separate
stakeholder consultation meetings were hosted by EMSA:
30 Titled “Consultation on EMSA’s Pollution Preparedness and Response Activities”, distributed Feb 2010.
5.3.1. Summary of the Evaluation of the Agency - 2008
The findings of the Final Report are summarised below. It
is worthwhile to compare these with more recent feedback
from stakeholders.
• Member States had different opinions regarding the
relevancy of the task.
• Most indicated that the Agency had adopted the correct
operational/contractual/financial approach to setting up
marine pollution response services.
• The marine pollution response services were rated by
the Member States as some of the activities in which the
Agency had been most effective. The chart shows the
results of the questionnaire carried out in 2008.
5.4. STAkEhOLdER CONSULTATION IN PREPARATION OF ThE MULTI-ANNUAL FUNdING MId-TERM REPORT - MARCh 2010
As outlined in the Roadmap for the preparation of the MAF
Mid-term Report regarding Article 8 of Regulation (EC)
Figure 5.1 - Member States’ assessment of overall EU effectiveness prior to and after EMSA (Source: 2008 Evaluation of the Agency)
Source: COWI’s questionnaire survey. Total Member States = 27. N = 24. Response rate = 89%Note: 1 = Very low effectiveness; 2 = Low effectiveness; 3 = Average effectiveness; 4 = High effectiveness; 5 = Very high effectiveness.V
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
The Network of Stand-by Oil Spill Response Vessels:
• The technical and operational capabilities of the EMSA
contracted vessels are very good, especially in addressing
heavy Fuel Oil (hFO) and very heavy Fuel Oil (vhFO)
pollution;
• A Member States’ expert group for consultation on
technical and operational issues of the Stand-by Oil Spill
Response vessels Network could be established by EMSA
(similar to the CleanSeaNet User Group);
• The need has been identified for a new risk assessment
at EU level, covering the existing marine pollution
prevention, preparedness and response capacities of the
Member States and also addressing new risk factors (e.g.
large cargo ships) in addition to tanker traffic;
• It was recognised that the lack of a minimum standard for
national response mechanisms represents a challenge for
EMSA with regard to its “topping up” task of Member
State response capacity. Nonetheless, many Member
States consider that there should not be any “European
Standard/Approach” for national response capacities;
• Some Member States would like the Agency to provide
emergency ship-to-ship transfer services (lightering from
casualty or from recovery tanks of other response vessels
in the area) possibly using the EMSA contracted Stand-by
Oil Spill Response vessels;
• Some Member States, particularly Baltic countries,
further developed the range of potential services to
include emergency towing and fire fighting. It should
be noted that these types of activities are beyond the
current mandate of the Agency and that such activities
run counter to earlier statements that the protection of
national shorelines is a national responsibility.
• On 4 March 2010, a meeting was held with the Members
of the Consultative Technical Group for Marine Pollution
Preparedness and Response (CTG MPPR), including
representatives from the EU Member States, EFTA
coastal countries, EU Candidate Countries, the European
Regional Agreements and the European Commission (dG
Environment);
• On 5 March 2010, a meeting was held with other key
stakeholders (industry, NGOs and other organisations)
relevant to the work of the Agency.
The following is a brief summary and analysis of the feedback
provided by the stakeholders to the consultation paper’s
questions. It is based on the written feedback received
as well as on the discussions during the two consultation
meetings. It should be noted that all comments and
recommendations received have been taken into account,
regardless whether they fall within or outside of EMSA’s
current mandate.
5.4.1. Summary of Feedback from the 2010 Stakeholder Consultation
The main points from the abovementioned process are
detailed below. It should be noted that the feedback
reflects different approaches and considerations. As such
the feedback covers a broad range of aspects, some of
which are not necessarily within the mandate of the Agency
or within the present policy of the EMSA Administrative
Board. Per activity the following points were made:
Figure 5.2 - Consultation Paper: Scoring* of Activities by Stakeholders (Scores: 1= insufficient, 2=sufficient, 3=good, 4=very good, 5=excellent)
* SOSRV = Standby Oil Spill Response Vessels, CSN = CleanSeaNet, MAR-ICE = Marine Intervention in Chemical Emergencies Network, CO-OP = Co-operation and co-ordination, INF = Information.
European Maritime Safety Agency
68
Regulation 724/2004 tasked the Agency to “Provide
Member States and the Commission with technical and
scientific assistance in the field of ship-sourced pollution”
and “Support on request with additional means in a cost
efficient way the pollution response mechanisms of Member
States”. The implementation of these new tasks was
addressed in the 2004 Oil Action Plan, the development of
which included consultation with Member State technical
experts.
EMSA’s technical expertise was soon recognised, but some
Member States questioned the Agency’s ability to actually
implement the programme identified in the 2004 Oil Action
Plan. The first major activity identified was the setting-
up and maintaining of the Network of Stand-by Oil Spill
Response vessels. The approach of converting commercial
vessels to oil spill response vessels formed the basis for the
development of a European Tier of response capacity for all
Member States. It is fair to say that the Network has been
built up and managed successfully over a number of years
and this has been recognised by the stakeholders.
CleanSeaNet became operational in 2007 and the initial
scepticism of this free of charge EMSA service quickly
disappeared and it was soon well received. Its technical
sophistication and quick response times have clearly filled
a gap in European marine pollution surveillance. The
Member States are actively contributing to the continuous
improvement of the service through the CleanSeaNet User
Group.
In general it is worth noting that EMSA’s activities in pollution
preparedness, detection and response have become widely
appreciated and supported since the inception of the
Agency. This is due to three main reasons. Firstly, after 6
years, EMSA’s role in this field has been developed on a
step by step basis in consultation with and the approval of
Member States through the Agency’s Administrative Board.
