DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF INDIA - APRIL 2011

DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA

APRIL 2011

DSIVOLUME 3 ISSUE 5 ` 250

INDIAN NAVY

FROM SHIPSHAPEThe number of the Navy's major seagoing platforms has stagnated I P. S. Das

INDIA-US

WIKILEAKS, THE DEFENCE ANGLEThe recent publication of classified cables reveals anextaordinary defence relationship I Siddharth Vardarajan

ECONOMIC REVIVAL AND INCREASING

FINANCIALALLOCATIONS HAVE

DONE LITTLE TOREPLACE THE

INDIAN ARMY’S AGEING WEAPONRY

AJAI SHUKLA

FIGHTING TO KEEP

FIGHTING

DSI Cover April 2011.qxp print:cover-feb3.qxd 15/04/11 4:16 PM Page 1

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APRIL 2011 DSI

1

LETTER FROM THE editor

The lack of awell-directedmodernisationplan is alreadyimpactingnational security. Indianeeds to buildits military capabilities to cater to simultaneous,confrontation,potentially ontwo fronts.

Mannika ChopraEDITOR

Defence & Security of India

here is no doubt that the Army needs to modernise to make India more capableto meet the challenges of a new security environment. With overall changesin the global situation and especially with China’s ambitious modernisationplans and growing defence spend – a whopping $ 91 billion in 2011-12 – as DSI points out alarm bells should be ringing over the Army’s long list ofobsolete equipment.

The lack of a well-directed modernisation plan is already impacting nationalsecurity. India needs to build its military capabilities to cater to simultaneous confrontation,potentially on two fronts, that will be marked by short, high intensity warfare waged by adversariesequippped with high technology. This will only be possible by firstly, increasing defenceexpenditure and buying equipment in a global climate in which countries are lining up to sell to Indiaand secondly, by increasing indigenous defence production. India has a vibrant private sectorwhich can be tapped and surely the FDI debate cannot be a hurdle in allowing it to produce high-enddefence equipment serving not only domestic requirements but those of other countries as well.

As our analysis of the Defence Budget shows there has been an enhanced outlay in allocations thisfiscal. But though the numbers may have gone up apparently in real terms most of those monies willbe swallowed up by inflation and will be used to deal with committed liabilities rather than anysubstantial purchase of defence equipment.

K. Subrahmanyam, one of our regular contributors, understood the dilemmas of the Indiandefence sector well. Sadly, India’s best known strategic expert, described only half-jokingly as aone-man think thank, passed away recently. Despite his growing ill health over the past 15 years, hecontinued to contribute security papers, chair committees and deliver articles well before deadlineputting his younger colleagues to shame. It was as chairperson of the Kargil Review Committeethat he looked into India’s intelligence failures, making large-scale recommendations, whichchanged the country’s intelligence structure. In 1999, he declined the Padma Bhushan saying thatjournalists and bureaucrats should not accept government awards. In many ways, this strategicguru was the proverbial role model.

As usual we look forward to your feedback and suggestions which you can send to us [email protected]. Should you want to subscribe to us then simply drop us a line [email protected] and our marketing department will do the rest.

T

Letter from the Editor.qxd:contents-aug.qxd 14/04/11 9:42 AM Page 2

2 3

APRIL 2011 DSI

CO

NTE

NTS

MIDDLE EAST 38

THE MARCH OF HISTORY The recent unravelling of some MiddleEast countries can have a substantialimpact on India and Pakistan, thoughthere is little to indicate that South Asiasuffers from a ‘democracy deficit’.

NAVY 32

NOT REALLYSHIPSHAPE While the Indian Navy is the largestregional littoral maritime power, thenumbers of its major seagoingplatforms has stagnated and evendeclined requiring the urgent importof some platforms.

INDIA - US 44

WIKILEAKS,THEDEFENCE ANGLEThe publication of classified cabletraffic between the United Statesembassy in New Delhi and the StateDepartment and Pentagon inWashington,D.C. has stirred up ahornet’s nest in India with thecountry’s politicians andbureaucrats emerging in oftenunflattering colours.

SECURITY 26

IN THE LINE OF FIREPreviously national securitycentred around the defence ofIndia’s borders, a task that wasthe prime responsibility of thearmed forces. Today, a numberof central police andparamilitary forces help guardthe country’s borders andmaintain internal security.

DEFENCE BUDGET 2011 16

THE BATTLE OFTHE BUDGET India’s defence allocation for 2011-12 at ̀ 1,64,415.49 (US$ 36.1 billion) is nearly 12 percent more than the last fiscal. But this escalation will beneutralised by inflation which isaround 9.3 percent. The armed forcesare unhappy that the Budget whichis a measly 1.83 percent of India’sGDP is less than the three percentdemanded by the Services and farbelow China which has allocated $91 billion towards defenceexpenditure this year.

COVER STORY 06

PROMISES, PROMISESThe economic revival of the preceding decade and the increasing allocationsfor capital expenditure have not done much for replacing the Army’sgrowing inventory of grey-haired equipment.

Contents 2nd time :contents-feb-R.qxd 18/04/11 2:58 PM Page 2

2 3

APRIL 2011 DSI

CO

NTE

NTS

MIDDLE EAST 38

THE MARCH OF HISTORY The recent unravelling of some MiddleEast countries can have a substantialimpact on India and Pakistan, thoughthere is little to indicate that South Asiasuffers from a ‘democracy deficit’.

NAVY 32

NOT REALLYSHIPSHAPE While the Indian Navy is the largestregional littoral maritime power, thenumbers of its major seagoingplatforms has stagnated and evendeclined requiring the urgent importof some platforms.

INDIA - US 44

WIKILEAKS,THEDEFENCE ANGLEThe publication of classified cabletraffic between the United Statesembassy in New Delhi and the StateDepartment and Pentagon inWashington,D.C. has stirred up ahornet’s nest in India with thecountry’s politicians andbureaucrats emerging in oftenunflattering colours.

SECURITY 26

IN THE LINE OF FIREPreviously national securitycentred around the defence ofIndia’s borders, a task that wasthe prime responsibility of thearmed forces. Today, a numberof central police andparamilitary forces help guardthe country’s borders andmaintain internal security.

DEFENCE BUDGET 2011 16

THE BATTLE OFTHE BUDGET India’s defence allocation for 2011-12 at ̀ 1,64,415.49 (US$ 36.1 billion) is nearly 12 percent more than the last fiscal. But this escalation will beneutralised by inflation which isaround 9.3 percent. The armed forcesare unhappy that the Budget whichis a measly 1.83 percent of India’sGDP is less than the three percentdemanded by the Services and farbelow China which has allocated $91 billion towards defenceexpenditure this year.

COVER STORY 06

PROMISES, PROMISESThe economic revival of the preceding decade and the increasing allocationsfor capital expenditure have not done much for replacing the Army’sgrowing inventory of grey-haired equipment.

Contents 2nd time :contents-feb-R.qxd 18/04/11 2:58 PM Page 2

SIDDHARTHVARADARAJAN

Siddharth Varadarajan is theStrategic Affairs Editor and

Delhi Bureau Chief of TheHindu. A leading

commentator on foreignpolicy, he has reported

extensively from Pakistan,Iran, Nepal, Bangladesh,

the former Yugoslavia as wellas Kashmir and the North-East. He has edited a book

on the Gujarat riots, Gujarat:The Making of a Tragedy in2005. An economist, he is

currently writing a book onthe India-U.S. relationship.

Ajai Shukla works in boththe visual and the print

medium. He is consultingeditor (Strategic Affairs) forBusiness Standard . He was

also consulting editor (Strategic Affairs)

for NDTV, a reputed newsbroadcaster in India, forwhich he has anchored

prime time news and specialprogrammes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

AJAISHUKLA

Premvir Das retired from theIndian Navy in 1998 as

Commander-in-Chief of theEastern Naval Command. He

has served on the ExecutiveCouncils of two leading think

tanks, the Institute ofDefence Studies and

Analyses and the UnitedService Institute, and was

also a member of the NationalSecurity Advisory Board inthe Prime Minister’s Office.

PREMVIR DAS

Dr Ajey Lele is with theInstitute for Defence Studies

and Analyses where hespecialises in space

technology. Several of hisarticles have been published

in journals, websites andnewspapers. He has edited

a book Space Security andGlobal Co-operation and

most recenty he hasauthored Strategic

Technologies for the Militarywhich provides a holistic

view of the key technologiesthat are expected to

revolutionise military affairs in the future.

AJAYLELE

Laxman Kumar Behera is aresearch fellow at the New

Delhi-based Institute forDefence Studies and

Analyses (IDSA). As amember of the IDSA’s cluster

on defence, economics andindustry, he has specialisedon issues relating to India’s

arms procurement, defenceoffset policy, defence

industry, military spendingand defence co-operation. He

was closely associated withtwo high-level committees

set up by the Ministry ofDefence on defence

acquisition and expenditure.

LAXMAN KUMAR BEHERA

M.K.Bhadrakumar hasserved in the Indian Foreign

Service as a career diplomat.His 30-year career was

largely related to thePakistan – Afghanistan – the

Iran region and Muslimcountries as well as theterritories of the formerSoviet Union. Following

voluntary retirement in 2002,he has taken to writing and

presently contributes to The Hindu, Deccan

Herald, Rediff.com and AsiaTimes Online.

M.K.BHADRAKUMAR

Gurmeet Kanwal is director,Centre for Land Warfare

Studies, New Delhi. Hecommanded an infantry

brigade during OperationParakram on the Line of

Control in 2001-03. A soldier-scholar, he has authoredseveral books including

Indian Army:Vision 2020 andNuclear Defence: Shaping

the Arsenal. He is a well-known columnist and TV

analyst on national security issues.

GURMEETKANWAL

CONTRIBUTORS


APRIL 2011 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 5

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFManeesha DubeEDITORMannika ChopraSENIOR SUB-EDITORUrmila Marak

CREATIVE DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNAjay Kumar (Sr Designer) Saurabh Mishra, Sujit SinghSENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal MehtaDEPUTY MANAGER MARKETINGTarun MalviyaCIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONSunil GujralPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender PandeyMEDIA TRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550CHAIRMANJ. S. UberoiPRESIDENTXavier CollacoFINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESAustraliaCharlton D'Silva, Mass Media PublicitasTel: (61 2) 9252 3476Email: [email protected]/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected]/TurkeyLiat Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email :[email protected], [email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email :[email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected] and Security of Indiais published and printed byXavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 andprinted at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area,Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. Allrights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any languagein whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MediaTransasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine arethose of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of theeditors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost toverify information published they do not accept responsibilityfor its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return ofunsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.All correspondence should be addressed to Media TransasiaIndia Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of Indiais obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact:[email protected]

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.htmlhttp://www.defencesecurityindia.com

APRIL 2011 DSI

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhicorrespondent for Jane’sDefence Weekly, UK, and

contributes to it on a diverserange of security and

military related matters. He is also the India

correspondent for the DailyTelegraph, London, and

the Irish Times.

RAHUL BEDI

Contributors_April 2011_FINAL 2nd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 18/04/11 12:59 PM Page 4

SIDDHARTHVARADARAJAN

Siddharth Varadarajan is theStrategic Affairs Editor and

Delhi Bureau Chief of TheHindu. A leading

commentator on foreignpolicy, he has reported

extensively from Pakistan,Iran, Nepal, Bangladesh,

the former Yugoslavia as wellas Kashmir and the North-East. He has edited a book

on the Gujarat riots, Gujarat:The Making of a Tragedy in2005. An economist, he is

currently writing a book onthe India-U.S. relationship.

Ajai Shukla works in boththe visual and the print

medium. He is consultingeditor (Strategic Affairs) forBusiness Standard . He was

also consulting editor (Strategic Affairs)

for NDTV, a reputed newsbroadcaster in India, forwhich he has anchored

prime time news and specialprogrammes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

AJAISHUKLA

Premvir Das retired from theIndian Navy in 1998 as

Commander-in-Chief of theEastern Naval Command. He

has served on the ExecutiveCouncils of two leading think

tanks, the Institute ofDefence Studies and

Analyses and the UnitedService Institute, and was

also a member of the NationalSecurity Advisory Board inthe Prime Minister’s Office.

PREMVIR DAS

Dr Ajey Lele is with theInstitute for Defence Studies

and Analyses where hespecialises in space

technology. Several of hisarticles have been published

in journals, websites andnewspapers. He has edited

a book Space Security andGlobal Co-operation and

most recenty he hasauthored Strategic

Technologies for the Militarywhich provides a holistic

view of the key technologiesthat are expected to

revolutionise military affairs in the future.

