EDITORIAL 3 INVITED ARTICLE 4 VIEW POINT 7

Summer / January-June 2012

EDITORIAL 3

INVITED ARTICLE 4

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

VIEW POINT 7

COVER STORY 9

COUNTRY PROFILE 17 2011

OPINION 23

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NEWS 26

BOOK REVIEW 42

CBR Security: India's Threats and

Vulnerabilities

News Analysis: Chemical Substance Attacks

in Afghan Schools

Animesh Roul

Perspective on Implications of the Advances

in Life Sciences and Technologies Related to

BTWC

B. M. Gandhi

Libyan Disclosures: 'Take-away' for

CWC verification

Arun Vishwanathan

Anthrax Threat in Pakistan, Global Context

and Regional Consequences

Gunjan Singh

Historical Dictionary of Nuclear, Biological

and Chemical Warfare

Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav

THFINAL DECLARATION: 7 BTWC REV CON 44

Jan-Jun 2012 1

CBW M a g a z i n eM a g a z i n eM a g a z i n eM a g a z i n eM a g a z i n eJournal on Chemical and Biological Wepons

Volume 5 Number 1-2 Jan-Jun 2012 ISSN: 0974-0619

EDITORIAL 3

INVITED ARTICLE 4CBR Security: India's Threats and Vulnerabilities

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

VIEW POINT 7News Analysis: Chemical Substance Attacks in Afghan Schools

Mr. Animesh Roul

COVER STORY 9Perspective on Implications of the Advances in Life Sciences and

Technologies Related to BTWC

Dr. B. M. Gandhi

COUNTRY PROFILE 172011 Libyan Disclosures: 'Take-away' for CWC verification

Dr. Arun Vishwanathan

OPINION 23Anthrax Threat in Pakistan, Global Context and Regional Consequences

Ms. Gunjan Singh

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NEWS 26

BOOK REVIEW 42Historical Dictionary of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare

Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav

FINAL DECLARATION: 7TH BTWC REV CON 44

Journal on Chemical and Biological Weapons 2

Jan-Jun 2012 3

Editorial

Executive Editor

Ajey Lele

Assistant Editors

Gunjan Singh

Avinash Anil Godbole

The 7th Review Conference of the Biologicaland Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) washeld at Geneva in December 2011. At thisConference, important developments inscience and technology relating to theConvention were discussed with a point ofview of strengthening the mechanisms forregulating, monitoring and preventing dualuse technologies from falling into the handsof hostile elements. Even as technologicaladvancement is important for betterment ofknowledge, the diversity of actors makes itdifficult as well as necessary to review safetyand mechanisms at periodic intervals. Thisissue looks at the conclusions of the ReviewConference.

B. M. Gandhi analyses the outcomes of thisReview Conference and the documentssubmitted in the lead up to the Conference.Animesh Roul and Gunjan Singh analyse therecent instances of biological weapon use andthreat, respectively in Afghanistan andPakistan, highlighting the situation in theSouth Asian region. Based on a joint RUSIand ORF study, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalanthrows light on India’s vulnerabilities to theCBR materials. In the Country Profilesection, Arun Vishwanathan analyses theCWC verification process in context of thediscoveries of previously undeclaredchemical weapons’ stockpiles in Libya.

This issue also features other regularfeatures like Chemical and Biological Newsand Book Review. In addition the issue alsocarries the Final Declaration of the 7thBTWC Rev Con.

With our readers’ feedback, we wish topublish issues in the future that focus on asubject of particular concern.

Contributions and feedback arewelcome and can be addressed to:[email protected]


Invited Article

Royal United Service Institute (RUSI;London) and Observer Research

Foundation (ORF; New Delhi) recentlycompleted a study titled "Chemical,Biological and Radiological Materials: AnAnalysis of Security Risks and TerroristThreats to India," examining India'svulnerabilities to CBR materials. The firstpart of this study undertook a threat analysisfrom terrorists or insurgent groups withinIndia while the second examined the currentprovisions for safety and security withinindustries using CBR materials including anoverview of the approaches, legislations andinstitutional instruments that are currentlyimplemented by the government of Indiaand private industry. A third section alsolooked at the global best practices, drawingexamples from within India as well asinternational governmental and industrialmodels. The study concluded with a set ofrecommendations in order to strengthen thelevels of CBR security and safety, both at thegovernment and industrial levels.

This study brings in a unique perspectivegained particularly through field researchwherein visits and interviews wereconducted in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat,Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Delhi.Interactions were held with police andsecurity personnel, industry owners andofficers (chemical, pharmaceutical andbiological industries using CBR materials),industrial trade bodies and researchinstitutes, regulatory authorities such as theCentral and State Pollution Control Boardsand responder agencies, including the NDMAand state fire services. The field visits for thestudy may not be comprehensive in the senseof geographic coverage across India.However, it gives a fair overview looked atthrough a few important parameters,including the size of CBR industries and

CBR Security:India's ThreatsandVulnerabilitiesDr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

The author is a Senior Fellowat the Observer ResearchFoundation, New Delhi.

Summary

With an expansive and expandingnetwork of educational institutions,laboratories and private industrialfacilities as also the trend towardsprivatisation of existing functions,India has to be mindful of theconsiderable weakness in the currentframeworks of material facility andexpertise control.

Jan-Jun 2012 5

laboratories as well as states that combatdifferent forms of insurgency or internalsecurity threats, in order to betterappreciate the role and thinking of police andother security agencies in these states. Whileit is difficult to generalise, certain trend linesthat have appeared can be presumed tostand true in the larger context.

While most global databases do not showterrorist incidents in India that have involvedthe use of CBR materials, nonetheless therebeen a few instances in which terrorists haveused these materials or have been found inpossession of these materials. Theseincidents did not gain wider public attentiongiven that they did not cause large-scalelosses to the public.

While state and central agencies are live tothe threat of CBR attacks, the lack of focusedattention in a few states (given that thereare more dominant internal securitychallenges such as left-wing extremism in thecase of Andhra Pradesh and the absence of amajor catastrophic event) has the danger ofgenerating complacency as such incidentsdemonstrate a certain level of intent on thepart of the non-state actor. In India's safety-security discourse on CBR, safety essentiallycomes from the idea of predictability of theconsequences if safety standards are notadhered to. This is due to the inherenthazardous nature of the material being used.The concept of security in the Indian contextrests on the idea of incident based reaction.For instance, until such time the non-stateactors started using ammonium nitrate as abase explosive in bomb blasts, access to thismaterial remained unregulated. This reflectsthe threat perception within the statemachinery. This line of thinking isundergoing change both within the industryand security fields. Industry, for instance,views safety and security as two sides of thesame coin and considers that if safetymeasures are complied with, including issues

of theft, security is automatically taken careof. This changed perception is beginning totrickle down to the level of medium-scaleindustries. However, the same cannot be saidtrue for the small-scale industries which tendto flout the rules and norms imposed by thegovernment.

While the establishment of the NationalDisaster Management Authority (NDMA)has been a step in the right direction, by andlarge the government approach has beenfocused on post-incident response thanprevention and mitigation. The currentinstitutional and legal frameworks for post-incident response, especially when dealingwith stolen material, have remainedsensitised about the CBR threat only from aresponse outlook. This approach is driven bythe fact that there has been no majorcatastrophic incident (Bhopal gas tragedybeing an exception) and also the low numberof large-scale incidents. Therefore, theapproach has focused on safety involvingincident response and cleanup as opposed tosecurity and prevention.

With an expansive and expanding networkof educational institutions, laboratories andprivate industrial facilities as also the trendtowards privatisation of existing functions,India has to be mindful of the considerableweakness in the current frameworks ofmaterial facility and expertise control. Lackof an integrated approach in controlling andprotecting these materials could pose seriouschallenges to India. Delhi's recent Cobalt 60incident is a case in point.

The lack of a centralised database withupdated information on incidents,intelligence or reports of CBR terroristattacks, sabotage, material thefts, intentionalmisuse or illegal trading has been found tobe a major lacuna in India's currentapproach. While criminal investigationsproceed under existing laws, the review


mechanism of the regulatory frameworkremains weak. For instance, it was foundduring our field study, particularly whiletalking to small-scale industries that minorcases involving theft of small amounts of CBRmaterials have failed to capture the attentionof the relevant security agencies.

While some of the Indian industries areexamples of international best practices, withsafety and security concerns effectivelyinterwoven, it was found that there exists ahuge gap between large and small-scaleindustries, in terms of threat perception andthe response measures undertakenthereafter. However, state and centralagencies have to pay attention to theconcerns of smaller manufacturers mainlythe high level of spending on security, erodingthe cost competitiveness in the market.Resource pooling may be a useful tool forclusters of small companies in order toemploy good security companies whilereducing the costs and maximising theimpact of security spending.

Uneven levels of training and securityprovisions and lack of standardisation of theprivate security agencies in India is also amajor lacuna. An accreditation and auditmechanism must be established for allagencies, involving an appropriate level ofCBR threat awareness and reportingstructure for audit findings to be signed offby a designated regulator. Insider threatsare another set of issues that might goundetected under the current scenario giventhat there are no personnel reliabilityprogrammes that are being done at sensitiveinstallations.

Even in worst-case scenarios, onsiteprotection of CBR materials receives greaterattention as compared to offsite measures.Material transportation remains the weakestlink in the CBR safety and security layout ofIndia. While there is more control over

material which are imported into or exportedfrom India, domestic transportation controlsappear to be underdeveloped.

While the Central and State Pollution ControlBoards have the most advanced andinterconnected national environmentalsampling structure within India, the limitedmandate of the pollution control board isanother major loophole. The PollutionControl Boards' mandate begins duringproduction and ends with wastemanagement and disposal; security of CBRmaterials is rarely considered to be undertheir jurisdiction.

While the creation and accomplishments ofthe NDMA is a way forward, the fact thatthe NDMA guidelines are not legally bindingis a major weakness. Efforts must be madeto make it mandatory for states toimplement these guidelines. Lastly, whilethere are several laws and regulations thatcover different aspects of CBR safety andsecurity, the lack of an overarching CBR lawhas been a major oversight.

Jan-Jun 2012 7

View Point

News Analysis:ChemicalSubstanceAttacks inAfghan SchoolsMr. Animesh Roul

The author is ExecutiveDirector, Society of Study ofPeace and Conflict.

Summary

In the two months of April and May(2012), over a hundred schoolgirlsand teachers were affected bypoisoned drinking water andcontaminated air at these highschools. Periodic attacks againststudents, teachers and schools usingvarious methods are in practice sincethe Taliban was ousted by the US ledallied forces.

Afghan Taliban’s campaign against femaleeducation and empowerment is well

known. This campaign reached new heightswhen unidentified poison attacks occurredtargeting several girls schools located inKapisa and Parwan provinces in April-May2009. These attacks involved poisonouschemical substances and the victims hadcomplained of headaches, nausea, vomiting,itching in the eyes following exposure. Again,in mid 2010, incidents of poisoning came tolight in the Afghan capital, Kabul includingin Esmati High School. Similar incidents havebeen noticed in 2012 as well. During samemonths of this year the reported attackshave occurred in many girls high schools in-cluding the Naheed Shaheed Girls HighSchool and Bashirabad High School in theTakhar province. In the two months of Apriland May, over a hundred schoolgirls andteachers were affected by poisoned drink-ing water and contaminated air at these highschools. Unidentified toxic powder was usedto contaminate the air in the classrooms aswell as the drinking water source of theseschools.

Periodic attacks against students, teachersand schools using various methods are inpractice since the Taliban was ousted by theUS led allied forces. In the past, Islamic rad-icals resorted to acid attacks against womenand girls who were seen either in market plac-es or going to schools. Additionally, there arereports of schools being bombed or burneddown. The former Taliban regime in Afghan-istan had banned any form of female educa-tion terming it against Islamic practice. Nowout of power, these elements have been try-ing to implement their writ in the areas lo-cated in North East of Kabul where they con-tinue to maintain dominant positions andwhere insurgency draws support from thelocal Pashtuns. According to the Afghan ed-


ucation ministry, extremists associated withTaliban have forcibly close down more than500 schools in 11 provinces in which it hasstrong support base.

The head of Takhar’s public health depart-ment confirmed in a media report that theattacks are intentional acts aimed at poison-ing schoolgirls. Even though the officials weresilent, largely due to fears of retribution, fin-gers point to pro-Taliban elements that havealways been opposing female education.Thus, this act seems to be aimed at spread-ing fear amongst the people of the localities.Authorities also believe that this could be apart of Taliban’s annual ‘spring-summer of-fensive’.

However, from a larger perspective, twothings remained unclear so far and needproper investigations by authorities: theidentification of substance used and thesource of the chemical.

Zabiullah Mujahid, the known Talibanspokesman denied Taliban’s role in the gasattacks against girl schools in the past. Afterthe Esmati High School incident in Kabul inAugust 2010, Zabiullah Mujahid said: “Wehave not and will never take such actionagainst innocent girls.” Even in the after-math of latest attacks, Taliban denied car-rying out such attacks. Zabihullah Mujahidtold the BBC News that the Taliban condemnsuch actions. He reiterated that the Muja-hideen of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan(Taliban) are not involved in these allegedincidents. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s intelli-gence agency, the National Directorate forSecurity (NDS), has accused the Talibangroup for poisoning and reportedly has ap-prehended some suspects having links withthe Taliban. Investigating reporters activein the region also believed that the chemicalgas attacks are very much unlikely and thiscould be part of some mass hysteria or a con-spiracy to cripple the education system. Ac-

cording to NDS officials, one detained Tali-ban commander reportedly claimed respon-sibility behind the transportation of non le-thal chemical materials from the borderingregions of Pakistan and confirmed about acomplicity of insiders who assisted the mili-tants to transfer the Chemical material in-side schools.

In the case of chemical substance attacksagainst schools, the intent seems not to killany girl students but plausibly to deter theirparents and students from attending schools.It could also be the case that as Taliban’s coredoes not have full control of affiliated or localgroups, it is possible that hardcore elementsperpetrated those attacks or conspired withinsiders to achieve their objective without theknowledge of senior leadership of Taliban.

References:

1 . “160 Takhar schoolgirls poisoned” , Pajhwok,May 29, 2012 http://www.paj hwok.com/en/2 0 1 2 / 0 5 / 2 9 / 1 6 0 - t a k h a r - s c h o o l g i r l s -poisoned

2. “Afghan girls poisoned in second anti-schoolattack,” Reuters, May 23, 2012, ttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/23/us-a f g h a n i s t a n - p o i s o n i n g - i d U S BRE84M0N420120523

3. “15 Afghans arrested after Taliban ‘bribedstudents to sneak poison into girls’ school’sdrinking water”, Daily Mail, June 06, 2012.http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2155304/Arrests-Taliban-bribed-students-sneak-poison-gir ls -schools-dr inking-water.html#ixzz1yVItyVK6

4. “Afghan officials say Taliban poisonedschoolgirls” , Associated Press, June 6, 2012.http://news.yahoo.com/afghan-officials-taliban-poisoned-schoolgirls-102124909.html

Jan-Jun 2012 9

Perspective onImplications ofthe Advances inLife Sciences andTechnologiesRelated to BTWCDr. B. M. Gandhi

The author was formerlyadvisor to the Government ofIndia in the Department ofBiotechnology, Ministry ofScience and Technology.

Summary

The document is collation of theinformation available from the 7thReview Conference of BWC held atthe UN Office in Geneva from 5 to 22December 2011. The FinalDeclaration at the Conferencereaffirmed its conviction about theessentiality of the provisions of theobligations for international peace andsecurity and to meet the goal ofcomplete disarmament under strictand effective international controlincluding the prohibition andelimination of all weapons of massdestruction repugnant to the safetyof humankind.