Secondly there are now well established relationships
between EMSA and EU Member States, EFTA coastal
States and EU Candidate Countries either at the individual
or Regional level. Lastly, and arguably most importantly,
the Agency has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to
implement complex operational programmes in the field of
pollution preparedness, detection and response. Looking
to the future, it is also clear that the challenge for the
Agency is to continue to identify and implement added
value activities in accordance with evolving needs.
cleanSeanet Service:
• The pan-European monitoring and surveillance
operational capability and role of EMSA is considered as
very efficient and providing added value;
• Most Member States emphasised the complementary use
of aerial surveillance and satellite monitoring regarding
illegal discharges, which is strongly advocated by the
Agency.
HnS and the mar-icE network:
• EMSA should strengthen its hNS-related activities. There
is a growing concern about chemical spills and this type
of service/information is very important;
• The MAR-ICE Network and EMSA’s other work in the
field of HNS/chemical marine pollution could be further
developed and could also cover hNS operational
response capability in the future;
• In the future the EMSA vessels could also have hNS
response capability (currently only Sweden, Finland and
Germany have or are investing in developing dedicated
vessels for hNS spill response and they support the
development of EMSA hNS vessels).
cooperation, coordination and information:
• EMSA has established good relations with the Member
States and the Regional Agreements;
• The role of the CTG MPPR in the field of accidental or
deliberate marine pollution is regarded positively. A
good example of work on issues of common interest is
the Claims Management Guideline, which was developed
for the benefit of all Member States. Work on this topic
should continue;
• EMSA could work closer with the MPPR scientific and
technical community and stakeholders and should have
a role in MPPR-related R&d coordination, evaluation and/
or funding;
• Bilateral meetings with industry associations are
appreciated and could be further developed;
• EMSA could further develop its role in training activities.
5.5. EvOLUTION IN STAkEhOLdERS PERSPECTIvES OF EMSA’S POLLUTION PREPAREdNESS ANd RESPONSE TASk
It is worthwhile reviewing the perspectives of stakeholders
regarding the Agency pollution preparedness and response
task and its implementation.
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
considerations, accident patterns and merchant shipping
traffic patterns.
6.1. dISTRIBUTION OF MEMBER STATE OIL SPILL RESPONSE vESSELS
Based on information from the Inventory of EU Member
States Oil Pollution Response vessels as published in 2009
and developed in conjunction with Member States, the map
below shows the distribution of response vessels around
Europe. It should be noted that the Uk uses chemical
dispersants as its primary response option whilst Greece
has a significant number of vessels which have a storage
capacity less than 50 m3. These are not shown in the map.
From the map it is clear that there is a high concentration
of large and medium sized response vessels in the southern
North Sea. With regard to the Baltic and the central
Mediterranean area, there are a significant number of
smaller vessels and some medium sized vessels are also
available.
6. EUROPEAN RISk EvALUATION ANd IMPLICATIONS FOR EMSA ACTIvITIES
In accordance with the Multi-annual Funding Regulation
Mid-term Report Roadmap, as adopted by the EMSA
Administrative Board, the Report should also:
• Identify, where relevant, any refinements/improvements
to the activities in order to bring them into line with the
evolving pollution preparedness, detection and response
environment;
• Identify, where appropriate and in line with Article 8 of
Regulation 2038/2006, any potential recommendations or
modifications to the budgetary/legal framework keeping
in mind any evolutions in the pollution preparedness,
detection and response field.
In order to achieve these objectives, it is necessary to
have information on any contextual changes that have
occurred since the publication of 2004 Oil Action Plan. Such
issues are addressed in the text below beginning with an
overview of Member State response vessels, environmental
* disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU Institutions
Figure 6.1 - Indicative Distribution of National Oil Spill Response Vessels in 2009** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party.
European Maritime Safety Agency
70
as far north as the Shetlands Isles in the United kingdom.
It also includes the Channel and its approaches;
• The Canary Islands.
Natura 2000 is the centrepiece of EU nature and biodiversity
policy. It is an EU-wide network of nature protection areas
established under the 1992 habitats directive. The aim of
the network is to assure the long-term survival of Europe’s
most valuable and threatened species and habitats. It
includes Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) designated
by Member States under the habitats directive. SACs
provide rare and vulnerable animals, plants and habitats with
increased protection and management. It also incorporates
Special Protection Areas (SPAs) which they designate under
the 1979 Birds directive. SPAs help protect and manage
areas which are important for rare and vulnerable birds for
breeding, feeding, wintering or migration. The establishment
of this network of protected areas also fulfils a Community
obligation under the UN Convention on Biological diversity.
All EU Member States contribute to the network of sites in
a Europe-wide partnership from the Canaries to Crete and
from Sicily to Finnish Lapland. This reflects public sensitivity
and concern regarding the protection of the environment.
The map below shows PSSAs in Europe as well illustrating
the relative density of Natura 2000 sites.
6.2. ENvIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
In the event of an oil spill from any type of source, various
socio-economic and environmental resources will be put at
risk through contamination. The individual importance of
such resources and the associated prioritisation for their
defence during an incident is clearly within the competence
of the affected Member State and maybe detailed their
national contingency plan.
At the European scale there are a limited number of
environmental classifications that can be considered namely
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs) and Natura 2000
sites. PSSAs, as designated by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), are areas that need special protection
through action by IMO because of their significance for
recognised ecological, socio-economic or scientific reasons
and which may be vulnerable to damage by international
maritime activities. The following PSSAs area of relevance:
• The Baltic Sea;
• The Wadden Sea which is adjacent to the North Sea with
responsibility for it shared between the Netherlands,
Germany and denmark;
• The Western European Waters which encompasses an
area to the south of Portugal along the Atlantic Coast and
Figure 6.2 - Distribution of Particularly Sensitive Seas Areas (PSSAs) and Natura 2000 Sites** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party.