AJAYLELE

Laxman Kumar Behera is aresearch fellow at the New

Delhi-based Institute forDefence Studies and

Analyses (IDSA). As amember of the IDSA’s cluster

on defence, economics andindustry, he has specialisedon issues relating to India’s

arms procurement, defenceoffset policy, defence

industry, military spendingand defence co-operation. He

was closely associated withtwo high-level committees

set up by the Ministry ofDefence on defence

acquisition and expenditure.

LAXMAN KUMAR BEHERA

M.K.Bhadrakumar hasserved in the Indian Foreign

Service as a career diplomat.His 30-year career was

largely related to thePakistan – Afghanistan – the

Iran region and Muslimcountries as well as theterritories of the formerSoviet Union. Following

voluntary retirement in 2002,he has taken to writing and

presently contributes to The Hindu, Deccan

Herald, Rediff.com and AsiaTimes Online.

M.K.BHADRAKUMAR

Gurmeet Kanwal is director,Centre for Land Warfare

Studies, New Delhi. Hecommanded an infantry

brigade during OperationParakram on the Line of

Control in 2001-03. A soldier-scholar, he has authoredseveral books including

Indian Army:Vision 2020 andNuclear Defence: Shaping

the Arsenal. He is a well-known columnist and TV

analyst on national security issues.

GURMEETKANWAL

CONTRIBUTORS


APRIL 2011 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 5

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFManeesha DubeEDITORMannika ChopraSENIOR SUB-EDITORUrmila Marak

CREATIVE DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNAjay Kumar (Sr Designer) Saurabh Mishra, Sujit SinghSENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal MehtaDEPUTY MANAGER MARKETINGTarun MalviyaCIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONSunil GujralPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender PandeyMEDIA TRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550CHAIRMANJ. S. UberoiPRESIDENTXavier CollacoFINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESAustraliaCharlton D'Silva, Mass Media PublicitasTel: (61 2) 9252 3476Email: [email protected]/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected]/TurkeyLiat Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email :[email protected], [email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email :[email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected] and Security of Indiais published and printed byXavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 andprinted at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area,Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. Allrights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any languagein whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MediaTransasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine arethose of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of theeditors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost toverify information published they do not accept responsibilityfor its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return ofunsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.All correspondence should be addressed to Media TransasiaIndia Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of Indiais obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact:[email protected]

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.htmlhttp://www.defencesecurityindia.com

APRIL 2011 DSI

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhicorrespondent for Jane’sDefence Weekly, UK, and

contributes to it on a diverserange of security and

military related matters. He is also the India

correspondent for the DailyTelegraph, London, and

the Irish Times.

RAHUL BEDI

Contributors_April 2011_FINAL 2nd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 18/04/11 12:59 PM Page 4

The current crisis of equipmentobsolescence within the IndianArmy (IA) has been brewing since

the sharp cuts in defence expenditureduring the economic crisis of the early1990s. From its highs of more than fourpercent of Gross Domestic Product duringthe late 1980s, when India had pursued

an activist security and foreign policy (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Operation Brass Tacks, Operation Chequerboard, theSiachen Glacier), defence expenditure hasplummeted to below 2.5 percent of theGDP as New Delhi’s focus shifted to fiscalstabilisation and economic reform.

Through the 1990s, before India’seconomy shifted to a high growthtrajectory, the Army’s meagre capitalallocations were insufficient for the phasedreplacement of equipment and weaponrythat had out lived its life. The moneyavailable barely covered the annualinstallments due for the tanks, infantrycombat vehicles, mechanised air defencesystems, assault engineering equipmentand helicopters that Rajiv Gandhi,Defence Minister Arun Singh and General K. Sundarji had splashed money on beforethe Bofors scandal swept away theCongress in 1989.

Nor has the economic revival of the preceding decade, and the steadily

7

APRIL 2011 DSI

6

MODERNISATION

The economic revival of the preceding decade andthe increasing allocations for capital expenditurehave done little to replace the Indian Army’s growinginventory of grey-haired equipment

PROMISES,PROMISES

AFP

AJAISHUKLA

n Through the 1990s, the Army’smeagre capital allocations wereinsufficient for the replacement ofoutdated equipment and weaponry.n Other than the multi-billion dollarpurchase of T-90 tanks from Russia,the big-ticket military expenditure hasbeen directed more towards warshipsand aircraft than towards the Army .n This gloomy situation stems largelyfrom India’s archaic system ofdefence planning.

KEY POINTS

Bofors guns prepare to fireat enemy positions in theSrinagar-Kargil Road

Military Mordernisation7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:11 PM Page 6

The current crisis of equipmentobsolescence within the IndianArmy (IA) has been brewing since

the sharp cuts in defence expenditureduring the economic crisis of the early1990s. From its highs of more than fourpercent of Gross Domestic Product duringthe late 1980s, when India had pursued

an activist security and foreign policy (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Operation Brass Tacks, Operation Chequerboard, theSiachen Glacier), defence expenditure hasplummeted to below 2.5 percent of theGDP as New Delhi’s focus shifted to fiscalstabilisation and economic reform.

Through the 1990s, before India’seconomy shifted to a high growthtrajectory, the Army’s meagre capitalallocations were insufficient for the phasedreplacement of equipment and weaponrythat had out lived its life. The moneyavailable barely covered the annualinstallments due for the tanks, infantrycombat vehicles, mechanised air defencesystems, assault engineering equipmentand helicopters that Rajiv Gandhi,Defence Minister Arun Singh and General K. Sundarji had splashed money on beforethe Bofors scandal swept away theCongress in 1989.

Nor has the economic revival of the preceding decade, and the steadily

7

APRIL 2011 DSI

6

MODERNISATION

The economic revival of the preceding decade andthe increasing allocations for capital expenditurehave done little to replace the Indian Army’s growinginventory of grey-haired equipment

PROMISES,PROMISES

AFP

AJAISHUKLA

n Through the 1990s, the Army’smeagre capital allocations wereinsufficient for the replacement ofoutdated equipment and weaponry.n Other than the multi-billion dollarpurchase of T-90 tanks from Russia,the big-ticket military expenditure hasbeen directed more towards warshipsand aircraft than towards the Army .n This gloomy situation stems largelyfrom India’s archaic system ofdefence planning.

KEY POINTS

Bofors guns prepare to fireat enemy positions in theSrinagar-Kargil Road


8

MODERNISATION

increasing allocations for capitalexpenditure, done much for replacingthe Army’s growing inventory of grey-haired equipment. Other than the multi-billion dollar purchase of T-90 tanks fromRussia, big-ticket military expenditure has been directed more towards warshipsand aircraft than towards an Army that has been engaged in relentless low-intensity combat in Jammu & Kashmir,Assam and Manipur.

Infantry modernisation has been more aslogan than a reality. India’s mechanisedforces,which had constituted a formidableconventional deterrent through the 1980sand 1990s, have lost ground to Pakistan,which has dramatically cut down India’scombat power advantage with theintelligent purchase of modern tanks fromEastern Europe and self-propelled artilleryfrom the US. The IA’s artillery has beenunable to procure modern guns for a quarterof a century, while air defence artillery iseven more decrepit. Logistics, traditionallyconsigned by India’s general staff to the unglamorous fringes of operationalplanning, has seen no new acquisitions ofspecialist vehicles and equipment.

But boosting the clearlyinadequate numbers and

ranges has provedimpossible since the late

1980s, when the Bofor’s scandal restricted

India’s buy of 155 mm, 45 calibre FH-77B

howitzers from the planned1,510 guns to just 410.

The plan to upgrade India’s60-odd regiments of

Soviet-era 130 mm guns to 155 mm was curtailed

after the Israeli company,Soltam, was criticised for a

poor upgrade.

”A

FP

Arjun tanks during the Republic Day parade,New Delhi


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APRIL 2011 DSIMODERNISATION

altitudes, or for high-speed performance.Instead of zeroing in on the capability that itneeded, the military added one and oneand got eleven.

Compounding the delays caused bypoorly formulated GSQRs are the Ministroyof Defence’s (MoD) complex procurementregulations, promulgated in the frequentlyrevised Defence Procurement Policy. (DPP)Seven versions of the DPP since 2002 haveculminated in the most recent one: DPP-2011. Every procurement initiated duringthis last decade is governed by the DPP thatwas valid at that time, confusing vendorsand ministry officials alike.

A final deterrent to expeditiousprocurement is the Bofors-TehelkaSyndrome, the cautious MoD mindset thatemerged from those two investigations of alleged procurement transgressions.Bureaucrats handling procurementoperate with the clear understanding thatprocurement delays are not punishablewhereas the slightest proceduralinfringement can result in a career scuttled.Consequently, equipment procurement ischaracterised by a stultifying adherence tohidebound procedure where officials focus

1110

Archiac Defence PlanningThis gloomy situation stems largely fromIndia’s archaic system of defence planningin which identifying the weapons platformsthat are needed, rather than capabilities,drives the formulation of the military’s 15-year Long Term Integrated PerspectivePlan; 5-year defence plans; and AnnualAcquisition Plans.

Modern military’s across the globe first identify the operational capabilitiesthat they deem essential, then they buildor acquire the weapons and equipmentthat would provide those capabilities. For example, a military might decideit needs the ability to bring down,at 30 minutes notice, 20 tonnes of highexplosive on a target 100 x 50 m in size,80km inside enemy territory, anywherealong a 700-km section of the border. The planning cell would then decidewhether that requirement would best be met by field artillery, multi-barrelledrocket launchers, cruise or surface-to-surface missiles, strike aircraft, or special forces. That crucial decision would then inform equipment procurement or development.

In New Delhi, however, equipmentplanning consists of the incrementalupgrading of equipment that the Armyalready holds. Line directorates forexample, infantry, artillery or mechanisedforces directorates, which govern theequipment planning of each arm or service,simply demand an improvement over what they already operate. The artillery,equipped with 45-calibre 155 mmhowitzers, demands 52-calibre howitzersto ‘modernise’ the arm.

The armoured corps clamours for T-90sto replace the T-72 fleet, the mechanisedinfantry for BMP-3s to replace the BMP-2s,and the engineers for bridges with 52-metre spans to replace the 40-metrebridges already in service.

The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) ischarged with preventing duplication andoptimising resources, but with the Armyunable to rationalise equipment between itscomponent branches, the IDS can hardlydischarge that function. And so, instead offocussing intelligently on acquiring specificcapabilities that are likely to be required inour specific operational environment,money is shared between various interest

groups, hoping to please all rather thandeveloping specific capabilities.

With no clarity on the specificcapabilities that it requires, the Army’sframing of its equipment requirementsalso remains unclear. Arms’ vendors from across the globe complain about the tendency to frame General StaffQualitative Requirements (GSQRs) – theperformance specifications that eachplatform must fulfil – on a ‘best of each’basis, extracting the best performancequalities from a number of differentproducts and putting them togetherto create a “perfect” product. Thisapproach,however,disregards the simpleengineering truth that performance is allabout trade-offs.

For example, the specifications that the Army and the Indian Airforce (IAF)framed for the Dhruv Advanced LightHelicopter (ALH),developed by HindustanAeronautics Limited, demanded acontinuous cruise speed of 270km per hour at sea level and the ability to lift a 200 kg payload at 6,000 m. This entirelydisregarded the fact that a helicopter’s rotorcan either be optimised for lift at high-

With no clarity on thespecific capabilities that

it requires, the Army’sframing of its equipment

requirements also remainsunclear. Arms’ vendors from

across the globe complainabout the tendency to frame

General Staff QualitativeRequirements on a “best

of each” basis, extractingthe best performance

qualities from a number ofdifferent products and

putting themtogether to create

a ‘perfect’ product.

”AFP

AFP

Soldiers stand beforethe national flag atRed Fort , New Delhi

Border Security Force jawans keepvigil at the Rann of Kutch

bordering Pakistan


APRIL 2011 DSIMODERNISATION

altitudes, or for high-speed performance.Instead of zeroing in on the capability that itneeded, the military added one and oneand got eleven.

Compounding the delays caused bypoorly formulated GSQRs are the Ministroyof Defence’s (MoD) complex procurementregulations, promulgated in the frequentlyrevised Defence Procurement Policy. (DPP)Seven versions of the DPP since 2002 haveculminated in the most recent one: DPP-2011. Every procurement initiated duringthis last decade is governed by the DPP thatwas valid at that time, confusing vendorsand ministry officials alike.