Cover Story

There has been a growing concern overadvances in scientific and technological

innovations of concern to Biological andToxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Thisissue has been discussed at number offorums as prelude to the 7th ReviewConference on BTWC and reviews have beenundertaken for in-depth analysis of theunderlying questions related to provisions ofthe BTWC on identifying the science andtechnology (S&T) innovations of concern tothe Convention; elements of dualapplications for hostile and benign purposes;what policies, regulations and governance theState Parties are going to adopt to respondto the issues at the national and internationallevel; the ways the identified issues are goingto be addressed under the Convention incoming years; and the ways continuedreview of advancements are going to bemonitored with active participation of thescientific community and the State Parties.Reports submitted at the Seventh ReviewConference held in Geneva in December,2011 addressed some of these issues, whichare highlighted below.

A report on the inter-sessional programme(2007–2010) by the ImplementationSupport Unit (ISU), working papers byIndia and other countries like Australia,Japan and New Zealand on significantdevelopments S&T of relevance to theConvention and potential areas for futureconsideration were submitted to theConference. A review of the provisions of theConvention, article by article, including thearticles impacted by the developments inS&T is undertaken below.

The Final Declaration at the Conferencereaffirmed its conviction about theessentiality of the provisions of theobligations for international peace and


security and to meet the goal of completedisarmament under strict and effectiveinternational control including the prohibitionand elimination of all weapons of massdestruction repugnant to the safety ofhumankind.

The Conference reiterated its intent toinvoke provisions of Article I and otherrelated articles with special emphasis ondevelopments in S&T and cooperationamongst the State Parties and the full andeffective implementation of United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 1540 and otherrelevant United Nations resolutions againstthe terrorists acting for non-peacefulpurposes.

Article I of the Convention covers allmicrobial or other biological agents or toxinsin quantities that have no justification forprophylactic, protective or other peacefulpurposes. Use by the States Parties of suchagents, not consistent with prophylactic,protective or other peaceful purposes, forhostile purposes or in armed conflict, isconsidered a violation of the article. In thisregard, experiments involving open airrelease of pathogens or toxins harmful tohumans, animals and plants were consideredinconsistent with the undertakings containedin Article. Since provisions of this article areapplicable to all the scientific andtechnological developments in life sciencesand in other relevant fields of science, in-depth analysis of developments in the fieldhas been emphasised by a number of StateParties including India and accordinglyinter-sessional discussions have beenplanned for the period 2012-2015. Specificsubjects to be considered would include (a)advances in enabling technologies, includinghigh-throughput systems for sequencing,synthesizing and analyzing DNA;bioinformatics and computational tools; andsystems biology (2012), (b) advances intechnologies for surveillance, detection,

diagnosis and mitigation of infectiousdiseases, and similar occurrences caused bytoxins in humans, animals and plants (2013),(c) advances in the understanding ofpathogenicity, virulence, toxicology,immunology and related issues (2014), and(d) advances in production, dispersal anddelivery technologies of biological agents andtoxins (2015). Each Meeting of Expertswould come out with a factual reportreflecting its deliberations.

The Conference reaffirmed the provisions ofArticle III, which comprehensively coverrecipients at the international, national orsub-national levels and called for appropriatemeasures, including effective national exportcontrols, by all States Parties to ensure thatno direct and indirect transfers are maderelevant to the Convention, to any recipientwhen the intended use is for purposesprohibited under the Convention. However,the States Parties were cautioned not to usethe provisions of this Article to imposerestrictions and/or limitations on transfersfor purposes consistent with the objectivesand provisions of the Convention of scientificknowledge, technology, equipment andmaterials under Article X.

The Conference called upon States Partiesto adopt under Article IV , theconstitutional processes, legislative,administrative, judicial and other measures,including penal legislation, designed toenhance domestic implementation of theprovisions of Article I of the Convention, takeappropriate action against the defaultersunder international laws; and ensuremeasures of safety and security of microbialor other biological agents or toxins ofpilferage in laboratories, facilities, and duringtransportation against unauthorized access.The importance of national implementationmeasures were emphasised under thenational laws, including measures ofbiosafety and biosecurity, voluntary

Jan-Jun 2012 11

management of standards on biosafety andbiosecurity awareness among scientificcommunity and professionals, voluntarydevelopment, adoption and promulgation ofcodes of conduct, enhanced capacity forsurveillance and detection of outbreaks ofdisease at the national, regional andinternational levels to contain internationalspread of diseases.

The Conference reaffirmed full andcomprehensive commitment to legalimplementation of Article X to facilitateState Parties to have the right to participatein exchange of equipment, materials andscientific and technological informationwithout hampering the economic andtechnological development of States Parties.The role of the private sector and UN bodiesengaged in international cooperation wasrecognized to promote capacity building inthe fields of vaccine and drug production,disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis,and containment of infectious diseases.Potential areas of cooperation includestrengthening existing internationalorganizations, networking on infectiousdiseases, epidemiology of disease outbreak,improved communication on diseasesurveillance, establishing and/or improvingnational and regional capabilities ofsurveillance, detection, diagnosis and combatof infectious diseases, development andproduction of vaccines and drugs, biologicalrisk management and creating necessaryinfrastructure for the same. Public-privatepartnerships are considered to be effectivemeasures of cooperation under the ArticleX. Conference agreed on the need oftargeting and mobilizing resources, includingfinancial resources, to facilitate maximumpossible exchanges of equipment, material,scientific and technological information,specific needs and requirements anddeveloping partnerships.

It is recognised that the Conference is awareof the fact that while scientific andtechnological developments in the field ofbiotechnology would increase the potentialfor cooperation among States Parties, theycould also increase the potential for themisuse of both S&T.

The document submitted by theImplementation Support Unithighlighted significant developments in S&Tat the inter-sessional programme (2007–2010) including enhancing internationalcollaboration on enforcement of national oflegislations; measures to improve biosafetyand biosecurity; adoption and/ordevelopment of codes of conduct; assistanceand exchanges in biological sciences andtechnology, capacity building for diseasesurveillance, detection, diagnosis, andcontainment of infectious diseases andstrengthening national biological riskmanagement. Significant advances of S&Twith beneficial and harmful impacthighlighted included;

1. Significant recent developmentswith possible negativeconsequences: Efforts to increasevirulence of influenza viruses throughreassortment of contemporary virus withpandemics strain; Increasing thetransmissibility of influenza virusesthrough the reassortment of the H1N1and H5N1 strains; computer simulationmodels on spread of disease that couldalso help optimise the impact of adeliberate release; Creation of a chimeravirus from components from an influenzavirus and the West Nile Virus; andidentification and characterization ofantibiotic resistance to new antibiotics.

2. Significant advances in S&T withpotential for weapon applications:Improved understanding of toxicity,


transmission, infectivity, virulence andpathogenicity in terms of mechanism ofaction of toxins, characterization of newtoxins, transmission of agents, simulationmodels of transmission, expression ofvirulence factors, use of sequencingtechniques to identify relevant proteinshave potential negative consequences.Other advances that could be misusedinclude enhanced efficacy of a biologicalweapon agent in terms of engineeredRNA-base for programmed kill, alteringhost ranges that are capable of crossingthe species barrier, efficient systems ofdelivering biological agents, avoiding hostimmune systems and evading detection,mechanisms that confer resistance totherapies, environmental stability andadoption of aerosol technologies byindustry. All this leads to enhancedavailability of complex bioactivecompounds including through the use ofbacterial chassis, development ofsynthetic ribosome and advances inbiopharmingc circumventing existingcontrol mechanisms causing securityconcerns under the provision of biosafetyas scientists tend to work on parts,systems or information in minimalcontainment settings for pathogens thatwould usually require high-containmentprovisions. Also important are advancesin understanding the role ofneuroregulators in terms of theirinfluence on psychological states andaltered physical performance as well aslinking neurobiology to disease.

3. Developments with possiblebeneficial consequences include:

a. Detection technologies that canprovide new capabilities of earlywarning and response systems usingsatellite data, pre-clinical diseaseindicators, visual sensors for tracking

of pathogens and toxins andenvironmental detection of agents;

b. Rapid diagnostics enable faster,efficient and tailored response as ituses new approaches to differentiatebetween bacterial and viralinfections. It also helps in genotypingpathogens and identifyingreassortment events, in theidentification of single particles ofpathogens or toxins real-timediagnosis of fungal pathogens makingbroader use of mass spectrometry,advanced microscopy and sequencingtechnology. There have also beenadvances in developing faster assaysfor toxins.

c. Prevention and prophylaxis byuse of broad spectrum vaccines asnew approach in developing novelmechanisms to pre-empt disease, findways to improve upon naturalimmune systems and improvedelivery techniques for prophylaxis.

d. Therapeutics: Developments ofnovel antibiotic capabilities has led tocreation of novel classes of antibiotics,identification of their characterizationand has improved efficacy inidentification of new targets.Therapeutics also helps inunderstanding how bacteriaovercome antibiotics and identifyingbetter discovery tools.

e. Advanced antiviral therapyincludes development of a pan-viraldrug, discovery of new drugs,improvement in understanding ofhost virus interaction, discovery ofantiviral virus, virucidal proteins todisrupt viral adhesion to host cells anddisrupt viral replication, and high-

Jan-Jun 2012 13

affinity binding reagents todemonstrate antiviral activity.

f. Bioprospecting has led to identifypotential therapeutic compounds.There are advances in dealing withtoxins including through geneticmanipulation of host mechanisms,nanoparticles to trap toxins, as wellas antibody approaches to allow themto be flushed from the body; and

g. Response capacity: There havebeen advances in determiningwhether a disease event involvescultured rather than naturalpathogens, using statisticalapproaches and microbial forensiccapabilities. Research alsodemonstrated the importance ofeffective quarantine measures inlimiting the impact and advanceddecontamination technology, such asantibacterial foams using nano-particles in a post-attack clean up.

4. Enabling advances andtechnologies include:

a. Characterizing biologicalsystems and their networking:Advances in Genomics includeunderstanding the role of SingleNucleotide Polymorphisms and copynumber variation in disease,functional genomics, and evolvabilityof gene regulatory networks.Transcriptomics advances includeidentification of regulators, theircharacterization and the implicationsof network structure. Progress inproteomics includes betterunderstanding of proteins synthesis,new tools for identification andquantification of proteins anddetermining their structure,standardization of data reporting and

enhancing understanding of protein-protein interactions. Metabolimicsadvances include comparative studiesof pathways between species.Integrating data from these fieldshelps characterization in terms ofmapping and modelling systems. Bestexample of combining differentapproaches was the characterizationof Mycoplasma pneumonia.

b. Manipulating biologicalsystems and networks: The twomost significant advances were RNAinterference technology (RNAi) andZinc Finger Nucleases (ZFN);

c. Engineering biological systemsand networks: Important advanceshere have been engineering of themetabolic pathway in yeast toproduce the precursor of an anti-malarial drug, the creation of asynthetic mammalian gene circuitthat revealed anti-tuberculosiscompounds, a demonstration ofdistributed biological computation;and the engineering of an E. coli tosense and kill a human pathogen.

d. Advances in bioinformatics andcomputational biology: It hashelped in gathering, processing andutility of biological data, includingcreation of new languages. It hashelped in data mining, modelling andsimulation, online tools and softwarefor visualising complex biologicalinformation and analysing genesequence data, protein analysis, aswell as in designing tools. A computercontrolled artificial intelligence candesign a new round of experiments.

e. Converting biologicalinformation to digital data andback: Gene sequencing and gene


synthesis coupled with informationtechnology can sequence costeffectively the bacterial genome inaround two hours. Whole genome canbe sequenced in a day. Also there hasbeen significant progress in the abilityto understand and use sequence datato produce longer strands of geneticmaterial including combining shortfragments into long sequences.Synthesis of genetic material hasmoved from viral settings, throughbacterial settings, and mammalianorganelles, to partial synthesis of achromosome from a eukaryote; and

f. Generic enabling technologies:Advances in technologies has made iteasier, cheaper, faster and morereliable to do many of the basicprocedures and practices involved inexpanding the limits of ourunderstanding and creating newapplications and have allowedscientists to do things that werepreviously unattainable.

India Working Paper

The scope of Article I covers S&Tdevelopments relevant to the Convention.Article XII provides for five-yearly reviewof new scientific and technologicaldevelopments relevant to the Convention.Article X facilitates cooperation forexchanges of scientific and technologicalknowledge, training of personnel, transfer ofmaterials and equipments. The workingpaper submitted by India proposed to holdsystematic and structured review of S&Tdevelopments within the framework of theConvention at the annual Meetings ofExperts and Meetings of State Parties withmaximum participation of industry,academia and the scientific community. Thesuggested reviews could include newscientific and technological developments

with special relevance to diseasesurveillance, diagnosis and treatment ofpandemics, identification of developmentswith potentials of misuse and particularconcern with respect to bioterrorism withemerging risks in dual use research,voluntary Codes of Conduct inter alia forscientists, academia and industry, S&Tdevelopments of particular benefit todeveloping countries, developments in othermultilateral organizations such as WHO,OIE, FAO and IPPC and communicationstrategies about risks and benefits of lifesciences.

An international workshop, Trends inScience and Technology Relevant to theBiological Weapons Convention was heldOctober 31–November 3, 2010 at theInstitute of Biophysics of the ChineseAcademy of Sciences in Beijing. Thisworkshop was planned by an internationalcommittee appointed by the NationalResearch Council (NRC) of the NationalAcademy of Sciences and convened incooperation with IAP–the Global Networkof Science Academies, the InternationalUnion of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology(IUBMB), the International Union ofMicrobiological Societies (IUMS), and theChinese Academy of Sciences. The reportprepared by IAP, the Global Network ofScience Academies, was submitted to the 7th

Review Conference by ISU as anindependent contribution by InternationalScientific Community.

The meeting discussed issues related to lifesciences and related fields including pace ofscientific and technological developments,diffusion and its applications, beyondtraditional research institutions and theextent to which additional scientific andtechnical disciplines beyond biology areincreasingly involved in life sciencesresearch. It addressed the issues ofchallenges, monitoring and bettermanagement.

Jan-Jun 2012 15

The developments in S&T were consideredin terms whether scientific developmentsyield new or novel types of agents ormaterials that are not captured under thescope of Article I, adequacy of nationalimplementation measures (Article IV), thecapabilities to carry out investigations of thealleged use of biological weapons (Article VI)and the design of international cooperationto ensure the benefits of peacefulapplications of biology (Article X). Theworkshop discussed ways in which the BTWCand its States Parties could continue to followtrends in S&T including potentialmechanisms for more systematicengagement with the scientific community.

Significant observations were made onadvances in S&T related to Convention. Someof the observations are:

a. Increase in the overall understanding ofbiological systems, its complexity andrelated challenges remain significantbarriers and this complexity is likely toremain a defining feature of the biologicalsciences for the foreseeable future.

b. The continuing as well as rapid diffusionof research capacity and knowledgemakes the commitments of States Partiesin Article III to restrict access toknowledge, materials, and technologiesfor anything other than purposespermitted by the Convention morechallenging.

c. Diffusion is seen as positive and beneficialas continuing attention to monitoring andassessing would anticipate any potentialnegative consequences and to strengthenthe capacity of States Parties to addressthem. Examples are global diseasesurveillance and developing scientificcapacity in microbial forensics.

d. Some trained researchers takeadvantage of commercial kits andservices and second hand equipment, tobuild their own laboratories and conductexperiments. In others less trainedpractitioners perform experimentswithout having the detailed biological ormechanistic understanding. Both thesegroups foster cultures of safety, security,and ethics. It however, underscores theneed to understand how training andknow-how are propagated and culturesof safety are developed in such non-institutional environments.

e. Integration of life sciences with otherdisciplines may pose challenges andrequire further policy discussions to theoperation of regimes like the BTWC andthe Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC). The assessment of theirimplications will need to draw onexpertise from a range of disciplines.

f. The international scientific communitycan play a useful role in tracking trendsand developments in S&T across diversefields and contribute to a betterappreciation of both the drivers and theroadblocks that broadly affect how S&Tactually develops. Tracking and analyzingthe impact of these forces should also beconsidered areas of potential interest forfuture monitoring of S&T trends.

g. An area for future in-depth analysissuggested is the changing nature of tacitknowledge, as kits and other resourcesmake it easier for less-skilled individualsto carry out work that once requiredsignificant training. This is facilitated byavailability of web-based technologiesthrough the creation of worldwide formalor informal learning communities orpartnerships.


h. International scientific organizations areconsidered potential resource for gainingaccess to a wide range of expertise toassist in understanding the “state of thescience” and in assessing its implications.