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
Accidents often happen when ships and seafarers are being
worked harder, and during the shipping boom times in 2007
and 2008, accidents increased substantially, while since
then, the opposite has been the case. Supply overcapacity,
high levels of ship scrapping, lower operating speeds
and generally less pressure to meet tight deadlines in the
economic downturn are seen to be the main reasons for the
significant reduction in overall accident numbers. However,
slow steaming is predicted to result in increasing numbers of
engine failures, and deferred maintenance and repairs due
to decreases in the income of ship owners and operators
may also cause problems. Therefore, developments in these
areas must be watched closely.
Looking forward, given the relatively low accident numbers
towards the end of 2009, if the trend continues, 2010 could
also be another year with lower accident figures, although a
look at the figures for early 2010 suggests that this is unlikely
to be the case. They show that the presently stuttering
economic upturn, possibly led by the domestic Chinese
economy and the country’s demand for raw materials, may
already be contributing to an increase in accident numbers.
What is clear is that any relaxation of standards resulting
from an improved accident situation in 2009 could lead
to greater problems when traffic volumes return to, or
exceed, the levels in the recent past. Consequently, it is
very important that the maritime community continues to
At the European scale it is clear that the bulk of PSSAs
cover the Baltic Sea, the Atlantic coast and the Channel. As
can be expected, Natura 2000 sites can be found all along
the European coastline. higher concentrations of such sites
are in the North East and South West Baltic, in the southern
North Sea and along the Atlantic coast.
6.3. MERChANT ShIPPING: ACCIdENT PATTERNS
Each year the Agency produces a Maritime Accident Review
which provides selective and aggregated information on
EU maritime accidents (the term EU includes Norway and
Iceland for the purpose of this review). The aim is to make
both the EU maritime community and EU citizens aware of
the accident situation in and around EU waters.
The 2009 figures show that the total number of ships involved
in accidents, and also loss of life, were substantially down
in comparison to the market boom years of 2007/2008,
although the number of accidents was still significantly
higher than in 2006. Given that accident numbers fell off
significantly from late 2008, it appears that there may be a
correlation with the global financial crisis and the associated
slump in shipping demand. At the same time, it is also
possible that heightened activity by the EU and Member
States to counter accidents and pollution may have had
To give a little perspective to the accident picture, it should
be borne in mind that 20,644 merchant vessels were
recorded as calling at EU ports in 2009 (down almost 10%
from 2008), and that these ships were involved in 593,207
port movements (down by almost 15% from 2008). The map
below indicates the distribution of accidents across Europe.
The relative density of accidents is also shown with the
aim of understanding which areas of Europe have higher
concentrations of such events.
From the map, the highest concentration of accidents
occurred:
• In the Baltic: Finland (South-East), Sweden (Central-East),
Germany and denmark;
• In the North Sea: Norway (Central and South-West), Uk
(Scotland and Central East England), the Netherlands,
Belgium and the Channel;
• Along the Atlantic coast: Uk (Western Scotland) and
Ireland (South);
• In the Mediterranean: South-East Greece.
These accident “blackspots” reflect to a certain degree the
overall merchant shipping traffic pattern around European
waters.
pursue initiatives aimed at improving ship/cargo/pollution
monitoring, accident response and maritime safety in
general.
When looking at the month-by-month picture, a number of
interesting points can be noted. When looking at the winter
months, it can be seen that, as reported in the 2008 review,
following the accident high point in November 2008,
the two following months (december 2008 and january
2009) saw a significant reduction in the number of vessels
involved in accidents in comparison to the previous two
years. however, the numbers for November and december
2009 saw a far greater decrease, to the extent the numbers
almost halved in comparison to the corresponding months
in 2008. As mentioned previously, an early look at the
January 2010 figures shows that this downward trend is
showing definite signs of reversing.
The figures for September 2009 showed a significant
increase over those for September 2008, with the main
increases associated with general cargo ship collisions and
contacts. however, following an in-depth analysis, no clear
pointers emerged as to the reason for the increase, and
there was no significant regional bias.
Figure 6.4 - Indicative Distribution of Accidents: 2009 (Source: EMSA Maritime Accident Review)** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party.
* Information comes from multiple sources, including the media monitoring service of the European Commission, reliable accident information sources, recognised shipping information systems, the maritime and general media and a wide range of internet based publications.
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
Most of the incidents have occurred in Northern Europe
with most spills in 100-1000 tonne range. A “hotspot” is
the Algeciras/Gibraltar area where there were four spills in
period reviewed. historically, major oil spills have mainly
been from tankers.
6.4. ACCIdENTAL OIL SPILLS
Based on data collated by the Agency, as part of preparing
the Annual Maritime Accident Review, the map below shows
the main oil spills that occurred during the period 2007-2008
from all sources i.e. shipping and oil/gas offshore facilities.
The map on the next page illustrates the distribution of
accidental oil spills over the longer term and illustrates the
distribution of major oil spills over the last 25 years around
European and adjacent waters.
Those incidents involving more than 10,000 tonnes are
highlighted and listed in more detail in the subsequent
table (Figure 6.7). It is striking that a significant proportion
of these spills are in Western Europe.
Those incidents involving more than 10,000 tonnes are
highlighted and listed in more detail in the subsequent
table. It is striking that a significant proportion of these
spills are in Western Europe.
