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Do financial incentives motivate conservation on private land? M Y ASUÉ and J AMES B. K IRKPATRICK Abstract Financial incentives may aid in conservation if they broaden the numbers and types of landowners who engage in protection and conservation management on private land. We examined the hypotheses that financial incentives () encourage participation of people with lower autonomous motivation towards conservation and lower self-transcendence (i.e. benevolence and universalism) values compared to participants in similar programmes without such incentives; () enable more on-ground works and activities; and () enhance feelings of competence and autonomy with respect to conservation actions. We sur- veyed landowners in private land conservation pro- grammes in Tasmania, only some of whom had received financial incentives. All of these landowners had high self-transcendence values, and autonomous motivation to- wards the environment. Owners of large properties and participants with higher self-enhancement values, lower self-transcendence values and lower autonomous moti- vation towards the environment were slightly more likely to engage in incentive programmes. However, people who received funding did not report more conservation actions than people in programmes without incentives. Owners of larger properties receiving incentives reported fewer conser- vation actions. Thus financial incentives probably recruited a few into nature conservation who may not have otherwise engaged, but did not result in a more intensive level of con- servation management. Our results caution against the blanket-use of incentives amongst landowners who may al- ready have values and motivations consistent with environ- mental action, and point to the need for further research on the socio-psychological characteristics of landowners, to examine the contextual factors that influence the effects of conservation payments. Keywords Agri-environment, conservation psychology, covenant, financial incentive, payments for ecosystem services, portrait values questionnaire, Tasmania Supplementary material for this article is available at https://doi.org/./S. Introduction S ince the s there has been growth in private land- owner conservation schemes that aim to improve bio- diversity and promote sustainable management on private land (Kleijn & Sutherland, ; Thompson et al., ; Wunder, ). The ecological impacts (Fitzsimons & Wescott, ; Kleijn & Sutherland, ; Hardy et al., ), economic efficiency (Dobbs & Pretty, ; Iftekhar et al., ), community perceptions and motivations for participation (Moon & Cocklin, ; Selinske et al., ) have been addressed. However, questions remain about how and in what context financial incentives, which are pro- vided within some of these programmes, enhance conserva- tion outcomes (Borner et al., ). The rationale for financial incentives is to increase moti- vation (Wilson & Hart, ; Blackmore & Doole, ) and enhance participation rates among people who are not already autonomously motivated to engage in conservation (Sorice et al., ; Shaw & Miller, ) or who cannot cover the direct or opportunity costs of conservation (Ernst & Wallace, ). However, because participants often self-select into incentive programmes (Ferraro & Pattanayak, ), some participants who receive incentives may already engage in conservation management practices (Borner et al., ), reducing cost- effectiveness (Ferraro & Kiss, ; Borner et al., ). Although randomized-control trials are the ideal method to assess the impacts of payments (Agrawal et al., ; Chervier et al., ), such experiments may not be ethically or logistically feasible (Butsic et al., ). One approach to understanding the effectiveness of incentives is to use a quasi-experimental approach (Ferraro & Pattanayak, ; Butsic et al., ) to examine the socio-psychological char- acteristics and management practices of people in incentive schemes and compare them to demographically similar conservationists who have not received financial support. Because values and motivations influence the tendency to undertake voluntary pro-environmental behaviours (de Groot & Steg, ; Agrawal et al., ; Cooke et al., ), we hypothesized that, if incentives are effective in broadening the pool of participants, then people in paid programmes may have values and motivations that are less consistent with conservation than people enrolled in non-incentive programmes. MYASUÉ* (Corresponding author) Quest University Canada, Social Science, Squamish 604 898 8034, Canada. E-mail [email protected] JAMES B. KIRKPATRICK University of Tasmania, Geography and Spatial Sciences, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia *Also at: University of Tasmania, Geography and Spatial Sciences, Tasmania, Australia Received November . Revision requested January . Accepted January . First published online December . Oryx, 2020, 54(4), 499510 © 2018 Fauna & Flora International doi:10.1017/S0030605318000194 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0030605318000194 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 65.21.228.167, on 20 Feb 2022 at 09:13:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
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Do financial incentives motivate conservation on private land?

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Page 1: Do financial incentives motivate conservation on private land?

Do financial incentives motivate conservation onprivate land?

