Important disclosures appear at the end of this document. Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050 Dominic Wilson Roopa Purushothaman 1st October 2003 Global Economics Paper No: 99 n Over the next 50 years, Brazil, Russia, India and China—the BRICs economies—could become a much larger force in the world economy. We map out GDP growth, income per capita and currency movements in the BRICs economies until 2050. n The results are startling. If things go right, in less than 40 years, the BRICs economies together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms. By 2025 they could account for over half the size of the G6. Of the current G6, only the US and Japan may be among the six largest economies in US dollar terms in 2050. n The list of the world’s ten largest economies may look quite different in 2050. The largest economies in the world (by GDP) may no longer be the richest (by income per capita), making strategic choices for firms more complex. Economic Research from the GS Financial Workbench ® at https://www.gs.com Many thanks to Jim O’Neill, Paulo Leme, Sandra Lawson, Warren Pearson and our regional economists for their contributions to this paper.
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Important disclosures appear at the end of this document.
Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050
Dominic WilsonRoopa Purushothaman
1st October 2003
Global EconomicsPaper No: 99
� Over the next 50 years, Brazil, Russia, India and China—the BRICseconomies—could become a much larger force in the world economy. Wemap out GDP growth, income per capita and currency movements in theBRICs economies until 2050.
� The results are startling. If things go right, in less than 40 years, the BRICseconomies together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms. By 2025they could account for over half the size of the G6. Of the current G6, only theUS and Japan may be among the six largest economies in US dollar terms in2050.
� The list of the world’s ten largest economies may look quite different in 2050.The largest economies in the world (by GDP) may no longer be the richest (byincome per capita), making strategic choices for firms more complex.
EconomicResearch from the
GS Financial Workbench®
at https://www.gs.com
Many thanks to Jim O’Neill, Paulo Leme, SandraLawson, Warren Pearson and our regionaleconomists for their contributions to this paper.
Global Paper No 99 2 1st October 2003
SUMMARY� Over the next 50 years, Brazil, Russia, India and China—the BRICs economies—could become a much
larger force in the world economy. Using the latest demographic projections and a model of capitalaccumulation and productivity growth, we map out GDP growth, income per capita and currencymovements in the BRICs economies until 2050.
� The results are startling. If things go right, in less than 40 years, the BRICs economies together could belarger than the G6 in US dollar terms. By 2025 they could account for over half the size of the G6. Currentlythey are worth less than 15%. Of the current G6, only the US and Japan may be among the six largesteconomies in US dollar terms in 2050.
� About two-thirds of the increase in US dollar GDP from the BRICs should come from higher real growth,with the balance through currency appreciation. The BRICs’ real exchange rates could appreciate by up to300% over the next 50 years (an average of 2.5% a year).
� The shift in GDP relative to the G6 takes place steadily over the period, but is most dramatic in the first 30years. Growth for the BRICs is likely to slow significantly toward the end of the period, with only Indiaseeing growth rates significantly above 3% by 2050. And individuals in the BRICs are still likely to bepoorer on average than individuals in the G6 economies, with the exception of Russia. China’s per capitaincome could be roughly what the developed economies are now (about US$30,000 per capita).
� As early as 2009, the annual increase in US dollar spending from the BRICs could be greater than that fromthe G6 and more than twice as much in dollar terms as it is now. By 2025 the annual increase in US dollarspending from the BRICs could be twice that of the G6, and four times higher by 2050.
� The key assumption underlying our projections is that the BRICs maintain policies and developinstitutions that are supportive of growth. Each of the BRICs faces significant challenges in keepingdevelopment on track. This means that there is a good chance that our projections are not met, eitherthrough bad policy or bad luck. But if the BRICs come anywhere close to meeting the projections set outhere, the implications for the pattern of growth and economic activity could be large.
� The relative importance of the BRICs as an engine of new demand growth and spending power may shiftmore dramatically and quickly than expected. Higher growth in these economies could offset the impact ofgreying populations and slower growth in the advanced economies.
� Higher growth may lead to higher returns and increased demand for capital. The weight of the BRICs ininvestment portfolios could rise sharply. Capital flows might move further in their favour, promptingmajor currency realignments.
� Rising incomes may also see these economies move through the ‘sweet spot’ of growth for different kindsof products, as local spending patterns change. This could be an important determinant of demand andpricing patterns for a range of commodities.
� As today’s advanced economies become a shrinking part of the world economy, the accompanying shiftsin spending could provide significant opportunities for global companies. Being invested in and involvedin the right markets—particularly the right emerging markets—may become an increasingly importantstrategic choice.
� The list of the world’s ten largest economies may look quite different in 2050. The largest economies in theworld (by GDP) may no longer be the richest (by income per capita), making strategic choices for firmsmore complex.
The world economy has changed a lot over the past50 years. Over the next 50, the changes could be at
least as dramatic.
We have highlighted the importance of thinkingabout the developing world in our recent globalresearch, focusing on key features of developmentand globalisation that we think are important toinvestors with a long-term perspective. A majortheme of this work has been that, over the next fewdecades, the growth generated by the largedeveloping countries, particularly the BRICs (Brazil,Russia, India and China) could become a much largerforce in the world economy than it is now—and muchlarger than many investors currently expect.
In this piece, we gauge just how large a force theBRICs could become over the next 50 years. We dothis not simply by extrapolating from current growthrates, but by setting out clear assumptions about howthe process of growth and development works andapplying a formal framework to generate long-termforecasts. We look at our BRICs projections relativeto long-term projections for the G6 (US, Japan, UK,Germany, France and Italy)1.
Using the latest demographic projections and amodel of capital accumulation and productivitygrowth, we map out GDP growth, income per capitaand currency movements in the BRICs economiesuntil 2050. This allows us to paint a picture of how theworld economy might change over the decadesahead.
The results of the exercise are startling. They suggestthat if things go right, the BRICs could become a veryimportant source of new global spending in the nottoo distant future. The chart below shows that India’seconomy, for instance, could be larger than Japan’sby 2032, and China’s larger than the US by 2041 (andlarger than everyone else as early as 2016). TheBRICs economies taken together could be larger thanthe G6 by 2039.