As can be appreciated most incidents occur due a
combination factors. The information below has classified
“cause” in terms of the primary event or operation in
progress at the time of the spill. Spills for which the relevant
information is not available or where the cause was not one
of those given are listed under “Other/unknown”.
For incidents involving spills in excess of 700 tonnes it is
apparent from the table that approximately:
• 29 % of these are related to collisions;
• 36 % of these are related to groundings;
• 65 % of these are related to collisions and groundings;
• 77 % of these are related to collisions, groundings and
hull failures.
Figure 6.5 - main Ship Sourced oil Spills: 2007-2008 (Source: EmSa maritime accident review)** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party.
* disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU Institutions
European Maritime Safety Agency
74
Figure 6.6 - large oil tanker Spills since 1984 (Source: itopF)** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party.
Figure 6.7 - Incidence of Oil Tanker Spills >700 tonnes by Cause: 1970-2009 (Source: ITOPF)
* disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU Institutions
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Multi-annual Funding Regulation: Mid-term Report
EU sea areas, weather conditions, geographical restrictions,
tidal conditions and other factors may mean that the danger
of accidents will increase unless improved safety and
environmental risk reduction procedures are set in place. At
the core of the required procedural improvements are traffic
organisation measures which involve the monitoring of ship
movements, with the aim of preventing the development of
dangerous situations.
Based on (limited) data extracted from SafeSeaNet, the
vessel traffic monitoring system hosted by the Agency, the
map below shows the relative density of shipping traffic
around Europe. It should be noted that some relevant
AIS stations (e.g. along the Atlantic coast in France and
Portugal as well as along North Africa) are not presently
part of the SafeSeaNet system. In parallel the data sample
is of a relatively short time period which could be subject
to seasonal variations. Accordingly the map provides an
indicative overview of shipping density around Europe.
6.5. MERChANT ShIPPING: TRAFFIC PATTERNS
The seas surrounding the European Union contain some of
the busiest shipping areas in the world. As well as handling
around 90% of EU external trade and around 35% of trade
between EU countries, the sea lanes also handle a huge
amount of through traffic. In particular, oil tanker traffic is
rapidly growing as more and more oil is progressively being
brought to the global market place via EU waters. The
consequence of this significant growth in tanker traffic, in
addition to the existing level of hazardous goods traffic in
general, is a corresponding growth in environmental risk to
the European Union in most of its main sea areas.
Much of the growth in future maritime traffic could also
occur as a result of the EU drive to move goods transport
off the roads. In addition, there is also growth in passenger
traffic from the present 350 million passenger journeys per
year, and this is spread around the EU. In addition, in many
Figure 6.8 - Vessel Traffic Density around Europe: Feb – May 2010 (Source:SafeSeaNet AIS Position Database)** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party.
European Maritime Safety Agency
76
6.6. MERChANT ShIPPING: TANkER TRAFFIC PATTERNS
As is self-evident, oil tankers are a source of oil spills.
keeping in mind the earlier statistics on the causes of major
spills, it is important to have an overview of tanker trading
patterns around Europe. It is also important to see if any
identifiable changes in these patterns have occurred since
the 2004 Oil Action Plan.
With this in mind, the Agency contracted two companies for
the provision of oil cargo data (Lloyds List Intelligence) and
the subsequent cartographic representation of this data
using shipping routes (COWI A/S). The oil cargo trading
data provided by Lloyds List Intelligence is based on their
APEx database, which gathers global seaborne oil trade
and tanker movement information based on ports calls.
The information refers to the transportation of crude oil
in vessels above 10,000 deadweight (dWT). Consequently
ships smaller than this threshold are not included nor
represented in the maps.
The oil cargo data has been sourced for 2004, the year
EMSA’s Oil Action Plan was approved by the Administrative
Board, and 2009, the most recent complete year for which
data is available. It should be highlighted that the economic
crisis had a significant effect on merchant shipping in 2009.
COWI A/S analysed and aggregated the data. They also
established, based on the data available (port to port) and
their experience, the tanker trading routes and created
the associated maps. Regarding the routes taken by the
ships, these have been consolidated into a format that
is both presentable as well as being as representative as
possible. Accordingly, the routes displayed should be taken
as indicative within the framework of the need to have an
overview of tanker trading patterns around Europe.
6.6.1. Tanker Traffic Patterns by Number of Voyages
The map (Figure 6.9) on the next page shows the number
of voyages by tankers around Europe. As expected the
traditional main tanker routes are clearly shown.
Vessel traffic separation schemes and other measures to
ensure safe passage notwithstanding, there is clearly a
correlation between shipping traffic density and the risk
of a collision with another vessel or offshore structure and
even that of a grounding ashore. Whilst it is natural to
focus on oil spills from tankers, it is worth noting that the
current merchant shipping trend is one of increasing vessel
size for most types of ships. These non-tankers can carry
significant amounts of fuel, often heavy fuel oil/bunkers. For
larger vessels the quantity can be in thousands of tonnes
of oil that could potentially be spilt. Consequently the risk
of a collision or grounding should also be considered as
potential source of a significant oil spill.
With respect to the Baltic shipping traffic situation, much
of this is located in the southern and central parts of the
Baltic Sea, and economic downturns aside, ship voyages
and cargo volumes are generally increasing, not least due
to the transport of crude oil from Russia. The south-western
approaches between denmark and Sweden and the Gulf of
Finland are the two areas with the greatest concentrations
of shipping traffic.
Regarding the North Sea, the Channel and the Atlantic
Coast there is a huge amount of ship traffic operating
between the Atlantic Ocean and northern EU ports as well
traffic with Northern Russian ports.
