DEC 16985 JTB/85/12/12/0 Ml GI MEMEORANDUM TO: FROM: SUBJECT: REEVES - 1 - D isr Vit ?u 0-wenctnf Dltibuti~n: A WMEG r/f NMSS r/f REBrowning MJBell JTGreeves MSNataraja HJMiller JOBunting LBHigginbotham PDR/LPDR (B, Nj:S$: 417, I ho± k4h J 1 ( JA/ ?LR GIzhs rhaL +'r John T. Greeves, Chief Engineering Branch Division of Waste Management Mysore S. Nataraja, Section Leader Rock Mechanics Section Engineering Branch Division of Waste Management John T. Buckley Rock Mechanics Section Engineering Branch Division of Waste Management Sher Bahadur Rock Mechanics Section Engineering Branch Division of Waste Management TRIP REPORT BWIP EXPLORATORY SHAFT WORKSHOP Attached is a copy of our trip report for the BWIP Exploratory Shaft Workshop held in Richland, WA on December 3-5, 1985. DOE's viewgraphs have i_> also been enclosed as attachments to the report even though they are quite numerous. If you desire any additional information about the trip we will be happy to provide it for you. WM Record File /La/, Distribution: WM Project / / I . Docket No. LPDR a - Mysore S. Nataraja, Section Leader Rock Mechanics Section Engineering Branch Division of Waste Management 8601240157 851216 PDR WASTE WM-lo PDR : . 1. :~~~~~~~~~~~ (Return to WM, 623-SS) IFC :WMEG :WME9> :WMEG : [AME :JBuckley/km-:MNataraJa :SBahadur *ATE .: &iOs85 . t3/85 : 8 .5 s, - - A ;x
317
Embed
Division of Waste Management I ho± FROM: k4h J JA/WMEG r/f NMSS r/f REBrowning MJBell JTGreeves MSNataraja HJMiller JOBunting LBHigginbotham PDR/LPDR (B, Nj:S$: 417, I ho± k4h 1J(
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
To Ensure That ES Activitiesare Performed in AccordanceWith 10 CFR 60.10(d):
* Limit Adverse Effects onLong Term Performance
* Obtain Information Neededfor Site Characterization
* Location of Boreholes andShafts
* Coordination with RepositoryDesign/Construction
Background Information Requested
By The NRC To Conduct Effective
Review of ES Activities:
* Performance Analysis
* Performance Allocation
Sources of NRC Comments onBWIP ES Design/Construction:
* BWIP
* BWIP
SCR Review
Meeting/Workshop Minutes
* BWIP EA Review
* NRC/DOE ES Correspondence
Aug. 6. 1982
Sept. 23, 1982
Oct. 15, 1982
Nov. 5. 1982
DOE/NRC Correspondence OnBWIP Exploratory Shaft
NRC Requested Details of Sealing and QA
DOE Response to Aug. 6 Letter
NRC Requests ES Test Plan
NRC Identifies the Requirementsof 1OCFR6O.11(a)(6)iii
NRC Requests Specific Information on ES
DOE Response to Jan. 13 Letter
DOE Detailed Response to Jan. 13 Letter
DOE Revision of April 1 Response
NRC Comments on DOE Response
NRC Comments on ESTP
Jan. 13, 1983
Feb. 23, 1983
April 1 1983
April 29. 1983
Nov. 9, 1983
Mar. 12, 1984
Sunnary of Information Request
By NRC On BWIP ES Activities:
I Design* Shaft & Sea'
* ES Construction Procedures
* Sealing/Grouting Procedures
* Testing/Inspection Procedures
* QA For The Above
STATUS OF BWIP ES REVIEW
Based on Design DocumentsSubrnitted To This Date TheNRC Staff Has Not IdentifiedAny Major Adverse SafetyRelated Effects ResultingFromn ES Construction.
NRC Continues
Inforiation onto Requestthe Following:
* Performance Analysis
For Exploratory Shaft
* Performance Allocation of
the Repository Conponents
ATTACHMENT 4
ATTACHMENTX
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED FOR
ES PHASE I MEETING DECEMBER 3-5, 1985
1. Exploratory Shaft - Phase IFunctional Design CriteriaBWI-FDC-003 August 1984
2. Exploratory Shaft - Phase ITitle II Design ReportSystem Design DescriptionBWI-DR-001 July 1984
3. Functional Design CriteriaExploratory Shaft - Phase IIBWI-FDC-007 January 1985
* INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES RELATED TO PRE-SITE CHARACTERI-ZATION HAVE BEEN ON GOING SINCE 1976 UNDER THENATIONAL WASTE TERMINAL STORAGE PROGRAM
* SUBSEQUENT TO PASSAGE OF THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACTOF 1982, THE FOLLOWING IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTSWERE ISSUED:- MISSION PLAN
- SITING GUIDELINES
- GENERIC REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
- SUPPORT DOCUMENTS
* EXPANDED ROLE OF EXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY TOINCLUDE:- SITE CHARACTERIZATION PROCESS CONSISTENT WITH THE NUCLEAR WASTE
POLICY ACT OF 1982- CONFIRMATORY TESTING
- USAGE IN SUPPORT OF TWO-PHASED REPOSITORY CONSTRUCTION ANDOPERATION
PSAt 2023.Id)f
9
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (CONT.)
* PROGRAM OVERVIEW TO STAY ON TARGET WITH A DYNAMICEXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY PROGRAM, THE PROJECT HAS:- INTEGRATED THE EXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY PLANNING USING THE
SYSTEM ENGINEERING APPROACH FOR REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS ANDDEVELOPMENT OF PROJECT SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING PLANS
- ESTABLISHED A QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM BASED ON THE NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION SITE CHARACTERIZATION REVIEW PLAN NQA-1,10 CFR 50, APPENDIX B, RESULTING IN DETAILED PROJECT PLANS ANDPROCEDURES WHICH DRIVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE BASALT WASTEISOLATION TASKS
- ESTABLISHED A PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO MEASURE AND REVIEWPROGRESS AGAINST COST, SCHEDULE, FUNDS, AND TECHNICAL BASELINESAND CONTROL CHANGES TO THESE BASELINES. TOOLS USED TO CONTROLTHE TECHNICAL BASELINE INCLUDE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT ANDQUALITY ASSURANCE
t".8. e I iI 1
BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECTPROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS
* THE BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT MANAGEMENTSYSTEMS DEVELOPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT OFENERGY ORDERS
* HIERARCHY OF WORK REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLSESTABLISHED
* BASELINE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY THE DEPARTMENTOF ENERGY-HEADQUARTERS- MISSION PLAN- GENERIC REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT- THE BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT CHARTER
* BASELINE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY PROJECT OFFICE- THE BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT PLAN- THE BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT MANAGEMENT PLAN- THE BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT PLAN- THE BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT SITE-SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS AND
REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
Pt8-, 2 I Of,
BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECTPROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT PLAN
* STRUCTURES THE CONTENT AND CHARTS THE COURSE FOR THETECHNICAL PROGRAM
* ASSURES WORK REQUIREMENTS ARE MISSION DERIVED- SITE CHARACTERIZATION PROGRAM- WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
* SYSTEMATIC DEVELOPMENT OF DATA REQUIREMENTS
* PRESENTS A HIERARCHY OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES ANDDOCUMENTATION
* SUPPORTS AND INTEGRATES QUALITY ASSURANCEACCOUNTABILITY AND TRACEABILITY WITHIN ITS FRAMEWORK
. Si S S. Si S 5 . Sf I 5 S W aS i . J I I I IaI 1 I L 81^I"I 'I I' ' 18|n I'l rI|:U 1 I2Il0 1 1 -| -- | I {ItI "I-I-II S1 |ta|I|"| l SIAIIIOISSI.IIMIIMI 1 II t Glr OI |N|I|J 1 I
v 5555
FIRSTSHAFT I 1, II I .5.5
|~~~~ .....
A*5.t .. *NA.
i.. IIII I *Wdab%&I
-
.AA r 4411 1 41.01f55 "Al 5tl SW Ifn.ZINp...^ I 4th,
I t~ lt tI1 li'me.
Pa. MUt
atSP ".555 WINS
.,.55..
BWIP EXPLORATORYSHAFT TEST PROGRAM
PROPOSED BASELINE(5 MONTH PROGRAM)
REV.I 57/YS%S.-iI5SS.445 P4S. 555 55
ad 1.zd 15*4 r4flSSSA5 t5 I.. J5..
\.5* s~bs6
5. .
SttS 1 l1.
oovSxkcav DO* Jkha
Afl SUN Make 11VSECONDSHAFT
s. t I.S.f*'KN l
.. ". * 'fl ,,~lUS|s_
55555 104
- 4 SWsI- K t105C4G5 S *D1
S'S, 5e S5 Sz U tAL ISI *sSC SSNSAL O
. , oh ss 4S5 I SU 3.8 5 5 5,5 tf .5 5, 5
r S w Page
~~~~~~(.... Pa. . ,., P.M..
6.14, (l ,wS
.4W SAA
i W.SSn a It * ,t 5 , 5545,,.
h5..% I5I.M.
3 i
SA-1 5SIL ' S1
1 1 f.-~~~~611(1855055MthIt
I 'we. II 4I I
r 1515555501 (hA.M6.0 1(ti
S SIL, 51110 .9 C 55 551 155 ..
lk 5-5l I .tAla a Me' 5(
I ..-11.0d4to St
A.. IM
b,,t.
T i. ,.. .. &0"" I MO. .. "*^ StI1 SOS 55 .4I.......
3 ' 4 55' 55 1
: "A554I. I
aMSA
I I
I i 5 .4. f. S .%I
§ T If LA.
1wea I 4 V
I Hl ;; I Al -
* IfX | e1^ rPA55'U aim 4h S
t v
1 I 1 1 .1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .1 1 1 1. 1 1 1 1 1 ls l* a * ls . .! 4S . S 6 ..I5e S .S .5 S . , 6
EXPLORATORY SHAFT PREREQUISITE PLAN
PURPOSE
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT TOOL TO IDENTIFY, DEFINE, ASSESS,AND SCHEDULE THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE NECESSARYPRECURSORS TO THE START OF CONSTRUCTION, OPERATIONS,AND TESTING
* & BASIC ELEMENTS:- FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
- SAFETY PROTECTION PLAN
- SPECIAL STUDIES W t, 4 -Lt
- DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTIBILITY REVIEWS ad
- READINESS REVIEWS _
, Q_ f ___i__
"v ; A cnt9;QS
EXPLORATORY SHAFT PREREQUISITE PLAN (CONT.)