MA Ï Y A S U É and J A M E S B . K I R K P A T R I C K

Abstract Financial incentives may aid in conservation ifthey broaden the numbers and types of landowners whoengage in protection and conservation management onprivate land. We examined the hypotheses that financialincentives () encourage participation of people with lowerautonomous motivation towards conservation and lowerself-transcendence (i.e. benevolence and universalism)values compared to participants in similar programmeswithout such incentives; () enable more on-ground worksand activities; and () enhance feelings of competence andautonomy with respect to conservation actions. We sur-veyed landowners in private land conservation pro-grammes in Tasmania, only some of whom had receivedfinancial incentives. All of these landowners had highself-transcendence values, and autonomous motivation to-wards the environment. Owners of large properties andparticipants with higher self-enhancement values, lowerself-transcendence values and lower autonomous moti-vation towards the environment were slightly more likelyto engage in incentive programmes. However, people whoreceived funding did not report more conservation actionsthan people in programmes without incentives. Owners oflarger properties receiving incentives reported fewer conser-vation actions. Thus financial incentives probably recruiteda few into nature conservation who may not have otherwiseengaged, but did not result in a more intensive level of con-servation management. Our results caution against theblanket-use of incentives amongst landowners who may al-ready have values and motivations consistent with environ-mental action, and point to the need for further research onthe socio-psychological characteristics of landowners, toexamine the contextual factors that influence the effects ofconservation payments.

Keywords Agri-environment, conservation psychology,covenant, financial incentive, payments for ecosystemservices, portrait values questionnaire, Tasmania

Supplementary material for this article is available athttps://doi.org/./S.

Introduction

Since the s there has been growth in private land-owner conservation schemes that aim to improve bio-

diversity and promote sustainable management on privateland (Kleijn & Sutherland, ; Thompson et al., ;Wunder, ). The ecological impacts (Fitzsimons &Wescott, ; Kleijn & Sutherland, ; Hardy et al.,), economic efficiency (Dobbs & Pretty, ; Iftekharet al., ), community perceptions and motivations forparticipation (Moon & Cocklin, ; Selinske et al., )have been addressed. However, questions remain abouthow and in what context financial incentives, which are pro-vided within some of these programmes, enhance conserva-tion outcomes (Borner et al., ).

The rationale for financial incentives is to increase moti-vation (Wilson & Hart, ; Blackmore & Doole, ) andenhance participation rates among people who are not alreadyautonomously motivated to engage in conservation (Soriceet al., ; Shaw&Miller, ) orwho cannot cover the director opportunity costs of conservation (Ernst &Wallace, ).However, because participants often self-select into incentiveprogrammes (Ferraro & Pattanayak, ), some participantswho receive incentives may already engage in conservationmanagement practices (Borner et al., ), reducing cost-effectiveness (Ferraro & Kiss, ; Borner et al., ).

Although randomized-control trials are the ideal methodto assess the impacts of payments (Agrawal et al., ;Chervier et al., ), such experiments may not be ethicallyor logistically feasible (Butsic et al., ). One approach tounderstanding the effectiveness of incentives is to use aquasi-experimental approach (Ferraro & Pattanayak, ;Butsic et al., ) to examine the socio-psychological char-acteristics and management practices of people in incentiveschemes and compare them to demographically similarconservationists who have not received financial support.Because values and motivations influence the tendency toundertake voluntary pro-environmental behaviours (deGroot & Steg, ; Agrawal et al., ; Cooke et al.,), we hypothesized that, if incentives are effective inbroadening the pool of participants, then people in paidprogrammes may have values and motivations that areless consistent with conservation than people enrolled innon-incentive programmes.

MAÏ YASUÉ* (Corresponding author) Quest University Canada, Social Science,Squamish 604 898 8034, Canada. E-mail [email protected]

JAMES B. KIRKPATRICK University of Tasmania, Geography and Spatial Sciences,Hobart, Tasmania, Australia

*Also at: University of Tasmania, Geography and Spatial Sciences, Tasmania,Australia

Received November . Revision requested January .Accepted January . First published online December .

Oryx, 2020, 54(4), 499–510 © 2018 Fauna & Flora International doi:10.1017/S0030605318000194

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Much of the research on values, motivations andpro-environmental behaviours (Pelletier et al., ;Schultz & Zelezny, ; de Groot & Steg, ; Sheldonet al., ; Evans et al., ; Cooke et al., ) draws ontwo major theories from cross-cultural and social psychol-ogy: the Theory of Basic Human Values (Schwartz, ;Schwartz et al., , ) and Self-Determination Theory(Ryan & Deci, , ). Questionnaires developed inthese theoretical contexts have been empirically tested,validated, translated, and adapted to address applied prob-lems in health, education, work environments and parenting(Williams et al., ; Deci et al., a, b; Kasser, ).More recently, they have been applied to conservation(Hicks et al., ; Cetas & Yasué, ; Ramsdell et al.,). Research using validated instruments is importantbecause it can help generate data on the socio-psychologicalcharacteristics of conservationists that can be used in lateranalyses. At present, much of the research on values, moti-vations and pro-environmental behaviour using validatedinstruments has been conducted predominately with psy-chology undergraduate students (Pelletier et al., ; Schultz& Zelezny, ; de Groot & Steg, ; Sheldon et al., )rather than conservationists.

