Delhi+Metro+case (1)

8/11/2019 Delhi+Metro+case (1)

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ICMR Case CollectionICFAI Center for Management Research

This case was written byNamratha V. Prasad & Sachin Govind, under the direction ofS.S. George,ICFAI Center for Management Research (ICMR). It was compiled from published sources, and is intendedto be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of amanagement situation.

The Delhi Metro Project: Effective ProjectManagement in the Indian Public SectorPROM005

2006, The ICFAI Center for Management Research. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means- -electronic or mechanical, without permission.

To order copies, call +91-40-2343-0462/63 or write to ICFAI Center for Management Research, Plot # 49,Nagarjuna Hills, Hyderabad 500 082, India or email [email protected]. Website: www.icmrindia.org


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PROM/005

The Delhi Metro Project: Effective Project Managementin the Indian Public Sector

Everyone who has traveled by the Delhi Metro wants one in his or her city. Today, there is anational resurgence in public interest in urban public transport. 1

- Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, in 2006.

The successful implementation of the Delhi Metro project would not have been possible withouttimely availability of funds and the necessary political support. An equally important role has been

played by the DMRCs corporate culture, which emphasizes that targets are most sacrosanct andour dignity is in performing our duty well. 2

E. Sreedharan, Managing Director, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., in 2005.

INTRODUCTION

With a 6.5 km section of Line 3 becoming operational in April 2006, Phase I of the Delhi Metro 3 project was nearing completion. Of the total length of 65.16 km of the first phase, 62 km had beencompleted and opened for service. This phase was set to cost Rs. 98 billion. As of early 2006,around 450,000 passengers were traveling by the Delhi Metro every day.

The Delhi Metro was meant to solve Delhis traffic problems, which had become almostunmanageable. The first steps to build a metro system in the city were taken in the early 1990s. In1995, the Government of India (GoI) and the Government of the National Capital Territory ofDelhi (GNCTD) formed the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd (DMRC) under the Companies Actto construct the Delhi Metro. Conceived as a social sector project, a significant portion of the

project cost was funded through a soft loan provided by the Japanese government through JapanBank International Corporation (JBIC) 4. The rest was contributed by GoI and GNCTD throughequity.

E. Sreedharan (Sreedharan) was appointed managing director (MD) of the DMRC and projectmanager for Phase I of the project in November 1997. Work on Line 1 of Phase I started inOctober 1998. DMRC formed consortiums to advise it on the project and to provide it with thelatest technology. It also saw to it that the foreign companies worked with the Indian companies toensure that the latter assimilated their expertise and technological know-how.

1 PM lays foundation stone for Bangalore Metro, www.pib.nic.in, June 24, 2006.2 Interview with Mr. E. Sreedharan, Managing Director, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd, www.indiainfoline.com,

December 19, 2005.3 A metro system is usually an urban electric mass transit railway system independent of other traffic and with high

frequency. A metro system includes elevated, at-grade, and underground sections.4 JBIC was founded in 1961 by the Japanese government as the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF).

It served as the implementing agency for loan aid given to entities in developing countries. OECF generally gavelow-interest (around 2.1%), long-term funds (about 20 years with five year grace period). In 1999, OECF wasmerged with Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) to form the JBIC.


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The Delhi Metro Project

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The DMRC faced any number of technical and systemic challenges during the construction of themetro. However, thanks to thorough planning, an effective project design, and a we-mean

business culture, it was able to overcome all these hurdles. The organizational culture was basedon punctuality, honesty, and a strict adherence to deadlines. The DMRC successfully managed the

various stakeholders in the project like the general public, government bodies, etc., and alsoensured that the project was environmentally safe.

With Phase I of the Delhi Metro project nearing completion, the GoI decided to extend the metronetwork and work on Phase II of the Delhi Metro project was set to commence in September 2006.In the process of implementing the project, the DMRC had gained a lot of technological expertise,which would be used by other cities in India and abroad to build metro systems similar to the DelhiMetro.

BACKGROUND NOTE

Metro systems were generally considered as a transport option when the population of a citycrossed the 1 million mark ( Refer Exhibit I to know more about metro transit systems ). Delhicrossed that milestone as early as in the 1940s. The 1950s saw a doubling of the citys population;with that, the vehicular traffic also soared. By the early 1990s, Delhi had more registered vehiclesthan Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai put together. It had become one of the most polluted cities inthe world, with automobiles contributing to more than two thirds of the total atmospheric

pollution. There was an urgent need felt at this point to improve both the quality and availability ofmass transport services in Delhi.

The first ever traffic study of Delhi (titled the Origin Destination Survey of Traffic of GreaterDelhi) was carried out by the Central Road Research Institute (CRRI) in 1957. As many as 35more studies on Delhis transport problems were conducted subsequently by various entities ( Refer

Exhibit II for some of these studies ). Almost all these studies recommended the Mass Rapid TransitSystem (MRTS) as a means to solve Delhis traffic problems.

In 1989, the GNCTD, with support from the GoI, commissioned a feasibility study for developingan MRTS for Delhi. The study was undertaken by Rail India Technical & Economic Services Ltd.(RITES) 5 and completed in 1991. RITES recommended a three-component transit systemcomprising rail corridors (surface/elevated), metro corridors (underground), and a dedicated

busway, totaling 198.5 km. This mix of elevated and underground sections was proposed in orderto bring down the overall project cost 6.

RITES further recommended sequential construction of the total network because of the high costsassociated with the project. The complete network was to have 16 lines. Sections with higher

projected passenger traffic densities were to be constructed first.

In 1995, RITES submitted a Detailed Project Report (DPR) for Phase I of the Delhi Metro project.

THE DELHI METRO PROJECT

In order to implement the Delhi Metro project, the GoI and the GNCTD set up a 50:50 jointventure company called the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC). The company wasincorporated under the Companies Act in May 1995. The DMRC was to complete Phase I of the

5 RITES, established in 1974, is the multi-disciplinary consultancy wing of the Indian Railways. RITES has served asa consultant to top organizations and Governments in 55 countries. It largely operates in the fields of transport,infrastructure, and related technologies.

6 As of 2002, the cost of building the underground section was estimated to be Rs. 2.70 billion per kilometer, whilethe cost of building an elevated section was Rs. 1 billion per kilometer. Underground sections required stricterenvironmental control and fire safety systems. The operational cost of maintaining underground sections was alsohigher.


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project within 10 years, i.e., by the end of 2005. After the recommendations of various other civicorganizations had been incorporated, the proposal for Phase I of the Delhi Metro project wasapproved by the GoI in September 1996.