A final deterrent to expeditiousprocurement is the Bofors-TehelkaSyndrome, the cautious MoD mindset thatemerged from those two investigations of alleged procurement transgressions.Bureaucrats handling procurementoperate with the clear understanding thatprocurement delays are not punishablewhereas the slightest proceduralinfringement can result in a career scuttled.Consequently, equipment procurement ischaracterised by a stultifying adherence tohidebound procedure where officials focus

1110

Archiac Defence PlanningThis gloomy situation stems largely fromIndia’s archaic system of defence planningin which identifying the weapons platformsthat are needed, rather than capabilities,drives the formulation of the military’s 15-year Long Term Integrated PerspectivePlan; 5-year defence plans; and AnnualAcquisition Plans.

Modern military’s across the globe first identify the operational capabilitiesthat they deem essential, then they buildor acquire the weapons and equipmentthat would provide those capabilities. For example, a military might decideit needs the ability to bring down,at 30 minutes notice, 20 tonnes of highexplosive on a target 100 x 50 m in size,80km inside enemy territory, anywherealong a 700-km section of the border. The planning cell would then decidewhether that requirement would best be met by field artillery, multi-barrelledrocket launchers, cruise or surface-to-surface missiles, strike aircraft, or special forces. That crucial decision would then inform equipment procurement or development.

In New Delhi, however, equipmentplanning consists of the incrementalupgrading of equipment that the Armyalready holds. Line directorates forexample, infantry, artillery or mechanisedforces directorates, which govern theequipment planning of each arm or service,simply demand an improvement over what they already operate. The artillery,equipped with 45-calibre 155 mmhowitzers, demands 52-calibre howitzersto ‘modernise’ the arm.

The armoured corps clamours for T-90sto replace the T-72 fleet, the mechanisedinfantry for BMP-3s to replace the BMP-2s,and the engineers for bridges with 52-metre spans to replace the 40-metrebridges already in service.

The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) ischarged with preventing duplication andoptimising resources, but with the Armyunable to rationalise equipment between itscomponent branches, the IDS can hardlydischarge that function. And so, instead offocussing intelligently on acquiring specificcapabilities that are likely to be required inour specific operational environment,money is shared between various interest

groups, hoping to please all rather thandeveloping specific capabilities.

With no clarity on the specificcapabilities that it requires, the Army’sframing of its equipment requirementsalso remains unclear. Arms’ vendors from across the globe complain about the tendency to frame General StaffQualitative Requirements (GSQRs) – theperformance specifications that eachplatform must fulfil – on a ‘best of each’basis, extracting the best performancequalities from a number of differentproducts and putting them togetherto create a “perfect” product. Thisapproach,however,disregards the simpleengineering truth that performance is allabout trade-offs.

For example, the specifications that the Army and the Indian Airforce (IAF)framed for the Dhruv Advanced LightHelicopter (ALH),developed by HindustanAeronautics Limited, demanded acontinuous cruise speed of 270km per hour at sea level and the ability to lift a 200 kg payload at 6,000 m. This entirelydisregarded the fact that a helicopter’s rotorcan either be optimised for lift at high-

With no clarity on thespecific capabilities that

it requires, the Army’sframing of its equipment

requirements also remainsunclear. Arms’ vendors from

across the globe complainabout the tendency to frame

General Staff QualitativeRequirements on a “best

of each” basis, extractingthe best performance

qualities from a number ofdifferent products and

putting themtogether to create

a ‘perfect’ product.

”AFP

AFP

Soldiers stand beforethe national flag atRed Fort , New Delhi

Border Security Force jawans keepvigil at the Rann of Kutch

bordering Pakistan


12

MODERNISATION

less on giving the military quality productsin an acceptable timeframe, at an optimalcost, and more adhering fanatically to the DPP.

Obsolete Field Artillery The Indian Army’s crippling equipmentobsolete is most alarmingly highlighted in its field artillery, the most importantelement of combat power in the Indianoperational context. Unlike westernexpeditionary armies,which increasinglyrely on air-delivered munitions for fire support to ground troops engaged in fleeting encounters with guerrillaopponents, IA operations are most likely toconsist of set-piece attack or defence,in which sustained, heavy artillery fires are regarded as crucial for causing attritionon the enemy. This was most recentlyillustrated during the Kargil conflict in 1999,when India’s ability to pulverise Pakistanipositions with massed artillery proved abattle-winning factor.

India has less than 220 regiments ofoutdated artillery to support troopsdeployed year-round along its sprawling4,350km of disputed boundary withPakistan and China. Since poor roadcommunications disallow the quick

redeployment of guns to threatenedsectors, Army planning involves pre-positioning artillery all along the 740-kmLine of Control, or LoC, between India andPakistan; the 110-km Actual GroundPosition Line, or AGPL, above the SiachenGlacier and the 3,500-km Line of ActualControl, or LAC, between India and China.

But boosting the clearly inadequatenumbers and ranges has provedimpossible since the late 1980s, when theBofor’s scandal restricted India’s buy of155 mm, 45 calibre FH-77B howitzers fromthe planned 1,510 guns to just 410. Theplan to upgrade India’s 60-odd regimentsof Soviet-era 130 mm guns to 155 mm wascurtailed after the Israeli company, Soltam,was criticised for a poor upgrade job on thefirst ten regiments. The backbone of India’sartillery, especially in the mountains,remains the indigenous 105 mm gun,which was built in India in two variants:the Light Field Gun for mountain terrainand the Indian Field Gun (IFG) for plains.

Multiple procurements are envisionedunder the expansively named ArtilleryVision 2027, and the MoD-sanctionedArtillery Modernisation Plan. Theseinclude a tender worth an estimated `8, 000 crore for 1,580 towed 155-mm, 52-

A soldier carries aheavy machinegun in Tiger Hills,Kargil

AFP

Although the infantry forms the bulk of the IndianArmy and has long been its

most combat-committedelement, its modernisationhas languished since 1998,

when the MoD cleared whatis known as ‘Modification

4B’ for the scaling of aninfantry battalion. This

involved boosting firepowerat the platoon level and

also enhancing an infantry battalion’s

anti-tank and anti-aircraft capabilities.

”


216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 4/1/11 3:41:48 PM4/1/11 3:41:48 PM

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calibre howitzers. Another tender worth over `3,000 crore is being pursued,under the US Foreign Military SalesProgramme, for 140 ultralight 155-mm,39-calibre howitzers for mountainformations. Another `3,500 crore is chasing 100 track-mounted 155-mm,52 calibre guns for the mechanisedformations. And ̀ 4,000 crore is earmarkedfor 180 similar vehicle-mounted guns forself-propelled regiments. The total moneyin play here, some `18,500 crore, is less aproblem than the glacial pace at whichthese procurements have been processedover the last decade.

Mounting frustration over the delays in artillery procurement have encouragedan Indian consortium, led by the DefenceR&D Organisation (DRDO), in partnershipwith private sector companies, to consider a domestic howitzer developmentprogramme. Such an enterprise wouldbypass many of the procedural and politicalhurdles that have stymied attempts topurchase foreign artillery systems.

Also making headway is Project Shakti,or the Artillery Combat Command andControl System, a digital network that hasbeen jointly developed by the DRDO’sCentre for Artificial Intelligence andRobotics and Bharat Electronics Limited(BEL). Dedicated to the Army in June 2009,this is the first of India’s net-centricwarfare systems that are intended toseamlessly integrate command functionsin the 21st century battlefield.

Tank UpgradesThe Army’s tank arsenal is basedpredominantly on 2,418 obsolescent T-72tanks, the first of which came into service in1979, more than three decades ago.Underpowered,night blind and reliant onoutdated gunnery computers, many ofthese will be replaced by a planned arsenalof 1,657 T-90 tanks, 1,100 of which will bebuilt at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF),Avadi. But, since more than a thousand T-72s will continue to be in service beyond2022, the Army plans to spend ̀ 5 crore perT-72 (it was bought for ` 9 crore each) onretrofitting crucial systems, including thefire control system,main engine and nightvision devices. This procurement hassputtered along for almost a decade withbarely visible success.

The early retirement of the T-72 has beenstymied by the Army’s incomprehensiblerefusal to order larger numbers of theDRDO-developed Arjun, a 60-tonneMain Battle Tank that outperformed the

T-90 during comparative trialsconducted by the Army’s 180Armoured Brigade near Bikanerin March 2010. While a bulkorder for Arjun tanks wouldallow HVF Avadi to scale up itsproduction line, the Army has capped itsorder at 248 Arjuns.

The T-72, after its planned upgrade,will cost ̀ 14 crore per tank. The T-90s thatHVF has produced since 2009 cost `17.5crore apiece. In contrast, a brand newArjun, with a 1,400 horsepower engine,state-of-the-art integrated electronics,an acclaimed 120 mm gun, and theindigenous, widely praised Kanchanarmour, comes in at ̀ 16.8 crore.

Given the Arjun’s much-delayedsuccess, the Army and the DRDO areformulating the specifications of a next-generation tank, so far referred to as theFuture Main Battle Tank (FMBT). This willbe developed by the DRDO as an entirelyindigenous project. Additionally, theArmy has sent out a Request forInformation (RfI) to global vendors forlight tanks,which it plans to deploy in theNortheast and for mountain warfare.

Infantry ModernisationAlthough the infantry formsthe bulk of the Indian Armyand has long been its mostcombat-committed element,infantry modernisation has

languished since 1998, when the MoDcleared what is known as ‘Modification 4B’to the scaling of an infantry battalion. Thisinvolved boosting firepower at the platoonlevel and also enhancing an infantrybattalion’s anti-tank and anti-aircraftcapabilities. In 2003, a ̀ 3,500 crore infantrymodernisation plan was cleared, whichinvolved the procurement of 84 mm rocketlaunchers, anti-material rifles,under-barrelgrenade launchers, Kornet-E anti-tankguided missiles and modern small arms,including sniper rifles.

The new game-changer for the infantryis an ambitious new development projectcalled the Future Infantry Soldier as aSystem (F-INSAS), which aims to convertan infantryman into a digitally-networkedall-terrain ll-weather, weapons platformwith enhanced lethality, survivability,sustainability, mobility and situationalawareness. This is still a development

project, in which the DRDO, Indianindustry and foreign technology partnersare working together.

Modernisation of the mechanisedinfantry is another priority project for the Army, with four private sectorcompanies – Tata Motors; the MahindraGroup; L&T; and the MoD-ownedOrdnance Factory Board – competing todesign and build 2,600 new-generationFuture Infantry Combat Vehicles (F-ICVs)to replace the IA’s aging fleet of Russian-designed BMP-IIs. It is estimated that thedevelopment cost and the cost ofmanufacturing 2,600 F-ICVs for themechanised infantry could add up to`50,000 crore, making this India’s mostexpensive defence contract so far. The fourcompanies will be submitting theirproposals to the MoD by May 2011.

Air Defence For Mechanised ForcesAir defence remains a crucial vulnerabilityin India’s national defence,with even theIAF chief and the defence minister publiclyadmitting to gaps in the radar coverage of Indian airspace. The efficacy of theSoviet-era SAM-2 and SAM-3 missile

batteries,which have been granted severallife-extensions by the OEMs, is alsoquestionable. The air defence of India’smechanised forces is another major gap, with the SAM-6, SAM-7 and SAM-8medium range missile systems,procured in the 1980s, having lived outtheir service lives.

With the overseas procurement ofreplacement missile systems appearingtoo expensive to be viable, the MoD has initiated several developmentprojects to produce India’s requirementsindigenously. The DRDO’s Akash missileis already entering service; BEL andBharat Earth Movers Ltd (BEML) arebuilding 8 Akash squadrons for the IAFand 6 squadrons for the Army. AndDRDO, in partnership with Israelidefence manufacturers, is developing aLong Range Surface to Air Missile (LR-SAM) with a range of 70km; a ShortRange Surface to Air Missile (SR-SAM)with a range of 15km and is alsodeveloping hypersonic technology for more advanced missiles. The Indo-Russian Brahmos cruise missile, whichwas designed as an anti-ship missile with a

range of 290km, has been modified for theArmy for use against surface targets andhas been undergoing extensive testing.

The DRDO is also at an intermediatestage in developing an integrated anti-ballistic missile system,having tested bothexo-atmospheric and endo-atmosphericinterceptors. This system is also capable offunctioning as a long range air defencesystem, capable of engaging aircraft targetsat ranges above 100km.

Meanwhile, also following theindigenisation track, the private and public sectors are competing for adevelopment project to upgrade the L-70air defence gun and integrate it with a firecontrol radar.

Signals ModernisationThe provision of a state-of-the-artcommunication’s network for the Army isone of the MoD’s key modernisationpriorities. The static communicationsnetwork along the borders is beingconverted to optic fibre. Meanwhile, amajor indigenous development project –the Tactical Communications System, orTCS – has been initiated under the ‘Make’procedure of the DPP. Eight consortia, ledby Indian prime contractors – whichinclude BEL, ECIL, ITI, Tata Power SED,Rolta,L&T,Wipro and HCL Infosystems –will submit bids in late April.