PROPOSED DOE-RL HOLD POINTS
1. THE ES-I START-TO-DRILL
2. THE ES-Il START-TO-DRILL
3. THE ES-I LINER INSTALLATIONS
4. THE ES-Il LINER INSTALLATIONS
S. PERSONNEL ENTRY INTO ES-I
6. PERSONNEL ENTRY INTO ES-11
7. BREAKOUT FROM ES-I
8. BREAKINTO ES-Il
ATTACHMENT 6
REPOSITORY/EXPLORATORYSHAFT SITE INVESTIGATIONS
P.E. LONG, MANAGER OF HOST ROCKSTUDIES UNIT
BWIP SITE DEPARTMENT
ROCKWELL HANFORD OPERATIONS
PSB6 2013 1
1. SELECTION OF REFERENCE REPOSITORYLOCATION
II. SELECTION OF EXPLORATORY SHAFTLOCATION
Ill. SELECTION OF REPOSITORY HOST ROCK
PS862021 r
SELECTION OF REFERENCE REPOSITORY LOCATION(STUDY CONDUCTED FOR BWIP BY WOODWARD-CLYDE
CONSULTANTS 1978 TO 1980)
* IDENTIFICATION OF SITE LOCALITIES- DEFINE CANDIDATE AREA
- DELINEATE SUBAREAS
- IDENTIFY SITE LOCALITIES
* IDENTIFICATION AND RANKING OF CANDIDATE SITES- SCREENING TO IDENTIFY CANDIDATE SITES
- RANKING OF SITES USING DOMINANCE ANALYSIS
REFERENCES:
WOODWARD-CLYDE CONSULTANTS, 1980, R"O-BWI-C-62
WOODWARD-CLYDE CONSULTANTS, 1981, RHO-BWI-C-107
PS!,:f.-)nfl1 1
-
Stup I: SCREENING AREA
I
SwP : suaARA
Stop 2: CANDIDATE AREA
LSup 4: SITE LOCALITIES
Stop 5: CANDIDATE SITES
FIGURE M2
RELATIONSHIP OF AREA DESIGNATIONSAND SCREENING STEPS
I% ) ji'a Isaws- Ito1; t-C1I1 iv Q
H sa4s Is. tV, H ,
RANKING CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF THEREFERENCE REPOSITORY LOCATION
* LINEAMENTS
* THICKNESS OF REFERENCE BARRIER INTERIOR
* TIERING WITHIN HOST FLOW
* POTENTIAL EARTHQUAKE SOURCES
* GROUNDWATER TRAVEL TIMES
* BEDROCK FRACTURES AND FAULTS- CONTAMINATION- SPECIAL SPECIES- VEGETATIVE COMMUNITIES
- UNIQUE MICROHABITATS
P'Al.- Ino 1 .
ORDINAL DOMINANCE ANALYSIS RESULTS
CANDIDATE 1' l' ' 1'+h+t 1'+h+t 1'+h.+t 1'+h+t SKING D SITESITE V 'h1+ 'ht +p .ep+g'p g'b RAKN DOITE
VALUE BY
A 1.84 2.51 2.84 3.51 4.26 4.39 4.66 0.834 H
B 0.50 1.50 1.17 2.17 2.79 3.05 3.15 0.496 AHJ
C 1.00 1.58 1.67 2.25 2.72 2.97 3.47 0.550 AH
D 0.66 1.41 0.99 1.74 2.62 3.12 3.28 0.495 AHj
E 0.66 1.33 0.66 1.33 2.33 2.83 2.95 0.442 A.C.DH.J
F 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.46 0.92 0.088 All
G 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.25 1.25 1.25 0.255 ACQJK
H 2.00 2.67 3.00 3.67 4.36 4.49 4.68 0.860
J 1.16 1.83 1.49 2.17 2.79 3.28 3.70 0.584 AH
K 1.16 1.33 1.16 1.33 1.71 1.84 1.84 0.366 AHJ1' = lineaments.h = thickness of host flow.t = tiering in host flow.p = potential earthquake.g = groundwater travel time.
= bedrock fracture.
ps8raO,0.i j
SELECTION OF THE EXPLORATORY SHAFTLOCATION
(STUDY CONDUCTED IN 1982)
* TECHNICAL FACTORS
* RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FACTORS
* EVALUATION OF ANOMALIES
* REPRESENTATIVENESS
REFERENCE: ROCKWELL STAFF, 1982, RHO-BW-ST-16
P' 86-O231.6
TECHNICAL FACTORS FOR THEEXPLORATORY SHAFT LOCATION
* GENERAL CONSIDERATION: BASALT DIP
* SPECIFIC CRITERIA:- LAND USE
- SURFACE CONTAMINATION
- GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION
- REPOSITORY ORIENTATION
- PROXIMITY TO EDGE OF THE REFERENCE REPOSITORY LOCATION
Pset,2023-It I
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OFTECHNICAL FACTORS
* BASALT DIP DID NOT DISCRIMINATE
* SPECIFIC CRITERIA WERE EXCLUSIONARY AND UNBIASED
* PRINCIPAL BOREHOLE LOCATION BASED ON:- LOCATION OF EXISTING BOREHOLE
* AVAILABLE DATA NOT JUDGED TO WARRANT MOVING THEEXPLORATORY SHAFT
PS86 Mni 1 9
TABLE 11-13. SCALING CONSTANTS FOR MULTI-AlTRIBUTE UTILITY FUNCTIONS.
UTILITY FUNCTIONS BEST LEVEL BASE LEVELSCALING
CONSTANTSWITHIN GROUPa
FUNCTION A (PERFORMANCE-RELATED MEASURES)
Radionuclide releasea -4.0 0.0 0.208
Groundwater travel time (yr) 100,000 10,000 0.448
Radionuclide plume depth (m) 600 200 0.344
FUNCTION B (CONSTRUCTION-RELATED MEASURES)
Mean interior thickness (m) 45.0 25.0 0.785
Minimum interior thickness (m) 36.0 24.0 0.674
Percent vesiculation 0.0 25.0 0.792
FUNCTION C (COST-RELATED MEASURES)
Cost savings ($ million) 400 0.0 0.637
Schedule savings (rno)c 12.0 0.0 0.363
COMPLETE UTILITY FUNCTION
Function A 0.108 11%
Function B 0.874 87%
Function C 0.018 2%
aThe scaling convention is such that the utilities of the best levels are one and those of the baselevels are zero.
bLog1o of curies per 1,000 t heavy metal.
PS6.7O21-F74
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
1. WEIGHTING SCHEMESCOHASSETT RANKS HIGHEST UNLESS ALL WEIGHT IS PLACED ON EITHER COST ORRADIONUCLIDE PLUME DEPTH. BOTH ARE UNREASONABLE WEIGHTING SCHEMES
11. VARIATIONS IN LEVELS OF MEASURESOF VESICULATION IN COHASSETT WERE MUCH HIGHER (e.g., 20% COMPARED TO0%) THE FLOW WOULD STILL RANK HIGHEST
Ill. CHANGE IN JUDGMENTAL INPUT OR CHANGE IN MATHMATICALFORM OF UTILITY FUNCTIONNO CHANGE RESULTED IN PREFERRED HORIZON
PS8 2023 E 16
FLOW TOP VARIABILITY
* CAPTURED IN DECISION ANALYSIS BY MINIMUM THICKNESSMEASURE
* AVAILABLE DATA SHOW CONSISTENCY IN COHASSETT FLOWTOP THICKNESS
* REPOSITORY SHAFT SINKING COMMENCES TWO MONTHSAHEAD OF PHASE I SHAFT
* REQUIRES APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS TO COMPLETE ANDOUTFIT A SHAFT
* SHAFT FUNCTIONS:- ES-I
- ES-Il- R-3- R-6- R-1- R-S- R-9
- EXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY SERVICE AND DEVELOPMENTEXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY VENTILATION--INTAKEREPOSITORY PHASE I DEVELOPMENT
- EXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY VENTILATION--EXHAUST- BASALT HOISTING DEVELOPMENT EXHAUST- CONFINEMENT EXHAUST- SERVICE AND DEVELOPMENT VENTILATION INTAKE- WASTE HANDLING- CONFINEMENT INTAKE
PS86-2023- Macs
U I I V I a i a I . I P I u I B 1 _ i a I a i i
X.*.*-a S
U r
a a
a
S
( J-;),:bi
UNDERGROUND LAYOUT
SHOWING HINI REPOSITORY
¾
a
RS S
A,._
Sa- moa.m*a
_ ..
toI. I T ' asII I I I - 0 4 I 6 I I I t
~~~41 I 12 ~ I 11 I *1la I 1.6 I I I S I Sm I 4 I a I a I I-t I-
a £OnDIRE*1IS OF SHAVIS S
if,' I , "~' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
gj..~~~~~~..Fi:.L2I~~~~~~~~~~2~~~1,S U ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ jJS*~~~~~4.4t5 It lO~~~~POR 1611OttIMo
' * i i ~ L J I M_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ a eu . ~wo f m r
____________ S.~~~~~=2w"_______________ 5,~~~~~~~~~~~~ s bfI 7j ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.11 I
P. I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~iIl
is II A.-~~___ ~l&~NSII
-~~~ II...- El II z II, IA4,6
"I - .LU.AIL S L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~JLLL..LLAJL LL J-UhJ IAII A I I A I I I I LJ4 IJLALLLU LLi.JIJL .' 1Tr-f_-'i-r-IITFui p1ii...i ITJT.;..aTI 1711Yffll IISIS
is MW I ,*
o*l,~ loo,*CaowI 1 I o-la. lo-iss No #W.1 NO& 1484148 P*I.* D 11.
____Ic *. WIP- S1DY IO/ sSC CAPERA s
*'.A4m Jr OF 4PHSE5 I-f4ESOU10O~v-§WS4ILi0f IAIOUJ F-LANd
13 12 I 0' I a I '
a
a
A
-I-
I
13 I "a .J " L t " i: .!a - I 8 I I I a I I 1 ' I a I I I I- -
--
f S.15 45d4
s ~ : 1 _ I .__._: .Il
C.7 _--,---__---
Y6A^ 3 -,i s .1xytimbffs Of J.!. a
*a] a..-,^. s....a.e..,s "'_ s.,m.,s
'! *.- 5 '*.&.e5 .--.. , ! itamn'!
i ;
559 " ... 5 Iw.*I¢ l^ 55*.55 5151
a
ina U ck it Vrw S 11-w . e= - = - =eWeI =tf 0
F
*~~j sm~le. i!j -=a=:- "ZZO:: ,55e5W55 :: ..
-J -_JS! - - I
Er-JI INRLRIREl i2>YR-3WII .ifr
I55'j S
;, '.!L -
'''. g,
5 I
Oo,5 I.S
II
-1
I.
I
i
i
I.1
I
ri
I,
.5 -55.,. -SM.... - s =-____________________ _ -IWO'
DESIGN EQUATIONS AND FACTORS- ELASTIC BUCKLING BETWEEN RING STIFFENERS- ELASTIC INSTABILITY- YIELD COLLAPSE PRESSURE- STRENGTH REDUCTION FACTOR- STABILITY CRITERIA FOR CYLINDRICAL SHELLS- HEMISPHERICAL HEAD UNDER EXTERNAL PRESSURE- STABILITY CRITERION FOR HEMISPHERICAL HEAD- SHELL STRESSES AT MIDBAY- STRESSES AT STIFFENER-SHELL JUNCTION IN SHELL- STRESSES IN STIFFENERS- COMBINED FACTORED STRESS INTENSITY- STIFFENER-TO-SHELL CONNECTION- STRESSES AT JUNCTION OR SHELL AND HEMISPHERICAL HEAD- SHELLS SUBJECTED TO AXIAL COMPRESSIVE LOADS
PS86 2023- S f By. 13
ran
N
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO NRC QUESTIONS
Q. DESCRIBE TECHNICAL FACTORS IN SELECTION OFCONSTRUCTION METHOD.
A. SHAVT=CONSTRUCTIN METHOD WAS SELECTED BASED ONSAFEThT COST, AND SCHEDULE.
Q. B EXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY INTERFACE WITHREPOSITORY.
p'.7 -'
�t 4
�z �
�;v'. �
A. - LIMIT ADVERSE EFFECTS ON REPOSITORY- MAXIMIZE USEFULNESS IN REPOSITORY JUNCTION- USE TO INITIATE DEVELOPMENT OF REPOSITORY- CONTINUE AS TEST FACILITY DURING REPOSITORY
DEVELOPMENT- OTHER USES - TO BE DETERMINED
WAGt 02i-r, v , 4
ATTACHMENT 8
EXPLORATORY SHAFTCONSTRUCTION
ED HERSHBERGER, PROJECT DIRECTOR
MORRISON-KNUDSEN COMPANY, INC.