Phase I was to connect Delhis business, education, and shopping districts. It was to cover about340 hectares of land (of which about 58% was government land, 39% was private agriculturalland, and 3% was private urban land) and involved the design and construction of three lines (witha total length of 56 km), 50 stations (of which 10 were underground), and three maintenancedepots ( Refer Figure I and Table I for the plan for Phase I ).

Figure I: Phase I of the Delhi Metro Project

Source: www.urbanrail.net.

Table I

Phase I of the Delhi Metro

Line Length of Line Route

Line 1 (Red line) 22km Shahdara to RithalaLine 2 (Yellow line) 11km Vishwa Vidyalaya to Central Secretariat

Line 3 (Blue line) 23km Barakhamba to DwarakaSource: www.delhimetrorail.com.

FUNDING THE PROJECT

Globally, most urban MRTS projects were financially unviable because the fares could not befixed solely on a commercial basis. If the fares were fixed too high, the passenger numbers wouldremain low, thereby defeating the very purpose of setting up the system. Therefore, the concernedgovernments generally bore the capital costs of an MRTS system. In the case of the Delhi Metro

project too, the GoI and the GNCTD bore the capital costs.


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The total cost of the first phase of the project was initially estimated at Rs. 60 billion, at April 1996 prices. Later in 2002, with the cost of the project rising by approximately 10% per year, theestimate was revised to Rs. 89.27 billion.

Initially, for Phase I of the metro to become viable, it was estimated that it would have to transport2.2 million passengers per day. This was later revised to 1.5 million passengers per day. Theeconomic IRR 7 (internal rate of return) of the project worked out to be about 21.4% 8 while thefinancial IRR was less than 3%. In view of the high cost of the project and the low financial IRR,some ministers in the GoI even suggested that the project be dropped. However, the GoI decided togo ahead with it, keeping in mind that it was essentially a social sector project, expected to

benefit the regional economy in more ways than one.

The financial plan for Phase I was approved by the GNCTD and the GoI in 1996. Of the projectcost, 28% was to be financed by equity, subscribed to equally by the GoI and the GNTCD. Thetwo also agreed to give interest-free subordinate loans to cover the cost of land acquisition, whichwas expected to be about 5% of the total project cost. Funding for the major share or about 64% ofthe project cost was to be provided by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF whichlater became JBIC) through a time-sliced soft loan 9. JBIC disbursed the loan in tranches with eachtranche treated as a separate loan, with its own moratorium and repayment period. The repayment

period for each tranche was set at 30 years, which included a 10-year grace period ( Refer Table II for the loan tranches given by JBIC ).

Table II

Loans from JBIC

Tranche Year Amount(in mn yen) Interest

1 1997 14,760 2.3%2 2001 6,732 2.3%

3 2002 28,569 1.8%4 2003 34,012 1.8%5 2004 59,296 1.8%6 2005 19,292 1.3%

Source: www.delhimetrorail.com.

Property development 10 at the highly lucrative sites around the metro stations was to generatefunds to cover the remaining 3% of the project cost. The debt-equity ratio was fixed at 2:1. TheGoI and the GNCTD also decided to bear the exchange rate risks equally. The DMRC planned torepay the OECF loan through surpluses from revenues, property development around metrostations and its corridors, and levies/taxes on the residents of Delhi. Further, the project wasexempted from custom and excise duties.

7 Internal Rate of Return or IRR is defined as the rate of return that would make the present value of future cashflows plus the final market value of an investment equal to the current value of the investment. It is used by firms tomake decisions regarding long-term investments. (Source: www.investorwords.com)

8 Phase I of the Delhi Metro was expected to generate substantial benefits to the economy by way of saving time forcommuters, enabling reliable and safe journeys, reducing atmospheric pollution, curtailing the number of accidents,reducing fuel consumption, reducing vehicle operating costs, increasing the average speed of road vehicles, andimproving the quality of life all of which, in turn, were expected to make Delhi a more attractive city forinvestment.

9 Time-sliced loans are given in parts (tranches or slices). Each part had its own interest rate, moratorium, andrepayment period.

10 The DMRC planned to generate around Rs. 6 billion by developing real estate projects in and around the metro

stations. This included an IT park, a mega shopping mall cum multiplex, restaurants, ATM counters, beveragecounters, web stores, chemists shops, and coffee parlors.


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THE PROJECT TEAM

With the funding for the project being finalized, the next step was to constitute a project team.Sreedharan was appointed as project manager and managing director of the DMRC in November

1997. A technocrat, he had had a long stint in the Indian Railways (IR) and had retired in 1990.During his service with IR, he had earned a reputation for completing major projects 11 on time andwithin the budget.

By the end of 1998, DMRC was able to recruit only 100 people; around 70% of the senior staff atthe DMRC was on deputation from IR. The long delay in recruitment prompted critics of the

project to comment that it was an indication that the project itself would take more time andmoney than planned.

Sreedharan was given complete freedom to pick and choose the project team. He selected amotivated team of professionals whom he regarded as fundamental to the success of the project.Each member of the team was interviewed personally by me. I went through their track record

particularly with regard to their integrity, 12 said Sreedharan. Most of the staff was between 18 and

30 years. Unlike other public sector organizations in India, the DMRC opted for a lean structure. Ithad just two departments project organization, and operation & maintenance.

The Delhi Metro was only the second metro project in India (the Kolkata Metro 13 being the first).Since the technology to build metro systems was highly specialized, experts in the areas of civilengineering, electrical engineering, communications engineering, etc., were needed. However, theDMRC faced the problem of skill shortage as the country had neither institutes which taught metrotechnology nor experienced personnel. Therefore, after recruiting suitable candidates, the DMRCsent them abroad for training. The key operating and maintenance personnel received training atHong Kongs Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC). They, in turn, trained the rest of thestaff. Later the DMRC opened its own Metro Training School at Shastri Park, New Delhi.Sreedharan too visited subway systems around the world for ideas on building the Delhi Metro. Inan interview describing the difficulties he faced in getting suitable people, Sreedharan said, When

we started there was a handicap as almost everyone was new to metro projects. Then we educatedall the personnel and officers and absorbed experience from general consultants to upgrade ourskills and now these very personnel have become one of the greatest assets to the nation. 14

The corporation aimed to project an image of efficiency, courtesy, and a we-mean-businessattitude; the employees were also required to be polite and discharge their duties to perfection.What is important is that I have created an organization which has got a unique work culture andorganizational values. The team consists of hard-working, dedicated, and professionally competent

people, 15 said Sreedharan.