The Mediterranean and Black Seas, taken together, are
very heavily trafficked in a number of areas, with much
of the through traffic going in two main directions. The
largest volume of through traffic uses the main east-west
lanes between the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, and passes
between the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar. There is
also a huge volume of through traffic using the main north-
south lanes, which pass through the Aegean Sea between
Greece and Turkey. The requirement to move oil westwards
from both the Black Sea and Gulf regions means that a
significant number of tankers are also passing through.
Finally, the amount of internal traffic in the region is also
huge. Although the Mediterranean and Black Seas are both
enclosed bodies of water, and although the sea conditions
are frequently calmer than in more northerly waters, major
storms and heavy seas can occur in both from time to time.
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Figure 6.9 - Number of Tanker Voyages: 2009 (Source LLI/COWI)
With regard to evolving tanker trading patterns, analysis
has been undertaken comparing data from 2004 with that
of 2009. The next map (Figure 6.10) shows relative (%)
changes in number of tanker voyages along the trading
routes.
With reference to changes in number of tanker voyages
between 2004 and 2009 the following can be noted:
• The predicted increase in exports of oil from Russia and
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries has occurred.
The areas most affected are along the Norwegian coast
as well as the Baltic and the Black Seas;
• For the Baltic Sea Route from the Gulf of Finland the
number of voyages increased from 501 to 910. voyages
from kaliningrad decreased from 58 to 2;
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• The number of tanker voyages in the North Sea would
appear to have partly decreased and partly increased
depending on individual routes. This could be due
to an increase ship-to-ship transfers e.g. from a small
tanker sailing from a Russian port to a larger vessel for
onward transportation. The changes shown could also
be due to the data set itself as tankers of a size below
10,000 dWT are not represented. It is also possible that
the combination of both factors has led to the complex
pattern shown.
• For the northern route through the Barents Sea the
number of voyages increased from 94 to 122;
• For the Black Sea Route the number of voyages increased
from 861 to 910;
• Trade from the Arabian Gulf across the Mediterranean
to Northern European ports has also shown a significant
increase;
• There has been a significant increase in exports from the
eastern Mediterranean most probably due to the new
pipeline network that has become operational in this area;
Figure 6.10 - Number of Tanker Voyages: Changes between 2004 and 2009 (Source LLI/COWI)
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6.6.2. Tanker Traffic Patterns by Quantity of Oil Transported
With regarding to understanding oil cargo trading patterns,
another perspective is that of the quantity of oil being
transported. The maps below illustrate the situation in 2009
as well as a comparison with 2004.
Figure 6.11 - Quantity of Oil Transported: 2009 (Source LLI/COWI)
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The areas most affected are along the Norwegian coast
as well as the Baltic and the Black Seas;
• For the Baltic Sea Route from the Gulf of Finland the
largest increase of transported crude oil was observed,
from 40.5 to 79.8 million tonnes. The volume of other oil
products increased from 0.1 to 2.2 million tonnes;
• For the Black Sea Route the transported crude oil
increased from 71,4 to 81.2 million tonnes. The volume
of other oil products decreased from 4.1 to 0.9 million
tonnes;
• For the northern route through the Barents Sea only a
minor increase from 7.1 to 7.2 million tonnes crude oil was
observed.
As expected there is a strong correlation between the
voyage patterns and the amount of oil cargo transported.
With regard to total seaborne crude tonnes there was
little change (-0.57 %) between 2004 and 2009. Given the
traditional trend of year on year increase in oil consumption
the nominal change between 2004 and 2009 could be due
to the general economic downturn that occurred in 2009.
The following map shows the changes between 2004 and
2009 at the route specific level.
With reference to changes in the quantity of oil transported
between 2004 and 2009 the following can be noted:
• The expected increase in exports of oil from Russia and
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries has occurred.
Figure 6.12 - Quantity of Oil Transported: Changes between 2004 and 2009 (Source LLI/COWI)
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trading crude oil in the various regions of Europe in 2009 as
well changes between 2004 and 2009 those age profiles. It
should be noted that there is insufficient data for tankers
aged 30 years or more to make robust comparisons.
From the chart below, in 2009 and for tankers greater than
10,000 dWT, the vast majority of crude was transported by
ships aged 14 years or less. Older tankers are a feature of
trade in the Mediterranean and the North East Atlantic.
6.7. OThER INdICATORS
Additional factors can also be considered with the framework
of accidents and spills. Some of these are included below
based on the availability of data.
age of tankers
The age of a tanker is linked to the level of maintenance
required to keep the vessel fit for purpose. The charts below
show, based on the data available, the age profile of tankers
Figure 6.13 - Tanker Age Profile per Region* for Quantity of Crude Oil Transported: 2009 (Source LLI)
* GrBWSeas refers to the Greenland Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea and the White Sea.N. East Atlantic Ocean includes the Bay of Biscay, Celtic Sea and the North Sea.
From the next chart (Figure 6.14), it would appear, for tankers
greater than 10,000 dWT, that the Baltic is experiencing a
significant increase in trade in older tankers i.e. more than 20
years of age. Cross-checking with the earlier chart indicates
that this increase in based on a relatively small amount of
oil transported. The areas of the Greenland Sea, Norwegian
Sea, the Barents Sea and the White Sea are showing trend
of increasing age but with more emphasis in the 10-20 age
brackets.
tanker Hull type
Following previous major incidents there have been a
number of initiatives enhance the basic design of tanker
with respect to safety. One of the steps taken has been to
phase out single hull tankers.
The following map (Figure 6.15) shows single hull tanker
trade patterns in 2009.