CONSTRUCTION MANAGER
ROCKWELL HANFORD OPERATIONS
PsC-2023-MAV-1
OVERVIEW OF EXPLORATORY SHAFT ANDUNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION
aUnits are curies per 1,000 t of heavy metal.bThickness below the internal vesicular zone. (See Table 1-2 for total thickness).cUniform ranges were provided for schedule rather than point estimates. The midpoints of these ranges
|LfNUMBER IDENTIFICATION SCALE: 1cm 7.2mREFERS TO EXCAVATION (l = 60')SEQUENCE
CA
I-
00
I-'-4-
I
SINGLE AXIS THREE AXISSENSOR SENSOR PS8409-49
FIGURE 4-8. Elevation View of Shaft and Breakout Station Showing Acoustic Emission Sensor Locations.
PROUIE 1;tOLU 0Or-Er
TYPICALPROCE HOLE
A
I I/
:: -- - - 6 - - - - -- sr
I -:-Y -
F
I-- OVERSIZE HOLE I____L_ -�
IlFOR PACKER
ASSEMBLYIS
- - - -- - -
II
F %. , -Z z Z. -
A'
A-A'SECTION VIEW PLAR VIEW
I fo.T.S . T'.T.S.
SD-BWI-TP-007 REV 1 VOLUME II
MULTIPLE-POSmONBOREHOLE EXTENSOMETER
POINT
SECTION A.A
o ¶ 2MEnGtsI I
o 5 T
TEMPORARYCONVERGENCE
REFUGE ENLARGEMENT POINTBREAKOUT STATION
SECTION 9-8 PS8409-47
FIGURE 4-12. Convergence Monitoring Station.
4-66
SD-BWI-TP-007 REV 1 VOLUME II
GAGE CONFIGURATION
00 90 1800 2707I I 0 I
- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
-1
IIII 3-[-1-
- I - :II/-]
~~~~~I
I I|| Z k I
V RECTANGULAR ROSETTE GAGES
IUNEAR GAGE PS8409-48
FIGURE 4-7. Strain-Gaged Bolt.
4-43
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO NRC QUESTIONS
Q. DESCRIBE TESTING DURING CONSTRUCTION
A. - SHAFT CONSTRUCTION MONITORING- PORTHOLE TESTING- UNDERGROUND EXCAVATION
Q. DISCUSS TESTING FROM SHAFT
A. PORTHOLE TESTING
ATTACHMENT 10
EXPLORATORY SHAFTPREREQUISITES PLAN
NED HUTCHINS, MANAGER
EXPLORATORY SHAFT PROGRAM
ROCKWELL HANFORD OPERATIONS
FHt. .,:? Ptfet I
THE EXPLORATORY SHAFT PREREQUISITESPLAN IS A MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHTTOOL TO IDENTIFY, DEFINE, ASSESS, ANDSCHEDULE THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT ARENECESSARY PRECURSORS OR PREREQUI-SITES TO THE START OF CONSTRUCTION,OPERATING, AND TESTING.
iS116-223-o4lereq 2
PREREQUISITE PLAN GOALS
TO IMPLEMENT THOSE MEASURES NECESSARY TO ENSURE THATTHE EXPLORATORY SHAFT PROGRAM MEETS:
* PROGRAMMATIC REQUIREMENTS
* QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
* DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REQUIREMENTS
PS86-2023,fPfee 3
PLAN ELEMENTS
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
READINESS REVIEWS
DESIGN/CONSTRUCTIBILITY REVIEWS
SAFETY PROTECTION PLAN
PS86o2013.Ptereq.4
.4EXPLORATORY SHAFT
CONSTRUCTION/OPERATIONSPREREQUISITES PLAN
WIREQUIREMENTS
DESIGNCRITERIA
DESIGNSOLUTION
.-
FUNCTIONALANALYSIS
SAFETYPROTECTION
PLAN
DESIGN ANDCONSTRUCTIBILITY
REVIEWSREADINESSvREVIEWS 1
CONSTRUCTIONAND
OPERATIONS IS~lb-2O03-Psereq S
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
P%86-2021-pree 6
FUNCTIONALANALYSIS
PSub-202UPrie~eq
REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THEEXPLORATORY SHAFT LOCATION
* THE EXPLORATORY SHAFT IS PART OF OVERALL SITECHARACTERIZATION PLAN
* AVAILABLE DATA SUGGEST LOCATION IS TYPICAL OF THEREFERENCE REPOSITORY LOCATION
* LOCATION CAN BE CONSIDERED A "RANDOM" SELECTIONRELATIVE TO GEOTECHNICAL DATA
* REPRESENTATIVENESS CAN ONLY BE EVALUATED AS SITECHARACTERIZATION APPROACHES COMPLETION
rse-7v IN I1"
SELECTION OF REPOSITORY HOST ROCK(STUDY CONDUCTED BY WOODWARD-CLYDE CONSULTANTS IN
CONJUNCTION WITH BWIP PERSONNEL, 1982,1983)
* TECHNICAL FACTORS
* RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FACTORS
* FLOW TOP VARIABILITY
* VERTICAL FLEXIBILITY
REFERENCE:
LONG AND WOODWARD-CLYDE CONSULTANTS, 1984, RHO-BW-SD-TY-001
PSB6.1O231 1I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
* PRIOR TO MAY 1982, THE UMTANUM FLOW WAS USED AS THEREFERENCE REPOSITORY HORIZON
* ORIGINAL SELECTION OF THE UMTANUM FLOW WAS BASED ONITS OCCURRENCE IN BOREHOLE DC-1 (COMPLETEDSEPTEMBER 1969)
* THE UMTANUM APPEARED TO BE THE BEST FLOW FOR AREPOSITORY BECAUSE IT WAS THOUGHT TO BE THE DEEPESTTHICK FLOW IN WHICH A REPOSITORY COULD BEECONOMICALLY CONSTRUCTED
* THE NEED TO CONDUCT A STUDY TO COMPARE BASALT FLOWSTHAT WERE POSSIBLE CANDIDATE HORIZONS, IN A SYSTEMATICWAY, WAS RECOGNIZED (MAY 1982)
* IN JUNE OF 1982, UNEXPECTEDLY THICK FLOW TOP BRECCIAWAS ENCOUNTERED IN THE UMTANUM FLOW. THIS GAVEADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO THE HORIZON IDENTIFICATION STUDYAND SERVED TO UNDERSCORE ITS IMPORTANCE
Ilsfifio2013r 12
9
READINESS REVIEWS
9
PI86*20ki-Prereq 9
REQUIREMENTS -
l~
DESIGNCRITERIA
DESIGNSOLUTION
I
READINESSREVIEWS
CONSTRUCTIONAND
OPERATIONS
PS46.2023-Pitleq 10
READINESS REVIEWS
* A FORMAL ASSESSMENT TO DETERMINE THE PREPAREDNESSOF:- THE RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL- THE FACILITIES- MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
* CONFIRMATION WITH REQUIREMENTS
{a t ' l? II~ rs1
READINESS REVIEW GOALS
* TASK DEFINITION
* REGULATORY COMPLIANCE OF TASKS
* PHASED SELF ASSESSMENT
* MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW (HOLD POINTS)
* PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
* PROBLEM MITIGATION
PS8C 2021 Prereq 12
READINESS REVIEW MUST VERIFY, USIN9 MOR)LOGIC, THAT:
(--r1 >-
1.
2.
3.
FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT (HARDWARE) ARE "READY"
PERSONNEL ARE "READY"
POLICIES/PROCEDURES ARE "READY"
MsG-.Jo23Frereq s
START-UP TEAM
START-UP TEAM CHAIRMAN
ENGINEERING REPRESENTATIVE
QUALITY ASSURANCE REPRESENTATIVE
SAFETY REPRESENTATIVE
CONSTRUCTION REPRESENTATIVE
SYSTEMS REPRESENTATIVE
OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE
PS86-2023-Prereq 14
S
READINESS REVIEW BOARD
SENIOR LEVEL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES FROM:
* CONSTRUCTION MANAGER
* ARCHITECT ENGINEER
* ROCKWELL HANFORD OPERATIONS
* BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT
* DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY-RICHLAND OPERATIONS OFFICE (AS OBSERVER)
* OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE
PSW-2023-Fitieq 15
READINESS REVIEW (HOLD POINTS)
ES-1, ES-11,
ES-I, ES-11,
ES-1, ES-11,
ES-I, ES-11,
ES-I, ES-11,
ES-I, ES-11,
12 TOTAL
START-TO-DRILL
LINER INSTALLATION
PERSONNEL ENTRY
PORTHOLE DRILLING
BREAKOUT
OPERATIONS (TESTING)
P~I6-ZO23 Pwfeq1l6
DESIGN/CONSTRUCTIBILITY REVIEW
PSG8b2023-Picreq 17
REQUIREMENTS
DESIGNCRITERIA
IDESIGN
SOLUTION
DESIGN ANDCONSTRUCTIBILITY
REVIEWS
f'86-2023-Piereq 18
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTIBILITY REVIEWS
* A FORMAL AND RIGOROUS ASSESSMENT OF:- THE DESIGN DOCUMENTATION- THE CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTATION- THE OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTATION
* TECHNICAL VERIFICATION OF IDENTIFIED REQUIREMENTS
PS 20223 Pereq 19
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTIBILITY REVIEWS
* ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT'S DESIGN
* ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT'S CONSTRUCTIBILITY
* PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
* PROBLEM MITIGATION
PS86-202J-Piereq 20
DESIGN/CONSTRUCTIBILITY REVIEW ELEMENTS
REQUIREMENTS REVIEW
DESIGN REVIEW
CONSTRUCTIBILITY REVIEW
OPERATIONS (TESTING) REVIEWS
SPECIAL REVIEWS
PS-2P2retseq 21
SPECIAL REVIEWS - DESIGN BASIS EVALUATION
PftalOti*Pge.eq *1
REVIEW ISSUES
* WATER INFLOW
* METHANE RELEASE RATE
* (FLEXIBILITY J)
* CONSTRUCTIBILITY
.� ka"
k,4,'�y t--
CQ
PS862023 lPtereq 23
REVIEW SCOPE
EVALUATION OF THE FOLLOWING:* DESIGN BASIS VALUES FOR WATER INILOW AND METHANE RELEASE RATE
* FLEXIBILITY TO SUPPORT POTENTIAL PROGRAM CHANGES
* COST AND SCHEDULE IMPACTS IF GASSY MINE STANDARDS WERE TO BEIMPOSED
COST, SCHEDULE, AND OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF ARGER DIAMETEISECOND SHAFT
<~~~
/
, I--
I ;�- 4'1 .74,
,J21t
, � I
PSEG- 223-Piereq.24
REVIEW OBJECTIVES
CONFIRM THE FOLLOWING:* DESIGN CRITERIA FOR METHANE CONCENTRATION AND RELEASE RATE
* DESIGN CRITERIA FOR WATER INFLOW
* DESIGN CRITERIA FOR PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, HARDWARE, AND FACILITIESBEYOND THOSE CURRENTLY PLANNED
* REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL VENTILATION, DEWATERING, AND HOISTINGCAPABILITIES
* THE RANGE OF COST AND SCHEDULE IMPACTS IF GASSY MINE STANDARDSWERE TO BE IMPOSED
* THE RANGE OF COST, SCHEDULE, AND OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF A LARGERDIAMETER SECOND SHAFT
M~l, '. I' -I 2.f
REVIEW SCHEDULE
Ps8G- O21Iptereq K
ANALYZE DATA/PREPARE REPORTFLEXIBILITY
WATER INFLOW/METHANE
RELEASE RATE
GASSY MINEIMPACTS
SECOND SHAFTSIZE STUDY
PREPAREDESIGN
ANALYZE DATA/ INDEPENDENT, PREPARE REPORT- REVIEW
INDEPENDENT
ANALYZE DATA/PREPARE REPORT
ANALYZE DATA/PREPARE REPORT
P8G-021-Pterq 27
SAFETY PROTECTION PLAN
PS861023-Proreq 28
DESIGNCRITERIA
ZDESIGN
SOLUTION
LILY.~e
SAFETYPROTECTION
PLAN
CONSTRUCTIONAND
OPERATIONS
S
PSB 202-Prereq 29
THE SAFETY PROTECTION PLAN IDENTIFIESTHE SAFETY DOCUMENTATION WHICH ISREQUIRED FOR THE READINESS REVIEWS.