Values are trans-situational guiding principles that helppeople make behavioural decisions (Manfredo et al., ).The Theory of Basic Human Values (Schwartz, ;Schwartz et al., ) suggests that there are human valuesthat construct four higher-order values (self-enhancement,

self-transcendence, openness to change, and conservation;Table ) that exist in at least countries and languages.To avoid confusion, ‘conservation’ is referred to as ‘conser-vativism’ here. The four higher-order values are structuredso that values more similar to each other are closer togetheron a circumplex. Self-enhancement and self-transcendanceare on opposite sides of the circumplex, as are openness tochange and conservativism (Schwartz, ). People withmore self-enhancement values may be less likely to engagein pro-environmental behaviour than people with moreself-transcendence values (de Groot & Steg, ; Sheldonet al., ; Corner et al., ).

Self-Determination Theory differentiates between au-tonomous and controlled motivation (Ryan & Deci, ,). Autonomous motivation includes intrinsic moti-vation (e.g. ‘I plant trees because it is enjoyable to planttrees’) as well as forms of extrinsic motivation that are con-sistent with personal beliefs and values (e.g. ‘I plant treesbecause I am an environmentalist’). Non-autonomous mo-tivation consists of extrinsic forms of motivation that arenot fully personally endorsed, such as guilt, shame, rewardattainment or punishment avoidance (e.g. ‘I plant trees onlyso that I get paid’). Autonomous forms of motivation arecorrelated with creativity (Ryan & Deci, ), increasedengagement (Taylor et al., ), persistence in carryingout a difficult task (Dweck, ), willingness to evince dif-ficult pro-environmental behaviours (Cooke et al., ),conservation programme satisfaction (Sorice et al., ;

TABLE 1 Items used to measure values. The instructions indicated ‘Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description andthink about howmuch each person is or is not like you.’ People responded either , ‘Not like me at all’; , ‘Not like me’; , ‘A little like me’; ,‘Somewhat like me’; , ‘Like me’, or , ‘Very much like me’, to each of the items.

Broader constructs Values Item

Self-transcendence Universalism-tolerance It is important to her to listen to people who are different from her.Universalism-nature She strongly believes that she should care for nature.Universalism-concern She thinks it is important that every person in the world have equal

opportunities in life.Benevolence-dependability It is important to her to be loyal to those who are close to her.Benevolence-caring Caring for the well-being of people she is close to is important to her.

Openness to change Self-direction-thought Learning things for herself & improving her abilities is important to her.Self-direction-action Freedom to choose what she does is important to her.Stimulation Excitement in life is important to her.Hedonism* Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to her.

Self-enhancement Achievement She wants people to admire her achievements.Power-dominance She wants people to do what she says.Power-resources Being wealthy is important to her.Face* It is important to her that no one should ever shame her.

Conservativism Security-personal Her personal security is extremely important to her.Security-societal Having order & stability in society is important to her.Tradition It is important to her to maintain traditional values or beliefs.Conformity-rules Obeying all laws is important to her.Conformity-interpersonal Her personal security is extremely important to her.Humility* It is important to her to be humble.

*Although we have placed these items into one of the four broader constructs, the multi-dimensional-scaling plots place them in between two broaderconstructs. These items were taken from Schwartz et al. ().

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Price & Leviston, ; Ramsdell et al., ) and better so-cial and ecological outcomes for conservation projects(Cetas & Yasué, ). Past research on the social contextsthat can foster autonomous motivation (Black &Deci, ;Baard et al., ; DeCaro & Stokes, ) suggests thatprogrammes help fulfil the basic psychological needs ofautonomy, competence and relatedness (Chen et al., )by providing meaningful choices, conveying trust in theparticipants, fostering relationships between participantsand programme implementers, and providing meaningfulfeedback (Cetas & Yasué, ; Ramsdell et al., ).

Research on the effects of payments and other externalrewards on autonomous motivation has demonstrated vari-able impacts. Incentives have been shown to both crowd-in(i.e. enhance) motivation by helping to foster relationships oftrust and mutual respect (Sommerville et al., ; Borneret al., ) and enhance a participant’s feelings of compe-tence or self-efficacy to carry out personally meaningfultasks (D’Adda, ; Rode et al., ). However, other studieshave shown that external rewards can also crowd-out (i.e.thwart) autonomous motivation by thwarting feelings ofautonomy (Deci et al., a; Frey & Jegen, ; Burton &Paragahawewa, ), communicating a lack of trust betweenfunders and participants (Gneezy& Rustichini, ; Reeson& Tisdell, ) or shifting attitudes away frommore endur-ing self-transcendence motivations to short-term individ-ual profit motivations (Hecken & Bastiaensen, ;Fisher, ; Agrawal et al., ).