Our projections are optimistic, in the sense that theyassume reasonably successful development. But theyare economically sensible, internally consistent andprovide a clear benchmark against which investorscan set their expectations. There is a good chance thatthe right conditions in one or another economy willnot fall into place and the projections will not be
Overtaking the G6: When BRICs' US$GDP Would Exceed G6
Italy
France
*cars indicate when BRICs US$GDP exceeds US$GDP in the G6
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
Germany
1 Any decision to limit the sample of countries is to some extent arbitrary. In focusing on the G6 (rather than the G7 or a broader grouping), wedecided to limit our focus to those developed economies with GDP currently over US$1 trillion. This means that Canada and and some of theother larger developed economies are not included. Adding these economies to the analysis would not materially change the conclusions.
realized. If the BRICs pursue sound policies,however, the world we envisage here might turn out tobe a reality, not just a dream.
The projections leave us in no doubt that the progressof the BRICs will be critical to how the worldeconomy evolves. If these economies can fulfil theirpotential for growth, they could become a dominantforce in generating spending growth over the next fewdecades.
A Dramatically Different World
We start with some key conclusions that describe theway the world might change over the next 50 years.The big assumption underlying all of theseprojections is that the BRICs maintaingrowth-supportive policy settings. The chartsthroughout the text illustrate these points. Ourconclusions fall under five main topics: 1) economicsize; 2) economic growth; 3) incomes anddemographics; 4) global demand patterns; and 5)currency movements.
Economic Size
� In less than 40 years, the BRICs’ economiestogether could be larger than the G6 in US dollarterms. By 2025 they could account for over halfthe size of the G6. Currently they are worth lessthan 15%.
� In US dollar terms, China could overtakeGermany in the next four years, Japan by 2015and the US by 2039. India’s economy could belarger than all but the US and China in 30 years.Russia would overtake Germany, France, Italyand the UK.
� Of the current G6 (US, Japan, Germany, France,Italy, UK) only the US and Japan may be amongthe six largest economies in US dollar terms in2050.
Economic Growth
� India has the potential to show the fastest growthover the next 30 and 50 years. Growth could behigher than 5% over the next 30 years and close to5% as late as 2050 if development proceeds
Global Paper No 99 4 1st October 2003
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
BRICs
G62025: BRICs
economies
over half as
large as the G6
By 2040:
BRICS
overtake
the G6
BRICs Have a Larger US$GDP Than the G6
in Less Than 40 YearsGDP
(2003 US$bn)
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
BRICs Share of GDP Rises
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
G6 share ofcombined BRICsand G6 GDP
BRICs share ofcombined BRICsand G6 GDP
28% 33% 39%45%
50%
56%
60%
GDP
(2003 US$bn)
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
The Largest Economies in 2050
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
Ch US In Jpn Br Russ UK Ger Fr It
GDP
(2003 US$bn)
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
successfully.
� Overall, growth for the BRICs is likely to slowsignificantly over this time frame. By 2050, onlyIndia on our projections would be recordinggrowth rates significantly above 3%.
Incomes and Demographics
� Despite much faster growth, individuals in theBRICs are still likely to be poorer on average thanindividuals in the G6 economies by 2050. Russiais the exception, essentially catching up with thepoorer of the G6 in terms of income per capita by2050. China’s per capita income could be similarto where the developed economies are now(about US$30,000 per capita). By 2030, China’sincome per capita could be roughly what Korea’sis today. In the US, income per capita by 2050could reach roughly $80,000.
� Demographics play an important role in the waythe world will change. Even within the BRICs,demographic impacts vary greatly. The declinein working-age population is generally projectedto take place later than in the developedeconomies, but will be steeper in Russia andChina than India and Brazil.
Global Demand Patterns
� As early as 2009, the annual increase in US dollarspending from the BRICs could be greater thanthat from the G6 and more than twice as much indollar terms as it is now. By 2025 the annualincrease in US dollar spending from the BRICscould be twice that of the G6, and four timeshigher by 2050.
Currency Movements
� Rising exchange rates could contribute asignificant amount to the rise in US dollar GDP inthe BRICs. About 1/3 of the increase in US dollarGDP from the BRICs over the period may comefrom rising currencies, with the other 2/3 fromfaster growth.
� The BRICs’ real exchange rates could appreciateby up to 300% over the next 50 years (an average
Global Paper No 99 5 1st October 2003
China Overtakes the G3; India Is Close
Behind
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
China
India
Japan
US
Germany
GDP
(2003 US$bn)
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
India Shows Most Rapid Growth Potential
of the BRICS
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Brazil
China
India
Russia
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
real GDP
growth (%yoy)
$521
$1,594
$4,517
$1,137
$656$470
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
2010 2030 2050
BRICs
G6
Annual increase
in US$GDP
(2003 $USbn)
Incremental Demand From
the BRICs Could Eventually
Be Quadruple G6 Demand
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
of 2.5% a year). China’s currency could double invalue in ten years’ time if growth continued andthe exchange rate were allowed to float freely.
How Countries Get Richer
Our predictions may seem dramatic. But over aperiod of a few decades, the world economy canchange a lot. Looking back 30 or 50 years illustratesthat point. Fifty years ago, Japan and Germany werestruggling to emerge from reconstruction. Thirtyyears ago, Korea was just beginning to emerge fromits position as a low-income nation. And even over thelast decade, China’s importance to the worldeconomy has increased substantially.
History also illustrates that any kind of long-termprojection is subject to a great deal of uncertainty.The further ahead into the future you look, the moreuncertain things become. Predictions that the USSR(or Japan) would overtake the US as the dominanteconomic power turned out tobebadly off the mark.
While this makes modeling these kinds of shiftsdifficult, it is still essential. Over 80% of the valuegenerated by the world’s major equity markets willcome from earnings delivered more than 10 yearsaway. Developing strategies to position for growthmay take several years and require significantforward planning. The best option is to provide asensible framework, based on clear assumptions.
As developing economies grow, they have the
potential to post higher growth rates as they catch upwith the developed world. This potential comes fromtwo sources. The first is that developing economieshave less capital (per worker) than developedeconomies (in the language of simple growth modelsthey are further from their ‘steady states’). Returns oncapital are higher and a given investment rate resultsin higher growth in the capital stock. The second isthat developing countries may be able to usetechnologies available in more developed countriesto ‘catch up’ with developed country techniques.