The following are the observations of thegroup:

It is generally agreed that the advancementsin S&T are within the scope of Article I.However, there could be new developmentsor surprise discoveries, for which continuedmonitoring and evaluation is important ofadvances in the life sciences relevant to BWC.

Beyond the question of whether these trendspose fundamental challenges to the scope ofthe treaty, every major article of the treatywill be affected by the developmentssurveyed. The trends may pose challengesto the implementation of some aspects, butthey also offer important opportunities tosupport the operation of the convention.

The increase in pace, diffusion andconvergence of S&T will continue for theforeseeable future. However, an in depthanalysis and understanding of the factorsincluding commercial interests responsiblefor driving the progress and technicalroadblocks that impede it would provide ameaningful picture of how and whencontinuing S&T developments are likely toaffect the convention.

Scientific community would play a major rolein monitoring and assessment of trends inS&T and their implications for the BTWC.Intercessional discussions and otherresources would feed information to theReview Conference, which would have todebate on ways and means of utilising theadvice and analysis.

The advances in S&T have obviousimplications for the BTWC with regard to themeasures States Parties need to take toimplement the provisions of the Conventionand to prevent the use of biological or toxinagents for hostile purposes.

References:

1 . BWC/CONF.VII/INF.3; Add.1,2,3; Corr.1,2,3New scientific and technological developmentsrelevant to the Convention. Backgroundinformation document submitted by theImplementation Support Unit

2. Life sciences and related fields: trends relevantto the Biological Weapons ConventionPrepared by IAP–the Global Network ofScience Academies contained in BWC/CONF.VII/INF.3

3. BWC/CONF.VII/7 Final Document of theSeventh Review Conference

4. BWC/CONF.VII/WP.3 Proposal for structuredand systematic review of science andtechnology developments under theConvention Submitted by India

5. BWC/CONF.VII/WP.13 Proposal for theannual review of advances in science andtechnology relevant to the Biological WeaponsConvention - Submitted by Australia, Japanand New Zealand

6. BWC/CONF.VII/COW/CRP.2 Outline of theDraft Final Declaration of the Seventh ReviewConference - Submitted by the Chair of theCommittee of the Whole

Jan-Jun 2012 17

2011 LibyanDisclosures:'Take-away' forCWC verificationDr. Arun Vishwanathan

The author is an AssistantProfessor, InternationalStrategic and SecurityStudies Programme, NationalInstitute of Advanced Studies,IISc Campus, Bangalore.

Summary

As part of the process of joining theCWC in January 2004, Tripoli madea declaration to the Organisation forthe Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW) wherein it declared thefollowing materials and capabilities,which were verified by OPCWinspections. However, on November1, 2011, the transitional Libyangovernment declared a hiddenstockpile of chemical weapons.

Country Profile

Introduction

Libya and chemical weapons have a longhistory going back to the 1930s when theItalian dictator Benito Mussolini authorisedthe use of sulphur mustard gas againstLibyan rebels. The decision led to the use of24 mustard gas bombs on an oasis that wascontrolled by the Libyan rebels.1

After decades as a pariah state, Libya wasbrought in from the cold following theDecember 19, 2003 statement where theformer Libyan dictator, the late ColonelQaddafi declared that it would dismantle itsweapons of mass destruction (WMD)programmes and open the country toimmediate and comprehensive verificationinspections. This announcement followedmany months of secret negotiations thatbegan with a Libyan offer to the Britishofficials in March 2003 to give up its WMDprogrammes.2 As part of this process, Libyapledged to eliminate its nuclear and chemicalweapons programmes subject to theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)verification.3

As part of the process of joining the CWC inJanuary 2004, Tripoli made a declaration tothe Organisation for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons (OPCW) wherein itdeclared the following materials andcapabilities, which were verified by OPCWinspections. These included 24.7 metrictonnes (MT) of sulphur mustard; 1,390 MTof precursor chemicals; 3,563 unloadedchemical weapons munitions (aerial bombs)and 3 former chemical weapons productionfacilities.4

A complex interplay of various factorsinfluenced the Libyan decision. This ranged


from economic burden imposed by threedecades of economic sanctions that hadlimited oil exports to a great extent. This inturn resulted in the drying up of new foreigninvestment which made giving up the WMDprogrammes so much more enticing. This wasbuttressed by the fact that Tripoli’s effortsat procuring nuclear and biological weaponswere not making much headway though itdid possess a ‘moderately capable’ chemicalweapons arsenal.5 Therefore, in the cost-benefit analysis, the Libyan leadership didnot see much merit in continuing its WMDprogrammes.

Between 2004 and February 2011, Libyadestroyed 51% of its sulphur mustardstockpile and 40% of its precursor chemicalsunder OPCW verification. It also irreversiblydestroyed one of the three former chemicalweapons production facilities by razing it tothe ground and converted the other two intopharmaceutical plants after approval by theExecutive Council of the OPCW.6 Destructionof the sulphur mustard started in October2011. However, it was stopped in February2011 due to breakdown of the heating unitin the disposal station.7 The situation has notbeen remedied as a result of the NATO-ledoperations in Libya that began in March 2011when the OPCW inspectors left Tripoli.

November 2011 disclosures

However, on November 1, 2011, thetransitional Libyan government declared a“previously undeclared chemical weaponsstockpile”.8 This was confirmed by theBritish PM David Cameron at the LordMayors Banquet where he stated, “In thelast few days, we have learnt that the newLibyan authorities have found chemicalweapons that were kept hidden from theworld.”9 Reports indicated that chemicalweapons were stored at two previouslyundeclared sites in violation of the 2003agreement that the former Libyan dictator

had reached with the internationalcommunity. This declaration by the newLibyan government brought to light severalhundred munitions loaded with sulphurmustard, few hundred kilograms of sulphurmustard stored in plastic containers and alimited number of unfilled plastic containers(munitions components). The total amountof sulphur mustard declared by Libya standsnow at 26.3 metric tonnes.

Following the declaration, the OPCWdispatched its inspectors to Libya. Contraryto fears about possible use of chemicalweapons by the Qaddafi regime againstrebels, the inspectors did not find anydiversion of the undestroyed sulphurmustard and precursors.10 On November 28,2011, the new Libyan authorities officiallysubmitted a declaration of these materialsto the OPCW.11 This was confirmed by theOPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü atthe opening of the week-long annualconference of the parties to the ChemicalWeapons Convention (CWC) at in theHague.12

Subsequently, another team of OPCWinspectors visited Libya during January 17-19, 2012 to verify the previously undisclosedchemical weapons. The purpose of theinspection as stated by the OPCW was two-fold; to “verify the new declaration in termsof types and quantities of chemical weapons,and to assist the Libyan authorities indetermining whether another set ofdiscovered materials is declarable under theprovisions of the Chemical WeaponsConvention”.13

The inspectors found that all the newlydeclared materials were stored at theRuwagha depot along with quantities ofsulphur mustard and precursor chemicalsthat were declared by the Qaddafigovernment in 2004. In addition, at therequest of the Libyan authorities the OPWC

Jan-Jun 2012 19

inspectors examined munitions mainly inform of artillery shells which theydetermined were chemical munitions andhence declarable.14

Current CWC VerificationRegime

The CWC is the fastest growing regimeamongst the various arms control treaties.The CWC which entered into force in April1997 currently has 188 members. Israel andMyanmar have not ratified the ChemicalWeapons Convention; whereas Angola,Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan,Syria are amongst the handful of countriesthat have neither signed nor acceded to theCWC.15

Such success is possible as a result of the factthat the CWC is seen as a non-discriminatoryas well as a serious attempt at combiningarms control and disarmament measures.The non-discriminatory nature of the CWCcan be gauged from the fact that it treats allmember states equally regardless of whetherthey possess chemical weapons or not. Thisis in complete variance with the division ofthe nuclear ‘haves’ in form of the five nuclearweapon states (NWS) and the remaining‘have nots’ as the non-nuclear weapon states(NNWS). Secondly, the CWC does not grantany special rights to any individual stateparties. Nor does it have any conditions forentry into force like the CTBT’s Article XIVand Annex II which India and other countriesview with great discomfort and suspicion.16

The second feature as stated by MichaelBothe is the ‘system of compliance control’or the verification system that by itscomprehensiveness has established thestandard. Bothe correctly points out that thearms control verification systems designedunder the BWC Verification Protocol and theCTBT owe much to the CWC system.17

In light of the Libyan case, it is important tore-look at the existing CWC verificationregime and analyse the reason as to why itwas possible for the Qaddafi regime to keepthe materials disclosed from the OPCW. Thisbecomes more intriguing because of the factthat the OPCW inspectors were regularlypresent in Libya since 2004 towardsachieving the goal of destroying the declaredchemical weapons stockpile.

The CWC establishes verification systems tofour different obligations, namely theobligation to destroy chemical weapons inpossession of a country; destroy old orabandoned chemical weapons; destroy orconvert chemical weapons productionfacilities; ensure that toxic chemicals andtheir precursors are used only for purposesnot prohibited by the Convention, i.e. are notdiverted to weapons purposes. As Bothepoints out, the first three of these aredisarmament obligations whereas the fourthobligation is an arms control obligation.18

One issue that the Libyan case brings forthis that of National Implementation.Although, having universal membership (ornear universal in CWC’s case) is important,what is equally important is for states toimplement the treaty’s requirements inletter and spirit. Having a state like Libya asmember of the CWC is of little use if it is notadhering to its obligations under the treatyand is not fully disclosing its chemicalweapons stockpile/arsenal.

Under the CWC a ‘well organised andtransparent’ system of nationalimplementation, as Sergey Batsanovdescribes it, reinforces the compliancemechanism. To this end, as Batsanov states,the OPCW has been “…providing assistanceto Member States with nationalimplementation, including the preparationand adoption of domestic legislation and


administrative regulations and setting upfunctional national authorities”.19 However,the CWC has to carefully walk the very thinline between assistance and impinging on astate’s sovereign right to make laws. It isimportant to dwell on this point further, asverification involves a fundamental conflictof interest between the state’s interests tonot be subjected to intrusive verification andsafety of commercial and industrial secrets.On the other hand, the verification systemmust be able to detect any non-compliance.

Conclusion

There are four types of routine inspectionsunder the CWC, all of which are based onnational declarations. The nationaldeclarations (Article III), detailing thelocations and quantities of chemical weaponsand production facilities, thus form thestarting point of the verification process.Under the Verification Annex, which is themost voluminous sections of the CWC, statesare obliged to declare all facilities wherespecific chemicals are handled in specificquantise. These are the sites where routineinspections are conducted.

However, the inherent problem in such amethod is that the only way to check whetherall the relevant sites are declared by a stateis through challenge inspections.Interestingly, there has never been aninstance where an ad hoc (challenge)inspection has been carried out under theCWC. In a case like the Libyan one,ascertaining the completeness of thedeclaration becomes critical. Currently,under the CWC, the OPCW selects the sitesto be inspected either by comprehensive on-site inspection of all sites, random selectionor selection based on qualitative thresholdsetc.20 Thus, on-site inspections form a keyelement in establishing the completeness andcorrectness of the national declarations made

by state parties. It is as a result of the abovethat the CWC lays out in great detail therequirement relating to nationaldeclarations.21

It is crucial to ensure that the TechnicalSecretariat updates the approved inspectionequipment list, of course, in consultation withMember States. Given that the CWC doesnot lay down a procedure or a mechanism toachieve this, it has proved difficult to achievean agreement among State Parties on theneed to update the approved inspectionequipment list.22 The need for the inspectorsto be armed with the latest equipmentbecomes much more important when theyare dealing with a state like Libya. However,not all problems with verifying the contentsat a particular site are equipment related.In many cases, the analyses techniques usedlike radiography, using portable X-rayequipment, ultrasonic pulse echo have theirown particular advantages anddisadvantages. It is therefore a continuingchallenge to identify the stored munitionswith a high degree of confidence at the leastexpense of resources.

The Libyan case points to the necessity totake remedial measures to strengthen theOPCW’s ability to check the veracity of thenational declarations made by states. Thisbecomes doubly important in cases such asLibya. Central in this regard is thecontinuous training of the organisation’sinspectorate, which has faced problems as aresult of financial and other constraints.Simultaneously, updating of the approvedinspection equipments and working todevelop newer, safer and more cost-effectiveways to establish the contents of a chemicalweapon munition are needed to make theCWC more effective. The internationalcommunity would stand in good stead if itremembers, former US President RonaldRegan’s mantra, “Trust, but Verify.” This

Jan-Jun 2012 21

holds the key to a stronger CWC and ensuringthat the regime does not have to bear thebrunt of any more surprises.

Endnotes:1 Col (Dr.) Jim A. Davis, “The looming biological

warfare storm: misconceptions and probablescenarios,” Air & Space Power Journal, Spring2003, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/davis.html

2 Gary Hart and Martin Indyk write about twoprevious Libyan offers dating back to 1992 and1999. See Gary Hart, “My Secret Talks withLibya, and Why They Went Nowhere,”Washington Post, January 18, 2004; andMartin Indyk, “Was Kadafi Scared Straight?The Record Says No,” Los Angeles Times,March 28, 2004.

3 The White House, “Fact Sheet: The President’sNational Security Strategy to Combat WMD,Libya’s Announcement,” December 19, 2003cited in Sharon Squassoni, “Disarming Libya:Weapons of Mass Destruction,” CRS Reportfor Congress, RS21823, September 22, 2006.

4 “Libya: Fact and Figures”, Organisation for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons, availableat http://www.opcw.org/the-opcw-and-libya/libya-facts-and-figures/

5 “Libya: Country Profile”, Nuclear ThreatInitiative, available at http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/libya/



8 James Blitz, “Libyans find undeclared chemicalarsenal”, Financial Times, November 14, 2011,available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c b 5 8 d 4 8 e - 0 e f 5 - 1 1 e 1 - b 8 3 c -00144feabdc0.html#axzz1xeu3dJxF

9 Thomas Harding, “Gaddafi regime producedchemical weapons, David Cameron confirms”,The Telegraph, November 15, 2011, availableat http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8 8 9 0 2 3 8 / G a d d a f i - r e g i m e - p r o d u c e d -c h e m i c a l - w e a p o n s - D a v i d - C a m e r o n -confirms.html

10 “OPCW Inspectors Return to Libya”,Organisation for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons, November 4, 2011 available at http://www.opcw.org/the-opcw-and-libya/opcw-inspectors-return-to-libya/

11 “Report of the Secretary-General on the UnitedNations Support Mission in Libya,” UnitedNations Security Council, S/2012/129, March1, 2012, pp. 7-8, available at http://unsmil. u n m i s s i o n s . o r g / L i n kC l i c k . a s p x ? f i l e t i c k e t = v _ - F 2 X r 3 c 9 I%3D&tabid=3543&mid=6187&language=en-US

12 Daniel Horner, “OPCW Prepares for MoreLibya Inspections,” Arms Control Today,December 2011, available at http://www.armscontrol. org/act/2011_12/O P C W _ P r e p a r e s _ f o r _ M o r e_Libya_Inspections

13 “OPCW Inspectors Verify Newly DeclaredChemical Weapons Materials in Libya”,Organistion for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons, January 20, 2012, available at http://www.opcw.org/the-opcw-and-libya/opcw-inspectors-verify-newly-declared-chemical-weapons-materials-in-libya/

14 “OPCW Inspectors Verify Newly DeclaredChemical Weapons Materials in Libya”,Organistion for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons, January 20, 2012, available at http://www.opcw.org/the-opcw-and-libya/opcw-inspectors-verify-newly-declared-chemical-weapons-materials-in-libya/

15 “About the OPCW: Members and Non-Members”, Organistion for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons, http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/

16 “Article XIV Entry Into Force Process”, CTBTOrganisation, http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/article-xiv-conferenceentry-into-force-process/

17 Michael Bothe, “Verification of DisarmamentTreaties”, in Giovanni Gasparini and NatalinoRonzitti Eds., The Tenth Anniversary of theCWC’S Entry into Force: Achievements andProblems, December 2007, Istituto AffariInternazional, pp.45-56.