Also being developed indigenously are aseries of electronic warfare (EW) systemsunder the hush-hush Project Suraj,whichinclude a Low Power Jammer; anelectronic warfare system for low intensityconflict; an Integrated EW System forMountains; and a track and wheeled EW system for mechanised formations(EW – Track & Wheeled).

While the high number of indigenousdevelopment projects in the IA’smodernisation plan is potentially apositive development, especially if thisresults in the development of domesticcapability, a key reason for this is thefailure of the defence procurement systemto provide a combat-committed Army withsuitable equipment in timely fashion.

It is time for the Army to evolve realisticand well-considered GSQRs, and for theMoD to specify unbreakable time schedulesfor procurement,with officers being heldaccountable for delays. It is time also totranslate into action the long-discussedproposal for a rolling,non-lapsable DefenceModernisation Fund to assure fundavailability when a procurement process isreaching culmination.

Infantry modernisation has been more a slogan

than a reality. India’smechanised forces, which

constituted a formidableconventional deterrent

through the 1980s and 1990s, have lost

ground to Pakistan, whichhas dramatically cut down

India’s combat poweradvantage with the

intelligent purchase of modern tanks from

Eastern Europe and self-propelled artillery from

the US.

”AFP

Soldiers patrol inDarranga village in theNalbari district on theIndo-Bhutan border,Assam


15

APRIL 2011 DSI

14

MODERNISATION

calibre howitzers. Another tender worth over `3,000 crore is being pursued,under the US Foreign Military SalesProgramme, for 140 ultralight 155-mm,39-calibre howitzers for mountainformations. Another `3,500 crore is chasing 100 track-mounted 155-mm,52 calibre guns for the mechanisedformations. And ̀ 4,000 crore is earmarkedfor 180 similar vehicle-mounted guns forself-propelled regiments. The total moneyin play here, some `18,500 crore, is less aproblem than the glacial pace at whichthese procurements have been processedover the last decade.

Mounting frustration over the delays in artillery procurement have encouragedan Indian consortium, led by the DefenceR&D Organisation (DRDO), in partnershipwith private sector companies, to consider a domestic howitzer developmentprogramme. Such an enterprise wouldbypass many of the procedural and politicalhurdles that have stymied attempts topurchase foreign artillery systems.

Also making headway is Project Shakti,or the Artillery Combat Command andControl System, a digital network that hasbeen jointly developed by the DRDO’sCentre for Artificial Intelligence andRobotics and Bharat Electronics Limited(BEL). Dedicated to the Army in June 2009,this is the first of India’s net-centricwarfare systems that are intended toseamlessly integrate command functionsin the 21st century battlefield.

Tank UpgradesThe Army’s tank arsenal is basedpredominantly on 2,418 obsolescent T-72tanks, the first of which came into service in1979, more than three decades ago.Underpowered,night blind and reliant onoutdated gunnery computers, many ofthese will be replaced by a planned arsenalof 1,657 T-90 tanks, 1,100 of which will bebuilt at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF),Avadi. But, since more than a thousand T-72s will continue to be in service beyond2022, the Army plans to spend ̀ 5 crore perT-72 (it was bought for ` 9 crore each) onretrofitting crucial systems, including thefire control system,main engine and nightvision devices. This procurement hassputtered along for almost a decade withbarely visible success.

The early retirement of the T-72 has beenstymied by the Army’s incomprehensiblerefusal to order larger numbers of theDRDO-developed Arjun, a 60-tonneMain Battle Tank that outperformed the

T-90 during comparative trialsconducted by the Army’s 180Armoured Brigade near Bikanerin March 2010. While a bulkorder for Arjun tanks wouldallow HVF Avadi to scale up itsproduction line, the Army has capped itsorder at 248 Arjuns.

The T-72, after its planned upgrade,will cost ̀ 14 crore per tank. The T-90s thatHVF has produced since 2009 cost `17.5crore apiece. In contrast, a brand newArjun, with a 1,400 horsepower engine,state-of-the-art integrated electronics,an acclaimed 120 mm gun, and theindigenous, widely praised Kanchanarmour, comes in at ̀ 16.8 crore.

Given the Arjun’s much-delayedsuccess, the Army and the DRDO areformulating the specifications of a next-generation tank, so far referred to as theFuture Main Battle Tank (FMBT). This willbe developed by the DRDO as an entirelyindigenous project. Additionally, theArmy has sent out a Request forInformation (RfI) to global vendors forlight tanks,which it plans to deploy in theNortheast and for mountain warfare.

Infantry ModernisationAlthough the infantry formsthe bulk of the Indian Armyand has long been its mostcombat-committed element,infantry modernisation has

languished since 1998, when the MoDcleared what is known as ‘Modification 4B’to the scaling of an infantry battalion. Thisinvolved boosting firepower at the platoonlevel and also enhancing an infantrybattalion’s anti-tank and anti-aircraftcapabilities. In 2003, a ̀ 3,500 crore infantrymodernisation plan was cleared, whichinvolved the procurement of 84 mm rocketlaunchers, anti-material rifles,under-barrelgrenade launchers, Kornet-E anti-tankguided missiles and modern small arms,including sniper rifles.

The new game-changer for the infantryis an ambitious new development projectcalled the Future Infantry Soldier as aSystem (F-INSAS), which aims to convertan infantryman into a digitally-networkedall-terrain ll-weather, weapons platformwith enhanced lethality, survivability,sustainability, mobility and situationalawareness. This is still a development

project, in which the DRDO, Indianindustry and foreign technology partnersare working together.

Modernisation of the mechanisedinfantry is another priority project for the Army, with four private sectorcompanies – Tata Motors; the MahindraGroup; L&T; and the MoD-ownedOrdnance Factory Board – competing todesign and build 2,600 new-generationFuture Infantry Combat Vehicles (F-ICVs)to replace the IA’s aging fleet of Russian-designed BMP-IIs. It is estimated that thedevelopment cost and the cost ofmanufacturing 2,600 F-ICVs for themechanised infantry could add up to`50,000 crore, making this India’s mostexpensive defence contract so far. The fourcompanies will be submitting theirproposals to the MoD by May 2011.

Air Defence For Mechanised ForcesAir defence remains a crucial vulnerabilityin India’s national defence,with even theIAF chief and the defence minister publiclyadmitting to gaps in the radar coverage of Indian airspace. The efficacy of theSoviet-era SAM-2 and SAM-3 missile

batteries,which have been granted severallife-extensions by the OEMs, is alsoquestionable. The air defence of India’smechanised forces is another major gap, with the SAM-6, SAM-7 and SAM-8medium range missile systems,procured in the 1980s, having lived outtheir service lives.

With the overseas procurement ofreplacement missile systems appearingtoo expensive to be viable, the MoD has initiated several developmentprojects to produce India’s requirementsindigenously. The DRDO’s Akash missileis already entering service; BEL andBharat Earth Movers Ltd (BEML) arebuilding 8 Akash squadrons for the IAFand 6 squadrons for the Army. AndDRDO, in partnership with Israelidefence manufacturers, is developing aLong Range Surface to Air Missile (LR-SAM) with a range of 70km; a ShortRange Surface to Air Missile (SR-SAM)with a range of 15km and is alsodeveloping hypersonic technology for more advanced missiles. The Indo-Russian Brahmos cruise missile, whichwas designed as an anti-ship missile with a

range of 290km, has been modified for theArmy for use against surface targets andhas been undergoing extensive testing.

The DRDO is also at an intermediatestage in developing an integrated anti-ballistic missile system,having tested bothexo-atmospheric and endo-atmosphericinterceptors. This system is also capable offunctioning as a long range air defencesystem, capable of engaging aircraft targetsat ranges above 100km.

Meanwhile, also following theindigenisation track, the private and public sectors are competing for adevelopment project to upgrade the L-70air defence gun and integrate it with a firecontrol radar.

Signals ModernisationThe provision of a state-of-the-artcommunication’s network for the Army isone of the MoD’s key modernisationpriorities. The static communicationsnetwork along the borders is beingconverted to optic fibre. Meanwhile, amajor indigenous development project –the Tactical Communications System, orTCS – has been initiated under the ‘Make’procedure of the DPP. Eight consortia, ledby Indian prime contractors – whichinclude BEL, ECIL, ITI, Tata Power SED,Rolta,L&T,Wipro and HCL Infosystems –will submit bids in late April.

Also being developed indigenously are aseries of electronic warfare (EW) systemsunder the hush-hush Project Suraj,whichinclude a Low Power Jammer; anelectronic warfare system for low intensityconflict; an Integrated EW System forMountains; and a track and wheeled EW system for mechanised formations(EW – Track & Wheeled).

While the high number of indigenousdevelopment projects in the IA’smodernisation plan is potentially apositive development, especially if thisresults in the development of domesticcapability, a key reason for this is thefailure of the defence procurement systemto provide a combat-committed Army withsuitable equipment in timely fashion.

It is time for the Army to evolve realisticand well-considered GSQRs, and for theMoD to specify unbreakable time schedulesfor procurement,with officers being heldaccountable for delays. It is time also totranslate into action the long-discussedproposal for a rolling,non-lapsable DefenceModernisation Fund to assure fundavailability when a procurement process isreaching culmination.

Infantry modernisation has been more a slogan

than a reality. India’smechanised forces, which

constituted a formidableconventional deterrent

through the 1980s and 1990s, have lost

ground to Pakistan, whichhas dramatically cut down

India’s combat poweradvantage with the

intelligent purchase of modern tanks from

Eastern Europe and self-propelled artillery from

the US.

”AFP

Soldiers patrol inDarranga village in theNalbari district on theIndo-Bhutan border,Assam


LAXMANBEHERA

Like many other countries, India has aunique way of presenting its DefenceBudget which is the summation of

allocations for the Defence Services,whichinclude the three armed forces, the Army,Navy and Air Force, the Defence Researchand Development Organisation (DRDO),an umbrella organisation consisting of 50-odd laboratories engaged in defence-related research and 40-odd Ordnance

17

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DEFENCE BUDGET 2011

n The 2011-12 Budget has increasedthe defence allocation to ̀ 1,64,415.49crore. The allocation, to be spent inthe current fiscal year, represents a 12 percent increase over last year’sBudget.n The Ministry of Defence is satisfiedwith its new allocation.n The Budget as measured in terms ofits share in national resources – suchas the GDP and CGE – continues todecrease.

KEY POINTS

The global fiscal crisismay have little impact onIndia’s allocations as seenin this year’s defencebudget but in real termsthe outlay falls far short ofnational security needs

THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET

Indian soldiers load a Bofor’s artillery gun duringOperation Desert Strike atPokhran, Rajasthan

AFP

Defence Budget 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:39 PM Page 16

LAXMANBEHERA

Like many other countries, India has aunique way of presenting its DefenceBudget which is the summation of

allocations for the Defence Services,whichinclude the three armed forces, the Army,Navy and Air Force, the Defence Researchand Development Organisation (DRDO),an umbrella organisation consisting of 50-odd laboratories engaged in defence-related research and 40-odd Ordnance

17

APRIL 2011 DSI

16

DEFENCE BUDGET 2011

n The 2011-12 Budget has increasedthe defence allocation to ̀ 1,64,415.49crore. The allocation, to be spent inthe current fiscal year, represents a 12 percent increase over last year’sBudget.n The Ministry of Defence is satisfiedwith its new allocation.n The Budget as measured in terms ofits share in national resources – suchas the GDP and CGE – continues todecrease.

KEY POINTS

The global fiscal crisismay have little impact onIndia’s allocations as seenin this year’s defencebudget but in real termsthe outlay falls far short ofnational security needs

THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET

Indian soldiers load a Bofor’s artillery gun duringOperation Desert Strike atPokhran, Rajasthan

AFP


APRIL 2011 DSI

18

DEFENCE BUDGET 2011

Factories. The Budget, however, does not include defence pension, which used to be included till the late 1990s andthe civil expenditure of the Ministry ofDefence (MoD). The latter consists ofexpenses of the MoD which include theSecretariat,Defence Estate Organisation,Defence Accounts Department, CoastGuard Organisation, Canteen StoresDepartment and the Jammu andKashmir Light Infantry.

In the 2011-12 outlay, the defencepension accounts for ` 34,000 crore ($7.5billion) while the MoD’s civil expenditureamounts to ` 4,156.8 crore ($0.9 billion). If these two heads of expenditures are included, then the total allocationavailable for the MoD stands at` 2,02,572.3 crore ($44.4 billion).