Few studies (Agrawal et al., ; Chervier et al., )have compared values, motivations or behaviours betweenpeople in programmes with and without financial in-centives, to examine the impacts of financial incentives onconservation, and, as far as we know, no studies have usedthe previously validated instruments from the Theory ofBasic Universal Values and Self-Determination Theory toexamine the effectiveness of incentives in private landconservation. Here we examine the effectiveness of financialincentives for private land conservation by addressing threequestions. () Do financial incentives help to broaden thetypes of landowners willing to engage in private landconservation by engaging people who have lower self-transcendence values and autonomous motivation towardsthe environment? () Do people in incentivized pro-grammes report more engagement in greater conservationmanagement? () Do people in incentivized programmesreport higher feelings of autonomy and competence?

Methods

Contexts of private land conservation programmes inTasmania

With over % of land protected in conservation reserves, conservation covenants, , registered participants of

strictly educational conservation schemes, and the first everGreen Party politicians (in the world, in ), the people ofthe island State of Tasmania (Australia) are known for theirenvironmentalism (Schultz & Cica, ). During –there were several private-land conservation programmesthat provided incentives to persuade landowners to coven-ant land or undertake stewardship activities, concurrentlywith several non-incentive educational programmes(Prager & Vanclay, ; Iftekhar et al., ).

The majority of our survey and interview participantswere engaged in one of three broad types of conservationprogrammes (Supplementary Material ): () covenant pro-grammes that provided either no incentives or substantialincentives (Iftekhar et al., ), () stewardship pro-grammes that provided small, targeted financial supportfor a particular management task (e.g. half the costs ofplanting trees), () educational programmes that providedonly educational resources. We define non-incentiveprogrammes as the two educational programmes and thenon-incentive covenanting programme.

Data collection

Prior to conducting this research, MY met with conserva-tion organizations, government agencies, farming organiza-tions, agricultural consultants and University of Tasmaniaacademics who work in private land conservation inTasmania. We sought support from these organizations tohelp recruit participants through newsletters andFacebook groups, identify a range of types of landownersto participate in interviews, and enhance the clarity ofsurveys and interviews. During January– June

the survey (Supplementary Material ) was promoted bythese organizations.

Demographic and property characteristics The first sectionof the survey requested information on the property(e.g. size, duration of ownership), demographics (e.g. age,gender, education) and participation in conservationprogrammes, to assess whether there were significantdifferences in these characteristics between participants ofincentive or non-incentive programmes. Factors such asage, education, property size and gender may influenceland management decisions and the willingness to engagein incentive programmes (Knowler & Bradshaw, ;Lastro-Braxo et al., ).

Programme experience The second section (SupplementaryMaterial ) consisted of items to measure perceptionsof autonomy-support, autonomy and competence whenengaging in a programme. Participants indicated howautonomy-supportive they perceived the conservation

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programmes to be, on a -point Likert scale. These itemswere adapted from previously validated instrumentsthat measured perceptions of autonomy-support fromeducators, supervisors and coaches. These items similarlyhad high reliabilities or internal consistencies (Cronbach’sα = .; Black & Deci, ; Pelletier et al., ; Baardet al., ). These measures examine the nature ofthe relationship between the programme participant andthe programme administrator because in addition tothe payments, programmes may also differ in terms ofautonomy-supportive practices. The sections following theitems for autonomy-supportive environments were itemsthat assessed feelings of autonomy (Cronbach’s α = .)and competence (α = .) when engaging in theprogramme activities. These two subscales were takenfrom the basic psychological needs at work questionnaires(Deci et al., b). The items measuring autonomy andcompetence were used to assess whether participants inincentive programmes had higher levels of autonomy andcompetence than non-participants. In addition to theseitems from previously validated instruments, based onfeedback from landowners we added ‘I do not need theprogramme to achieve my conservation and stewardshipgoals’. These questions were used to assess whetherparticipants in incentive programmes had higher levels ofautonomy and competence than non-participants.

Portrait values questionnaire This section included

gender-matched items that provided verbal portraits ofvalues (e.g. ‘Being wealthy is important to her.’) tomeasure the broader value aspirations of participants(Table ; Schwartz et al., ). The reliability and validityof this instrument has been demonstrated elsewhere(Schwartz et al., , ; McQuilkin et al., ). Ourpreliminary analyses using correlation analyses andmulti-dimensional scaling analyses (with Proxscal in SPSSv. , IBM Corp, Armonk, USA) with Euclidian distancemeasures, were consistent with theorized structures anddemonstrated broader dimensions of self-transcendenceand self-enhancement on one dimension and opennessto change and conservativism on the other dimension(Supplementary Material ).

Motivation towards the environment scale These six items(Pelletier et al., ; Supplementary Material & )measured autonomous or non-autonomous forms ofmotivation (Green-Demers et al., ). The reliability andvalidity has been demonstrated elsewhere (Green-Demerset al., ; Pelletier et al., ). For the sake of brevity wetook one item per subscale.