As countries develop, these forces fade and growthrates tend to slow towards developed country levels.In Japan and Germany, very rapid growth in the 1960sand 1970s gave way to more moderate growth in the1980s and 1990s. This is why simple extrapolationgives silly answers over long timeframes. As a crudeexample, assuming that China’s GDP growthcontinued to grow at its current 8% per year over thenext three decades would lead to the prediction thatChina’s economy would be three times larger thanthe US by 2030 in US dollar terms and 25 times largerby 2050.
Countries also grow richer on the back ofappreciating currencies. Currencies tend to rise ashigher productivity leads economies to converge onPurchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates.There is a clear tendency for countries with higherincome per capita to have exchange rates closer toPPP. The BRICs economies all have exchange ratesthat are a long way below PPP rates. These large
Global Paper No 99 6 1st October 2003
Japanese GDPGrowthDeclinedAsthe
EconomyDeveloped
10.4%
5.0%
4.0%
1.8%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00
Average
yoy%growth
BRICs Exchange Rates Could Appreciate
By Close to 300%
289%
281%
208%
129%
0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350%
China
India
Russia
Brazil
Real exchange rate appreciation (%)GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
differences between PPP and actual exchange ratescome about because productivity levels are muchlower in developing economies. As they develop andproductivity rises, there will be a tendency for theircurrencies to rise towards PPP. The idea thatcountries experiencing higher productivity growthtend to appreciate is an important part of both ourGSDEER and GSDEEMER models of equilibriumexchange rates.
Breaking Down Growth
To translate these two processes into actualprojections, we need to develop a model. The modelwe use is described in more detail in the Appendix butthe intuition behind it is quite simple. Growthaccounting divides GDP growth into threecomponents:
We model each component explicitly. We use the USCensus Bureau’s demographic projections to
forecast employment growth over the long term,assuming that the proportion of the working agepopulation that works stays roughly stable. We useassumptions about the investment rate to map out thepath that the capital stock will take over time. And wemodel TFP growth as a process of catch-up on thedeveloped economies, by assuming that the larger theincome gap between the BRICs and the developedeconomies, the greater the potential for catch-up andstronger TFP growth.
We then use the projections of productivity growthfrom this exercise to map out the path of the realexchange rate. As in our GSDEER framework, weassume that if an economy experiences higherproductivity growth than the US, its equilibriumexchange rate will tend to appreciate.
By varying the assumptions about investment,demographics or the speed of catch-up, we cangenerate different paths for annual GDP, GDPgrowth, GDP per capita (in local currency or USdollars), productivity growth and the real exchangerate.
Because both the growth and currency projections arelong-term projections, we ignore the impact of theeconomic cycle. Effectively, the projections can beinterpreted as growth in the trend (or potentialgrowth) of the economy and the currencies’ path as anequililibrium path. Where economies peg theirexchange rates (as in China), it is even moreimportant to view the exchange rate projections as anequilibrium real rate. In practice, real exchange rateappreciation might come about through acombination of nominal appreciation and higherinflation, with different mixes having differentimplications. We abstract from inflation, expressingall of our projections in real terms (either 2003 localcurrency or 2003 US dollars).3
Generally speaking, the structure of the models isidentical across the four economies. We make twominor alterations. We assume that the ‘convergencespeed’ of TFP in Brazil and India is slower than in
Global Paper No 99 7 1st October 2003
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
-6 -4 -2 0 2
Deviation from purchasing power parity*
GDP per capita relative to the US*
Higher Income Per Capita Moves Exchange Rates
Closer to PPP
*expressed in logs
2 We do not explicitly allow for increases in human capital (education), which are implicitly picked up in the technical progress/TFP term inour model.
3 Higher inflation in the BRICs would raise nominal GDP forecasts in local currencies and nominal exchange rates, but would not change theforecasts of real GDP or of US dollar GDP under the standard assumption that higher inflation would translate into an offsetting depreciationin the currency.
Russia and China for the first twenty years, largelybecause of lower education levels and poorerinfrastructure (more on these factors below), butgradually rises from 2020 onwards (as thesestructural problems are addressed) so that all of theBRICs are ‘running’ at the same convergence speed.We also assume that China’s investment rategradually declines from its current levels of around36% to 30% (close to the Asian average) by 2015.
We use GS forecasts until 2004 and begin thesimulations in 2005.
A More Detailed Look at the BRICs’ Potential
We have already highlighted some of the moststriking results, though there are many otherintriguing aspects. The tables and charts set out thekey features of the projections, summarising them in5-year blocks. They show average GDP growth rates,income per capita in US dollars, the real exchangerate and the main demographic trends.
In each economy, as development occurs, growthtends to slow and the exchange rate appreciates. Bothrising currencies and faster growth raise US dollarGDP per capita gradually and the gap between theBRICs and developed economies narrows slowly.
The impact of demographics varies, with labour forcegrowth contributing relatively more to growth in
India and Brazil and detracting from growth inRussia, where the US Census projections show thelabour force shrinking quite rapidly. Where labourforce and population growth is rapid, income percapita tends to rise more slowly as higher investmentis needed just to keep up with population growth.
To illustrate the shift in economic gravity, we also makecomparisons with the G6. To do that, we use a lesssophisticated version of the same model to project G6growth. We assume a common 2% labour productivitygrowth rate across the G6, so differences in projectedGDP growth are purely a function of demographics(and real exchange rates remain roughly stable). Ashrinking working age population appears to be thebiggest issue in Japan and Italy, whose growth rates arelower than the others, and the smallest issue in the US,which maintains the fastest growth.
Our G6 projections allow us to compare the paths ofGDP and GDP per capita in the BRICs with that of themore advanced economies in a common currency.The shift in GDP relative to the G6 takes placesteadily over the period, but is most dramatic in thefirst 30 years. The BRICs overtake the G6 throughhigher real growth and through the appreciation ofBRICs’ currencies. About 1/3 of the increase in USdollar GDP from the BRICs over the period maycome from rising currencies, with the other 2/3 fromfaster growth.