The DMRC corporate culture was based on integrity. It was clear to the management at the DMRCthat if the metro was to be built within the budget and on time, they would have to put in placeeffective contract-awarding and procurement processes in order to prevent corruption the bane of

most public sector projects in India. For this, the contract-awarding process was made transparentand simple. The procurement processes were made fair and just by removing almost all traces ofsubjectivity from tender evaluation.

11 In 1963, Sreedharan was in charge of the repair of the Pamban bridge joining Rameshwaram, an island off the coastof Tamil Nadu, with the mainland. He was able to complete the project in 46 days when the project duration was setat 180 days. In 1997, he was put in charge of the Konkan Railways project, which involved building a railwaysystem along the west coast of India, covering 760 km. The project, which was a major engineering feat with 150

bridges and 93 tunnels, was completed in record time and within the budget.12 First section of the Delhi Metro to open this year, www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002.13 The Kolkata Metro in the eastern city of Kolkata (earlier known as Calcutta) in India was inaugurated in 1984. It is

16.45 km long and has 17 stations.14 Taking Metro to new heights, www.hinduonnet.com, April 04, 2005.15 Taking metro to new heights, www.hinduonnet.com, April 04, 2005.


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PLANNING THE PROJECT

In India, major infrastructure projects are often stalled because of a lack of funds, politicalinterference, lack of professionalism and accountability, property disputes, corruption, etc.

Therefore, even before the commencement of the project, the DMRC attempted to put in placeeffective systems to ensure the smooth progress of the project.

Funding was not an issue in the case of the Delhi Metro project because it was settled even beforethe project commenced. In order to steer clear of political interference, the DMRC soughtautonomy on all major matters and the GoI promised to give it this autonomy. Financial powerswere vested in the managing director. Also, the managing director was the last authority ontenders, 16 said Anuj Dayal (Dayal), chief public relations officer, DMRC.

Next, the project manager put in place a system where every individual would be accountable forhis/her role in the project. Each employee had to prepare a detailed project report (DPR) with

particulars regarding the work assigned and work completed each day and this was to be submittedto the respective supervisors. In case of deviations, the employee had to give reasons for thedeviations and see that they were rectified. Every Monday, the heads of departments had to meet toreview progress, set new targets, or revise targets. Great stress was laid on adherence to schedulesand reverse clocks were to be used to indicate the number of days left before important deadlines.This kind of approach was unusual in public sector projects in India.

Even though the project commenced three years later than originally planned, Sreedharan and histeam decided to stick to the original deadline for the completion of the first phase, i.e., December2005. When the government approved the project, it was envisaged that the metro would becompleted in 10 years. Work should have started in 1995, but we didnt have an organization in

place until 1997 so we were only able to begin work in April 1998. Nevertheless, we said wewould complete the first phase within seven years to meet the original target. This will be quite anachievement to build a metro from scratch within seven years, 17 said Sreedharan.

Like other major infrastructure projects in India, the Delhi Metro project too faced its share of property disputes. To ensure that these disputes did not hinder the progress of the project, the GoIenacted the Delhi Metro Railway (Operation & Maintenance) Act, 2002 18 or the Delhi Metro Actin 2002. The Act, which spelt out the rules for the local authorities, superseded the local municipallaws of Delhi. Also, lower courts were barred from issuing stay orders. This, to a large extent,

prevented property owners affected by the project from getting stay orders from courts to haltwork on the project. In other cases, the DMRC engaged a team of lawyers to make sure that thecourts did not grant such stay orders.

In order to control costs, the total expenditure of the Delhi Metro was split into three broad heads manpower, energy, and materials including maintenance. Each of these accounted forapproximately one-third of the project cost.

To control manpower costs, DMRC employed only 45 persons per kilometer of track a numberthat was close to the international norm. Kolkata Metro, in contrast, had employed three times asmany people. The organization was designed to be lean but effective. To keep down energy costs,DMRC entered into a special agreement with the Delhi Transco Ltd. 19 to source power 20 for the

16 On the fast track, www.tribuneindia.com, January 02, 2005.17 First section of the Delhi Metro to open this year, www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002.18 Prior to 2002, the Delhi Metro project came under the Metro Railways (Construction and Works) Act, 1978. The

1978 Act was enacted to facilitate the construction of the Calcutta (Kolkata) Metro. Since this Act covered only theconstruction stage of Metro Railways, the need for an exclusive Act for the Delhi Metro, covering operation andmaintenance, was felt. Therefore, the Delhi Metro Act was enacted by the GoI in 2002.

19 Delhi Transco Ltd is the state-run transmission utility for Delhi.


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project at a very low rate. DMRC used Primavera Project Planner 3.0 21 for project planning andmonitoring. The resource planning module of the software alerted users if there was an excess orshortage of resources and the cost planning module provided a complete cost break-up for the

project.

The software allowed the DMRC to keep track of project activities, the quantum of workcompleted at different levels, the time lost or gained, etc. It also provided information of all criticaland upcoming activities, making it possible to keep track of and reschedule activities wherevernecessary. This was vital considering that the loss incurred if one day of work was lost was aboutRs. 5 million.

In order to ensure quality in construction, the DMRC appointed a special quality assurance teamindependent of the field executives. Safety was a major concern. All personnel working at theconstruction site were required to wear helmets and other appropriate safety gear.

The DMRC adopted a global bidding program for consultancy and contracts that required at leastone Indian partner. This was done to facilitate technology absorption by Indian firms and to ensure

that the technology was localized and re-engineered. One of the preconditions for anymultinational company to bid for a Delhi Metro project is it should have an Indian partner, 22 saidDayal.

The DMRC secured the best technology available globally, for the Delhi Metro ( See Exhibit III for features of the Delhi Metro ). We are proud to say that Delhi Metro has the best and latesttechnology in the world, sourced from various countries. In fact it would be appropriate to say thatwe are using tomorrows technology today, 23 said Sreedharan. Several multinational engineeringcorporations from Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden workedon the project ( See Exhibit IV for the names of the various companies involved in the project ).

A five-member consortium, called the General Consultants Group, was constituted in 1998 to provide overall consultancy for the project. This group included the Japanese firms Pacific

Consultants International (PCI), Japan Railway Technical Services, and Tonichi EngineeringConsultants Inc, US-based Parson Brinkerhoff International Inc., and RITES. The group was lead by PCI.

Initially, there was disagreement between the IR and Sreedharan over the gauge to be adopted forthe metro. Sreedharan was in favor of standard gauge 24, generally used in metro systems the worldover, while the IR favored the broad gauge 25, the gauge used over most of the railway network inIndia. Finally the GoI intervened and asked the DMRC to adopt the broad gauge for the DelhiMetro. This confusion delayed the project by a few months.