Impacts on conservation action We asked respondentsabout their conservation management activities in the

previous years. Based on preliminary conversations withresearchers, conservation organizations and landowners,we included eight common conservation activities thatwere advocated by these conservation programmes (e.g.‘Fenced off area to restore native or threatened species’,‘Planted native species to restore habitat for native andthreatened species’). In addition, we asked ‘To what extentdo the programmes that you engage in influence how youmanage your land?’ (-point Likert scale) as well as ‘Onaverage in the last year, how many hours a month did youspend doing activities consistent with the programme?’

Data analysis

We centred the scores for the portrait values questionnaireand the motivations for engagement in the programmesby subtracting the mean score of all items for each in-dividual (Schwartz, ). We calculated means for theitems measuring autonomy-support and autonomy, self-enhancement, self-transcendance, conservativism, andopenness to change, and calculated a measure of autono-mous motivation and non-autonomous motivation follow-ing Green-Demers et al. () and Cooke et al. (). Incontrast to previous studies that subtracted the non-autonomous from the autonomous motivation to create asingle index, we retained two variables for autonomousand controlled motivation because they were not correlated(R = .). Autonomous and controlled motivations canoccur simultaneously (Cameron et al., ; Cerasoli et al.,). Because property size was positively skewed, wedichotomized the variable by splitting it at the median( ha). Given the small number of respondents with onlya high-school degree or technical or trade school qualifica-tion, we pooled these responses and thus we had threegroups based on education: secondary school, technical ortrade school, graduate degree and postgraduate degree.

To determine whether there were differences in de-mographic characteristics, values or autonomous environ-mental motivation between people who participated inprogrammes with or without financial incentives, we usedKruskal–Wallis (continuous data) and χ tests (categoricaldata). To examine the simultaneous effects of multiple vari-ables, we fitted a binary logistic model. The response vari-able was the dichotomous variable indicating whether aparticipant had participated in at least one incentivizedprogramme. Using hierarchical regression we first tested ademographic and property model (together termed ‘de-mographic’) in which we included property size, age oflandowner, gender, whether they were retired or not, educa-tional attainment, property type (commercial, lifestyle andresidential) and all two-way and three-way interactionterms (for continuous variables). In the next step weadded all significant variables and interactions from the

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demographic/property model and the four higher ordervalues and interaction terms. Similarly, we added autono-mous motivation and controlled motivation from themotivation towards the environment scale to test whetherautonomous motivation towards the environment predictedparticipation in an incentivized programme (de Groot &Steg, ). All interaction terms were examined visuallyby dichotomizing the variables at the median. Modelsaturation precluded more interaction terms. Likelihoodratio tests (α, .) informed model optimization viabackwards elimination (Crawley, ; Zuur et al., ),and Spearman correlations were calculated and tests formulti-collinearity conducted.

Using the same modelling procedure, we used hierarch-ical linear regression to examine the factors that influencedthe number of conservation actions. We used ANOVAs tocompare the residual sum of squares between differentmodels. In the final step, we assessed whether the numberof conservation actions depended on participation in anincentivized programme.

Results

The survey respondents were : female : male, andmean age was ± SE . years (range –). The percen-tages of people with secondary school diplomas, technicaldegrees, graduate and postgraduate degrees were , ,

and %, respectively. Within Tasmania only % of theadult population has an undergraduate degree and % apostgraduate degree (Australian Bureau of Statistics, ).Owners of larger and commercial properties weremore like-ly to engage in programmes with financial incentives(Table ). Commercial properties tended to be larger thannon-commercial properties.

Respondents indicated high levels of autonomy (mean. ± SE .; = ‘Neutral’, = ‘Agree somewhat’ and = ‘Mostly agree’) and competence (. ± SE .) whenengaging in the programmes, as well as moderate levels ofperceived autonomy-support (S . ± SE .). A largenumber of respondents (%) were neutral or agreed some-what that they did not need the programme to achieveconservation or stewardship goals. There were no significantdifferences between those in programmes with and withoutincentives in autonomy-support, autonomy, competenceand need for the programme to achieve conservation orstewardship goals (Table ).

All respondents indicated high self-transcendance(universalism and benevolence), high openness to change(self-direction, hedonism and stimulation), low self-enhancement (power and achievement) and low conserva-tivism (tradition, conformity and security; SupplementaryMaterial & , Table ). The top-ranked items from the por-trait values questionnaire were universalism (care for na-ture), benevolence (care and loyalty for people close to

TABLE 2 Comparison of demographic and property characteristics, programme experiences, values, motivations and behaviours betweenparticipants of incentive and non-incentive private land conservation programmes (values are % or mean ± SE; test statistic isKruskal–Wallis for continuous data and χ for categorical data).