We also look explicitly at where new demand growthin the world will come from. While it takes some timefor the level of GDP in the BRICs to approach the G6,their share of new demand growth rises much morerapidly. Because it is incremental demand thatgenerally drives returns, this measure may be
Global Paper No 99 8 1st October 2003
% Brazil China India Russia
2000-2005 2.7 8.0 5.3 5.9
2005-2010 4.2 7.2 6.1 4.8
2010-2015 4.1 5.9 5.9 3.8
2015-2020 3.8 5.0 5.7 3.4
2020-2025 3.7 4.6 5.7 3.4
2025-2030 3.8 4.1 5.9 3.5
2030-2035 3.9 3.9 6.1 3.1
2035-2040 3.8 3.9 6.0 2.6
2040-2045 3.6 3.5 5.6 2.2
2045-2050 3.4 2.9 5.2 1.9
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
GSBRICsModelProjections. Seetext for detailsandassumptions.
ProjectedUS$GDP
2003$USbnBRICs G6
particularly useful to assess the extent ofopportunities in these markets. We measure that newdemand growth as the change in US dollar spendingpower in the various economies, so again itincorporates both growth and currency effects. Onthese measures, the BRICs come to dominate the G6as a source of growth in spending power within 10years.
Taking each of the economies in brief:
� Brazil. Over the next 50 years, Brazil’s GDPgrowth rate averages 3.6%. The size of Brazil’seconomy overtakes Italy by 2025; France by2031; UK and Germany by 2036.
� China. China’s GDP growth rate falls to 5% in2020 from its 8.1% growth rate projected for2003. By the mid-2040s, growth slows to around3.5%. Even so, high investment rates, a largelabor force and steady convergence would meanChina becomes the world’s largest economy by2041.
� India. While growth in the G6, Brazil, Russiaand China is expected to slow significantly overthe next 50 years, India’s growth rate remainsabove 5% throughout the period. India’s GDPoutstrips that of Japan by 2032. With the onlypopulation out of the BRICS that continues togrow throughout the next 50 years, India has the
potential to raise its US dollar income per capitain 2050 to 35 times current levels. Still, India’sincome per capita will be significantly lower thanany of the countries we look at.
� Russia. Russia’s growth projections arehampered by a shrinking population (anassumption that may be too negative). But strongconvergencerateswork toRussia’sbenefit, andby2050, the country’s GDP per capita is by far thehighest in the group, and comparable to the G6.Russia’s economy overtakes Italy in 2018; Francein 2024; UK in 2027 and Germany in 2028.
Although we focus on the BRICs, as the four largestdeveloping economies, we do not mean to suggestthat development elsewhere is not important. In thebox on p11, we look at what our approach says forSouth Africa and the African region and other largerdeveloping economies could also become important.
Are the Results Plausible?
The projection of a substantial shift in the generationof growth towards the BRICs is dramatic. Is itplausible?
We have looked at three main ways to cross check theforecasts, all of which give us broad comfort with theresults.
First, the forecasts for GDP growth in the next 10years are not out of line with the IMF’s assumptions
Global Paper No 99 10 1st October 2003
Projected Population Growth Rates
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2001 2008 2015 2022 2029 2036 2043 2050
%
Brazil
China
India
Russia
G6
China's Income Per CapitaGrowing
Share of US Income Per Capita
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
2003
US$bn
US GDP PerCapita (US$bn)
China GDP PerCapita (US$bn)
17% 21% 26%32%
37%
GSBRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
Global Paper No 99 11 1st October 2003
With Asia, Europe and Latin America representedin the BRICs profile, some readers will noticeAfrica’s absence. The BRICs are chosen becausethey are the four largest developing economiescurrently. Still, it is interesting and important tolook beyond at the potential for Africa, andparticularly South Africa, the largest economy inthe region, toplay apart in the same kind ofprocess.
We have already published a 10-year outlook onSouth Africa using detailed econometric work toproject the same components of growth(employment growth, capital stock growth andtechnical progress) that underpin our methodologyhere (see Global Economics Paper #93, SouthAfrica Growth and Unemployment: A Ten-YearOutlook). The study showed that South Africacould achieve 5% growth over the next decade if theright policies were put in place. The emphasis ongetting the conditions for growth right is one that isimportant for the BRICs also.
To provide comparison, we applied our projectionmethods for the BRICs to South Africa. Themethod is simpler than that in our paper on SouthAfrica, but does provide a longer-term outlook. Thetable sets out the main results in terms of growth.Projected growth over the next decade is a littlelower than the 5% projected in our more detailedstudy (around 4% here), but the main thrust of the
outlook is similar. The differences arise largelybecause the demographic projections we assume muchsharper shrinkage in the labour force (around 1% peryear) than did the more detailed exercise. Both inSouth Africa, and in the region more generally, thechallenge of AIDS and the impact it will have onlabour force and population dynamics is an importantrisk and challenge that has no direct counterpartelsewhere.
Our longer-term projections show South Africagrowing at an average rate of around 3.5% over thenext 50 years, comparable to our predictions for Russiaand Brazil. With declining population growth rates,per capita incomes under these projections would risesignificantly more rapidly. We find under theseprojections that South Africa’s economy would besignificantly smaller than the BRICs in 2050 (aroundUS$1.2bn compared to US$5.9bn for Russia, thesmallest of the BRICs economies), though itsprojected GDP per capita would actually be higher.
South Africa and the Challenge for the African Continent
SouthAfricaProjectedReal GDPGrowth
3.4%
4.4%
3.6%3.3%
3.1%3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
5.0%
2000-
2005
2005-
2010
2010-
2015
2015-
2020
2025-
2030
2030-
2035
2035-
2040
2040-
2045
2045-
2050
Average yoy%
growth
GSBRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
ProjectedIncomePerCapita
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
India
Brazil
China
SouthAfrica
Russia
GDPpercapita
(2003US$)
GSBRICsModelProjections. Seetext for detailsandassumptions.
2003US$bn SouthAfrica Brazil China India Russia
2000 83 762 1078 469 391
2010 147 668 2998 929 847
2020 267 1333 7070 2104 1741
2030 447 2189 14312 4935 2980
2040 739 3740 26439 12367 4467
2050 1174 6074 44453 27803 5870
GSBRICs ModelProjections. Seetext for details andassumptions.
ProjectedUS$GDPLevels
of potential growth in these economies (roughly 5%for Russia, 4% for Brazil, 8% for China, 5-6% forIndia). With the exception of Brazil, our projectedgrowth rates are also close to recent performance.Brazil’s performance would have to improve quitesignificantly relative to the past.