P58G-2023-Prereq30
SAFETY PROTECTION PLAN GOALS
* ANALYZE EXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITIES IN TERMS OFPOTENTIAL HAZARDS
* METHODS TO MITIGATE IDENTIFIED HAZARDS
PS86I*023lefeq t
-SAFETY PROTECTION PLAN ELEMENTS
* JOB SAFETY PLAN
* HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION
* SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
PS86-J02-Prelezi I2
JOB SAFETY PLAN
CONSTRU 9 TION CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITY
* EVALUATES HAZARDS OF JOB ELEMENTS
* PREVENTIVE MEASURES DETERMINEDI
MPu-2023 Pleeq 33
HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION
0 SAFETY-RELATED DESIGN CRITERIA AND DESIGN COMPLIANCE
* HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
* HAZARDS MITIGATION- DESIGN
- ENGINEERED HARRIER
- ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
* HAZARDS QUANTIFICATION- PROBABILITY
- CONSEQUENCES
- RISK
P!86 2023 Pereq.34
$AFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
* SAME FEATURES AS HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION ANDEVALUATION d
* PLUS COMME NTS RELATED TO:- SITE DESCRIPTION- QUALITY ASSURANCE- OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH- ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
INFORMATION FACTS REQUIRED FOR PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT ANDSYSTEM DESIGN, TO SUPPORT THE LICENSING PROCESS,AND TO RESOLVE ISSUES. INFORMATION IS GENERATEDBY SUCH ACTIVITIES AS:
* DIRECT OBSERVATION
* DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
* ENGINEERING STUDIES
* MODELING AND SIMULATION
DATA NEEDS THE INDIVIDUAL SITE PROPERTIES, SITE-RELATED EVENTSAND ENGINEERED SYSTEM DESIGN VARIABLES WHICH MUSTBE QUANTIFIED IN ORDER TO PRODUCE INFORMATION.
IDENTIFICATION OF INFO/DATA NEEDS
MUST BE:
* INDEPENDENT OF DESIGN OR EMPLACEMENT APPROACH
* WITHOUT PREJUDGEMENT OF SENSITIVITY OR IMPORTANCE
* NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR ALL APPLICATIONS
* TRACEABLE
METHOD:
* USE BASE THAT PROVIDES OBJECTIVITY
* SYSTEMATIC, DISCIPLINED. EXHAUSTIVE ANALYSIS
- A MISSION-BASED TREE -
DEFINITION OF TERMS
SYSTEM MISSION
FUNCTIONALREQUIREMENTS
THE PURPOSE OF THE SYSTEM; ie., TO PERMANENTLYISOLATE HIGH LEVEL WASTE FROM THE ACCESSIBLEENVIRONMENT
THE THINGS THE WASTE ISOLATION SYSTEM MUST DOOR PROVIDE TO SATISFY THE SYSTEM MISSION
* IDENTIFIED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEREQUIREMENTS TREE
* VALUES OR LIMITS ESTABLISHED LATER
REQUIREMENTS TREE DEVELOPMENT
AVOID:
* PRECONCEPTIONS
* PREJUDGEMENT OF SENSITIVITY OR IMPORTANCE
* DESIGN SOLUTIONS
a PROJECT FUNCTIONS AND TASKS
* PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENtS
REQUIREMENTS TREE DEVELOPMENT
CONTROLLING QUESTIONS
THE QUESTION YIELDS
WHAT MUST THE ISOLATION SYSTEM DOOR PROVIDE TO PERFORM THE MISSION)?
WHAT IS NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT TO
COMPLETELY SATISFY (THIS FUNCTIONAL
REQUIREMENT)
TOP-LEVEL FUNCTIONALREQUIREMENTS
FUNCTIONALREQUIREMENTS
WHAT IS (THIS REQUIREMENT, PROPERTY OR
PARAMETER) DEPENDENT ON?INFO/DATA NEEDS
BASALT MINED GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL SYSTEM MISSION
PERMANENTLYISOLATE HIGH-LEVEL
RADIOACTIVEWASTES FROMTHE ACCESSIBLEENVIRONMENT
7-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I 1.0 I
PROVIDE ANDOPERATE A HIGH-
LEVEL WASTEREPOSITORY
LIMITRADIONUCLIDERELEASE TO THE
ACCESSIBLEENVIRONMENT
If ~~I _ _ -I I .
I II 1 2 I 2.1 I 2.2 I. , . 2
OPERATEREPOSITORY
PROVIDE(CONSTRUCT)REPOSITORY
CONTAINRADIONUCLIDES
AND LIMIT RELEASERATE FROM THE
ENGINEEREDBARRIER SYSTEM
LIMIT MIGRATIONOF RADIONUCLIDES
FROM THEENGINEERED
BARRIER SYSTEMTO THE ACCESSIBLE
ENVIRONMENT
INITIALRADIONUCLIDE
INVENTORY
.
- I . E. F - V
I I1I
HANDLEWASTE
1 1.
PROVIDEPROCESSED
EMPLACEMENTAND CLOSURE
MATERIALS
I 12
PROVIDE GENERALPURPOSE SURFACE
FACILITIES ANDEQUIPMENt 1t
PROVIDESUBSURFACE
FACILITIES ANDEQUIPMENT
PROVIDE SURFACE-SUBSURFACE
COMMONFACILITIES AND
EQUIPMENT
.1 SUNIUAU NAITUALRACKGROUND
.1.1 SOtIOPHASERADM UGADIS
.1.2 VotAtI PHASE&ADmwtuaots
.2 SUSSUIrrAcE NIAVUALSACKGRtWODJ.t SOLIDPHASE
RADIWIUCuOES
JJ2. VOAit PASAoONUCI lIES
. fUMACUD WAfSt.3. 1 SD ASE
SAIONUCLDtiS
3. VOATI. PHASERADMNUlCDIOS
I I I I.' 1 2 4 1 2
PROVIDEOPERATIONS
SUPPORT SERVICES
CLOSE ANDDECOMMISSION
REPOSITORY
PROVIDE BULKMATERIALS
HANDLING ANDPROCESSING
fACILITIES ANDEQUIPMENT
PROVIDE WASTEHANDLING
fACILITIES ANDEQUIPMENT
.1 or a Information/Data Need PS84-2042-NWRB
July 29, 1985
PERMANENTLY ISOLATE HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
12.0 LIMIT RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE TO THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
LIMIT RELEASE CONTROL RADIONUCUDE NATURALLY INDUCEDBATE FROM THE RAINCIE RADIONUCLIDE TRANSPORTNAULYMNINUE
ENGINEERED RADIONUGIDE TRANSPORT INDUCEDCHANGES CHANGES INBARRIER SYSTEM MIGRATION THROUGH THE THROUGH THE IN RAOIONUCUDE RADIONUCIJDE(PROVIDED FOR IN SEAL SYSTEM HOST ROCK SURROUNDING FX FLUX
BRANCH 2.13) S SYSTMROCK
PS84-2042-2 .2
March 29, 1985
PERMANENTLY ISOLATE HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
I2.0 LIMIT RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE TO THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
2.2 LIMIT MIGRATION OF RADIONUCLIDES FROM THE ENGINEERED BARRIER SYSTEM tO THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
2.2.1 RADIONUCLIDE FLUX TO ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT PER NUCLIDE
J_ 2.2.1.1
CONTROLRADIONUCLDE
MIGRATIONTHROUGH SEAL
SYSTEM
I~
2.2.1.1.1
CONTROLRADIONUCLIDE
MIGRATIONTHROUGH SEAL
CONTROLRADIONUCLIDE
MIGRATIONTHROUGH
SEAVHOST ROCIINTERFACE
2.2.1.1.3 2.2.1.1.4CONTROL
RADIONUCLIDEMIGRATION LOCATIONS ANDTHROUGH ORIETATI OF
DISTURBED SEALSROCK ZONE
PS84-2042-22.1 1a
March 29, 1985
PERMANENTLY ISOLATE HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
l2.0 LIMIT RADIONUCLDE RELEASE TO THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
l2.2 LIMIT MIGRATION OF RADIONUCLIDES FROM THE ENGINEERED BARRIER SYSTEM TO THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
12.2.1 RADIONUCLIDE FLUX TO ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT PER NUCLIDE
l2.2.1.1 CONTROL RADIONUCLIDE MIGRATION THROUGH SEAL SYSTEM
2.2.1.1.1
CONTROLRADIONUCLIDE
MIGRATIONTHROUGH SEAL
1 2.2.1.1.t.1 | Z~~~~~~~~~~~~~.2.t 1N1.2
CONTROL CONTROLRADIONUCLIDE RAOIONUCLIDE
TRANSPORT MIlGRATIONTHROUGH SEAL BY THROUGH SEAL BYGROUNDWATER DIFFUSION
ADVECTION
PS84-2042-2 .2 .1. 1b
March 29, 1985
PERMANENTLY ISOLATE HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT£
2.0 LIMIT RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE TO THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
2.2 LIMIT MIGRATION OF RADIONUCLIDES FROM THE ENGINEERED BARRIER SYSTEM TO THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
2.2.1 RADIONUCLIDE FLUX TO ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT PER NUCLIDE
221.1 CONTROL RADIONUCLIDE MIGRATION THROUGH SEAL SYSTEM
2.2.1.11 CONTROL RADIONUCLIDE MIGRATION THROUGH SEAL1 21
* DOES CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXPLORATORY SHAFT AFFECTTHE ABILITY TO CHARACTERIZE THE SITE?
* DOES CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXPLORATORY SHAFT AFFECTTHE ABILITY TO ISOLATE WASTE?
* WHAT ARE THE MITIGATING MEASURES?
P... .. .: -fi-.. ".
SITE CHARACTERIZATION
DISCIPLINES
GEOLOGY
GEOHYDROLOGY
GEOCHEMISTRY
GEOMECHANICS
DATA ACQUISITIONPROGRAMS DATABASE
I _ I
.
__
DATA INTERPRETATION
* IMPACTS ON SITECHARACTERIZATION
* IMPACTS ON WASTEISOLATION
POTENTIAL IMPACTS MATRIX OF ES CONSTRUCTION ON SITE CHARACTERIZATION AND WASTE ISOLATION.