From the map there were still a significant number of single
hull tankers trading in 2009. 2010 is a key year with respect
to the phase out of such tankers and so the trend of reduced
trade can be expected. Analysis of 2004/2009 changes (not
shown) confirms the expected decrease in the use of single
hull tankers. This no doubt reflects the changes in maritime
legislation aiming at such an effect. What is not clear at
this stage, due to the various exemptions allowed under
MARPOL, is the effect in the medium term. In particular,
the Black Sea and the East Mediterranean Sea may be
confronted with negative consequences of the continued
use of single hull tankers in these sea areas.
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Figure 6.14 - Tanker Age Profile per Region* for Quantity of Crude Oil Transported: Changes 2004 -2009 (Source lli)* GrBWSeas refers to the Greenland Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea and the White Sea. N. East Atlantic Ocean includes the Bay of Biscay, Celtic Sea and the North Sea.
Figure 6.15 - Single Hull Tankers: Number of Voyages: 2009 (Source LLI/COWI)
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On the economic front, most large-scale activity has focused
on offshore fisheries and hydrocarbon development.
Important fisheries and rich mineral and hydrocarbon
reserves are becoming increasingly accessible due to
technological advances and the observed trend toward
longer periods of open sea. This trend also has significant
implications for the use of the Arctic as an efficient shipping
route.
It should also be noted that, following the 2985th Foreign
Affairs Council meeting in december 2009, the Council of
the European Union adopted a set of conclusions in relation
to Arctic issues. Inter alia, the Council considered that
there was a need for responsible, sustainable and cautious
action in view of new possibilities for transport, natural
resource extraction and other entrepreneurial activities
linked to melting sea ice and other climate change effects.
It agreed with the Commission that one of the main policy
objectives should be promoting sustainable use of natural
resources. Those conclusions of particular relevance can be
summarised as follows:
• Research regarding environmental protection in light of
long range transport of hazardous chemicals;
• Reinforced co-operation for emergencies;
• Monitoring of the evolving situation with regard to
transoceanic Arctic routes for shipping and navigation.
As shown in the map on the next page, the EMSA Network
of Stand-by Oil Spill Response vessels does not provide any
reasonable coverage of the Artic area.
oil and Gas industry Facilities
The recent deepwater horizon incident in the Gulf of
Mexico, and the huge amount of oil released into the
marine environment, is a harsh reminder of the potential
for major spills from petroleum industry facilities. Within
the European context there are two notable incidents that
involved EMSA.
The first occurred at the Statfjord A oil platform in Norway
in 2007. Approximately 3,850 tonnes of Brent crude oil
leaked during loading from the Statfjord Alpha platform
to a tank ship. The leak occurred in a pipe between the
platform and a nearby loading buoy where tankers dock to
load up. The second was the jieh Spill in Lebanon in 2006.
As a result of conflict in the Lebanon region, a substantial
amount, initially estimated at 10,000 tonnes, of medium/
6.8. TRENdS IN SPILL FACTORS
Ship to Ship transfers: lightering
Lightering involves the process of transferring cargo from
a larger vessel (typically a very Large Crude Carrier or
Suezmax) to a smaller vessel, or service ship (typically an
Aframax). By way of an example, a very Large Crude Carrier
could offload to as many as four or five smaller vessels
which in themselves can still be of a significant size e.g. 50-
80,000 dWT. The reverse operation is also undertaken. In
general, lightering is undertaken when restrictions such as
depth of water, narrow entrances or small berths impede
a large vessel from entering a port. This type of activity
can also be done in reverse, loading from a terminal and
carrying cargo out to a bigger vessel offshore. The extent
of such activities is largely driven by long-haul crude oil
import volumes, which fluctuate depending on demand for
petroleum products and refinery utilisation.
Such ship to ship transfers (STS) do occur around Europe.
Unfortunately, there does not appear to any collated and/
or consolidated data regarding the actual areas and the
amounts of oil being transferred. Accordingly, it is difficult
to build a picture of such operations at the European level.
One of the most well-known recent trends is an increase in
STS operations of relatively small tankers due to the shallow
waters of the Baltic Sea and some of the approaches to
the Northern Maritime Corridor ports. however, once this
stage of the journey has been negotiated it is then more
economically viable to transfer the oil into larger tankers for
the onward journey to its eventual destination in either the
Americas or the Far East. data from the Uk’s Maritime and
Coastguard Agency (MCA) indicates that such operations
tend to involve transfer of oil from a number of smaller
vessels (around 2-6) into one larger vessel.
arctic issues
Another evolving issue is the expected increase in activities
in and around the Arctic related to shipping and oil/gas
production. According to information available through
the Arctic Council, the environmental, economic and socio-
cultural changes occurring in the Arctic today are primarily
driven by two key factors: climate change and increasing
economic activity. Regarding climate change, it is estimated
that warming of the Arctic could be more than (potentially
twice) the global average. It was also concluded that the
reduction in sea ice will continue to lengthen the navigation
season and very likely increase access to Arctic resources.
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The on-going concern over this issue will require reflection
at the European level regarding the most appropriate
way forward. The Agency will separately reflect on the oil
platform safety situation in the European Union and will
analyse its own capacities in this respect and, if required,
its suitability to respond to spills caused by offshore
installations.
From the map, it can be concluded that the Network covers
many of the main oil fields in Europe. Areas that that are
poorly supported include the northern North Sea and the
Adriatic Sea (as well as the Arctic).
heavy fuel split when a number of oil storage tanks were
damaged and caught fire in Jieh on the Lebanese coast.
Regarding exploration and production across Europe,
there is expected to be a general increase in activities as
new fields are developed. The map below, based on the
collation of data from a number of sources including the
Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) industry association, shows
the distribution of offshore facilities around Europe. This
data has been combined with the 48h (after mobilisation)
coverage of the EMSA Network of Stand-by Oil Spill
Response vessels.