Second, although the implied changes in GDP andcurrencies may look dramatic on an absolute basis,they are significantly less spectacular than what someeconomies actually achieved over the last fewdecades. In Japan, between 1955 and 1985 real GDPincreased by nearly 8 times (from initial levels ofincome per capita not unlike some of the BRICs) andreal industrial production increased tenfold. Between1970 and 1995—the yen appreciated by over 300% innominal terms against the US dollar. In the morerecent past, Korea’s GDP in 2000 increased by nearly9 times between 1970 and 2000. Next to theseexperiences our projections look quite tame.Although the projections assume that economiesremain on a steady development track, they do notassume ‘miracle-economy’ growth.
As a final check on our estimates, we applied anentirely different approach to generate long-termgrowth projections based on cross-countryeconometric research. We took a well-knownexisting econometric model from Levine and Renelt(LR) that explains average GDP growth over the nextthirty years as a function of initial income per capita,investment rates, population growth and secondaryschool enrollments4.
Although the technique employed is very differentand a year-by-year path cannot be generated, themodel has close parallels to our own approach. Initialincome per capita drives our productivity catch-up,investment drives capital accumumulation, and thelevel of education can be thought of as helping to
determine the speed of convergence. Projectionsusing the LR equation are not identical to our own, butclose enough to reassure us that we are makingsensible assumptions. Our own models are a bit moreoptimistic about growth prospects in general, but notby much.
A Look Back In Time—What Would We HaveSaid in 1960
We mentioned earlier that the world has changed a lotin the last fifty years. One further check on theplausibility of our projections is to go back in time,apply the same methods that we have used here andlook at how our projections of GDP growth thenwould have compared with subsequent reality.
To do that, we looked at a set of 11 developed anddeveloping countries (US, UK, Germany, France,Italy, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, India, Korea andHong Kong) starting in 1960 and projecting theirGDP growth for the following 40 years (dataavailability meant we could not easily do a full 50year projection).
We applied the same methodology, modeling capitalstock growth as a function of the starting level ofcapital and investment and technical progress as acatch-up process on the US. Because we did not havedemographic projections for 1960 (as we do now forthe next fifty years), we used actual population datafor the period as the basis for our labour force growthassumptions (effectively assuming that this part ofthe exercise was predicted perfectly).
The results of that exercise are generallyencouraging. In general, the projected averagegrowth rates over the period are surprisingly close tothe actual outcomes. For the more developedcountries, where the growth path has been steadier(France, Germany, UK, US, Italy) the differencesbetween projected and actual growth rates are small.
For the developing countries (and Japan, which in1960 was a developing country that was significantlypoorer than Argentina) the range of outcomes iswider. For those countries where policy settings werenot particularly growth-supportive—India, Brazil
Global Paper No 99 12 1st October 2003
30 year average
real GDPgrowthOur Projections Levine-Renelt Model
Brazil 3.7 3.3
Russia 3.9 3.5
India 5.8 5.3
China 5.6 5.8
Comparing Our Projections With the Levine-Renelt Model
4 Levine, Ross & Renelt, David, 1992. “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions,” American Economic Review, Vol. 82(4) p942-63.
Global Paper No 99 13 1st October 2003
A set of core factors—macroeconomic stability,institutional capacity, openness and education—canset the stage for growth. Robert Barro’s influentialwork on the determinants of growth found that growthis enhanced by higher schooling and life expectancy,lower fertility, lower government consumption, bettermaintenance of the rule of law, lower inflation andimprovements in the terms of trade. These corepolicies are linked: institutional capacity is requiredto implement stable macroeconomic policies, macrostability is crucial to trade, and without price stabilitya country rarely has much success in liberalizing andexpanding trade. We briefly view some of the mostrecent findings on these ingredients here:
Macro Stability. An unstable macro environmentcan hamper growth by distorting prices andincentives. Inflation hinders growth by discouragingsaving and investment. Accordingly, a key focus isprice stability, achieved through fiscal deficitreduction, tighter monetary policy and exchange-raterealignment. Within the BRICs, macroeconomicindicators reflecting policy divergence show wideswings: through the 1990s, Brazil averaged aninflation rate of 548% and a government deficit of21.2% of GDP, against China’s average inflation rateof 8% and government deficit of 2.3% of GDP.
Institutions. Institutions affect the ‘efficiency’ of aneconomy much in the same way as technology does:more efficient institutions allow an economy toproduce the same output with fewer inputs: Badinstitutions lower incentives to invest, to work and tosave. ‘Institutions’ in this broad sense include thelegal system, functioning markets, health andeducation systems, financial institutions and thegovernment bureaucracy. Recent research argues thatpoor political and economic policies are onlysymptoms of longer-run institutional factors—a line
of reasoning that could help explain the disappointingresults of developing countries‘ adoption ofmacroeconomic policy reforms in the 1990s.
Openness. Openness to trade and FDI can provideaccess to imported inputs, new technology and largermarkets. Empirical studies of trade and growth fallinto three buckets. First, country studies documentthe economic and political consequences ofimport-substitution policies and export promotingpolicies. Second, much work uses cross-section orpanel data to examine the cross-country relationshipbetween openness and growth. This has producedmixed evidence, but in general it demonstrates apositive relationship between openness and growth.Third, sector, industry and plant-level studiesinvestigate the effects of trade policy on employment,profits, productivity and output at a micro-economiclevel. There appears to be a greater consensus herethan in the cross-country work about theproductivity-enhancing effects of tradeliberalization.
Education. As economies grow rapidly, they mayface shortages of skilled workers, meaning that moreyears of schooling are a prerequisite for the next stageof economic development. Enrolment rates haveincreased dramatically over the past 30 years, onaverage over 5% per year, particularly in highereducation (around 14%). Among the BRICs, Indiareceives low marks for education indicators,particularly at the primary and secondary levels.Many cross-country studies have found positive andstatistically significant correlations betweenschooling and growth rates of per capita GDP—onthe order of 0.3% faster annual growth over a 30-yearperiod from an additional one year of schooling.
The Conditions for Growth
and Argentina—actual growth fell below what wewould have projected. But for the Asian economiesthat had an unusually favourable growth experience,our method would have underpredicted actual growthperformance in some cases quite significantly.