DATABASEMAJORINTERPRETATIONS
SITE CHARACTERIZATION IMPACTS ISOLATION IMPACTS_
NEAR FIELD FAR FIELD ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT
GEOLOGYBOREHOLEGEOPHYSICSREMOTE SENSINGOUTCROPS
STRAT IGRAPHYSTRUCTURE I NO I NOFRACTURE DENSITY I NO NO
NO
POTENTIAL 2,3,4,5
MINERAL ASSEMBLAGES POTENTIAL NO
SEISIICITY MICRO-SEISMICITY POTENTIAL NO
REGIONAL SEISIMICITY NO NO
QUIESIONS THAT1-5 |-MAY REQUIRE
MmGATION
TECTONICS STRUCTURALDEFORMATION
POTENTIAL No
VOLCANIC POTENTIAL NO NO
EROSION POTENTIAL NO NO
GEO-HYDROI OGY
GROUNDWATERLEVELS
GROUNDWATERCHEMISTRY
FLOW DIRECTION &GRADIENTS
POTENTIALFT
POTENTIAL
.......................................... ..... ....... . - --RECHARGE/DISCHARGE NO NORELATIONSHI PS NO
.......................................... _
GROUND WATERTRAVEL TIME
POTENTIALFr NO
- 4 4HYDRAULICPROPERTIES
hYDRAULIC CONDUCTIVITY POTENTIAL POTENTIALrij
STORATIVITYIPOTE TI1L P07ENTIAL T
EFFECTIVE POROSITY POTENTIAL NOI t I- i --
GEO-CHEMISTRY
CHEMICALREACTI VITY
RADIONUCLIDE TRANSPORT POTENTIAL
GEO- PHYSICAL EXTENr OF DRZNO NO POTENTIAL 2,3,4,5MIECIIANICS PROPERTIES ROCK STRENGTH NO NO NO
OPENING STABILITY NO NO NO
IN SITU STRESS NO NO NO
DEFORIIAT10t1 NO NO TBD
QUESTIONS REQPERFORMANCE
UIRING MITIGATION ANDASSESSMENT ANALYSIS
* WILL SHAFT SINKING NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE DETERMINATIONOF SITE HYDROLOGIC CHARACTERISTICS?
* HOW DOES CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXPLORATORY SHAFTAFFECT POSTCLOSURE SEALING CAPABILITY?
* HOW DOES TESTING IN THE EXPLORATORY SHAFTAFFECT POSTCLOSURE SEALING CAPABILITY?
FACILITY
* WHAT EFFECTS WILL EXPLORATORY SHAFT CONSTRUCTIONHAVE ON THE ISOLATION PERFORMANCE OF THE TOTALSYSTEM?
V WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL THAT THE SHAFTS WOULD BEPREFERENTIAL PATHWAYS TO THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT?
PSu 20.U J-Mv.: 4
ES TESTINGWORKSHOP
* ISSUES RESOLUTION
* RATIONALE FOR TESTING
* TESTING CATEGORY
* TEST DESCRIPTIONS
* TESTING SUFFICIENCY CRITERIA
* TESTING SCHEDULE
* TESTING SCALE LOGIC ;
* TESTING DATA ANALYSES
* PERFORMANCE ALLOCATION
4 COUPLED EFFECTS TESTING
ATTACHMENT 13
EFFECTS ON HYDROLOGYCHARACTERIZATIONR. M. CRAIG, STAFF ENGINEER
SITE ANALYSIS GROUP
ROCKWELL HANFORD OPERATION'S
IMPACT OF EXPLORATORY SHAFT ON SITEGEOHYDROLOGY
CHARACTERIZATION
* WILL CHANGE HYDRAULIC GRADIENTS
X COULD AFFECT INTERPRETATIONS- FLOW DIRECTIONS AND GRADIENTS (FACILITY AND SITE)- GROUNDWATER TRAVEL TIME (FACILITY)
- HYDRAULIC CONDUCTIVITY (FACILITY AND SITE)
- STORATIVITY (FACILITY AND SITE)
- EFFECTIVE POROSITY (FACILITY)
* IMPACT MITIGATED BY:- CONTROLLED DRILLING
- MONITORING PERTURBATION AND RECOVERY
ISOLATION
E MIGHT PROVIDE PREFERENTIAL PATHWAY FOR GROUNDWATERFLOW-
E MITIGATED BY SEALS DESIGN
PSel. ), . .V
ISSUE
WILL SHAFT SINKING NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE DETERMINATION OFSITE HYDROLOGIC CHARACTERISTICS?
RESPONSE
NOT ANTICIPATED BECAUSE BWIP IS FOLLOWING A PROGRAM TOMINIMIZE THE DISTURBANCES CAUSED BY SHAFT DRILLING
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO NRC QUESTION'S
Q. WILL DRILLING MUD AFFECT HYDROLOGIC TEST RESULTS?
A. YES, BWIP RECOGNIZE THE INVASION OF DRILLING FLUID CANIMPACT HYDROLOGIC TESTING. A PROGRAM TO MINIMIZETHESE IMPACTS WILL BE INSTITUTED DURING DRILLING OF THESHAFT.
Q. WILL HYDROLOGIC CONDITIONS IN NEARBY DRILL HOLES BEMEASURED DURING SHAFT CONSTRUCTION?
A. YES, WATER LEVELS WILL BE MONITORED WITHIN AND NEARTHE REFERENCE REPOSITORY LOCATION. THIS MONITORING ISPART OF THE OVERALL SITE CHARACTERIZATION.
ATTACHMENT 14
BWIP POSTCLOSUREPERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
B. SAGAR - " -C.,
R. R. SEITZ
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT
ROCKWELL HANFORD OPERATIONS
,.".. W.. , . I
PRELIMINARY POSTCLOSURE PERFORMANCEASSESSMENT OF SHAFTS
PRIMARY PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT CONCERNS
i WHAT EFFECT WILL THE EXPLORATORY SHAFTS HAVE ONTHE ISOLATION PERFORMANCE OF THE TOTAL SYSTEM?- WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL THAT THE SHAFTS WOULD BE PREFERENTIAL
PATHWAYS TO THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT?
rGu-J bog Vss 2
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF POSTCLOSUREPERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
* PRESENCE OF SHAFTS APPEAR TO AFFECT THEGROUNDWATER FLOW PATTERNS ONLY LOCALLY IN THEIMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE SHAFTS
v BUOYANCY DRIVING FORCE IS MUCH HIGHER IN THEREPOSITORY AREA THAN IN THE SHAFT REGION
0 RADIONUCLIDE MASS TRANSPORTED THROUGH THESHAFT APPEARS TO BE A SMALL FRACTION OF THE TOTALRELEASE (MASS PRIMARILY TRANSPORTED THROUGH THESITE).
THEREFORE
* BACKFILLED SHAFTS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO BEPREFERENTIAL PATHWAY
* ISOLATION PERFORMANCE OF THE TOTAL SYSTEM ISEXPECTED TO BE AFFECTED ONLY MARGINALLY BY THESHAFTS
zo1n. M.b I ', S f
TECHNICAL APPROACH
COMPUTER SIMULATION (PORFLO COMPUTER CODE)
POSTCLOSURE PERFORMANCE IS DEPENDENT ON THREECOUPLED PROCESSES:
* GROUNDWATER FLOW
* HEATTRANSFER AND BUOYANCY EFFECTS
* RADIONUCLIDE MIGRATION
ALL THREE PROCESSES ARE INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTERSIMULATION
Psuc M13 s.1 S
MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS FOR COMPUTERSIMULATION (CONT.)
2. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
* MODEL REPRESENTS VERTICAL CROSS SECTION THROUGH ACCESSDRIFT AND A TYPICAL SHAFT
* MODEL BOUNDARY AT WHICH VERTICAL RADIONUCLIDE FLUX ISCOMPUTED IS ARBITRARILY CHOSEN TO BE VANTAGE INTERBED(820 METERS BELOW SURFACE, 150 METERS FROM REPOSITORYHORIZON)
a MODEL BOUNDARY AT WHICH HORIZONTAL RADIONUCLIDE FLUX ISCOMPUTER IS ARBITRARILY LOCATED AT 165 METERS FROM THE EDGEOF THE REPOSITORY
a RELEASE BEGINS AT 6,000* YEARS. THE ENTIRE RADIONUCLIDEINVENTORY DISSOLVES INSTANTANEOUSLY IN THE WATERCONTAINED IN THE EMPLACEMENT- ROOMS AND DRIFT AND ATYPICAL SHAFT
*MEAN CONTAINER LIFETIME ESTIMATED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTANALYSIS (P-6-224) AND DOCUMENTED IN SAGAR, ETAL. (1984),SD-BWI-TA-01 2.
RESULTS OF COMPUTER SIMULATION
1. GROUNDWATER FLOW
d,"6 ,01 I....
CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF REPOSITORY SEALS SUBSYSTEM
?SHAFT REGION AND DAMAGED ROCK ZONE
8
-COMPOSITE LAYER. . . . az vTz.zAax Za* e s a xasZ ~ ZnX ~r V NA EITR E
* GROUNDWATER RELEASE PATTERNS APPEAR TO BEAFFECTED ONLY LOCALLY IN THE VICINITY OF THE SHAFT
* PREFERRED FLOW PATH FOR WATER PARTICLES LOCATEDIN THE ACCESS DRIFT IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE THROUGHTHE SHAFTS
* PREFERRED FLOW PATH FOR WATER PARTICLES LOCATEDAT THE BASE OF THE SHAFT (ABOVE THE DRIFT) ISEXPECTED TO BE THROUGH THE SHAFT UNTIL A FLOWTOP IS INTERCEPTED
aMEASURED AT VANTAGE INTERBED - APPROXIMATELY 150 METERS FROMREPOSITORY HORIZON
bASSUMES RELEASE FROM NINE IDENTICAL SHAFTSMEASURED AT BOUNDARY LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 165 METERS
DOWNSTREAM FROM REPOSITORY
i, .;c.U IS' II
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON RADIONUCLIDETRAN SPORT
* RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE THROUGH THE SHAFTS ISEXPECTED TO BE A SMALL FRACTION OF THE RELEASETHROUGH THE SITE
* THE EFFECT OF THE SHAFTS ON THE POSTCLOSUREPERFORMANCE OF THE TOTAL SYSTEM IS EXPECTED TO BESMALL
PSsMi-Ol-sys 12
PROGRAM STRATEGY
* ESTABLISH A POTENTIOMETRIC SURFACE BASELINE FOR SITECHARACTERIZATION PRIOR TO ANY LARGE-SCALE HYDRAULICSTRESS TESTING OR SHAFT DRILLING
* NO LARGE-SCALE HYDRAULIC STRESS TESTING WILL BECONDUCTED WHILE SHAFT SINKING IS BEING CONDUCTED INTHE GRANDE RONDE
* MUD LOSS WILL MINIMIZED FOR TECHNICAL AND ECONOMICREASONS
* TIME DURATION OF PRESSURE BUILD-UP IS SAME AS DURATIONOF PRESSURE DECLINE (RETURN TO PRE-DISTURBANCECONDITION)
* MONITOR PRESSURE AND WATER LEVEL RESPONSE IN LARGE-SCALE HYDRAULIC STRESS MONITORING FACILITIES DURINGDRILLING TO REMOVE THE TRANSIENT EFFECT OF DRILLINGFROM THE BASELINE
PSS6-2023-Visc.2
MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS FOR COMPUTERSIMULATION
1. DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS
* PLACEMENT ROOMS AND ACCESS DRIFTS ARE FILLED WITH CRUSHEDBASALT (HYDRAULIC CONDUCTIVITY - 3 x 10-5 M/S POROSITY = 25%
* LINER AND GROUT ARE REMOVED FROM THE SHAFTS
* SHAFTS ARE BACKFILLED WITH CRUSHED BASALT-BENTONITEMIXTURE (HYDRAULIC CONDUCTIVITY = 10-12 TO 10-10 M/S)
* HORIZONTAL HYDRAULIC GRADIENT IS ASSUMED TO BE ALIGNEDWITH THE LAYOUT OF THE DRIFTS
* THERE ARE NINE IDENTICAL SHAFTS
PS862023-Syi.5
ATTACHMENT 15
POSTCLOSURE SEALING OF THEEXPLORATORY SHAFT TEST
FACILITYE. A. FREDENBURG, MANAGER
REPOSITORY SEALS DEVELOPMENT GROUP
ROCKWELL HANFORD OPERATIONS
Ie. .':l J I 1 a-,I 1 I
PRESENTATION OUTLINE
DESCRIPTION AND REQUIREMENTS FOR POSTCLOSUREREPOSITORY SEALS
SEALING ISSUES RELATED TO THE EXPLORATORYSHAFT FACILITY
DESIGN CONCEPTS FOR SHAFT SEALING
f8stib201 i Aep 4
PREPARATION OF TECHNICAL PROCEDURES FORCONSTRUCTION
* WORK PROCEDURES REQUIRED FOR EXPLORATORY SHAFTCONSTRUCTION PHASE I - SD-BWI-AR-011- PROVIDES DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES
* LIST AND STATUS INCLUDED IN PRESENTATION PACKAGE
"afi. 7J0 I(. WI
I
DESCRIPTION AND REQUIREMENTS FORPOSTCLOSURE REPOSITORY SEALS
P"6-iO)}J-Hop
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR SHAFT AND BOREHOLESEALS (10 CFR 60.134)
A) GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIONSEALS FOR SHAFTS AND BOREHOLES SHALL BE DESIGNED SO THAT FOLLOWINGPERMANENT CLOSURE THEY DO NOT BECOME PATHWAYS THAT COMPROMISETHE GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY'S ABILITY TO MEETTHE PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVESFOR THE PERIOD FOLLOWING PERMANENT CLOSURE.