The work on utility diversion was undertaken much before the work on a particular sectioncommenced. The DMRC followed a systematic process wherein the concerned consortiumsurveyed the area for the utilities (water pipes, sewer, power cables, etc) to be diverted andsubmitted a written report to the DMRC. The DMRC in turn forwarded it to the concerned utility

bodies, which completed the work within a prescribed period.

20 The Delhi Metro project sourced its power from different sources in order to ensure continuous supply of power.They are - Badarpur Thermal power station, Northern Region Electricity Board and NTPC thermal power station.The DMRC paid the Delhi Transco Rs. 4.80 per unit.

21 Primavera Project Planner 3.0 software was developed by Primavera of the US, and supplied to the DMRC by KGLSystems which was a technical and marketing partner of Primavera in India.

22 Riding high in Delhi, usembassy.state.gov, July- August 2003.23 Interview with Mr. E. Sreedharan, www.indiainfoline.com, December 19, 2005.24 The tracks in standard gauge are set 1435 mm or 4 ft 8 1/2 inches apart.25 The tracks in broad gauge are set 1680 mm or 5 ft 6 inches apart.


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The DMRC decided to adopt construction technologies that would help it make up for lost time.These included trench-less digging and the use of pre-fabricated/precast concrete 26 blocks and

ballastless tracks 27. The use of ballast-less tracks also minimized maintenance costs, reducedvibration, and provided greater riding safety and comfort for passengers.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Construction work on the project commenced on October 1, 1998. The entire project was dividedinto three lines. Further, these lines were divided into sections ( Refer Table III for details of Phase

I of the Delhi Metro project ).

Table III

Details of Phase I

Particulars Sections Character Length, Stations Opened on

Shahdara toTis Hazari

7.92 km,6 stations

25/12/2002

Tis Hazari toInder Lok

4.74 km,4 stations

04/10/2003

Line 1(Shahdara toRithala)

Inder Lok toRithala

Elevated andat-grade.

9.40 km,8 stations

01/04/2004

Total 22.06 kms, 18 stations

Vishwa Vidyalayato Kashmere Gate

4 km,4 stations

20/12/2004Line 2 (VishwaVidyalaya to CentralSecretariat) Kashmere Gate to

Central Secretariat

Underground

7 km,

6 stations

03/07/2005

Total 11 kms, 10 stations

Line 3 (Barakhambato Dwaraka)

Barakhamba toDwaraka

22.79 kms,22 stations

31/12/2005

Dwaraka- SubcityDwaraka

6.5 kms,6 stations

01/04/2006With extensions toLine 3.

Barakhamba toIndraprastha

Elevated andAt Gradewith a shortundergroundsectionwhere it joinsLine 2.

2.81 kms,3 stations

Expected to be completedin September2006.

Total 32.1 kms, 31 stations

Total length of Phase I 65.16 kms, 59 stations


26 Precast concrete was generally prepared by casting concrete in reusable molds in a controlled environment. Later, itwould be transported to the construction site and set into place. It generally was of higher quality and cheaper thantraditional concrete.

27 Ballast, consisting of gravel and cinders, usually form the track bed on which railway sleepers are laid. In ballastless tracks, tracks are placed on concrete without sleepers or ballast being used. Ballastless tracks are mainlyused on high speed lines and in tunnels.


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Line 1 (Shahdara to Rithala)

The work on Phase I commenced with the Shahdara-Tis Hazari section of Line 1, covering adistance of about eight kilometers. The work involved utility diversions, barricading, and actualcivil construction. A major part of this section was on elevated tracks. All tracks in the elevatedcorridor were laid on concrete (ballastless). The tracks were supported on single piers. Theelevated viaducts had a height of 10 m and were built generally in the middle of the roads.

The tracks were fenced with 10 ft high concrete slabs with barbed circular wire on top to preventtrespassing. The section where the metro crossed over the river Yamuna was constructed first

because the density of traffic was projected to be the highest on this route. Building across theriver Yamuna was completed by using a special technique called incremental launching 28. Theuse of this method caused minimum disturbance to traffic. This was also expected to provide asmoother journey for commuters because of a lack of joints. Line 1 also included a short sectionwhich was built at-grade. Line 1 became completely operational with the inauguration of the InderLok to Rithala section in April 2004.

Line 2 (Vishwa Vidyalaya to Central Secretariat)

Line 2 of Phase I covered 11 km and was completely underground. Of this, a four km stretch(Vishwa Vidyalaya to Kashmere Gate) was constructed by Kumagai Gumi of Japan, Skanska ofSweden, Itochu of Japan, and Hindustan Construction Company (HCC) of India using the cut andcover 29 method. The work for the remaining seven km (Kashmere Gate to Central Secretariat)

began in April 2001 and was handled by M/s International Metro Civil Contractors (IMCC) 30, a joint venture of five companies. Of this section, four km involved underground tunneling whichwas done using fully automated, high performance boring machines. The remaining three km wereconstructed using the cut and cover method. This section of Line 2 was completed eight monthsahead of schedule.

The tunneling started in August 2002 and was completed by September 2004. Different types ofmachines were used for tunneling, depending on the soil conditions. For a distance of four km between Kashmere Gate and Patel Chowk, Rock Tunnel Boring Machines (TBM) and EarthPressure Balance Machines 31 (EPBM), purchased from Bangkok Metro 32, were used for tunneling.To further speed up the process of tunneling, the DMRC used the New Austrian TunnelingMethod 33 (NATM). This method provided temporary support to the rock by means of shotcrete 34 and rock bolts till permanent concrete was used ( Refer Exhibit V for more about the tunneling

process ). The twin tunnels for up and down movement of trains were made using high qualityreinforced concrete. The finished internal diameter of these tunnels was 5.7 meters.

28 In incremental launching, segments of the bridge were precast and then were launched in place with the help ofspecial low-friction sliding bearings with lateral guides.

29 This is a simple method of excavation for building tunnels. In this process a trench is dug and is later roofed over,with strong supporting beams to prevent roof collapse.

30 IMCC comprised Dyckerhoff Widmann AG (DYWIDAG) (Germany), Larsen and Toubro (India), SamsungCorporation (Korea), Shimizu Corporation (Japan), and Ircon International (India).

31 The EPBM is a type of tunnel boring machine (TBM). It is generally used when boring below the water table. Thecutter head is pressurized with either fluid or air to balance the water pressure. EPBM operators generally had toundergo intensive training including passing through decompression chambers like deep sea divers.

32 Bangkok Metro was constructed by the Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) and operated byBangkok Metro Public Company Limited (BMCL) under a 25-year concession.