Escaping the Austerity Axe This year when the Defence Budget wasannounced, most analysts feared a cut in the outlay in view of the government’sresolve to bring the nation’s fiscalsituation under the control. Analogieswere being drawn to the stringentmeasures taken by administrations in theUS, UK and some other countries whichhad taken steps to reign in their defenceexpenses to reduce the debt burden ontheir economies. However, contrary toexpectations, India’s Defence Budgetincreased by 12 percent,making it one ofthe highest in recent years.

The prime reason why the Budgetescaped elements of fiscal austerity was aturnaround in the Indian economy whichwas suffering from the after effects of theglobal financial crisis. The return of thenational economic growth to its ‘pre-crisis’ status at nine percent gave theFinance Ministry some scope to step up itsrevenue collection, while keeping fiscaldeficit in check.

This fiscal year, the government’s netrevenue is expected to rise by 16 percent to`7,89,892 crore ($173.3 billion), mainlybecause of its increase in tax revenuewhich is projected to grow by 24 percent to `6,64,457 crore ($145.8 billion). Theexpected escalation in revenue collectionhas made it possible for the FinanceMinistry to follow the twin goals of fiscalconsolidation and expansion of totalexpenditure. This, in turn, has benefitedmany Central ministries and departmentsincluding the MoD.

India’s Defence Budget is broadlydivided into two categories – revenueexpenditure and capital expenditure. The

former mainly caters to the running oroperating expenditure of the defenceServices. The major items under this headinclude pay and allowances, stores andequipments, transportation,maintenanceof buildings and installations. Capitalexpenditure on the other hand caters tothe creation of assets of a long-termnature. The most crucial part of capitalexpenditure is acquisition expenditurewhich is spent on the procurement ofhardware such as aircraft, tanks,missiles,radars, naval ships and so on.

Historically, revenue expenditureaccounts for the bulk of the DefenceBudget, although its share has come downsharply over the years. For instance, therevenue: capital ratio which was 74:26 in the 9th Plan (1997-2002) has vastlyimproved in favour of capital expenditure.Its share has gone up to 42 percent in thelatest Budget indicating the MoD’s greaterfocus on modernisation of its armed forces. In the new Budget, revenue expendituretotals ` 95,216.7 crore ($20.9 billion)and capital expenditure, `69,198.8 crore($15.2 billion).

In this year’s outlay, the Army has anallocation of `83,402 crore ($18.3 billion),accounting for 51 percent of the total Budget,distantly followed by the Air Force (`46,152crore or $10.1 billion), the Navy (`25,247crore or $5.5 billion),DRDO (`10,253 crore or$2.2 billion) and Ordnance Factories (`777crore or $0.2 billion). This lion’s share for theArmy is due to a large-scale provision underrevenue expenditure, which is primarilydriven by pay and allowances. In terms ofcapital expenditure, the Air Force, with abudget of `30,224 crore ($6.6 billion), is themost capital-intensive, followed by the Army(`19,151 crore or $4.2 billion), the Navywith `14,658 crore ($3.2 billion), DRDOwith `4,628 crore ($1.0 billion) and OFswith ̀ 400 crore ($0.1 billion).

Utilising Capital Expenditure In the past, the MoD has had difficulty inspending its full budget, especially thecapital portion which drives themodernisation process of the armedforces. As a result, funds amounting tobillions of dollars have been surrenderedat the end of each fiscal year.

The reason why the Budgetescaped elements of fiscalausterity was a turnaroundin the economy which was

suffering from the aftereffects of the global

financial crisis. The return ofthe national economic

growth rate to its ‘pre-crisis’status, at 9 percent, gave the

Finance Ministry somescope to step up its revenue

collection while keepingfiscal deficit in check.

”

Indian Air Force MI-17 helicopterstake part in a fly past, New Delhi

AFP


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Factories. The Budget, however, does not include defence pension, which used to be included till the late 1990s andthe civil expenditure of the Ministry ofDefence (MoD). The latter consists ofexpenses of the MoD which include theSecretariat,Defence Estate Organisation,Defence Accounts Department, CoastGuard Organisation, Canteen StoresDepartment and the Jammu andKashmir Light Infantry.

In the 2011-12 outlay, the defencepension accounts for ` 34,000 crore ($7.5billion) while the MoD’s civil expenditureamounts to ` 4,156.8 crore ($0.9 billion). If these two heads of expenditures are included, then the total allocationavailable for the MoD stands at` 2,02,572.3 crore ($44.4 billion).

Escaping the Austerity Axe This year when the Defence Budget wasannounced, most analysts feared a cut in the outlay in view of the government’sresolve to bring the nation’s fiscalsituation under the control. Analogieswere being drawn to the stringentmeasures taken by administrations in theUS, UK and some other countries whichhad taken steps to reign in their defenceexpenses to reduce the debt burden ontheir economies. However, contrary toexpectations, India’s Defence Budgetincreased by 12 percent,making it one ofthe highest in recent years.

The prime reason why the Budgetescaped elements of fiscal austerity was aturnaround in the Indian economy whichwas suffering from the after effects of theglobal financial crisis. The return of thenational economic growth to its ‘pre-crisis’ status at nine percent gave theFinance Ministry some scope to step up itsrevenue collection, while keeping fiscaldeficit in check.

This fiscal year, the government’s netrevenue is expected to rise by 16 percent to`7,89,892 crore ($173.3 billion), mainlybecause of its increase in tax revenuewhich is projected to grow by 24 percent to `6,64,457 crore ($145.8 billion). Theexpected escalation in revenue collectionhas made it possible for the FinanceMinistry to follow the twin goals of fiscalconsolidation and expansion of totalexpenditure. This, in turn, has benefitedmany Central ministries and departmentsincluding the MoD.

India’s Defence Budget is broadlydivided into two categories – revenueexpenditure and capital expenditure. The

former mainly caters to the running oroperating expenditure of the defenceServices. The major items under this headinclude pay and allowances, stores andequipments, transportation,maintenanceof buildings and installations. Capitalexpenditure on the other hand caters tothe creation of assets of a long-termnature. The most crucial part of capitalexpenditure is acquisition expenditurewhich is spent on the procurement ofhardware such as aircraft, tanks,missiles,radars, naval ships and so on.

Historically, revenue expenditureaccounts for the bulk of the DefenceBudget, although its share has come downsharply over the years. For instance, therevenue: capital ratio which was 74:26 in the 9th Plan (1997-2002) has vastlyimproved in favour of capital expenditure.Its share has gone up to 42 percent in thelatest Budget indicating the MoD’s greaterfocus on modernisation of its armed forces. In the new Budget, revenue expendituretotals ` 95,216.7 crore ($20.9 billion)and capital expenditure, `69,198.8 crore($15.2 billion).

In this year’s outlay, the Army has anallocation of `83,402 crore ($18.3 billion),accounting for 51 percent of the total Budget,distantly followed by the Air Force (`46,152crore or $10.1 billion), the Navy (`25,247crore or $5.5 billion),DRDO (`10,253 crore or$2.2 billion) and Ordnance Factories (`777crore or $0.2 billion). This lion’s share for theArmy is due to a large-scale provision underrevenue expenditure, which is primarilydriven by pay and allowances. In terms ofcapital expenditure, the Air Force, with abudget of `30,224 crore ($6.6 billion), is themost capital-intensive, followed by the Army(`19,151 crore or $4.2 billion), the Navywith `14,658 crore ($3.2 billion), DRDOwith `4,628 crore ($1.0 billion) and OFswith ̀ 400 crore ($0.1 billion).

Utilising Capital Expenditure In the past, the MoD has had difficulty inspending its full budget, especially thecapital portion which drives themodernisation process of the armedforces. As a result, funds amounting tobillions of dollars have been surrenderedat the end of each fiscal year.

The reason why the Budgetescaped elements of fiscalausterity was a turnaroundin the economy which was

suffering from the aftereffects of the global

financial crisis. The return ofthe national economic

growth rate to its ‘pre-crisis’status, at 9 percent, gave the

Finance Ministry somescope to step up its revenue

collection while keepingfiscal deficit in check.

”

Indian Air Force MI-17 helicopterstake part in a fly past, New Delhi

AFP


APRIL 2011 DSIDEFENCE BUDGET 2011

However, as the new Defence Budgetreveals the MoD has spent more than its2010-11 budgetary allocations earmarkedunder the capital head. On the face of it,the over-utilisation of the capital fund iscredible given the complexities involvedin defence procurement. However, acloser examination of the Budget revealsthat the spending has not been done asintended in the original Budget, leadingto under-utilisation under some headsand over-utilisation in others.

For instance, 30 percent of theallocation under the head of ‘OtherEquipment’ which caters to missiles,radars and electronic items remainsunder-utilised, whereas the allocationsunder ‘Aircraft and Aero-Engine’ and‘Naval Fleet’ have been over-utilised by24 percent and 11 per cent respectively.

It is, however, not clear whether theoverspending is necessitated due to achange of plan midway, or because of the parking of funds with the state-owned enterprises so as not to surrenderthem. With regards the parking of funds,there have been several occasions in the past, where the MoD hasdeliberately transferred funds in excess of the annual budgetary provisions to itsproduction agencies.

Impact on Modernisation India’s armed forces are now on amodernisation drive. The shopping listincludes virtually all kind of weapons andplatforms, including fighter aircraft,armoured vehicles, radars, missiles andwarships. It’s appropriate to ask whetherthe latest Budget has the necessary

financial provisions to meet suchrequirements (see cover story).

Given the fact that the modernisationprogramme of the armed forces largelydepends on capital acquisitions, it boilsdown to how the capital budget isallocated. Of the total ̀ 69,198.8 crore ($15.2billion) earmarked for capital expenditure,nearly 80 percent (`55,600 crore or $12.2billion) will be spent on procurement.Assuming that 60 percent of theprocurement budget goes for “committedliabilities” (on account of contracts alreadysigned), the MoD has around ̀ 22,240 crore($4.9 billion) to pay for new acquisitionswhich are up for contract- signing in 2011-12. It is expected that the first trancheof money will flow from the new Budget for the much awaited 126 MediumMulti-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA),

C-17 Globemaster, both for the Air Force,advanced helicopters for the Air Force and Army and patrol vessels for the Navy. If these contracts materialise, it will be ahuge boost for the modernisation of thearmed forces.

Need for Higher Allocations Is the amount allocated enough? AlthoughIndia enjoys a geo-strategic advantagebecause of its location it also faces amultitude of security threats from land,sea, air and now increasingly cyberspace.The rise of China as a strong militarypower supported by massive militaryspending, has further complicated India’ssecurity calculations. China’s latest DefenceBudget of $91.5 billion is more than two-and-a-half times that of India’s. There isa growing sense of concern among the

Indian security establishmentabout Beijing’s rapid progress in military capability and itsadverse impact on our nationalsecurity. Security analysts inparticular are demanding anincrease in defence spendingthat is commensurate with nationalsecurity requirements.

However, contrary to the demands for higher allocation, the Defence Budgetmeasured in terms of its share in national resources – such as the GDP andCentral Government Expenditure (CGE) –continues to decrease. For instance, incomparison to 1985 when the DefenceBudget accounted for 3.05 percent of GDPand 16.10 percent of the CGE, the presentDefence Budget accounts for 1.83 percentof the GDP and 13.07 percent of the CGE.

The decreasing share of defencein national resources is a matterof concern given India’s hugegap in military capability. Forinstance, the Navy is battlingwith the grim prospect ofretaining only 61, 44 and 20

percent of the envisaged force levels forfrigates, destroyers and corvettes.

The other sister services are facing asimilar situation. Given that the resourcesconstitute the core input for augmentingmilitary capability, there is a need toprogressively increase defence spendingto at least three percent of the GDP. This level of spending is not onlyinternationally accepted as affordable, butthe one promised to be delivered to thecause of national defence by the PrimeMinister in 2005.

2120

The Defence Budgetmeasured in terms of its

share in national resources– such as Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) and Central GovernmentExpenditure (CGE) –

continues to decrease. For instance, in comparison

to 1985 when the Defence Budget accountedfor 3.05 percent of GDP and

16.10 percent of CGE, the present Defence Budget

accounts for 1.83 percent of GDP and 13.07 percent

of CGE.

”Indian Navypersonnelparticipate in aRepublic DayParade, New Delhi

AFP

AFP

AFP

Defence MinisterA.K. Antony

Finance MinisterPranab Mukherjee


APRIL 2011 DSIDEFENCE BUDGET 2011

However, as the new Defence Budgetreveals the MoD has spent more than its2010-11 budgetary allocations earmarkedunder the capital head. On the face of it,the over-utilisation of the capital fund iscredible given the complexities involvedin defence procurement. However, acloser examination of the Budget revealsthat the spending has not been done asintended in the original Budget, leadingto under-utilisation under some headsand over-utilisation in others.