B) SELECTION OF MATERIALS AND PLACEMENT METHODSMATERIALS AND PLACEMENT METHODS SHALL BE SELECTED TO REDUCE, TO THEEXTENT PRACTICABLE:(i) THE POTENTIAL FOR CREATING A PREFERENTIAL PATHWAY FOR
GROUNDWATER TO CONTACT THE WASTE PACKAGES, OR(2) FOR RADIONUCLIDE MIGRATION THROUGH EXISTING PATHWAYS
Ps(.J-21 -kep 4
- -
LAYOUT OF PHASE 1 REPOSITORY RELATIVE TO ES FACILITY
* SMALLER RADIAL EXTENT OF DAMAGED ROCK, DUE TO LESSENERGY ABSORPTION, AND CONSEQUENTLY LESS FRACTURING
rsof. n;01 .W 9
COMPATIBILITY OF PRECLOSURE ANDPOSTCLOSURE SHAFT SEALS
* SHAFT LINER AND GROUT WILL BE REMOVED IN AREASDESIGNATED FOR POSTCLOSURE SEALING
f.X. otG X CI,) Ili
PN4-pTirc TOL
/lAA C4
REMNOVAL OF GROurO C EE-RE IND S T E L IE
CONCLUSIONS ON EFFECTS OF SHAFTCONSTRUCTION ON POSTCLOSURE SEALING
* PRELIMINARY DAMAGED AND STRESS-INDUCED ZONE MODELSARE CURRENTLY USED IN PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
* EXISTING MODELS WILL BE REFINED BASED ON RESULTS OFEXAMINATION OF IN SITU HYDRAULIC PROPERTIES IN THEDAMAGED AND STRESS-INDUCED ZONES DURING THEEXPLORATORY SHAFT TEST PROGRAM
* BLIND BORING FOR SHAFT CONSTRUCTION IS EXPECTED TORESULT IN A SMALLER DAMAGED ROCK ZONE THAN BLASTING
* SHAFT LINER AND GROUT MATERIALS, AND EMPLACEMENTTECHNIQUES DO NOT IMPACT POSTCLOSURE SEALINGCAPABILITY
PSLS G o 1 fi nt 1 l
-- -
COMPATIBILITY OF EXPLORATORY SHAFT TESTINGWITH POSTCLOSURE SEALING CAPABILITY
* EXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY DRIFTS AND TEST BOREHOLESARE CONTAINED ENTIRELY WITHIN THE COHASSETT FLOW
* BOREHOLES IN THE EXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY WILL BESEALED, AS REQUIRED, TO MEET SYSTEM PERFORMANCEREQUIREMENTS
CONCLUSION ON THE EFFECT OF EXPLORATORYSHAFT TESTING ON POSTCLOSURE SEALING
* TESTING IN THE EXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY WILL NOTCOMPROMISE THE WASTE ISOLATION CAPABILITY OF THEREPOSITORY
I>HhUdSO .S Rsp IS
DESIGN CONCEPTS FOR SHAFT SEALING
I M' Pto It.- .,. .,
SHAFT SEALING CONCEPT
DAMAGED ROCK ZONE
WF'I S1-al
ILLUSTRATION OF DRILLED CUTOFF METHOD FOR
SEALING THE DAMAGED ROCK ZOIIE
GROUTED BOREHOLES
CYST~~~~~~~ (IS LEVEL)damaged N
/ :-.LX \ \ 80~~~~~BREHOLESI e::::: @ an ~~~~~~~ISECOND AND THIRO LEVEL)
-K " ...... .... S BEFORE GROU TING DRILLEDTO OVERLAP FIRST-LEM!~
\ 2 X 1, .l ~~~~~HOLE
NOmh EACH HOLE IS GROUTED PROR TOPLAN VIEW ORILLING AOJACENT HOLES
ORIU PATTERN
VERTICAL SECTIONAT SHAFT
SECTION A.A'
VERTICAL SECTION6 m 120 FT) FROM SHAFT
SECTION 8-8'
NOTE NOT TO SCALE
ILLUSTRATION OF KERF METHOD FOR SCALINGBACK THE DAMAGED ROCK ZONE
SHAFT UNER
UMITOf damagedROCK ZONE
HOST ROC
SCALEDACX AREA
CROSS SECTIONVIEW OF SHAFT
NOTE NOTTO SCALE
SUMMARY
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXPLORATORY SHAFT, ANDTESTING TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE EXPLORATORY SHAFT FACILITY,ARE COMPATIBLE WITH POSTCLOSURE SEALING REQUIREMENTS
* DAMAGED ROCK ZONE AND STRESS-INDUCED ZONE MODELS ACCOUNT FORTHE EFFECTS OF SHAFT CONSTRUCTION
* PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE SHAFT SEAL INDICATES THAT SHAFT WOULDNOT BE A PREFERENTIAL PATHWAY
* PRECLOSURE SEALS ARE NOT INCORPORATED IN POSTCLOSURE SEAL DESIGN
* TEST BOREHOLES ARE CONTAINED WITHIN THE COHASSETT FLOW, ANDWOULD BE SEALED, AS REQUIRED, AT THE TIME OF DECOMMISSIONING
* THE DAMAGED ROCK ZONE AROUND THE SHAFT COULD BE SEALED, IFNECESSARY, TO MEET PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
N1. i It. ,. ,
ATTACHMENT 16
BASALT VASTE ISOLATIONPROJECT QUALITY ASSURANCE
OVERVIEWPIERRE SAGET, QUALITY ASSURANCE
BRANCH CHIEF
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - RICH LAND
ROCKWELL HANFORD OPERATIONS
APPLICABLE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY QUALITYASSURANCE PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS
DOCUMENTS
* DOE ORDER 5700.6A, "QUALITY ASSURANCE"
* DOE-RL ORDER 5700.1 A, "QUALITY ASSURANCE"
• OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT"tQUALITY MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND REQUIREMENTS"
* OFFICE OF GEOLOGIC REPOSITORIES "QUALITY ASSURANCEPLAN FOR SITING AND SITE CHARACTERIZATION," OGR/B-3
* QUALITY PERFORMANCE - DO IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME
* PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND QUALITY ASSURANCEARE INSEPARABLE
* THE BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT IS DEVELOPINGDISCIPLINED PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS
• THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS AREMINIMUMS
* LINE RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE- ACCOUNTABILITY RESTS WITH PROJECT OFFICE- INDEPENDENT REVIEW BY SEPARATE QUALITY ASSURANCE ORGANIZATION
* THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY EXPERIENCE
I"F 1 8'* - Il
DOE SAFETY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMQUALITY PERFORMANCE
* PLAN WHAT YOU DO* DO WHAT YOU PLAN* DOCUMENT WHAT YOU DID* EVALUATE YOUR PERFORMANCE* IMPROVE YOUR PLANS AND PERFORMANCE
1'S8df.2G02tsvl 16
I
BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECTQUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM ASSESSMENT
PROJECT OFFICE
* QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTPROGRESS HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALREVISED QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN BEING ISSUED TO HEADQUARTERS FORREVIEW AND APPROVALREQUIRED IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIEDOUTSTANDING PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IDENTIFIED FOR RESOLUTION
* QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATIONPREPARATION OF IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES INITIATED AND SCHEDULE FORCOMPLETION ESTABLISHEDCHALLENGES AHEAD TO COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAM PRIOR TOSUBMISSION OF SITE CHARACTERIZATION PLANVERIFICATION EFFORTS INTENSIFIED, RESULTING IN IDENTIFICATION OF AREASFOR IMPROVEMENT
s'. i .. , . r V..
BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECTQUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM ASSESSMENT
(CONT.)
PROJECT PARTICIPANTS
* QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT ANDIMPLEMENTATIONPROGRAM REQUIREMENTS IDENTIFIED TO PARTICIPANTSROCKWELL DEVELOPING ACTION PLANS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE PRIOR TOISSUANCE OF SITE CHARACTERIZATION PLAN
as V.* '" I II 1
AREAS INCLUDED IN QUALITY ASSURANCEPROGRAM APPLICATION TO EXPLORATORYSHAFT
* SITE SPECIFIC* DESIGN* PROCUREMENT (ITEMS AND SERVICES)* FABRICATION* HANDLING, SHIPPING, STORING
COMPONENTS* INSTALLING COMPONENTS* HARDWARE ACCEPTANCE TESTING* SITE CHARACTERIZATION DATA
COLLECTION* SITE CHARACTERIZATION DATA ANALYSIS* FACILITY OPERATIONS
VERIFICATION EFFORTS FOR EXPLORATORY SHAFTPREREQUISITES PROGRAM
A. QUALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES
B. QUALITY ASSURANCE PARTICIPATES IN READINESS REVIEW
PsB. 202 I S V ?