33 NATM used the geological stress of the rock mass in the tunnel to stabilize the tunnel. An optimal cross section wascomputed using geotechnical measurements. Shotcrete was used, immediately after excavation, to create a naturalload-bearing ring in the tunnel which also minimized rock deformation.

34 Shotcrete (sprayed concrete) generally used compressed air to shoot concrete onto surfaces. It was generally used invertical structures, rock surfaces or for rock support during tunneling activities.


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The completion of tunneling was a major milestone for the Delhi Metro project in view of thetricky ground conditions and the requirement to ensure complete safety of the buildings in thevicinity. Most of the buildings in that area had shallow foundations. The DMRC thereforeundertook a condition survey of each building and strengthened the foundations of the weak

buildings. This was all the more important as the tunneling activity was carried out in areas withvery old buildings, some even dating back to the 17th century Mughal Empire. The newunderground section was the most difficult and formidable stretch of Phase-I of the metro. We hadto preserve the architectural heritage of old Delhi and the character of Lutyens Delhi, 35 saidSreedharan. The metro underground tunnel was expected to have a life of 120 years.

The first four km section of Line 2 between ViswaVidyalaya and Kashmere Gate becameoperational in December 2004. The lines final seven km section opened in July 2005. Line 2 wascompleted within the budget and nine months ahead of the contracted schedule.

Line 3 (Barakhamba to Dwaraka Subcity)

The work on Line 3 started in February 2003. In April 2004, the GoI and the DMRC decided toextend Line 3. This led to the addition of about 9 km and nine metro stations to Line 3. With theextension, the total length of Phase I increased to 65.16 km (13.01 km Metro corridor and 52.15km Rail Corridor). The scheduled completion date of this phase was also revised from end 2005 toMarch 2006. The revised cost of Phase I of the Delhi Metro was estimated to be Rs. 105.71 billion,which excluded the cost of the Dwarka sub-city extension (Rs. 3.20 billion) which was to befunded by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).

Over the course of the Delhi Metro project, the Indian partners - especially RITES in theconsortiums acquired several capabilities. This gave the DMRC and RITES the confidence tomanage the construction of Line 3 on their own even though the stretch passed through some of

the most congested areas of Delhi. Moreover, some changes were incorporated in Line 3 to cutdown on costs as well as on time to make the facility more user-friendly. For example, Line 3 usedU-shaped girders 36 in constructing most of the elevated sections. These were believed to be costeffective, aesthetic, and sound absorbent. Also, cement was replaced with steel at many places inorder to save time.

The Barakhamba-Dwarka Metro section was inaugurated on December 31, 2005. This section waselevated or at-grade with a short underground section in central New Delhi that intersected withLine 2 at Connaught Place. At that place, the track was at a depth of 16 meters. It gradually rose toa height of 10.5 meters. It was constructed at a 3% gradient, which meant that the track rose bythree meters for every 100 meters traveled horizontally. This section was completed in 30 months.The elevated track reached a maximum height of 17.5 meters at Raja Garden crossing, where itcrossed over an existing flyover. It also became, at 23 km, the longest metro section in the world to

be put to service at one go.

In April 2006, the extension line from Dwarka to Dwarka sub-city was inaugurated. As more landwas available in this section, the metro tracks were supported not on a single large pier but on twosmaller circular piers placed side by side with a small foundation. This also meant that no

buildings had to be demolished or people displaced as in the construction of the other lines. All thework on Line 3 was completed by April 2006, except for the Barakhamba to Indraprastha section,which was expected to be completed by September 2006.

35 New underground section of Delhi Metro inaugurated, www.outlookindia.com, July 02, 200536 A girder is a support beam used in construction. Tracks were laid on girders across elevated sections, especially

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MANAGING THE STAKEHOLDERS IN THE PROJECT

Effective project management involved not only completing the project on schedule and within the budget, but also managing the projects stakeholders. The stakeholders included the governments,

the contractors, the funding agencies, and the general public.Despite assurances that the DMRC would enjoy autonomy, it faced political pressure not only inits recruitment processes, promotions, and contract awarding but also in land acquisition.However, the DMRC resisted this pressure. we never changed any decision simply becausesomebody wants it. If it was required technically or from a professional angle, yes, we do it. Not

because anybody wants it, 37 said Sreedharan.

The DMRC also ensured that it paid the contractors, whom it called associates, on time. It wasable to complete most of the project within the budget mostly by limiting corruption. Thecontractors are grateful not to have to give bribes to get a project, 38 said Sreedharan. Because ofthe cordial relationship that the DMRC was able to establish with the contractors, they workedharder to help the DMRC in its project activities. In fact, the project was finished ahead of

schedule on certain sections because of the suggestions given by the contractors on utilitydiversion and surface road traffic management.

Considering that the Delhi Metro was constructed mostly with Japanese funds, DMRC put inspecial efforts to maintain good relations with JBIC officials. It made it a point to invite JBICofficials to the inauguration events of various metro sections.

The DMRC also tried to ensure that the project did not cause much inconvenience to the general public. It faced and overcame challenges of relocating a large number of utilities like water pipes,sewerage lines, telephone and electric cables, to facilitate the construction work. It ensured that allthese utilities were diverted in advance, so that there was no interruption of services during theconstruction of the metro in a particular area. It organized community interaction programs toinform and seek solutions from the public. We have a community meeting to explain what we

will do, what problems are likely to arise for them, and to seek their help. We have publicized atelephone help line number so that anyone with a problem or question can contact us, 39 saidSreedharan.

The DMRC also faced the difficult task of relocating the people 40 evicted from properties acquiredfor the project. It built temporary accommodations for the people who were to be relocated. Withthe Delhi Metro Act coming into force, the DMRC faced very few legal problems in acquiring

properties. About 400 cases were filed against the DMRC on this issue, out of which only 100were pending as of 2006. Of these, most were for augmenting the assessed value of the property,and the compensation to be paid. One of our main achievements has been our ability to acquireland and move people without any major problems, whereas this is normally a very sensitive issuein India, 41 said Sreedharan.

In order to lessen the difficulties for motorists and pedestrians, alternate traffic plans for the roadsaffected by the construction work were prepared well in advance, with the assistance of the IndianInstitute of Technology, Delhi. When the construction began, barricades were put up withassistance from Delhi Traffic Police. Moreover, new roads were built or the existing roadswidened to accommodate traffic before work actually started.

37 Politicians know I cannot be maneuvered, www.rediff.com, March 10, 2006.38 Elattuvalapil Sreedharan, Getting New Delhi on track, www.time.com, 2003.39 First section of the Delhi metro to open this year, www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002.40 The people who had to be evicted were generally the ones who owned properties or houses along the intended

metro tracks. The project involved the removal of 30 slums, and 4,000 structures, which included several small businesses.

