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Henr i -Pau l Cunn ingham
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Maritain, Gilson, and the Ontology of Knowledg
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S t
. Thom as and Pre-Conceptual K nowledg e
Lawrence Dewan, o
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Etudes maritainiennes/Maritai
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2 2
1
ST
. THOMAS AND PRE-CONCEPTUA
L
I N T E L L E C T I O
N
Lawrence Dewan, o
.p
Co118ge dominicain de philosophie et de thdologi
e
Questions 84 to 89, in the
Sum ma theologiae, prima pars,
o f S t
Thomas Aquinas have, it seems to me, a good claim to be the firs
t
system atic treatise, in our philosophical tradition, on the human act o
f
understanding
. Obviously not a mere commentary on the relevant part
s
of the
De anima
of Aristotle, neither are they on altogether the sam
e
lines as treatises like A lbert the Great
s
De intellectu et intelligibili
.
T h
e
discussion is divided into five questions on the act of understanding, a
s
performed by the soul when united with the body, and one question o
n
intellection by the separated soul
. The five questions comprise, first o
f
all, three on the human intellection of corporeal things, then one on ou
r
intellection of the human soul itself and the things to be found in it (suc
h
as intellection), with lastly a question on our understanding of thing
s
which are higher in the order of being than the human soul itself
. Thus
we have an order of discussion appropriate to the nature of huma
n
intellection (as taught in the treatise), as taking its start from th
e
knowledge of bodies, and moving from them to itself and things abov
e
itself
The three questions on understanding bodily reality constitute
thus, the largest part and the foundation for the discussion as a whole
In them, the order is such that the first speaks of the principle of our ac
t
of
understanding
bod ie s, na m e ly th e
species
in te l l ig ib i l i s
i t s e x i s t e n c e ,
c a u s e s a n d n a t u r e
; t h e s e c o n d s p e a k s o f t h e a c t ' s a b st r a c t i v e m o d e , a n
d
h a s q u e r i es c o n c e r n i n g o r d e r i n s u c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g
; a n d t h e t h i r d a s k
s
a b o u t t h e p r e c i s e t a r g e t s , i n b o d i l y t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , w h i c h a r e a t t a i n e
d
b y t h i s c o g n i t i o n
. T h e o r d e r i s t h u s o n a p a t t e r n o f b e g in n i n g , m i d d l
e
a n d e n d o f t h e a c t
. W e s h o u l d , h o w e v e r , m e n t i o n t h e r o l e o f t h e v e r
y
f i r s t a r t i c l e o f t h e v e r y f i r s t q u e s t i o n , c r u c i a l fo r a l l t h e r e s t : d o e s t h
e
s o u l t h r o u g h i n t e l l e c t k n o w b o d i e s ? I s t h e r e a n y s u c h t h i n g a s i n t e l le c t i o
n
o f b o d i e s , o r w a s P l a t o r i g h t , a n d i s in t e l l e c t i o n r e a l ly a b o u t s o m e t h i n
g
e l s e , a h i g h e r o r d e r o f b e i n g s ?
I have said all this to call attention to the systematic character o
f
this treatise on the human act of understanding
. One would expect t
o
find in it Thomas Aquinas
s most important v iews on the m atter
Now, at this point I wish to draw attention to a phenomeno
n
among writers on St
. Thomas, viz how much has been written in thi
s
century on Thoma s
'
s views on knowledge , and more part icula r ly on tha
t
i tem called the concept
or the inner (or mental) word
; and there is
a somewhat associated topic, the divine ideas
. This interest is no
t
surprising, since Thomas, particularly in his teachings on the Trinity o
f
persons in God, has written extensively on the mental word or inne
r
word or concept
. He also has lots to say about the divine ideas
.
However, much of the writing by others on these matters has had as it
s
f o cu s T ho mas
s theory of knowledge, and one sees discussions which i
n
Thomas himself only arose in a Trinitarian context now introduced t
o
interpret his v iews on knowledge in general
What I wish to underline is that, in the aforementioned treatise o
n
human understanding, one finds in the whole of it only one small repl
y
to an objection giving
ex professo
attention to what Thomas elsewher
e
calls the concept
or "mental word
. The present paper takes its ris
e
from this interesting situation
. A recent paper, typically bearing on th
e
raison d'2tre
of the mental word according to St
. Thomas, notes thi
s
failure of Thomas to discuss the word in qq
84-89
with momentary
surprise, but then immediately shrugs off the situation by suggestin
g
that, after all, enough had been said about it elsewhere in the
prima
pars .'
It is just this sort of solution which I wish to question
. I believ
e
that the silence of S t
. Thomas on the concept in this treatise i
s
deliberate, and that it has to do with how he thinks the human act o
f
understanding ought to be p resented
.