For instance, 30 percent of theallocation under the head of ‘OtherEquipment’ which caters to missiles,radars and electronic items remainsunder-utilised, whereas the allocationsunder ‘Aircraft and Aero-Engine’ and‘Naval Fleet’ have been over-utilised by24 percent and 11 per cent respectively.

It is, however, not clear whether theoverspending is necessitated due to achange of plan midway, or because of the parking of funds with the state-owned enterprises so as not to surrenderthem. With regards the parking of funds,there have been several occasions in the past, where the MoD hasdeliberately transferred funds in excess of the annual budgetary provisions to itsproduction agencies.

Impact on Modernisation India’s armed forces are now on amodernisation drive. The shopping listincludes virtually all kind of weapons andplatforms, including fighter aircraft,armoured vehicles, radars, missiles andwarships. It’s appropriate to ask whetherthe latest Budget has the necessary

financial provisions to meet suchrequirements (see cover story).

Given the fact that the modernisationprogramme of the armed forces largelydepends on capital acquisitions, it boilsdown to how the capital budget isallocated. Of the total ̀ 69,198.8 crore ($15.2billion) earmarked for capital expenditure,nearly 80 percent (`55,600 crore or $12.2billion) will be spent on procurement.Assuming that 60 percent of theprocurement budget goes for “committedliabilities” (on account of contracts alreadysigned), the MoD has around ̀ 22,240 crore($4.9 billion) to pay for new acquisitionswhich are up for contract- signing in 2011-12. It is expected that the first trancheof money will flow from the new Budget for the much awaited 126 MediumMulti-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA),

C-17 Globemaster, both for the Air Force,advanced helicopters for the Air Force and Army and patrol vessels for the Navy. If these contracts materialise, it will be ahuge boost for the modernisation of thearmed forces.

Need for Higher Allocations Is the amount allocated enough? AlthoughIndia enjoys a geo-strategic advantagebecause of its location it also faces amultitude of security threats from land,sea, air and now increasingly cyberspace.The rise of China as a strong militarypower supported by massive militaryspending, has further complicated India’ssecurity calculations. China’s latest DefenceBudget of $91.5 billion is more than two-and-a-half times that of India’s. There isa growing sense of concern among the

Indian security establishmentabout Beijing’s rapid progress in military capability and itsadverse impact on our nationalsecurity. Security analysts inparticular are demanding anincrease in defence spendingthat is commensurate with nationalsecurity requirements.

However, contrary to the demands for higher allocation, the Defence Budgetmeasured in terms of its share in national resources – such as the GDP andCentral Government Expenditure (CGE) –continues to decrease. For instance, incomparison to 1985 when the DefenceBudget accounted for 3.05 percent of GDPand 16.10 percent of the CGE, the presentDefence Budget accounts for 1.83 percentof the GDP and 13.07 percent of the CGE.

The decreasing share of defencein national resources is a matterof concern given India’s hugegap in military capability. Forinstance, the Navy is battlingwith the grim prospect ofretaining only 61, 44 and 20

percent of the envisaged force levels forfrigates, destroyers and corvettes.

The other sister services are facing asimilar situation. Given that the resourcesconstitute the core input for augmentingmilitary capability, there is a need toprogressively increase defence spendingto at least three percent of the GDP. This level of spending is not onlyinternationally accepted as affordable, butthe one promised to be delivered to thecause of national defence by the PrimeMinister in 2005.

2120

The Defence Budgetmeasured in terms of its

share in national resources– such as Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) and Central GovernmentExpenditure (CGE) –

continues to decrease. For instance, in comparison

to 1985 when the Defence Budget accountedfor 3.05 percent of GDP and

16.10 percent of CGE, the present Defence Budget

accounts for 1.83 percent of GDP and 13.07 percent

of CGE.

”Indian Navypersonnelparticipate in aRepublic DayParade, New Delhi

AFP

AFP

AFP

Defence MinisterA.K. Antony

Finance MinisterPranab Mukherjee


22

SPACE

23

APRIL 2011 DSI

Historically,many of the world’s bigevents, inventions, ideas evenmissions have had small

beginnings. India’s entry into the spacearena on November 21, 1963 also had anascent start from a small church inThumba village located in the heart ofKerala with the launching of soundingrockets. The location of the village wasimportant because the geomagneticequator passes through it and the onlyavailable building in that village at thattime was the local church. Since thenduring the last four to five decades,India’s space programme has madesignificant progress and is recognisedglobally but at the same time it continuesto face growing challenges.

India actually became a ‘space-faring’nation on July 18, 1980 with the launch of the Rohini satellite by using anindigenously made satellite launchvehicle. At that time India was the seventhnation in the world to become space-worthy. After India, over the last thirtyyears only two more countries have beenable to join this coveted group – Iran andNorth Korea whose claims are still a little doubtful. The fundamental aim ofIndia’s space programme has always beento use space technology for socio-economic development and to makeadvances in the fields of communication,meteorology, science, education andnatural resource management.

In its early years, India’s spaceprogramme started under the tutelage ofthe Department of Atomic Energy. Todevelop the nation’s space agenda, the

Indian National Committee for SpaceResearch (INCOSPAR) was set up underthe able stewardship of Dr VikramSarabhai who articulated India’s spacevision. Later in 1969, the Indian SpaceResearch Organisation (ISRO) was formedunder the Department of Atomic Energy.Three years later it was subsequentlybrought under the Department of Space.Reflecting the importance of space in anation’s thinking, in the same year, a SpaceCommission was set up reporting directlyto the Prime Minister.

Many believe that ISRO has done a commendable job over the years by successfully undertaking variousmissions of national importance.Contributing to its growth have beenmany known and unknown people.Perhaps the most significant contributiontowards the development of India’s spaceprogramme has been made by Prof SatishDhawan. Many believe that the formerchairperson of the Space Commission hasremained an unsung hero in India’s space annals.

Developing a Space AgendaThanks to its early grounding over the last four decades ISRO has manyachievements to its credit. It hasestablished various units in the specificfields of technology, directly or indirectlyrelated to satellite manufacture, in launch vehicles systems and groundinfrastructure. It has also developedsignificant expertise in the arenas ofpropulsion, telemetry, tracking andcommunications systems.

Today, India is in a position to launch satellites weighing approximately 2,000 kgs. It has also established a stronginfrastructure for remote sensing andcreated effective communications satellitesystems. In 1992, it established acommercial outlet, Antrix Corporation.This organisation looks after thecommercial aspects of ISRO both in thelaunch market as well as in the area oftelecommunication products and satellite-derived data.

Clearly, India’s space programme haswitnessed an exponential growth. Duringthe 1980s, the focus of India’s space

programme was on experimental and low-capability projects. With the help ofinternational assistance the programmedeveloped further. Some Indian scientiststrained abroad in developed space-technology countries like the US, Russia(erstwhile USSR) and France – all countrieswhich made a significant contribution tothe growth and development of India’sspace programme.

A few of the early ‘birds’ that werelaunched in those initial stages were theAryabhata, the first Indian satellite (1975),Bhaskara-I and II, the first and secondexperimental remote sensing satellite (1979 and 1981) and the Ariane PassengerPayload Experiment – the first experimentalcommunication satellite (1981).

But by the early eighties, India’sscientific establishment had realised that ithad to focus more towards developing anindigenous launch vehicle if the nationwas to make strides in space. By the mid-1980s, ISRO started designing anddeveloping the PSLV (Polar OrbitingSatellite Launch Vehicle) and its successorthe Geosynchronous Satellite LaunchVehicle (GSLV). These vehicles wererequired to launch the indigenouslydeveloped Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite and a meteorology andtelecommunications satellite, the IndianNational Satellite (INSAT). PSLVcommenced its operational launches in1997 and since then it has been widelyregarded as a dependable workhorse. Withthe help of this vehicle, India has to datelaunched 41 satellites into orbit,more thanhalf for other countries. The PSLV has alsobeen particularly successful in its low earthorbit missions. A variant of the PSLV has also been used for the first Indian moon mission.

Rise and Fall of GSLV Vehicles GSLV vehicles are designed to launchsatellites into geostationary orbit some36,000km above the earth’s surface. Such vehicles are also used for thelaunching of heavy satellites usually in therange of 2,500 to 5,000 kg. In September2007, ISRO launched its INSAT-4CRgeostationary satellite with a GSLV F04 vehicle. The success of this launch

KEY POINTSn ISRO’s dream to achieve self-sufficiency in launching heavysatellites will remain unfulfilled till itsucceeds in mastering reliablecryogenic technology.n The problems with ISRO are notonly connected to launch vehicles butit also faces challenges with somesatellites operating in space.n Bhuvan, ISRO’s answer to GoogleEarth, is facing certain glitches.

AJEY LELE

UPWARDS AND, SOMETIMES,

DOWNWARDS

ISRO’s Polar Satellite LaunchVehicle - C14 lifting off fromthe Satish Dhawan SpaceCentre in Sriharikota,Andhra Pradesh

The recent failure of the ambititious Geosynchronous SatelliteLaunch Vehicle has raised questions over the role of the Indian Space

Research Organisation in the country’s space programme

AFP

India's Space Programme - LATEST 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 1:53 PM Page 22

22

SPACE

23

APRIL 2011 DSI

Historically,many of the world’s bigevents, inventions, ideas evenmissions have had small

beginnings. India’s entry into the spacearena on November 21, 1963 also had anascent start from a small church inThumba village located in the heart ofKerala with the launching of soundingrockets. The location of the village wasimportant because the geomagneticequator passes through it and the onlyavailable building in that village at thattime was the local church. Since thenduring the last four to five decades,India’s space programme has madesignificant progress and is recognisedglobally but at the same time it continuesto face growing challenges.

India actually became a ‘space-faring’nation on July 18, 1980 with the launch of the Rohini satellite by using anindigenously made satellite launchvehicle. At that time India was the seventhnation in the world to become space-worthy. After India, over the last thirtyyears only two more countries have beenable to join this coveted group – Iran andNorth Korea whose claims are still a little doubtful. The fundamental aim ofIndia’s space programme has always beento use space technology for socio-economic development and to makeadvances in the fields of communication,meteorology, science, education andnatural resource management.

In its early years, India’s spaceprogramme started under the tutelage ofthe Department of Atomic Energy. Todevelop the nation’s space agenda, the

Indian National Committee for SpaceResearch (INCOSPAR) was set up underthe able stewardship of Dr VikramSarabhai who articulated India’s spacevision. Later in 1969, the Indian SpaceResearch Organisation (ISRO) was formedunder the Department of Atomic Energy.Three years later it was subsequentlybrought under the Department of Space.Reflecting the importance of space in anation’s thinking, in the same year, a SpaceCommission was set up reporting directlyto the Prime Minister.

Many believe that ISRO has done a commendable job over the years by successfully undertaking variousmissions of national importance.Contributing to its growth have beenmany known and unknown people.Perhaps the most significant contributiontowards the development of India’s spaceprogramme has been made by Prof SatishDhawan. Many believe that the formerchairperson of the Space Commission hasremained an unsung hero in India’s space annals.

Developing a Space AgendaThanks to its early grounding over the last four decades ISRO has manyachievements to its credit. It hasestablished various units in the specificfields of technology, directly or indirectlyrelated to satellite manufacture, in launch vehicles systems and groundinfrastructure. It has also developedsignificant expertise in the arenas ofpropulsion, telemetry, tracking andcommunications systems.

Today, India is in a position to launch satellites weighing approximately 2,000 kgs. It has also established a stronginfrastructure for remote sensing andcreated effective communications satellitesystems. In 1992, it established acommercial outlet, Antrix Corporation.This organisation looks after thecommercial aspects of ISRO both in thelaunch market as well as in the area oftelecommunication products and satellite-derived data.

Clearly, India’s space programme haswitnessed an exponential growth. Duringthe 1980s, the focus of India’s space

programme was on experimental and low-capability projects. With the help ofinternational assistance the programmedeveloped further. Some Indian scientiststrained abroad in developed space-technology countries like the US, Russia(erstwhile USSR) and France – all countrieswhich made a significant contribution tothe growth and development of India’sspace programme.

A few of the early ‘birds’ that werelaunched in those initial stages were theAryabhata, the first Indian satellite (1975),Bhaskara-I and II, the first and secondexperimental remote sensing satellite (1979 and 1981) and the Ariane PassengerPayload Experiment – the first experimentalcommunication satellite (1981).

