DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF INDIA - JUNE/JULY 2012

DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA

JULY 2012

DSIVOLUME 4 ISSUE 5 ` 250

SIACHEN GLACIER

CONFLICT WITHOUT END The Siachen imbroglio has been misunderstood, evenmismanaged, by Indian policy makers I B.G. VERGHESE

INDO-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

INCREASING TIESDefence relations between India and Europe are poisedto grow in the coming decade I KANWAL SIBAL

TAKING TOTHE SKIESTHE DEFENCE SERVICES ARE INDUCTING ROTARY WINGAIRCRAFT IN HUGE NUMBERS I AJAI SHUKLATHE DEFENCE SERVICES ARE INDUCTING ROTARY WINGAIRCRAFT IN HUGE NUMBERS I AJAI SHUKLA

DSI Cover August print 2nd time:cover-feb3.qxd 20/07/12 1:55 PM Page 2

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JULY 2012

01

DSI

LETTER FROM THE

Mannika ChopraEDITOR

Defence & Security of India

editor

midst the high profi le, headline-grabbing, fi xed-wing combat aircraft many might forget the lowly helicopter. Reconnaissance has been an integral part of any military operation and it has been the helicopter, with its incredible agility and ability, which has played that role ever since it became a part of the aviation pantheon more than sixty years ago. It is the ideal platform to relay intelligence, transport defence personnel and carry out almost impossible rescue missions.

So while the impending sale of the 126 Rafale Multi-Role Medium Combat Aircraft to India or the development of the Indo-Russian Fifth-Generation Aircraft continue to dominate the media space, as DSI reveals, there is an almost unnoticed activity occurring in India’s rotary wing arena. Not only is the Indian Air Force planning to induct about a thousand rotary wing aircraft into its inventory over the next ten years but the Bengaluru-based Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is doing solid groundwork to manufacture the Dhruv Mark-III with its versatile Shakti engine.In a detailed essay, we feature a possible resolution of the Siachen imbroglio which, as DSI points out, has been mismanaged by Indian policy makers over the years. Interest has revived on the Siachen glacier when Pakistan’s all-powerful Army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, suddenly stated that India and Pakistan must live in peaceful co-existence, referring particularly to the Siachen. India’s increasing visibility as a regional player, a dramatic growth in her weapons’ market clubbed together with the challenges thrown up by a global economic downturn has lead to a growing engagement between Europe and the Subcontinent, especially in the defence arena. Though the engagement is not with the European Union as a single entity, it is with defence consortia in which many European countries have a stake. At the same time, there exist important one-to-one partnerships with countries like France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. DSI undertakes an assessment of future prospects.Refl ecting a unique Indo-US-China strategic exchange on maritime security, two back-to-back visits recently took place: one to Beijing followed by one to Washington, both at the Track-Two level. The trilaterals reveals, as DSI says, the growing signifi cance of the Indo-Pacifi c maritime domain. Unlike, the US and Soviet face-off during the Cold War which focussed on land the confl ict zones of the future will be at sea. A message that was brought home by the rather unusual meeting of these three, often adversarial, global powers.As usual we look forward to your feedback, suggestions and comments. Do write to us [email protected]. Should you want to subscribe then drop us an email [email protected] and our marketing team will do the rest.

Not only is the Indian Air Force planning to induct about a thousand rotary wing aircraft into its inventory over the next ten years, HAL is doing solid groundwork to manufacture the Dhruv Mark-III with its versatile Shakti engine.

LETTER FROM EDITOR 3rd time.indd 1LETTER FROM EDITOR 3rd time.indd 1 20/07/12 5:23 PM20/07/12 5:23 PM

JULY 2012

02 03

DSI

COVER STORY � 06

INDO-EUROPEAN DEFENCE RELATIONS � 16

MARITIME SECURITY � 44

CO

NT

EN

TS TAKING TO

THE SKIES

STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

RAISING THE FLAGS

Unlike the Indian Air Force’s high profi le acquisition of fi xed wing aircraft, its rotary wing plan is leaning more towards indigenisation with the Dhruv and its versatile Shakti engine powering this new Indian capability.

Nations which have remained continentally fi xated for centuries and remain so even today, notably China and India, are awakening to the meaning and relevance of not just the waters that surround them butalso of those that are more distant.

NARROW VISIONAnnually, thousands of crores are disbursed by the Budget for the acquisition of defence equipment which then gets surrendered because of slow procurement.

SIACHEN GLACIER � 28

THE SIACHEN FOLLIESThere has been a fl urry of interest in the Siachen issue after Pakistan called for an Indian withdrawal from the glacier, a mutual pull-back and a demiltarisation of the glacier.

India’s defence ties with European countries refl ects its foreign policy choices and, in some ways, the position these countries have taken on the India-Pakistan differences. With India set to import USD 200 billion over the next ten years, Europeans are likely to tap into the vast weapon’s market.

DEFENCE BUDGET � 34

BACKWARD MARCHThe allocation to defence has offi cially gone up by 17.6 percent from ` 1,64,415 crore last year to ` 1, 93, 007 crore this year. Still, military expenditure remains well below the politically correct level of three percent.

AFP

AFP

AFP

AFP

AFP

AFP

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT � 38

contents 2nd time.indd 1-2contents 2nd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 10:51 AM20/07/12 10:51 AM

JULY 2012

02 03

DSI

COVER STORY � 06

INDO-EUROPEAN DEFENCE RELATIONS � 16

MARITIME SECURITY � 44

CO

NT

EN

TS TAKING TO

THE SKIES

STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

RAISING THE FLAGS

Unlike the Indian Air Force’s high profi le acquisition of fi xed wing aircraft, its rotary wing plan is leaning more towards indigenisation with the Dhruv and its versatile Shakti engine powering this new Indian capability.

Nations which have remained continentally fi xated for centuries and remain so even today, notably China and India, are awakening to the meaning and relevance of not just the waters that surround them butalso of those that are more distant.

NARROW VISIONAnnually, thousands of crores are disbursed by the Budget for the acquisition of defence equipment which then gets surrendered because of slow procurement.

SIACHEN GLACIER � 28

THE SIACHEN FOLLIESThere has been a fl urry of interest in the Siachen issue after Pakistan called for an Indian withdrawal from the glacier, a mutual pull-back and a demiltarisation of the glacier.

India’s defence ties with European countries refl ects its foreign policy choices and, in some ways, the position these countries have taken on the India-Pakistan differences. With India set to import USD 200 billion over the next ten years, Europeans are likely to tap into the vast weapon’s market.

DEFENCE BUDGET � 34

BACKWARD MARCHThe allocation to defence has offi cially gone up by 17.6 percent from ` 1,64,415 crore last year to ` 1, 93, 007 crore this year. Still, military expenditure remains well below the politically correct level of three percent.

AFP

AFP

AFP

AFP

AFP

AFP

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT � 38

contents 2nd time.indd 1-2contents 2nd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 10:51 AM20/07/12 10:51 AM

AJAISHUKLA

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print

media. He is consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard. He

was also consulting editor (Strategic Affairs)

for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored

prime time news and special programmes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

SUBIMALBHATTACHARJEE

Subimal Bhattacharjeeis a widely recognised

expert on global cybersecurity

issues. A well-knowncolumnist, he writes onissues related to global

internet governance andcyber-security with over

165 published articles andpapers on the subject.

Currently, he is theCountry Head of General

Dynamics Corporation IndiaPvt. Ltd., New Delhi.

B. G.VERGHESE

B. G. Verghese is a visiting professor at the Centre for Policy Research. A

recipient of the Magsaysay Award in 1975 and Assam’s

Sankaradeva Award for 2005, he is also a distinguished

fellow of the Administrative Staff College of India,

Hyderabad. He was also a member of the Kargil

Review Committee and co-author of the Kargil

Review Committee Report. He has written several books, including Rage,

Reconciliation and Security. He started his career in

journalism with The Times of India and was later the

editor of both Hindustan Times and

The Indian Express.

KANWAL SIBAL

Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary to

the Government of India from 2002 to 2003. Most recently he was India’s Ambassador to Russia (2004-2007). Joining the

Indian Foreign Service in 1966, he began his career

in France. He has been the Deputy Spokesperson in the Ministry of External

Affairs (1973-1975). Currently, he is a member

of the National Security Advisory Board and is the

President of Association of Indian Diplomats.

GURMEETKANWAL

Gurmeet Kanwal is the Director, Centre for

Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He has commanded an infantry brigade during

Operation Parakram on the Line of Control in

2001-03. A soldier-scholar, he has authored several

books including Indian Army:Vision 2020 and

Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal. He is a well-known columnist and TV

analyst on national security issues.

PREMVIR DAS

Premvir Das (retd.) fromthe Indian Navy in 1998 as

Commander-in-Chief of theEastern Naval Command.

He has been closelyassociated with theformulation of naval

acquisition plans and theirimplementation. He hasserved on the ExecutiveCouncils of two leading

think tanks, the Institute ofDefence Studies and

Analyses and the UnitedService Institute.

MRINAL SUMAN

Mrinal Suman, Major General (retd.) is an expert

on various aspects of India’s defence procurement regime

and offsets and has been closely associated with the

evolution of the new defence procurement mechanism.

Often consulted by policy makers and the

Parliamentary Committee on Defence, he also heads

the Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory

Service of the Confederation of Indian Industry..

CONTRIBUTORS JULY 2012


EDITOR-IN-CHIEFManeesha DubeEDITORMannika ChopraSUB-EDITORIshleen Kaur TakkarCREATIVE DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNAmal Mourya (Designer)SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal Mehta (E-Mail: [email protected])DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETINGTarun Malviya (E-Mail: [email protected])SALES & MARKETING COORDINATORAtul Bali (E-Mail: [email protected])CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONSunil GujralPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMANJ. S. UberoiPRESIDENTXavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESFrance/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected] Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Latd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email :[email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email :[email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected]

Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited. Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily refl ect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

JULY 2012 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 5

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of India is obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact: [email protected]

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.htmlhttp://www.defencesecurityindia.com

DSI

contributors 3rd time.indd 1-2contributors 3rd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 5:31 PM20/07/12 5:31 PM

AJAISHUKLA

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print

media. He is consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard. He

was also consulting editor (Strategic Affairs)

for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored

prime time news and special programmes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.


Subimal Bhattacharjeeis a widely recognised

expert on global cybersecurity

issues. A well-knowncolumnist, he writes onissues related to global

internet governance andcyber-security with over

165 published articles andpapers on the subject.

Currently, he is theCountry Head of General

Dynamics Corporation IndiaPvt. Ltd., New Delhi.

B. G.VERGHESE

B. G. Verghese is a visiting professor at the Centre for Policy Research. A

recipient of the Magsaysay Award in 1975 and Assam’s

Sankaradeva Award for 2005, he is also a distinguished

fellow of the Administrative Staff College of India,

Hyderabad. He was also a member of the Kargil

Review Committee and co-author of the Kargil

Review Committee Report. He has written several books, including Rage,

Reconciliation and Security. He started his career in

journalism with The Times of India and was later the

editor of both Hindustan Times and

The Indian Express.

KANWAL SIBAL

Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary to

the Government of India from 2002 to 2003. Most recently he was India’s Ambassador to Russia (2004-2007). Joining the

Indian Foreign Service in 1966, he began his career

in France. He has been the Deputy Spokesperson in the Ministry of External

Affairs (1973-1975). Currently, he is a member

of the National Security Advisory Board and is the

President of Association of Indian Diplomats.

GURMEETKANWAL

Gurmeet Kanwal is the Director, Centre for

Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He has commanded an infantry brigade during

Operation Parakram on the Line of Control in

2001-03. A soldier-scholar, he has authored several

books including Indian Army:Vision 2020 and

Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal. He is a well-known columnist and TV

analyst on national security issues.

PREMVIR DAS

Premvir Das (retd.) fromthe Indian Navy in 1998 as

Commander-in-Chief of theEastern Naval Command.

He has been closelyassociated with theformulation of naval

acquisition plans and theirimplementation. He hasserved on the ExecutiveCouncils of two leading

think tanks, the Institute ofDefence Studies and

Analyses and the UnitedService Institute.

MRINAL SUMAN

Mrinal Suman, Major General (retd.) is an expert

on various aspects of India’s defence procurement regime

and offsets and has been closely associated with the

evolution of the new defence procurement mechanism.

Often consulted by policy makers and the

Parliamentary Committee on Defence, he also heads

the Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory

Service of the Confederation of Indian Industry..

CONTRIBUTORS JULY 2012


EDITOR-IN-CHIEFManeesha DubeEDITORMannika ChopraSUB-EDITORIshleen Kaur TakkarCREATIVE DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNAmal Mourya (Designer)SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal Mehta (E-Mail: [email protected])DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETINGTarun Malviya (E-Mail: [email protected])SALES & MARKETING COORDINATORAtul Bali (E-Mail: [email protected])CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONSunil GujralPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMANJ. S. UberoiPRESIDENTXavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESFrance/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected] Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Latd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email :[email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email :[email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected]

Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited. Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily refl ect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

JULY 2012 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 5

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of India is obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact: [email protected]

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.htmlhttp://www.defencesecurityindia.com

DSI

contributors 3rd time.indd 1-2contributors 3rd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 5:31 PM20/07/12 5:31 PM

MILITARY AVIATION JULY 2012

06 07

DSI

With the defence Services poised to induct well over a thousand rotary wing aircraft in the coming decade, military aviation will see a prominent growth in the area of helicopters

KEY POINTS � The versatile Shakti engine, has powered the genesis of a new Indian capability in helicopter building.� HAL’s focus is shifting to indigenous development and the making of light helicopters.� Besides the huge market in military helicopters, there is a huge potential among civilian users.

AJAISHUKLA

Sea King helicopters land on Indian Navy’s aircraft carrier INS

Viraat, Mumbai coast

It was the ultimate test of helicopter and pilot, the man and his machine. As the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) shuddered towards the icy

helipad on a 21,000-foot ledge high above the Siachen glacier, the pilots could spot wreckage from earlier helicopter crashes littered around the base of the vertical ice wall ahead of them. This was the approach to the Indian Army’s (IA) legendary Sonam Post, the highest inhabited spot on earth. Sonam is just one example of why the military so urgently wants the Dhruv, which the Bengaluru-based Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has custom-engineered for high altitude operations.

As the trial continued, the twin-engine Dhruv – incongruously sporting

the fl amboyant peacock motif of Sarang, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) helicopter aerobatics team – quickly demonstrated its superiority over the military’s venerable single-engine Cheetah helicopters, which can barely lift 20 kilos of payload to Sonam. Touching down on a tiny H-shape formed on the snow with perforated iron sheets, the Dhruv’s pilots signalled to one of the infantrymen on Sonam to climb aboard. The Dhruv took off smoothly, circled the post and landed again. Another soldier clambered onto the helicopter and the process was repeated, then with a third, and then a fourth soldier. Finally, with all Sonam’s six defenders on board, the Dhruv lifted off and landed back safely.

“This helicopter is simply unmatched at high altitudes”, proclaimed Group Captain Unni Nair, HAL’s chief helicopter test pilot, who fl ew the Dhruv that August morning during the ‘hot-and-high’ trials at Sonam. That term refers to high-altitude fl ying in summer, when the heat-swollen oxygen is even thinner than usual. “The Army wanted the Dhruv to lift 200 kilos to Sonam; we managed to carry 600 kilos.”

The Dhruv, and its versatile Shakti engine, have powered the genesis of a new

Indian capability in helicopter building. With each new project leveraged by the knowhow and experience of the preceding one, HAL has graduated from the Dhruv to an armed version called the Rudra and from there to a full-fl edged Light Attack Helicopter that is so far unnamed, but is referred to as the Light Combat Helicopter or LCH. Simultaneously, HAL is developing a Light Utility Helicopter, or LUH, which will replace the Chetaks and Cheetahs that have served the Indian military for four decades.

Each of these helicopters (with the possible exception of the LUH, described later) rides the success of a world-beating new engine, the Shakti, which was jointly developed and customised for India’s high-altitude borders by French engine-maker Turbomeca, in partnership with HAL, with Turbomeca having a 83 percent share and HAL 17 percent. This engine makes the new Dhruv Mark III – which is now being delivered in numbers to the military – far superior to the Mark I and Mark II Dhruvs, which were powered by Turbomeca’s older TM 333-2B2 engine. The Shakti, which will

AFP

helicopters 3rd time.indd 1-2helicopters 3rd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 5:27 PM20/07/12 5:27 PM


06 07

DSI

With the defence Services poised to induct well over a thousand rotary wing aircraft in the coming decade, military aviation will see a prominent growth in the area of helicopters

KEY POINTS � The versatile Shakti engine, has powered the genesis of a new Indian capability in helicopter building.� HAL’s focus is shifting to indigenous development and the making of light helicopters.� Besides the huge market in military helicopters, there is a huge potential among civilian users.

AJAISHUKLA

Sea King helicopters land on Indian Navy’s aircraft carrier INS

Viraat, Mumbai coast

It was the ultimate test of helicopter and pilot, the man and his machine. As the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) shuddered towards the icy

helipad on a 21,000-foot ledge high above the Siachen glacier, the pilots could spot wreckage from earlier helicopter crashes littered around the base of the vertical ice wall ahead of them. This was the approach to the Indian Army’s (IA) legendary Sonam Post, the highest inhabited spot on earth. Sonam is just one example of why the military so urgently wants the Dhruv, which the Bengaluru-based Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has custom-engineered for high altitude operations.

As the trial continued, the twin-engine Dhruv – incongruously sporting

the fl amboyant peacock motif of Sarang, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) helicopter aerobatics team – quickly demonstrated its superiority over the military’s venerable single-engine Cheetah helicopters, which can barely lift 20 kilos of payload to Sonam. Touching down on a tiny H-shape formed on the snow with perforated iron sheets, the Dhruv’s pilots signalled to one of the infantrymen on Sonam to climb aboard. The Dhruv took off smoothly, circled the post and landed again. Another soldier clambered onto the helicopter and the process was repeated, then with a third, and then a fourth soldier. Finally, with all Sonam’s six defenders on board, the Dhruv lifted off and landed back safely.

“This helicopter is simply unmatched at high altitudes”, proclaimed Group Captain Unni Nair, HAL’s chief helicopter test pilot, who fl ew the Dhruv that August morning during the ‘hot-and-high’ trials at Sonam. That term refers to high-altitude fl ying in summer, when the heat-swollen oxygen is even thinner than usual. “The Army wanted the Dhruv to lift 200 kilos to Sonam; we managed to carry 600 kilos.”

The Dhruv, and its versatile Shakti engine, have powered the genesis of a new

Indian capability in helicopter building. With each new project leveraged by the knowhow and experience of the preceding one, HAL has graduated from the Dhruv to an armed version called the Rudra and from there to a full-fl edged Light Attack Helicopter that is so far unnamed, but is referred to as the Light Combat Helicopter or LCH. Simultaneously, HAL is developing a Light Utility Helicopter, or LUH, which will replace the Chetaks and Cheetahs that have served the Indian military for four decades.

Each of these helicopters (with the possible exception of the LUH, described later) rides the success of a world-beating new engine, the Shakti, which was jointly developed and customised for India’s high-altitude borders by French engine-maker Turbomeca, in partnership with HAL, with Turbomeca having a 83 percent share and HAL 17 percent. This engine makes the new Dhruv Mark III – which is now being delivered in numbers to the military – far superior to the Mark I and Mark II Dhruvs, which were powered by Turbomeca’s older TM 333-2B2 engine. The Shakti, which will

AFP



08

DSI

licence at a new HAL plant soon, provides a healthy 517 KW of power at 6,000 m (19,685 ft), 25 percent more than the 412 KW that the TM 333-2B2 eked out for pilots.

The Shakti-powered Dhruv Mark III has already changed the operational dynamics on India’s high-altitude Himalayan defences. The helicopter’s load-carrying ability permits outlying posts to be manned with fewer soldiers. In a crisis, jawans can be airlifted quickly to threatened areas, and casualties evacuated. And when soldiers on isolated piquets like Sonam see a Dhruv fl ying in, they know that there is space on board for essential stores, and even occasional goodies from families and comrades.

HAL’s sharpening skills in rotary wing design and engineering are driving an important shift in the company’s strategy. HAL’s focus, which has long been on building fi xed wing fi ghter aircraft, under licence from foreign aeronautics giants like the Sukhoi and Mikoyan, is shifting to the indigenous development and building of light helicopters. Once the technology

quotient rises and a supply chain is developed, HAL can graduate to heavier helicopters. This shift began with a strategic assessment in the mid-1990s – when Ashok Baweja was HAL’s chairperson – which concluded that indigenisation would be more realistically pursued in the rotary wing fi eld than in the challenging, cutting-edge realm of fi ghter aircraft.

Shift in Strategy This shift has already begun reflected in HAL’s bottom line. P.Soundara Rajan, who heads HAL’s prestigious Helicopter Complex, says the revenue from helicopters will comprise 25 percent of HAL’s total turnover a decade from now. “HAL took 40 years to build its first700 helicopters, which were basically second-generation machines. But the next 700 helicopters will be built in just a decade. Our helicopter business is currently just 5-10 percent of our total turnover(HAL’s total sales in 2010-11 were ` 13,116 crore). By 2022, home-grown helicopters

will account for 25 percent of HAL’s revenues,” says Rajan.

This enhanced share of helicopter sales, HAL offi cials point out, will take place despite the sharply rising sales fi xed wing aircraft production. Over the coming decade, HAL will be setting up production lines for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft; the Rafale Medium Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft; the Indo-Russian Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft and the Indo-Russian Medium Transport Aircraft, all of which will add signifi cantly to the company’s bottom line.

While the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has charged HAL with developing and building much of the IAF’s and the Army’sprojected requirement of light helicopters, HAL has made little headway in meeting the Indian Navy’s need for a light helicopter to replace the deck-landing Chetak. The MoD, therefore, is exploring the international market for light naval helicopters, as well as for the medium and heavy helicopter requirements of all three Services.

The major procurements in the pipeline are: Mi-17 V-5: The IAF is in the process of inducting 139 Russian Mi-17 V-5 Medium Lift Helicopters, for an estimated USD 2.4 billion. This continues the IAF’s four-decade old reliance on Russian-designed twin-turbine, Medium Lift Helicopters, which the manufacturing plants at Ulan-Ude and Kazan have built in larger numbers; more than any other helicopters in history. India began with the Mi-4 in the 1960s, graduated to the Mi-8 in the 1970s and then to the Mi-17 in the 1980s. The current version of the Mi-17 transports 26 soldiers in combat gear, or 4 tonnes of supplies to high altitude posts. However, the new-model V-5 is a vastly superior machine, with new engines, rotor blades and avionics. An IAF orderfor 80 Mi-17s is already being delivered, while a follow-on order for 59 more is in the pipeline.

CH-47F Chinook: Fifteen American CH-47F Chinook Heavy Lift Helicopters

will soon replace the IAF’s obsolete fl eet of giant Russian Mi-26 helicopters, of which just 3-4 remain serviceable. The Boeing Company’s Chinook is one of the iconic aircraft built in the US in the 1950s and 1960s, which continue in frontline service, albeit in highly upgraded contemporary variants. The others are the C-130J Hercules transport aircraft, the B-52 bomber, and the UH-1 Iroquois helicopter.

The Chinook’s fi rst serious combat experience was during the Vietnam War, when the twin-engine, tandem rotor CH-47A impressed the aviation world with its ability to deliver guns, stores or personnel directly into the combat zone.

A recent version of the Chinook, the CH-47D, has distinguished itself in campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, taking insurgents by surprise by transporting troops and supplies to remote operating bases. However, the US doctrine of generating operational tempo by exploiting the

Chinook’s lifting capabilities comes fraught with risks. Last August, in the biggest single-day loss for American forces in Afghanistan since 2001, a Taliban rocket-propelled grenade brought down a US Air Force Chinook near Kabul, killing 38 persons on board. In early June, another Chinook was shot down near Kabul, killing everyone on board, including 16 American Special Forces members.

But the Chinook continues to be one of the world’s most sought after heavy lifters. Its current version, the CH-47F, which rolled out in 2006, extends the Chinook’s service life to at least 2030. The CH-47F fl ies at close to 300km per hour, carrying a load of almost 10 tonnes. It features advanced avionics, including a Rockwell Collins Common Avionics Architecture System cockpit, and a BAE Systems Digital Advanced Flight Control System. The IAF, which has evaluated the helicopter, is pleased with its avionics and power that

The Dhruvʼs other big problem is

an unsatisfactory indigenisation

programme. In a critical report, dated August

2010, the Comptroller and Auditor General

noted, “90 percent of the value of material used in

each ALH is still imported from foreign suppliers.”