A. QUALITY ASSURANCE VERIFICATION OFACTIVITIES
1. REVERIFICATION OF PREVIOUSLY COMPLETEDPROCUREMENTS TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH ALLREQUIREMENTS
2. REVIEW AND APPROVAUCONCURRENCE OF DESIGN ANDDOCU M ENTS
3. PROCUREMENT QUALITY ASSURANCE/QUALITY CONTROL
4. SURVEILLANCE OF ARCHITECT-ENGINEER, CONSTRUCTIONMANAGER, AND FIELD ACTIVITIES
5. AUDITS OF ARCHITECT-ENGINEER, CONSTRUCTIONMANAGER, ROCKWELL, AND OTHERS
,... IlI ., I, S; ,.#- I
I
B. READINESS REVIEW ACTIVITY* QUALITY ASSURANCE IS STARTUP TEAM MEMBER
PERFORMING:
1. QUALITY ASSURANCE ITEMS FOR ACTION LIST
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH PHASE
3. VERIFY QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM APPROVAL FORCONSTRUCTION MANAGER, ARCHITECT-ENGINEER,ROCKWELL, AND OTHERS
4. EXPLORATORY SHAFT-I AND 11 INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCEPLANS
5. LESSONS LEARNED FROM EACH PHASE IN EXPLORATORYSHAFT-I INTEGRATED INTO RELATED PHASE EXPLORATORYSHAFT-Il
6. REVIEW OF RECORD PACKAGES
I..,q, . ' d. St*
PREPARATION OF TECHNICAL PROCEDURES FORCONSTRUCTION
¢ WORK PROCEDURES REQUIRED FOR EXPLORATORY SHAFTCONSTRUCTION PHASE I - SD-BWI-AR-01 1- PROVIDES DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES
S LIST AND STATUS INCLUDED IN PRESENTATION PACKAGE
MPsli-0}17 1 . t-r I
ATTACHMENT 17
QmLIST
KARL HADLEY, MANAGER
REPOSITORY LICENSING GROUP
ROCKWELL HANFORD OPERATIONS
r5u6 1023 I
Q-LIST
* STATUS OF Q-LIST METHODOLOGY
* Q-LIST CRITERIA
* TYPES OF EXPLORATORY SHAFT SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES, ANDCOMPONENTS
* CLASSIFICATION OF EXPLORATORY SHAFT SYSTEMS,STRUCTURES, AND COMPONENTS
STATUS OF Q-LIST METHODOLOGY
* NRC/DOE MEETING IN JULY 1985
* REDRAFT IN PROGRESS
* NRC/DOE MEETING IN EARLY 1986
'58t. 10) i I
Q-LIST CRITERIA
USING ENGINEERING JUDGMENT AT THE SITE CHARACTERIZATIONPLAN STAGE AND ANALYSIS AT THE LICENSE APPLICATION STAGE,A SYSTEM, STRUCTURE, OR COMPONENT IS DETERMINED TO BE AQ-LIST ITEM IF IT IS:
* IMPORTANT TO SAFETY
OR
* IMPORTANT TO ISOLATION
i"8 n? I I
IMPORTANT TO SAFETY
o PRECLOSURE PERIOD
* ENGINEERED SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES, AND COMPONENTS
* ESSENTIAL TO PREVENTION OR MITIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT
* RADIATION EXPOSURE (0.5 rem) IN THE UNRESTRICTED AREA
I
IMPORTANT TO ISOLATION
• POSTCLOSURE PERIOD
* OVERALL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE- ENGINEERED BARRIER SYSTEM AND SHAFT/BOREHOLE SEALS- ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY STANDARDS
* PARTICULAR BARRIERS' PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES- WASTE PACKAGE CONTAINMENT- ENGINEERED BARRIER SYSTEM CONTROLLED RELEASE- PREEMPLACEMENT GROUNDWATER TRAVEL TIME
TYPES OF EXPLORATORY SHAFT SYSTEMS
* TEMPORARY ENGINEERED SYSTEMS- NOT FOR USE DURING REPOSITORY OPERATION
.-. a~ ~~~~ ~ ~~~ ( to ,} .4 I , , . %e
> to . l i I
* SEMIPERMANENT ENGINEERED SYSTEMS- REMAIN IN PLACE DURING REPOSITOKY OPERATION
* PERMANENT NATURAL SYSTEMS- PORTION OF SITE PERFORMING ISOLATION FUNCTION
* T I V\ C \ \ i. I i . >, y -. -ft. 8 . N.C \, i. /, - .s,,
j'i t...l. I' ' '
tL , . , X 3l~
P, Ad. .P7!
I
EXAMPLES OF EXPLORATORY SHAFT SYSTEMS
a TEMPORARY ENGINEERED SYSTEMS- HOISTS- VENTILATION- DEWATERING- LIGHTING- COMMUNICATION- FIRE PROTECTION- ELECTRICAL POWER AND RELATED INSTRUMENTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS
X SEMIPERMANENT ENGINEERED SYSTEMS- SHAFT LINER, GROUT, AND OPERATING SEALS- ROOF SUPPORTS
D PERMANENT ENGINEERED SYSTEMS- LONG-TERM SHAFT AND BOREHOLE SEALS
* PERMANENT NATURAL SYSTEMS- UNDERGROUND FACILITY OPEMINGS- DAMAGED ROCK ZONE- DISTURBED ROCK ZONE- UNDISTURBED ROCK ZONE
CLASSIFICATION OFEXPLORATORY SHAFT SYSTEMS
* NO ENGINEERED ITEMS PERFORM AN IMPORTANT-TO-SAFETYFUNCTION DURING EXPLORATORY SHAFT OPERATIONBECAUSE:- NO HIGH-LEVEL WASTE WILL BE PLACED IN THE EXPLORATORY SHAFT
* NO ENGINEERED SYSTEMS PERFORM AN IMPORTANT-TO-SAFETY FUNCTION DURING REPOSITORY OPERATION BECAUSE:- REPOSITORY SYSTEMS WILL REPLACE "TEMPORARY" EXPLORATORY SHAFT
SYSTEMS- FAILURE OF SEMIPERMANENT EXPLORATORY SHAFT SYSTEMS DURING
REPOSITORY OPERATION SHOULD NOT CAUSE ACCIDENTS WITHRADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
- PERMANENT SYSTEMS ARE INSTALLED AT END OF PRECLOSURE PERIOD
* NO TEMPORARY OR SEMIPERMANENT ENGINEERED SYSTEMSPERFORM AN IMPORTANT-TO-ISOLATION FUNCTION
,.. ,,,, Fa ..
EXPLORATORY SHAFT Q-LIST
* LONG-TERM SHAFT AND BOREHOLE SEALS- TO BE INSTALLED UPON CLOSURE OF REPOSITORY IN SAME MANNER AS FOR
REPOSITORY SHAFTS AND BOREHOLES
* NATURAL SYSTEMS- MINIMIZE, DOCUMENT, AND CHARACTERIZE EXTENT OF EXPLORATORY SHAFT
BASALT WASTE ISOLATION PROJECT ENGINEERINGDESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
ROCKWELL HANFORD OPERATIONS
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~q.ti
QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVELS
QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVEL I
* CONTROLS THOSE STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, ANDACTIVITIES THAT ARE:1. DETERMINED TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY
WITHIN RESTRICTED AREA, WORKER INDUSTRIAL SAFETY, PROJECT SCHEDULECOST, SECURITY, OR FIRE PROTECTION
2. DETERMINED TO MEETTHE DEFINITIONS OF EITHER IMPORTANTTO SAFETYOR TO WASTE ISOLATION
* REQUIRES IMPLEMENTATION OF EACH APPLICABLEREQUIREMENT OF ALL APPLICABLE CRITERION OF BQARD
e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.. .Btp
QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVELS (CONT.)
QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVEL II
o CONTROLS THOSE STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, ANDACTIVITIES THAT IMPACT RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY WITHINRESTRICTED AREA, WORKER INDUSTRIAL SAFETY, PROJECTSCHEDULE, OR COST
o REQUIRES A GRADED IMPLEMENTATION OF APPLICABLENQA-1 -1 983 BASIC AND SELECT NONMANDATORYREQUIREMENTS OF APPLICABLE CRITERIA
, - -S5,, t}.,~1' ~
QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVELS (CONT.)
QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVEL III
* CONTROLS THOSE STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, ANDACTIVITIES THAT HAVE NO IMPACT ON RADIOLOGICAL SAFETYWITHIN RESTRICTED BOUNDARY AND MINIMAL IMPACT ONWORKER INDUSTRIAL SAFETY, PROJECT SCHEDULE, OR COST
* REQUIRES A GRADED IMPLEMENTATION OF APPLICABLENQA-1-1983 BASIC AND SELECT SUPPLEMENTARYREQUIREMENTS OF APPLICABLE CRITERIA, OR APPROVED EQUAL
, sn XV OAl .1
QUALITY LEVEL CATEGORIZATION
PLACE ITEMON Q LIST
SELECT
DOCUMENT APPLICABLE D QA RATIONALE FOR _ CRITERIA AND DEPARTMENT
CATEGiORIZATION DOCUMENT REVIEW ANDRATIONALE FOR ENCONCURRENCENONSELECTION
I DOCUMENT APPLICABLE DETERMINE QAYES b RATIONALE FOR CRITERIA AND DEGREE OF EACH DEPARTMENT
CATEGORIZATION DOCUMENT CRITERION REVIEWANDRATIONALE FOR IMPLEMENTATION CONCURRENCE
SELECTION
DOCUMENT APPLIABLEDETERMINE QARATIONAL FOR -- _ CRITERIA AND _DEGREE O EACH DEPARTMENT
10CATEGORIZATION DOCUMENT _ CRITERION REVIEW AND_ RATIONALE FOR IMPLEMENTATION CONCURRENCE
SELtCTIONF-
I
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVEL
LEVEL I LEVEL 11 LEVEL III
A. WILL CREDIBLE FAILURE OR WILL CREDIBLE FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION THERE IS NO CREDIBLE RADIO-MALFUNCTION OF ITEM TYPICALLY OF ITEM TYPICALLY RESULT IN A RADIO- LOGICAL RISK.RESULT IN A RADIOLOGICAL DOSE TO LOGICAL DOSE TO ANY INDIVIDUAL INANY INDIVIDUAL IN EXCESS OF EXCESS OF 300 mrem?1.25 rem?
B. WILL CREDIBLE FAILURE OR WILL CREDIBLE FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION THERE IS NO ANTICIPATED WORKERMALFUNCTION OF ITEM TYPICALLY OF ITEM TYPICALLY RESULT IN AN MSHA OR INDUSTRIAL HAZARD.RESULT IN A FATAL ACCIDENT? OSHA REPORTABLE ACCIDENT?
C. WILL CREDIBLE FAILURE OR WILL CREDIBLE FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION THE COST IMPACT OF CREDIBLEMALFUNCTION OF AN ITEM, OR OF ITEM, OR REJECTION OF THE ITEM OR FAILURE IS <500K DOLLARS.REJECTION OF THE ITEM OR ACTIVITY ACTIVITY TYPICALLY INCREASE THETYPICALLY INCREASE THE PROJECT PROJECT BY > 500K 1.000K?COST BY > 1,000K DOLLARS?
D. WILL CREDIBLE FAILURE OR WILL CREDIBLE FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION THE PROGRAMMATIC IMPACT OFMALFUNCTION OF AN ITEM, OR OF ITEM, OR REJECTION OF THE ITEM OR CREDIBLE FAILURE IS <THREEREJECTION OF TIIE ITEM OR ACTIVITY ACTIVITY TYPICALLY RESULT IN A MONTHS.TYPICALLY RESULT IN A PROGRAM- PROGRAMMATIC IMPACT OF MORE THANMATIC IMPACT OF > SIX MONTHS? THREE MONTHIS?
CAN THE ACTIVITY PLACE AT RISK CAN THE ACTIVITY PLACE AT RISK THERE IS NO REGULATORY IMPACT.COMPLIANCE WITH A REGULATORY COMPLIANCE WITII.A REGULATORYREQUIREMENT WITH ITS OR ITWI REQUIREMENT OTHER THAN ONE WITH ITSCONSEQUENCES? OR ITWI CONSEQUENCES?