Incentive No incentive Test statistic

Demographic & property characteristics% female 48 55 0.4Mean age (years) 60 ± 1.2 58 ± 0.9 1.6Education (% postgraduate degree/% graduate degree/% other) 30/40/30 47/23/29 5.5Year of possession 1998 ± 1.9 2001 ± 1.0 2.2Property size (ha) 710 ± 415 53 ± 17 31.8**% commercial property 41 20 5.9**Programme experiences (Supplementary Material 2)Autonomy-supported 4.9 ± 0.2 4.6 ± 0.1 2.9Autonomy 5.8 ± 0.16 6.0 ± 0.09 2.2Competent 5.3 ± 0.12 5.2 ± 0.08 0.09Do not need programme to achieve goals 4.2 ± 0.31 4.7 ± 0.15 2.2Values (portrait values questionnaire; Table 1, Supplementary Material 3 & 4)Self-transcendence 0.91 ± 0.08 0.88 ± 0.04 0.1Self-enhancement −1.4 ± 0.13 −1.3 ± 0.07 0.62Conservativism −0.44 ± 0.10 −0.34 ± 0.06 0.22Open to change 0.50 ± 0.08 0.36 ± 0.05 0.82Motivation towards environment (Supplementary Material 2 & 4)Autonomous motivation 27.9 ± 1 29.1 ± 0.6 0.77Controlled motivation 10.5 ± 0.1 11.1 ± 0.5 0.85Behaviours—management actionNumber of management activities 3.1 ± 0.3 3.6 ± 0.1 2.8Hours engagement/month 19 ± 4.6 31 ± 5.6 0.17

**P, ..

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you) and self-direction (freedom in thinking and action;Table ). Preliminary investigation of a correlation matrix(Supplementary Material ) also indicated relationships be-tween values, motivations and behaviour that were consis-tent with past research and theoretical predictions ofSelf-Determination Theory (Ryan & Deci, ) and theTheory of Basic Values (Schwartz et al., ; Baur et al.,).

Participants were motivated to engage in these pro-grammes because they felt that it was consistent with theirpersonal values. Although intrinsic motivation is also apart of autonomous motivation, it appeared that the plea-sure of engagement was only moderately important.Non-autonomous motivation tended to be least important(Supplementary Material ). There was also no evidencethat the perceived influence of programmes on land man-agement, the number of conservation actions undertaken,or the hours of engagement in the programme were higherfor respondents in incentive programmes (Table ).

When we restricted the data to only the covenantors,there were still no indications of differences in values, mo-tivations and behaviours amongst people who did or did notreceive financial incentives. Further preliminary exploratorymultivariate analysis (Supplementary Material ) also sug-gested respondents could be divided into different typesof landowners (in terms of values and motivations) butthat respondents did not separate into groups based on

whether they participated in a programme with or withoutincentives.

Owners of larger properties, men with graduate degreesand women with secondary or technical diplomas weremore likely to be in incentive programmes (Table , Fig. ).None of property type (commercial, residential or lifestyle),age or retirement status had significant effects. People withhigher self-enhancement and lower self-transcendence mo-tivations were more likely to engage in paid programmes.Adding autonomous motivation and non-autonomousmotivation to the model resulted in a significant reductionin deviance compared to the demographic and valuesmodel. People with higher self-enhancement, lowerself-transcendence and lower autonomous motivation weremore likely to be part of paid programmes. For people onsmall properties, higher autonomous motivation increasedtheir likelihood of participating in incentive programmescompared to owners of small properties with less autono-mous motivation. On large properties, more autonomouslymotivated landowners were less likely to participate inincentive programmes (Table , Fig. ).

People with larger properties engaged in fewer conserva-tion actions on their property (Table , Fig. ). Furthermore,although participants in incentive programmes did not re-port more conservation actions, on larger properties higherautonomous motivation led to an increase in the number ofconservation actions. On smaller properties, regardless of

TABLE 3 Regression coefficients (± SE) for each of the independent variables in a hierarchical logistic regression predicting participation inprogrammes with financial incentives for landowners. The three progressively complex models are listed from left to right andaccounted for an increasing proportion of the variability, based on the Nagelkerke R (Model = ., Model = ., Model = .).The reference category for gender is male (i.e. men are more likely to participate in incentivized programmes) and the reference categoryfor education is people who do not have a graduate degree (i.e. people with graduate degrees are more likely to enrol in incentivizedprogrammes than people without graduate degrees).

Model1 1. Demographic/property 2. Values 3. Motivation

Intercept 1.9 ± 0.5*** 2.1 ± 0.5*** 10.2 ± 3**Gender 1.9 ± 0.8* 1.7 ± 0.8* 1.8 ± 0.9Education (graduate) 1.5 ± 0.7* 1.6 ± 0.8* 1.8 ± 0.8*Education (post-graduate) −0.1 ± 0.9 −0.3 ± 0.9 −0.3 ± 1.0Gender × Education (graduate) −3.3 ± 1.1** −3.7 ± 1.2** −3.5 ± 1.3**Gender × Education (post-graduate) −1.0 ± 1.0 −0.8 ± 1.1 −1.0 ± 1.3SEV 0.9 ± 0.5 8.8 ± 3.5*STV −1.1 ± 0.9 −16.3 ± 6.1**SEV × STV −1.2 ± 0.6* −11.85 ± 3.8**AM 0.2 ± 0.2NAM −0.3 ± 0.1*Property size × AM −0.3 ± 0.10**SEV −0.2 ± 0.07*STV × AM 0.4 ± 0.2*SEV × AM −0.2 ± 0.1STV × SEV × AM 0.3 ± 0.1*Δdeviance/χ2 33/32.7*** 7/7.1 20/20.0**