Figure 6.16 - Offshore Facilities around Europe & the EMSA Network of Stand-by Spill Response Vessels (Source: multiple inputs including oGp)**** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party.
* Disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU institutions. The range is shown as the area which a vessel can reach at an estimated speed of 10 knots within the time given counting the mobilisation time and delaying factors. Source: International Association of Oil and Gas Producers OGP + EEA Environment Report Assessment Report n°10 (2003) + CMap Electronic Nautical Charts + Petroleum Economist Ltd Oil and Gas Map.
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6.9. SYNOPSIS OF OIL SPILL PREPAREdNESS ANd RESPONSE FACTORS
The various factors described above can be summarised on
a regional basis as shown in the table below.
TABLE 6.1 - SYNOPSIS OF OIL SPILL PREPAREdNESS ANd RESPONSE FACTORS
Region
Factor Baltic Sea North Sea Atlantic Mediterranean Black Sea
MS Response vessels
Significant number of smaller vessels and some medium sized vessels
high density of large and medium sized vessels in southern North Sea
Significant number of smaller vessels and some medium sized vessels
Environmental Aspects
PSSA (whole area)
high Natura 2000 density
PSSA (small zone)
high Natura 2000 density in southern area
PSSA (whole area)
high Natura 2000 density in northern area
Enclosed body of water
Enclosed body of water
Merchant Shipping: Accident density
high density found in Finland, Sweden, Germany and denmark
high density found in Norway, Uk, the Netherlands, Belgium and the Channel
high density found in Uk and Ireland
high density found in Greece
Accidental Oil Spills high density of large tanker spills
Merchant Shipping: Traffic Patterns
high density found in the southern and central areas;
The south-western approaches between denmark and Sweden and the Gulf of Finland are the two areas with the greatest concentrations
high density found in the southern North Sea & the Channel
high density found along southern the Atlantic Coast
high density found along:
- The main east-west routes between the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar
- The north-south route passing through the Aegean Sea
high density found at Bosporus Straits
Tanker Traffic Patterns: Voyages/Quantity
Significant increase due to Russian exports
Possible decrease in traffic
Significant increase in traffic
Significant increase in east-west traffic
Increase in traffic levels
Tanker Age Profile Most crude is transported in tankers of 14 years or less;
Greenland/Norwegian/Barents/White Seas are showing trend of increasing age but within the 10-20 year range
Significant trade using older tankers
Significant trade using older tankers
Single Hull Profile Significant number of voyages
Significant number of voyages
Offshore Facilities Some in southern area
very high density very low density high density in Adriatic Sea and off parts of North Africa
high density of Russia and Romania
From the table it is clear that there are a range of oil spill
factors which are more or less important depending on the
different regions in Europe. The complexity and range of
issues reflects the broad nature of the European Union as
a whole. Each sea region has its own individual risk profile.
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86
7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1. FINdINGS ANd RECOMMENdATIONS
As described earlier the Agency has undertaken a wide range
of activities in the field of marine pollution preparedness
and response during the period 2007-2009. The activities
have been presented in detail under the three main themes
of operational assistance, co-operation & co-ordination, and
information. It should be noted that published previously
individual annual Reports are also available for the years
2007, 2008 and 2009 through the Agency website.
As can be expected, the main expenditures relate to the
operational services, in particular the Network of Stand-by
Oil Spill Response vessels and CleanSeaNet, the oil spill
satellite detection and monitoring service.
Analysis has been undertaken on the cost-efficiency
of the approaches implemented to provide these two
main operational services at the European level. The
conclusion of the analysis is that the Agency has set-up
and maintained these services in a cost efficient manner
at the European level. This conclusion is supported by the
various evaluations of EMSA activities in this field as well
as by stakeholder feedback. The added (operational) value
of such a framework has been confirmed. The technical
specifications of the at-sea oil recovery service provided
through the Network of Standby Oil Spill Response vessels
have been recognised as being fit for purpose
It must be highlighted that the purpose of the Network
is to “top-up” Member States’ response capacity when
affected by a spill. The primary responsibility to respond
to an incident is, and remains, with national authorities.
Accordingly, the Agency provides a “European tier” of
response capacity that is aimed at assisting coastal States.
Clearly, such a “reserve for disasters” should have limits in
terms of how much response capacity is made available.
As shown in the map on the next page, the Network
currently provides a level of operational coverage that is
broadly similar across Europe. The main areas of weak/
no coverage in terms of time needed for an EMSA vessel
to arrive onsite include the Arctic, the northern North
Sea, the Bay of Biscay, the Canary Islands, parts of the
central Mediterranean area, the Adriatic and the eastern
Mediterranean.
6.10. SUMMARY
Reflecting the complex nature of merchant shipping
around Europe, the risk factors identified above and their
importance per region varies widely. Some areas are of
particularly high ecological/environmental value whilst
others have a high density of merchant shipping traffic. The
overview is further complicated when one considers the
trends in tanker trading patterns with respect to number of
voyages, quantity transported and age profile and even the
effect of regulations to phase-out single hull tankers.
Such considerations would imply that the Agency’s initial
assumptions, as identified in the 2004 Oil Action Plan, are
still broadly valid. The main theme of providing a broadly
similar level of support across Europe with an emphasis
on tanker trading routes would appear to be appropriate,
except for the Black Sea. The main issues that were not fully
considered at the time related to the oil and gas industry
offshore facilities and European policies regarding the
Arctic.
