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Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty ER 11, Gov E-1040 Spring 2012
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Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Jan 03, 2016

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Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty. ER 11 , Gov E-1040 Spring 2012. Pragmatism: anti-foundationalist, practice-oriented movement in (American) philosophy. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Page 1: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

ER 11, Gov E-1040Spring 2012

Page 2: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Pragmatism:

anti-foundationalist, practice-oriented movement in (American) philosophy

Page 3: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

[T]he tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one

of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect

clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical

kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must

prepare. (William James, Pragmatism)

Page 4: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Pay a visit…?

Page 5: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Rorty on Human rights

• Pragmatism applied to search for foundations for human rights

• “disagreement about foundations makes no practical difference anyway, so might as well not have it”

Page 6: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Rorty on Human rights

• Pragmatism applied to search for foundations for human rights

• “disagreement about foundations makes no practical difference anyway, so might as well not have it”

Page 7: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Against foundations in ethics “We pragmatists argue from the fact that the

emergence of the human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories, to the conclusion that there is probably no knowledge of the sort Plato envisaged.

We go on to argue: Since no useful work seems to be done by insisting on a purportedly ahistorical human nature, there probably is no such nature, or at least nothing in that nature that is relevant to our moral choices.” (p 118)

Page 8: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

So argument is:

(1) Foundational inquiries do not explain emergence of human rights culture.

(2) If X is not needed to explain emergence of Y, but we care about maintaining Y, we need not inquire about X.

(3) Therefore, we need not make foundational inquiries about human rights.

Page 9: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

To blame: Plato

Page 10: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty
Page 11: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty
Page 12: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Ethics: all wrong-headed, following Plato?

• Moral philosophy focused on “rather rare figure of psychopath” – who (a) grew up without moral sentiments, and (b) can be rationally persuaded to adopt them

• much more common: person whose treatment of narrow range of people is impeccable, but who remains indifferent to others

Page 13: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

(…) [T]he rational egoist is not the problem. The problem is the gallant and honorable Serb who sees Muslims as circumcised dogs. It is the brave soldier who loves and is loved by his mates, but who thinks of women as dangerous, malevolent whores and bitches.” (p 124)

Page 14: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Leave “foundationalism” behind!

• concentrate energies on “sentimental education”

• acquaint people with one another so that they are less tempted to think of others as only quasi-human

Page 15: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Expand reference of terms such as “our kind of people”

and “people like us”

Page 16: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Wrong audience?

Page 17: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Wrong audience?

Page 18: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Instead --

Page 19: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Instead, indeed --

Page 20: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Progress of sentiments

• would think of immoral people not as irrational but deprived

• “thinking of the spread of the human rights culture not as a matter of becoming more aware of the requirements of the moral law, but rather as what [the philosopher Annette] Baier calls ‘a progress of sentiments.’”

Page 21: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Why should I be moral? New responses

“Because this is what it is like to be in her situation – to be far from home, among strangers”

“Because she might become your daughter-in-law”

“Because her mother would grieve for her”

People will be more readily inclined to adopt this attitude if they live securely enough to develop sympathies with others

Page 22: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Fourth strategy for grounding human rights

• Natural rights/Kant/Griffin

• Rorty: not focusing on rational argument, but putting people in position to show sympathies

• raise them in such a way that they understand moral life as richer than morally deprived life

Page 23: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

What we can grant to Rorty

• Given resistance we offered to Kant/Gewirth approach, we can grant that a certain approach to morality is asking too much

• Griffin approach does not tie rationality and morality in the way Rorty criticizes

• centrality of education for “progress of sentiments” is undeniable

Page 24: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

The hardest task

Page 25: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Objecting to Rorty: power of ideas

• Rorty underestimates power of ideas

• Opposing standpoint: “Thought achieves more in the world than practice; for once the realm of imagination has been revolutionized, reality cannot resist” (Hegel)

• Remember emancipation movements

Page 26: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Objecting to Rorty: power of ideas

• Rorty underestimates power of ideas

• Opposing standpoint: “Thought achieves more in the world than practice; for once the realm of imagination has been revolutionized, reality cannot resist” (Hegel)

• Remember emancipation movements

Page 27: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Why inquire about foundations?

• questioning dominance of human rights discourse in evaluation of moral success

• understanding one’s own approach to an assessment of other cultures

Page 28: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

We use human rights language to justify interventions – they better have good

foundations!

Page 29: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Education is essential, but intellectual engagement is required as well for success

Page 30: Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

Recall the argument:(1) Foundational inquiries do not explain emergence

of human rights culture.

(2) If X is not needed to explain emergence of Y, but we care about maintaining Y, we need not inquire about X.

(3) Therefore, we need not make foundational inquiries about human rights.

[First premise is doubtful, second premise is false.]