It i s generally appreciated that Thom as underwent a developmen
t
of doctrine regarding the mental word or concept,
but less attention ha
s
been pa id to th is same deve lopment as a changing conception of the rol
e
of that other form of the known in the knower, what Thomas calls th
e
'Tirot, Dom
Paul, O .S .B
.,
La raison d'etre du verbe mentale dans la pens6
e
de saint Thomas ,
Doctor Communis
1994, 3-21, at p
. 1 5
. In fact, he sees onl
y
that it is no t discussed in 1
.85.2
. It does not seem to strike him that it is absen
t
from the who le treatise
'See the bibliography at the end of the paper
. Ch@ nevert is most aware of th
e
changing conception
of the SI. Lonergan is
moving towards
what
I am proposing
i .e
. a pre-conceptua
l
character for the fundamental act of knowing, though
I
suspect him still of a sort of interiorism
of intellection
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22 2
D e w a n
: St
T h o m a s a n d P r e - c o n c e p t u a l In t e l le c t i o
n
species intelligibilis [SI]
.
I wish to highlight
this development as a
n
increasingly important role for the SI, so that
it
becomes the sta
r
performer in Thomas
s conception of the nature of the act o
f
understanding
I will call attention to a string of texts, stretching from end to en
d
of Thomas's career
. Some are taken from discussions of divin
e
knowledge, and some are taken from discussions of Averroes' doctrin
e
of the u nity of the intellect for the entire
h u m a n race
. What I propose i
s
that they start with a
confusion
of the SI and the concept (I wil
l
henceforth use that term, in the main, for the other item)
; that Thoma
s
then sharply
distinguishes between them (all the while giving the concep
t
a central role in the act of
knowledge)
;
and that finally the act i
s
understood as of such a nature that the SI must be featured, while th
e
concept, however important for the inner life of the mind, is eliminate
d
from the explanation of the very act of understanding
I suppose, a t the ou tset, that everyone is f amiliar wi th such a tex
t
a s
Summa contra gentiles ["SCG"]
1
.53, in its third redaction. In thi
s
famous
locus
in the
autograph
of the
SCG,
Thomas wrote, struck out
,
and rewrote the chapter, only to com e back som etime later to strike ou
t
the second redaction and write in the margin still a third
. I mention i
t
because it is a
painstaking
presentation of the human act o
f
understanding as involving two likenesses of the understood thing, one
,
the SI, which is the principle of the act, and the second, there calle
d
primarily the
intentio intellecta '
(though
ratio
verbum ,
an
d
conceptio
are used), w hich the intellect, forme d by the S I, must i tsel
f
form in order to
understand
the thing
This much cited
passage
show s
us Thomas
making
a hard and fast distinction between the two forms
.
Moreover, both seem to be of the essence of human understanding, w it
h
its abstractive view of concrete things
. This text seems to have serve
d
as
a
key for much subsequent interpretation of St
. Thomas by hi
s
commentators
. Let us look at some of the things Thomas said, not onl
y
before he wrote it, but also after he wrote it
Our first text comes from Thomas
s
Commentary on th
e
SEN TEN C ES
of Peter Lombard,
bk . 1
. Thomas is speaking of God'
s
knowledge of things other than himself
. He presents a view o
f
intellection patterned on ocular vision
. In doing so, he obviously see
s
'This expression has some p rominence in a text of A verroes which is o
f
importance f or the present discussion, i
.e
. A verrois Cordubensis,
Commentariu
m
magnum in A ristotelis De anima,
ed
. F
Stuart Crawford, Cambridge, Mass
1953, 3
.5 (p
. 402)
E t u d e s m a r i t a i n i e n n e s /M a r i t a i n St u d i e s
22 3
himself as following in the footsteps of Aristotle, using the senses as a
n
approach to mind
. He will never leave off,
t h rough ou t
his career
making this comparison, but in this first instance the picture is ver
y
dif ferent f rom wh at i t wi ll soon becom e
. He says that in ocular vision
the seen
[visum]
is twofold
. There is first of all the likeness within th
e
sense (or within the eye), and there is secondly the thing itself outsid
e
the eye
: it too is the seen
. On this model, then, we have two item
s
called the understood
[intellectum],
one the likeness of the thing foun
d
in the intellect, and the second the thing itself outside the intellect
. I
n
accordance with this, Thomas can explain how Aristotle can say tha
t
God knows only himself
. God knows only himself, taking th
e
understood
in the first way
; yet God knows all things other tha
n
himself, taking the understood
in the second way
.
Since, clearly, God
'
s own self-knowledge is being explained b
y
the first sort of understood
, Thoma s means very l i terally that there i
s
actual understanding of this inner likeness
. I stress this because Fr
Geiger tried to tone down the sense of know
regarding the inne
r
likeness, as presented in this text, thus bringing it into line with late
r
texts
.' The full extent of the difference between this text of St
. T ho ma
s
and later ones will only be appreciated when one sees the use of th
e
sense of sight as an approach to understanding in the later texts
Since Thomas here uses the sense of sight to present the role o
f
the likeness in the mind, and since this is how he regularly presents th
e
SI later, I think it is safe to say tha t, here in this text, the S I is presente
d
as something itself known
. And f rom this and some associated texts on
e
can see that we have here also what will later be called the concept
.