SEV, self-enhancement values; STV, self-transcendence values; AM, autonomous motivations; NAM, non-autonomous motivations. SEV and STV weretaken from the portrait values questionnaire and AM and NAM were based on the motivation towards the environment scale.*P, ., **P, ., ***P, ..

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the level of autonomous motivation, landowners engaged ina larger number of conservation actions.

Discussion

Incentives marginally added to the types of landowners en-gaging in conservation on private land but did not appearto lead to increased conservation action, or to changes in feel-ings of autonomy or competence with respect to conservation.In addition to enhancing participation of owners of largerproperties, there were also some indications that people withlower self-transcendence values, higher self-enhancementvalues and lower autonomous motivation towards the envir-onment were more likely to engage in incentive programmes.As property size did not influence values or motivations, in-centives may have helped to encourage participation of own-ers of larger properties who may have higher costs inimplementing conservation action.

The differences in values and autonomous motivationbetween participants of the two types of programmes weresmall. Participants had values and motivations that areconsistent with other types of pro-environmental behaviour(Pelletier et al., ; Schultz & Zelezny, ; de Groot &Steg, ; Sheldon et al., ). High self-transcendencevalues have been observed in other studies (Baur et al.,; McQuilkin et al., ; Schwartz et al., ), especiallyin older (c.f. Robinson, ) and well-educated populations(Sheldon, ).

Our results indicated that autonomous motivation wasparticularly important in promoting conservation actionon large properties. In contrast, participation of owners oflarge properties in an incentive programme did not in-fluence conservation action. These results are consistentwith the generalization that autonomous motivation isassociated with more challenging and enduringpro-environmental behaviours (de Groot & Steg, ;Burton & Paragahawewa, ; Agrawal et al., ; Cookeet al., ). The design of resilient conservation interven-tions that lead to action on the ground requires that

programmes not only persuade otherwise uninvolved land-owners to participate (DeCaro & Stokes, ; Burton &Paragahawewa, ; Greiner & Gregg, ), but also pro-mote autonomous motivation (Greiner & Gregg, ;Borner et al., ). Increased autonomous motivationmay result from promoting moral reasons for programmeparticipation; an emphasis on communal benefits (ratherthan private benefits); the fostering of social capital betweenprogramme participants, or between programme partici-pants and programme officers through face-to-face engage-ment; and the creation of opportunities for greaterself-determination and self-efficacy through the provisionof comprehensive and meaningful information exchangeand feedback between participants (Curtis & Lockwood,; Reeve, ; Crompton & Kasser, ; Bowles &Polania-Reyes, ; Agrawal et al., ; Selinske et al.,). Given that autonomous motivation had marginallypositive effects on owners of small properties, unlike incen-tives, these types of approaches are likely to have positiveimpacts for owners of both small and large properties.Although we only had small sample sizes for owners ofsmaller properties who received incentives, our results indi-cate that incentives for this group may have led to a positiveimpact on conservation action.

Limitations

As with all surveys, except compulsory censuses, there maybe participation bias, making relational analyses more valu-able than normative statements. In comparison to previoussurveys that had higher response rates (Morrison &Lockwood, ), the participants may have been that sub-section of the population who are particularly autonomous-ly motivated to engage in conservation (and even fill out asurvey on conservation). Moreover, within Tasmania, as aresult of the extensive history of environmentalism, it is like-ly that environmental values and a stewardship ethic aremore socially accepted than elsewhere. Thus the results of

FIG. 1 The proportion (withbinomial errors) of landownerswho participated in a programmewith financial incentives, by (a)education (secondary educationincludes landowners who alsoattended technical collegeprogrammes) and (b) propertycharacteristics (median valueswere used to dichotomizeproperty size). Numbers abovebars indicate sample size.

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this study cannot be extrapolated to other regions withoutinvestigation of prevailing values and motivations.

We focused on three potential benefits of incentives(enhanced pool of participants, increased conservationaction, and enhanced feelings of competence and auton-omy). However, there could be other important reasonsfor providing financial benefits. For example, payments

may be a subsidy to retain or support family farms thatsupport more conservation action, they may be an oppor-tunity to begin building relationships between landownersfor future conservation projects or they may simply helpto shift landowners’ perspectives about conservation orconservationists (Rode et al., ; Ramsdell et al., ).These are all outcomes that were not measured in our study.