- IF NON-CORED, CONTINUOUSLYMONITOR DRILL PERFORMANCE TOEVALUATE IF HOLE IS PENETRATING LESSCOMPETENT ROCK, ANOMALOUSFEATURES AND/OR FLOW TOP 3 2 3 3 - - 3
- IF CORED, CONTINUOUSLY MONITORDRILL PERFORMANCE AND EXAMINECORE TO EVALUATE IF HOLE ISPENETRATING LESS COMPETENT ROCK,ANOMALOUS FEATURES AND/OR FLOWTOP 3 2 3 3 - - 3
3 ELECTRIC POWER - 13.8 kV OVERHEAD/MCC/LIGHTING/STANDBY GENERATOR/GROUNDING
2 WATER SUPPLY - FIRE PROTECTION
3 WATER SUPPLY - PROCESS/POTABLE
3 SANITARY SYSTEM - SEPTIC TANKS/DRAIN FIELDS
3 FOUNDATIONS AND SUPPORTS - PAD/COLLAR
2 SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS
0 SECOND ORDER MONUMENTS
3 CONDUITS AND CABLEWAYS
3 DRILLING MUD
3 MUDPITS
3 TESTING, SETUP
2 TESTING, PENETRATIONS
1 TESTING, DATA
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 X X X X X X
xX X X
K X
x x
K K
K X
K X X K K K K
K
K X X K K X K K
X
X
X X X X X X X X X X X X
I
X K K X X K K K K
x K K K X K K K K
K K K K X K X K X
x
K K X K K K K X
K K K K K X K X
K X K K K X K X
K
K
K
2 EXCAVATIONS
STARTER HOLE
2 UPPER SHAFT (112)*
1 MAIN SHAFT
2 MAIN SHAFT- OTHER*
MAIN SHAFT - INTERNALS
2 DEWATER DISCHARGE
DEWATERING, OTHER
VENTILATION SYSTEM
2 HOIST SYSTEM
HOIST SYSTEM, OTHER
STANDBY SYSTEM
2 COMMUNICATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS, OTHER
2 ELECTRIC POWER
ELECTRIC POWER. OTHER
2 WATER SUPPLY
WATER SUPPLY, OTHER
SANITARY SYSTEM
FOUNDATIONS AND SUPPORTS
2 SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS*
Q SECOND ORDER MONUMENTS*
DRILLING MUD
MUDPITS
TESTING, SET UP
2 TESTING. PENETRATIONS
CONDUITS AND CABLEWAYS
1 TESTING DATA*
X X X X X X X X X
K K K K X K K X K K K X K K
K K K K K K X K K K K K K K*TO BE DETERMINED.
I
ATTACEIIENT 19
MEETING REPORT
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY/NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WORKSHOPEXPLORATORY SHAFT DESIGN
Date/Location of Meeting
December 3-4, 1986, Richland, Washington
Attendees/Organizational Affiliation
See Attachment 1.
Background/Facts
The agenda for the meeting, indicating the items discussed, is provided inAttachment 2.
The material reviewed, exchanged, and discussed is provided in Attachment 3 (copiesof the viewgraphs utilized and additional handouts).
Observations
1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
( Background material presented described the basis for selection of the\ Reference Repository Location, the selection of the Exploratory Shaft (ES)
location, and selection of the repository host rock.
Information was provided to answer specific Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)S questions regarding selection of the ES location and selection of the reposi-
tory horizon, including flow top variability and vertical flexibility.
The NRC did not object with the view that representativeness of the ES locationcould only be evaluated on the basis of data during the overall site character-ization plan.
2. Department of Energy
-t The Basalt Waste Isolation Project (BWIP) advised NRC of an ES design criteriatask force to reexamine the rationale and bases for selected ES Facility designcriteria. For example, water inflow, methane, system capacity margin to handlefuture programmatic needs, etc. The NRC did not object to this approach.
The NRC also asked if a determination of the adequacy of the piezometricbaseline will be made prior to beginning the drilling of the ESs. The BWIP hasadopted a strategy with prior concurrence from NRC of ascertaining a consensusbaseline for purposes of hydrologic testing prior to the start of drilling.The Department of Energy (DOE) will consult with NRC with respect to ground-water level baseline conditions at a planned meeting on Monday, December 9.1985.
The NRC recognized that in situ stress was not used in determining ES location.
A preliminary shaft sealing concept was presented which incorporates use of acrushed rock/bentonite clay backfill material between the shaft bottom and theVantage interbed, except at flow tops where the liner and grout would remain,if necessary, to limit groundwater inflow during construction of the seals.The NRC expressed concerns that those portions of the preclosure operationalseals that will be left in place were being used to serve a postclosure sealingfunction, and were not accounted for in the performance analysis of postclosureseals. The DOE stated that (1) no credit would be taken for remaining portionsof preclosure seals, (2) the potential efforts of preclosure sealing materialson postclosure seal design would be evaluated and accounted for, and (3) if thepreclosure seals had been explicity accounted for in the performance assess-ment, presented results and conclusions would not be significantly differentsince such zones are of limited extent. The NRC was satisfied with thisexplanation. No reservations were expressed with the concept of leaving groutand liner in place above the Vantage interbed, and with reliance on a singlematerial, i.e., crushed rock/bentonite clay backfill, for postclosure sealingof shafts and drifts.
The NRC strongly advocated that performance analysis should be closely tied torepository seals design, including establishment of design criteria. Amethodology and resulting numerical criteria was presented providing designrequirements for seals components, based on the functions of those components.The resulting criteria for drift seals is to limit the contaminated flow frac-tion entering the shafts to 1% or less. The criteria for the shaft seals is tolimit groundwater travel time to the Vantage interbed to 1,000 years or longer.These criteria are consistent with criteria previously established inSD-BWI-CR-15, and were accepted as reasonable and conservative.
The NRC concurred with the DOE approach of requiring all systems associatedwith importance to safety and waste isolation be controlled under Quality LevelI and BWIP's provision for applying Quality Level I to selected non Q-Listeditems.
Concerns were expressed that measures which might be taken to remove thedamaged rock zone would result in a further enlargement of the damaged rockzone. The NRC and DOE agree that such an effect must be considered in finalseals design, and should be avoided if it can be conclusively demonstrated thatrepository release requirements can be met without resort to such measures.
The NRC expressed general concurrence with the BWIP performance assessmentmodeling approach of using probabilistic analyses to address uncertainty wherepossible and sensitivity analyses with deterministic models otherwise.
The NRC expressed support for the concept of preliminary performance assessmentof the seal subsystem, as presented during the workshop and encouragedadditional analysis to test parameter sensitivity and to evaluate otherscenarios.
The NRC concurred that water inflow (into the ES Facility) calculations are notimportant to radiological safety or waste isolation.
Most of NRC's comments concerning hydrologic testing are more appropriatesubjects of the forthcoming Hydrology Workshop.
-Il
;/ II l
i;
3a. State of Washington
None.
3b. State of Oregon
None.
3c. Yakima Indian-Nation
The representative expressed appreciation for the invitation and opportunity toparticipate.
I'%' 3d. Representatives from the Nez Perce Tribe and the Confederated Tribes of\\ Umatilla Indian Reservation did not attend.
\ Agreements
. \.The NRC indicated an interest in participating in the major ES readiness reviews.
\ Open Items
\ A question as to whether BWIP is planning to place a tracer(s) in the drillingfluid to monitor its migration during drilling of the ESs was raised by NRC. Atpresent, BWIP has no plans to do this, but will consider this for inclusion withinthe hydrology Site Characterization Program.
= OBSERVATIONS
I. It is encouraging to note that DOE has used Performance Assessment as aczol in support of Exploratory Shaft Design. However, ES-1 and E-2 design,couments provided to NRC reflect a omplete absence of such analyses.
_. The aroach presented by DOE for assessing post-closure performance of the-:ploratory Shaft System appears reasonable. As recognized by both DOE andNR, a systems analysis addressing a range of significant processes and eventsneeds to be employed to support the ES design.
-. DE recognizes that ES construction may perturb the pre-waste emplacement:_diticns of the natural system (e.g., hydraulic gradients and properties).O-jweierq no analyses were presented to asess the ignificance of these_erturbations which could preclude adequate characterization of the system.
En -hould present analyses to demonstrate that ES construction does not:raclude de-ensiblecharacterization of the natural system.
7. COE stated that the Cohassett lot- is the only flow under consideration fornoating th repository. Additionally, DOE considers that it is possible to
''.-u witiin the v__icular zone. Howaver, the analyses supporting thi s.- e. ied D'E position were not provided. No determination on the cceptability.tF _iacing waste pack:ages in the vesicular zone was made by DE.
_. __tate-d that testing in the Eploratory Shaft Facilities will not_.moi. the aste iolation apability of the repository. However, no
_Lt =Z C r-- -_ analyses wer-e p-ovided. Such analyses , be provided by DOE in
_" -'~ _lra-ims that eineering measures beyond reasonable availabie technolog,- -t eu ncessary to conitr uct the exploratory saft within a high stress
nas ' -C nvJironmrient associ ated with the borehole spalling and coredii;i.,g observed in the RRL, and particularly at the ES shaft location.H.os-sever, no contingency plans have been presented to address tight holeconditions caused by roc: bursts, rock falls, and high in-situ tresses.
? . -lthough DOE's approach to estimate groundwater inflow appears reasonable,")_ should present documentation of the analyses and selection of ssufMed_eobogic features and associated hydrologic parameter values to support theseS-ti mates.
hat ES construction would not affect isolation capability ofthe site. RC does not agree that this has been adequately demonstrated.The-refore, in view of the preliminary nature of the analyses conducted todats, it is prudent to apply Quality Assurance procedures consistent withlOFr:50 Appendix B requirements to _ activities related to ES design andconstruction that may affect radiological safety or isolation,.until such timeas performance analyses demonstrate insignificant effect.
-14 <YL7r-c, e°. The level of documentation of design ac ivities was discuss fd.An examplWwas the level of documentation needed for Functional nalyses.YNRC noted therationale for potential engineering data needs produced during Funct onalmnalyses is an example of an area where a ditional documentation is desirable.Sel.-ed to this cbservation NRC oncludes a procedUre or a A policy which.ddrese5 reqUirements for documenta.tion of all design a-ctivities related tosafty or i .ation is needed to assure the degree o dcumentation in allwork is co-siEstent with NRC A requirements arid to provide Ct ehicle for-urther staff review.
10. The NRC agrees with the use of pre-requiste plansv incorporating readinessreviews and hold points Lo provide rmanagement oversight to define, assess andschedule activities that are necessary precursors to key site activities, suchas ES cnstruction. Such pre-requiste plans should not only look at discreteactivities but also consider the interface between activities in varioustechnical areas.
1i. DOE presented various viewgraphs concerning Quality Assurance plans forfuture application as well as current activities. Because of the constraintDf time there was no discussion of the presentation to fully understand theDOE presentations. Hence NRC will further review the DOE viewgraphs andprovide comments to DOE on their current activies and their planning viaseparate orrespcndence.
1. In gneral, DOE needs to provide performance analyses to support:Csi tions being tk'n. NRC i nt able t provide maningful cmments on Eposi tions without riewing the rat ionale supporting the position. Tl-e NRCrealizes that for preliminary psi!Lons this may only involve nominal or_ensitivity Studies.
NRC empressed concerns that t rationale behind porthole orientation in:' same lartical plane would only prcvid a -Dimensional haract-rization.
7-i _,=hou1 d a addr-essed ir, thi ETP n-eting.
14. DOE iBho~ld ____ ____ the physical and chemicalcharactisticz of the short termAseals since they may affect integrity of longt--rm i1ation.
IZJ, ?rr to initiation of ES constrLuctcn, DE suld deternine hct:draulic baseline is adequate for determination o pre-waste emplacment--rsundwater ti-avel time.
Pi SEEMENTS C'Pi17o v
1. The NRC that priority should be given to set up a meeting on
EWIP systems and performance assessment methodology. Such a meeting is needed
to ma:imize the effectiveness of meetings on specific technical topics.
2. DOE will provide NRC with the following: Barton Report, 185 Revision; SD
'JWI TI 112; SD ER 0b; SD TA 15; and Study 1.
N:C wil provide DOE with a copy of the report by Aimerican Colloid indicating
that Zement/tentonite mi> tures are more permeable than either cement or
) ;tcOit alone.
23E Sill present in the up coming STF meeting their rationale for the
przpmtsed testing and an analysis of the effect
o- testing on long term isolation and site characterization No documented
analyses of the effect of such testing have been provided to date to NRC.
rAO4 /(S+. DOE Ad provide NRC with a document outlining their list and 0 level
methodolouies to further support presentations given at this meeting.
ja f2 _~ / IU < >2 , z~h
SOURCE OF QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMCRITERIA
10 CFR 60, SUBPART G
10CFR 50, APPENDIX B
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION REVIEW PLAN FORSITE CHARACTERIZATION