The two forms in the intellect are not yet distinguished from each other
Is this text an isolated and entirely anomalous one? No, a littl
e
later on in Thomas
's career, in the
De veritate,
we f ind Thoma
s
identifying the SI and the
intentio
e
However, we also find the doctine of the SI as
not itsel
f
something know n, save through reflection on the f undamental act whic
h
is directed towards external sensible things
.
'
This is important bu
t
°Thomas, In Sent
.
1 .3 5
.1
.2
(Mandonnet, pp
. 813-815)
5
Geiger, Les idles divines
. .
. ,
p . 196 .
6 Thomas, De veritate
10 .8 ,
where he
is
closely following Averroes
. Earlier
we have 8
.15,
where Thoma s speaks of ocular vision, and intellection, as a seein
g
of something in , in the sense
of through , a
cognitional
form
'In
DV 10 .9 .ad 10
(first series), it is quite clear that the species intelligibilis
8/18/2019 Dewan 1995. St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Intellection
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224
Dewan
:
St .
T h o m a s a n d P r e - e o n e e p t u a l In t e l le c t i o
n
ambiguous
.
It is ambiguous because, while we have just seen texts i
n
which the likeness in the mind is what is first known, and while late
r
texts on the SI will stress that it is not a known, but a principle fro
m
which the act of
u n d e r s t a n d i n g
originates (thus only known b
y
reflection), still the concept or mental word, likewise, will be called
a
known
, s
yet a
known which has the role of making the externa
l
thing known, and which thus itself is somehow only known throug
h
reflection
.' Thus, to be only knowable through reflection does no
t
i s on ly known thro ugh r e f l e c t i on
. And th i s a c cord s w i t h wha t i s sa i d i n t h e bod
y
of the ar t i c l e
. I w o u l d c o n t r a s t t h i s w i t h
DV
8 .15,
whi ch sugge s t s t h e
In Se n t
v i s um
t ext
. Remember tha t 10
. 9 i s in t h e a cad emi c year f o l low ing
8 .15 (I
a m n o t
s u r e w h e r e t o m ake t h e d i v is i o n i n t o t h e t h r e e y e a r s
; S y n a v e d i v i d e d i n t o 8
4
a r t i c le s e a ch y e a r , b u t i t l o o k s a s t h o u g h 8 a n d 9 g o t o g e t h e r
; 1 0 w o u l d b e a g o o
d
p l a c e t o s t a r t t h e 2 n d y e a r , a s t o t o p i c s )
.
'DV 4
.2
. a d 3
. .
. t h e c onc ep t i on o f t h e i n t e l le c t i s i n t e rmed i a t e
[ m e d ia ]
b e t w e e
n
the intellect and the thing understood, because through it
s
medi a t i on t h e ope ra t i on o f t h e i n t e l l e c t a t t a i n s
[per tingit]
t o t h e
th ing
. And s o t h e c onc ep t i on o f t h e i n t e l l e c t i s no t on ly t ha t wh i c
h
i s u n d e r s t o o d
[i d
q u o d in t e l l e c tu m e s t ] ,
bu t a l so tha t through whic
h
t h e t h i ng i s und er s t ood
[ id q u o
res intell igi tur]
;
s o t h a t b o t h t h
e
t h i ng i t s e lf a nd a l s o t h e c on c e p t i o n o f t h e i n t e ll e c t c an b e c a l le
d
" tha t wh ich i s und ers to od"
[id
q u o d in t e l lig i tu r ]
A n d i n SC G 4
.11
But the und ers to od in the und er s tand er i s the
in t e n t io in t e l le c ta
an d
t h e w o r d
. T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s in G od und e r s t and i ng h i m s e l f t h
e
W o r d o f Go d , a s Go d U n d e r s t o o d
: j u s t a s t h e w o r d o f t h e s t o n e
i n the i n t e l l e c t , i s
t h e s t o n e u n d e r s t o o d
'C f
. T h o m a s ,
SC G
4.11
:
N o w , I c a ll
i n t e n t i o in t e l le c t a
t ha t wh i ch t h e i n t e l le c t c onc e i v e
s
i n i t s e lf c onc e rn i ng t h e und er s t ood t h i ng
[ d e r e i n t e l le c t a ]
In u
s
[human s ] , t h i s i s ne i t h e r t h e t h i ng i t s e l f wh i ch i s under s t o od , no
r
i s i t t h e v e ry sub s t anc e o f t h e i n t e l l e c t
; bu t i t i s a c e r t a i n l i kene s
s
conceived in the intellect concerning the understood thing [
a
l i kene s s ] wh i ch ex t e rna l s poken w ords s i gn i f y
: h enc e , t h e
in t e n t io
i t s e lf i s c a l led t h e " i nn er wo rd" , wh i ch i s s i gn i f ied by t h e ex t e rna
l
w o r d
.