But by the early eighties, India’sscientific establishment had realised that ithad to focus more towards developing anindigenous launch vehicle if the nationwas to make strides in space. By the mid-1980s, ISRO started designing anddeveloping the PSLV (Polar OrbitingSatellite Launch Vehicle) and its successorthe Geosynchronous Satellite LaunchVehicle (GSLV). These vehicles wererequired to launch the indigenouslydeveloped Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite and a meteorology andtelecommunications satellite, the IndianNational Satellite (INSAT). PSLVcommenced its operational launches in1997 and since then it has been widelyregarded as a dependable workhorse. Withthe help of this vehicle, India has to datelaunched 41 satellites into orbit,more thanhalf for other countries. The PSLV has alsobeen particularly successful in its low earthorbit missions. A variant of the PSLV has also been used for the first Indian moon mission.

Rise and Fall of GSLV Vehicles GSLV vehicles are designed to launchsatellites into geostationary orbit some36,000km above the earth’s surface. Such vehicles are also used for thelaunching of heavy satellites usually in therange of 2,500 to 5,000 kg. In September2007, ISRO launched its INSAT-4CRgeostationary satellite with a GSLV F04 vehicle. The success of this launch

KEY POINTSn ISRO’s dream to achieve self-sufficiency in launching heavysatellites will remain unfulfilled till itsucceeds in mastering reliablecryogenic technology.n The problems with ISRO are notonly connected to launch vehicles butit also faces challenges with somesatellites operating in space.n Bhuvan, ISRO’s answer to GoogleEarth, is facing certain glitches.

AJEY LELE

UPWARDS AND, SOMETIMES,

DOWNWARDS

ISRO’s Polar Satellite LaunchVehicle - C14 lifting off fromthe Satish Dhawan SpaceCentre in Sriharikota,Andhra Pradesh

The recent failure of the ambititious Geosynchronous SatelliteLaunch Vehicle has raised questions over the role of the Indian Space

Research Organisation in the country’s space programme

AFP


24

SPACE APRIL 2011 DSI

proved India’s capabilities to put satellites weighing around 2,500 kg intogeostationary orbit.

India’s GSLV technology has a PSLVcomponent too. The first two stages ofthese GSLV vehicles are derived fromPSLV technology. ISRO has ambitions of designing and developing aGeosynchronous Satellite Launch VehicleMark-III (GSLV Mk-III) an entirely newlaunch vehicle and not based on the PSLVor GSLV Mk-I/II technology. GSLV Mk-IIIis expected to launch a 4,400 kg satellite toGTO (Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit)with a growth potential towards a 6,000 kg payload capability through minor improvements.

Not Yet a MasterUnfortunately, as 2010 revealed, ISRO isyet to master the GSLV-Mk-I/II vehicletechnology fully. On December 25, 2010ISRO’s GSLV-F06 mission with, a GSAT-5Psatellite onboard, failed. The vehicle brokeup 53.8 seconds from lift-off. Surprisingly,the launch failed in the “first stage” of thelaunch process itself. This followed anearlier failure in mid-April last year whenISRO attempted to use an indigenouslymade cryogenic engine with its GSLV-D3to launch the GAST-4 satellite. It may takeISRO some more time to test thistechnology again.

Last December’s failure, however,cannot be associated with cryogenicengines because the launch had failedbefore the cryogenic stage. But it can be

connected with the blending ofthe GSLV technology with thecryogenic technology. Anylaunch vehicle, like the PSLV,has to use both solid and liquid fuels.However, for a satellite with more weight, athird stage called the cryogenic stage isrequired and sadly India is yet to masterthis technology.

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsinwas to transfer this technology to India.He, however, rescinded, giving in to thepressure by the then US administrationwhich feared that India could divert thistechnology to strengthen its missile

programme. Subsequently,Russia ended up selling sixcryogenic engines to India.

For the last two decadesIndia hasbeen working consistentlytowards indigenously developing thistechnology. But it has been tough. Out ofthe six Russian engines India is now left with only one which has beenearmarked for an upcoming second moonmission in 2013. The Indian dream toachieve self-sufficiency in launching heavysatellites will remain unfulfilled till it succeeds in developing a reliable cryogenic technology.

Below The Global AverageThe truth is ISRO’s current track record of successful space launches is below theglobal average. Critics feel that ISRO is over extending itself and not beingrealistic about its current capabilities. Thatbeing said, no country has been able toachieve a 100 percent success rate in itsspace activities.

ISRO’s problems are not only limitedto launch vehicles but also to satellitesoperating in space. ISRO has also yet toresolve issues with the transpondersmade available by them for DTHtelevision services.

Along the way, there have been manybotch-ups. Last July, ISRO reported aglitch in the operation of the INSAT 4B andhad to resort to switching off 50 percent ofthe transponders on board the satellite.Then INSAT-4CR which was launched inSeptember 2007 for an estimated lifespanof ten years showed some deficiencies.Immediately after the launch, the satellitefailed to reach its planned orbit butsomehow managed after a few technicalcorrections were made. But there has been

a price to pay. According to someunconfirmed reports the mission life of thissatellite has decreased by five yearsbecause of the extra fuel used to carry outthe corrections.

Additionally, even though India’s firstmoon mission was able to perform almostall of its designated tasks correctly themission wound up more than one yearahead of its schedule: it lasted 9 monthsagainst the designed life-span of 24. Fewother projects, such as Bhuvan, which isISRO’s answer to Google Earth, have alsoexhibited various inadequacies making itsusers unhappy.

So has ISRO spread itself for this bydreaming too big? The answer is both yes and no. No, because for any visionaryorganisation it’s critical to have hugedreams which is probably the reason forISRO’s many achievements. One cannotdiscount the fact that ISRO discoveredwater on the moon; that it has launchedten satellites or that it successfully receiveda capsule back on earth after sending it to space.

Today, ISRO is able to capture data from

the earth’s surface with less than a metreresolution through its Cartosat series ofsatellites that match the best in the world.Recently, the space organisation has alsoestablished an effective Control Room foranti-Naxal operations that providessatellite imaging of insurgency-infestedareas to security and intelligence agencies.

The organisation also has major plansfor the future: from a human space missionto Mars to participating in an internationalspace station experiment to developingIndia’s own navigational network tolaunch an astronomical satellite. Also, itintends to increase its transpondercapacity from the existing 200(approximately) to 500. India’s armedforces are also demanding the launch ofseparate satellites and then there arenumerous international clients waiting forISRO to launch their satellites.

Maybe, just maybe, ISRO is unable tocorrelate available infrastructure and itsexisting technology base to the goals it hasset itself. And maybe it’s time for ISRO todo some serious soul-searching and takesome course correction.

Last year was marked bytwo significant failures for

ISRO. On December 25,2010, ISRO’s GSLV-F06

mission with a GSAT-5Psatellite onboard failed.

The vehicle broke up 53.8seconds from lift-off.

This followed an earlierfailure in Mid-April

”The GSLV-F06 rocketbefore its ill-fatedlaunch last December

AFP


24

SPACE APRIL 2011 DSI

proved India’s capabilities to put satellites weighing around 2,500 kg intogeostationary orbit.

India’s GSLV technology has a PSLVcomponent too. The first two stages ofthese GSLV vehicles are derived fromPSLV technology. ISRO has ambitions of designing and developing aGeosynchronous Satellite Launch VehicleMark-III (GSLV Mk-III) an entirely newlaunch vehicle and not based on the PSLVor GSLV Mk-I/II technology. GSLV Mk-IIIis expected to launch a 4,400 kg satellite toGTO (Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit)with a growth potential towards a 6,000 kg payload capability through minor improvements.

Not Yet a MasterUnfortunately, as 2010 revealed, ISRO isyet to master the GSLV-Mk-I/II vehicletechnology fully. On December 25, 2010ISRO’s GSLV-F06 mission with, a GSAT-5Psatellite onboard, failed. The vehicle brokeup 53.8 seconds from lift-off. Surprisingly,the launch failed in the “first stage” of thelaunch process itself. This followed anearlier failure in mid-April last year whenISRO attempted to use an indigenouslymade cryogenic engine with its GSLV-D3to launch the GAST-4 satellite. It may takeISRO some more time to test thistechnology again.

Last December’s failure, however,cannot be associated with cryogenicengines because the launch had failedbefore the cryogenic stage. But it can be

connected with the blending ofthe GSLV technology with thecryogenic technology. Anylaunch vehicle, like the PSLV,has to use both solid and liquid fuels.However, for a satellite with more weight, athird stage called the cryogenic stage isrequired and sadly India is yet to masterthis technology.

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsinwas to transfer this technology to India.He, however, rescinded, giving in to thepressure by the then US administrationwhich feared that India could divert thistechnology to strengthen its missile

programme. Subsequently,Russia ended up selling sixcryogenic engines to India.

For the last two decadesIndia hasbeen working consistentlytowards indigenously developing thistechnology. But it has been tough. Out ofthe six Russian engines India is now left with only one which has beenearmarked for an upcoming second moonmission in 2013. The Indian dream toachieve self-sufficiency in launching heavysatellites will remain unfulfilled till it succeeds in developing a reliable cryogenic technology.

Below The Global AverageThe truth is ISRO’s current track record of successful space launches is below theglobal average. Critics feel that ISRO is over extending itself and not beingrealistic about its current capabilities. Thatbeing said, no country has been able toachieve a 100 percent success rate in itsspace activities.

ISRO’s problems are not only limitedto launch vehicles but also to satellitesoperating in space. ISRO has also yet toresolve issues with the transpondersmade available by them for DTHtelevision services.

Along the way, there have been manybotch-ups. Last July, ISRO reported aglitch in the operation of the INSAT 4B andhad to resort to switching off 50 percent ofthe transponders on board the satellite.Then INSAT-4CR which was launched inSeptember 2007 for an estimated lifespanof ten years showed some deficiencies.Immediately after the launch, the satellitefailed to reach its planned orbit butsomehow managed after a few technicalcorrections were made. But there has been

a price to pay. According to someunconfirmed reports the mission life of thissatellite has decreased by five yearsbecause of the extra fuel used to carry outthe corrections.

Additionally, even though India’s firstmoon mission was able to perform almostall of its designated tasks correctly themission wound up more than one yearahead of its schedule: it lasted 9 monthsagainst the designed life-span of 24. Fewother projects, such as Bhuvan, which isISRO’s answer to Google Earth, have alsoexhibited various inadequacies making itsusers unhappy.

So has ISRO spread itself for this bydreaming too big? The answer is both yes and no. No, because for any visionaryorganisation it’s critical to have hugedreams which is probably the reason forISRO’s many achievements. One cannotdiscount the fact that ISRO discoveredwater on the moon; that it has launchedten satellites or that it successfully receiveda capsule back on earth after sending it to space.

Today, ISRO is able to capture data from

the earth’s surface with less than a metreresolution through its Cartosat series ofsatellites that match the best in the world.Recently, the space organisation has alsoestablished an effective Control Room foranti-Naxal operations that providessatellite imaging of insurgency-infestedareas to security and intelligence agencies.

The organisation also has major plansfor the future: from a human space missionto Mars to participating in an internationalspace station experiment to developingIndia’s own navigational network tolaunch an astronomical satellite. Also, itintends to increase its transpondercapacity from the existing 200(approximately) to 500. India’s armedforces are also demanding the launch ofseparate satellites and then there arenumerous international clients waiting forISRO to launch their satellites.

Maybe, just maybe, ISRO is unable tocorrelate available infrastructure and itsexisting technology base to the goals it hasset itself. And maybe it’s time for ISRO todo some serious soul-searching and takesome course correction.

Last year was marked bytwo significant failures for

ISRO. On December 25,2010, ISRO’s GSLV-F06

mission with a GSAT-5Psatellite onboard failed.

The vehicle broke up 53.8seconds from lift-off.

This followed an earlierfailure in Mid-April

”The GSLV-F06 rocketbefore its ill-fatedlaunch last December

AFP


27

APRIL 2011 DSI

A few decades ago the concept ofnational security revolved aroundthe defence of India’s borders – a

task that was the prime responsibility of thearmed forces. Today, that scenario haschanged dramatically and a number ofCentral Police and Paramilitary Forces(CPMFs) help in guarding the country’sborders and manage internal security.

Pakistan’s proxy war first in Punjabduring the 1980s and then in Jammu andKashmir (J&K) beginning in 1988-89, nowin its third decade, triggered this change. Theadvent of international fundamentalistterrorism increased and internal instabilitysoon became a serious challenge. TheArmy, which was deployed for internal

26

SECURITY

n The prevailing internal securityenvironment demands the vigorousimplementation of a national-levelconflict management strategy with amulti-departmental policy formulation. n The Group of Ministers decided todesignate the CRPF as a strike forcefor internal security and to send theBSF and the ITBP back to the borders.n The NSG is responsible forcounter-terrorist operations andcounter-hijack tasks.