Overall, the results highlight that our method ofprojection seems broadly sensible. For the BRICs tomeet our projections over the next fifty years, they donot need ‘miracle’ performance—though it isimportant that they stay on the right track inmaintaining broadly favourable conditions forgrowth.
Ensuring the Conditions For Growth
This historical exercise highlights a critical point.For our projections to be close to the truth it isimportant that the BRICs remain on a steady growthtrack and keep the conditions in place that will allowthat to happen. That is harder than it sounds and is themain reason why there is a good chance that theprojections might not be realised. Of the BRICs,Brazil has not been growing in line with projectionsand may have the most immediate obstacles to thiskind of growth. It provides a good illustration of theimportance of getting the necessary conditions inplace (see box on p.15).
Research points to a wide range of conditions that arecritical to ensuring solid growth performance andincreasingly recognises that getting the rightinsitutions as well as the right policies is important.5
These are the things that the BRICs must get right (orkeep getting right) if the kinds of paths we describeare to be close to the truth. The main ingredients(more detailed discussion of the evidence is providedin the box) are:
� Sound macroeconomic policies and a stablemacroeconomic background. Low inflation,supportive government policy, sound publicfinances and a well-managed exchange rate canall help to promote growth. Each of the BRICshas been through periods of macroeconomicinstability in the last few decades and some facesignificant macroeconomic challenges still.Brazil for instance has suffered greatly from theprecariousness of the public finances and theforeign borrowing that it brought about.
� Strong and stable political institutions.Political uncertainty and instability discouragesinvestment and damages growth. Each of theBRICs is likely to face considerable (anddifferent) challenges in political developmentover the next few decades. For some (Russiamost obviously), the task of institution-buildinghas been a major issue in recent growthperformance.
� Openness. Openness to trade and foreign directinvestment has generally been an important partof successful development. The openness of theBRICs varies, but India is still relatively closedon many measures.
� High levels of education. Higher levels ofeducation are generally helpful in contributing tomore rapid growth and catch-up. The LR growthestimates above are based on a strong connectionbetween secondary schooling and growthpotential. Of the BRICs, India has the most workto do in expanding education.
Global Paper No 99 14 1st October 2003
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Arg Br Fr Ger HK In It Jp Ko UK US
Actual
Predicted
Projected average annual GDP growth, 1960-2000 (%)
How Our Model Fares in Gauging Growth 1960-2000
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
5 Because of this, the catch-up process is often described as a process of ‘conditional convergence’ where the tendency for less developedeconomies to grow more rapidly is only evident after controlling for these conditions.
Global Paper No 99 15 1st October 2003
Of the BRICs, Brazil is the only one where recentgrowth experience has been significantly lower thanour projected growth rates. This suggests that moreneeds to be done to unlock sustained higher growth inBrazil than is the case elsewhere and that ourconvergence assumptions for Brazil (though alreadylower than in China and Russia) may still prove toooptimistic without deeper structural reforms.
Over the last 50 years, Brazil’s real GDP growth rateamounted to 5.3%, but the chart below shows thatgrowth has been declining sharply since the debtcrisis of the 1980s. Following a growth surge betweenthe late 1960s and the early-1970s on the back ofeconomic liberalization, growth rates fell—in partbecause of a series of external shocks combined withpoor policy response amidst of a political transitionfrom a military regime to a democracy.
Over the last decade, real GDP growth amounted to2.9%, compared to an average of 5.3% since 1950.The excessive reliance on external financing anddomestic public debt during the oil crisis and duringthe Real plan has rendered this adjustment effortparticularly difficult, in part explaining the markeddrop in growth rates.
The adjustment process has also reduced investment,which contributed to a depreciation of the capitalstock, particularly in infrastructure, with importantconsequences for productivity. Even so, temporarysurges in external financing or statistical reboundsmay push growth higher temporarily, but for Brazil tobreak the historical downward trend in GDP growthand attain the kind of path set out in our projectionshere will take more.
The Lula Administration is making some progress.Macro stabilization is a key precondition ofsuccessful reform and is now clearly underway. Theresult of that stabilization is likely to be animprovement in growth over the next year or two thatis reflected in our current forecasts of about 3.5% ayear. On its own, though, stabilization will beinsufficient to raise and sustain Brazil’s growth rate tothe kinds of levels that are set out in the projections in
this paper. If that goal is to be achieved, substantialstructural reforms will also be needed.
Comparing Brazil with China and the other Asianeconomies gives a sense of the relatively largerobstacles that Brazil currently faces.
� Brazil is much less open to trade. The tradablegoods sector in China is almost eight times largerthan in Brazil, when measured by imports plusexports.
� Investment and savings are lower. Savings andinvestment ratios are around 18-19% of GDPcompared to an investment rate of 36% of GDP inChina and an Asian average of around 30%.
� Public and foreign debt are much higher.Without a deeper fiscal adjustment and lowerdebt to GDP ratio (currently at 57.7% of GDP ona net basis and 78.2% of GDP on a gross basis),the private sector is almost completely crowdedout from credit markets. China’s net foreign debtand public debt are both significantly smaller.
Unless significant progress is made in removing orreducing these obstacles, the projections set out here(which still show much lower growth than Brazil’spost-war average) are unlikely to be achievable andthe slide in trend growth could continue.
Brazil: Challenges in Setting the Conditions For Sustained Growth
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998
Real GDP
growth
Real GDPGrowth Trend
GSBRICs Model Projections. See text for details andassumptions.
Brazil'sTrendGDPGrowthRate Is
Declining
Real GDPGrowth
Growth (%yoy)
How Different Assumptions Would ChangeThings
In our models, the effect of these conditions forgrowth can be thought of as operating through ourassumptions about the investment rate and the rate ofcatch-up in TFP with the developed economies. If theBRICs economies fail to deliver the kinds ofconditions that are broadly necessary for sustainedgrowth, our assumptions about investment andconvergence will prove too optimistic. For Brazil andIndia, in particular, if they succeed more quickly thanwe expect, investment rates might actually be higherthan our projections and convergence more rapid.