T hom as t h e r e a r gue s f o r t h e d i s t i n c t io n b e t w e e n t h e
in t e n t io
and t h e t h i n
g
w h i c h w e u n d e r s t a n d , th e
res in te l lec ta
a s f o l lows
:
A nd t h a t th e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d
in t e n t io
is not in us the thin
g
under s to od app ea rs f rom th i s , tha t i t i s o n e th ing to und ers ta nd th
eth ing and i t i s someth ing e l s e t o und ers tand the und ers to od
in t e n t i
o
i t sel f
[ ipsam
in te n t io n e m in te l l e c ta m ] ,
whi ch [ la t t e r ope ra t i on ] i
s
what the intellect does when it reflects on its own operation
.
H e nc e , a ls o , t h e s c i e n c e s w h i c h a r e ab ou t t h i ng s
[ d e r e b u s ]
ar e
E t u d e s m a r i t a i n ie n n e s /M a r l t a i
n
S t u d i e s
225
altogether rule out being essentially something known
. Accordingly ,
when we are told that the SI is only known through reflection, we canno
t
be sure that Thomas is yet
distinguishing
between the SI and th
e
concept
. He might still be conceiving of the SI as known
, in the sens
e
that the concept can be known
However, with the previously mentioned SCG 1
.53 (3r
d
redaction), we have Thomas very explicitly setting out the distinctio n
between the two forms, stressing that the SI is prior to the act o
f
understanding and only knowable through reflection, and presenting th
e
intentio intellecta
as a sort of necessary inner picture
, if I may us
e
such an expression
. It is called, in
SCG 4
11, the inner word, and it
s
being is described as being understood
[ipsum
intelligt7
Taking th e
example of knowledge of a stone, Thomas says that, while the inne
r
word is not the stone, it can be called the stone
u n d e r s t o o d
Th
e
intentio intellecta is
not called
intellecta
[ understood
] lightly
This doctrine
is developed
to its fullest in
De potentia
9
.5 . This
is a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, using human intellectua
l
life as the approach
. Accordingly, Thomas sets out to say, given tha
t
intellection involves necessarily an understander and an understood, jus
t
what precisely is the essentially understood
(primo et per s
e
intellectum]
.
The answer is unequivocal
. It is neither the SI nor the thin
g
outside the mind
. It is the concept, terminating the act of understanding
,
which is firstly and intrinsically the understood
t 0
At the same time, however, we must pick up a line of discussion
,
starting back in the
SCG 2
.7 5
:
Thomas dealing with a certain line o
f
thinking coming from Averroes
. The line of thinking is that, if there ar
e
many intellects, then there are many
species intellectae
in them ; an
d
these will be merely understood in potency
; and one will have t o
abstract something common from them
. One point in Thomas
'
s criticis
m
of this is that it treats the
species as
that which is understood
, wherea
s
other than the sciences which are abo ut understood
intentions We
intentionibus intellectis]
.
1 'De potentia 9
.5
:
This, therefore, is primarily and essentially
[Primo
et per se
]
understood
, viz that which the intellect conceives within itsel
f
a b o u t [de]
the thing understood, whether it be a definition or a
n
enunciat ion
.
. [It] is called the interior word
; for it is this whic
h
is signified by the voca l utterance
: for the external vocal u tteranc
e
does not signify the intellect itself, or its intelligible form, or th
e
act of understanding, but rather the concept of [i
.e . in] th e
intellect , through m ediat ion o f which it signif ies the thing
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226
Devvan
:
St.
T h o m a s a n d P r e - c o n c e p t u a l In t e l le c t i o
n
its true role is by virtue of which som ething is unde rstood
. If this wer
e
not so, says Thomas, all sciences would be about mental items rathe
r
than about things
. The
universality
of our intellectual cognition o
f
material singulars stems from the
universality
of the SI
. In thi
s
presentation, there is no mention of
a n y
c o n c e p t o r
intentio intellecta
to be distinguished from the SI, and which would be an
understood
This is hardly s urprising,
inasmuch as the expression
intentio intellecta
is right out of the Latin translation of Averroes, discussing the ver
y
issue
. Mention of such a form might be thought to confuse the issue
.
However, in the
De spiritualibus creaturis,
a group of
quaestione
s
disputatae
dating from
slightly
bef ore [?] the
Prima pars,
we have th
e
same Averroist issue discussed, and in it, Thomas speaks of the thin
g
understood
[res
i n t e l lec t a ]
be i ng
in a w a y
o n e , y e t
in
a w a y
many .
T h
e
things
are the concept and the thing outside the mind
. The SI ha
s
its own proper role as control of the situation
One might think, then, that Thomas has decided to bring th
e
concept into the framework for discussion of the previously mentione
d
Averroist line of
a rgum e nt
However, wi th the
Prima pars
it definitel y
takes a back seat
. Let us consider the texts
The main text is 1
.8 5
.2
. Prior to this, there is the direc
t
consideration of the Averroist position, in 1
.7 6
.2
. In it there is n
o
mention of the concept
. It is, in the relevant parts, pretty much a long th
e
lines of
SCG 2
.7 5
How ever, I say that the m ain text is 1
.85
.2 becaus e
that is the moment in the treatise on the act of understanding at whic
h
the role of the SI is discussed
. Before looking at it, I would like to not
e
that, in the decisive 1
.84 .1, the
keynote text for the whole treatise
stress is upon science bearing on things, with the universality of ou
r
knowing located in the realm of our mode of knowing the things
Platonism is associated with a confusion of the thing known with th
e
universal mode of knowing
.