19 Sergey Batsanov, “The tenth Anniversary ofthe Chemical Weapons Convention:Assessment and Perspectives”, in GiovanniGasparini and Natalino Ronzitti Eds., TheTenth Anniversary of the CWC’S Entry intoForce: Achievements and Problems,December 2007, Istituto Affari Internazional,pp. 9-31.


21 Ron G. Manley, “Verification under theChemical Weapons Convention. A reflectivereview”, Pure Applied Chemistry, Vol. 74, No.12, 2002, pp. 2235–2240.

22 Ron G. Manley, “Verification under theChemical Weapons Convention. A reflectivereview”, Pure Applied Chemistry, Vol. 74, No.12, 2002, pp. 2235–2240.

Jan-Jun 2012 23

Anthrax Threatin Pakistan,Global Contextand RegionalConsequencesMs. Gunjan Singh

The author is a Researcher atIDSA, New Delhi.

Summary

Reports of Anthrax threat toPakistani officials raises importantquestions regarding its spread inSouth Asia. It also exposesPakistan’svulnerabilities to bioterrorism andcalls for urgent attention atappropriate levels.

Opinion

Anthrax has come into focus yet again witha letter received by a high profile office. Ac-cording to media reports, Pakistani PrimeMinister Yousaf Raza Gilani received a postalpackage containing anthrax spores in Feb-ruary 2012. While this incidence is con-firmed by various sources, its exact date re-mains unclear as there are a number of con-tradicting reports with respect to the timewhen this happened. Some media reportsclaim that this incident happened about fourmonths ago while others have been statingthat this happened over a year ago. As re-ported by the New York Times, “The pack-age was intercepted by the prime minister’ssecurity staff in October, according to thespokesman, Akram Shaheedi. The PakistanCouncil of Scientific and Industrial Research,a government laboratory, established thatthe suspicious white powder it contained wasanthrax spores, he said”.1 A criminal casewas also reported to be filed and it was an-nounced that this package was sent by a pro-fessor, Ms. Zulekha, of the Jamshoro Uni-versity.2

Anthrax had become an important securitythreat in 2001 in the aftermath of 9/11. Re-ports show that letters containing Anthraxwere sent to various people and resulted infive deaths and seventeen were reportedsick.3 It is also generally believed that theseattacks were carried out by some Americanscientists.4 There were similar attempts inIndia as well when the then Deputy ChiefMinister of Maharashtra, Mr. ChhaganBhujbal, received an envelope containingsome white powder. It was later confirmedthat the envelope contained Anthrax.5

There seems to be a pattern to these eventsas anthrax has been used as a major tool ofdistraction rather than as a Weapon of MassDestruction (WMD). However in the past,


there have been reports which suggest thatAnthrax has been one of the favoured weap-ons of Al Qaeda. There are reports whichsuggest that it had gained Anthrax as earlyas 1997.6

Another important question which arises af-ter this is whether biological weapons havebecome the tool of choice for the disgruntledand discontent sections of the society. Thereis also a pattern whereby terrorist organi-sations and disgruntled individuals learnfrom each other as far as weapon usage isconcerned. This is more prominent in the caseof biological and chemical weapons. In thecase of Anthrax one sees that more and moredisgruntled people are using it. The first suchcase was when discontent scientists used itin the United States in 2001.7

After that in 2011 Anders BehringBreivik had also stated that he regardedAnthrax as ‘one of the most effective weap-ons’. Therefore, the potential are non-stateactor users of anthrax, who see its utility forviolent purposes, need not be terrorist or-ganisations as such as such instances indi-cate. On the other hand, they could belongto any sections of the society reacting to anytrigger causing disturbance. Thus, monitor-ing such individual actors becomes that muchmore difficult than observing an organisedgroup.

The event appears to be more disturbing asPakistan has always been considered a fer-tile ground for terrorism breeding. In the lasttwo years there has been a steady increasein the number of terrorist activities insidePakistan. What is surprising is that the Pa-kistani security establishment took almostfour months to establish and acknowledgethis fact. Delay in releasing these reportshighlights the fact that the Pakistani govern-ment and security establishment are not ful-ly equipped with detection and preventiontechniques. This also raises questions about

Pakistan’s capability to handle a full scaledisaster arising out of biological attack. Onthe other hand in case of India, during theMayapuri nuclear radiation case, govern-ment had proper institutions and process inorder to handle the situation. The NationalDisaster Management Authority (NDMA)had successfully managed to control the sit-uation and clear the affected area. The sec-ond issue which needs attention is the de-gree of Pakistani investment in the area ofbiological agents/weapons protection andsafety in case of a disaster. It is always beenin the domain of argument as to how strongis the Pakistani state’s capability to preventan accident/incident from spiraling out ofcontrol. This incident becomes even moreworrying when seen in the light of other re-cent anthrax attacks reported in the last sixmonths in neighbouring Afghanistan. Paki-stan’s weak institutional structures wouldstand even more exposed if these attackswere related to each other in any ways atall.

These developments show that the Pakistaniterrorist organisations can get access to bio-logical weapons. There is a need to under-stand and study the possibility of the out-come of such a scenario. As has been arguedby Animesh Raul, “More than state actors,biological weapons are most dangerous whenacquired, developed or used by non-stateactors like terrorists, religious cults, andMafia syndicates”.8

Endnotes:1 “Pakistan Says Prime Minister Was Mailed

Anthrax Spores” By Salman Masood, The NewYork Times, February 1, 2012 at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/world/asia/pakistan-reveals-prime-minister-gilani-was-sent-anthrax.html accessed on February 8,2012

2 Ibid.

3 “Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation” athttp://www.fbi .gov/about-us/history/

Jan-Jun 2012 25

f a m o u s - c a s e s / a n t h r a x - a m e r i t h r a x /amerithrax-investigation accessed on February14, 2012

4 “2001 Anthrax attack on US Congress madeby scientists and covered up by FBI, expertsays” by Sherwood Ross, Global Research,December 12, 2006 at http://w w w . g l o b a l r e s e a r c h . c a /index.php?context=va&aid=4129 accessed onFebruary 14, 2012

5 “Letter to Bhujbal ‘anthrax positive’” TheHindu, November 3, 2001 at http://www.hindu.com/2001/11/03/stor ies/01030007.htm accessed on February 14, 2012

6 “Al Qaeda, Anthrax and Ayman: means,opportunities, motive, and modus operandi“Copyright 2002 Ross E. Getman, Esq.,November 20, 2002 at http://cryptome.org/alqaeda-anthrax.htm accessed on February 16,2012

8 “Bioterrorism and the BTWC” by AnimeshRoul, February 8, 2011 at http://www.bwpp.org/revcon-bioterrorism.htmlaccessed on February 16, 2012


Chemical and Biological News

ARMS CONTROL

Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Visitsthe OPCW

11 June 2012

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of theRepublic of Azerbaijan, H.E Mr ElmarMammadyarov, visited the OPCW TechnicalSecretariat in The Hague today for a meetingwith Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü andother senior staff.

The Director-General commendedAzerbaijan for its support to the OPCW andupdated the Foreign Minister on itsactivities. He highlighted the preparationswhich are now underway for the ThirdReview Conference in April 2013 andstressed the importance of broadparticipation by States Parties in thatprocess. Foreign Minister Mammadyarovreaffirmed Azerbaijan’s continuingcommitment and support to the OPCW andassured the Director-General of itswillingness to help ensure a successfuloutcome for the Conference.

http://www.opcw.org/news/article/foreign-minister-of-azerbaijan-visits-the-opcw/

U.S. Watching Syrian Chemical ArmsAmid Fear of Attack, Diversion: ByRachel Oswald

December 5, 2011

WASHINGTON — The United States isquietly but closely monitoring the status ofSyria’s large chemical weapons stockpileamid fears the regime of autocratic rulerBashar Assad could use the warfare agentsto quell continued political protests or divert

the materials to extremist groups thatoperate in the region.

Government officials in Washington declinedto discuss specifics of the monitoringoperation or what intelligence resourceswere involved, citing the need to maintainsecrecy about operational tactics. Theyacknowledged, though, that there is a greatdeal of concern in Washington over Syria’schemical arsenal.

“It is extremely important that we maintainvisibility on Syria’s chemical weapons and itis something that we as an intelligencecommunity” are actively involved in doing,a U.S. intelligence official told Global SecurityNewswire.

A joint U.S.-Israeli surveillance campaign inSyria was first reported by the Wall StreetJournal in late August. Since that time “ithasn’t diminished in importance at all,”according to another U.S. official.

Both officials spoke on condition of anonymitydue to the sensitivities surrounding theintelligence operation.

The United States is believed to haveprepared contingency plans for dealing withSyria’s toxic arsenal should it appear theregime is about to use the weapons or passthem to affiliated extremist organizationssuch as Hezbollah.

Syria is not a member of the ChemicalWeapons Convention. It has also neverpublicly declared to the internationalcommunity its chemical arsenal, which isunderstood to comprise hundreds of tons ofnerve and blister agents, its doctrine forusing such weapons or their exactcapabilities. Still, Damascus’ status as achemical weapons possessor is widelyaccepted as fact.

Jan-Jun 2012 27

The Middle Eastern state is not known tohave ever used those materials, which dateback to the 1970s, according to informationcompiled by the James Martin Center forNonproliferation Studies. Until nowDamascus is believed by most analysts tohave developed them as a deterrent tooutside attack, namely from Israel, and notfor use against its own people.

The Assad regime, though, has earned areputation for brutality toward its ownpeople. More than 4,000 Syrians have beenkilled in the political uprising that began thispast spring, according to the United Nations.The rising body count has U.S. officials andanalysts concerned that if the Syrianleadership feels besieged and without otheroptions, it could revise its calculus on the useof chemical weapons against Syrian armydefectors and protesters.

In the event that violence in the countryescalates into a full-blown civil war, therewould likely be an effort by opposition forcesto gain control of the regime’s chemicalweapon sites. A civil war would also likelyincrease the prospects of Assad ordering theuse of his chemical armaments, according toLeonard Spector, deputy director of theJames Martin Center.

“We are aware of the situation in Syria andcontinue to follow the events as they unfold,”Pentagon spokeswoman Lt. Col. AprilCunningham, said in a prepared statement.“The potential use of chemical weapons byany state poses a security threat tointernational security.”

The chemical weapons surveillance campaignin Syria is not the only such effort the UnitedStates has been involved with this year.When Libyan civilians rose up in Februaryagainst dictator Muammar Qadhafi’sdecades-long rule, U.S. intelligence anddefense officials used a variety of assets to

keep tabs on the nation’s small stockpile ofdeclared mustard blister agent.

The United States worked with NATO andLibyan opposition forces to establish a teamof specialists that watched over Libya’sknown chemical weapon facilities to detergovernment forces from seeking to use ordivert chemical warfare materials, accordingto an Agence France-Presse report.Undeclared sites have also been identifiedas the Qadhafi regime was ousted.

The State Department also said it used“national technical means” to monitorLibya’s chemical sites. National technicalmeans are typically understood toencompass reconnaissance aircraft andsatellites.

Obama administration officials would notdisclose whether such technology is alsobeing used to monitor Syria’s chemical-weapon sites on the grounds that revealingsuch details could jeopardize the integrity ofthe operation. Unlike in Libya, NATO andthe United States have no internationallysanctioned mandate for military operationsin Syria, nor do they have the relationshipswith Syrian opposition groups similar tothose established with the Libyan rebels.

Syria’s chemical weapons program isconsiderably larger than Libya’s, whichwould presumably make monitoring it moreof a challenge.

“This is a full-blown chemical weaponsprogram not the remnants” of one as inLibya, Spector said. “You have largeinventories ... there are a lot of people millingaround the sites,” presumably guarding themand managing day-to-day operations.

Syria’s chemical weapons program isunderstood to be comprised of fourproduction facilities at al-Safira, Hama, Homs


and Latakia, along with two munitionsstorage sites at Khan Abu Shamat andFurqlus. Additionally, there is a chemicalweapons research laboratory nearDamascus, according to Michelle Dover ofthe James Martin Center.

“You’re also looking at a program that isalmost completely self-sufficient from theresearch and production through the storageand weaponization,” said Dover, citing opensource information dating back to the 1980s.

The Assad regime is thought to possessbetween 100 and 200 Scud missiles carryingwarheads loaded with sarin nerve agent. Thegovernment is also believed to have severalhundred tons of sarin agent and mustard gasstockpiled that could be used in air-droppedbombs and artillery shells, according toinformation compiled by the James MartinCenter.

“We do not have any information thatsuggests there have been changes to thesecurity of Syria’s chemical weaponsstockpile,” a State Department official saidin an e-mail to GSN. “Syria is a country ofsignificant proliferation concern, so wemonitor its chemical weapons activities veryclosely. We will continue to work closely withlike-minded countries to limit proliferationto Syria’s chemical weapons program. Webelieve Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile,composed of nerve agents and mustard gas,remains under Syrian government control.”

Damascus is a well-known backer of Hamasand Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which bothbase their headquarters in the Syrian capital.Syria is also a supporter of Hezbollah and lastyear was accused by Israel of providing Scudballistic missiles to the Lebanese militantgroup.

Noting reporting on contingency plansprepared by the Pentagon for military

operations to prevent militants fromobtaining Pakistani nuclear weapons,Spector said it was reasonable to extrapolatethat preparations have also been made torespond to crisis situations involving Syria’schemical arms.

Such events might include the Assad regimepreparing its chemical arsenal for an airattack on protesters and army defectors orthe weakening of security around thechemical sites. The details of presumedaction plans are a closely held secret.

“It would seem illogical to think thatPentagon has not brainstormed contingencyplans,” Spector said.

Spector said he believes the United Stateshas “definitely” issued backdoor diplomaticthreats to Damascus of serious consequencesshould Assad order chemical weapon attackson opposition activists. “I’m sure thatmessage has been conveyed.”

Though Washington is concerned about thepotential chemical weapons threat, it is notthe Obama administration’s primary focusin dealing with Syria, according to the issueexpert. “I think they have still more urgentitems that are constantly on top of theagenda” such as persuading the Arab Leagueto pass sanctions against the regime andpushing for Assad to step down, he said.

A key factor in U.S. contingency thinking isthought to be what actions Israel couldunilaterally take if it feels a chemical weaponsattack or proliferation is imminent, Spectorsaid.

Israel in June 2007 mounted a sneak aerialattack on a Syrian site at Dair Alzour that itsuspected housed an unfinished atomicreactor with military applications (see GSN,March 31, 2008).

Jan-Jun 2012 29

A crucial element of any potential Israelicalculus on striking against Syria’s chemicalassets would be identifying the exact locationof the weapons, Spector said.

“You have a lot of sites [in Syria] and not allof them may be known and you really haveto do a lot of work, you really have to geteverything,” Spector said.

Also likely weighing on Israeli and U.S.thinking is whether an attack on Syria’schemical arsenal could backfire by pushingopposition forces to rally around Damascusin response to a foreign attack, Spector said.“You don’t want to create an environmentwhere the country rallies around thegovernment because they face an externalattack.”

The Israeli Embassy in Washington did notrespond to requests for comment by presstime.