But HALʼs helicopter chief, Rajan, points out

that indigenisation does not mean building every

component of an aircraft.

“A

FPDhruv helicopters at HAL’s helicopter division, Bengaluru



08

DSI

licence at a new HAL plant soon, provides a healthy 517 KW of power at 6,000 m (19,685 ft), 25 percent more than the 412 KW that the TM 333-2B2 eked out for pilots.

The Shakti-powered Dhruv Mark III has already changed the operational dynamics on India’s high-altitude Himalayan defences. The helicopter’s load-carrying ability permits outlying posts to be manned with fewer soldiers. In a crisis, jawans can be airlifted quickly to threatened areas, and casualties evacuated. And when soldiers on isolated piquets like Sonam see a Dhruv fl ying in, they know that there is space on board for essential stores, and even occasional goodies from families and comrades.

HAL’s sharpening skills in rotary wing design and engineering are driving an important shift in the company’s strategy. HAL’s focus, which has long been on building fi xed wing fi ghter aircraft, under licence from foreign aeronautics giants like the Sukhoi and Mikoyan, is shifting to the indigenous development and building of light helicopters. Once the technology

quotient rises and a supply chain is developed, HAL can graduate to heavier helicopters. This shift began with a strategic assessment in the mid-1990s – when Ashok Baweja was HAL’s chairperson – which concluded that indigenisation would be more realistically pursued in the rotary wing fi eld than in the challenging, cutting-edge realm of fi ghter aircraft.

Shift in Strategy This shift has already begun reflected in HAL’s bottom line. P.Soundara Rajan, who heads HAL’s prestigious Helicopter Complex, says the revenue from helicopters will comprise 25 percent of HAL’s total turnover a decade from now. “HAL took 40 years to build its first700 helicopters, which were basically second-generation machines. But the next 700 helicopters will be built in just a decade. Our helicopter business is currently just 5-10 percent of our total turnover(HAL’s total sales in 2010-11 were ` 13,116 crore). By 2022, home-grown helicopters

will account for 25 percent of HAL’s revenues,” says Rajan.

This enhanced share of helicopter sales, HAL offi cials point out, will take place despite the sharply rising sales fi xed wing aircraft production. Over the coming decade, HAL will be setting up production lines for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft; the Rafale Medium Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft; the Indo-Russian Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft and the Indo-Russian Medium Transport Aircraft, all of which will add signifi cantly to the company’s bottom line.

While the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has charged HAL with developing and building much of the IAF’s and the Army’sprojected requirement of light helicopters, HAL has made little headway in meeting the Indian Navy’s need for a light helicopter to replace the deck-landing Chetak. The MoD, therefore, is exploring the international market for light naval helicopters, as well as for the medium and heavy helicopter requirements of all three Services.

The major procurements in the pipeline are: Mi-17 V-5: The IAF is in the process of inducting 139 Russian Mi-17 V-5 Medium Lift Helicopters, for an estimated USD 2.4 billion. This continues the IAF’s four-decade old reliance on Russian-designed twin-turbine, Medium Lift Helicopters, which the manufacturing plants at Ulan-Ude and Kazan have built in larger numbers; more than any other helicopters in history. India began with the Mi-4 in the 1960s, graduated to the Mi-8 in the 1970s and then to the Mi-17 in the 1980s. The current version of the Mi-17 transports 26 soldiers in combat gear, or 4 tonnes of supplies to high altitude posts. However, the new-model V-5 is a vastly superior machine, with new engines, rotor blades and avionics. An IAF orderfor 80 Mi-17s is already being delivered, while a follow-on order for 59 more is in the pipeline.

CH-47F Chinook: Fifteen American CH-47F Chinook Heavy Lift Helicopters

will soon replace the IAF’s obsolete fl eet of giant Russian Mi-26 helicopters, of which just 3-4 remain serviceable. The Boeing Company’s Chinook is one of the iconic aircraft built in the US in the 1950s and 1960s, which continue in frontline service, albeit in highly upgraded contemporary variants. The others are the C-130J Hercules transport aircraft, the B-52 bomber, and the UH-1 Iroquois helicopter.

The Chinook’s fi rst serious combat experience was during the Vietnam War, when the twin-engine, tandem rotor CH-47A impressed the aviation world with its ability to deliver guns, stores or personnel directly into the combat zone.

A recent version of the Chinook, the CH-47D, has distinguished itself in campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, taking insurgents by surprise by transporting troops and supplies to remote operating bases. However, the US doctrine of generating operational tempo by exploiting the

Chinook’s lifting capabilities comes fraught with risks. Last August, in the biggest single-day loss for American forces in Afghanistan since 2001, a Taliban rocket-propelled grenade brought down a US Air Force Chinook near Kabul, killing 38 persons on board. In early June, another Chinook was shot down near Kabul, killing everyone on board, including 16 American Special Forces members.

But the Chinook continues to be one of the world’s most sought after heavy lifters. Its current version, the CH-47F, which rolled out in 2006, extends the Chinook’s service life to at least 2030. The CH-47F fl ies at close to 300km per hour, carrying a load of almost 10 tonnes. It features advanced avionics, including a Rockwell Collins Common Avionics Architecture System cockpit, and a BAE Systems Digital Advanced Flight Control System. The IAF, which has evaluated the helicopter, is pleased with its avionics and power that

The Dhruvʼs other big problem is

an unsatisfactory indigenisation

programme. In a critical report, dated August

2010, the Comptroller and Auditor General

noted, “90 percent of the value of material used in

each ALH is still imported from foreign suppliers.”

But HALʼs helicopter chief, Rajan, points out

that indigenisation does not mean building every

component of an aircraft.

“

AFP

Dhruv helicopters at HAL’s helicopter division, Bengaluru


MILITARY AVIATION

10

allows it to accurately deliver 50 fully equipped soldiers, or a payload of 12.7 tonnes, onto the roof of a house or the edge of a cliff.

AH-64 Apache: The Indian Air Force has also completed trials for the purchase of 22 Medium Attack Helicopters, and honed onto Boeing’s AH-64 Apache. Attack helicopters, which often operate ahead of the forward ground troops, provide immediate fire support – cannons, rockets and anti-tank missiles – to soldiers that encounter the enemy, often providing them a battle-winning

advantage. Unlike most other countries, India on its part has chosen not to use attack helicopters in counter-insurgency operations for fear of collateral damage.

But in a full-fl edged war, the Apache is the ultimate predator of the mechanised battlefi eld. A twin-engine helicopter, it takes off with a maximum weight of ten tonnes, of which fi ve tonnes consists of armament. Capable of fl ying at close to 300km per hour, the Apache can operate by day or night. It carries, amongst other weaponry like guns and rockets, the fearsome Hellfi re ‘fi re-and-forget’ anti-tank missile that homes in on

enemy armoured vehicles without requiring to be guided.

Light Naval Helicopter: The Navy is buying some 50 light, twin-engine helicopters, with Agusta Westland currently tipped to win this order. HAL offered a variant of the Dhruv ALH to the Navy, but its composite rotors could not be folded up for stowing the helicopter in a warship’s tight confi nes. The Navy, therefore, has decided to go in for an off-the-shelf foreign buy.

Naval Multi-Role Helicopters: In addition, the Indian Navy is also procuring91 medium, multi-role helicopters to

AFP

Civilians stranded by snow walk towards an IAF Mi-17 helicopter, Jammu

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12 13

DSI

AFP

While the Ministry of Defence has charged HAL with developing

and building much of the IAFʼs and the

Indian Armyʼs projected requirement of light helicopters, HAL has made little headway

in meeting the Indian Navyʼs needs for a light

helicopter to replace the deck-landing Chetak.

The MoD, therefore, is exploring the

international market for light naval helicopters, as

well as for the medium and heavy helicopter

requirements ofall three Services.

“

replace its obsolescent Sea King fl eet, which fl ies from the decks of larger frigates and destroyers. The MoD has already put out a global tender for 16 helicopters, to which another 75 have been added.

Central to the future of Indian helicopter building are the four light helicopters that HAL is developing for the MoD.

These are: Dhruv Mark III: The IAF and the IA have already placed a` 3,650 crore order for 83 Shakti-powered Dhruv Mark III utility helicopters, which HAL has begun delivering at the rate of 36 Dhruvs each year. While this order can be completed soon, there is an estimated need for more than 350 Dhruvs for the IA, IAF and the coast guard.

The Dhruv, although well received by the military, continues to struggle with a problem in its Integrated Dynamic System (IDS), which carries power from the Shakti engine to the helicopter’s rotors. Users have complained that the Dhruv’s cruising speed is not exceeding 250km per hour, signifi cantly short of the 270 kmph that HAL specifi cations promise.

The IDS has also been found to suffer from excessive wear and tear, requiring replacement at frequent intervals. HAL claims to have fi xed the problem by making six modifi cations in the gear boxes. Nevertheless, Italian aerospace designer, Avio, has been hired to audit the Dhruv’s IDS, a painstaking process that has been underway for more than a year. Since the same IDS will also equip the Rudra and the LCH, HAL is taking no chances.

Says a top HAL designer: “Right now we can be sure of 1,200 hours of life [for the IDS]. The Italian company will audit the design per se… by making a gearbox exactly to the specifi cations of HAL. [However], if [Avio] fi nds that there are some design shortcomings, they will make their own design. It is a back up audit. It will build up confi dence. Any aircraft that is fl ying today is designed in the 1960s and 1970s. They have gone through a number of iterations to reach their present form: the Dauphin; the Bell 412, which evolved from the Bell 212 of Vietnam fame.”

The Dhruv’s other big problem is an unsatisfactory indigenisation programme.

In a critical report , dated August 2010, the Comptroller and Auditor General noted, “90 percent of the value of material used in each ALH is still imported from foreign suppliers.” But HAL’s helicopter chief, Rajan, points out that indigenisation does not mean building every component of an aircraft. Citing the example of the Dhruv’s HAL-built mission computer, he asks whether the imported microchips inside make the mission computer any less indigenous. Rajan sums up HAL’s helicopter strategy as follows: “We will design our helicopters; develop the critical technologies of helicopter transmissions; manufacture composites; and integrate and assemble the helicopter. We will outsource the manufacture of sub-assemblies and components and structures to any vendor on the globe that offers us cost-effective solutions.”

But HAL also realises that a vital component industry is essential for cutting down costs that escalate from so much import. As Rajan says: “Our next focus will be on developing component systems within the country. Today the glass cockpit, the autopilot and the vibration monitoring system all come from abroad. Now we will cut down [their] costs by increasing the level of indigenisation in our helicopters.”

Rudra: Riding on the Dhruv’s success, and paving the way for the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), is the Rudra, a heavily armed version of the Dhruv, equipped with a cannon, rocket pods, anti-tank missiles and a full suite of electronic warfare (EW) equipment. Though the Rudra serves the function of a test bed for perfecting and proving the weapons and electronics suites that will equip the LCH, the military is also buying 76 Rudras as fl ying weapons platforms in its own right.

A heated debate has surrounded the question of which weapons systems the Rudra (and its successor, the LCH) should mount. Initially, the armed helicopters were to be fi tted with the Defence Research Development Organisation indigenous Nag anti-tank missile, but its development remains incomplete. The Army has not yet cleared even the vehicle-mounted version of the Nag, with a range of 4,000m.

The development of the helicopter-mounted version (termed the HELINA, or Helicopter-mounted Nag) lags even further behind. In the circumstances, the IAF is choosing between MBDA Missile Systems Pars 3 LR missile (with a range of 7,000m), and the Spike-ER missile, offered by Israeli company, Rafael Advanced Defence Systems. Meanwhile,

HAL and the IAF have zeroed in on a Nexter 20 mm turret mounted cannon, an MBDA air-to-air missile, and an EW suite from SAAB, South Africa. These weapons systems, and their integration into the Rudra’s all-glass cockpit, are currently being evaluated in field trials.

Light Combat Helicopter (LCH): Even as the Rudra proves many of the

systems that will provide teeth to the 5.5 tonne LCH, the in-service Dhruv is validating its twin-Shakti power pack and dynamic components (main rotor, tail rotor and the gearbox). The LCH is planned as a high altitude virtuoso, able to provide fire support to the Army’s highest and most forward positions, a capability gap that was most seriously experienced during the Kargil conflict in 1999. The LCH will be capable of taking off from Himalayan altitudes of 10,000 ft, providing supporting fire with guns and rockets up to 16,300 ft, and launching missiles at UAVs flying at over 21,000 ft.

HAL already has confi rmed orders for 179 LCHs: the IAF has ordered 65 helicopters, while the Army has demanded 114. HAL aims to obtain an Initial Operational Clearance for the LCH by end-2013, which means that delivery is unlikely before 2015-16.

The Dhruv’s greatest gift to the LCH will be integration. According to one of the LCH’s chief designers, “In the Dhruv, we added on systems one by one; but in the LCH, we knew all those systems would be needed, so we were able to integrate them from the beginning. So the LCH is a sleeker, faster, more integrated aircraft.”

Notwithstanding the commonality, HAL offi cials emphasise the LCH’s many new features, which have made engineering a challenge. Its two pilots are seated one behind the other, unlike the Dhruv’s side-by-side confi guration. That has required a complete redesign of all the fl ight controls, the hydraulics and the fuel system. The LCH’s stealth profi le has also necessitated a redesign of the fuselage, leading to a slimmer, sleeker helicopter. A particular challenge has been the new crash-resistant landing gear, which allows pilots to survive even when the LCH smacks into the ground at more than 10 metres/second.

Currently, the LCH designers are struggling to pare down the helicopter’s weight, which went 250 kilogrammes higher than what it had been catered for. Says HAL’s former helicopter design chief, N.Seshadri, who oversaw the initial design phase: “An extra 250 kg may not seem much on a 5.5 tonne helicopter, but it really

is a serious problem. At altitudes of 6,000 m (almost 20,000 ft), which the LCH must operate at, the air is so thin that it can only carry a weapons payload of about 500 kg. If the helicopter ends up 250 kg heavier than planned, its high altitude fi repower will be dramatically reduced.”

Light Utility Helicopter (LUH): Another key MoD requirement is for 384 Light Utility Helicopters, or LUH’s, to replace the Army and IAF’s obsolescent Cheetahs and Chetaks. In an unusual gambit that was designed to minimise development risk, the MoD has divided this procurement into two streams: 197 LUHs are being bought off-the-shelf through a global tender. Meanwhile, the remaining 187 LUHs are being indigenously developed and built by HAL. To ensure delivery by the target date of 2017, the MoD has specifi ed time targets for each of

IAF helicopters with Indian Air Force fl ags at Hindon Air Base, New Delhi



12 13

DSI

AFP

While the Ministry of Defence has charged HAL with developing

and building much of the IAFʼs and the

Indian Armyʼs projected requirement of light helicopters, HAL has made little headway

in meeting the Indian Navyʼs needs for a light

helicopter to replace the deck-landing Chetak.

The MoD, therefore, is exploring the

international market for light naval helicopters, as

well as for the medium and heavy helicopter

requirements ofall three Services.

“

replace its obsolescent Sea King fl eet, which fl ies from the decks of larger frigates and destroyers. The MoD has already put out a global tender for 16 helicopters, to which another 75 have been added.

Central to the future of Indian helicopter building are the four light helicopters that HAL is developing for the MoD.

These are: Dhruv Mark III: The IAF and the IA have already placed a` 3,650 crore order for 83 Shakti-powered Dhruv Mark III utility helicopters, which HAL has begun delivering at the rate of 36 Dhruvs each year. While this order can be completed soon, there is an estimated need for more than 350 Dhruvs for the IA, IAF and the coast guard.

The Dhruv, although well received by the military, continues to struggle with a problem in its Integrated Dynamic System (IDS), which carries power from the Shakti engine to the helicopter’s rotors. Users have complained that the Dhruv’s cruising speed is not exceeding 250km per hour, signifi cantly short of the 270 kmph that HAL specifi cations promise.

The IDS has also been found to suffer from excessive wear and tear, requiring replacement at frequent intervals. HAL claims to have fi xed the problem by making six modifi cations in the gear boxes. Nevertheless, Italian aerospace designer, Avio, has been hired to audit the Dhruv’s IDS, a painstaking process that has been underway for more than a year. Since the same IDS will also equip the Rudra and the LCH, HAL is taking no chances.

Says a top HAL designer: “Right now we can be sure of 1,200 hours of life [for the IDS]. The Italian company will audit the design per se… by making a gearbox exactly to the specifi cations of HAL. [However], if [Avio] fi nds that there are some design shortcomings, they will make their own design. It is a back up audit. It will build up confi dence. Any aircraft that is fl ying today is designed in the 1960s and 1970s. They have gone through a number of iterations to reach their present form: the Dauphin; the Bell 412, which evolved from the Bell 212 of Vietnam fame.”

The Dhruv’s other big problem is an unsatisfactory indigenisation programme.

In a critical report , dated August 2010, the Comptroller and Auditor General noted, “90 percent of the value of material used in each ALH is still imported from foreign suppliers.” But HAL’s helicopter chief, Rajan, points out that indigenisation does not mean building every component of an aircraft. Citing the example of the Dhruv’s HAL-built mission computer, he asks whether the imported microchips inside make the mission computer any less indigenous. Rajan sums up HAL’s helicopter strategy as follows: “We will design our helicopters; develop the critical technologies of helicopter transmissions; manufacture composites; and integrate and assemble the helicopter. We will outsource the manufacture of sub-assemblies and components and structures to any vendor on the globe that offers us cost-effective solutions.”

But HAL also realises that a vital component industry is essential for cutting down costs that escalate from so much import. As Rajan says: “Our next focus will be on developing component systems within the country. Today the glass cockpit, the autopilot and the vibration monitoring system all come from abroad. Now we will cut down [their] costs by increasing the level of indigenisation in our helicopters.”

Rudra: Riding on the Dhruv’s success, and paving the way for the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), is the Rudra, a heavily armed version of the Dhruv, equipped with a cannon, rocket pods, anti-tank missiles and a full suite of electronic warfare (EW) equipment. Though the Rudra serves the function of a test bed for perfecting and proving the weapons and electronics suites that will equip the LCH, the military is also buying 76 Rudras as fl ying weapons platforms in its own right.

A heated debate has surrounded the question of which weapons systems the Rudra (and its successor, the LCH) should mount. Initially, the armed helicopters were to be fi tted with the Defence Research Development Organisation indigenous Nag anti-tank missile, but its development remains incomplete. The Army has not yet cleared even the vehicle-mounted version of the Nag, with a range of 4,000m.

The development of the helicopter-mounted version (termed the HELINA, or Helicopter-mounted Nag) lags even further behind. In the circumstances, the IAF is choosing between MBDA Missile Systems Pars 3 LR missile (with a range of 7,000m), and the Spike-ER missile, offered by Israeli company, Rafael Advanced Defence Systems. Meanwhile,

HAL and the IAF have zeroed in on a Nexter 20 mm turret mounted cannon, an MBDA air-to-air missile, and an EW suite from SAAB, South Africa. These weapons systems, and their integration into the Rudra’s all-glass cockpit, are currently being evaluated in field trials.

Light Combat Helicopter (LCH): Even as the Rudra proves many of the

systems that will provide teeth to the 5.5 tonne LCH, the in-service Dhruv is validating its twin-Shakti power pack and dynamic components (main rotor, tail rotor and the gearbox). The LCH is planned as a high altitude virtuoso, able to provide fire support to the Army’s highest and most forward positions, a capability gap that was most seriously experienced during the Kargil conflict in 1999. The LCH will be capable of taking off from Himalayan altitudes of 10,000 ft, providing supporting fire with guns and rockets up to 16,300 ft, and launching missiles at UAVs flying at over 21,000 ft.

HAL already has confi rmed orders for 179 LCHs: the IAF has ordered 65 helicopters, while the Army has demanded 114. HAL aims to obtain an Initial Operational Clearance for the LCH by end-2013, which means that delivery is unlikely before 2015-16.

The Dhruv’s greatest gift to the LCH will be integration. According to one of the LCH’s chief designers, “In the Dhruv, we added on systems one by one; but in the LCH, we knew all those systems would be needed, so we were able to integrate them from the beginning. So the LCH is a sleeker, faster, more integrated aircraft.”

Notwithstanding the commonality, HAL offi cials emphasise the LCH’s many new features, which have made engineering a challenge. Its two pilots are seated one behind the other, unlike the Dhruv’s side-by-side confi guration. That has required a complete redesign of all the fl ight controls, the hydraulics and the fuel system. The LCH’s stealth profi le has also necessitated a redesign of the fuselage, leading to a slimmer, sleeker helicopter. A particular challenge has been the new crash-resistant landing gear, which allows pilots to survive even when the LCH smacks into the ground at more than 10 metres/second.

Currently, the LCH designers are struggling to pare down the helicopter’s weight, which went 250 kilogrammes higher than what it had been catered for. Says HAL’s former helicopter design chief, N.Seshadri, who oversaw the initial design phase: “An extra 250 kg may not seem much on a 5.5 tonne helicopter, but it really

is a serious problem. At altitudes of 6,000 m (almost 20,000 ft), which the LCH must operate at, the air is so thin that it can only carry a weapons payload of about 500 kg. If the helicopter ends up 250 kg heavier than planned, its high altitude fi repower will be dramatically reduced.”

Light Utility Helicopter (LUH): Another key MoD requirement is for 384 Light Utility Helicopters, or LUH’s, to replace the Army and IAF’s obsolescent Cheetahs and Chetaks. In an unusual gambit that was designed to minimise development risk, the MoD has divided this procurement into two streams: 197 LUHs are being bought off-the-shelf through a global tender. Meanwhile, the remaining 187 LUHs are being indigenously developed and built by HAL. To ensure delivery by the target date of 2017, the MoD has specifi ed time targets for each of

IAF helicopters with Indian Air Force fl ags at Hindon Air Base, New Delhi


MILITARY AVIATION

14

HAL’s development milestones: building of a mock-up; the design freeze; the fi rst fl ight; Initial Operational Clearance and so on. Each time HAL misses a milestone its order reduces from 187.

HAL’s former chairperson, Baweja explained the company’s plan for completing the LUH by 2015, a full two years ahead of schedule. HAL has already completed the conceptual design of the helicopter, including specifi cations of key systems like the fuel system, the hydraulics system and the cockpit. Drawing on its experience with the Dhruv, HAL will design and build core components like the main rotor, tail rotor, gearbox and weaponry. Less critical sub-systems will be acquired off-the-shelf from specialist manufacturers in the international market.

Says Baweja: “It is wasteful to duplicate the efforts of specialists who make individual systems. For example, there are specialist cockpit houses, which mainly design cockpits. You have Honeywell, you have Rockwell, and you have Thales. Our [HAL’s] role will be that of a top-end designer; we will identify systems and write the software that makes them function together.

“Take fuel systems. Those consist of fuel cells, pumps, cut-off valves, fi re protection and so on. We can make all these things. But there are specialist companies that do only fuel systems. All we need to do is to identify them. We’ll control top-end design and we’ll do the certifi cation tests. One needs air-conditioning in a helicopter; but should we start designing it? There are half a dozen companies in the world that do air-conditioning, heating, cooling.”

But pressure on the LUH’s strict time lines has come from an unlikely source: Turbomeca. Unlike the twin-engine Dhruv and LCH, the lighter LUH will fl y with a single Shakti engine. That requires Turbomeca to design a new transmission, and to certify the Shakti with the European Aviation Safety Agency for single-engine operations. To HAL’s dismay, Turbomeca demanded` 190 crore for these jobs, more than half of the LUH’s entire budget of ` 376 crore.

In formulating the LUH development budget, HAL has assumed that Turbomeca will design the new transmission system cheaply, to benefi t from additional orders of

hundreds of Shakti engines over the LUH’s service life. In negotiations, Turbomeca has offered to reduce the cost by ` 90 crore, provided that amount was adjusted against its offset liability. But HAL has rejected that offer, and has now approached other engine-makers – including General Electric, Honeywell, Rolls-Royce, and Pratt & Whitney – for an engine for the LUH. The MoD increasingly believes that it may be unwise to put all its eggs in the Turbomeca basket.