De spiritualibus creaturis 9
.ad 6
.
This is another answer to A verroes on th
e
unity of the possible intellect
. Thomas is replying to the argument tha
t
multiplication of intellects would multiply the thing understood
. He says
:
Therefore, the
res
i n t e l l e c t a
by t wo
i n t e l lec t s i s in a w ay on
e
a n d t h e s a m e , a n d i n a w a y m a n y
: b e c a u s e , o n t h e s i d e o f t h
e
th ing
which is known
[ex
p a n e rei quae
cognosciturl ,
i t i s o ne a n d
t h e s a m e , b u t o n t h e s i d e o f k n o w l e d g e i t s e lf
[ex parte
. .
. ipsiu
s
c o g n i t i o n s ] ,
i t is
o the r a nd o the r . Just
as , i f t w o [p eo p le] see o n e
w a l l, i t i s t h e s a m e t h i n g s e e n , o n t h e s i d e o f t h e t h i n g w h i c h i
s
seen, and nevertheless other and other a ccording to the divers
e
seeings
E t u d e s m a d t a i n i e n n e s /M a r i t a i n S t u d i e s
2 2
7
A longer presentation would dote on the scientific portrait of th
e
SI presented in 84
.2-8
. However, let us say only that it is presented a
s
the principle of the act of understanding corporeal things, though it
s
need of being a senior partner
along with the phantasms in th
e
imagination and the senses is brought out
. In 85, we begin with a
n
article on the abstractive mode of our knowing, i
.e
. abstracting the S
I
from the phantasms
. A. 2 then asks whether the SI is that which i
s
understood
. We should no te no t only the main reply but the answers t
o
the preliminary argu ments o r o bjections
The main reply begins with two reasons why the SI cannot b
e
tha t which is unders tood
. I t would mean that sciences would be abou
t
items in the mind
rather than
abo u t
things outside the mind
.
It would
also mean that all
judgments
ar e
true, and
thus that contradictories ar
e
simultaneously true
; every opinion would be true, and every way o
f
taking things
. We then get the u sual doctrine, that the S I i s the principl
e
of the act, but that
that which is known
i s the thing ou tside the sou l
The SI is, of course, known by subsequent reflection
. No mention i
s
made of the concept
The objections and replies are of the greatest interest
. The firs
t
uses the doctrine that the understood in act
must be in the one wh
o
unders tands
: since the understood in act is the very intellect in act
And since nothing else of the thing u nderstood is in the intellect actuall
y
understanding ex cept the SI, the SI mu st be the very
t
understood in act
T h o m a s '
s reply interprets the doctrines proposed by the objector a
s
meaning simply that there is a likeness of the thing understood in th
e
mind
. This likeness is the S I
. That i s what i s meant by the known bein
g
in the knower, or the understood in act being the intellect in act
. Thus ,
the SI is not that which is actually understood
; it is just its likeness
No whisper of a concept
The second objector argues that
the understood in act has to b
e
in something, for otherwise it would be nothing at all
. He rules out it
s
being in the thing outside, because that is material
. The only option i
s
to place it in the intellect, and thus it must be the SI
. T ho mas
'
s reply i
s
a lesson on abstraction,
distinguishing
between the thing which i
s
understood, which is the nature of the thing outside the soul, and it
s
being understood or its universality
. It is a reply in the line of th
e
doctrine of a mode of understanding
. It does, however, mention th
e
intentio universalitatis
,
seemingly as a note attached to the natur
e
which we consider
. The reply actually proceeds in two steps, firs t
speaking of the being understood
[ipsum
intelligtl of the nature, an
d
then
adding the being
abstracte
d
and
the
intentio
u n i v e r s a l i t a t i s
T hi s
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228
Dewan
:
S t
. Thomas and Pre-conceptual
I n t e l l e c t i o
n
is certainly not the concept of the thing
. The understood is the thin
g
[ . .
outside
accidit
.
a n
d
.]its being understood is something that
happens to i
t
,
We come now to
the third objection and reply, the
one plac
e
h e r e w e h a v e
a n
ex
professo
d i s c u s si o n o f t h e c o n c e p t ( t h o u g h n o t s
o
alled in
this
place)
.