41 First section of the Delhi metro to open this year, www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002.


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The DMRC also tried to ensure that the construction of the Delhi Metro did not damage theenvironment. It pursued environmental and safety objectives during the construction and operationof the Metro by seeking and receiving the appropriate ISO certifications. In 2003, the ISO 14001 42 Environmental Management certification was achieved on two sections during the construction

phase itself. In addition, in 2004, Delhi Metro obtained the OHSAS 1800143

certification for itsenvironment, occupational heath, and safety management system.

The DMRC ensured that the construction sites were entirely covered, with no soil or dirt beingallowed to spread outside. Trucks carried away debris and dugout soil during the night. Theconstruction site was also totally concealed from public view and all vehicles going out of the sitewere washed at the entrance. During the construction stage, special efforts were made to minimizeconstruction noise and pollution. The DMRC used silent generators at work sites and also usedlight shields to reduce glare from work lights at night.

The DMRC took measures to dispose of waste water from the construction sites in anenvironmentally friendly manner. It initiated a program to plant new saplings along the route of themetro, to replace the trees that had been cut down during the project. It also included the provisionof rain-water harvesting 44 facilities as part of its station construction contract, as a measure toconserve water.

PROJECT EVALUATION

The successful completion of the project effectively silenced the critics who had been skepticalabout the ability of an Indian public sector organization to complete any project, let alone one ascomplex and costly as the Delhi Metro, on time and within the budget. The DMRC stuck to itscompletion targets throughout the project and even finished some sections ahead of schedule. Theextension work (on a 2.8 kms stretch) on Phase I was progressing smoothly and was expected to becompleted by September 2006.

DMRC was expected to save Rs. 6 - 7 billion on the project. The project completion cost is Rs10,570 crore (Rs. 105.70 billion). We have not spent that much. Now the project is practicallyover. My own assessment is we will definitely save about Rs. 600 crore to Rs. 700 crore (Rs. 6

billion to Rs. 7 billion) on the project cost, 45 said Sreedharan.

This was in contrast to the cost escalation seen in most public sector projects in India. The DMRCwas successful in keeping the cost of the project at US$ 32-53 million per kilometer. Incomparison, the Bangkok Metro had incurred costs of US$ 56-80 million per kilometer.

OUTLOOK

The Delhi Metro was expected to play a major role in relieving the transport problems faced by thecitys residents. Moreover, with the GoI planning extensions to the Metro, it appeared that the

benefits of an efficient transport system would be enjoyed by people living in a widergeographical area than originally planned. The GoI and the GNTCD had prepared acomprehensive plan to extend the Delhi Metro to 244 km by 2021 in three subsequent phases( Refer Exhibit VI for more information about the Delhi Metro project by 2021 ). The DMRC hoped

42 ISO 14001 environment management standards help organizations minimize the adverse effects of their operation processes on the environment. These standards are flexible and can be applied to any organization producing any product or service at any place in the world. The New York Metro is the only other metro to obtain thiscertification.

43 The OHSAS 18001 certification is a part of BSIs (a leading business service provider) Health & Safety ElectronicBook. The certification was created through the efforts of a number of the worlds leading national standards

bodies, certification bodies, and specialist consultancy groups. It is compatible with both the ISO 9001 and ISO14001 management systems standards.

44 Rain water run-off from the roofs of the metro stations was to be diverted through the drain pipes to settlement/filtration tanks where the water was cleaned, before being allowed to flow into borewells below the stations.

45 Delhi Metro has become the symbol of India's progress, www.rediff.com, March 13, 2006.


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to start work on Phase II of the Delhi Metro project by September 2006, and was set to receivefinancial assistance from the JBIC on the same pattern as Phase I. Phase II was planned to becompleted before the Commonwealth Games, scheduled to be held in Delhi in 2010. This Phase,which was estimated to cost over Rs. 75 billion, would comprise 5 lines (3 of which were to be

extensions of existing lines) with a total length of 53 kilometers ( Refer Exhibit VII for theapproved budget of DMRC for 2006-07 ).

The DMRC was also recruiting new people to work on not only the previously constructed lines but also on the new lines that were coming up. While the number of people recruited foradministration jobs was low, most of the recruitments were for works, maintenance, signaling, andtelecommunication. As of March 2006, the employee strength of DMRC was 3,000.

It also seemed that the Delhi Metro had provided a stimulus to the GoI and the state governmentsto improve the public transport infrastructure in other cities in India. With the DMRC assimilatingthe metro technology from its international partners, it now had the capability to build and manage

projects in other Indian cities, for as low as US$ 18 million per kilometer in some cases. Some ofthe prospective beneficiaries include the Indian cities of Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Lucknow,Bangalore, Hyderabad, Thiruvananthapuram, and Kochi. Also, the West Bengal government had

requested the DMRC to prepare a detailed project report to connect the existing metro rail inKolkata to Howrah, an industrial hub on the other side of the river Hooghly. The DMRC wasexpected to use construction technology similar to that used in the Euro Tunnel, although on asmaller scale.

The Delhi Metro project was successful in reducing pollution levels and vehicular traffic. It helpedincrease road safety by reducing the requirement for buses by around 2,600. Street-level traffic fell

by as much as 50% in the areas where the Metro operated. The reduction in vehicular traffichelped increase the average speed of Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) buses from 10.5 km perhour to 14 km per hour. Two million man-hours per day were expected to be saved due toreductions in journey times. Fuel worth Rs. 5 billion per year was also expected to be saved.However, as of May 2006, only 0.45 million people were using the Delhi metro, which was muchlower than expected 46.

Despite the project having been completed successfully, the GoIs decision to adopt the broadgauge for the Metro seemed to have created problems for the DMRC. The DMRC imported therolling stock from Korea and remodeled it to suit the requirements of the broad gauge track. Evenafter delivery, the rolling stock had to go to Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) in Bangalorefor fitment before it was ready for operations in Delhi, thus delaying the deployment of rakes. Wecannot increase the frequency further than that due to the shortage of trains (rake), 47 said SatishKumar (Kumar), director (Rolling Stock and Electricals), DMRC. Similarly, the process ofindigenization of the coaches was also not yet complete.

Another challenge that the DMRC faced was the severe dearth of parking facilities at its metrostations. Many of its parking lots were full and in some areas, the municipal authority that ownedthe land around the metro stations did not allot it sufficient space for parking facilities. To dealwith this problem, the DMRC initially considered building multi-level parking facilities near itsstations. However, the idea was dropped owing to its prohibitively high cost. Instead, the DMRCsought to introduce more shuttle buses to and from the stations, to solve the parking problem( Refer Exhibit VIII for more information on operational aspects of DMRC ).