India’s big play in helicopters has already lifted off the ground. Besides

the huge market in military helicopters, vendors like HAL estimate a growing market amongst civilian users, including State Governments, political parties, police organisations and corporate houses. This may indeed be the future of rotary wing aviation in India. But implementing this will require an enhanced regulatory and infrastructure framework, as well as the creation of far greater capacities in organisations like HAL, and in the trickle of foreign helicopter vendors that are opening up shop in India. DSI

THE SHOPPING LISTTYPE SOURCE QTY

MI-17 V-5 RUSSIA 139

HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS CH-47 CHINOOK LIKELY 15

MEDIUM ATTACK HELICOPTERS AH-64 APACHE LIKELY 22

UTILITY TWIN-ENGINE HELICOPTERS DHRUV MK III (HAL) 83

NAVAL TWIN-ENGINE HELICOPTERS GLOBAL MARKET 50

NAVAL MEDIUM, MULTI-ROLE GLOBAL MARKET 91

WEAPONISED UTILITY HELICOPTER RUDRA (HAL) 76

LIGHT COMBAT HELICOPTER LCH (HAL) 179

LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTERS GLOBAL MARKET 197

LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTERS HAL 187

IAF’s Dhruv helicopters fl y in formation at the International Aerospace Exhibition, Schoenefeld Airport, Berlin

AFP

helicopters 3rd time.indd 9helicopters 3rd time.indd 9 20/07/12 5:28 PM20/07/12 5:28 PM

216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 6/13/11 4:00:36 PM6/13/11 4:00:36 PM

INDO-EUROPEAN RELATIONS JULY 2012

16 17

DSI

KEY POINTS � Though India deals with individual European countries, Its defence manufacturing is mostly multinational.� India’s defence relations with European countries reflect India’s foreign policy choices.� France, of all the EU countries, has been the first to establish a reliable strategic partnership with India.

STRATEGIC ALLIANCESIndiaʼs defence ties with Europe come with less intrusive demands and with fewer chances of disruption in supplies

Rafale fi ghter plane exhibited at Aero India,

Yelahanka Air Force Station, Bengaluru

KANWAL SIBAL

AFP

TO appreciate better the subject of India’s defence relations with Europe some reflections of a general nature are pertinent.

The point needs to be made right at the start that India does not have defence relations with Europe as such; it has them with individual European countries. Europe has forged a strong economic personality in the form of the European Union (EU), but it has failed to develop a common foreign and defence policy in the true sense. When it comes to economic issues India, like other countries, has to deal with Brussels.

In foreign affairs, Europe has acquired some role as an interlocutor through the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with India holding a regular dialogue with the EU as a dialogue partner. But in defence

relations India deals, not with Brussels, but with individual capitals.

It also needs to be pointed out that even though the EU exists as a shared economic space protected by common external tariffs, individual European countries commercially compete with each other intensely in foreign markets. In the defence arena such competition is even more spirited as the overall cake is much smaller, the opportunities to win sizable contracts are not many, the contracts are generally high-valued and the margins are considerable. Also, the contracts create a long-term relationship, with the provision of spare parts, training, overhauling, periodic upgrades, modernisation and so on providing plentiful returns.

Defence ties, besides, have a political element that commercial exchanges do not have. Countries with serious political differences, including the potential of confl ict, can have fl ourishing economic ties, as is the case between America and China or Japan and China, not to mention political differences between Russia and Europe not standing in the way of their close energy ties. In such cases defence ties are excluded because that pre-supposes a degree of geo-political understanding beforehand.

Such ties also give the country that sells arms a degree of political leverage over the

Indo European defence ties 2nd time.indd 1-2Indo European defence ties 2nd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 12:03 PM20/07/12 12:03 PM


16 17

DSI

KEY POINTS � Though India deals with individual European countries, Its defence manufacturing is mostly multinational.� India’s defence relations with European countries reflect India’s foreign policy choices.� France, of all the EU countries, has been the first to establish a reliable strategic partnership with India.

STRATEGIC ALLIANCESIndiaʼs defence ties with Europe come with less intrusive demands and with fewer chances of disruption in supplies

Rafale fi ghter plane exhibited at Aero India,

Yelahanka Air Force Station, Bengaluru

KANWAL SIBAL

AFP

TO appreciate better the subject of India’s defence relations with Europe some reflections of a general nature are pertinent.

The point needs to be made right at the start that India does not have defence relations with Europe as such; it has them with individual European countries. Europe has forged a strong economic personality in the form of the European Union (EU), but it has failed to develop a common foreign and defence policy in the true sense. When it comes to economic issues India, like other countries, has to deal with Brussels.

In foreign affairs, Europe has acquired some role as an interlocutor through the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with India holding a regular dialogue with the EU as a dialogue partner. But in defence

relations India deals, not with Brussels, but with individual capitals.

It also needs to be pointed out that even though the EU exists as a shared economic space protected by common external tariffs, individual European countries commercially compete with each other intensely in foreign markets. In the defence arena such competition is even more spirited as the overall cake is much smaller, the opportunities to win sizable contracts are not many, the contracts are generally high-valued and the margins are considerable. Also, the contracts create a long-term relationship, with the provision of spare parts, training, overhauling, periodic upgrades, modernisation and so on providing plentiful returns.

Defence ties, besides, have a political element that commercial exchanges do not have. Countries with serious political differences, including the potential of confl ict, can have fl ourishing economic ties, as is the case between America and China or Japan and China, not to mention political differences between Russia and Europe not standing in the way of their close energy ties. In such cases defence ties are excluded because that pre-supposes a degree of geo-political understanding beforehand.

Such ties also give the country that sells arms a degree of political leverage over the



18 19

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recipient country because the latter becomes dependent on the former for its defence preparedness. The danger is always there that at a critical moment spare parts may not be released or the needed ordnance may not be available because of the imposition of sanctions or the existence of a confl ict situation. All these aspects are very relevant to India’s defence ties with European and other countries.

Not many countries, even in Europe, manufacture advanced defence systems that can be sold in the international market. Defence manufacturing is a high-cost enterprise as very advanced technologies are involved, which, in turn, require huge outlays on Research and Development (R&D) for development. The need to export in order to have some economies of scale and amortise development costs is therefore a pressing one. All the more so because in the absence of any real external threat European countries have had to reduce their defence budgets and the size of their standing armed forces with the consequence that domestic orders for defence equipment are not suffi cient to achieve the wanted economies of scale.

Confl ict-Free SpaceEurope’s great success is, in fact, the creation of a genuinely confl ict-free, geographical space in a continent that has witnessed the most inhumane and destructive wars in the past. No European country is threatened with aggression by a neighbour. This should have argued in favor of a massive contraction of the European defence sector. Ironically, outside the US which maintains a gargantuan defence sector and Russia, which inherited an oversized defence manufacturing base from the Soviet Union but which has declined considerably, individual European countries still retain impressive defence manufacturing capabilities. There is little relationship between the external threat European countries face and the wherewithal they maintain to defend themselves.

For the bigger European powers which have wielded power internationally for a very long period and are habituated to it, and which have fought with each other and

with others in order to advance or preserve their interests or impose their will, the possession of a sizable defence industry is an expression of their continued big power status. It gives credibility to their role in maintaining international peace and security whether institutionalised in the Security Council, within the ambit of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a “coalition of the willing” or self-assumed in the light of their national interests. Their military capabilities give them the means to project their power outside. Besides this, the civilian off-shoots of defence technologies

are also very important as they have a bearing on the efforts of these countries to remain in the forefront of global-level technological innovation.

For Europe, rivalry with the US, which is both an ally and a competitor, is a powerful reason to maintain a sizable, independent defence manufacturing base. If, on the one hand, the trans-Atlantic alliance in the form of NATO provides Europe with the US defence umbrella and allows it to reduce its defence expenditure, fears of loss of independence in foreign policy making and subservience to the

US makes the major European countries retain sizable defence capabilities.

With the lessons from the confl ict in Yugoslavia in mind, these countries also want to be able to maintain peace at least on the periphery of Europe largely on their own rather than relying entirely on the US for this. The French, for example, have long pushed for a common European defence policy, but without much success because of the NATO factor and the opposition of many European countries, especially those from the erstwhile Soviet bloc, not to mention the UK, to any dilution of the US role in European defence.

One also needs to keep in mind that while India and others deal with individual European countries for defence co-operation and purchases, in actual fact Europe’s defence manufacturing has become mostly “multinational”. Much of this sector has either been privatised in Europe or enterprises are jointly owned by Governments and private capital.

The economies of scale are sought to be obtained within Europe itself by various countries pooling requirements and jointly funding defence production programmes. Work is shared between countries often in proportion to the size of the procurement orders placed by them. Equipment manufactured by one country has its components manufactured in other countries, such is the nature of collaboration in defence manufacturing today.

In view of all the acquisitions and mergers that have taken place, as part of a consolidation process the industry worldwide has undergone many changes. Hardly any product is now purely ‘national’. Even when a European product is being bought it is likely to have US made components in it. At the level of tie-ups in capital, the trans-national nature of major

European defence manufacturing companies is even more of a reality.India’s defence relations with European countries have refl ected, over the years, India’s foreign policy choices its adherence to the policy of non-alignment during the Cold War and the impact of the Cold War on our region with Pakistan deciding to join western military pacts and receiving military aid from the West. The position taken by European countries and others on India-Pakistan differences, especially on Jammu & Kashmir; on sanctions imposed on India because of India-Pakistan hostilities or the degree of reticence in selling arms in order to avoid sharpening tensions in a region seen as unstable. India’s nuclear and missile programmes have also had a bearing on the policies of European countries with regard to the transfer of sensitive or dual use technologies barred under the technology denial regimes set up by the West.

The European Aeronautics, Defence and Space company (EADS), for example, was created in 2000 by merging French (Aerospatiale-Matra), German (DASA) and Spanish (Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA or CASA) companies. Its missile branch was merged with BAE Systems of the UK and Finmeccanica of Italy to form the MBDA. The Eurofi ghter, the other contender for our Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract, is jointly produced by companies from Germany (DASA), Britain (BAE), Italy (Aeritalia) and Spain (CASA). Dassault, whose Rafale has been selected for negotiations for the acquisition of 126 combat aircrafts by India, is owned by the Dassault group (50.5 percent) and EADS (46.3 percent), which means that even if the Eurofi ghter has been excluded from the 126 aircraft competition, EADS, the manufacturer of the Eurofi ghter, will fi nancially benefi t from the Rafale deal.

Augusta Westland, which has signed a joint venture agreement with Tata Sons to assemble its AW 119 helicopters, is an Anglo-Italian company. Turbomeca, the French aircraft engine maker is tied up with Rolls Royce. Thales, another French company, which is involved in India defence programmes, is tied up with Raytheon from the US and BAE from the UK. BAE, the

In July 2010, during Prime Minister David

Cameronʼs visit to India U.K. placed

an order for an additional 57 Hawk aircraft worth USD

1.1 billion to be built by Hindustan

Aeronautics Limited, with Indian

complaints about delays in transfer of technology for

the earlier contract apparently resolved.

“

British Prime Minister David Cameron and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi

AFP



18 19

DSI

recipient country because the latter becomes dependent on the former for its defence preparedness. The danger is always there that at a critical moment spare parts may not be released or the needed ordnance may not be available because of the imposition of sanctions or the existence of a confl ict situation. All these aspects are very relevant to India’s defence ties with European and other countries.

Not many countries, even in Europe, manufacture advanced defence systems that can be sold in the international market. Defence manufacturing is a high-cost enterprise as very advanced technologies are involved, which, in turn, require huge outlays on Research and Development (R&D) for development. The need to export in order to have some economies of scale and amortise development costs is therefore a pressing one. All the more so because in the absence of any real external threat European countries have had to reduce their defence budgets and the size of their standing armed forces with the consequence that domestic orders for defence equipment are not suffi cient to achieve the wanted economies of scale.

Confl ict-Free SpaceEurope’s great success is, in fact, the creation of a genuinely confl ict-free, geographical space in a continent that has witnessed the most inhumane and destructive wars in the past. No European country is threatened with aggression by a neighbour. This should have argued in favor of a massive contraction of the European defence sector. Ironically, outside the US which maintains a gargantuan defence sector and Russia, which inherited an oversized defence manufacturing base from the Soviet Union but which has declined considerably, individual European countries still retain impressive defence manufacturing capabilities. There is little relationship between the external threat European countries face and the wherewithal they maintain to defend themselves.

For the bigger European powers which have wielded power internationally for a very long period and are habituated to it, and which have fought with each other and

with others in order to advance or preserve their interests or impose their will, the possession of a sizable defence industry is an expression of their continued big power status. It gives credibility to their role in maintaining international peace and security whether institutionalised in the Security Council, within the ambit of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a “coalition of the willing” or self-assumed in the light of their national interests. Their military capabilities give them the means to project their power outside. Besides this, the civilian off-shoots of defence technologies

are also very important as they have a bearing on the efforts of these countries to remain in the forefront of global-level technological innovation.

For Europe, rivalry with the US, which is both an ally and a competitor, is a powerful reason to maintain a sizable, independent defence manufacturing base. If, on the one hand, the trans-Atlantic alliance in the form of NATO provides Europe with the US defence umbrella and allows it to reduce its defence expenditure, fears of loss of independence in foreign policy making and subservience to the

US makes the major European countries retain sizable defence capabilities.

With the lessons from the confl ict in Yugoslavia in mind, these countries also want to be able to maintain peace at least on the periphery of Europe largely on their own rather than relying entirely on the US for this. The French, for example, have long pushed for a common European defence policy, but without much success because of the NATO factor and the opposition of many European countries, especially those from the erstwhile Soviet bloc, not to mention the UK, to any dilution of the US role in European defence.

One also needs to keep in mind that while India and others deal with individual European countries for defence co-operation and purchases, in actual fact Europe’s defence manufacturing has become mostly “multinational”. Much of this sector has either been privatised in Europe or enterprises are jointly owned by Governments and private capital.

The economies of scale are sought to be obtained within Europe itself by various countries pooling requirements and jointly funding defence production programmes. Work is shared between countries often in proportion to the size of the procurement orders placed by them. Equipment manufactured by one country has its components manufactured in other countries, such is the nature of collaboration in defence manufacturing today.

In view of all the acquisitions and mergers that have taken place, as part of a consolidation process the industry worldwide has undergone many changes. Hardly any product is now purely ‘national’. Even when a European product is being bought it is likely to have US made components in it. At the level of tie-ups in capital, the trans-national nature of major

European defence manufacturing companies is even more of a reality.India’s defence relations with European countries have refl ected, over the years, India’s foreign policy choices its adherence to the policy of non-alignment during the Cold War and the impact of the Cold War on our region with Pakistan deciding to join western military pacts and receiving military aid from the West. The position taken by European countries and others on India-Pakistan differences, especially on Jammu & Kashmir; on sanctions imposed on India because of India-Pakistan hostilities or the degree of reticence in selling arms in order to avoid sharpening tensions in a region seen as unstable. India’s nuclear and missile programmes have also had a bearing on the policies of European countries with regard to the transfer of sensitive or dual use technologies barred under the technology denial regimes set up by the West.

The European Aeronautics, Defence and Space company (EADS), for example, was created in 2000 by merging French (Aerospatiale-Matra), German (DASA) and Spanish (Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA or CASA) companies. Its missile branch was merged with BAE Systems of the UK and Finmeccanica of Italy to form the MBDA. The Eurofi ghter, the other contender for our Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract, is jointly produced by companies from Germany (DASA), Britain (BAE), Italy (Aeritalia) and Spain (CASA). Dassault, whose Rafale has been selected for negotiations for the acquisition of 126 combat aircrafts by India, is owned by the Dassault group (50.5 percent) and EADS (46.3 percent), which means that even if the Eurofi ghter has been excluded from the 126 aircraft competition, EADS, the manufacturer of the Eurofi ghter, will fi nancially benefi t from the Rafale deal.

Augusta Westland, which has signed a joint venture agreement with Tata Sons to assemble its AW 119 helicopters, is an Anglo-Italian company. Turbomeca, the French aircraft engine maker is tied up with Rolls Royce. Thales, another French company, which is involved in India defence programmes, is tied up with Raytheon from the US and BAE from the UK. BAE, the

In July 2010, during Prime Minister David

Cameronʼs visit to India U.K. placed

an order for an additional 57 Hawk aircraft worth USD

1.1 billion to be built by Hindustan

Aeronautics Limited, with Indian

complaints about delays in transfer of technology for

the earlier contract apparently resolved.

“

British Prime Minister David Cameron and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi

AFP



20 21

DSI

manufacturer of the Hawk trainer aircraft sold to India, the Ultra Light Howitzers that India has decided to acquire through the US Foreign Military Sales route and a partner in the Eurofi ghter, has made several acquisitions in the US.

Reliable PartnerFor historical reasons India has had close defence ties with the UK for some years after 1947, to the extent that India’s Naval Chief was a Britisher till April 1958, with Britishers also the Air Chief till April 1954 and Army Chief till January 1949. India’s Centurion tanks, Vampires, Canberra, Hunter and Gnat aircraft a and Leander class frigates were of British origin. But Cold War politics, British support for Pakistan and interference in the Kashmir issue in Pakistan’s favour and a reluctance to strengthen India militarily against Pakistan, inevitably led to a dilution of the defence relationship.

Within Europe, France, whose commitment to Pakistan was not of the same order and which was not mentally hostage to any colonial era responsibilities towards Pakistan or the Subcontinent, was an alternative source. India acquired from France, in the 1950s itself, Ouragan, Mystere and Alize aircraft, AMX tanks and air to surface and anti-tank missiles. In the 1960s, India went in for the licensed production of French Alouette helicopters, to which were added Lama Helicopters for high-altitude operations in the 1970s.

The biggest consequence of Cold War politics was India’s turn towards the Soviet Union beginning in the 1960s for defence supplies and licensed production of equipment, to the point that Russia accounts today for almost 70 percent of India’s military hardware.

France, amongst all the European countries, has been seen as the most reliable partner. It has studiously avoided imposing sanctions on India whether because of India-Pakistan tensions or even in the wake of India’s nuclear tests in 1998, besides being the fi rst to establish a strategic partnership with India, indicating clearly how it perceived India’s role in a developing multi-polar world. In the 1980s, India signed the

agreement to procure Mirage aircraft from France. A USD 2.4 billion deal was inked in July 2011 with Dassault Aviation and Thales to upgrade 51 of these Mirage aircrafts.

The selection of Rafale for fi nal negotiations for the MMRCA contract, even if done strictly on the basis of technical and commercial parametres, testifi es to the underlying confi dence in the stability and security of defence ties with France.

In December 2005, India and France signed the USD 3 billion Scorpene deal, opening up co-operation in an area the French were especially keen on, in part to obtain orders for their state-owned naval shipyard, the DCN, and, in part, to attenuate negative feelings in Indiaabout their considerable naval co-operation with Pakistan.

The element of competition with Germany, which had supplied four type 209 submarines to India between 1986 and 1994, was strong. Two of these German submarines were built in Germany by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) and two were assembled in the Mazagaon docks. In 1991, however, HDW, the manufacturers of the submarines, were blacklisted by India, which opened up space for France to enter the Indian submarine market.

The bagging of the Scorpene contract was a political success for France, given that Germany had greater experience and a more established reputation in submarine

building and technology. This success was not unconnected with the goodwill France had earned by its accommodative position on India’s 1998 nuclear tests. The delay in implementing the Scorpene project did cause some bickering about where the responsibility lay, but this has been overcome.

Other projects with France include, the development of engines for the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), the Kaveri engine for the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) and the Shakti engine for Dhruv. A major project involving substantial technology transfer that has been negotiated with MBDA and awaits governmental approval is joint development and manufacture of the SR-SAM, the short range surface-to-air missile. A successful implementation of this project can open up more co-operation in the missile fi eld, including, potentially, ballistic missile defence.

During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to France in July 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy reportedly promised to open all doors for Indo-French defence co-operation. The Indian decision in favour of Rafale creates a favourable ground for India to press for implementation of that promise. For the time being, French attention is focussed on fi nalising the Rafale contract and other major steps in defence cooperation, especially in restricted technologies, will probably have to wait till then.

The Mother CountryIn 1979, with India ordering around130 Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft, with licence production and transfer of technology as part of the package, the British made a sizable come-back into the Indian market. In February 2003, India ordered 66 Hawk trainer jets from Britain worth USD 1.7 billion. India insisted these planes carry no US parts because of the experience with its Harrier aircraft detained in Britain after the imposition on nuclear sanctions on India in 1998.

In July 2010, during Prime Minister David Cameron’s visit to India it placed an order for an additional 57 Hawk aircraft worth USD 1.1 billion to be built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL),

with Indian complaints about delays in transfer of technology for the earlier contract apparently resolved. Apart from defence sales, India and Britain have held air and naval exercises.

In the area of Research and Development (R&D), the tie-up between Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the British DSTL (Defence Science and Technology Lab) is of potential interest. Britain is offering participation to India in the Global Combat Ship (GCS), a fl exible role frigate. Britain, as we know, has a very large defence manufacturing base, the largest in Europe, with almost 2,600 defence companies. BAE Systems, which have contracted to sell 140 Ultra Light Howitzers to India, is looking at a role in artillery modernisation in India, for which it has tied up with the Mahindra group to create a Centre for Excellence for artillery projects.

The German ConnectionGermany’s Kurt tank was involved in the manufacture of HAL’s Marut jet fi ghter in the 1950s. Since 1999, Germany, which is the fi fth-largest exporter of defence items to India, has been providing parts for the construction of ships and submarines, such as fi re control systems, sonar and navigation systems, parts for planes, helicopters and tanks. Apart from supplying four Type 209 submarines, it has supplied a large number of Dornier 228 aircraft. India and Germany signed a new defence and security agreement in 2006; an Indo-German High Defence Committee has been formed and visits of service chiefs have been exchanged. In 2008, the fi rst joint naval exercise was held off Kochi.

Of course the Germans have had their set-backs in defence deals, having lost the submarine contract to the French and failing to win the MMRCA contract for which they were the lead country for negotiations. Earlier, too in December 2007, they saw the cancellation of the USD 500 million 197 helicopter deal that had been won by Eurocopter. The result of the re-tender remains uncertain because of competition from the Russia’s Kamov helicopter. Similarly, in the fi rst tender

The biggest consequence of Cold War politics was Indiaʼs turn towards the Soviet Union beginning

in the 1960s for defence supplies and licensed

production of equipment, to the point that Russia

accounts today for almost 70 percent of Indiaʼs

military hardware.

“An employee of DCN, the French

state-owned naval dockyard

AFP



20 21

DSI

manufacturer of the Hawk trainer aircraft sold to India, the Ultra Light Howitzers that India has decided to acquire through the US Foreign Military Sales route and a partner in the Eurofi ghter, has made several acquisitions in the US.

Reliable PartnerFor historical reasons India has had close defence ties with the UK for some years after 1947, to the extent that India’s Naval Chief was a Britisher till April 1958, with Britishers also the Air Chief till April 1954 and Army Chief till January 1949. India’s Centurion tanks, Vampires, Canberra, Hunter and Gnat aircraft a and Leander class frigates were of British origin. But Cold War politics, British support for Pakistan and interference in the Kashmir issue in Pakistan’s favour and a reluctance to strengthen India militarily against Pakistan, inevitably led to a dilution of the defence relationship.

Within Europe, France, whose commitment to Pakistan was not of the same order and which was not mentally hostage to any colonial era responsibilities towards Pakistan or the Subcontinent, was an alternative source. India acquired from France, in the 1950s itself, Ouragan, Mystere and Alize aircraft, AMX tanks and air to surface and anti-tank missiles. In the 1960s, India went in for the licensed production of French Alouette helicopters, to which were added Lama Helicopters for high-altitude operations in the 1970s.

The biggest consequence of Cold War politics was India’s turn towards the Soviet Union beginning in the 1960s for defence supplies and licensed production of equipment, to the point that Russia accounts today for almost 70 percent of India’s military hardware.

France, amongst all the European countries, has been seen as the most reliable partner. It has studiously avoided imposing sanctions on India whether because of India-Pakistan tensions or even in the wake of India’s nuclear tests in 1998, besides being the fi rst to establish a strategic partnership with India, indicating clearly how it perceived India’s role in a developing multi-polar world. In the 1980s, India signed the

agreement to procure Mirage aircraft from France. A USD 2.4 billion deal was inked in July 2011 with Dassault Aviation and Thales to upgrade 51 of these Mirage aircrafts.