Th e
objector
recalls
Aristotle's
teaching
tha t spo ke
n
ords are
the signs
of
the
soul's
affections
. Thus,
since
spoken
word
s
signify the things understood
[res
intellectas],
the affections of the soul
that is, the
species intelligibiles,
are what we understand
. Thoma
s
answers, once more
using his technique
of
approaching the
intellect b
y
comparison with the senses
. In sense knowledge, there is first th
e
opera tion in function of the sense powe r's being affected by the sensibl
e
hing
. Then, secondly, there is the operation of the
imagina t ive
power
which forms pictures of absent or even never seen things
. In th
e
intellectual power, both of these operations are found
t2
First, there i
s
the operation pertaining to the possible intellect's being informed by th
e
I
. Then, the intellect, so formed, itself forms a definition, or
a
composition or division
; and it is these that are signified by spoke
n
ords
. Thus, the spoken words do not signify the SI, but rather the
y
signify the items which the intellect forms for itself with a view t
o
judging
abou t the exte rna l th ings
[ad
i u d i c a n d u m
de
rebus exterioribus]
.
H e r e , t h e n ,
w e
have
th e
n o t i o n ,
t h e d e f i n i ti o n , e t c
., i
.e . wha t
e l s e whe r e a r e c a l l e d t h e c onc e p t , th e me n t a l wo r d , o r e v e n t h e
i n t e n t i
o
intellecta .
The obj e c t o r had a r gue d t ha t t h e spoke n wo r d s i gn i f ie s t ha
t
wh i c h i s unde r s t o od , a nd t ha t t h e spoke n w or d s i gn i f ie s t h e S I
. Thomas
,
in his reply, simply says that it does not signify the SI
Is he
ackn ow l ed g in g t h a t t h e c on c ep t i s t h a t wh i ch i s u n d e r s t ood ? H ard l y
. H i
s
w h o l e p o i n t i s t h a t i t is t h e e x t e r n a l th i n g w h i c h i s
t h e u n d e r s t o o d "
.
Ne ve r th e le s s , h e do e s no th i ng t o c ou n t e r t h e i d e a t ha t t h e c on c e p t i s " t h
e
n d e r s t ood "
. Su r e l y , t he r e a s o n m us t b e tha t he ha s , i n h i s e xp l ana t i o
n
of the role of the concept here, said enough to make it clear that i
t
c ann o t have t ha t r o l e
. T h e p l a in m e a n i n g i s t h a t t h e c o n c e p t c o m e s o
n
t h e s c en e t oo l a t e t o b e " t h e u n d e r s t ood "
. I t is , ra ther , a prod uc t f l owin
g
f r o m t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e t h i n g , a n d u s e d b y t h e m i n d w i t h a v ie
w
o
maki ng
. j u d g m e n t s a b o u t t h e t h i n g
. Su ch
a n i d e a
w o r k s i n
c l e a r l
y
e nough w i t h t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e know l e dge o f t r u t h i n 1
.16
. 2 , w h i c h
s a y s t ha t i n e v e r y c ompo s i t i o n and d i v is i o n , i
.e
. e v e r y a c t o f p r e d i c a t i o n
,
t h e i n t e l le c t p r e d i c a t e s a f o r m , r e pr e s e n t i ng t h e i n t e l le c t ' s know l e dge o
f
1 2
The word here
(ST
1
.85
.2
. a d 3
; e d
. O t tawa 52 8al ) i s
coniungitur ,
b u t S t
Th om as cer ta in ly does n o t m ean to con fu s e th e two
E t u d e s m a r i t a i n ie n n e s / M a r i t a i n S t u d i e s
22 9
the thing, of the thing itself
. The formation o f such predicates would b
e
what Thomas seems to have in mind as conceptualization
.
My hypothesis, then, is that the reply of St
. Thomas to the
object ion speaks of the concept in such a way as to make impo ssible an
y
confusion between the concept and the understood
If I am right, I am correcting Cardinal Cajetan
. In his commentar y
on this article, he complains that St
. T ho mas
'
s answer to the objectio
n
is inadequate
. The reason is that, while it rejects the doctrine that the S
I
i s that which is understood
, i t does nothing to reject the doctrine tha
t
the concept is that which is understood
. Cajetan proceeds t
o
supplement what Thom as has sa id
. He explains that bo th the SI and th
e
concept can be considered in two ways
: as a thing, and as a likeness o
f
the thing outside
. Taken as a thing, neither is known save throug
h
reflection
. Bu t the concept, taken as a likeness, is known
. Still, it is one
and the same thing for it to be known, and for that of which it is th
e
likeness to be known
. Hence, it creates no problem
Caje tan
s view supposes a problem, and works to overcome tha
t
problem
. His view is that the external thing is known only throug
h
knowledge of the concept
. My qu estion is
: is that really the role of th
e
concept here at this stage in St
. T ho mas '
s career? The strategy of th
e
Prima pars
suggests that it is not
. Thomas is well aware of th
e
possibilities of knowing one item in or through another, as in or throug
h
a mirror
. He certainly presents the role of the concept as a sort o
f
mental mirror, and there seems every reason to believe that it ca
n
function either as a noticed mirror or as an unnoticed mirror
.