We have also assumed that any differences in values andmotivations between those who participated in programmeswith or without incentives reflect preferences for types ofprogrammes. There could be other differences between pro-grammes, such as experiences with individual stewardshipofficers, that could lead to different types of people partici-pating (Moon & Cocklin, ; Selinske et al., ). Despitethese differences, given the significant costs of incentiveschemes in comparison to the overall budgets of privateland conservation programmes, it is reasonable to expectdifferences in conservation actions and feelings of compe-tence between programmes with and without incentives(Armsworth et al., ; Iftekhar et al., ).

One important source of variation in our data that wasnot accounted for in our survey was the presence of threa-tened species or ecosystems on properties. For participationin several of the paid covenant and stewardship pro-grammes, landowners needed to demonstrate the presenceof threatened ecosystems or species. Thus, irrespective ofthe values and attitudes of the landowners, requirementsof the funding agency may lead to differential levels ofeconomic support for particular properties and therefore re-duce the differences in property or landowner characteris-tics between incentive or non-incentive programmes.

The significance of several interaction terms and thelarge number of variables that appear to have significant(but small) effects, indicate that the impacts of financialincentives on conservation are highly context-dependentand influenced by a wider range of factors than we havebeen able to investigate in this quantitative analysis. Togain a finer-grained and more nuanced perspective on thepsychological impacts of incentives and how payments, aswell as other programme features such as extension officersand educational opportunities, can enhance or thwartautonomous motivation for the environment and conserva-tion action, we suggest further studies using in-depthinterviews.

Conclusion

Each year billions of dollars are spent on various forms ofpayments for ecosystem services (Armsworth et al., ).Effective use of conservation funds requires that financialincentives not only increase programme participation, butactually lead to changes on the ground (Kleijn &Sutherland, ; Morris, ). Although financial

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

FIG. 2 The proportion (with binomial errors) of landowners whoreceived financial incentives, by self-enhancement values and (a)self-transcendence values, (b) non-autonomous motivation, (c)autonomous motivation among people with lowerself-transcendence values, and (d) autonomous motivationamong people with higher self-transcendence values. Medianvalues were used to dichotomize continuous variables. Numbersabove bars indicate sample size.

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incentives may, in certain contexts, efficiently use conserva-tion funds and enhance autonomous motivation (Ferraro &Kiss, ; Rode et al., ), the blanket-use of financialincentives for conservation needs to be approachedcautiously, especially if participants may already beautonomously motivated to engage in conservation.Understanding longer-term impacts of these programmesrequires socio-psychological investigation (DeCaro &Stokes, ) because it is human values and motivationsthat mediate the relationship between incentives andconservation outcomes.

Acknowledgements We thank the numerous collaborators andcolleagues who contributed to this work: Department of Primary

Industries, Parks, Water and Environment (especially IonaMitchell), Tasmania Land Conservancy, faculty and students atUniversity of Tasmania (especially Michael Lockwood), ChloeLucas, Greening Australia, Natural Resource Management,Landcare, Common-Cause Australia, researchers at the Universityof Queensland and RMIT University, anonymous reviewers,Conservation Landholders Tasmania, and all the landowners whoparticipated in the programme.

Author contributions Designing survey and research question,collecting data, analysis, writing: MY; support with data collection,feedback on initial concept and survey questions, writing: JBK.

Conflicts of interest None.

TABLE 4 Regression coefficients (± SE) for hierarchical linear regressions predicting the number of conservation actions by landowners.The four progressively complex models are listed from left to right and accounted for an increasing proportion of the variability (Model = ., Model = ., Model = ., Model = .).

Model1 1. Demographic/property 2. Values 3. Motivation 4. Incentive

Property size −0.8 ± 0.3*** −3.5 ± 0.5*** −3.8 ± 1.2** −3.7 ± 1.2**STV −0.8 ± 0.4* −1.0 ± 0.3** −1.0 ± 0.3**Openness −1.1 ± 0.5* −1.1 ± 0.5* −1.0 ± 0.5*STV ×Openness 0.9 ± 0.5* 0.9 ± 0.5 0.8 ± 0.5AM −0.1 ± 0.06 −0.1 ± 0.06*Property size × AM 0.1 ± 0.04* 0.1 ± 0.04**Incentive 3.4 ± 1.4*Property size × Incentive −1.9 ± 0.8*ΔResidual Sum of Squares/χ2 23/9.9** 17/2.4 20/4.8** 13/3.1*

STV, self-transcendence values; AM, autonomous motivations.*P, ., **P, ., ***P, ..

FIG. 3 The number of conservation actions (with standard errors) implemented by landowners, by (a) their openness to change andself-transcendence, and by (b) autonomous motivation and (c) the presence or absence of incentive and property size. All significantinteraction terms from the model are shown. Numbers above bars indicate sample size.

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Ethical standards Human research ethics were approved by theUniversity of Tasmania (H0016128).

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