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• The potential threat posed by the relatively high
concentration of single hull tankers trading in the East
Mediterranean and Black Sea areas;
• The increase in ship to ship transfers of oil and the
associated general lack of detailed information on the
scale of these activities;
• The development of the Arctic in general and the increase
in shipping and oil/gas exploration activities in particular;
• Particularly in the wake of the deepwater horizon incident,
the potential threat posed by offshore oil facilities;
• The increasing importance to make available EMSA
pollution preparedness and response resources and
activities to neighbouring countries in adjacent seas.
With the abovementioned issues in mind, the Agency intends
to continue the broad line of activities that it has undertaken
to date and as described in earlier chapters. CleanSeaNet
is, as of 2011, already in phase of service upgrading whilst
Co-operation & Co-ordination and Information activities will
continue in the same vein.
Such actions will have to be carried out within the existing
financial envelope, as provided by the Budget Authorities.
The time needed for the vessels to be “ready to sail” varies
between contracts. Accordingly, a mobilisation time of
up to 24 hours, for discharging any cargo and for loading
specialised response equipment, should be kept in mind
before the vessel is “ready to sail”.
With regard to more general feedback from stakeholders,
primarily Member States and their marine pollution experts,
the conclusion is that there has been a positive evolution
of their perception with respect to the scope of activities
undertaken by the Agency. EMSA has implemented complex
and challenging projects in an effective manner. Whilst
there is always room for improvement, the overall sense
is that the Agency provides added value to the pollution
preparedness and response mechanisms of Member States.
The 2004 Oil Action Plan identified a number of assumptions
regarding oil spill risk factors around European waters. This
analysis remains valid with certain exceptions. The main
conclusion is that the risk factor overview across Europe
is complex. Each area has its own profile wherein different
specific elements are more or less significant. Additional
issues that need to be considered include the following:
Figure 7.1 - Network of Standby Oil Spill Response Vessels: Coverage from “Ready to Sail** As of 17 June 2010, Iceland is an EU Candidate Country in addition to being an EFTA Contracting Party.
* disclaimer: Boundaries and country names are indicative and do not represent the views of EMSA nor EU Institutions
European Maritime Safety Agency
million over the period 2007-2013. The table below shows
the results of the projected utilisation.
Whilst the utilisation rate for Commitment Appropriations
is very good, the projected utilisation of Payments
Appropriations is lower. A number of factors influence the
rate of payments. For example, with respect to the Network
of Standby Oil Pollution Response vessels, if there is a delay
regarding a new contract in entering the operational phase
of the service, there is a reduction in payments for that
year. Similarly, if a satellite image provider does not deliver
the product in a timely manner then there is a reduction in
payment. In addition, 4 year contracts signed (committed)
before 2014 will trigger payments up to 2017 which will fall
outside the current Financial Perspectives. The “rolling”
effect of renewed or replacement contracts evens out such
effects. The balance can only be achieved if the aggregated
value of contracts running into 2007 were the same as at
the end of 2013. Clearly this is not possible as the Agency
was in the “building up” phase in 2007 compared to a
significantly more mature structure expected by the end of
2013. It is worth noting that in 2005 the Agency started
making commitments and initial payments in relation to
the first set of 3-year Standby Oil Spill Response Vessel
contracts. 2006 saw similar actions with respect to setting
up the CleanSeaNet service, also based on 3-year contracts.
Accordingly, payments for these two main activities are
spread over a number of years, some of which fall into the
period covered by the Multi-annual Funding Regulation.
It is worth noting that given the utilisation of budget
appropriations to date, there is very limited scope for
any major new activities to be implemented within the
remainder of the financial envelope available through the
existing Multi-annual Funding Regulation.
The Multi-annual Funding (MAF) Regulation itself has
proven to date to be a very useful tool for enabling the
Agency to implement its activities in the field of pollution
preparedness and response. The complex nature of some
of these activities, combined with the need to have multi-
annual contracts with industry allowing, for example, the
Agency to benefit from one-off investments in pre-fitting
vessels for oil recovery services and to create economies of
scale for satellite based services, has been greatly facilitated
by the MAF Regulation.
The (cost-efficient) sustainability of the operational services,
which is a key factor in their added value, is only possible
through the budgetary framework provided by the MAF
Regulation. accordingly, it is strongly recommended that
the financial envelope be renewed beyond its expiry
date in 2013.
7.2. BUdGET APPROPRIATIONS: SUMMARY
Based on the continuation of the services described at the
level indicated it is possible to estimate the overall utilisation
of the Multi-annual Funding financial envelope of EUR 154
ExPECTEd UTILISATION OF MAF FINANCIAL ENvELOPE
Utilisation compared to:- Actual amounts for 2007-9,- Amount projected for 2010- Amount requested for 2011 and- Amount estimated for 2012-13
Commitments Payments
2007 23,979,706 15,314,262
2008 17,094,428 15,452,978
2009 18,766,800 17,302,982
2010 20,241,742 13,332,883
2011: Requested 23,000,000 20,000,000
2012: Est. 21,000,000 21,000,000
2013: Est. 25,600,000 20,000,000
TOTAL 149,682,676 122,403,105
MAF Envelope 154,000,000 154,000,000
difference 4,317,324 31,596,896
Utilisation (%) 97.20 79.48
TABLE 7.1 - ExPECTEd UTILISATION OF MAF REGULATION FINANCIAL ENvELOPE
The European Maritime Safety Agency is one of the European Union’s decentralised agencies.Based in Lisbon, the Agency provides technical assistance and support to the European Commission and Member States in the development and implementation of EU legislation on maritime safety, pollution by ships and maritime security. It has also been given operational tasks in the field of oil pollution response, vessel monitoring and in long-range identification and tracking of vessels.