How ever, in this discussion, he is presenting in the most f ormal way th
e
act of unde rstanding
. A nd he raises the question
: should it be conceive
d
as a knowing of a mental item? His reasons for not so conceiving it ar
e
most se rious
. It would do away w ith knowledge of ex tra-mental reality
He does not say
: it would be angelism . I
.e
., he does not say that i
t
would an unsuitable mode of knowing for the human being, though i
t
might suit a separate intelligence
. He rather says that it would destro
y
knowledge
: all opinions would be true and every way of taking thing
s
whatsoever
Cajetan'
s judgment that St
. Thomas
'
s reply is inadequate, an
d
Caje tan '
s supplement to the reply strike me as leading the mind in
a
direction Thomas was deliberately rejecting
. At the very least , i t shoul d
Cf
. ST 1
.16
.2 , in toto
.
See abo ve, no te 9, the text
from SCG
4.11 .
The
intentio intellecta i
s
understood only through reflection
.
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3
Dewan:
t
T h o m a s a n d P r e - c o n c e p t u a l In t e l le c t i o
n
be said that Thom as is ma king the SI the crucial i ssue in the conceptio
n
of knowledge
. The concept, however it fits in, is secondary
Confirmation of this is provided by the presentation of th
e
understood in the later
De unitate intellectus
Just as in earlie
r
discussions, the adversary is accused of error concerning th
e
understood
. S t
. Thom as carefully presents the understood as the thin
g
outside the soul . Knowledge, he insists, is about things, not about an
y
sort of
species
Thus we read :
Bu t i t remains to be inquired what is the ve ry
understood
[quid sit
ipsum intellectum]?
For if they say that th
e
u n d e r s t ood "
is one immaterial
species
existing in
th
e
intellect, they fail to notice
that they
drift in a
certain
wa
y
into
th e
doctrine of
Plato, who
posited
that concerning
sensible
things
no
science
ca n
be had,
but a ll science is ha
d
concerning one separate fo rm
. For it makes no differenc
e
for the present issue, whether someone say that the scienc
e
which is had concerning the stone is had
concerning
o n
e
separate
form of the stone, or of one form of the ston
e
which is
in the intellect
:
it will follow for both that science
s
are not about the things which are here, but only abou
t
separate things
. But because Plato maintained that suc
h
immaterial forms are subsisting by themselves, he coul
d
also, alon g with that, posit severa l intellects participating i
n
the knowledge of the one tru th f rom the one separate fo rm
.
But these [people], who posit such immaterial forms
-
which they call the understoods
[intellecta] -
in th
e
intellect, necessarily hav e to po sit that there is one in tellec
t
only, not only of all men, but even unqualifiedly
All this, then, merely makes the point that there is something seriousl
y
wrong with the conception these people have of the object o
f
understanding, i
.e
the unders tood
.
Now, we come to the positive presentation of the true nature o
f
the understood
. We read
:
Therefore, it is to be said, according to the vie
w
[sententiam]
of Aristotle, that the
understood", which i
s
one, is the very nature or quiddity of the thing
; for natural
science and the other sciences are about things, not abou
t
understood
species [species intellectis]
For if th
e
understood we re not the very nature of the stone, whic
h
"Thomas
Aquinas,
De
unitate intellectus 5
(L eonine lines
164-185)
E t u d e s m a r U d n i e n n e s /M a r U
dn
S t u d i e s
2 3
1
is in things, but the
species
which is in the intellect, i
t
would follow that I would not understand the thing whic
h
is the stone
[rem
q u a e
est lapis],
but only the
intenti
o
which is abstracted from the stone
6
This, then, is the
fundamenta l
answer, but it remains to be explaine
d
how it can be true, given the mode of being which the nature has i
n
singular things . And he continues
:
But it is true that the nature of the stone, as it is i
n
singulars, is understood in potency
[intellecta i
n
potentia] ;
but it is rendered understood in act
throug
h
this, that the
species
come from sensible things, by th
e
mediation of the senses, right to the imagination, an
d
through the power of the agent intellect are abstracted th
e
species intelligibiles,
w hich are in the possible intellect
. B u
t
these
species
do not stand related to the poss ible intellect a
s
the understoods
[intellecta],
but as the
species
by whic
h
the intellect unde rstands, just as also the
species
which ar
e
in [the sense of] sight are not the very [items] seen
[ips
a
visa],
but those [factors] by which the sight sees
[ea q u i b u
s
visus
videt]
:
save inasmuch as the intellect reflects upo
n
i tself, which cannot happen in the sense
.
17
The important thing for Thomas is to change the idea o
f
understanding, so that it does not have as its target of attention som
e
pure intelligible existing within the intellect, but the thing which i
s
outside the intellect
. Certainly, the mental word would only caus
e
confusion in the presentation, since it can easily be taken for just suc
h
an inner object
. Still, in the SC response, Thomas used the twofol
d
th ing unders tood
doctrine, and brought in the concept . And in the
D
P
he even presented the concept as the primarily and essentiall
y
understood
. Nevertheless, in the
ST
and the
UI,
the concept is almos
t
entirely (ST) or entirely
(UI)
omitted
. And while the vocabulary of th
e
ST prefers
id
q u o d i n t e l l ig i t u r ,
t h e
UI
p r e s e n t s t h e i s su e w i t h t h
e
s i m p l e t e r m
intellectum
,
identifying it with the quiddity which i
s
present in the singular thing
.