Source: http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-watching-syrian-chemical-arms-amid-fear-attack-diversion/

DISARMAMENT

Course on Emergency MedicalAssistance for Victims of ChemicalIncidents Held in Ukraine

May 24, 2012

The OPCW and Government of Ukrainejointly organised a course on emergencymedical assistance for the victims of chemicalincidents or attacks, including chemical-warfare agents, in Kyiv from 7 to 11 May2012. Eighteen Russian-speaking expertsfrom 14 States Parties* took part in thecourse, which related to Article X of theChemical Weapons Convention and was heldat the Ukrainian Scientific and PracticalCentre of Emergency Medical and DisasterMedicine.

The course targeted professionals andmanagers in the field of medicalcountermeasures to emergencies involvingchemical warfare agents and other toxicchemicals. The agenda included theoreticallectures and practical exercises, withintensive discussion of issues related tonational and international responses andmedical countermeasures to a chemicalattack during a mass gathering event.

A complex field exercise focused onmitigating the consequences of a chemicalattack was conducted on the final day of thecourse with more than 200 representativesof different Ukrainian emergency responseunits participating. The exercise covered allstages from the first response in the incidentarea to hospital treatment of the victims.

*Armenia, Belarus, China, Estonia, Hungary,Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Serbia,Russia, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen andUSA (as a lecturer).

http://www.opcw.org/news/article/course-on-emergency-medical-assistance-for-victims-of-chemical-incidents-held-in-ukraine/

Advance Assistance-and-ProtectionCourse Held in China

May 24, 2012

The OPCW and Government of the People’sRepublic of China jointly organised anAdvanced Assistance-and-Protection Coursefrom 14 to 18 May 2012 at the Institute ofChemical Defence of the People’s LiberationArmy in Beijing. Experts from 19 StatesParties* took part in the course, which relatedto Article X of the Chemical WeaponsConvention.

The course participants belonged to nationalemergency-response agencies involved indealing with chemical-related incidents. The


course provided advanced training in the useof chemical protective equipment and intechniques of monitoring, detection anddecontamination in response to attacks withchemical warfare agents, supplemented withtable-top and field exercises.

Mr Leslie Gumbi, the OPCW Director ofInternational Cooperation and Assistance,addressed the opening session of the courseand held bilateral meetings withrepresentatives of the Foreign Affairs andDefence ministries.

* Belarus, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, India,Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar,Malaysia, Mongolia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru,Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambiaand Zimbabwe.

http://www.opcw.org/news/article/advance-assistance-and-protection-course-held-in-china/

OPCW Inspects 1000th OCPF PlantSite

March 15, 2012

OPCW inspectors have now inspected 1,000different sites around the world of “OtherChemical Production Facilities” (OCPFs) asthey are classed under Article VI of theChemical Weapons Convention. The 1000thsite inspection was conducted at an industrialplant in France.

OCPFs do not produce any of the threeSchedules of chemicals listed in theConvention. They are subject to inspectionbecause the configuration and complexity oftheir production processes enables thempotentially to be converted for themanufacture of chemical weapons or relatedmaterials. Of the nearly 5,000 chemicalplants sites globally that are inspectable bythe OPCW, about 85% are currently OCPFs.

Recognizing their importance to theConvention, the most recent Conference ofthe States Parties in December approved aplan to scale up the OPCW’s annual numberof industrial inspections from 209 in 2011,to 241 in 2014. All of the additionalinspections will be OCPFs.

“This milestone is yet another demonstrationof the shared commitment of the OPCW, itsStates Parties and the global chemicalindustry to ensuring that chemistry is onlyused for peaceful purposes,” said OPCWDirector-General Ahmet Üzümcü. “Byincreasing the number of OCPF inspectionsin the coming years, we will improve ourcapacity to verify compliance with theprovisions of the Chemical WeaponsConvention and thereby raise the level ofconfidence among all our stakeholders.”

Toxic chemicals are used for a variety ofpeaceful purposes from making ink toproducing pharmaceuticals. To allow forverification, States Parties declare legitimateactivities involving scheduled chemicals(chemicals that have been used as warfareagents or to make such agents in the past). The OPCW verifies such declarationsthrough a combination of data monitoringand on-site inspections without “undueintrusion into the State Party’s chemicalactivities”.

http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-inspects-1000th-ocpf-plant-site/

OPCW Inspectors Verify NewlyDeclared Chemical WeaponsMaterials in Libya

January 20, 2012

A team of OPCW inspectors visited Libyafrom 17 to 19 January 2012 to verifypreviously undisclosed chemical weaponsthat were discovered after the fall of the

Jan-Jun 2012 31

former regime. The new government inTripoli announced the discovery last yearand submitted a formal declaration of theweapons to the OPCW on 28 November.

The two-fold purpose of this inspection wasto verify the new declaration in terms oftypes and quantities of chemical weapons,and to assist Libyan authorities indetermining whether another set ofdiscovered materials is declarable under theprovisions of the Chemical WeaponsConvention. The mission was carried outwith the logistical support of the FederalRepublic of Germany and the UNDepartment of Safety and Security, and withthe full cooperation of Libyan authorities.

The OPCW inspectors verified the declaredchemical weapons, which consist of sulfurmustard agent that is not loaded intomunitions. At the same time, at the requestof the Libyan authorities the inspectorsexamined munitions, mainly artillery shells,which they determined are chemicalmunitions and hence declarable.

All of the newly declared materials are storedat the Ruwagha depot in southeastern Libya,together with quantities of sulfur mustardand precursor chemicals that were declaredby the Qaddafi government when Libyajoined the OPCW in early 2004. The Qaddafigovernment succeeded in destroying 54% ofits declared sulfur mustard and about 40%of the precursor chemicals before operationshad to be suspended in February 2011 whenthe destruction facility malfunctioned.

Libya must now submit a detailed plan andcompletion date for destroying all of thedeclared materials to the OPCW not laterthan 29 April 2012, the date of the finalextended deadline.

http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-inspectors-verify-newly-declared-chemical-weapons-materials-in-libya/

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENTS

10th Regional Meeting of AfricanNational Authorities Held at AfricanUnion Complex in Ethiopia

June 01, 2012

The African Union and the OPCW co-hostedthe 10th Regional Meeting of NationalAuthorities of States Parties to the ChemicalWeapons Convention in Africa at the newAfrican Union Conference Complex in AddisAbaba, Ethiopia from 22 to 24 May 2012.The meeting was attended by 42 participantsfrom 36 OPCW States Parties* together withpermanent representatives and sub-regionalinstitutions accredited to the African Union.

The opening ceremony featured an array ofspeakers including Mr El Ghassim Wane, AUDirector for Peace and Security; Mr LeslieGumbi, Director of the OPCW’s InternationalCooperation and Assistance Division; andBrigadier General Dr Charles NorbertMuzanila, Director at Tanzania’s Ministry ofDefence and National Service andChairperson of the Tanzanian NationalAuthority.

The meeting was officially opened byHonourable Tadesse Haile, State Minister forIndustry and Chairman of Ethiopia’sNational Authority, who delivered thekeynote speech.

“Besides the priority given by OPCW toAfrica in supporting and fosteringinternational cooperation in areas of peacefuluses of chemistry, the (OPCW) is alsodelivering significant capacity buildingsupport in the region in areas of nationalimplementation of the Convention,” theHonourable Tadesse Haile stated. “Theconcerted efforts of the Organisation torespond to Africa’s needs in this regard, ishighly commendable.”


The 3-day meeting is an annual event thatprovides an opportunity for NationalAuthorities to confer, network and shareexperiences, as well as consult with theTechnical Secretariat of the OPCW on howbest they can fulfil their obligations andreceive the required assistance. It alsoserves as a forum for States Parties in theregion to indicate which forms of assistancethey can offer to other States Parties.

* Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad,Comoros, Republic of the Congo, DemocraticRepublic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon,Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mauritius,Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, SaoTome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles,Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania,Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

http://www.opcw.org/news/article/10th-regional-meet ing-of-afr ican-national-authorities-held-at-african-union-complex-in-ethiopia/

Director-General Addresses FinalChemical Weapons DemilitarisationConference in Scotland

May 22, 2012

OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcüvisited Glasgow on 21 and 22 May 2012where he attended the 15th and finalinternational Chemical WeaponsDemilitarisation (CWD) Conference, hostedby the UK’s Defence Science and TechnologyLaboratory (Dstl).

The CWD conferences have been heldannually around the world since 1998. Thisyear’s final event marked the passing of the29 April 2012 deadline for possessors ofchemical weapons to eliminate their

stockpiles, and celebrated the globalprogress in chemical weapons destruction. The conference attracted more than 170delegates from 16 countries and featuredmore than 90 prominent speakers, includingthe UK Minister of State for Armed Forces,Mr Nick Harvey.

Discussions in the conference included a long-term review of the progress made bynational CWD programmes, focusing onsuccesses, lessons learned and an exchangeof best practices. Participants also looked atexplosive detonation technology - given thatmany countries’ plans are now to acquiresuch equipment - as well as at chemicalsafety and security, recovery of chemicalweapons from rivers and seas, andinnovative technologies.

In his address to the conference , Director-General Üzümcü reported that nearly three-quarters of all declared chemical weaponshave now been destroyed under OPCWverification since entry into force of theChemical Weapons Convention in 1997.Although this fell short of the final extendeddeadline, he said the decision of the StatesParties on this issue fully preserved theintegrity of the Convention and that thethree concerned possessor states havesubmitted detailed plans to the OPCW fordestroying their remaining arsenals,together with planned completion dates. Inthe specific case of Libya, he stated that anumber of States Parties have consideredproviding assistance to enable thegovernment to destroy its remainingstockpile, and that Canada has provided alarge sum for this purpose under the GlobalPartnership Program.

The Director-General also reported that ofthe 70 former chemical weapons productionfacilities (CWPFs) that have been declaredin total by 13 States Parties, 43 have been

Jan-Jun 2012 33

irreversibly destroyed and 21 converted forpurposes not prohibited under theConvention. He added that all convertedproduction facilities remain under systematicverification by the OPCW for a 10-yearperiod following conversion to ensure theyare fully consistent with the approvedconversion requests.

http://www.opcw.org/news/article/d i r e c t o r - g e n e r a l - a d d r e s s e s - f i n a l -chemical-weapons-demilitarisation-conference-in-scotland/

Canada Provides OPCW its Largest-Ever Donation to ExpediteDestruction of Chemical Weapons inLibya

April 24, 2012

Canada has made a voluntary contributionto the OPCW of CAD 6 million (Euro 4.53million) for the Organisation to support theLibyan Government’s efforts in resumingand completing the destruction of itsremaining stockpile of chemical weapons.

Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird firstannounced the offer of assistance in Tripolilast October, when he visited the city shortlybefore the end of the eight-month conflictwhich resulted in the fall of the Qadhafiregime. The donation is the largest theOPCW has ever received from a State Partysince it was established in 1997.

“This historic donation reflects the spirit ofsolidarity and mutual aid that hasexemplified the OPCW from its beginning,and which is vital to achieve our goal ofridding the world of all chemical weapons,”said the OPCW Director-General,Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü. “I commendthe Government of Canada for its generous

support, and we look forward to workingclosely with Libya to eliminate the last of itschemical weapons as soon as possible.”

The Libyan authorities, in turn, highlyappreciate the support provided by theGovernment of Canada to Libya in order toachieve its comprehensive programme forthe disposal of chemical weapons.

OPCW will use the funds for three mainactivities: 1) Project management andtraining of personnel to operate thedestruction facility, 2) purchase of equipmentand related materials for destroying sulfurmustard agent and chemical weaponsmunitions stored at the Ruwagha depot, and3) provision of support services for OPCWon-site inspectors at Ruwagha.

The OPCW will continuously maintainrotating teams of 5-6 inspectors at Ruwaghathroughout the destruction process, whichOPCW officials expect should be completedfor Libya’s Category 1 chemical weaponswithin 6 months after operations resume.

Libya is one of three States Parties, togetherwith the Russian Federation and the UnitedStates, that are unable to meet the 29 April2012 final extended deadline set by theChemical Weapons Convention forcompleting the destruction of their declaredchemical arsenals. By decision of theConference of States Parties in December,the three countries must submit detaileddestruction plans to the OPCW, withcompletion dates, by no later than the finalextended deadline, and are subject toenhanced reporting and verificationmeasures.

http://www.opcw.org/news/article/canada-provides-opcw-its-largest-ever-donation-to-expedite-destruction-of-chemical-weapons-in-libya/


Fears grow for fate of Syria’s chemicalweapons: by Jonathan Marcus

There are growing concerns - shared bothin neighbouring countries and among keywestern governments - about the securityof these weapons should the regime fall.

There are even persistent reports in the USthat preparations are being made to securesuch stocks in the event of a regimemeltdown.

One aspect of the problem is the scale andscope of Syria’s chemical weaponsprogramme.

Leonard Spector, executive director of theJames Martin Center for NonproliferationStudies based in Washington, notes that:“Syria has one of the world’s largest chemicalweapon arsenals, including traditionalchemical agents, such as mustard, and moremodern nerve agents, such as Sarin, andpossibly persistent nerve agents, such as VX.

“Syria is thought to have a number of majorchemical weapon complexes, some in areasof current conflict, such as the Homs andHama regions. The bases are said to beguarded by elite forces, but whether theywould stay at their posts if the Assad regimecollapses cannot be predicted.”

“Conceivably, the Assad government coulduse some of these agents against rebel forcesor even civilians in an effort to intimidatethem into submission” Leonard SpectorJames Martin Center for NonproliferationStudies

An additional concern is the manner in whichthe different kinds of chemical weapons arestored.

Mr Spector notes that while the mustardagent is believed to be stored in bulk form,

rather than in individual munitions, otheragents are thought to be in “binary”munitions, in which two innocuous solutionscombine when the munition is fired to createthe chemical warfare agent.

These might be more easily transported andused than the bulk agent.

Mr Spector adds: “US officials believe Syria’schemical arms are stored in secure bunkersat a limited number of sites and have notbeen dispersed into the field.”

Beyond the intelligence services there is littlehard and fast detail on Syria’s chemicalweapons programme.

Unlike Libya, which had signed the ChemicalWeapons Convention and was in the processof dismantling its stocks when MuammarGaddafi’s regime collapsed, Syria has notjoined the convention and thus has nevermade any formal declarations of its stocks.

Indeed as Charles Blair, a Senior Fellow atthe Federation of American Scientistsunderlines, Libya is not a terribly usefulprecedent when considering the potentialproblems surrounding Syria’s chemicalarsenal.

Libya’s arsenal was much smaller; stocks ofmustard agent were essentially old; locationsof stockpiles were known and the Libyanauthorities were co-operating in theirdestruction.

Crucially too, says Mr Blair, there are hugedifferences in the two countries’ potentialabilities to deliver chemical weapons.

“Libya was able to deliver its sole CW agentvia aerial bombs only - a militarily ineffectivemanner in this case,” he says.

“Syria, by comparison, is thought to possessa variety of platforms for chemical weapons

Jan-Jun 2012 35

delivery - an open-source CIA report listsaerial bombs, artillery shells and ballisticmissiles.”

There is considerable discussion as to thenature of the threat Syria’s weapons pose.

Leonard Spector says that there are multipledangers.

“Conceivably, the Assad government coulduse some of these agents against rebel forcesor even civilians in an effort to intimidatethem into submission,” he says.

“Or insurgents could overrun one of thechemical weapon sites and threaten to usesome of these weapons, in extremis, ifthreatened with overwhelming force by theSyrian army.”

The scenario that is causing the greatestconcern, he says, is the possible loss of controlover Syria’s chemical arsenal leading to thetransfer of chemical weapons to Hezbollah,in Southern Lebanon, or to al-Qaeda.

Special forces

Components of both organisations are nowoperating in Syria as one of the groupschallenging the Assad regime, he says.