The selection of Rafale for fi nal negotiations for the MMRCA contract, even if done strictly on the basis of technical and commercial parametres, testifi es to the underlying confi dence in the stability and security of defence ties with France.

In December 2005, India and France signed the USD 3 billion Scorpene deal, opening up co-operation in an area the French were especially keen on, in part to obtain orders for their state-owned naval shipyard, the DCN, and, in part, to attenuate negative feelings in Indiaabout their considerable naval co-operation with Pakistan.

The element of competition with Germany, which had supplied four type 209 submarines to India between 1986 and 1994, was strong. Two of these German submarines were built in Germany by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) and two were assembled in the Mazagaon docks. In 1991, however, HDW, the manufacturers of the submarines, were blacklisted by India, which opened up space for France to enter the Indian submarine market.

The bagging of the Scorpene contract was a political success for France, given that Germany had greater experience and a more established reputation in submarine

building and technology. This success was not unconnected with the goodwill France had earned by its accommodative position on India’s 1998 nuclear tests. The delay in implementing the Scorpene project did cause some bickering about where the responsibility lay, but this has been overcome.

Other projects with France include, the development of engines for the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), the Kaveri engine for the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) and the Shakti engine for Dhruv. A major project involving substantial technology transfer that has been negotiated with MBDA and awaits governmental approval is joint development and manufacture of the SR-SAM, the short range surface-to-air missile. A successful implementation of this project can open up more co-operation in the missile fi eld, including, potentially, ballistic missile defence.

During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to France in July 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy reportedly promised to open all doors for Indo-French defence co-operation. The Indian decision in favour of Rafale creates a favourable ground for India to press for implementation of that promise. For the time being, French attention is focussed on fi nalising the Rafale contract and other major steps in defence cooperation, especially in restricted technologies, will probably have to wait till then.

The Mother CountryIn 1979, with India ordering around130 Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft, with licence production and transfer of technology as part of the package, the British made a sizable come-back into the Indian market. In February 2003, India ordered 66 Hawk trainer jets from Britain worth USD 1.7 billion. India insisted these planes carry no US parts because of the experience with its Harrier aircraft detained in Britain after the imposition on nuclear sanctions on India in 1998.

In July 2010, during Prime Minister David Cameron’s visit to India it placed an order for an additional 57 Hawk aircraft worth USD 1.1 billion to be built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL),

with Indian complaints about delays in transfer of technology for the earlier contract apparently resolved. Apart from defence sales, India and Britain have held air and naval exercises.

In the area of Research and Development (R&D), the tie-up between Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the British DSTL (Defence Science and Technology Lab) is of potential interest. Britain is offering participation to India in the Global Combat Ship (GCS), a fl exible role frigate. Britain, as we know, has a very large defence manufacturing base, the largest in Europe, with almost 2,600 defence companies. BAE Systems, which have contracted to sell 140 Ultra Light Howitzers to India, is looking at a role in artillery modernisation in India, for which it has tied up with the Mahindra group to create a Centre for Excellence for artillery projects.

The German ConnectionGermany’s Kurt tank was involved in the manufacture of HAL’s Marut jet fi ghter in the 1950s. Since 1999, Germany, which is the fi fth-largest exporter of defence items to India, has been providing parts for the construction of ships and submarines, such as fi re control systems, sonar and navigation systems, parts for planes, helicopters and tanks. Apart from supplying four Type 209 submarines, it has supplied a large number of Dornier 228 aircraft. India and Germany signed a new defence and security agreement in 2006; an Indo-German High Defence Committee has been formed and visits of service chiefs have been exchanged. In 2008, the fi rst joint naval exercise was held off Kochi.

Of course the Germans have had their set-backs in defence deals, having lost the submarine contract to the French and failing to win the MMRCA contract for which they were the lead country for negotiations. Earlier, too in December 2007, they saw the cancellation of the USD 500 million 197 helicopter deal that had been won by Eurocopter. The result of the re-tender remains uncertain because of competition from the Russia’s Kamov helicopter. Similarly, in the fi rst tender

The biggest consequence of Cold War politics was Indiaʼs turn towards the Soviet Union beginning

in the 1960s for defence supplies and licensed

production of equipment, to the point that Russia

accounts today for almost 70 percent of Indiaʼs

military hardware.

“An employee of DCN, the French

state-owned naval dockyard

AFP


standing in the way through export controls that is where India needs to exert pressure.

European countries will have to contend with Russia’s entrenched position in our defence sector, the impressive share Israel has carved out for itself – the second-largest in this sector – and the advances that the US is making. India is caught between the need to limit the inventory of equipment it has for operational and maintenance reasons, and the need to diversify so as not to create over-dependence on any one country.

India is expected to import USD 200 billion worth of arms in the next 12 years. European countries will certainly have a share of this. They should, as European co-operation comes with much less intrusive demands and fewer chances of disruption of supplies for extraneous reasons. And we have tested our co-operation with European countries for long years now.


22

DSI

for six Refuelling Aircraft, EADS’s Airbus 330 (military version), for which the lead country is Spain – but Germany is a big shareholder of EADS – came out lowest in price but this tender too was cancelled in 2009 and has been re-tendered. The competition is again with a Russian aircraft, the IL76, with new engines but with uncertain result.

India’s defence relations with Italy are relatively limited. Italy’s Alenia Aeronautica has 21 percent share in the Eurofi ghter, but this plane lost out in the MMRCA race. Italy is providing consultancy to our Navy for our indigenous aircraft carrier. Finmeccanica of Italy is providing its propulsion system. India is obtaining heavy weight torpedoes for its submarines and frigates from Italy. Finmeccanica’s subsidiary

Augusta Westland won the tender for supply of 12 AW101 helicopters to serve as executive transport helicopters for the Indian VIPs. Augusta Westland has established a joint venture with Tata Sons

to assemble the eight-seat AW 119 Ke Light Helicopter in India. In 2003, India and Italy renewed their 1994 Memorandum of Understanding on defence co-operation. The India-Italy Joint Defence Committee has met once, in January 2010.

India has the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest importer of arms. This refl ects extremely poorly on the state of indigenous defence manufacturing. That a large country like ours, facing huge security challenges from China and Pakistan, aggravated by the US and the Western arming of Pakistan and subjected to technology regimes, should have impelled it to build domestic capability on an accelerated basis. No country can follow a truly independent policy without an independent defence base of its own. There can be no strategic autonomy without an independent self-defence capacity. We have not been able to leverage our large-scale imports for obtaining the level of transfers of technology needed by us.

Fortunately, the allure of the Indian market has persuaded countries like France and Germany not to enter into any new major defence contracts with Pakistan.

Changing AttitudesToday, the situation has improved for us. India has been liberated from nuclear sanctions and our Western partners are, in principle, supportive of our membership of the various technology regimes set up by them. This changed attitude towards India should progressively make it easier for us to insist and obtain meaningful technology transfers. The policy on offsets will contribute to building a larger defence manufacturing base, but it would be on a sub-contractual basis and is not likely to lead to the kind of transfers we want. For this, a change in our rules on Foreign Direct Investment in the defence sector is required. The present 26 percent ceiling needs to be increased to 49 percent

For the bigger European powers which have wielded power and

are habituated to it, and which have fought

with each other and with others in order to

advance or preserve their interests or impose their will, the possession

of a sizable defence industry is an expression

of their continued big power status.

“DSI

The engine of a Eurofi ghter Typhoon fi ghter displayed, Bengaluru

AFP

as a first step. The private sector should be given all encouragement to enter the defence sector.

The entry of the US in the Indian defence market and its success in bagging contracts worth USD 9 billion in the last five to six years is impressive. This shows that India does not think that the use of sanctions against India is a serious threat anymore. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s relations with the US and the West in general have seriously deteriorated.

The US now has begun to focus on the Asia-Pacific region to potentially counter a threat from rising China. These developments are in our favour in terms of building up our defence potential. The technology transfer problems will not be easy to deal with as the defence sector in western countries has been largely privatised and private companies cannot be compelled to part with proprietary technologies. Where Governments are

AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIRSHOWAND AEROSPACE & DEFENCE EXPOSITION

AIRSHOW2013

26 FEBRUARY - 3 MARCH 2013

GEELONG VICTORIA

Australian Sales Team

Bob Wouda T: +61 (0) 3 5282 0538 M: +61 (0) 418 143 290 E: [email protected] Haines T: +61 (0) 3 5282 0535 M: +61 (0) 407 824 400 E: [email protected] McLaglen T: +61 (0) 3 5282 0502 M: +61 (0) 411 147 882 E: [email protected]

www.airshow.com.au

THE ESSENTIAL AVIATION, AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE SHOWCASEFOR AUSTRALIA AND THE ASIA PACIFIC


standing in the way through export controls that is where India needs to exert pressure.

European countries will have to contend with Russia’s entrenched position in our defence sector, the impressive share Israel has carved out for itself – the second-largest in this sector – and the advances that the US is making. India is caught between the need to limit the inventory of equipment it has for operational and maintenance reasons, and the need to diversify so as not to create over-dependence on any one country.

India is expected to import USD 200 billion worth of arms in the next 12 years. European countries will certainly have a share of this. They should, as European co-operation comes with much less intrusive demands and fewer chances of disruption of supplies for extraneous reasons. And we have tested our co-operation with European countries for long years now.


22

DSI

for six Refuelling Aircraft, EADS’s Airbus 330 (military version), for which the lead country is Spain – but Germany is a big shareholder of EADS – came out lowest in price but this tender too was cancelled in 2009 and has been re-tendered. The competition is again with a Russian aircraft, the IL76, with new engines but with uncertain result.

India’s defence relations with Italy are relatively limited. Italy’s Alenia Aeronautica has 21 percent share in the Eurofi ghter, but this plane lost out in the MMRCA race. Italy is providing consultancy to our Navy for our indigenous aircraft carrier. Finmeccanica of Italy is providing its propulsion system. India is obtaining heavy weight torpedoes for its submarines and frigates from Italy. Finmeccanica’s subsidiary

Augusta Westland won the tender for supply of 12 AW101 helicopters to serve as executive transport helicopters for the Indian VIPs. Augusta Westland has established a joint venture with Tata Sons

to assemble the eight-seat AW 119 Ke Light Helicopter in India. In 2003, India and Italy renewed their 1994 Memorandum of Understanding on defence co-operation. The India-Italy Joint Defence Committee has met once, in January 2010.

India has the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest importer of arms. This refl ects extremely poorly on the state of indigenous defence manufacturing. That a large country like ours, facing huge security challenges from China and Pakistan, aggravated by the US and the Western arming of Pakistan and subjected to technology regimes, should have impelled it to build domestic capability on an accelerated basis. No country can follow a truly independent policy without an independent defence base of its own. There can be no strategic autonomy without an independent self-defence capacity. We have not been able to leverage our large-scale imports for obtaining the level of transfers of technology needed by us.

Fortunately, the allure of the Indian market has persuaded countries like France and Germany not to enter into any new major defence contracts with Pakistan.

Changing AttitudesToday, the situation has improved for us. India has been liberated from nuclear sanctions and our Western partners are, in principle, supportive of our membership of the various technology regimes set up by them. This changed attitude towards India should progressively make it easier for us to insist and obtain meaningful technology transfers. The policy on offsets will contribute to building a larger defence manufacturing base, but it would be on a sub-contractual basis and is not likely to lead to the kind of transfers we want. For this, a change in our rules on Foreign Direct Investment in the defence sector is required. The present 26 percent ceiling needs to be increased to 49 percent

For the bigger European powers which have wielded power and

are habituated to it, and which have fought

with each other and with others in order to

advance or preserve their interests or impose their will, the possession

of a sizable defence industry is an expression

of their continued big power status.

“DSI

The engine of a Eurofi ghter Typhoon fi ghter displayed, Bengaluru

AFP

as a first step. The private sector should be given all encouragement to enter the defence sector.

The entry of the US in the Indian defence market and its success in bagging contracts worth USD 9 billion in the last five to six years is impressive. This shows that India does not think that the use of sanctions against India is a serious threat anymore. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s relations with the US and the West in general have seriously deteriorated.

The US now has begun to focus on the Asia-Pacific region to potentially counter a threat from rising China. These developments are in our favour in terms of building up our defence potential. The technology transfer problems will not be easy to deal with as the defence sector in western countries has been largely privatised and private companies cannot be compelled to part with proprietary technologies. Where Governments are

AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIRSHOWAND AEROSPACE & DEFENCE EXPOSITION

AIRSHOW2013

26 FEBRUARY - 3 MARCH 2013

GEELONG VICTORIA

Australian Sales Team

Bob Wouda T: +61 (0) 3 5282 0538 M: +61 (0) 418 143 290 E: [email protected] Haines T: +61 (0) 3 5282 0535 M: +61 (0) 407 824 400 E: [email protected] McLaglen T: +61 (0) 3 5282 0502 M: +61 (0) 411 147 882 E: [email protected]

www.airshow.com.au

THE ESSENTIAL AVIATION, AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE SHOWCASEFOR AUSTRALIA AND THE ASIA PACIFIC


SECURITY JULY 2012

24 25

DSI

KEY POINTS � The growth of the Indian cyberspace has increased manifold from the time it was ushered in 1995.� With a consistent rise in cyberspace users there is an urgent need for a co-ordinated cyber security plan.� The management of cyberspace has two very critical elements – its technical nature and its infrastructure.

AN ANONYMOUS FOEThis is warfare of a diff erent sort. It ranges from rogue hackers to espionage working for nation states. How can India deal with the threat to its cyber-security?


AFP

The growth of Indian cyberspace has been phenomenal in the last few years. Today, there are more than 121 million internet users

and 380 million mobile users out of which more than 30 percent are smartphone users and thus using the internet for purposes like e-commerce and social networking. This is a long way since the public internet was ushered in India in 1995.

In all these years, a massive network of the internet infrastructure has grown bringing with it its own vulnerabilities, also subjected to misuse and attacks. With more users joining cyberspace, concerns have also grown across all spheres of life (social, business and government sectors) about the need for cyber-security.

To deal effectively with cyber-security it is imperative to understand the very nature of the medium and issues that affect not only its growth but its very sustainability. Clearly, the management of cyberspace has two very critical elements – its technical nature and the infrastructure that runs the internet medium and issues related to usage. The World Summit of Information Society, held both in Geneva (2003) and in Tunis (2005), identifi ed these two points, in fact, this also formed a part of the effort led by the Internet Governance Forum that was formed subsequently. However, despite these beginnings, nations across the globe are still on a learning curve about the extent of the medium’s technical infrastructure and cultural sensitivities. There is still no single global strategy that has been evolved to manage issues of cyberspace, which includes the defence of the medium.

Growing AwarenessIn India, however, awareness for the protection of cyberspace has been gaining ground. Various technical infrastructure incidents and a growing sophistication among users has contributed to this attention: sudden attacks from foreign cyber-networks, particularly from neighbouring

A busy cyber cafe, Bengaluru

cybersapce 2nd time.indd 1-2cybersapce 2nd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 1:08 PM20/07/12 1:08 PM

SECURITY JULY 2012

24 25

DSI

KEY POINTS � The growth of the Indian cyberspace has increased manifold from the time it was ushered in 1995.� With a consistent rise in cyberspace users there is an urgent need for a co-ordinated cyber security plan.� The management of cyberspace has two very critical elements – its technical nature and its infrastructure.

AN ANONYMOUS FOEThis is warfare of a diff erent sort. It ranges from rogue hackers to espionage working for nation states. How can India deal with the threat to its cyber-security?


AFP

The growth of Indian cyberspace has been phenomenal in the last few years. Today, there are more than 121 million internet users

and 380 million mobile users out of which more than 30 percent are smartphone users and thus using the internet for purposes like e-commerce and social networking. This is a long way since the public internet was ushered in India in 1995.

In all these years, a massive network of the internet infrastructure has grown bringing with it its own vulnerabilities, also subjected to misuse and attacks. With more users joining cyberspace, concerns have also grown across all spheres of life (social, business and government sectors) about the need for cyber-security.

To deal effectively with cyber-security it is imperative to understand the very nature of the medium and issues that affect not only its growth but its very sustainability. Clearly, the management of cyberspace has two very critical elements – its technical nature and the infrastructure that runs the internet medium and issues related to usage. The World Summit of Information Society, held both in Geneva (2003) and in Tunis (2005), identifi ed these two points, in fact, this also formed a part of the effort led by the Internet Governance Forum that was formed subsequently. However, despite these beginnings, nations across the globe are still on a learning curve about the extent of the medium’s technical infrastructure and cultural sensitivities. There is still no single global strategy that has been evolved to manage issues of cyberspace, which includes the defence of the medium.

Growing AwarenessIn India, however, awareness for the protection of cyberspace has been gaining ground. Various technical infrastructure incidents and a growing sophistication among users has contributed to this attention: sudden attacks from foreign cyber-networks, particularly from neighbouring

A busy cyber cafe, Bengaluru


SECURITY JULY 2012

26 27

DSI

countries, on Indian institutions, including defence, has caused concern. The increasing growth of the internet and its use in offi cial work has added to the understanding that it is necessary to secure networks despite a section of the Government offering an arrangement of standalone computer safety.

Today, the cyberspace is becoming a zone of virtual espionage. The Naval war room leak case in 2005, despite its references to the pen-drive angle, created a national fl utter, especially within the Government with the breaching of computer-related content. Worse was to follow. In January 2010, the then National Security Adviser (NSA) publicly mentioned that his computer was being targetted by Chinese cyberattacks. A few months later, the Stuxnet worm, which was primarily attacking Iranian computers and networks in July 2010, also affected many Indian networks and the very sophisticated nature of the attacks and the module generated fears among all stakeholders. Then there was the hacking of the Central Bureau of Investigation website in early December 2010 and recently the attack by a hacking group calling itself, Anonymous, has led to collective concerns about the need for better cyber-security co-ordination in India.

The RoadmapSo how is India addressing the issue of cyber-security? Given the enormity of the problem, progress is slow. In 2000, the Information Technology Act 2000 (IT Act) was enacted for the fi rst time primarily to usher in e-commerce but it also provisions for addressing basic cyber-attacks. Around the same time, on the institutional front, the Department of Information Technology under the Ministry of Communications and IT was addressing policy issues of cyber-space, primarily the growth of the medium and fostering e-governance.

However, a cyber-security mechanism was also actually set up with the formation of the National Information Board (NIB) in 2002: chaired by the NSA, it consisted of 21 members, mostly Secretaries in the Union Government. The NIB was supported by the National Technology Research Organisation (NTRO) set up in 2004 to provide technical

cyber-security and intelligence and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) for co-ordinating cyber-security activities across the country. In 2004, the Computer Emergency Response Team India (CERT IN) was set up in Delhi, under the Ministry of Communications and IT to act as the public interface for reporting incidents, generating response and also to create cyber-security awareness among the IT user community.

To be sure, incidents of cyber attacks and misuse of the internet medium has led to a greater generation of awareness but the issue really entered the public domain with the CEO of Bazee.com, Avnish Bajaj, was arrested in December 2004, by the Delhi police because of the sale of the infamous mobile phone sex clip via the auction site. Pan-India, the incident generated adverse reactions leading to the formation of an Expert Committee to recommend amendments to the IT Act.

The Committee’s report in 2006 motivated the Government to bring in an Amended Bill which was comprehensively evaluated by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on IT. But was referred back to the Government. It was only after the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008 the Government hurriedly passed the Bill in December 2008 and notify it in the Gazette of India in February 2009.

The IT Amendment Act (ITA) specifi cally enlarges the scenarios of cyber-crimes, defi nes cyber-terrorism and points out the need for critical infrastructures. It also introduces provisions related to the monitoring, interception and blocking of communications and content in cyber-space, subject to some rules, some of which were introduced in April 2011 and became very controversial.

The ITA also brought in CERT IN under its ambit, redefining its functions and responsibilities and giving the necessary attention required for Critical Information Infrastructure Protection. A national nodal body for CIIP was also envisaged to which NTRO is responsible. In the process, it also defined areas where both these institutions operate thus preventing occasional references to the turf wars between these institutions.

Simultaneously, various intelligence agencies have also been involved in the pursuit of cyber-security efforts, including

for the defence forces, but mostly these efforts have been un-co-ordinated, never adding to a national picture on the

institutional front. This anomaly was addressed in early 2011 with the decision to have the Deputy National Security Adviser as an overall co-ordinator for cyber- security for the country. Meanwhile the NIB continues to be the highest policy formulation body for cyber defence of the country reporting periodically to the Cabinet Committee on Security.

Functional Levels In March 2011, a draft National Cyber-

Security Plan was put up for public comments but though many relevant interjections were made, till now, a fi nal policy has not been announced. Clearly, a policy that spells out an overall strategy through which institutional capacity building, training and awareness, defensive capabilities and tools, ,investigative and forensic infrastructures have to be put in place is critical.

A massive reorientation of the police forces is also needed as part of that effort whereby the issue of cyber-policing, either in intelligence gathering or investigations, has to be bolstered. Currently, this is being done in a haphazard manner and has not been identified as a priority sector for most of the police forces across the country. Dedicated Security Operations Centres and Network Operation Centres also need to be set up across domains and critical sectors like banking, telecom, defence and citizen delivery services. Additionally, there is a need to develop means for keeping a close check on any intrusion attempts or attacks.

Since many of these activities directly involve the private sector, a mechanism of trustworthiness has to be fostered, different from the current scenario where there is a strange sense of mistrust among both these sectors. Attention towards building cyber-R&D capabilities within the country has to be done on a proactive basis and talent pools have to be involved with the right level of investments.

While the Defence and Research Development Organisation and its labs are involved in cyber-security research it, the private sector should also be engaged and their involvement should be institutionalised as their output is more advanced.

In May 2012, the NSA said that the Government was in the fi nal stages of preparing a ‘Whole-of-Government’ cyber-security architecture. Part of that effort, entails ‘to be prepared to deal with both threats to cyberspace and risks arising through cyber-space’.

Two recent reports published in May this year have laid out blueprints for addressing most of these issues, including the outlining of an institutional mechanism that not only involves Government organisations but also the private sector community. One of the reports is the result of an expert group set up by the Ministry of Defence thinktank, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis that has made specifi c recommendations for cyber-security including critical infrastructure, international co-operation and cyber-warfare.

The other report by the industry body, NASSCOM, has recommended the growing need for private-public partnerships and involving both sectors in institutional capacity building.

In January 2010,the National Security

Adviser publicly mentioned that his

computer was targetted by Chinese cyber-attacks.

A few months later, the Stuxnet worm, which

was primarily attacking Iranian computers and networks in July, also

aff ected manyIndian networks and

the very sophisticatednature of the attacks

and the module generated fears

among the stakeholders.

“An elderly Kashmiri

reads a newspaper near a cybercafe in Jammu

AFP

DSI


SECURITY JULY 2012

26 27

DSI

countries, on Indian institutions, including defence, has caused concern. The increasing growth of the internet and its use in offi cial work has added to the understanding that it is necessary to secure networks despite a section of the Government offering an arrangement of standalone computer safety.

Today, the cyberspace is becoming a zone of virtual espionage. The Naval war room leak case in 2005, despite its references to the pen-drive angle, created a national fl utter, especially within the Government with the breaching of computer-related content. Worse was to follow. In January 2010, the then National Security Adviser (NSA) publicly mentioned that his computer was being targetted by Chinese cyberattacks. A few months later, the Stuxnet worm, which was primarily attacking Iranian computers and networks in July 2010, also affected many Indian networks and the very sophisticated nature of the attacks and the module generated fears among all stakeholders. Then there was the hacking of the Central Bureau of Investigation website in early December 2010 and recently the attack by a hacking group calling itself, Anonymous, has led to collective concerns about the need for better cyber-security co-ordination in India.

The RoadmapSo how is India addressing the issue of cyber-security? Given the enormity of the problem, progress is slow. In 2000, the Information Technology Act 2000 (IT Act) was enacted for the fi rst time primarily to usher in e-commerce but it also provisions for addressing basic cyber-attacks. Around the same time, on the institutional front, the Department of Information Technology under the Ministry of Communications and IT was addressing policy issues of cyber-space, primarily the growth of the medium and fostering e-governance.