To illustrate in a simple way the point that theassumptions that we have made—and the underlyingconditions that determine them—are important, weshow briefly what happens if we change them:
� Catch-up. Because the convergence ratecaptures a broad range of factors that determinethe ability to ‘catch up’, altering it can make asignificant difference to projections. Forexample, if we lower China’s ‘convergence rate’by a third, our projections of average GDPgrowth rate over the 50-year period fall to 4.3%from 4.8% and our projected 2050 US$GDPlevel drops by 39%. In our baseline model, ratesof convergence are generally slower for India andBrazil than for China and Russia. If we raised ourconvergence rates in India and Brazil to those ofChina and Russia, India’s 2000-2030 averageGDP growth rate would rise to 7.4%, against5.8% originally. Brazil’s GDP growth rate wouldrise as well: to 4.3% from 3.7%.
� Investment. The assumed investment rates areless important, but substantial differences fromour assumptions would certainly alter the mainconclusions. Lowering our assumptions ofChina’s investment rate by 5 percentage pointsslightly lowers China’s average 2000-2030 GDPgrowth rate to 5.5% from 5.7%. Cutting 5percentage points off of investment rates acrossthe BRICS would reduce their GDP levels onaverage by around 13% by 2050.
� Demographics. The demographic assumptionsmay also turn out to be incorrect. For instance,
Russia’s demographics might not turn out to beas negative as the US census projections, anddeclining fertility and rising mortality may turnout to have been a temporary feature of thetransition from communism. Shiftingdemographic trends might also be partly offsetby attempts to raise participation or to extendworking ages, neither of which we currentlycapture.
Sensitivity to these kinds of assumptions clearlymeans that there is significant uncertainty around ourprojections. The advantage of the framework that wehave developed is that we now have the tools to look atthese and other questions in much more detail. We alsohave a clear baseline against which to measure them.
Implications of the BRICs’ Ascendancy
Each of the BRICs faces very significant challengesin keeping development on track. This means thatthere is a good chance that our projections are notmet, either through bad policy or bad luck.
Despite the challenges, we think the prospect is worthtaking seriously. After all, three of thesemarkets—China, India and Russia—have alreadybeen at the top of the growth charts in recent years.They may stay there.
If the BRICs do come anywhere close to meeting theprojections set out here, the implications for thepattern of growth and economic activity could bevery large indeed. Parts of this story—theopportunities in China, for instance—are wellunderstood. But we suspect that many otherparts—the potential for India and the other marketsand the interplay of aging in the developedeconomies with growth in the developing ones—maynot be.
We will be using the tools developed here to look indetail at different kinds of scenarios and to flesh outthe links between our growth projections andinvestment opportunities, but we set out some briefconclusions here:
� The relative importance of the BRICs as anengine of new demand growth and spendingpower may shift more dramatically and quickly
Global Paper No 99 16 1st October 2003
than expected under the right conditions. Highergrowth in these economies could offset theimpact of greying populations and slower growthin today’s advanced economies.
� Higher growth may lead to higher returns andincreased demand for capital in thesemarkets—and for the means to finance it. Theweight of the BRICs in investment portfolioscould rise sharply. The pattern of capital flowsmight move further in their favour and majorcurrency realignments would take place.
� Rising incomes may also see these economiesmove through the ‘sweet spot’ of growth fordifferent kinds of products, as local spendingpatterns change. This could be an importantdeterminant of demand and pricing patterns for arange of commodities.
� As the advanced economies become a shrinkingpart of the world economy, the accompanyingshifts in spending could provide significantopportunities for many of today’s globalcompanies. Being invested in and involved in theright markets—and particularly the rightemerging markets—may become anincreasingly important strategic choice for manyfirms.
� The list of the world’s ten largest economies maylook quite different in fifty years time. Thelargest economies in the world (by GDP) may
also no longer be the richest (by income percapita) making strategic choices for firms morecomplex.
� Regional neighbours could benefit from thegrowth opportunities from the BRICs. With threeout of the four largest economies in 2050potentially residing in Asia, we could seeimportant geopolitical shifts towards the Asianregion. China’s growth is already having asignificant impact on the opportunities for therest of Asia. Sustained strong growth in the otherBRICs economies might have similar impacts ontheir major trading partners.
Are you ready?
Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman
Global Paper No 99 17 1st October 2003
GDPSize andRelative Income Per Capita
LevelsWill Diverge Over Time
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
Ch US In Jp Br Russ UK Ger Fr It
2003US$bn
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
US$GDP US$GDPper capita
2003US$
GSBRICs Model Projections. See text for details andassumptions.
Growth Model
We provide detail on the underlying assumptions ofour models. The model relies on a simple formulationof the overall level of GDP (Y) in terms of a) labour(L) b) the capital stock (K) and c) the level of“technical progress” (A) or Total Factor Productivity(TFP).
We assume that GDP is a simple (Cobb-Douglas)function of these three ingredients:
where a is the share of income that accrues tocapital.
We then need to describe the process by which each ofthe different components (labour, the capital stockand TFP) change over time.
� For, L, we simply use the projections of theworking age population (15-60) from the USCensus Bureau.
� For K, we take the initial capital stock, assume aninvestment rate (investment as a % of GDP) and adepreciation rate to calculate the growth in thecapital stock:
� For A, the description of technical progress, weassume that technology changes as part of aprocess of catch-up with the most developedcountries. The speed of convergence is assumedto depend on income per capita, with theassumption that as the developing economies getcloser to the income levels of the more developedeconomies, their TFP growth rate slows.Developing countries can have faster growth inthis area because there is room to ‘catch up’ withdeveloped countries:
where� is a measure of how fast convergence takesplace and 1.3% is our assumed long-term TFP growth
rate for the US.
The assumptions needed to generate the forecasts aresummarised below:
� Labour force and population, from the USCensus Bureau projections
� Depreciation rate (�) assumed to be 4% as in theWorld Bank capital stock estimates
� Investment rate assumptions based on recenthistory, for Brazil (19%), for India (22%) forRussia (25%) for China (36% until 2010,declining to 30% thereafter).
� Income share of capital assumed to be 1/3, astandard assumption (�) from historicalevidence
� US long-run TFP growth assumed to be 1.33%,implying steady-state labour productivitygrowth of 2% - our long-run estimate.
� Convergence speed for TFP (�) assumed to be1.5%, within the range of estimates fromacademic research.
Exchange Rate Model
Our model of real exchange rates is then calculatedfrom the predictions of labour productivity growth.Specifically, we assume that a 1% productivitydifferential in favour of economy A relative to the USwill raise its equilibrium real exchange rate againstthe US dollar by 1%, where our long-run assumptionfor US productivity growth is again 2%.