Such a link-up between al-Qaeda-affiliatedgroups and weapons of mass destruction hashaunted US military planners for more thana decade.

In the face of such concerns there has beenconsiderable pressure, not least fromWashington, for the US to come up with plansto secure the Syrian weapons in the event ofthe collapse of the regime.

There has been a succession of press reportsdisplaying various degrees of bravadosuggesting US Special Forces are being

readied to swoop in and take over Syria’schemical weapons infrastructure.

The reality is more complex. Such a missionwould require significant numbers of “bootson the ground” in highly volatilecircumstances.

As Charles Blair makes clear: “The Iraqexperience demonstrates the difficulty ofsecuring highly sensitive military storagefacilities.”

He argues that in Syria the challenges arelikely to be greater “because no foreign armystands poised to enter the country to locateand secure chemical weapons manufacturingand storage facilities”.

Of course, as Leonard Spector points out,details of US contingency planning are notknown.

“The most desirable plan would be to urgethe weapons’ current custodians to remainin place during any transition of power, andto place the sites under the supervision ofan international contingent that couldmonitor the weapons’ security, as decisionswere made about how to manage or destroythem in the future,” he says.

However, he adds: “For the US to attemptto secure the sites in the face of armedresistance by Syrian forces would beextremely demanding, given the number ofthe sites involved and their considerablesize.”

Of course if the Assad regime were to go, awhole new set of issues emerges.

Would any new Syrian government agree tojoin the convention and agree to eliminateits chemical weapons stocks?

Or, as Leonard Spector notes, would theyinstead “insist on retaining them as a counter


to Israel’s nuclear capabilities and as abargaining chip in future negotiations withIsrael over the Golan Heights?”

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18483788

Police probe anthrax sent to PakistanPM: by Sajjad Tarakzai

Pakistani police said they were investigatinghow and why an envelope containing anthraxwas sent to the prime minister’s office in thecapital Islamabad last year.

It appeared to be the first reported case ofanthrax sent to the government in Pakistan,a nuclear-armed country of 174 million thatis battling a Taliban insurgency and whereAl-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was shotdead.

It was not immediately clear how toxic wasthe substance included in the packageaddressed to Prime Minister Yousuf RazaGilani, who was responsible or how theycould have accessed anthrax of any qualityin Pakistan.

The case was registered on Tuesday, butaccording to the police report and a seniorgovernment official, the envelope wasreceived last October.

“After the laboratory test confirmed that theparcel contained anthrax we registered acase against unknown people,” police officerHakim Khan said.

The senior government official said thePakistan Council of Scientific and IndustrialResearch confirmed the package was“anthrax-infected” but offered noexplanation for why it took months toregister a case with police.

The police report, registered on Tuesday andseen by AFP, said an envelope addressed to

Gilani contained a smaller envelope with anunidentified “powder/chemical”. It wasreceived by his office on October 18.

Police refused to let AFP see theaccompanying laboratory test results.

Khan said the parcel was posted from theJamshoro district in southern provinceSindh, the capital of which is Karachi —Pakistan’s biggest city used by the UnitedStates to ship supplies to troops fighting inAfghanistan.

“We have sent a police team to investigate itand to find the culprits there,” he told AFP.

But in Jamshoro, 180 kilometres (113 miles)northeast of Karachi, police said they had notbeen informed by Islamabad of any anthraxdelivery, instead finding out through localmedia reports.

“We have not yet received any instructionsfrom the government to investigate thismatter,” local police official Bashir Ahmedtold AFP.

“We have asked the local post officeprotectively to check their records to knowabout the sender.

“We can’t say how long it will take tocomplete the investigation. We expect aquick result if the sender’s identity is notfake.”

In November 2001, police arrested two mensuspected of sending a letter containinganthrax to Pakistan’s largest newspaper, Jang.

In the United States, anthrax mailingsrattled a jittery American public just daysafter the September 11, 2001 attacks thatkilled almost 3,000 people.

US government scientist Bruce Ivinscommitted suicide in July 2008 as FBI

Jan-Jun 2012 37

agents were about to bring charges againsthim over the anthrax campaign, which killedfive people and injured 17.

Source: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jKLkHBfhQGnuSnrT9nND52hTHJkg?docId=CNG.744bcb7e35508b7ab0945c9f1f64aa72.3a1

The Taliban’s unconventional tactics:the use of chlorine bleach

According to very recent reports fromAfghanistan, the Taliban may have retaliatedfor the Koran burning against the US-runBagram Air Field, by poisoning food at themilitary Torkham Forward Operation Basenear the Pakistan border in the Nangarharprovince. The actual situation is notcompletely clear, but NATO announced thattraces of chlorine bleach were found in fruitand coffee delivered for consumption bymilitary personnel, and the Taliban hastenedto claim responsibility for that.

h t t p : / / w w w . i b c o n s u l t a n c y . e u /publications/cer-update/

DEVELOPMENT IN SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGY

Bio-security, an emerging challenge:by Bhaskar Balakrishnan

Freedom to research in biotechnologyshouldn’t be hampered, but the risks mustbe dealt with.

Advancements in biotechnology can be usedto alarmingly destructive effect.

Recently, in September 2011, researchers inRotterdam succeeded in modifying the avianflu virus in ferrets (the best animal modelfor influenza in humans) to make it capableof airborne transmission, and therefore,making it far more contagious.

The implications are that the highly-dangerous A(H5N1) avian flu virus, whichso far spreads only from birds to humans,could get modified fairly easily, to enable itto spread by airborne transmission fromhuman to human, making it far moredangerous. The A(H5N1) avian flu hascaused around 350 deaths from 600reported cases so far, giving it a mortalityrate of around 60 per cent.

Advances in Biotech

Recent research indicates that developmentsin biotechnology have now made it quitefeasible to modify a wide range of pathogensto give them new features, including thosethat can make them far more dangerous tohumans. A number of new diseases haveemerged in recent years, adding to the listof existing pathogens and toxins that aredangerous to humans.

In the recent case, the research journalsconcerned were asked by US agencies to notpublish key details of their work on theprecise nature of changes to the A(H5N1)virus, due to the apprehension that suchinformation may be misused byunscrupulous elements. While the requesthas been acceded to, it has kicked off a debatein the scientific community on the generalquestion of disclosure of certain researchdetails in biosciences, which could be usedby terrorists and some others against humanpopulations, and the possible role of WHO inthis regard.

The Biological Weapons Convention, 1972,which has 165 countries party to it, embodiesthe determination of the internationalcommunity to ban biological and toxinweapons. Such weapons have, for long, beenregarded as being relatively less effective formilitary use.

However, the convention is wanting in thearea of verification. The US, which is the


global leader in biotechnology, has stalledprogress in this area, due to concernsregarding leakage of scientific information.This may now change. However, while theconvention applies to governments, it leavesopen the possibility of non-state actorsattempting to use bio-weapons.

Unlike nuclear weapons technology,biotechnology is relatively accessible and farless costly to use. For example, the cost ofgene sequencing has dropped dramaticallywith technology advances. Biotech researchcan be done at a relatively low cost comparedto nuclear technology. Harmful pathogenscan be easily transported and released tocause disease and panic.

So, this technology offers non-state actors apotential low-cost, high-impact instrumentto cause damage to human populations, orto the agricultural sector of target countries.The accidental release of dangerouspathogens from research facilities is anotherpossibility.

Indeed, reports have already surfaced of AlQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)seeking to produce a deadly toxin, Ricin,from the waste left after extracting castoroil. What if pathogens like avian flu A(H5N1),plague, SARS, etc. are deliberately modifiedto enable airborne transmission fromhumans to humans? This possibility can nolonger be dismissed as science fiction.

Action is needed at the national andinternational levels to deal with this threat.Biotech research is conducted in a wide rangeof institutions, in government laboratories,universities, and by the private sector.Freedom to do research in biotechnologyshouldn’t be hampered, and intellectualproperty rights must be protected. However,the risks to society and the generalpopulation must be dealt with, as in the caseof nuclear research.

This presents a formidable challenge tonational regulatory agencies andgovernments in devising suitableframeworks to enhance bio-security and bio-safety, while allowing research to go ahead.Developing countries shouldn’t faceadditional hurdles in access to biotechnologyand its useful applications.

India should be actively engaged ininternational efforts and adopt nationalmeasures to strengthen bio-safety and bio-security. Otherwise, institutions andresearchers in India are likely to faceproblems in entering into technologycollaborations and research activities inbiotechnology.

Regulatory Agency

India is still to set up a NationalBiotechnology Regulatory Agency, as a singleprofessional entity to deal with all aspects ofbiotech research and applications.

A Bill on this subject, prepared in 2008, wasfinally tabled in Parliament in December2011. This Bill needs to be revisited, to takeinto account the issue of bio-security andregulation of research activities, to preventpotentially dangerous information going intothe wrong hands. This is a delicate issue, andneeds to be dealt with in consultation withall stakeholders — research community,academics, and the private sector.

Research institutions should devote moreattention to security aspects, such aspersonnel security, security of materials andequipment, and security of information anddata. Suppliers of biotech equipment andconsumables may need to take more care andverify end-user details while responding torequests for equipment and materials thatcould be used for harmful ends.

Jan-Jun 2012 39

In the area of response to bio-threats, theactions needed are similar to those forcombating disease outbreaks. Rapidresponse should include national andinternational coordination to instantlyidentify and determine the genetic makeupof the responsible pathogen, and evolvecounter measures. The WHO’s GlobalOutbreak and Response Network (GOARN)has functioned well and could be furtherstrengthened.

On the international level, more teeth haveto be given to the BWC. Verificationprovisions should be strengthened, and therole of national entities more preciselydefined. A model code of conduct and rulesfor biotech institutions and national agenciescould be useful. The Chemical WeaponsConvention could provide a useful model inthis regard. The threat from bioterrorismjust got more likely than nuclear terrorism,and needs an effective response.

Source: http://www.thehindubusinessline.c o m / o p i n i o n / a r t i c l e 2 8 3 4 5 2 8 . e c e ?homepage=true

Dutch Scientist Agrees to OmitPublished Details of HighlyContagious Bird Flu Findings:by Mikaela Conley

December 21, 2011

The virologist who created a potentiallydangerous, mutant strain of the deadly birdflu virus has agreed to omit methodologydetails from his published reports on the newstrain. The decision came after the U.S.government warned Tuesday that publisheddetails of the experiment could be used tocreate a biological warfare weapon.

Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center inRotterdam, Netherlands, said he created thecontagious form of the deadly H5N1 bird flu

strain “easily” by mutating a few geneswithin the strain. Officials feared the viruscould kill millions if it were unleashed.

The study results were to be published inthe U.S. journal Science, but in anunprecedented move, the National ScienceAdvisory Board for Biosecurity, anindependent committee that advises the U.S.Department of Health and Human Servicesand other federal agencies, recommendedagainst full publication after it determinedthe risks outweighed the benefit.

“Due to the importance of the findings to thepublic health and research communities, theNSABB recommended that the generalconclusions highlighting the novel outcomebe published, but that the manuscripts notinclude the methodological and other detailsthat could enable replication of theexperiments by those who would seek to doharm,” the committee said in a statementTuesday.

“The researchers have reservations aboutthis recommendation but will observe it,” theErasmus Medical Center said Wednesday ina statement.

Fouchier said that he hoped his researchwould assist in developing better vaccinesand treatments for influenza in the future.He conducted his research on ferrets, whoseimmune response to influenza is similar tothat of humans.

“We know which mutation to watch for inthe case of an outbreak, and we can then stopthe outbreak before it is too late,” Fouchiersaid in a statement Tuesday on the medicalcenter’s website. “Furthermore, the findingwill help in the timely development ofvaccinations and medication.”

The Erasmus Medical Center press office andthe National Institutes of Health, which


funded the research, said in statements thatthe researchers are currently working on anew report that complies with the feds’recommendations before it is published inscientific journals.

Since it appeared in 1996, H5N1 has killedhundreds of millions of birds, buttransmission to humans has been rare.There have been about 600 confirmed casesof infections in people, most who workeddirectly with poultry. While rare, it is adeadly human disease. About 60 percent ofthose who had confirmed cases of the virusdied.

Up until now, experts believed that the strainwas transmissible from person-to-persononly through very close contact, butFouchier mutated the strain, creating anairborne virus that could be easilytransmitted through coughs and sneezes.

In a written statement, Science’s editor-in-chief Bruce Alberts said that the journal wastaking the NSABB’s request for anabbreviated version of Fouchier’s research“very seriously.”

While Alberts said that the journal stronglysupported the work of the NSABB, Albertsand the journal’s editors have “concernsabout withholding potentially importantpublic-health information from responsibleinfluenza researchers. Many scientists withinthe influenza community have a bona fideneed to know the details of this research inorder to protect the public, especially if theycurrently are working with related strainsof the virus.”

Experts contacted by ABCNews.com weresplit on whether the research should bepublished in full. While most virologistsbelieve in noncensorship for the good ofpublic health, some talked about thepotential danger of releasing information ona virus that was so easily mutated.

“The idea that biosecurity consists in policingscientists or chimerical “bioterrorists” isdangerous nonsense,” said Philip Alcabes, aprofessor in the CUNY School of PublicHealth at Hunter College. “Who knows whatthe motives of the self-professed biosecurityexperts really are, but in practice, theirridiculous pronouncements promote vastexpenditures of taxpayer monies thatachieve little outside of propping up the verybiosecurity industry from which thewarnings come.”

“Censorship offends me, particularly inscience,” said John Barry, author of “TheGreat Influenza.” “Nonetheless, I think thereshould be review of something like this ... butnot necessarily by the government. It shouldbe done by people who respect scientificopenness, and publishing should be thedefault position.”

Others, including Nicole Baumgarth, aprofessor in the department of pathology,microbiology and immunology at theUniversity of California at Davis, said NIHscientists were in an “excellent position” toreview the science and makerecommendations, and discussion of whetherto publish such data was necessary.

“I do think [the research] might help us toidentify which mutations in influenza mightcause outbreaks,” said Baumgarth. “Thiscould be of importance as the NIH and otherorganizations supporting the screening andsequencing of influenza viruses from birdsand other species, as a means to screen whatmight become the next pandemic.”

At least one other laboratory in Japan hasreportedly conducted similar research andfound similar results. Because of this,Baumgarth said, “it is really important toreport on the research progress made, butmaybe withhold the details of the exactmutations. At least that would preventcopycat science.

Jan-Jun 2012 41

“But let’s face it,” she said. “If two researchlabs have done this already, nobody is goingto stop a third and fourth lab from doing thesame. These are routine procedures done inmany labs around the world.”

Dr. William Schaffner, chairman ofpreventive medicine at Vanderbilt School ofMedicine, said Fouchier’s research is“illuminating” in helping to understand whataspects of the virus’s genome can be changedto make it easily transmissible. Instead ofworrying about biological warfare, Schaffnersaid the greater danger was the potential forthe virus to escape from the universityresearch laboratory, where it is reportedlybeing held under lock and key.

“A biowarfare threat of influenza is very lowbecause the virus cannot be controlled onceit is let out into the community,” saidSchaffner. “There are other biologicalwarfare weapons that are much better attargeting specific populations. Moreimportantly, people in that lab need to havea careful discussion on how to keep that virusin the lab secure. Viral escape is quite real.They should take extra care in handling it.”

Source: http://abcnews.go.com/Health/dutch-scientist-agrees-omit-details-killer-b i r d - f l u / s t o r y ? i d = 1 5 2 0 4 6 4 9 &page=2#.T8XMjrBzVOU


Book Review

Historical Dictionary

of Nuclear, Biological

and Chemical Warfare

(Benjamin C. Garrett

and John Hart, (2010)

Scarecrow Press Inc.

Maryland, USA. ISBN

0-8108-5484-8, Price

Rs. 995.00, pages

xxxvi + 261)

Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav

The author is ResearchAssistant at IDSA, New Delhi.