However, a cyber-security mechanism was also actually set up with the formation of the National Information Board (NIB) in 2002: chaired by the NSA, it consisted of 21 members, mostly Secretaries in the Union Government. The NIB was supported by the National Technology Research Organisation (NTRO) set up in 2004 to provide technical

cyber-security and intelligence and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) for co-ordinating cyber-security activities across the country. In 2004, the Computer Emergency Response Team India (CERT IN) was set up in Delhi, under the Ministry of Communications and IT to act as the public interface for reporting incidents, generating response and also to create cyber-security awareness among the IT user community.

To be sure, incidents of cyber attacks and misuse of the internet medium has led to a greater generation of awareness but the issue really entered the public domain with the CEO of Bazee.com, Avnish Bajaj, was arrested in December 2004, by the Delhi police because of the sale of the infamous mobile phone sex clip via the auction site. Pan-India, the incident generated adverse reactions leading to the formation of an Expert Committee to recommend amendments to the IT Act.

The Committee’s report in 2006 motivated the Government to bring in an Amended Bill which was comprehensively evaluated by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on IT. But was referred back to the Government. It was only after the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008 the Government hurriedly passed the Bill in December 2008 and notify it in the Gazette of India in February 2009.

The IT Amendment Act (ITA) specifi cally enlarges the scenarios of cyber-crimes, defi nes cyber-terrorism and points out the need for critical infrastructures. It also introduces provisions related to the monitoring, interception and blocking of communications and content in cyber-space, subject to some rules, some of which were introduced in April 2011 and became very controversial.

The ITA also brought in CERT IN under its ambit, redefining its functions and responsibilities and giving the necessary attention required for Critical Information Infrastructure Protection. A national nodal body for CIIP was also envisaged to which NTRO is responsible. In the process, it also defined areas where both these institutions operate thus preventing occasional references to the turf wars between these institutions.

Simultaneously, various intelligence agencies have also been involved in the pursuit of cyber-security efforts, including

for the defence forces, but mostly these efforts have been un-co-ordinated, never adding to a national picture on the

institutional front. This anomaly was addressed in early 2011 with the decision to have the Deputy National Security Adviser as an overall co-ordinator for cyber- security for the country. Meanwhile the NIB continues to be the highest policy formulation body for cyber defence of the country reporting periodically to the Cabinet Committee on Security.

Functional Levels In March 2011, a draft National Cyber-

Security Plan was put up for public comments but though many relevant interjections were made, till now, a fi nal policy has not been announced. Clearly, a policy that spells out an overall strategy through which institutional capacity building, training and awareness, defensive capabilities and tools, ,investigative and forensic infrastructures have to be put in place is critical.

A massive reorientation of the police forces is also needed as part of that effort whereby the issue of cyber-policing, either in intelligence gathering or investigations, has to be bolstered. Currently, this is being done in a haphazard manner and has not been identified as a priority sector for most of the police forces across the country. Dedicated Security Operations Centres and Network Operation Centres also need to be set up across domains and critical sectors like banking, telecom, defence and citizen delivery services. Additionally, there is a need to develop means for keeping a close check on any intrusion attempts or attacks.

Since many of these activities directly involve the private sector, a mechanism of trustworthiness has to be fostered, different from the current scenario where there is a strange sense of mistrust among both these sectors. Attention towards building cyber-R&D capabilities within the country has to be done on a proactive basis and talent pools have to be involved with the right level of investments.

While the Defence and Research Development Organisation and its labs are involved in cyber-security research it, the private sector should also be engaged and their involvement should be institutionalised as their output is more advanced.

In May 2012, the NSA said that the Government was in the fi nal stages of preparing a ‘Whole-of-Government’ cyber-security architecture. Part of that effort, entails ‘to be prepared to deal with both threats to cyberspace and risks arising through cyber-space’.

Two recent reports published in May this year have laid out blueprints for addressing most of these issues, including the outlining of an institutional mechanism that not only involves Government organisations but also the private sector community. One of the reports is the result of an expert group set up by the Ministry of Defence thinktank, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis that has made specifi c recommendations for cyber-security including critical infrastructure, international co-operation and cyber-warfare.

The other report by the industry body, NASSCOM, has recommended the growing need for private-public partnerships and involving both sectors in institutional capacity building.

In January 2010,the National Security

Adviser publicly mentioned that his

computer was targetted by Chinese cyber-attacks.

A few months later, the Stuxnet worm, which

was primarily attacking Iranian computers and networks in July, also

aff ected manyIndian networks and

the very sophisticatednature of the attacks

and the module generated fears

among the stakeholders.

“An elderly Kashmiri

reads a newspaper near a cybercafe in Jammu

AFP

DSI


SIACHEN JULY 2012

30 31

DSI

Pakistan’s solution calls for an Indian withdrawal from the glacier, a mutual pull-back and demiltarisation. India, however, insists on authentication and demarcation of the AGPL (Actual Ground Position Line which we hold) before redeployment to mutually defi ned positions, to prevent the vacated area being otherwise stealthily seized. Nevertheless, the Kayani initiative should be pursued so that no opportunity for peace is lost.

Critical Date Both Siachen ‘solutions’ however, beg the question. There was no AGPL prior to 1984. Where then did the northern extremity of the Cease-Fire Line (CFL) or the Line of Control (LoC) lie? The critical date is therefore not 1984 but July 29, 1949 when the Cease-Fire Agreement was signed in Karachi by ranking military representatives of India and Pakistan and the United Nations Military Observer Group in pursuance of Part I of the key UN resolution of August 8 1948. This was to be followed by a Truce under Part II and, after full compliance, by a plebiscite under Part III.

The Karachi Agreement delineated the entire CFL, demarcating over 740km on the ground. With the CFL increasingly running through high mountains and glaciated areas as it traversed north, it often followed a directional path in the absence of clear landmarks. Thus, finally, “Chalunka (on the Shyok River), Khor, thence North to the glaciers”, passing through grid reference NJ 9842. The segment beyond NJ 9842 was by mutual agreement not demarcated on the ground being a highly elevated, glaciated, unexplored and unpopulated region that had not witnessed any fighting. A plebiscite was soon to follow and the matter, it was assumed, would soon be settled.

The delineation of the northern-most segment of the CFL was, however, unambiguous – NJ 9842, “thence north to the glaciers”. The very next section crucially directed that “the Cease Fire Line described above” be drawn “so as to eliminate any no man’s land”. Therefore, the Line, whether delineated or demarcated, could in no way be left hanging in the air.

lines of communication eastwards and began licensing western mountaineering expeditions to venture east of K2.

It was emboldened to extend this ‘eastward creep’ when, between 1964 and 1972, the US Defence Mapping Agency, (USDMA), an international reference point for cartography, began depicting the CFL as extending from NJ 9842 to a point just west of the Karakoram Pass. The most charitable explanation for this totally unwarranted and unfriendly action was that it erroneously hardened what was possibly no more than an extant dotted World War II Air Defence Information Zone (ADIZ) line into a politico-military divide. World atlases followed suit, depicting the line drawn from NJ 9842 northeast to the Karakoram pass as the authentic and internationally accepted CFL/LOC, backed by international mountaineering lore that India did little to rebut or put in context.

Pakistan gladly accepted this fraudulent international endorsement and thereafter initiated moves to occupy Siachen. Reconnaissance teams were sent to the Saltoro Ridge, Siachen’s western wall, in 1983. Getting wind of this stratagem, India, pre-emptively occupied the glacier in March 1984.

At a US Institute for Peace (USIP) conference on J&K in Washington in 1991, delegates were delivered a map at their hotel rooms without the mandatory credit line regarding its origins simply headed, ‘The Kashmir Region: Depicting the CFL/LoC, Siachen and Shaksgam’.

This showed a hatched triangle: NJ 9842-Karakoram Pass-K2, and Shaksgam in the north, with a legend reading, ‘Indian Occupied since 1983’. The conference organisers disowned what they surmised could be a CIA map and suggested it be treated as “withdrawn”. The map not only confi rmed Pakistan’s claims but virtually labelled India an aggressor. Years later, US Ambassador Robert Blackwill said, “The US Defence Mapping Agency had got its lines wrong and that the impugned maps would be amended”. Nothing ensued.

Puzzled by the mysterious USIP map of 1990 depicting India as an aggressor in the NJ 9842-Karakoram Pass-K2 triangle, I posed

the problem to the well-known Minnesota University cartographer and South Asian scholar, Joseph E. Schwartzberg, author of the University of Chicago’s prestigious tome, A Historical Atlas of South Asia. In due course he gave me a bunch of USDMA maps showing how that offi cial cartographic agency had changed the alignment of the CFL/LoC over a period from 1967 to 1972. He did not read anything mala fi de in this line and attributed it to mistakenly adopting an old Air Defence Information Zone marking for the CFL. The line went back and forth and by the 1970s had stabilised at the NJ 9842-Karakoram Pass alignment where it remains in all international atlases , like Philips, Bartholomew, The Times, Oxford, the National Geographic, et al, to this day.

I presented a set of these maps to the offi ce of the Director-General, Military Operations at Army Headquarters in 2001 when I was briefl y Information Consultant to the Raksha Mantri and briefed other senior offi cials. The Government of India simply did not react to my concerns.

If the USDMA map was a product of genuine error, howsoever irresponsible,

If innocent absent mindedness on the part

of one or more offi cial US agencies is not altogether

convincing, where else might one look, howsoever

tangentially, for possible explanations of the Siachen

muddle? The Sino-Soviet rift was out in the open and

the US, having extricated itself from the Indo-China

quagmire, had begun to review its relations with the Peopleʼs Republic of China,

now a nuclear power.

“

A Pakistan Army helicopter hovers over the avalanche

Gayari, Siachen

AFP

measured the Siachen and other glaciers and publicly recorded its fi ndings. No Pakistani protest followed the prolonged, internationally-known and publicised presence and activity of the Indian scientists. It is simple to see why.

Locate NJ 9842 on a detailed physical map of northern J&K and draw a line “thence north” and much or most of Siachen will be found to lie on the Indian side of the CFL. Pakistani military maps (see General Pervez Musharraf’s memoir, In the Line of Fire – Free Press, London, 2006), depicting Pakistan’s military positions during the Kargil operations, situate the entire Siachen glacier on the Indian side of the delineated line, NJ 9842, “thence north to the glaciers”.

At Simla, Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi demanded acceptance of the CFL/LoC as the permanent political boundary but accepted Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfi qar Ali Bhutto’s honeyed assurances that he would take steps to promote the evolution of the LoC into a permanent

boundary. But no sooner were his Prisoners of War (PoW’s) back home, and his lost territories in the West restored, then he raged and reneged. Mrs Gandhi’s Secretary, P. N. Dhar put the record straight in The Times of India (April 4-5, 1995).

Even so, when later Pakistan sought to incorporate the Northern Areas within its territory, and still later when it announced construction of the Basha-Diamer dam, and yet again when it conferred a limited constitutional status on Gilgit-Baltistan, India protested against what it said was an infringement of its own sovereignty, betraying policy inconsistency in its stance on the contours of a fi nal political settlement in J&K.

All Pakistan, UN and global atlases depicted the CFL neutrally or correctly till around 1964-72. By the mid-1950s, China had commenced its creeping cartographic aggression in Ladakh. In 1963, it signed a boundary agreement whereby Pakistan unilaterally ceded the Shaksgam Valley. Thereafter, Pakistan kept extending its

The CFL was ratifi ed by both sides and deposited with the United Nation Commission for India and Pakistan. It was revalidated as the LoC under the Suchetgarh Agreement of December 1972, in accordance with the clear intent of the Simla Conference earlier that year to move from military confrontation to political resolution in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). However, the LoC incorporated the military gains made by either side in J&K in the 1971 war. Thus in the Kargil-Siachen sector, all territorial gains went entirely to India which acquired the 254 sq mile Turtok salient comprising fi ve villages, south and west of NJ 9842. This military acquisition provided India an additional territorial bulwark against hostile claims on Siachen.

Mapping SiachenEarlier in 1956-58, during the UN-designated International Geophysical Year, an Indian scientifi c expedition led by the Geological Survey explored the upper Nubra and Shyok Valleys, mapped and

Siachen 3rd time.indd 3-4Siachen 3rd time.indd 3-4 20/07/12 5:29 PM20/07/12 5:29 PM

SIACHEN JULY 2012

30 31

DSI

Pakistan’s solution calls for an Indian withdrawal from the glacier, a mutual pull-back and demiltarisation. India, however, insists on authentication and demarcation of the AGPL (Actual Ground Position Line which we hold) before redeployment to mutually defi ned positions, to prevent the vacated area being otherwise stealthily seized. Nevertheless, the Kayani initiative should be pursued so that no opportunity for peace is lost.

Critical Date Both Siachen ‘solutions’ however, beg the question. There was no AGPL prior to 1984. Where then did the northern extremity of the Cease-Fire Line (CFL) or the Line of Control (LoC) lie? The critical date is therefore not 1984 but July 29, 1949 when the Cease-Fire Agreement was signed in Karachi by ranking military representatives of India and Pakistan and the United Nations Military Observer Group in pursuance of Part I of the key UN resolution of August 8 1948. This was to be followed by a Truce under Part II and, after full compliance, by a plebiscite under Part III.

The Karachi Agreement delineated the entire CFL, demarcating over 740km on the ground. With the CFL increasingly running through high mountains and glaciated areas as it traversed north, it often followed a directional path in the absence of clear landmarks. Thus, finally, “Chalunka (on the Shyok River), Khor, thence North to the glaciers”, passing through grid reference NJ 9842. The segment beyond NJ 9842 was by mutual agreement not demarcated on the ground being a highly elevated, glaciated, unexplored and unpopulated region that had not witnessed any fighting. A plebiscite was soon to follow and the matter, it was assumed, would soon be settled.

The delineation of the northern-most segment of the CFL was, however, unambiguous – NJ 9842, “thence north to the glaciers”. The very next section crucially directed that “the Cease Fire Line described above” be drawn “so as to eliminate any no man’s land”. Therefore, the Line, whether delineated or demarcated, could in no way be left hanging in the air.

lines of communication eastwards and began licensing western mountaineering expeditions to venture east of K2.

It was emboldened to extend this ‘eastward creep’ when, between 1964 and 1972, the US Defence Mapping Agency, (USDMA), an international reference point for cartography, began depicting the CFL as extending from NJ 9842 to a point just west of the Karakoram Pass. The most charitable explanation for this totally unwarranted and unfriendly action was that it erroneously hardened what was possibly no more than an extant dotted World War II Air Defence Information Zone (ADIZ) line into a politico-military divide. World atlases followed suit, depicting the line drawn from NJ 9842 northeast to the Karakoram pass as the authentic and internationally accepted CFL/LOC, backed by international mountaineering lore that India did little to rebut or put in context.

Pakistan gladly accepted this fraudulent international endorsement and thereafter initiated moves to occupy Siachen. Reconnaissance teams were sent to the Saltoro Ridge, Siachen’s western wall, in 1983. Getting wind of this stratagem, India, pre-emptively occupied the glacier in March 1984.

At a US Institute for Peace (USIP) conference on J&K in Washington in 1991, delegates were delivered a map at their hotel rooms without the mandatory credit line regarding its origins simply headed, ‘The Kashmir Region: Depicting the CFL/LoC, Siachen and Shaksgam’.

This showed a hatched triangle: NJ 9842-Karakoram Pass-K2, and Shaksgam in the north, with a legend reading, ‘Indian Occupied since 1983’. The conference organisers disowned what they surmised could be a CIA map and suggested it be treated as “withdrawn”. The map not only confi rmed Pakistan’s claims but virtually labelled India an aggressor. Years later, US Ambassador Robert Blackwill said, “The US Defence Mapping Agency had got its lines wrong and that the impugned maps would be amended”. Nothing ensued.

Puzzled by the mysterious USIP map of 1990 depicting India as an aggressor in the NJ 9842-Karakoram Pass-K2 triangle, I posed

the problem to the well-known Minnesota University cartographer and South Asian scholar, Joseph E. Schwartzberg, author of the University of Chicago’s prestigious tome, A Historical Atlas of South Asia. In due course he gave me a bunch of USDMA maps showing how that offi cial cartographic agency had changed the alignment of the CFL/LoC over a period from 1967 to 1972. He did not read anything mala fi de in this line and attributed it to mistakenly adopting an old Air Defence Information Zone marking for the CFL. The line went back and forth and by the 1970s had stabilised at the NJ 9842-Karakoram Pass alignment where it remains in all international atlases , like Philips, Bartholomew, The Times, Oxford, the National Geographic, et al, to this day.

I presented a set of these maps to the offi ce of the Director-General, Military Operations at Army Headquarters in 2001 when I was briefl y Information Consultant to the Raksha Mantri and briefed other senior offi cials. The Government of India simply did not react to my concerns.

If the USDMA map was a product of genuine error, howsoever irresponsible,

If innocent absent mindedness on the part

of one or more offi cial US agencies is not altogether

convincing, where else might one look, howsoever

tangentially, for possible explanations of the Siachen

muddle? The Sino-Soviet rift was out in the open and

the US, having extricated itself from the Indo-China

quagmire, had begun to review its relations with the Peopleʼs Republic of China,

now a nuclear power.

“

A Pakistan Army helicopter hovers over the avalanche

Gayari, Siachen

AFP

measured the Siachen and other glaciers and publicly recorded its fi ndings. No Pakistani protest followed the prolonged, internationally-known and publicised presence and activity of the Indian scientists. It is simple to see why.

Locate NJ 9842 on a detailed physical map of northern J&K and draw a line “thence north” and much or most of Siachen will be found to lie on the Indian side of the CFL. Pakistani military maps (see General Pervez Musharraf’s memoir, In the Line of Fire – Free Press, London, 2006), depicting Pakistan’s military positions during the Kargil operations, situate the entire Siachen glacier on the Indian side of the delineated line, NJ 9842, “thence north to the glaciers”.

At Simla, Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi demanded acceptance of the CFL/LoC as the permanent political boundary but accepted Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfi qar Ali Bhutto’s honeyed assurances that he would take steps to promote the evolution of the LoC into a permanent

boundary. But no sooner were his Prisoners of War (PoW’s) back home, and his lost territories in the West restored, then he raged and reneged. Mrs Gandhi’s Secretary, P. N. Dhar put the record straight in The Times of India (April 4-5, 1995).

Even so, when later Pakistan sought to incorporate the Northern Areas within its territory, and still later when it announced construction of the Basha-Diamer dam, and yet again when it conferred a limited constitutional status on Gilgit-Baltistan, India protested against what it said was an infringement of its own sovereignty, betraying policy inconsistency in its stance on the contours of a fi nal political settlement in J&K.

All Pakistan, UN and global atlases depicted the CFL neutrally or correctly till around 1964-72. By the mid-1950s, China had commenced its creeping cartographic aggression in Ladakh. In 1963, it signed a boundary agreement whereby Pakistan unilaterally ceded the Shaksgam Valley. Thereafter, Pakistan kept extending its

The CFL was ratifi ed by both sides and deposited with the United Nation Commission for India and Pakistan. It was revalidated as the LoC under the Suchetgarh Agreement of December 1972, in accordance with the clear intent of the Simla Conference earlier that year to move from military confrontation to political resolution in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). However, the LoC incorporated the military gains made by either side in J&K in the 1971 war. Thus in the Kargil-Siachen sector, all territorial gains went entirely to India which acquired the 254 sq mile Turtok salient comprising fi ve villages, south and west of NJ 9842. This military acquisition provided India an additional territorial bulwark against hostile claims on Siachen.

Mapping SiachenEarlier in 1956-58, during the UN-designated International Geophysical Year, an Indian scientifi c expedition led by the Geological Survey explored the upper Nubra and Shyok Valleys, mapped and


SIACHEN JULY 2012

32 33

DSI

it would have been natural and simple to apologise and make amends in an appropriate manner. Nothing of the kind happened. Nor did the Indian Government respond to any of these alarm bells.

Robert G. Wirsing, the American scholar, later dwelt on this issue at some length in, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Confl ict and Its Resolution (Rupa 1994). He writes: “By the early 1980s, practically all the most respected atlases … were showing the CFL/LoC extending beyond grid reference point NJ 9842, about 55 miles in a clear north-easterly direction all the way to the Karakoram Pass on the Chinese border. The extension was a distinct departure from past cartographic practice. The UN maps of Kashmir produced in the early years of the dispute all terminated at the map coordinate NJ 9842.

In India and Pakistan, display of the CFL or LoC on publicly sold maps has been offi cially discouraged at least since the 1965 war; but among the scores of pre-1965 offi cial or offi cially-approved maps surveyed by this author in the Library of Congress, not a single one showed any extension beyond NJ 9842.

Wirsing also notes, “A nearly universal shift by map-makers to an extended and eastward-running CFL/LoC (from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass) was eventually achieved...One can hardly escape the conclusion that the US Defence Mapping Agency, one of the largest and probably the most infl uential of international map-makers, played a far from inconsequential role in the world’s “cartographic award of Siachen to Pakistan”.

Astonishingly, there was during all of this period no known formal protest from the Government of India or any of its agencies even as others cheerfully played ducks and drakes with one of India’s most sensitive borders. This undermined the solemnly certifi ed UN-authenticated CFL. India was placed at a huge political and military disadvantage in J&K through a cartographic sleight of hand that gratuitously rewarded Pakistan.

According to Wirsing, however, Lt. Gen M.N. Kaul, former Northern Army Commander in the late 1970s, had said at a

conference of serving and retired Defence offi cials in Delhi in 1991, that the Indian Army had taken “a keen interest” in his time at the “how, when and why” USDMA had taken on itself the task of border delimitation in this sector. The only answer vouchsafed was that the process had commenced in 1967. No other records were apparently available with the US.

However, on March 12, 1987, the Offi ce of the Geographer of the U.S State Department issued guidelines to producers of offi cial US maps that admitted past inconsistencies and specifi cally instructed them not to extend the line beyond NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass. Nonetheless, the damage had been done and remains uncorrected, with no apologies by or to anybody to this date.

If innocent absent mindedness on the part of one or more offi cial US agencies is not altogether convincing, where else might one look, howsoever tangentially, for possible explanations of the Siachen muddle? The Sino-Soviet rift was out in the open and the US, having extricated itself from the Indo-China quagmire, had begun to review its relations with the People’s Republic of China, now a nuclear power. The Sino-Pakistan rapprochement post-1963 made Pakistan a critical conduit to quiet Sino-US talks.

Henry Kissinger, as the American Secretary of State famously headed to the Subcontinent to stave off the possibility of an Indo-Pakistan war on account of the Bangladesh liberation struggle, a mission famously overshadowed by his secret dash to Beijing from Islamabad and the ensuing announcement of a Mao-Nixon

meeting. The Indo-Soviet Friendship Pact was signed and the notorious “Nixon tilt” against India went into play.

The Kissinger Transcripts by William Burr (1999) makes the extraordinary disclosure of the Secretary of State encouraging the People’s Republic of China in December 1971, through its UN Ambassador Huang Hua in New York with whom he was now in very close touch, to move against India in order to divert it from severing Bangladesh from Pakistan, a mutual ally. The US reassured Beijing that it would counter any Soviet riposte. President Richard Nixon had already ordered a US naval squadron headed by the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise into the Indian Ocean to show the fl ag, although this might ramp up tensions with the Soviet Union.

Was it in the background of this bizarre play of events that US map-makers started fiddling gratuitously with India’s strategic boundaries? Yet, when in the year 2000 Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf tried to argue that the Kargil Heights were "undemarcated" and the LoC was unclear, Bill Clinton, the serving American President then firmly told him that established boundaries could not be redrawn and the Pakistan Army must withdraw and respect the LoC. He had to do so.

Look now at the implications of the options being canvassed for a resolution of the Siachen matter. Any unqualifi ed redeployment from the Siachen Glacier, without asserting the correct delineation of the CFL/LoC from NJ 9842 “thence north to the glaciers”, will mean accepting the Pakistan claim and throw the August 1948 UN Resolution and derivative 1949 Karachi Agreement into the dustbin. This “mother” Resolution on J&K implicitly found Pakistan the aggressor and intruder, required its military personnel and tribal cohorts to leave the State forthwith, and upheld India’s de jure sovereignty over the entire State even while preparations were made for a plebiscite.

On February 4 1949, the United States representative, Senator Warren Austen, told the UN Security Council that “with the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, the foreign (external) sovereignty (over Kashmir) went over to India and is exercised by India, and that is how India happens to be here as petitioner”. The LoC is a subsequent derivative of the August 8, 1949 Resolution that drew the CFL.