Is Thomas
s variation in approach entirely dictated by th
e
argument with the Averroists? Or does the argument simply help t
o
bring ou t what is truly essential to the accou nt of the act of intellection
?
U
5 (186-194)
7
U/ 5 (194-206)
8/18/2019 Dewan 1995. St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Intellection
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2 32 D e w a n
:
St
.
T h o m a s a n d P r e - co n c e p t u a l I n t e l le c t i o
n
Notice that i t i s no t a m atter of
making
conc
eptua l iza t ion opt iona
l
for the human mind
. Thoma s is qu i te clear that a ll
hu
man intellection i
s
ecessarily
completed
by the concept
. 1 8
It is rather a question of wha
t
is the essenc e and w hat is the property in the situation
. To the ex tent tha
t
intellection is conceived of as essentially an inner picturing, then th
e
concept is e ssential
. That, I believe, is what Thomas is rejecting
.
The importance of this doctrine is that it gives things themselve
s
an absolute priority over knowledge itself, as to the order of objects o
f
nowledge
A ddend
a
L One could say that 1
.8 5
.3-4 has to do with the concepts and thei
r
rder
. But this feature of the situation is not brought out
. Thomas i
n
.84
.1 has set a pattern, and so we talk about acts of knowing the mor
e
univ ersal and the less universal, etc
. Definitions are discussed somewhat
Is the fact that we are talking abo ut con cepts implicit in the very additio
n
f 1
.86? i
.e
. that the order considered in 1
.85 is of concepts? So be it
but the
key point
for us is 1
.8 5 .2
2
. I think that it is important to consider the arguments in 1
.8 5
.2 give
n
gainst
the SI being
that which is understood
. I think the doctrine i
s
tied to the view that our knowledge starts with sense knowledge o
f
ensible things
. This is the source of our very idea of knowledge
. It i
s
entirely based on the complete ignorance of itself and the thoroug
h
attainment of the thing itself
. It is thus that we see the reality o
f
knowledge (through our subsequent power of reflection) as
knowing
things even ou tside o urselves
. We can thus dev elop the doctrine of th
e
two modes o f being, which alone explain the phenomeno n
Once one has the idea of cognition, then one can posit knowings o
f
one thing through another, where the one thing is even a form in
a
knower (as in the theory of the concept)
. However, the essence o
f
1 8 Cf
.Super Evangelium
S
. IOannis
L e c t u r a ,
g e n e r a ll y d a t e d i n t h e s e c o n
d
arisian
P
rofessorship
( 126 9 -1272)
. There, in cap
. 1 , l e s t
. 1 ( 5 th rev i s ed ed
. R
ai , O
.P., R
o m e/Turi n , 195 2
: M ar ie t t i , # 25) , Th om as s ay s
Patet
ergo quod
in
qualibet
natura intellectuali necesse est poner
e
erbum
: quia de
ration intelligendi est
quod
intellectu
s
ntelligendo
a l iquid formet huiusmodi a utem forma tio dic itu
rerbum
;
et
ideo
in
O m n i
intelligente oportet ponere
verbum
atura
autem
i
ntel lectual is est triplex, sci l icet
humana, angel ica
e
tivina
et ideo t r ip l ex es t v erbum
. . .
E t u d e s m a r i t a i n ie n n e s / M a r i t a i n S t u d i e s
2 3
3
k n o w l e d g e i s t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e b e i n g o f o t h e r t h i n g s (a n d t h u s o f a l
l
t h i n g s ) , a n d i t s v e r y e x i s t e n c e i s k n o w n t o u s t h r o u g h t h e k n o w i n g o
f
sens ib le th ings (s ens ib ly a nd in te l l ec tua l ly )
Bi bl i ograph
y
Ch@nevert ,
J
., L e Verbum
d a n s l e C o m m e n t a i r e s u r
les Sentences
d
e
s a in t T h o m a s d ' A q u i n ,
in
S c i e n c e s E c c l i s ia s t i q u e s
1 3 ( 1 9 6 1 ) 1 9 1
223 ,
359-390
.
Cromp, Germaine,
L es
s o u r c e s d e V a b s t r a c t i o n d e V i n t e l le c t a g e n t
dan s
la Somme de thbologie de Thomas d Aquin,
M o n t r 6 a l, s . d
I n s t i t u t d 'E t u d e s M 6 d i6 va le s
.
Gau th ie r , Ren6-Antoine , O
. P
., Introduction
, in Saint Thomas d' Aquin
,
Som me contre les gentiles,
[Paris?], 199 3
: Editions Unive rsitaire
s
[Collection Philosophie
Europ6enne,
dirigbe par Henri Hude]
,
[This introduction is a separate volume
.] at pp
. 105-108
Geiger, L .- B
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