The DMRC earned revenues of Rs. 1.50 billion in the financial year ended March 2006, incomparison to the Rs. 720 million it had earned the previous year. It planned to repay the Japaneseloan from 2007. Moreover, it expected to earn additional income by providing consultancyservices to organizations and cities, both in India and overseas. Sreedharan said DMRC has also

been approached by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Syria, and Iran forsetting up metro systems in their countries. 48

46 Metro to increase frequency today, www.hindu.com, August 09, 2006.47 Crowded days ahead for Delhi Metro, www.hindu.com, July 18, 2006.48 Taking Metro to new heights, www.hinduonnet.com, April 04, 2005.


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Exhibit I

The first metro system in the world was the London Underground which became operational in1863. Later, metro systems were established in Paris and Berlin. In 1904, the New York City

Subway was commissioned. Extending to 1,355 km, this went on to become the largest metrosystem in the world. In the 20 th century, metro systems became common with new ones comingup in major cities of the world.

Some Metro Systems around the World

Country City Name of System Year Opened Length (Kms)

England London London Underground 1863 408

France Paris Paris Metro 1900 221.6

USA New York New York City Subway 1904 1355

Spain Madrid Madrid Metro 1919 226.7

Japan Tokyo Tokyo Metro 1927 183.3Japan Osaka Osaka Municipal Subway 1933 113.5Russia Moscow Moscow Metro 1935 278.3

Russia St. Petersburg St. Petersburg Metro 1955 109.5

S. Korea Seoul Seoul Metro 1963 287

Mexico Mexico City Mexico City Metro 1969 177

Hong Kong Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway 1979 91

India Kolkata Kolkata Metro 1984 16.45

Egypt Cairo Cairo Metro 1987 43.5

Australia Sydney Metro Light Rail 1997 7.2Thailand Bangkok Bangkok Metro 2004 21

Source: www.wikipedia.org.

Exhibit II

Studies on Delhis Traffic Problems

S.No Study Organization Year1 Transportation study Central Road Research Institute,

New Delhi1969

2 Town and Country PlanningOrganization study

Ministry of Urban affairs andEmployment

1973

3 Metropolitan Transportation Team Ministry of Urban Development 19744 Metropolitan Transport Project Ministry of Railway 19755 Study group Planning Commission 19826 Indian Railway Study Group Indian Railways 19867 Task Force Ministry of Urban Development 19878 Planning of Mass Rapid Transport

System for DelhiCentral Road Research Institute,

New Delhi1989

9 Mass Rapid Transport System for Delhi RITES 1990



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Exhibit III

Outstanding Features of the Delhi Metro

The Delhi Metro was considered an advanced MRTS. It followed all the appropriate Indian andInternational construction codes.Each metro train could seat 240 passengers with space for another 1,240 passengers to stand. Ofthe required 280 coaches, 60 were manufactured offshore in Korea and the other 220 coacheswere to be manufactured by progressive indigenization by BEML. The coaches were 3.2 m wideand made of lightweight stainless steel. The coach interiors were air-conditioned and fireresistant. Every coach was fitted with anti-collision devices conforming to internationalstandards.Centralized Automatic Train Control (CATC) comprising Automatic Train Operation (ATO),Automatic Train Protection (ATP), and Automatic Train Signalling (ATS) systems wasinstalled on the Delhi Metro. The ATO was mostly used on the underground section. The ATPsystem applied automatic brakes on trains and brought them to a dead halt when train driverswent too fast or got too close to another train. This system made the Delhi Metro very safe evenwhen more than 256 trains traveled on any line.Ticketing in the Delhi Metro was fully automatic. Contact-less stored value smart cards servedthe purpose of tickets for metro passengers. The entire fare collection system was monitoredthrough a central computer in the operational control center of the DMRC.Communications equipment on the Delhi Metro consisted of a transmission system withfiberglass cables, a train radio system enabling communication between the metro trains and theoperations control center, an internal telephone system, a public-address system for theindividual stations, and the power supplies for the various communications equipment.A fully automatic computerized system i.e. SCADA system (Supervisory Control and DataAcquisition System) was used for controlling the power supply. The system could detect faultsand rectify them within seconds. The power for running trains as well as for all the stations ofthe 11 km underground section came through a feed from the New Delhi GIS sub-station.The station air-conditioning and ventilation system in tunnels were designed to meet therigorous climatic conditions of Delhi (temperature is maintained around 29 oC). Its reversibleventilation fans were designed to keep passengers cool while the automatic fire doors ensuredtheir safety. Also, all coaches were provided with emergency batteries that provided lightingand ventilation in case of power failure. There were escalators and accessible elevators at allstations, with tactile tiles to guide the visually impaired from outside the stations to the trains.All entrances of the metro stations were controlled through automatic flap gates through which45 to 60 passengers could enter per minute.The security systems on Delhi Metro were comparable to the best transport systems in the

world. All stations were fitted with CCTV cameras and surveillance systems. The trains systemalso had in-built safeguards against any terrorist attack. Even though X-ray machines wereinstalled at some stations, manual frisking of passengers was also done as it was consideredmore effective. All metro stations also had their own police force called the Metro Police.Since Delhi is an earthquake prone area, the elevated and underground sections of the Metrowere constructed to withstand extreme seismic stress. All stations were fitted with seismicsensors to warn of impending earthquakes.

Compiled from various sources.


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Exhibit IV

Companies Involved in the Project

General Consultants Group Pacific Consultants International (PCI), JapanRailway Technical Services, and TonichiEngineering Consultants Inc. (all three belong toJapan), Parson Brinkerhoff International Inc.(USA) and RITES (India).

Rolling stock Mitsubishi Corp. (Japan) and KOROS (renamedROTEM) (Korea) and Bharat Earth Movers Ltd.

Alternating current (AC) propulsionsystem, installation and control system forrolling stock

Mitsubishi Electric Corp. (Japan).

Centralized Automatic Train Control Alstom Transport Ltd. (India), Alstom SA(France), Alcatel SA (Portugal), and SumitomoCorp. (Japan).

Fare collection system Thales-e-transactions CGA, S.A.(France)

Communications equipment Siemens Ltd. (Germany)

SCADA (Supervisory Control and DataAcquisition) System

Alcatel (France).

Maintenance activities Cobra S.A and Eliop S.A, (both of Spain) andIRCON International Ltd. (India).