This assumption that the relationship is one-for-oneunderpins our GSDEER models and the coefficienton relative productivity terms in our GSDEEMERmodels is generally also clustered around 1. We makethe simplifying assumption that over the long term,only productivity differentials play a large role indetermining real exchange rates.
Global Paper No 99 18 1st October 2003
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Global Paper No 99 19 1st October 2003
Brazil China India Russia France Germany Italy Japan UK US BRICs G6
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
2003 US$BRICs G6
Projected US$GDP Per Capita
Global Paper No 99 21 1st October 2003
Brazil China India Russia France Germany Italy Japan UK US
2000 4.2 8.0 5.4 10.0 4.2 2.9 3.3 2.8 3.1 3.8
2001 1.5 7.3 4.2 5.0 2.1 0.6 1.7 0.4 2.1 0.3
2002 1.5 8.2 4.7 4.3 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.9 2.4
2003 1.1 8.1 5.6 6.1 0.5 0.0 0.6 2.7 1.8 2.7
2004 3.5 8.4 5.9 4.4 2.9 1.9 2.4 1.7 2.9 3.5
2005 4.2 7.9 6.2 5.8 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.4 2.4 3.1
2006 4.1 7.6 6.2 5.3 2.1 2.4 1.7 1.6 2.4 2.9
2007 4.1 7.3 6.1 4.8 1.8 2.1 1.6 0.8 2.0 2.6
2008 4.1 7.1 6.1 4.5 1.6 1.9 1.5 0.4 2.0 2.5
2009 4.2 6.9 6.1 4.3 1.6 1.7 1.5 0.4 2.2 2.5
2010 4.2 6.6 6.1 4.1 1.6 1.5 1.6 0.6 2.2 2.4
2011 4.1 6.4 6.0 4.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 0.8 2.2 2.3
2012 4.1 6.0 6.0 3.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.0 2.2 2.2
2013 4.0 5.8 5.9 3.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.1 2.2 2.2
2014 4.0 5.5 5.9 3.6 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.3 2.1 2.1
2015 3.9 5.2 5.8 3.5 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.3 2.1 2.1
2016 3.9 5.1 5.8 3.4 1.8 1.3 1.5 1.4 2.0 2.2
2017 3.8 4.9 5.7 3.4 1.8 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.1
2018 3.8 4.8 5.7 3.3 1.8 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.1
2019 3.7 5.1 5.6 3.3 1.8 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.7 2.1
2020 3.7 5.0 5.5 3.3 1.7 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.1
2021 3.7 5.2 5.6 3.3 1.7 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.6 2.1
2022 3.7 4.9 5.7 3.3 1.7 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.5 2.2
2023 3.7 4.1 5.7 3.4 1.7 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.4 2.2
2024 3.8 4.2 5.8 3.5 1.6 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.4 2.3
2025 3.8 4.2 5.8 3.6 1.6 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.4 2.4
2026 3.8 4.1 5.9 3.6 1.6 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.4 2.5
2027 3.8 4.3 5.9 3.6 1.6 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.6
2028 3.8 4.1 6.0 3.6 1.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.5 2.6
2029 3.8 3.9 6.0 3.5 1.6 0.8 0.5 0.7 1.6 2.6
2030 3.9 3.9 6.1 3.4 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.6 1.6 2.5
2031 3.9 3.8 6.1 3.3 1.5 1.1 0.5 0.4 1.6 2.6
2032 3.9 3.9 6.1 3.1 1.4 1.3 0.4 0.3 1.8 2.7
2033 3.9 3.8 6.2 3.0 1.5 1.6 0.4 0.2 1.9 2.8
2034 3.9 3.8 6.2 2.9 1.6 1.7 0.4 0.1 1.9 2.8
2035 3.9 3.9 6.2 2.8 1.7 1.7 0.5 0.2 2.0 2.8
2036 3.9 3.9 6.1 2.7 1.8 1.7 0.6 0.3 2.0 2.8
2037 3.8 3.9 6.1 2.6 1.8 1.7 0.8 0.5 2.1 2.8
2038 3.8 3.9 6.0 2.5 1.8 1.6 0.9 0.5 2.1 2.7
2039 3.7 3.8 5.9 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.0 0.6 1.9 2.7
2040 3.6 3.7 5.8 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.8 2.6
2041 3.6 3.8 5.8 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.8 2.6
2042 3.5 3.4 5.7 2.2 1.6 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.8 2.6
2043 3.5 3.5 5.6 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.4 0.8 1.8 2.6
2044 3.6 3.5 5.5 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.4 0.8 1.8 2.6
2045 3.5 3.3 5.4 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.5 0.9 1.7 2.6
2046 3.4 3.1 5.4 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.7 2.6
2047 3.4 2.8 5.3 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.6 2.6
2048 3.3 2.9 5.2 1.9 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.6 2.6
2049 3.3 2.8 5.1 2.0 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.6 2.6
2050 3.4 2.7 5.1 2.1 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.5 2.5
*indicative projections made only on the model assumptions described in the text. Not GS official forecasts.
GS BRICs Model Projections. See text for details and assumptions.
BRICs G6*
Projected Real GDP Growth
%yoy
We have used the US census’ population estimates,which are based on the cohort component populationprojection method, which follows each cohort ofpeople of the same age throughout its lifetimeaccording to mortality, fertility and migration.
First, fertility rates are projected and applied to thefemale population in childbearing ages to estimatethe number of births every year (see chart). Second,each cohort of children born is also followed throughtime by exposing it to projected mortality rates.Finally, the component method takes into accountany in-migrants who are incorporated into thepopulation and out-migrants who leave thepopulation. Migrants are added to or subtracted fromthe population at each specific age.
In setting levels for mortality and fertility, availabledata on past trends provide guidance. For mortality,information concerning programs of public healthare taken into account. For fertility, factors such astrends in age at marriage; the proportion of womenusing contraception; the strength of family planningprograms; and any foreseen changes in women’seducational attainment or in their labor forceparticipation are factored into the analysis.Assumptions about future migration are morespeculative than assumptions about fertility andmortality. The future path of international migrationis set on the basis of past international migrationestimates as well as the policy stance of countriesregarding future international migration flows.
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