The Manmohan-Musharraf 2005 peace formula sanctified the LoC as an evolving international boundary, rendered porous as “a mere line on a map” across which movement, investment, commerce, exchange and co-operation might be encouraged and joint institutions allowed to develop for their management. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had hinted that this arrangement might even include water.

Such a progression could bind the people of J&K and of India and Pakistan

together in friendship and co-operation. Indeed, this arrangement harks back to some kind of proto-confederal vision for J&K projected by Sheikh Abdullah and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in1964 without prejudice to the existing twin sovereignties.

This is the only viable win-win solution for all with regard to J&K. But unless the LoC is fi rmly anchored to a northern terminus, it will dangle loose in no-man’s land and could unravel, leaving everything for grabs.

Possible SolutionA way out could lie in the quiet authentication of the AGPL, if necessary, through an annexed exchange of letters. This should be combined with agreement on the only true meaning of “NJ 9842 thence north to the glaciers” leaving no room for any no man’s land and clearly marking a firm boundary.

Finally, there should be an understanding on converting the NJ 9842-K2-Karakoram Pass triangle into a demiltarised Third Pole International Peace Park for Glacier and World Weather Studies, hopefully with Shaksgam as a partner, to monitor climate change. Sovereignty within its own territory would remain with India and Pakistan, and with China, should it join. Such an arrangement would foreclose the risk of any clandestine military occupation of the vacated AGPL or adjacent Pakistani positions by anybody. None need lose face. All would gain.

Some critics argue that the Indian Parliamentary Resolution claiming title over all the erstwhile J&K Maharaja’s domain is binding and that any such partitioning as here proposed would be both illegal and unacceptable. This is specious reasoning. Any settlement and demarcation of the final post-Partition boundaries of India will not amount to ceding territory as clearly setout by the Supreme Court in the TinBigha judgement.

A separate conversation with the U.S on rectifying its maps in this sector and making due amends for its egregious error in this regard would be in order. DSI

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi shakes hands with Pakistani President

Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto on the sidelines on the 1972, Simla Agreement, Shimla

AFP


SIACHEN JULY 2012

32 33

DSI

it would have been natural and simple to apologise and make amends in an appropriate manner. Nothing of the kind happened. Nor did the Indian Government respond to any of these alarm bells.

Robert G. Wirsing, the American scholar, later dwelt on this issue at some length in, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Confl ict and Its Resolution (Rupa 1994). He writes: “By the early 1980s, practically all the most respected atlases … were showing the CFL/LoC extending beyond grid reference point NJ 9842, about 55 miles in a clear north-easterly direction all the way to the Karakoram Pass on the Chinese border. The extension was a distinct departure from past cartographic practice. The UN maps of Kashmir produced in the early years of the dispute all terminated at the map coordinate NJ 9842.

In India and Pakistan, display of the CFL or LoC on publicly sold maps has been offi cially discouraged at least since the 1965 war; but among the scores of pre-1965 offi cial or offi cially-approved maps surveyed by this author in the Library of Congress, not a single one showed any extension beyond NJ 9842.

Wirsing also notes, “A nearly universal shift by map-makers to an extended and eastward-running CFL/LoC (from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass) was eventually achieved...One can hardly escape the conclusion that the US Defence Mapping Agency, one of the largest and probably the most infl uential of international map-makers, played a far from inconsequential role in the world’s “cartographic award of Siachen to Pakistan”.

Astonishingly, there was during all of this period no known formal protest from the Government of India or any of its agencies even as others cheerfully played ducks and drakes with one of India’s most sensitive borders. This undermined the solemnly certifi ed UN-authenticated CFL. India was placed at a huge political and military disadvantage in J&K through a cartographic sleight of hand that gratuitously rewarded Pakistan.

According to Wirsing, however, Lt. Gen M.N. Kaul, former Northern Army Commander in the late 1970s, had said at a

conference of serving and retired Defence offi cials in Delhi in 1991, that the Indian Army had taken “a keen interest” in his time at the “how, when and why” USDMA had taken on itself the task of border delimitation in this sector. The only answer vouchsafed was that the process had commenced in 1967. No other records were apparently available with the US.

However, on March 12, 1987, the Offi ce of the Geographer of the U.S State Department issued guidelines to producers of offi cial US maps that admitted past inconsistencies and specifi cally instructed them not to extend the line beyond NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass. Nonetheless, the damage had been done and remains uncorrected, with no apologies by or to anybody to this date.

If innocent absent mindedness on the part of one or more offi cial US agencies is not altogether convincing, where else might one look, howsoever tangentially, for possible explanations of the Siachen muddle? The Sino-Soviet rift was out in the open and the US, having extricated itself from the Indo-China quagmire, had begun to review its relations with the People’s Republic of China, now a nuclear power. The Sino-Pakistan rapprochement post-1963 made Pakistan a critical conduit to quiet Sino-US talks.

Henry Kissinger, as the American Secretary of State famously headed to the Subcontinent to stave off the possibility of an Indo-Pakistan war on account of the Bangladesh liberation struggle, a mission famously overshadowed by his secret dash to Beijing from Islamabad and the ensuing announcement of a Mao-Nixon

meeting. The Indo-Soviet Friendship Pact was signed and the notorious “Nixon tilt” against India went into play.

The Kissinger Transcripts by William Burr (1999) makes the extraordinary disclosure of the Secretary of State encouraging the People’s Republic of China in December 1971, through its UN Ambassador Huang Hua in New York with whom he was now in very close touch, to move against India in order to divert it from severing Bangladesh from Pakistan, a mutual ally. The US reassured Beijing that it would counter any Soviet riposte. President Richard Nixon had already ordered a US naval squadron headed by the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise into the Indian Ocean to show the fl ag, although this might ramp up tensions with the Soviet Union.

Was it in the background of this bizarre play of events that US map-makers started fiddling gratuitously with India’s strategic boundaries? Yet, when in the year 2000 Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf tried to argue that the Kargil Heights were "undemarcated" and the LoC was unclear, Bill Clinton, the serving American President then firmly told him that established boundaries could not be redrawn and the Pakistan Army must withdraw and respect the LoC. He had to do so.

Look now at the implications of the options being canvassed for a resolution of the Siachen matter. Any unqualifi ed redeployment from the Siachen Glacier, without asserting the correct delineation of the CFL/LoC from NJ 9842 “thence north to the glaciers”, will mean accepting the Pakistan claim and throw the August 1948 UN Resolution and derivative 1949 Karachi Agreement into the dustbin. This “mother” Resolution on J&K implicitly found Pakistan the aggressor and intruder, required its military personnel and tribal cohorts to leave the State forthwith, and upheld India’s de jure sovereignty over the entire State even while preparations were made for a plebiscite.

On February 4 1949, the United States representative, Senator Warren Austen, told the UN Security Council that “with the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, the foreign (external) sovereignty (over Kashmir) went over to India and is exercised by India, and that is how India happens to be here as petitioner”. The LoC is a subsequent derivative of the August 8, 1949 Resolution that drew the CFL.

The Manmohan-Musharraf 2005 peace formula sanctified the LoC as an evolving international boundary, rendered porous as “a mere line on a map” across which movement, investment, commerce, exchange and co-operation might be encouraged and joint institutions allowed to develop for their management. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had hinted that this arrangement might even include water.

Such a progression could bind the people of J&K and of India and Pakistan

together in friendship and co-operation. Indeed, this arrangement harks back to some kind of proto-confederal vision for J&K projected by Sheikh Abdullah and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in1964 without prejudice to the existing twin sovereignties.

This is the only viable win-win solution for all with regard to J&K. But unless the LoC is fi rmly anchored to a northern terminus, it will dangle loose in no-man’s land and could unravel, leaving everything for grabs.

Possible SolutionA way out could lie in the quiet authentication of the AGPL, if necessary, through an annexed exchange of letters. This should be combined with agreement on the only true meaning of “NJ 9842 thence north to the glaciers” leaving no room for any no man’s land and clearly marking a firm boundary.

Finally, there should be an understanding on converting the NJ 9842-K2-Karakoram Pass triangle into a demiltarised Third Pole International Peace Park for Glacier and World Weather Studies, hopefully with Shaksgam as a partner, to monitor climate change. Sovereignty within its own territory would remain with India and Pakistan, and with China, should it join. Such an arrangement would foreclose the risk of any clandestine military occupation of the vacated AGPL or adjacent Pakistani positions by anybody. None need lose face. All would gain.

Some critics argue that the Indian Parliamentary Resolution claiming title over all the erstwhile J&K Maharaja’s domain is binding and that any such partitioning as here proposed would be both illegal and unacceptable. This is specious reasoning. Any settlement and demarcation of the final post-Partition boundaries of India will not amount to ceding territory as clearly setout by the Supreme Court in the TinBigha judgement.

A separate conversation with the U.S on rectifying its maps in this sector and making due amends for its egregious error in this regard would be in order. DSI

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi shakes hands with Pakistani President

Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto on the sidelines on the 1972, Simla Agreement, Shimla

AFP


DEFENCE BUDGET JULY 2012

34 35

DSI

BACKWARD MARCH

KEY POINTS � In keeping with inflation, the increase in the Defence Budget, fiscal 2012- 2013, is barely adequate.� The armed forces can be effectively modernised if the allocation goes up to 2.5 to 3.0 percent of the GDP.� India’s per capita defence expenditure is well below international norms.

GURMEET KANWAL

In an otherwise lacklustre annual Budget devoid of any enthusiasm for reform, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee has done well this year

by hiking the country’s Defence Budget by 17.6 percent in rupee terms. This hike is in keeping with the growing threats, challenges and vulnerabilities facing the country, India’s increasing responsibilities as a regional power and the need to modernise India’s armed forces in order to meet emerging threats and challenges. A detailed letter written by the Chief of Army Staff to the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh this March, revealed the real state of India’s defence preparedness and the fact that huge funds will need to be invested to make up operationally critical defi ciencies.

In real terms, the absolute increase from `1,64,415 crore in 2011-12 to `1,93,007 crore for 2012-13 is barely adequate to allow for infl ation, currently ruling at about 7.5 percent, and the consequent increase in pay and allowances. The rupee’s recent slide against the US dollar to almost `55 to a dollar has further eroded its purchasing power. Annual infl ation in the international price of assorted weapons, ammunition and defence equipment is generally between 12-

15 percent. Therefore, each year’s delay in the procurement of operationally critical items substantially increases the burden on the exchequer.

On its part, China’s People’s Liberation Army and its sister services – the Navy, the Air Force, the Second Artillery and the nuclear strike force – have been modernising at a rapid pace for over a decade, backed by a double-digit annual hike in the country’s Defence Budget. At USD 106 billion, China’s offi cial Defence Budget for the current year is 11.2 percent more than the previous year and it is almost three times India’s planned defence expenditure. As China invariably conceals many items of expenditure on security, its actual expenditure is likely to be well over USD 150 billion.

China is also investing heavily in modernising its surface-to-surface missile fi repower, fi ghter aircraft and air-to-ground strike capability. It is acquiring strategic airlift capability, modern aircraft carriers, new submarines, improving command and control and surveillance systems and is enhancing its capacity to launch amphibious operations. It is also upgrading the military infrastructure in Tibet to sustain larger deployments over longer durations.

Despite the long list of obsolescent weapons and equipment in service with the Indian armed forces, the present military gap with China is quantitative rather than qualitative. However, as India’s military modernisation has been stagnating for several years, this gap will soon become a qualitative one as well. By about 2020-25, China will complete its military modernisation and will then be in a position to dictate terms on the resolution of the territorial dispute if India continues to neglect defence preparedness.

Indian commandos from the Jammu and Kashmir Armed

Police march at the Sheeri Training Centre, Srinagar

On paper, Indiaʼs defence spending may have increased but in reality the hike has been neutralised by chronic delays in acquisition and growing infl ation

AFP

Defence Budget 2nd time.indd 1-2Defence Budget 2nd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 1:17 PM20/07/12 1:17 PM

DEFENCE BUDGET JULY 2012

34 35

DSI

BACKWARD MARCH

KEY POINTS � In keeping with inflation, the increase in the Defence Budget, fiscal 2012- 2013, is barely adequate.� The armed forces can be effectively modernised if the allocation goes up to 2.5 to 3.0 percent of the GDP.� India’s per capita defence expenditure is well below international norms.

GURMEET KANWAL

In an otherwise lacklustre annual Budget devoid of any enthusiasm for reform, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee has done well this year

by hiking the country’s Defence Budget by 17.6 percent in rupee terms. This hike is in keeping with the growing threats, challenges and vulnerabilities facing the country, India’s increasing responsibilities as a regional power and the need to modernise India’s armed forces in order to meet emerging threats and challenges. A detailed letter written by the Chief of Army Staff to the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh this March, revealed the real state of India’s defence preparedness and the fact that huge funds will need to be invested to make up operationally critical defi ciencies.

In real terms, the absolute increase from `1,64,415 crore in 2011-12 to `1,93,007 crore for 2012-13 is barely adequate to allow for infl ation, currently ruling at about 7.5 percent, and the consequent increase in pay and allowances. The rupee’s recent slide against the US dollar to almost `55 to a dollar has further eroded its purchasing power. Annual infl ation in the international price of assorted weapons, ammunition and defence equipment is generally between 12-

15 percent. Therefore, each year’s delay in the procurement of operationally critical items substantially increases the burden on the exchequer.

On its part, China’s People’s Liberation Army and its sister services – the Navy, the Air Force, the Second Artillery and the nuclear strike force – have been modernising at a rapid pace for over a decade, backed by a double-digit annual hike in the country’s Defence Budget. At USD 106 billion, China’s offi cial Defence Budget for the current year is 11.2 percent more than the previous year and it is almost three times India’s planned defence expenditure. As China invariably conceals many items of expenditure on security, its actual expenditure is likely to be well over USD 150 billion.

China is also investing heavily in modernising its surface-to-surface missile fi repower, fi ghter aircraft and air-to-ground strike capability. It is acquiring strategic airlift capability, modern aircraft carriers, new submarines, improving command and control and surveillance systems and is enhancing its capacity to launch amphibious operations. It is also upgrading the military infrastructure in Tibet to sustain larger deployments over longer durations.

Despite the long list of obsolescent weapons and equipment in service with the Indian armed forces, the present military gap with China is quantitative rather than qualitative. However, as India’s military modernisation has been stagnating for several years, this gap will soon become a qualitative one as well. By about 2020-25, China will complete its military modernisation and will then be in a position to dictate terms on the resolution of the territorial dispute if India continues to neglect defence preparedness.

Indian commandos from the Jammu and Kashmir Armed

Police march at the Sheeri Training Centre, Srinagar

On paper, Indiaʼs defence spending may have increased but in reality the hike has been neutralised by chronic delays in acquisition and growing infl ation

AFP


JULY 2012

36 37

DSI

Of the total allocation for defence, the Army will get `97,302.54 crore, the Navy `37,314.44 crore, the Air Force `48,191.16 crore and the Defence Research and Development Organisation `10,635.56 crore. The total revenue expenditure planned for the year is `1,13,829 crore − a 19.55 percent increase representing 58.85 percent of the Budget. The remaining amount of `79,578 crore − a 15 percent increase representing 41.15 percent of the Budget − has been allotted on the capital account for the acquisition of modern weapon systems, including initial payments for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft, C-17 Globemaster III Heavy Lift Aircraft, 197 Light Helicopters, 145 Ultra-Light Howitzers, among others. It is well known that India plans to spend approximately USD 100 billion over the next ten years or so on defence modernisation.

In addition to the Defence Budget, the Government has also earmarked adequate resources in the annual budget of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for homeland or internal security. A portion of these funds will be utilised for setting up a National Intelligence Grid and the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, measures which are considered necessary after the Mumbai terror strikes of November 2008. Also, funds for the modernisation of the Central Police and para-military forces will be provided from the budget of the MHA.

Giving his reaction to the Finance Minister’s Budget speech, Defence Minister A. K. Antony said, “By and large we are very happy about the [Defence] Budget because apart from the allocation, the Finance Minister said that if defence needs more money, there won’t be any problem.”

Lack Of CommitmentHowever, the truth is that the armed forces are unlikely to be satisfied as their plans for modernisation have been stymied, year after year, by the lack of committed budgetary support. The 11th Defence Plan, which ended on March 31 2012, was not accorded approval in principle by the Government and, therefore, continued to be hamstrung.

DEFENCE BUDGET

An Indian soldier during the Shoor Veer military exercise, near

Hanumangarh,Rajasthan

Following the publication of the Army Chiefʼs letter

in March, 2012, it is heartening to note that

the Defence Minister has now accorded ʻʼapproval in principleʼʼ to the 12th Defence Plan (2012-17).

However, unless the Cabinet Committee on

Security too approves the 13th Defence Plan and allocates an adequate

fi nancial support towards defence acquisition

proposed for the next fi ve years, approval in

principle will remain academic in nature.

“Following the publication of the Army

Chief’s letter, it is heartening to note that the Defence Minister has now accorded “approval in principle’’ to the 12th Defence Plan (2012-17). However, unless the Cabinet Committee on Security too approves the 13th Defence Plan and allocates adequate fi nancial support towards the defence acquisition proposed for the next fi ve years, an approval in principle will remain academic in nature.

After a gap of one year, when the funds earmarked on the capital account were fully spent by the Government for the fi rst time in many years, in fi scal 2011-12, once again,

approximately `3,000 crore have been returned unspent to the exchequer from the capital account despite the immediate urgency for modernisation.

The reasons for India’s lackadaisical approach to military modernisation include the shortage of funds on the capital account for major defence acquisitions, the inability to spend even the allotted funds due to bureaucratic red tape in decision making and the lack of a robust, indigenous defence industry because of an excessive reliance on uncompetitive ordnance factories and defence Public Sector Units. It is to be hoped that the 15

percent increase in the capital outlay to `79,579 crore this year will once again kick start the modernisation process.

The lack of progress in the replacement of the Army’s large inventory of obsolescent weapons and equipment and its qualitative modernisation to meet future threats and challenges is particularly worrisome as the Army continues to have large-scale deployments on border management and internal security duties. It needs to upgrade its really rudimentary Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system and graduate quickly to network

centricity to optimise the use of its combat potential. While the mechanised forces in the plains are still partly night blind, the capability to launch offensive operations in the mountains continues to remain inadequate to deter confl ict. The capability to launch precision strikes from ground and air-delivered fi repower which will pave the way for the infantry to win future battles is much short of the volumes that will be required. All of this will need massive budgetary support, which can be provided only if the Defence Budget goes up to 2.5 to 3.0 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The naysayers will, of course, object to the 17.6 percent increase in the defence outlay when the economy is slowing down, especially as there has been a drop in the growth momentum and investor confidence has been adversely impacted. But it will be useful to recall that no matter by which yardstick India’s defence expenditure is measured by, it is still well below international norms. As a ratio of the projected GDP for 2012-13, India’s defence expenditure is pegged at 1.91 percent vis-a-vis 1.83 percent in 2011-12. In comparison, the United States spends 4.8 percent of its GDP on defence; China 2.5 percent and Pakistan 3.5 percent indeed. Indeed it has been empirically established that defence expenditure of up to three percent of the GDP makes a positive contribution to a nation’s socio-economic development.

It is disheartening to know that India’s per capita expenditure on defence is less than USD 10, while the average expenditure of the top ten spenders in Asia is USD 800 approximately. India’s soldiers-to-citizens ratio, at 1.22 per 1,000 citizens, is also among the lowest in Asia. The average of the top ten Asian nations is about 20 soldiers per 1,000 citizens.

The 13th Finance Commission (2010-2015) has recommended that the nation’s defence expenditure should progressively come down to 1.76 percent of the GDP by 2014-15. Quite clearly, the Finance Minister appears to have decided to pay no heed to this unjustifi able advice. Now that the Parliament’s Standing Committee on

Defence has recommended the immediate raising of defence expenditure to 2.5 percent of the GDP and the Defence Minister has stated that he plans to go back to Parliament for a major hike in this year’s Defence Budget to make up the existing shortfall in weapons, ammunition and equipment, there is some hope that the nation will raise its defence expenditure to pragmatic levels.

Given India’s increasing vulnerabilities and rising international demands on it to act as a net provider of security as a rising regional power, the country’s defence expenditure is adequate to sustain present capabilities but inadequate to create the capabilities that the armed forces will need in future.

Finally, defence expenditure must be looked at as a form of insurance: it provides deterrence, an assurance against war and enables the armed forces to acquire the capabilities necessary to fi ght and win if deterrence fails. DSI

AFP


JULY 2012

36 37

DSI

Of the total allocation for defence, the Army will get `97,302.54 crore, the Navy `37,314.44 crore, the Air Force `48,191.16 crore and the Defence Research and Development Organisation `10,635.56 crore. The total revenue expenditure planned for the year is `1,13,829 crore − a 19.55 percent increase representing 58.85 percent of the Budget. The remaining amount of `79,578 crore − a 15 percent increase representing 41.15 percent of the Budget − has been allotted on the capital account for the acquisition of modern weapon systems, including initial payments for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft, C-17 Globemaster III Heavy Lift Aircraft, 197 Light Helicopters, 145 Ultra-Light Howitzers, among others. It is well known that India plans to spend approximately USD 100 billion over the next ten years or so on defence modernisation.

In addition to the Defence Budget, the Government has also earmarked adequate resources in the annual budget of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for homeland or internal security. A portion of these funds will be utilised for setting up a National Intelligence Grid and the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, measures which are considered necessary after the Mumbai terror strikes of November 2008. Also, funds for the modernisation of the Central Police and para-military forces will be provided from the budget of the MHA.

Giving his reaction to the Finance Minister’s Budget speech, Defence Minister A. K. Antony said, “By and large we are very happy about the [Defence] Budget because apart from the allocation, the Finance Minister said that if defence needs more money, there won’t be any problem.”

Lack Of CommitmentHowever, the truth is that the armed forces are unlikely to be satisfied as their plans for modernisation have been stymied, year after year, by the lack of committed budgetary support. The 11th Defence Plan, which ended on March 31 2012, was not accorded approval in principle by the Government and, therefore, continued to be hamstrung.

DEFENCE BUDGET

An Indian soldier during the Shoor Veer military exercise, near

Hanumangarh,Rajasthan

Following the publication of the Army Chiefʼs letter

in March, 2012, it is heartening to note that

the Defence Minister has now accorded ʻʼapproval in principleʼʼ to the 12th Defence Plan (2012-17).

However, unless the Cabinet Committee on

Security too approves the 13th Defence Plan and allocates an adequate

fi nancial support towards defence acquisition

proposed for the next fi ve years, approval in

principle will remain academic in nature.

“Following the publication of the Army

Chief’s letter, it is heartening to note that the Defence Minister has now accorded “approval in principle’’ to the 12th Defence Plan (2012-17). However, unless the Cabinet Committee on Security too approves the 13th Defence Plan and allocates adequate fi nancial support towards the defence acquisition proposed for the next fi ve years, an approval in principle will remain academic in nature.

After a gap of one year, when the funds earmarked on the capital account were fully spent by the Government for the fi rst time in many years, in fi scal 2011-12, once again,

approximately `3,000 crore have been returned unspent to the exchequer from the capital account despite the immediate urgency for modernisation.

The reasons for India’s lackadaisical approach to military modernisation include the shortage of funds on the capital account for major defence acquisitions, the inability to spend even the allotted funds due to bureaucratic red tape in decision making and the lack of a robust, indigenous defence industry because of an excessive reliance on uncompetitive ordnance factories and defence Public Sector Units. It is to be hoped that the 15

percent increase in the capital outlay to `79,579 crore this year will once again kick start the modernisation process.

The lack of progress in the replacement of the Army’s large inventory of obsolescent weapons and equipment and its qualitative modernisation to meet future threats and challenges is particularly worrisome as the Army continues to have large-scale deployments on border management and internal security duties. It needs to upgrade its really rudimentary Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system and graduate quickly to network

centricity to optimise the use of its combat potential. While the mechanised forces in the plains are still partly night blind, the capability to launch offensive operations in the mountains continues to remain inadequate to deter confl ict. The capability to launch precision strikes from ground and air-delivered fi repower which will pave the way for the infantry to win future battles is much short of the volumes that will be required. All of this will need massive budgetary support, which can be provided only if the Defence Budget goes up to 2.5 to 3.0 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The naysayers will, of course, object to the 17.6 percent increase in the defence outlay when the economy is slowing down, especially as there has been a drop in the growth momentum and investor confidence has been adversely impacted. But it will be useful to recall that no matter by which yardstick India’s defence expenditure is measured by, it is still well below international norms. As a ratio of the projected GDP for 2012-13, India’s defence expenditure is pegged at 1.91 percent vis-a-vis 1.83 percent in 2011-12. In comparison, the United States spends 4.8 percent of its GDP on defence; China 2.5 percent and Pakistan 3.5 percent indeed. Indeed it has been empirically established that defence expenditure of up to three percent of the GDP makes a positive contribution to a nation’s socio-economic development.