Summary

In an attempt to raise awarenessabout nuclear, biological and chemicalweapons, this historical dictionarydelineates their origins and maincharacteristics.

The knowledge and awareness of our society about Nuclear, Biological and Chem-

ical (NBC) weapon systems are limited ascompared to the conventional weapons sys-tems. In an attempt to raise awareness aboutthese weapons systems, this historical dic-tionary delineates various kinds of NBCweapon systems, their origins and main char-acteristics, basic facts and figures as well asthe military uses of these weapons. In addi-tion, this book attempts to demonstrate whathas been done and also what remains to bedone to control the spread of these weaponsof mass destruction.

The introduction section presents an over-view of the status of these weapons atpresent. Various milestones achieved in theprocess of creating as well as containingthese weapons are listed chronologically. Thelist of acronyms and abbreviations supple-ments the dictionary very well.

In the beginning, Garrett and Hart admitthat they have attempted to presents anoverview of historical, legal, technical, andpolitics aspects of NBC weapons. While do-ing so, the book aims to strike a balance be-tween various aspects of NBC weapons sys-tems and their development such as impor-tant events, notable individuals, fundamen-tal research, testing and fielding of theseweapons systems etc. It also throws lightupon behaviours and concerns of importantindividuals with reference to these weapons.This book will be helpful in enhancing theawareness about NBC weapons systems andwould also help in clarifying its current sta-tus which would help in the future consider-ations regarding these weapons.

According to the authors, information pro-vided in this dictionary is based on eitherunclassified primary or other authoritative

Jan-Jun 2012 43

and reliable sources. They clarify that thisdictionary does not contain any such infor-mation which are technically sensitive in na-ture. The authors note that generally statesare capable of finding information requiredto assess NBC threats but individuals oftencannot. If individuals are aware of the possi-ble threats posed by these weapons systems,they would be in a position to assess themeasures being taken to contain thesethreats. This book would be helpful in en-hancing such awareness as well.

According to the authors, emergence of nu-clear warfare is parallel to the developmentof nuclear physics. As the awareness aboutthe fundamental nature of atom and its util-ity as vast energy source enhanced, generalknowledge about nuclear weapons has im-proved. However, with regards to biologicalwarfare, it is difficult to track the course andits modern use. They note that it is difficultto give direct credit to any particular scien-tist for developing biological weapons. De-spite their large stockpiles in the US, erst-while USSR and elsewhere, chemical weap-ons were not used in combat except duringthe Iran-Iraq war in 1980s. Thus, despitelimited experience with these weapons sys-tems, NBC warfare continues to fascinatestates especially non-democratic regimessuch as Iraq during Saddam Hussein regime,North Korea according to the authors.

Meanwhile, according to the authors, therehave been repeated attempts to restrict orprohibit the development, stockpiling andthe use of NBS weapons systems. These ef-forts have resulted in establishing ChemicalWeapons Convention (CWC), Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Biological andToxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) etc.These multilateral instruments are aimed atcontrolling and prohibiting use of these NBCweapons systems. The book provides andexplains various relevant technical and legal

terms regarding these conventions and trea-ties as well.

However, the book appears to be mainly re-lying on western sources which create a gapin this study which could be fulfilled by fur-ther research in later editions. Meanwhile,explaining this gap, authors have noted thatwestern states have been most active in thefield of NBC weapon systems and thus themost primary resources are based in thesestates. They admit that a great deal of re-search needs to be carried out using prima-ry sources in Asia, Middle East, Latin Amer-ica and Africa. This historical dictionarywould certainly be an important referencebook for scientists, researchers, policy mak-ers as well as common readers interested inthe subject of NBC weapons and warfare.


Final Declaration: 7th BTWC Rev Con

Final Declaration

The States Parties to the Convention on theProhibition of the Development, Productionand Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruc-tion, which met in Geneva from 5 Decemberto 22 December 2011 to review the opera-tion of the Convention, solemnly declare:

(i) Their conviction that the Convention isessential for international peace andsecurity;

(ii) Their determination also to act with aview to achieving effective progresstowards general and completedisarmament under strict and effectiveinternational control including theprohibition and elimination of allweapons of mass destruction and theirconviction that the prohibitions of theConvention will facilitate theachievement of this goal;

(iii) Their reaffirmation of theirunderstanding that the Conventionforms acomposite whole, as well as oftheir firm commitment to the purposesof the Preamble and all the provisionsof the Convention;

(iv) Their determination to comply with alltheir obligations undertaken pursuantto the Convention and their recognitionthat States Parties not in compliancewith their Convention obligations posefundamental challenges to theConvention’s viability, as would the useof bacteriological (biological) and toxinweapons by anyone at any time;

(v) Their continued determination, for thesake of humankind, to excludecompletely the possibility of the use of

bacteriological (biological) and toxinweapons, and their conviction that suchuse would be repugnant to theconscience of humankind;

(vi) Their reaffirmation that under anycircumstances the use, development,production and stockpiling ofbacteriological (biological) and toxinweapons is effectively prohibited underArticle I of the Convention;

(vii) Their conviction that terrorism in all itsforms and manifestations and whateverits motivation, is abhorrent andunacceptable to the internationalcommunity, and that terrorists must beprevented from developing, producing,stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring orretaining, and using under anycircumstances, biological agents andtoxins, equipment, or means of deliveryof agents or toxins, for non-peacefulpurposes, and their recognition of thecontribution of the full and effectiveimplementation of United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 1540,United Nations General AssemblyResolution 60/288, and other relevantUnited Nations resolutions;

(viii) Their reiteration that the effectivecontribution of the Convention tointernational peace and security will beenhanced through universal adherenceto the Convention, and their call onsignatories to ratify and other States,not party, to accede to the Conventionwithout further delay;

(ix) Their recognition that achieving theobjectives of the Convention will bemore effectively realised throughgreater public awareness of itscontribution, and through collaboration

Jan-Jun 2012 45

with relevant regional and internationalorganizations, in keeping within theirrespective mandates, and theircommitment to promote this;

(x) Their recognition of their considerationof the issues identified in reviewing theoperation of the Convention asprovided for in Article XII, as well astheir consensus on the follow-up actionscontained herein.

Article I

1. The Conference reaffirms theimportance of Article I, as it defines thescope of the Convention. The Conferencedeclares that the Convention iscomprehensive in its scope and that allnaturally or artificially created or alteredmicrobial and other biological agents andtoxins, as well as their components,regardless of their origin and method ofproduction and whether they affecthumans, animals or plants, of types andin quantities that have no justificationfor prophylactic, protective or otherpeaceful purposes, are unequivocallycovered by Article I.

2. The Conference reaffirms that Article Iapplies to all scientific and technologicaldevelopments in the life sciences and inother fields of science relevant to theConvention and notes that theConference has decided to include in the2012-2015 intersessional programme astanding agenda item on review ofdevelopments in the field of science andtechnology related to the Convention.

3. The Conference reaffirms that the useby the States Parties, in any way andunder any circumstances of microbial orother biological agents or toxins, that isnot consistent with prophylactic,protective or other peaceful purposes,

is effectively a violation of Article I. TheConference reaffirms the undertaking inArticle I never in any circumstances todevelop, produce, stockpile or otherwiseacquire or retain weapons, equipment,or means of delivery designed to usesuch agents or toxins for hostilepurposes or in armed conflict in orderto exclude completely and forever thepossibility of their use. The Conferenceaffirms the determination of StatesParties to condemn any use of biologicalagents or toxins other than for peacefulpurposes, by anyone at any time.

4. The Conference notes thatexperimentation involving open airrelease of pathogens or toxins harmfulto humans, animals and plants that haveno justification for prophylactic,protective or other peaceful purposes isinconsistent with the undertakingscontained in Article I.

Article II

5. The Conference reaffirms for any stateratifying or acceding to the Convention,the destruction or diversion to peacefulpurposes specified in Article II would becompleted upon accession to, or uponratification of, the Convention.

6. The Conference emphasises that statesmust take all necessary safety andsecurity measures to protect humanpopulations and the environment,including animals and plants, whencarrying out such destruction and/ordiversion. The Conference also stressesthat these States Parties should provideappropriate information to all StatesParties via the exchange of information(confidence-building measures form F).

7. The Conference welcomes statementsmade by States Parties, and newly


acceding and ratifying States Parties,that they do not possess agents, toxins,weapons, equipment or means ofdelivery as prohibited by Article I of theConvention.

Article III

8. The Conference reaffirms that ArticleIII is sufficiently comprehensive to coverany recipient whatsoever at theinternational, national or sub-nationallevels.

9. The Conference calls for appropriatemeasures, including effective nationalexport controls, by all States Parties toimplement this Article, in order toensure that direct and indirect transfersrelevant to the Convention, to anyrecipient whatsoever, are authorizedonly when the intended use is forpurposes not prohibited under theConvention.

10. The Conference reiterates that StatesParties should not use the provisions ofthis Article to impose restrictions and/or limitations on transfers for purposesconsistent with the objectives andprovisions of the Convention of scientificknowledge, technology, equipment andmaterials under Article X.

Article IV

11. The Conference reaffirms thecommitment of States Parties to take thenecessary national measures under thisArticle. The Conference also reaffirmsthat the enactment and implementationof necessary national measures underthis Article, in accordance with theirconstitutional processes, wouldstrengthen the effectiveness of theConvention. In this context, theConference calls upon States Parties to

adopt, in accordance with theirconstitutional processes, legislative,administrative, judicial and othermeasures, including penal legislation,designed to:

(a) enhance domestic implementation of theConvention and ensure the prohibitionand prevention of the development,production, stockpiling, acquisition orretention of the agents, toxins, weapons,equipment and means of delivery asspecified in Article I of the Convention;

(b) apply within their territory, under theirjurisdiction or under their controlanywhere and apply, if constitutionallypossible and in conformity withinternational law, to actions takenanywhere by natural or legal personspossessing their nationality;

(c) ensure the safety and security ofmicrobial or other biological agents ortoxins in laboratories, facilities, andduring transportation, to preventunauthorized access to and removal ofsuch agents or toxins.

12. The Conference welcomes thosemeasures taken by States Parties in thisregard, and reiterates its call to anyState Party that has not yet taken anynecessary measures, to do so withoutdelay. The Conference encouragesStates Parties to provide appropriateinformation on any such measures theyhave taken, as well as any other usefulinformation on their implementation tothe Implementation Support Unit withinthe United Nations Office forDisarmament Affairs.

13. The Conference notes the value ofnational implementation measures, asappropriate, in accordance with the

Jan-Jun 2012 47

constitutional process of each StateParty, to:

(a) implement voluntary managementstandards on biosafety and biosecurity;

(b) encourage the consideration ofdevelopment of appropriatearrangements to promote awarenessamong relevant professionals in theprivate and public sectors andthroughout relevant scientific andadministrative activities and;

(c) promote amongst those working in thebiological sciences awareness of theobligations of States Parties under theConvention, as well as relevant nationallegislation and guidelines;

(d) promote the development of trainingand education programmes for thosegranted access to biological agents andtoxins relevant to the Convention andfor those with the knowledge or capacityto modify such agents and toxins;

(e) encourage the promotion of a culture ofresponsibility amongst relevant nationalprofessionals and the voluntarydevelopment, adoption andpromulgation of codes of conduct;

(f) strengthen methods and capacities forsurveillance and detection of outbreaksof disease at the national, regional andinternational levels, noting that theInternational Health Regulations (2005)are important for building capacity toprevent, protect against, control andrespond to the international spread ofdisease;

(g) prevent anyone from developing,producing, stockpiling, or otherwiseacquiring or retaining, transporting ortransferring and using under any

circumstances, biological agents andtoxins, equipment, or their means ofdelivery for non-peaceful purposes.

14. In this regard, the Conference welcomesassistance related to Article IV alreadyprovided and encourages those StatesParties, in a position to do so, to provideassistance, upon request, to other StatesParties.

15. The Conference further encouragesStates Parties, that have not yet doneso, in accordance with therecommendation of the Sixth ReviewConference, to designate a national focalpoint for coordinating nationalimplementation of the Convention andcommunicating with other States Partiesand relevant international organizations.

16. The Conference reaffirms that under allcircumstances the use of bacteriological(biological) and toxin weapons iseffectively prohibited by theConvention.

17. The Conference recalls United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 1540(2004) that places obligations on allstates and is consistent with theprovisions of the Convention. TheConference notes that Resolution 1540affirms support for the multilateraltreaties whose aim is to eliminate orprevent proliferation of nuclear,chemical or biological weapons and theimportance for all States Parties to thesetreaties to implement them fully in orderto promote international stability. TheConference also notes that informationprovided to the United Nations by statesin accordance with Resolution 1540 mayprovide a useful resource for StatesParties in fulfilling their obligationsunder this Article.


Article V

18. The Conference reaffirms that:

(a) this article provides an appropriateframework for States Parties to consultand cooperate with one another toresolve any problem and to make anyrequest for clarification, which may havearisen in relation to the objective of, orin the application of, the provisions of theConvention;

(b) any State Party which identifies such aproblem should, as a rule, use thisframework to address and resolve it;

(c) States Parties should provide a specific,timely response to any complianceconcern alleging a breach of theirobligations under the Convention.

19. The Conference reaffirms that theconsultation procedures agreed at theSecond and Third Review Conferencesremain valid to be used by States Partiesfor consultation and cooperationpursuant to this Article. The Conferencereaffirms that such consultation andcooperation may also be undertakenbilaterally and multilaterally, or throughother appropriate internationalprocedures within the framework of theUnited Nations and in accordance withits Charter.

20. The Conference takes note of initiativesfrom States Parties to promoteconfidencebuilding under theConvention.

21. The Conference stresses the need for allStates Parties to deal effectively withcompliance issues. In this connection, theStates Parties agreed to provide aspecific, timely response to anycompliance concern alleging a breach of

their obligations under the Convention.Such responses should be submitted inaccordance with the procedures agreedupon by the Second Review Conferenceand further developed by the ThirdReview Conference. The Conferencereiterates its request that informationon such efforts be provided to theReview Conferences.

22. The Conference emphasises theimportance of the exchange ofinformation among States Partiesthrough the confidence-buildingmeasures (CBMs) agreed at the Secondand Third Review Conferences. TheConference welcomes the exchange ofinformation carried out under thesemeasures and notes that this hascontributed to enhancing transparencyand building confidence.

23. The Conference recognises the urgentneed to increase the number of StatesParties participating in CBMs and callsupon all States Parties to participateannually. The Conference notes thatsince the Sixth Review Conference,there has only been a slight increase inthe percentage of State Partiessubmitting their CBMs. The Conferenceemphasises the importance of increasingand continuing participation in theCBMs.

24. The Conference recognises the technicaldifficulties experienced by some StatesParties in completing full and timelysubmissions. The Conference urgesthose States Parties, in a position to doso, to provide technical assistance andsupport, through training for instance,to those States Parties requesting it toassist them to complete their annualCBM submissions. The Conference notesthe decision to update the CBM forms.

Jan-Jun 2012 49

25. The Conference notes the desirability ofmaking the CBMs more user-friendlyand stresses the need to ensure thatthey provide relevant and appropriateinformation to States Parties.

26. The Conference recalls that the ThirdReview Conference agreed, “that theexchange of information and data, usingthe revised forms, be sent to the UnitedNations Department for DisarmamentAffairs no later than 15 April on anannual basis”. The Conference reaffirmsthat the data submitted in theframework of the annual exchange ofinformation should be provided to theImplementation Support Unit withinthe United Nations Office forDisarmament Affairs and promptlymade available electronically by it to allStates Parties according to the updatedmodalities and forms in Annex I. TheConference recalls that informationsupplied by a State Party must not befurther circulated or made availablewithout the express permission of thatState Party. The Conference notes thefact that certain States Parties made theinformation they provide publiclyavailable.