4 km stretch

(Vishwa Vidyalaya to Kashmere Gate)

Kumagai Gumi (Japan), Skanska (Sweden),

Itochu (Japan), and Hindustan ConstructionCompany (India).

7 kms(Kashmere Gate to Central Secretariat)

Dyckerhoff Widmann AG (Germany), L&T(India), Samsung Corp. (Korea), Shimizu Corp.(Japan), and IRCON International Ltd.



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Exhibit V

Tunneling Process of a Part of Line 2 of Delhi Metro



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Exhibit VI

The Delhi Metro Project by 2021

S.No. From To Length

Phase I (2005) 62.16

1 Shahdara-ISBT-Trinagar-Bariwala 28.00

2 Vishwa Vidyalaya-Central Secretariat 11.00

3 Barakhamba road-Patel Nagar-Dwaraka 23.16

Phase II (2011) 53.02

4 Vishwa Vidyalaya-Jahangiri puri 6.36

5 Central Secretariat-Qutub Minar 10.87

6 Shahdara-Dilshad Garden 3.09

7 Indraprastha-Yamuna Bank-New Ashok Nagar 8.078 Yamuna Bank-Anand Vihar ISBT 6.16

9 Kirti Nagar-Mundka 18.47

Phase III (2016) 58.20

10 Jahagiri puri- Raja Garden- Dhaula Khan-AIIMS- NehruPlace- Okhla Industrial Area Phase I

34.60

11 Barwala-Bhawana 5.20

12 Rangpuri-IGI Airport-Shahbad Mohaamadpur-Dwarka City 8.20

13 Shahbad Mohaamadpur-Dwarka City-Kakraula Village 10.20

Phase IV (2021) 72.80

14 Jahangiri puri-Peeragarhi-Pankha Road-Sagarpur 24.20

15 Narela-Bhawana-Gheora-Najafgarh 33.00

16 Mehrauli-Gurgaon 11.60

17 Dilshad Garden-Nand Nagiri 4.00

Total 244.86Source: www.delhimetrorail.com.


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Exhibit VII

Approved Budget 2006-2007

Particulars (Figures in billions of Rupees) Phase I Phase II Total

Business Area-Project

JBIC funded payments 5.45 3.11 8.56 Non-JBIC payments 3.58 9.26 12.84Total Project Expenses 9.03 12.37 21.41PD Works 0.82 0 0.82Deposit Works 0.79 0.72 1.51

Business Area- O&M

Receipt from Operations 2.29 0 2.29O&M Expenses 1.86 0 1.86

Business Area-Consultancy

Receipts 0.80 0 0Expenditure 0.40 0 0

JBIC Payments

Interest Payment of JBIC loan 1.77 0 1.77Repayment of JBIC Loan 0.14 0 0.14



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Exhibit VIII

Operational Aspects of the Delhi Metro Project Phase I

A study of the operational aspects of different metro networks of the world gave the DMRCinputs to run the Delhi metro. Within the short period that it had been functioning, the DelhiMetro set new operational efficiency standards. It became one of the few railway systems in theworld to record a punctuality level of over 99 per cent in train operations. The trains operated atintervals of three to five minutes between 6 am and 10 pm.In 2003, the DMRC signed an agreement with the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC), Delhis

bus operator, for the introduction of about 200 shuttle buses to move people to and from railwaystations.In the early days of the Delhi Metro, there was a near stampede to get onto the trains. People

jostled with each other, refused to stand in queue, did not return the tokens, tore up the seats,spat inside the coaches and even pulled the emergency chains without reason. The DMRCeducated passengers on appropriate behavior in trains as well as imposed penalties to rectifytheir behavior. It also conducted programs to teach passengers how to enter and exit the coaches

properly.The DMRC laid a lot of emphasis on commercial property development in the metro stationcomplexes to earn higher non-operating revenues. As of 2006, almost 20% of the annualrevenues of the DMRC came from these sources. Moreover, the DMRC had a system torationalize its fare structure so that the Delhi Metro earned more per passenger without affecting

passenger numbers. The maximum expenditure, about 23%, was incurred on salary, wages, andother employee costs.

Particulars 2004-05(Rs. in million)2003-04

(Rs. in million)

Revenue (income from operations, consultancy andrentals from properties) 720

Expenditure (before depreciation and interest on loans) 520

Loss after adding depreciation, interest and other costs 760 320



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Additional Readings & References:

1. Chandan Mitra, Delhi is finally a Metro , www.dailypioneer.com, July 10, 2006.

2. Manojit Saha, Metro Rail will be a cheap mode of transportation ,www.projectsmonitor.com, July 06, 2006.3. Rajat Guha, Govt to give metros a free run , under common code,

www.economictimes.indiatimes.com, June 23, 2006.

4. Gaurav Vivek Bhatnagar, Crowded days ahead for Delhi Metro , www.thehindu.com, June18, 2006.

5. Sudipta Sengupta, Delhi metro reports losses for 2nd year in a row , www.merinews.com,May 26, 2006.

6. Vandana Gombar, Is the Delhi Metro a costly mistake? www.rediff.com, April 03, 2006.7. Mission 2020: Delhi Metro must cover 400 km , www.thehindubusinessline.com, March 23,

2006.8. Archana Masih, Politicians know I cannot be maneuvered , www.rediff.com, March 10,

2006.

9. Delhi Metro chief Sreedharan in US top 25 newsmakers list , www.ibef.org, January 12,2006.

10. Mukta Magazine, How KLG Systel is keeping track of Delhi Metro Corporation ,www.klgsystel.com, 2006.

11. Shekhar Gupta, For the Record: Talking with E. Sreedharan , www.indianexpress.com, November 18, 2003.

12. DMRC all set to complete first section of Phase III , www.thehindu.com October 06, 2005.

13. Urban transit: The challenges , www.deccanherald.com, June 21, 2005.14. Amelia Gentleman, Delhi delighted with its new metro , www.iht.com, March 12, 2005.15. Ramesh Ramachandran, On the fast track , www.tribuneindia.com, January 02, 2005.16. Delhi Metro rail...2,500 less buses on roads! www.indiainfoline.com, January 03, 2003.17. R. C. Acharya, All set for Delhi Metro flag-off , www. thehindubusinessline.com, December

23, 2002.

18. Delhi Metro a symbol of Indo-Japanese friendship , www.cities.expressindia.com,December 25, 2002.

19. Ajita Shashidhar, Delhi Metro to raise funds through realty development ,www.blonnet.com, November 04, 2002.

20. www.delhimetrorail.com.21. www.urbantransit.net.22. www.irfca.org.23. www.blonnet.com.24. www.wikipedia.com.25. www.pbworld.com.26. www.delhimetrorail.com.

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