It is disheartening to know that India’s per capita expenditure on defence is less than USD 10, while the average expenditure of the top ten spenders in Asia is USD 800 approximately. India’s soldiers-to-citizens ratio, at 1.22 per 1,000 citizens, is also among the lowest in Asia. The average of the top ten Asian nations is about 20 soldiers per 1,000 citizens.

The 13th Finance Commission (2010-2015) has recommended that the nation’s defence expenditure should progressively come down to 1.76 percent of the GDP by 2014-15. Quite clearly, the Finance Minister appears to have decided to pay no heed to this unjustifi able advice. Now that the Parliament’s Standing Committee on

Defence has recommended the immediate raising of defence expenditure to 2.5 percent of the GDP and the Defence Minister has stated that he plans to go back to Parliament for a major hike in this year’s Defence Budget to make up the existing shortfall in weapons, ammunition and equipment, there is some hope that the nation will raise its defence expenditure to pragmatic levels.

Given India’s increasing vulnerabilities and rising international demands on it to act as a net provider of security as a rising regional power, the country’s defence expenditure is adequate to sustain present capabilities but inadequate to create the capabilities that the armed forces will need in future.

Finally, defence expenditure must be looked at as a form of insurance: it provides deterrence, an assurance against war and enables the armed forces to acquire the capabilities necessary to fi ght and win if deterrence fails. DSI

AFP


DEFENCE PROCUREMENT JULY 2012

38 39

DSI

KEY POINTS � A lack of unified functioning in the defence procurement system is costing the country heavily.� Procurement involves a long gestation period and effective participation from multiple agencies.� A unified work force can reduce acquisition time by 30 percent and capital expenditure by 15 percent.

NARROW VISION Lacking unifi ed functioning, Indiaʼs defence procurement system is a saga of selfi sh turfwars, missed opportunities and wasted funds

A soldier looks down the barrel of a rocket launcher during a defence exhibition, Amritsar

MRINAL SUMAN

Every nation’s defence procurement regime aims at providing effective, affordable and timely defence systems and equipment to its

armed forces. In that sense the stated aim of India’s Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) − to “ensure the expeditious procurement of the approved requirements of the armed forces in terms of capabilities sought and time frame prescribed, by optimally utilising the allocated budgetary resources” − is no different.

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in reviewing programmes and Functional Capabilities Board in assessing capability gaps and proposals. The contract support is provided by the Defence Contract Management Agency and logistic support by the Defence Logistics Agency.

The Indian Conundrum Despite repeated assertions to the contrary, India’s defence procurement regime has been a total failure. It has failed to achieve any of the stated objectives. Procurement cases continue to languish in an amazing bureaucratic tangle. Worse, India’s dependence on foreign systems continues to grow while India’s defence industry remains underdeveloped. Periodic reviews are announced with great fl ourish but there has not been much improvement on the ground.

One of the primary reasons for this failure is a total lack of unity of purpose and functioning amongst various Government agencies. The extent of a lack of coherence is appalling. Instead of adopting an integrated, mission-oriented approach, various organs tend to guard their own turf for narrow parochial interests.

The case of the Tactical Communication System (TCS) is symptomatic of this malaise. The TCS is a mobile wide-area network for battlefi eld and is universally considered to be a potent force multiplier. An urgent proposal for the TCS was initiated by the Army in 1996. The proposal was duly accepted as an upgrade of the existing facility. After wasting fi ve years in processing the case, the proposal was converted into a ‘fresh acquisition’, to be procured through a hybrid categorisation of ‘Buy and Make’ and ‘Make’ routes. Consequently, extensive work had to be carried out again. In a surprise twist, the case was recategorised as a ‘Make (Hi-Tech)’ in 2007 and the whole process had to be started ab initio. Concurrently, surreptitious efforts were made by the

Procurement of new weaponry and equipment in all nations is a multifaceted, protracted and cross-disciplinary activity, requiring participation of multiple agencies. The requirement of new weapon systems fl ows from threat analysis and required capabilities. Thereafter, again a stock-taking exercise is carried out to identify existing gaps in capability. Finally, perspective plans are evolved to acquire wherewithal to cover the gaps.

A close co-ordination between different agencies is of critical importance in all

multi-disciplinary activities and defence procurement is no exception. That is the reason why most countries have evolved a system of unifi ed functioning. They have created a nodal agency to exercise overarching oversight and to ensure that participating agencies do not work at cross purposes.

Unifi ed FunctioningIn Britain, the Defence Board, under the Permanent Under-Secretary for Defence is the central authority which provides

a senior level leadership and a strategic management of defence. It is assisted by two major structures in the acquisition process: a Joint Capabilities Board decides what capabilities the forces need while Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) delivers the required equipment or systems. It must be recalled here that the DE&S was created in April 2007 by merging two erstwhile entities, the Defence Procurement Agency and the Defence Logistics Organisation.

German defence acquisitions are managed by the Federal Defence Administration (FDA), as per the Defence Policy Guidelines issued by the German Ministry of Defence on 27 May, 2011. The FDA is assisted by four organisations: the Directorate-General of Armaments, responsible for defence research, planning and induction of equipment; the Federal Offi ce of Defence Technology and Procurement manages all armament projects (excluding Information Technology-IT) and ensures that the demands of the armed forces are fully met; the Modernisation-Directorate provides active support for all modernisation projects to improve economic effi ciency and effectiveness of the armed forces and fi nally, the Bundeswehr IT offi ce handles all IT related issues.

The French Government has adopted a highly centralised model. The General- Directorate for Armament or DGA, is the empowered overarching authority. It oversees the requirement of modern war systems by the French armed forces, analyses various options, identifi es the most appropriate route, facilitates development and ensures timely induction. It manages about 80 percent of the defence equipment budget.

The US defence acquisition system is characterised by centralised policies and a decentralised execution of acquisition activities. The Offi ce of the Under-Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is the nodal agency and the overall authority tasked to oversee the complete defence acquisition process. It is assisted by

AFP

Defence Procurement 2nd time.indd 1-2Defence Procurement 2nd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 1:26 PM20/07/12 1:26 PM

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT JULY 2012

38 39

DSI

KEY POINTS � A lack of unified functioning in the defence procurement system is costing the country heavily.� Procurement involves a long gestation period and effective participation from multiple agencies.� A unified work force can reduce acquisition time by 30 percent and capital expenditure by 15 percent.

NARROW VISION Lacking unifi ed functioning, Indiaʼs defence procurement system is a saga of selfi sh turfwars, missed opportunities and wasted funds

A soldier looks down the barrel of a rocket launcher during a defence exhibition, Amritsar

MRINAL SUMAN

Every nation’s defence procurement regime aims at providing effective, affordable and timely defence systems and equipment to its

armed forces. In that sense the stated aim of India’s Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) − to “ensure the expeditious procurement of the approved requirements of the armed forces in terms of capabilities sought and time frame prescribed, by optimally utilising the allocated budgetary resources” − is no different.

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in reviewing programmes and Functional Capabilities Board in assessing capability gaps and proposals. The contract support is provided by the Defence Contract Management Agency and logistic support by the Defence Logistics Agency.

The Indian Conundrum Despite repeated assertions to the contrary, India’s defence procurement regime has been a total failure. It has failed to achieve any of the stated objectives. Procurement cases continue to languish in an amazing bureaucratic tangle. Worse, India’s dependence on foreign systems continues to grow while India’s defence industry remains underdeveloped. Periodic reviews are announced with great fl ourish but there has not been much improvement on the ground.

One of the primary reasons for this failure is a total lack of unity of purpose and functioning amongst various Government agencies. The extent of a lack of coherence is appalling. Instead of adopting an integrated, mission-oriented approach, various organs tend to guard their own turf for narrow parochial interests.

The case of the Tactical Communication System (TCS) is symptomatic of this malaise. The TCS is a mobile wide-area network for battlefi eld and is universally considered to be a potent force multiplier. An urgent proposal for the TCS was initiated by the Army in 1996. The proposal was duly accepted as an upgrade of the existing facility. After wasting fi ve years in processing the case, the proposal was converted into a ‘fresh acquisition’, to be procured through a hybrid categorisation of ‘Buy and Make’ and ‘Make’ routes. Consequently, extensive work had to be carried out again. In a surprise twist, the case was recategorised as a ‘Make (Hi-Tech)’ in 2007 and the whole process had to be started ab initio. Concurrently, surreptitious efforts were made by the

Procurement of new weaponry and equipment in all nations is a multifaceted, protracted and cross-disciplinary activity, requiring participation of multiple agencies. The requirement of new weapon systems fl ows from threat analysis and required capabilities. Thereafter, again a stock-taking exercise is carried out to identify existing gaps in capability. Finally, perspective plans are evolved to acquire wherewithal to cover the gaps.

A close co-ordination between different agencies is of critical importance in all

multi-disciplinary activities and defence procurement is no exception. That is the reason why most countries have evolved a system of unifi ed functioning. They have created a nodal agency to exercise overarching oversight and to ensure that participating agencies do not work at cross purposes.

Unifi ed FunctioningIn Britain, the Defence Board, under the Permanent Under-Secretary for Defence is the central authority which provides

a senior level leadership and a strategic management of defence. It is assisted by two major structures in the acquisition process: a Joint Capabilities Board decides what capabilities the forces need while Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) delivers the required equipment or systems. It must be recalled here that the DE&S was created in April 2007 by merging two erstwhile entities, the Defence Procurement Agency and the Defence Logistics Organisation.

German defence acquisitions are managed by the Federal Defence Administration (FDA), as per the Defence Policy Guidelines issued by the German Ministry of Defence on 27 May, 2011. The FDA is assisted by four organisations: the Directorate-General of Armaments, responsible for defence research, planning and induction of equipment; the Federal Offi ce of Defence Technology and Procurement manages all armament projects (excluding Information Technology-IT) and ensures that the demands of the armed forces are fully met; the Modernisation-Directorate provides active support for all modernisation projects to improve economic effi ciency and effectiveness of the armed forces and fi nally, the Bundeswehr IT offi ce handles all IT related issues.

The French Government has adopted a highly centralised model. The General- Directorate for Armament or DGA, is the empowered overarching authority. It oversees the requirement of modern war systems by the French armed forces, analyses various options, identifi es the most appropriate route, facilitates development and ensures timely induction. It manages about 80 percent of the defence equipment budget.

The US defence acquisition system is characterised by centralised policies and a decentralised execution of acquisition activities. The Offi ce of the Under-Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is the nodal agency and the overall authority tasked to oversee the complete defence acquisition process. It is assisted by

AFP


40

Department of Defence Production (DDP) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to make it a captive project.

It is only now after a huge delay of16 years, that orders have been placed with two vendors to develop a prototype of the system. According to highly optimistic estimates, it will take yet another decade before the required quantity is inducted. The case shows the degree of gross inefficiency of the system and disjointed functioning of the agencies involved which allows a quarter of a century to provide urgently needed equipment to the Army. Evidently, selfish turf interests override national concerns.

Infamous FiveThe following five agencies participate in India’s defence procurement system: the three Services; the Department of Defence; the Department of Defence Procurement; officials from the defence finance ministry; and the Defence Research and Development Organisation.

Being the ultimate users, the Services are the main stake holders. Yet, they are to blame for a number of infi rmities. It is they who prepare three types of perspective plans: a

themselves. Newer proposals are given higher priority over the ones included in the approved plans.

Once a procurement proposal initiated by the Services is accepted, they are asked to spell out minimum performance attributes corresponding to the task/tasks envisaged to be performed by the equipment sought. Users’ requirements are spelt out in terms of functional characteristics which are translated into essential parametres, called Services Qualitative Requirements (SQRs).

Unfortunately, there is little dialogue between the three Services as well. For instance, the Army does not consult the Air Force while framing SQRs for helicopters. Similarly, it does not seek advice of the Navy while demanding deep sea diving equipment. As a result, most requests get aborted midway due to faulty SQRs.

To accurately validate performance characteristics of competing equipment in actual ground and climatic conditions, user trials are carried out under the aegis of the Services. Here again, the Services jealously guard their turf and refuse to consult other agencies. Quite irrationally, they feel that since they are the users, they alone are competent enough to carry out trials. They fail to appreciate the fact that the testing of equipment, with newer and differing technologies, require expertise which they do not possess.

The Department of Defence (DoD) is the controlling authority for all acquisition activities. To start with, it issues Defence Planning Guidelines that form the basis for the formulation of all perspective plans. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) constituted under its aegis, acts as the controlling body. In addition to approving perspective plans, it delineates the route for procurement in respect of every proposal initiated by the Services.

Predictably, the DAC is riven with factionalism. Every agency follows its own agenda. Whereas the Services demand an early procurement of their critical requirements, the Department of Defence Production wants to ensure that all orders go to the public sector entities, irrespective of their capabilities. On the other hand, the DRDO blocks all imports by making

A school boy handles a rocket launcher during a defence exhibition in Amritsar

AFP

The Services are highly sensitive about their

right to formulate SQRs. Despite the fact that they

possess no expertise, they are wary of consulting

others. Like spoilt children seeking the latest toys,

the Services demand equipment with utopian

capabilities, its cost being of no concern to them.

“

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

15-year Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan; a 5-year Services Capital Acquisition Plan and an Annual Acquisition Plan. As these are prepared in isolation without any confi rmed budgetary support, they tend to be mere wish-lists – a compilation of equipment proposals initiated by different directorates. Resultantly, these plans lack pragmatism and sanctity. Worse, they are not adhered to diligently by the Services

Defence Procurement 2nd time.indd 3Defence Procurement 2nd time.indd 3 20/07/12 1:26 PM20/07/12 1:26 PM

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DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIAOCTOBER 2011 DSIVOLUME 4 ISSUE 2 ` 250

REGION

OFFICERS AND BUSINESSMEN Many South Asian militaries are in business –

from hotels to bakeries to golf courses I Rahul Bedi

AVIATION

BROKEN WINGS High peacetime attrition due to accidents continues

to be a matter of great concern for the IAF I V.K. Bhatia

CHANGESIN THEAIR? MAY BE IT IS TIME TO INSTITUTE AN OVERARCHING AEROSPACE

TECHNOLOGY COMMISSION NOW THAT THE SECTOR IS ON THE CUSP OF

FAR REACHING CHANGES I AJAI SHUKLA

_ nd time.qxp:cover-feb3.qxd 29/09/11 1:49 PM Page 1


DECEMBER 2011


DEFENCE POLICY

SIGNS OF STRAIN India's defence management cannot deal with national

and international security challenges I C. UDAY BHASKAR

NUCLEAR

A YEAR OF COLD COMFORT

2011 brings few gains to India's quest for a nuclear energy

programme I SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

CHALLENGES

AHEADTHE MILITARY'S AMBITIOUS

PROGRAMME FOR

INDIGENOUS ARMOURED

VEHICLES MAY BE HAMPERED

BY BAD PLANNING AND

RISING COSTS I AJAI SHUKLA

DSI Cover_dec.qxp:cover-feb3.qxd 02/12/11 3:27 PM Page 1


JULY 2012


SIACHEN GLACIER

CONFLICT WITHOUT END The Siachen imbroglio has been misunderstood, evenmismanaged, by Indian policy makers I B.G. VERGHESE

INDO-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

INCREASING TIESDefence relations between India and Europe are poisedto grow in the coming decade I KANWAL SIBAL

TAKING TOTHE SKIESTHE DEFENCE SERVICES ARE INDUCTING ROTARY WINGAIRCRAFT IN HUGE NUMBERS I AJAI SHUKLATHE DEFENCE SERVICES ARE INDUCTING ROTARY WINGAIRCRAFT IN HUGE NUMBERS I AJAI SHUKLA


APRIL 2012


ENERGY SECURITY

FUTURE TENSE

Rising prices and geopolitical turbulence make energy

security a global priority I SHYAM SARAN

GENDER

TIME TO CHANGE

Women entered the Services 19 years ago but they are

still not accepted in combat roles I SONIA TRIKHA SHUKLA

DELAYED ARTILLERY PURCHASES HAVE

BECOME A SECURITY CONCERN I RAHUL BEDI

THE GUNSFALL SILENT

SI Cover.qxp:cover-feb3.qxd 21/03/12 2:30 PM Page 1

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to the Prime Minister on February 26, 2001, had faulted the then existing system of defence procurements and stated that it suffered from a lack of integrated planning and implementation. It suggested the creation of a separate, dedicated and integrated institutional structure to undertake a complete gamut of procurement functions to inject a higher degree of synergy, synchronisation, co-ordination and professionalism.

Although the Acquisition Wing has been created as an integrated setup with members drawn from the bureaucracy, the Services and the defence finance, it is a sham. Expectedly, it has failed to deliver as a cohesive body. Bureaucrats continue to call all the shots and are unwilling to treat Service officers as equals. Very cleverly, through the façade of an ‘integrated setup’, bureaucrats have managed to get defence officers from the various Services to do their secretarial spadework. They have been reduced to the status of note-preparers for the bureaucrats to give decisions and they have been given no powers at all.

The lack of unified functioning is costing the country dear. For example, once a Service Headquarters forwards a SQR of a piece of equipment to the DoD, it is considered inviolable. Unfortunately, the DoD does not consider it necessary to have a dialogue with the sponsoring SHQ regarding the cost-benefit analysis of the proposal. At times, minor dilution of some lesser SQRs can result in huge financial gains. Unfortunately, due to the segmented and compartmentalised functioning of the DoD and the Services, the nation suffers.

Reforms in structures and procedures become meaningless unless the impeding dynamics of domain interests and narrow attitudes are ruthlessly eliminated. It has generally been accepted the world over that an effi cient and unifi ed acquisition work force can not only reduce acquisition time by up to 30 percent but also affect a saving of up to 15 percent of the capital expenditure.

For a country that plans to spend up to USD 120 billion in the short term, it will be a colossal saving.

JULY 2012

42 43

DSI

false claims of possessing competence for indigenous development within the acceptable timelines, whereas its past track-record is abysmal, to say the least.

Vested InterestsThe Department of Acquisition is best known for its inability to reconcile inter-agency differences. For example, it has not been able to nominate a monitoring agency for offsets. Although defence offsets were introduced in 2006, the vacillation continues while millions of dollars worth of offsets remain unsupervised, unchecked and probably unfulfi lled.

The DoD can also be faulted for sitting on a pedestal with a deportment of superiority. It has acquired an attitude of dispenser of favours and displays a distinct tendency for functioning in isolation. It continues to concentrate all decision making powers in its own hands and refuses to share authority with others. So even though Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff has been asked to examine all procurement proposals, no powers have been delegated to it. Every case has to be referred to the DoD for decisions repeatedly, thereby delaying the whole process inordinately.

No other agency has done as much damage to India’s quest for speedy procurements and the development of indigenous industry than the DDP. It exercises control over 9 defence Public Sector Undertakings and 39 ordnance factories. Despite their inability to produce quality equipment, according to the accepted time schedule, the Services are forced to source their requirements from them. Very often the Services are given only one option, which is, take whatever the public sector offers or do without.

In all ‘Buy and Make’ cases, in which a bulk quantity is manufactured in India, the recipient of imported technology is always a public sector entity. Yet, they have failed to absorb such technologies to upgrade their own expertise. As the recent case of the Tatra vehicles has revealed, most public sector entities have assumed the role of traders – they assemble imported sub-assemblies and make huge profi ts by selling them to the helpless Services at infl ated prices.

Being a part of the Ministry of Defence, the DDP gets to know of the impending acquisition proposals well in advance. The DDP then promptly conveys this inside information to one of its public sector entities to enable it to sign the necessary Memorandum of Understanding with foreign vendors. Such a pre-emptive move inevitably forestalls competition from private companies and presents a fait accompli to the decision makers.

The DDP is often accused of charting its own selfi sh path by perpetuating an unhealthy monopoly of grossly ineffi cient public sector enterprises by wresting preferential treatment for them. The entry of the far more effi cient private sector is blocked through subtle and unobtrusive policy tweaks. Indisputably, the DDP has contributed directly to the current state of affairs – neither the public sector has the acquired capability of producing high-tech equipment nor does it allow the private sector to enter defence production. DSI

The gearbox of a Light Combat Aircraft manufactured by the

Defence Research and Development Organisation at Air Force Station,

Yelahanka, Bengaluru

AFP

Consequently, India’s defence industry continues to languish.

As defence procurements have huge fi nancial outlays, every proposal, very rightly, is subjected to close fi scal scrutiny by defence fi nance functionaries at all stages up to the signing of the contract. They actively participate in commercial evaluation and negotiation of contract.

Undoubtedly, their role of ensuring fi nancial propriety is of utmost importance. Unfortunately, instead of being facilitators and advisers, these functionaries have become the biggest impediment to the speedy conclusion of cases. It is incongruous that most of them have never studied a word of fi nance/economics (many are Masters in English Literature or Sanskrit language) and know little about defence weaponry, yet they masquerade as defence economic advisors and exercise overriding control.

Such functionaries, ironically, do not even consider themselves to be an integral part of the overall effort. Yet they enjoy unbridled authority without corresponding accountability. Such offi cers never accept any responsibility, claiming that they are mere advisers and have no role in decision making. As they have no stake in ensuring speedy fructifi cation of procurement cases, they keep raising infructuous and, at times, ridiculous observations. The fact that the defence fi nance offi cials take orders from the Ministry of Finance worsens the situation.

The saga of the DRDO is one of missed opportunities and wasted funds. The organisation holds a dubious record of never developing any equipment in the promised time-frame and conforming to the specifi ed parametres. Theirs has been a history of false claims, tall promises, unexplained delays and sub-optimal

products. In cases where they do manage to achieve some success, the time taken is so long that the equipment is obsolete even before its induction. Thus, the Services are forced to live with critical voids.

False ClaimsAlthough the primary task of the DRDO is to develop indigenous defence technologies and support the Services in their modernisation plans, it is more interested in safeguarding its own interests. Driven by the selfi sh motive of expanding its domain and getting additional budgets, it has been known to stall the import of even urgently required equipment by claiming, falsely, competence to produce the required equipment indigenously. Worse, the DRDO wastes considerable resources by undertaking needless and unrelated projects.

The Group of Ministers on National Security System, in their report submitted

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

The saga of the DRDO is one of missed

opportunities and wasted funds. The DRDO holds a dubious record of never

developing any equipment in the promised time-

frame and conforming to the specifi ed parametres. Theirs has been a history

of false claims, tall promises, unexplained

delays and sub-optimal products. In cases where

they do manage to achieve some success, the time taken is so long that the equipment is obsolete even before its induction.

“


to the Prime Minister on February 26, 2001, had faulted the then existing system of defence procurements and stated that it suffered from a lack of integrated planning and implementation. It suggested the creation of a separate, dedicated and integrated institutional structure to undertake a complete gamut of procurement functions to inject a higher degree of synergy, synchronisation, co-ordination and professionalism.

Although the Acquisition Wing has been created as an integrated setup with members drawn from the bureaucracy, the Services and the defence finance, it is a sham. Expectedly, it has failed to deliver as a cohesive body. Bureaucrats continue to call all the shots and are unwilling to treat Service officers as equals. Very cleverly, through the façade of an ‘integrated setup’, bureaucrats have managed to get defence officers from the various Services to do their secretarial spadework. They have been reduced to the status of note-preparers for the bureaucrats to give decisions and they have been given no powers at all.

The lack of unified functioning is costing the country dear. For example, once a Service Headquarters forwards a SQR of a piece of equipment to the DoD, it is considered inviolable. Unfortunately, the DoD does not consider it necessary to have a dialogue with the sponsoring SHQ regarding the cost-benefit analysis of the proposal. At times, minor dilution of some lesser SQRs can result in huge financial gains. Unfortunately, due to the segmented and compartmentalised functioning of the DoD and the Services, the nation suffers.

Reforms in structures and procedures become meaningless unless the impeding dynamics of domain interests and narrow attitudes are ruthlessly eliminated. It has generally been accepted the world over that an effi cient and unifi ed acquisition work force can not only reduce acquisition time by up to 30 percent but also affect a saving of up to 15 percent of the capital expenditure.