Article VI

27. The Conference notes that theprovisions of this Article have not beeninvoked.

28. The Conference emphasizes theprovision of Article VI that such acomplaint should include all possibleevidence confirming its validity. Itstresses that, as in the case of theimplementation of all the provisions andprocedures set forth in the Convention,the procedures foreseen in Article VI

should be implemented in good faithwithin the scope of the Convention.

29. The Conference invites the SecurityCouncil:

(a) to consider immediately any complaintlodged under this Article and to initiateany measures it considers necessary forthe investigation of the complaint inaccordance with the Charter;

(b) to request, if it deems necessary and inaccordance with its Resolution 620 of1988, the United Nations Secretary-General to investigate the allegation ofuse, using the technical guidelines andprocedures contained in Annex I ofUnited Nations Document A/44/561;

(c) to inform each State Party of the resultsof any investigation initiated under thisArticle and to consider promptly anyappropriate further action which may benecessary.

30. The Conference reaffirms the agreementof States Parties to consult, at therequest of any State Party, regardingallegations of use or threat of use ofbiological or toxin weapons. TheConference reaffirms the undertaking ofeach State Party to cooperate incarrying out any investigations whichthe Security Council initiates.

31. The Conference notes that theprocedure outlined in this Article iswithout prejudice to the prerogative ofthe States Parties to consider jointlycases of alleged non-compliance with theprovisions of the Convention and tomake appropriate decisions inaccordance with the Charter of theUnited Nations and applicable rules ofinternational law.


Article VII

32. The Conference notes with satisfactionthat these provisions have not beeninvoked.

33. The Conference takes note of desiresexpressed that, should a request forassistance be made, it be promptlyconsidered and an appropriate responseprovided. In this context, in view of thehumanitarian imperative, pendingconsideration of a decision by theSecurity Council, timely emergencyassistance could be provided by StatesParties, if requested.

34. The Conference recognises that StatesParties bear the responsibility forproviding assistance and coordinatingwith relevant organizations in the caseof alleged use of biological or toxinweapons. The Conference reaffirms theundertaking made by each State Partyto provide or support assistance inaccordance with the Charter of theUnited Nations to any State Party whichso requests, if the Security Councildecides that such State Party has beenexposed to danger as a result of aviolation of the Convention.

35. The Conference takes note of thewillingness of States Parties, whereappropriate, to provide or supportassistance to any State Party, which sorequests, when that State Party hasbeen exposed to danger or damage as aresult of the use of bacteriological(biological) agents and toxins as weaponsby anyone.

36. The Conference considers that in theevent that this Article might be invoked,the United Nations could play acoordinating role in providingassistance, with the help of States

Parties, as well as the appropriateintergovernmental organizations, inaccordance with their respectivemandates, such as the World HealthOrganization (WHO), the WorldOrganisation for Animal Health (OIE),the Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations (FAO), and theInternational Plant ProtectionConvention (IPPC). The Conferencerecognises the value of further dialogueregarding appropriate means ofcoordination between States Parties andrelevant international organizations.

37. The Conference recognizes that thereare challenges to developing effectivemeasures for the provision of assistanceand coordination with relevantinternational organizations to respond tothe use of a biological or toxin weapon.The Conference underlines theimportance of the coordination of theprovision of appropriate assistance,including expertise, information,protection, detection, decontamination,prophylactic and medical and otherequipment that could be required toassist the States Parties in the event thata State Party is exposed to danger as aresult of a violation of the Convention.The Conference also takes note of theproposal that States Parties may needto discuss the detailed procedure forassistance in order to ensure that timelyemergency assistance would beprovided by States Parties, if requested,in the event of use of biological or toxinweapons.

38. The Conference notes that State Parties’national preparedness contributes tointernational capabilities for response,investigation and mitigation of outbreaksof disease, including those due to allegeduse of biological or toxin weapons. The

Jan-Jun 2012 51

Conference notes that there aredifferences among States Parties interms of their level of development,national capabilities and resources, andthat these differences affect national andinternational capacity to respondeffectively to an alleged use of abiological or toxin weapon. TheConference encourages States Parties,in a position to do so, to assist otherStates Parties, upon request, to buildrelevant capacity.

39. The Conference notes the need for StatesParties to work nationally, and jointly,as appropriate, to improve, inaccordance with their respectivecircumstances, national laws andregulations, their own diseasesurveillance and detection capacities foridentifying and confirming the cause ofoutbreaks and cooperating, uponrequest, to build the capacity of otherStates Parties. The Conference notesthat the International HealthRegulations (2005) are important forbuilding capacity to prevent, protectagainst, control and respond to theinternational spread of disease; suchaims are compatible with the objectivesof the Convention.

40. On the provision of assistance andcoordination with relevant organizationsupon request by any State Party in thecase of alleged use of biological or toxinweapons, States Parties recognize thatin this regard health and security issuesare interrelated at both the national andinternational levels. The Conferencehighlights the importance of pursuinginitiatives in this area through effectivecooperation and sustainablepartnerships. The Conference notes theimportance of ensuring that effortsundertaken are effective irrespective ofwhether a disease outbreak is naturally

occurring or deliberately caused, andcover diseases and toxins that couldharm humans, animals, plants or theenvironment. The Conference alsorecognises that capabilities to detect,quickly and effectively respond to, andrecover from, the alleged use of abiological or toxin weapon need to be inplace before they are required.

Article VIII

41. The Conference appeals to all StatesParties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol tofulfil their obligations assumed underthat Protocol and urges all states not yetparty to the Protocol to ratify or accedeto it without further delay.

42. The Conference acknowledges that the1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibitsthe use in war of asphyxiating, poisonousor other gases, and of bacteriologicalmethods of warfare, and the Conventioncomplement each other. The Conferencereaffirms that nothing contained in theConvention shall be interpreted as inany way limiting or detracting from theobligations assumed by any state underthe 1925 Geneva Protocol.

43. The Conference stresses the importanceof the withdrawal of all reservations tothe 1925 Geneva Protocol related to theConvention.

44. The Conference recalls the actions whichStates Parties have taken to withdrawtheir reservations to the 1925 GenevaProtocol related to the Convention, andcalls upon those States Parties thatcontinue to maintain pertinentreservations to the 1925 GenevaProtocol to withdraw those reservations,and to notify the Depositary of the 1925Geneva Protocol accordingly, withoutdelay.


45. The Conference notes that reservationsconcerning retaliation, through the useof any of the objects prohibited by theConvention, even conditional, are totallyincompatible with the absolute anduniversal prohibition of thedevelopment, production, stockpiling,acquisition and retention ofbacteriological (biological) and toxinweapons, with the aim to excludecompletely and forever the possibility oftheir use.

46. The Conference notes that theSecretary-General’s investigationmechanism, set out in A/44/561 andendorsed by the General Assembly inits resolution 45/57, represents aninternational institutional mechanismfor investigating cases of alleged use ofbiological or toxin weapons. TheConference notes national initiatives toprovide relevant training to experts thatcould support the Secretary-General’sinvestigative mechanism.

Article IX

47. The Conference reaffirms that thisArticle identifies the recognizedobjective of the effective prohibition ofchemical weapons.

48. The Conference welcomes the fact thatthe Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production, Stockpilingand Use of Chemical Weapons and onTheir Destruction entered into force on29 April 1997 and that 188 instrumentsof ratification or accession have nowbeen deposited with the United Nations.The Conference calls upon all states thathave not yet done so to ratify or accedeto that Convention without delay.

49. The Conference notes the increasingconvergence of biology and chemistry

and its possible challenges andopportunities for the implementation ofthe Conventions.

Article X

50. The Conference stresses the importanceof implementation of this Article andrecalls that States Parties have a legalobligation to facilitate and have the rightto participate in the fullest possibleexchange of equipment, materials andscientific and technological informationfor the use of bacteriological (biological)agents and toxins for peaceful purposesand not to hamper the economic andtechnological development of StatesParties.

51. The Conference reaffirms thecommitment to the full andcomprehensive implementation of thisArticle by all States Parties. TheConference recognises that, while recentscientific and technologicaldevelopments in the field ofbiotechnology would increase thepotential for cooperation among StatesParties and thereby strengthen theConvention, they could also increase thepotential for the misuse of both scienceand technology. Therefore, theConference urges all States Partiespossessing advanced biotechnology toadopt positive measures to promotetechnology transfer and internationalcooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, particularly withcountries less advanced in this field,while promoting the basic objectives ofthe Convention, as well as ensuring thatthe promulgation of science andtechnology is fully consistent with thepeaceful object and purpose of theConvention.

Jan-Jun 2012 53

52. The Conference recognises theimportant role of the private sector inthe transfer of technology andinformation and the wide range oforganizations within the United Nationssystem that are already engaged ininternational cooperation relevant tothis Convention.

53. Recognizing the fundamentalimportance of enhancing internationalcooperation, assistance and exchange inbiological sciences and technology forpeaceful purposes, the Conferenceagrees on the value of working togetherto promote capacity building in the fieldsof vaccine and drug production, diseasesurveillance, detection, diagnosis, andcontainment of infectious diseases aswell as biological risk management. TheConference affirms that building suchcapacity would directly support theachievement of the objectives of theConvention.

54. The Conference:

(a) encourages the States Parties tocontinue strengthening existinginternational organizations andnetworks working on infectious diseases,in particular those of the WHO, FAO,OIE and IPPC, within their respectivemandates;

(b) notes that the role of these organizationsis limited to the epidemiological andpublic/animal/plant health aspects ofany disease outbreak, but recognises theadded value of information exchangewith them;

(c) encourages States Parties to improvecommunication on disease surveillanceat all levels, including between StatesParties and with the WHO, FAO, OIEand IPPC;

(d) calls upon States Parties to continueestablishing and/or improving nationaland regional capabilities to survey,detect, diagnose and combat infectiousdiseases as well as other possiblebiological threats and integrate theseefforts into national and/or regionalemergency and disaster managementplans;

(e) urges States Parties in a position to doso to continue supporting, directly aswell as through internationalorganizations, capacity-building inStates Parties in need of assistance inthe fields of disease surveillance,detection, diagnosis and combating ofinfectious diseases and related research;

(f) calls upon States Parties to promote thedevelopment and production of vaccinesand drugs to treat infectious diseasethrough international cooperation and,as appropriate, public-privatepartnerships.

55. The Conference recognizes theimportance of developing effectivenational infrastructure for human,animal and plant disease surveillance,detection, diagnosis and containment, aswell as national biological riskmanagement through internationalcooperation and assistance.

56. The Conference, while noting existingbilateral, regional and multilateralassistance, cooperation andpartnerships, recognizes, however, thatthere still remain challenges to beovercome in developing internationalcooperation, assistance and exchange inbiological sciences and technology forpeaceful purposes and that addressingsuch problems, challenges, needs andrestrictions will help States Parties tobuild sufficient capacity for disease


surveillance, detection, diagnosis andcontainment. Keeping in mind Article X,the Conference agrees on the value oftargeting and mobilizing resources,including financial resources, to facilitatethe fullest possible exchange ofequipment, material and scientific andtechnological information to helpovercome challenges to diseasesurveillance, detection, diagnosis andcontainment. Recognizing that all StatesParties have a role to play, theConference stresses that those StatesParties seeking to build their capacityshould identify their specific needs andrequirements and seek partnershipswith others, and that those StatesParties, in a position to do so, shouldprovide assistance and support.

57. The Conference reaffirms that existinginstitutional ways and means of ensuringmultilateral cooperation among allStates Parties need to be developedfurther in order to promoteinternational cooperation for peacefuluses in areas relevant to the Convention,including areas, such as medicine, publichealth, agriculture and the environment.

58. The Conference calls for the use of theexisting institutional means within theUnited Nations system and otherinternational organizations, inaccordance with their respectivemandates, to promote the objectives ofthis Article. In this regard theConference urges States Parties, theUnited Nations and its specializedagencies to take further specificmeasures within their competence forthe promotion of the fullest possibleexchange of equipment, materials andscientific and technological informationfor the use of bacteriological (biological)agents and toxins for peaceful purposes

and of international cooperation in thisfield.

59. The Conference also recognises thatthere should be efficient coordinationmechanisms between the specializedagencies of the United Nations systemand international and regionalorganizations in order to facilitatescientific cooperation and technologytransfer.

60. The Conference recognises the need toeffectively implement national measuresin order to further implementation ofArticle X. In this regard, the Conferenceurges States Parties to undertake toreview their national regulationsgoverning international exchanges andtransfers in order to ensure theirconsistency with the objectives andprovisions of all the articles of theConvention.

61. The Conference encourages StatesParties to provide at least biannuallyappropriate information on how theyimplement this Article to theImplementation Support Unit withinthe United Nations Office forDisarmament Affairs, and requests theImplementation Support Unit to collatesuch information for the information ofStates Parties. The Conferencewelcomes the information provided bya number of States Parties on thecooperative measures they haveundertaken towards fulfilling theirArticle X obligations.

Article XI

62. The Conference recalls that the IslamicRepublic of Iran has formally presentedat the Sixth Review Conference aproposal to amend Article I and the title

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of the Convention to include explicitlythe prohibition of the use of biologicalweapons.

63. The Conference recalls the statement atthe Sixth Review Conference by theGovernment of the Russian Federationas a Depositary that it has notified allStates Parties of the proposal by theIslamic Republic of Iran to amend theConvention.

64. The Conference reaffirms that theprovisions of this Article should inprinciple be implemented in such a wayas not to affect the universality of theConvention.

Article XII

65. The Conference reaffirms that ReviewConferences constitute an effectivemethod of reviewing the operation of theConvention with a view to assuring thatthe purposes of the Preamble and theprovisions of the Convention are beingrealized. The Conference thereforedecides that Review Conferences beheld at least every five years.

66. The Conference decides that the EighthReview Conference shall be held inGeneva not later than 2016 and shouldreview the operation of the Convention,taking into account, inter alia:

(a) new scientific and technologicaldevelopments relevant to theConvention, taking into account therelevant decision of this Conferenceregarding the review of developmentsin the field of science and technologyrelated to the Convention;

(b) the progress made by States Parties onthe implementation of the Convention;

(c) progress of the implementation ofdecisions and recommendations agreedupon at the Seventh Review Conference,taking into account, as appropriate,decisions and recommendations reachedat previous review conferences.

Article XIII

67. The Conference reaffirms that theConvention is of unlimited duration andapplies at all times, and expresses itssatisfaction that no State Party hasexercised its right to withdraw from theConvention.

Article XIV

68. The Conference notes with satisfactionthat ten states have acceded to or ratifiedthe Convention since the Sixth ReviewConference.

69. The Conference underlines that theobjectives of the Convention will not befully realized as long as there remainseven a single state not party that couldpossess or acquire biological weapons.

70. The Conference reiterates the highimportance of universalization, inparticular by affirming the particularimportance of the ratification of theConvention by signatory states andaccession to the Convention by thosewhich have not signed the Convention,without delay. States Parties agree tocontinue to promote universalization.

71. The Conference notes that the primaryresponsibility for promoting theuniversality of the Convention rests withthe States Parties. The Conference urgesStates Parties to take action to persuadenon-parties to accede to the Conventionwithout delay, and particularly


welcomes action by States Parties andregional initiatives to provide assistanceand support that would lead to wideraccession to the Convention.

72. The Conference welcomes regionalinitiatives that would lead to wideraccession and adherence to theConvention.

73. The Conference urges those StatesParties, in a position to do so, to offerassistance and support to States in theirpreparations for ratification or accessionto the Convention.

Article XV

74. The Conference welcomes the decisionof the Sixth Review Conference that aswell as the five languages listed in thisArticle, Arabic shall be considered anofficial language for the purposes of anymeetings of the States Parties and otherformal communications concerning theoperation of the Convention.

Reference:

1 . http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/G E N / G 1 2 / 6 0 0 / 6 0 / P D F /G1260060.pdf?OpenElement, pp. 9-19

Summer / January-June 2012

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