For a country that plans to spend up to USD 120 billion in the short term, it will be a colossal saving.

JULY 2012

42 43

DSI

false claims of possessing competence for indigenous development within the acceptable timelines, whereas its past track-record is abysmal, to say the least.

Vested InterestsThe Department of Acquisition is best known for its inability to reconcile inter-agency differences. For example, it has not been able to nominate a monitoring agency for offsets. Although defence offsets were introduced in 2006, the vacillation continues while millions of dollars worth of offsets remain unsupervised, unchecked and probably unfulfi lled.

The DoD can also be faulted for sitting on a pedestal with a deportment of superiority. It has acquired an attitude of dispenser of favours and displays a distinct tendency for functioning in isolation. It continues to concentrate all decision making powers in its own hands and refuses to share authority with others. So even though Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff has been asked to examine all procurement proposals, no powers have been delegated to it. Every case has to be referred to the DoD for decisions repeatedly, thereby delaying the whole process inordinately.

No other agency has done as much damage to India’s quest for speedy procurements and the development of indigenous industry than the DDP. It exercises control over 9 defence Public Sector Undertakings and 39 ordnance factories. Despite their inability to produce quality equipment, according to the accepted time schedule, the Services are forced to source their requirements from them. Very often the Services are given only one option, which is, take whatever the public sector offers or do without.

In all ‘Buy and Make’ cases, in which a bulk quantity is manufactured in India, the recipient of imported technology is always a public sector entity. Yet, they have failed to absorb such technologies to upgrade their own expertise. As the recent case of the Tatra vehicles has revealed, most public sector entities have assumed the role of traders – they assemble imported sub-assemblies and make huge profi ts by selling them to the helpless Services at infl ated prices.

Being a part of the Ministry of Defence, the DDP gets to know of the impending acquisition proposals well in advance. The DDP then promptly conveys this inside information to one of its public sector entities to enable it to sign the necessary Memorandum of Understanding with foreign vendors. Such a pre-emptive move inevitably forestalls competition from private companies and presents a fait accompli to the decision makers.

The DDP is often accused of charting its own selfi sh path by perpetuating an unhealthy monopoly of grossly ineffi cient public sector enterprises by wresting preferential treatment for them. The entry of the far more effi cient private sector is blocked through subtle and unobtrusive policy tweaks. Indisputably, the DDP has contributed directly to the current state of affairs – neither the public sector has the acquired capability of producing high-tech equipment nor does it allow the private sector to enter defence production. DSI

The gearbox of a Light Combat Aircraft manufactured by the

Defence Research and Development Organisation at Air Force Station,

Yelahanka, Bengaluru

AFP

Consequently, India’s defence industry continues to languish.

As defence procurements have huge fi nancial outlays, every proposal, very rightly, is subjected to close fi scal scrutiny by defence fi nance functionaries at all stages up to the signing of the contract. They actively participate in commercial evaluation and negotiation of contract.

Undoubtedly, their role of ensuring fi nancial propriety is of utmost importance. Unfortunately, instead of being facilitators and advisers, these functionaries have become the biggest impediment to the speedy conclusion of cases. It is incongruous that most of them have never studied a word of fi nance/economics (many are Masters in English Literature or Sanskrit language) and know little about defence weaponry, yet they masquerade as defence economic advisors and exercise overriding control.

Such functionaries, ironically, do not even consider themselves to be an integral part of the overall effort. Yet they enjoy unbridled authority without corresponding accountability. Such offi cers never accept any responsibility, claiming that they are mere advisers and have no role in decision making. As they have no stake in ensuring speedy fructifi cation of procurement cases, they keep raising infructuous and, at times, ridiculous observations. The fact that the defence fi nance offi cials take orders from the Ministry of Finance worsens the situation.

The saga of the DRDO is one of missed opportunities and wasted funds. The organisation holds a dubious record of never developing any equipment in the promised time-frame and conforming to the specifi ed parametres. Theirs has been a history of false claims, tall promises, unexplained delays and sub-optimal

products. In cases where they do manage to achieve some success, the time taken is so long that the equipment is obsolete even before its induction. Thus, the Services are forced to live with critical voids.

False ClaimsAlthough the primary task of the DRDO is to develop indigenous defence technologies and support the Services in their modernisation plans, it is more interested in safeguarding its own interests. Driven by the selfi sh motive of expanding its domain and getting additional budgets, it has been known to stall the import of even urgently required equipment by claiming, falsely, competence to produce the required equipment indigenously. Worse, the DRDO wastes considerable resources by undertaking needless and unrelated projects.

The Group of Ministers on National Security System, in their report submitted

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

The saga of the DRDO is one of missed

opportunities and wasted funds. The DRDO holds a dubious record of never

developing any equipment in the promised time-

frame and conforming to the specifi ed parametres. Theirs has been a history

of false claims, tall promises, unexplained

delays and sub-optimal products. In cases where

they do manage to achieve some success, the time taken is so long that the equipment is obsolete even before its induction.

“


MARITIME SECURITY JULY 2012

44 45

DSI

KEY POINTS � Asia is the focus of major power interests and the maritime domain is a main theatre of concern.� The USA, Japan, India and China are the main maritime players in the Indo-Pacific region.� The India-US-Japan maritime engagement worries the Chinese.

In the new emerging global scenario, potential confl ict zones are not on land, as they were in Cold War Europe but at sea

Naval sailors stand on the deck of INS Mumbai during the Fleet Review, Mumbai

PREMVIRDAS

AFP

‘Maritime Security’, it seems has become the theme song in the fi rst decade of the 21st Century and there is nothing on the horizon to show that this will change anytime soon. Nations which have remained continentally fi xated for centuries and remain so even today, notably China and India, are awakening to the meaning and relevance of not just the waters that surround them but also of those that are more distant.

Chinese strategists have begun to read Alfred Thayer Mahan’s, The Infl uence of Seapower upon History, and are recalling the mariner Zeng He and his voyages across the oceans, while no Indian conclave on security, at any level, fails to veer around to the Indian Ocean (IO) almost as if this is the only issue of concern. Countries that are archipelagic, like those of South East Asia, have no option but to factor the seas in their national concerns and so even the ramifi cations of what is happening in their region has begun to assume greater importance. Not surprisingly naval budgets everywhere have begun to see an uncommon increase.

The reasons for these developments are many but emerge from a fundamental change in the global security scenario. During the days of the Cold War the focus of international concerns lay in Europe. It was here, on land, that the great majority of nations, members of the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as well as those forming part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-led Warsaw Pact, confronted one another. Troops, tanks, guns and missiles and even tactical nuclear weapons were, essentially, land based and oriented towards confrontation on the continent.

Things have changed greatly since then and the security environment has now shifted to Asia. In this new scenario, the potential confl ict zones are not on land, as they were in Europe, but at sea. Almost all the areas of concern are littorals of the Indo-Pacifi c which can be construed as a stretch running from Japan at one end to South West Asia and the east coast of Africa on the other, in other words spanning the waters of the West Pacifi c and the Indian Ocean.

In the last two decades, three wars have been fought in this region, two in the Persian Gulf with Iraq and a third in Afghanistan. All of these required very comprehensive mobilisation at sea, both for putting across hundreds of thousands of troops and their associated vehicles and equipment and thereafter, the continuous running of huge logistics chains to sustain the forces that have been put in the confl ict zones. The last of these wars is in the process of winding

down but the presence of troops and their sustenance, essentially from the sea, is going to continue. Media reports have been sinusoidal on this score but the possibility of something violent being undertaken in Iran cannot be ruled out and the skyrocketing of oil prices will be one result.

Closer home is another IO littoral: Pakistan, with its nuclear weapons, seems an unlikely candidate for inviting direct intervention but it continues to create a sense of uncertainty. While in East Asia, North Korea is a source of worry.

The great majority of non-State actors and terrorist movements in the world operate from Asia. While many of them, especially those that are land based, have been neutralised to some

extent or kept in check, the pirates who operate at sea and interdict international seagoing commerce continue to go about their business quite successfully. This has necessitated the deployment of substantial naval resources from many countries. However, the sea is not a medium which permits easy detection and the lackadaisical prosecution of those arrested is another problem.

As a result, these criminals, operating from shore based havens in Somalia have been able to hijack dozens of merchant ships and ransom money running into several hundreds of million dollars has had to be paid by ship owners for their release.

International law and order requires safe access to the global commons and this kind

of lawlessness is particularly vexing in the IO region where geography, through narrow exit and entry points, facilitates criminal action by relatively ill equipped miscreants. The fact that some of the most important shipping routes in the world run across the IO and then through the waters of the Western Pacifi c adds to the vulnerabilities. If one considers that these routes carry as much as 60 percent of all global oil movement and also 35 percent of its gas, the perspective becomes clearer.

Despite this, there does not seem much possibility of any confl ict between littoral States. Most maritime boundaries are defi ned and where they are not, as between India and Pakistan, the situation is not

tense. In the IO, part of the concerns are essentially of a non-traditional nature.

West Pacifi c SituationThe situation in the West Pacifi c is quite different. While piracy, off entrances to ports and at sea, is not uncommon, it has a much lower threshold and largely comprises robbery. The real diffi culty in this vast region stems from maritime boundary and territorial disputes between littoral nations.

In the East China Sea, Japan and China lay claims to the same islands, Senkaku being the most important of them. In an incident some time ago, a Chinese fi shing trawler was apprehended by the Japanese Coast Guard causing considerable tension. The boat was

RAISING THE FLAGS

maritime security with ad 2nd time.indd 1-2maritime security with ad 2nd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 1:33 PM20/07/12 1:33 PM

MARITIME SECURITY JULY 2012

44 45

DSI

KEY POINTS � Asia is the focus of major power interests and the maritime domain is a main theatre of concern.� The USA, Japan, India and China are the main maritime players in the Indo-Pacific region.� The India-US-Japan maritime engagement worries the Chinese.

In the new emerging global scenario, potential confl ict zones are not on land, as they were in Cold War Europe but at sea

Naval sailors stand on the deck of INS Mumbai during the Fleet Review, Mumbai

PREMVIRDAS

AFP

‘Maritime Security’, it seems has become the theme song in the fi rst decade of the 21st Century and there is nothing on the horizon to show that this will change anytime soon. Nations which have remained continentally fi xated for centuries and remain so even today, notably China and India, are awakening to the meaning and relevance of not just the waters that surround them but also of those that are more distant.

Chinese strategists have begun to read Alfred Thayer Mahan’s, The Infl uence of Seapower upon History, and are recalling the mariner Zeng He and his voyages across the oceans, while no Indian conclave on security, at any level, fails to veer around to the Indian Ocean (IO) almost as if this is the only issue of concern. Countries that are archipelagic, like those of South East Asia, have no option but to factor the seas in their national concerns and so even the ramifi cations of what is happening in their region has begun to assume greater importance. Not surprisingly naval budgets everywhere have begun to see an uncommon increase.

The reasons for these developments are many but emerge from a fundamental change in the global security scenario. During the days of the Cold War the focus of international concerns lay in Europe. It was here, on land, that the great majority of nations, members of the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as well as those forming part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-led Warsaw Pact, confronted one another. Troops, tanks, guns and missiles and even tactical nuclear weapons were, essentially, land based and oriented towards confrontation on the continent.

Things have changed greatly since then and the security environment has now shifted to Asia. In this new scenario, the potential confl ict zones are not on land, as they were in Europe, but at sea. Almost all the areas of concern are littorals of the Indo-Pacifi c which can be construed as a stretch running from Japan at one end to South West Asia and the east coast of Africa on the other, in other words spanning the waters of the West Pacifi c and the Indian Ocean.

In the last two decades, three wars have been fought in this region, two in the Persian Gulf with Iraq and a third in Afghanistan. All of these required very comprehensive mobilisation at sea, both for putting across hundreds of thousands of troops and their associated vehicles and equipment and thereafter, the continuous running of huge logistics chains to sustain the forces that have been put in the confl ict zones. The last of these wars is in the process of winding

down but the presence of troops and their sustenance, essentially from the sea, is going to continue. Media reports have been sinusoidal on this score but the possibility of something violent being undertaken in Iran cannot be ruled out and the skyrocketing of oil prices will be one result.

Closer home is another IO littoral: Pakistan, with its nuclear weapons, seems an unlikely candidate for inviting direct intervention but it continues to create a sense of uncertainty. While in East Asia, North Korea is a source of worry.

The great majority of non-State actors and terrorist movements in the world operate from Asia. While many of them, especially those that are land based, have been neutralised to some

extent or kept in check, the pirates who operate at sea and interdict international seagoing commerce continue to go about their business quite successfully. This has necessitated the deployment of substantial naval resources from many countries. However, the sea is not a medium which permits easy detection and the lackadaisical prosecution of those arrested is another problem.

As a result, these criminals, operating from shore based havens in Somalia have been able to hijack dozens of merchant ships and ransom money running into several hundreds of million dollars has had to be paid by ship owners for their release.

International law and order requires safe access to the global commons and this kind

of lawlessness is particularly vexing in the IO region where geography, through narrow exit and entry points, facilitates criminal action by relatively ill equipped miscreants. The fact that some of the most important shipping routes in the world run across the IO and then through the waters of the Western Pacifi c adds to the vulnerabilities. If one considers that these routes carry as much as 60 percent of all global oil movement and also 35 percent of its gas, the perspective becomes clearer.

Despite this, there does not seem much possibility of any confl ict between littoral States. Most maritime boundaries are defi ned and where they are not, as between India and Pakistan, the situation is not

tense. In the IO, part of the concerns are essentially of a non-traditional nature.

West Pacifi c SituationThe situation in the West Pacifi c is quite different. While piracy, off entrances to ports and at sea, is not uncommon, it has a much lower threshold and largely comprises robbery. The real diffi culty in this vast region stems from maritime boundary and territorial disputes between littoral nations.

In the East China Sea, Japan and China lay claims to the same islands, Senkaku being the most important of them. In an incident some time ago, a Chinese fi shing trawler was apprehended by the Japanese Coast Guard causing considerable tension. The boat was

RAISING THE FLAGS

maritime security with ad 2nd time.indd 1-2maritime security with ad 2nd time.indd 1-2 20/07/12 1:33 PM20/07/12 1:33 PM

MARITIME SECURITY

46

released after China threatened to stop supplies of important minerals to Japan. In another case, the Japanese protested the ingress of Chinese submarines in its waters. In its latest defence strategy formulation, Japan has noticeably shifted its focus to its southern seas.

The situation in the South China Sea is even more complex as China claims ‘historical sovereignty’ over almost the entire sea including its several islands and islets, the Paracel and Spratly groups being the most well known.

Other littorals, trying to apply well accepted laws of the sea, internationally accepted in the year 1982, have their own formulations of their maritime boundaries and these too come into confl ict with one another. Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and the

Philippines are countries which have these problems. China wishes to resolve issues with each of these countries bilaterally while they prefer to deal with it as a group recognising their weakness if each is left to fend for itself.

There have been quite a few face-offs in recent years the two most recent ones are between China and the Philippines over a place called Scarborough Shoal and the other between China and Vietnam. The fi rst was tempered down after several days of tension while in the second, arrested Chinese fi shermen were released.

China has now offered a block of offshore waters, quite clearly part of Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), for commercial exploration creating another point of tension. On the other hand, Japan

has offered to co-operate with Vietnam and the Philippines in the maritime domain. While there have been regional efforts to tone down both rhetoric and provocative actions, it is not certain how effective these will be or how long they will last. In short, in the South China Sea there is a possibility of confrontation between the nation States as against the predominantly non-traditional concerns in the IO theatre.

Naval GazingThere is yet another dimension to the South China Sea which brings in other countries, principally, the USA. According to international law, all vessels have rights of innocent passage through the EEZ of another. However, China has its own interpretation of what these rights allow, imposing restrictions not acceptable to others.

China’s maritime strategy requires capabilities to impose its authority in the

AFP

Pakistani folk dancers perform as a warship arrives at the start of a naval exercise, Karachi

In the last two decades, three wars have been fought in this region,

two in the Persian Gulf with Iraq and a third in

Afghanistan. All of these have required very

comprehensive mobilisation

at sea, both for putting across hundreds of

thousands of troops and their associated

vehicles and equipment and thereafter, the

continuing running of huge logistics chains to sustain the forces that

have been put in theconfl ict zones.

“

maritime security with ad 2nd time.indd 3maritime security with ad 2nd time.indd 3 20/07/12 1:39 PM20/07/12 1:39 PM


AD

MARITIME SECURITY

48

First Island Chain, read the East and South China Sea while the USA, on the other hand, seeks an uninhibited presence and deployment rights. Clearly, the situation is potentially serious.

In recent months, President Barack Obama has declared that the USA will shift its focus to the Asia-Pacifi c. This has been followed by Defence Secretary Leon Panetta announcing that 60 percent of all US naval forces will be based in the Pacifi c, including 6 of its 11 aircraft carriers. There are talks with Vietnam and the Philippines on securing operating facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and Subic Bay in the Philippines, both former American naval bases. A contingent of 2,500 marines is being positioned in northern Australia. In short, the sovereignty claims of China are going to come under challenge, directly or indirectly.

India has its own concerns, mainly in the IO, but also in the western Pacifi c, the South China Sea in particular. Its energy imports from the Gulf are likely to cross 80 percent of its needs by 2020 and efforts

are also being made to access energy from Sudan which will have to be transported across the IO routes.

Indian ConcernsBesides, overseas trade is almost entirely seaborne and expected to cross USD 2 trillion by 2020 almost half of this will travel to and from the waters of western Pacifi c. India is also involved in commercial oil exploration activities in the Vietnam offshore and may soon offer similar joint venture assistance to others in that region. Its two-way trade with the countries of South East Asia is expected to reach USD 100 billion by 2015 and this should double in the next fi ve years. China is already India’s largest trading partner with a USD 75 billion trade fi gure in 2011 which is likely to continue to grow, possibly to USD 400 billion, by 2020. Economic growth, dependent on access to energy as well as on steadily growing overseas trade, is a vital national interest for India. Its security concerns, therefore, lie not just in the IO but also beyond.

Capabilities are necessary for coping with traditional nation State threats. These, largely, require forces which are suffi cient to deter an adversary. India does not seek military alliance with any other country and, therefore, must have strengths of its own.

In recent years, there has been greater recognition by the Indian Government of

the need to create appropriate forces at sea which must also be able to cope with the kind of terrorism that was seen in Mumbai on 26 November, 2008. Non-traditional threats like piracy, on the other hand, require capabilities but equally a co-operative arrangement in which both information, to create maritime domain awareness, and resources can be shared between many countries.

Over the last decade or so, India has made serious efforts to promote such an arrangement. It has defence agreements with nearly three dozen countries, littoral and external, in which maritime security co-operation dominates. Since paper transactions, themselves, cannot create the mutual trust and confi dence that are needed to bolster such engagement, joint exercises, exchange of personnel for training and professional dialogues, visits of ships to each others ports and co-ordinated patrols in mutually agreed areas have become routine features of the Navy’s deployments. These activities have to be in synergy with diplomacy so that maximum value may be gained.

The Indian Navy has also played a lead role in promoting co-operation at sea through institutions such as the biennial meeting of heads of IO navies, termed Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, and a

AFP

Supporters welcome the Japanese naval ship Tokiwa, which forms part of the US-led war on terror in the Indian

Ocean, Tokyo Port

Indiaʼs maritimeco-operation with the

USA is already very healthy and can be expected to further

enhance; its relations with Japan, a formidable

naval power in its own right, are improving as also with several

countries of South East Asia. Indiaʼs ability to infl uence the security environment in the IO

region is not only to its advantage but also to the

advantage of others is, therefore, quite unique.

“


216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 20/03/12 2:18 PM20/03/12 2:18 PM

MARITIME SECURITY

50

gathering of ships from the eastern littorals called Milan.

The major maritime players in the Indo-Pacifi c region are four — the USA, Japan, China and India. Of these, three — USA, Japan and India — have no issues of confl ict between themselves; on the other hand, each of them has some discord or the other with China. All three countries have begun to recognise the credibility of India’s maritime power in the IO given both the proximity and geographical confi guration which permit it to keep a fairly reasonable part of the northern ocean under surveillance and in which its maritime forces can operate credibly; neither Japan nor China can hope to arrange for themselves equivalent capabilities in the foreseeable future. They can deploy their warships at long distances but cannot operate them usefully unless they have the requisite air power.

This situation will not change even when China gets its fi rst aircraft carrier operational; it will need fi ve or six of these ships before it can deploy one in distant waters regularly.

INDIAN ADVANTAGEHowever, without base facilities in one or more littorals which will enable the PLA Navy to set up appropriate maintenance and logistics infrastructure, a concession which most countries will find very difficult to make, its operations will be seriously inhibited.

India’s maritime co-operation with the USA is already very healthy and can be expected to further enhance; its relations with Japan, a formidable naval power in its own right, are improving as also with several countries of South East Asia. India’s ability to infl uence the security environment in the IO region is not only to its advantage but also to the advantage of others is, therefore, quite unique. At the same time, it has important interests in the waters of the Western Pacifi c. This duality of its own interests and the ability to respond to those of others is unique to the maritime domain and gives India a fairly strong hand at sea. These are some of the reasons why the maritime domain has become so dynamic in this part of the world. A

FP

The Japanese maritime destroyer, JS Yuudachi

during Exercise Malabar held in the Bay of Bengal


Ad Size 216x276.indd 1Ad Size 216x276.indd 1 7/16/12 11:14:11 AM7/16/12 11:14:11 AM

MARITIME SECURITY

52

As highlighted earlier, India is very well placed to play a meaningful role provided it creates the desired capabilities. Apart from the need for quick acquisition decisions a greater effi ciency in the indigenous production sector is essential. We are also not as capable in sophisticated technologies as is necessary.

Unlike earlier years, many countries, most of all the USA, are now ready to offer much of what we want and willing to co-operate on issues earlier considered off their radar such as the co-production of major weapon platforms and joint research and development. Russia has supplied the formidable Akula nuclear submarine and we can negotiate with either country for bringing our own Arihant nuclear submarine project up to more exacting standards for which we presently do not have suffi cient know-how. Getting the indigenous aircraft carrier project more substance is another. No country knows these platforms better than the USA and its assistance should be welcomed. There are numerous other areas where induction of high technology will boost capabilities manifold.

The fear that such collaboration may act to the detriment of our ‘strategic autonomy’ is laughable. First, no one is clear of what exactly that term means but to think that a big country like India can or be made to lose its freedom to act in the way it chooses, is to

be unaware of the realities of the emerging world order.

An interface with China in the Indo-Pacifi c also merits discussion. The negatives of the India-China relationship cannot be brushed aside. At the same time, we must look at the positives. Aside from the developing trade relationship even if skewed to our disadvantage, the fact is that China has no option but to recognise our strengths just as we have no option but to recognise theirs. Their nuclear weapon holdings are far superior to ours and will remain so even as we develop a credible deterrence. In our conventional military capabilities, it is just not possible for us to surpass them on land or in the air.

Ahead Of ChinaThe only sector in which we are ahead and in which China will have diffi culty in overtaking us is in operational capability in the IO region. This should give us confi dence. The Chinese are fully aware of this and are apprehensive of our ability to interfere with their energy lifeline; they also see the India-US-Japan maritime engagement as worrying and there are signs that they are willing to engage with us.

The quite extraordinary reception given to four Indian warships that visited Shanghai in May is a pointer. We should

be proactive in encouraging frequent and continuing engagement of our two navies through ship visits, joint exercises and an exchange of personnel at middle and lower levels. This will encourage mutual trust and add to the regard, grudging though it may be, that they have for us. It will also send a useful message to the Americans that they cannot take us for granted. But all this, of course, requires that we build our naval capabilities speedily and consistent with present day technological needs.

To conclude, the security environment of this century is very different to that of the one gone by. Asia is the focus of major power interest and the maritime domain is the principal theatre of concern; the probability of wars being fought across borders for territorial gain is becoming passé especially between nuclear weapon states. India has substantial interests in the IO as well as in the adjacent waters and adequate capabilities at sea must be an essential ingredient of its national strategy.

A leadership role in the co-operative mechanisms that are necessary in the Indo-Pacifi c region and a positive yet watchful naval engagement with China must form the important prongs of India’s maritime initiatives. At this time, the environment is conducive to such initiatives. Who knows what the future might bring. DSI

AFP

A Naval cadet closely examines a model of the Indian frigate Ganga, Ahmedabad


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