KEY POINTS

IN THE LINE OF FIRETill a few years ago,national security was theprime responsibility ofthe armed forces buttoday a number of central police andparamilitary forces helpin guarding the country’sborders and manageinternal security

GURMEET KANWAL

Paramilitary Forces guard apolling station in Namerivillage, near Guwahati, Assam

AFP

Paramilitary Force - NEW 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:14 PM Page 26

27

APRIL 2011 DSI

A few decades ago the concept ofnational security revolved aroundthe defence of India’s borders – a

task that was the prime responsibility of thearmed forces. Today, that scenario haschanged dramatically and a number ofCentral Police and Paramilitary Forces(CPMFs) help in guarding the country’sborders and manage internal security.

Pakistan’s proxy war first in Punjabduring the 1980s and then in Jammu andKashmir (J&K) beginning in 1988-89, nowin its third decade, triggered this change. Theadvent of international fundamentalistterrorism increased and internal instabilitysoon became a serious challenge. TheArmy, which was deployed for internal

26

SECURITY

n The prevailing internal securityenvironment demands the vigorousimplementation of a national-levelconflict management strategy with amulti-departmental policy formulation. n The Group of Ministers decided todesignate the CRPF as a strike forcefor internal security and to send theBSF and the ITBP back to the borders.n The NSG is responsible forcounter-terrorist operations andcounter-hijack tasks.

KEY POINTS

IN THE LINE OF FIRETill a few years ago,national security was theprime responsibility ofthe armed forces buttoday a number of central police andparamilitary forces helpin guarding the country’sborders and manageinternal security

GURMEET KANWAL

Paramilitary Forces guard apolling station in Namerivillage, near Guwahati, Assam

AFP


of border management, making it morecomplex for the border guarding agencies. It is axiomatic that poor bordermanagement inevitably leads to a volatileinternal security situation in the borderstates of the country.

Ideally, border management should bethe responsibility of the Ministry of HomeAffairs (MHA) during peace time. However,the active nature of the LoC and the need tomaintain troops close to the Line of ActualControl (LAC) in a state of readiness foroperations in high altitude areas, hascompelled the Army to permanently deploylarge forces for this task. While the BSFshould be responsible for all settled borders,

the responsibility for unsettled and disputedborders, such as the LoC in J&K and the LAC on the Indo-Tibetan border, should bethat of the Army. However, the principle of‘single point control’ must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed.Divided responsibilities never result ineffective control.

At present, the responsibility formanaging the border with China in thenorth is that of the ITBP’s except in someplaces such as Sikkim where the Army is in charge. In the west, the entire borderwith Pakistan is manned by the BSF except the LoC in J&K. The LoC is theresponsibility of the Army with some BSFbattalions placed under its operationalcontrol. On the LoC, the primaryoperational responsibility of the forces is toensure its physical integrity againstPakistan Army encroachment; the Army’ssecondary responsibility is to minimisetrans-LoC infiltration by armed mercenaryterrorists usually aided and abetted by thePakistan Army and the ISI.

The border with Nepal was virtuallyunattended till very recently as Nepalesecitizens have free access to live and workin India under a 1950 treaty between thetwo countries. However, since theeruption of the Maoist insurgency in Nepalefforts have been made to gradually step-up vigilance along this border, as Indiafears the southward spread of Maoistideology. The responsibility for this hasbeen entrusted to the Sashastra Seema Bal(SSB). The Cabinet Secretariat hadexercised direct operational control overthe SSB till 2003 but the force is now underthe MHA.

Along the Bangladesh border, nowseeing active action recently, the BSF is in charge. This border remains in the news as there are frequent clashesbetween the BSF and the Bangladesh

Rifles (BDR) over encroachments,

enclaves and adverse possessions.

Cross-Border MovementsFor the Bhutan border, the responsibility isthat of the SSB. The border with Myanmaralso remains operationally active. Severalinsurgent groups have secured sanctuariesfor themselves in Myanmar despite theco-operation extended by theMyanmarese Army.

The cross-border movement of Nagasand Mizos for training, purchase of armsand shelter when pursued by Indiansecurity forces, combined with thedifficult terrain obtaining in the area,

makes this border extremely challengingto manage. This border is manned jointlyby the Army and some units of the AR.However, recent reports have indicatedthat the BSF may soon be deployed toguard this border, leaving AR units free forcounter-insurgency operations.

The NSG is responsible for counter-terrorist operations and counter-hijack

APRIL 2011 DSI

28

SECURITY

security duties in the Northeastern statessince the mid-1950s began to be employedfirst in Punjab and then in J&K to stabilisethe situation.

As Pakistan raised the ante and thenumber of mercenary jihadis inducted intoJ&K by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)rose sharply, first the Border Security Force(BSF), and then the Central Reserve PoliceForce (CRPF), was employed to assist theArmy. Soon the Indo-Tibetan Border PoliceForce (ITBP) was also used to guardvulnerable installations.

The Centre wisely decided to deploythe state and Central Police forces in theurban areas for active operations againstmilitants. The Army was given a free hand to conduct counter-insurgencyoperations in the rural hinterland and to check infiltration through the Line of Control (LoC).

That this policy succeeded admirably isborne out by the fact that insurgency in J&K isnow well under control and the government

has initiated a process of rapprochement tofind a permanent solution to the state’s long-standing problems.

Under the Constitution, law and orderis basically a state subject and ideally, theconstabulary and provincial armed policeof the states’ infested by militancy shouldbe capable of handling all but the mostvicious forms of militancy with only short-term supplementary support from thecentral security forces.

But based on the recommendations ofthe four task forces that were appointedafter the Kargil Review Committee, theGroup of Ministers (GoM) decided todesignate the CRPF as a strike force forinternal security and to send forces such asthe BSF and the ITBP to the borders, ratherthan continuing the ad hoc manner inwhich these forces were being employedbefore the Kargil conflict.

Since then the Central Police andParamilitary Forces are now charged withthe responsibility either to manage the

country’s borders during peace time or toundertake internal security duties in thecountry’s various trouble spots.

Border Management Border management is a responsibility thattoday is shared by the Army with the BSFand the ITBP. Dr G. P. Bhatnagar, formerInspector General, BSF has written that thepresent border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism;

infiltration and exfiltration of armedmilitants; the emergence of non-stateactors; a nexus between narcotics and armssmugglers; illegal migrations; left wingextremism; separatist movements aidedand abetted by external powers; and theestablishment of madrasas which couldprove to be security hazards.

Smugglers, drug-traffickers andfundamentalist terrorists are often inleague with local criminals, lower rungpolitical leaders and police functionaries.Such a situation exacerbates the challenges

The present border security scenario is marked

by increased cross-borderterrorism; infiltration and

exfiltration of armedmilitants; an emergence of

non-state actors; a nexusbetween narcotics and

arms smugglers; illegalmigrations; left wing

extremism and separatistmovements aided and

abetted by external powers.

”

According to the 2009-10 annual report ofthe Ministry of Home Affairs , there areseven Central Police and ParamilitaryForces that are controlled by the Ministryof Home Affairs. These are:

ASSAM RIFLES (AR):A paramilitary force with 46 battalionsunder the operational control of theIndian Army.

BORDER SECURITY FORCE (BSF):Raised as a paramilitary force, now apolice force with 159 battalions with 29 battalions under raising.

CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITYFORCE (CISF):Police force with 1,20,000 personnel;provides security cover to 289 industrialundertakings (mostly airports, PublicSector Undertakings and heritagemonuments) and ensures fire protection.

CENTRAL RESERVE POLICEFORCE (CRPF):Police force with 206 battalions,including two Disaster ManagementBattalions, three Mahila Battalions, ten RAF (Rapid Action Force) Battalions;five Signals Battalions; and six COBRA(Commando Battalion for ResoluteAction) Battalions; 38 battalions areunder raising.

INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE(ITBP):Deployed along the Indo-Tibet borderand for VIP protection duties, it is a policeforce with 45 (service) battalions plusfour specialised battalions and 20battalions under raising.

NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG):Paramilitary force with approximately8,000 personnel and one Special ActionGroup (SAG), strike force, comprisingArmy personnel; two Special Ranger

groups (SRGs), reconnaissance and VIPprotection duties, comprising policepersonnel; Force HQ; major componentlocated at Manesar, near Delhi; fourregional hubs at Chennai, Hyderabad,Kolkata and Mumbai.

SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL (SSB, FORMERLY SPECIAL SERVICEBUREAU):Police force with 46 battalions; deployed along the Indo-Nepal andIndo-Bhutan borders.

Central Police and Paramilitary Forces: The Super Seven

AFP


of border management, making it morecomplex for the border guarding agencies. It is axiomatic that poor bordermanagement inevitably leads to a volatileinternal security situation in the borderstates of the country.

Ideally, border management should bethe responsibility of the Ministry of HomeAffairs (MHA) during peace time. However,the active nature of the LoC and the need tomaintain troops close to the Line of ActualControl (LAC) in a state of readiness foroperations in high altitude areas, hascompelled the Army to permanently deploylarge forces for this task. While the BSFshould be responsible for all settled borders,

the responsibility for unsettled and disputedborders, such as the LoC in J&K and the LAC on the Indo-Tibetan border, should bethat of the Army. However, the principle of‘single point control’ must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed.Divided responsibilities never result ineffective control.

At present, the responsibility formanaging the border with China in thenorth is that of the ITBP’s except in someplaces such as Sikkim where the Army is in charge. In the west, the entire borderwith Pakistan is manned by the BSF except the LoC in J&K. The LoC is theresponsibility of the Army with some BSFbattalions placed under its operationalcontrol. On the LoC, the primaryoperational responsibility of the forces is toensure its physical integrity againstPakistan Army encroachment; the Army’ssecondary responsibility is to minimisetrans-LoC infiltration by armed mercenaryterrorists usually aided and abetted by thePakistan Army and the ISI.

The border with Nepal was virtuallyunattended till very recently as Nepalesecitizens have free access to live and workin India under a 1950 treaty between thetwo countries. However, since theeruption of the Maoist insurgency in Nepalefforts have been made to gradually step-up vigilance along this border, as Indiafears the southward spread of Maoistideology. The responsibility for this hasbeen entrusted to the Sashastra Seema Bal(SSB). The Cabinet Secretariat hadexercised direct operational control overthe SSB till 2003 but the force is now underthe MHA.

Along the Bangladesh border, nowseeing active action recently, the BSF is in charge. This border remains in the news as there are frequent clashesbetween the BSF and the Bangladesh

Rifles (BDR) over encroachments,

enclaves and adverse possessions.

Cross-Border MovementsFor the Bhutan border, the responsibility isthat of the SSB. The border with Myanmaralso remains operationally active. Severalinsurgent groups have secured sanctuariesfor themselves in Myanmar despite theco-operation extended by theMyanmarese Army.

The cross-border movement of Nagasand Mizos for training, purchase of armsand shelter when pursued by Indiansecurity forces, combined with thedifficult terrain obtaining in the area,

makes this border extremely challengingto manage. This border is manned jointlyby the Army and some units of the AR.However, recent reports have indicatedthat the BSF may soon be deployed toguard this border, leaving AR units free forcounter-insurgency operations.

The NSG is responsible for counter-terrorist operations and counter-hijack

APRIL 2011 DSI

28

SECURITY

security duties in the Northeastern statessince the mid-1950s began to be employedfirst in Punjab and then in J&K to stabilisethe situation.

As Pakistan raised the ante and thenumber of mercenary jihadis inducted intoJ&K by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)rose sharply, first the Border Security Force(BSF), and then the Central Reserve PoliceForce (CRPF), was employed to assist theArmy. Soon the Indo-Tibetan Border PoliceForce (ITBP) was also used to guardvulnerable installations.

The Centre wisely decided to deploythe state and Central Police forces in theurban areas for active operations againstmilitants. The Army was given a free hand to conduct counter-insurgencyoperations in the rural hinterland and to check infiltration through the Line of Control (LoC).

That this policy succeeded admirably isborne out by the fact that insurgency in J&K isnow well under control and the government

has initiated a process of rapprochement tofind a permanent solution to the state’s long-standing problems.

Under the Constitution, law and orderis basically a state subject and ideally, theconstabulary and provincial armed policeof the states’ infested by militancy shouldbe capable of handling all but the mostvicious forms of militancy with only short-term supplementary support from thecentral security forces.

But based on the recommendations ofthe four task forces that were appointedafter the Kargil Review Committee, theGroup of Ministers (GoM) decided todesignate the CRPF as a strike force forinternal security and to send forces such asthe BSF and the ITBP to the borders, ratherthan continuing the ad hoc manner inwhich these forces were being employedbefore the Kargil conflict.

Since then the Central Police andParamilitary Forces are now charged withthe responsibility either to manage the

country’s borders during peace time or toundertake internal security duties in thecountry’s various trouble spots.

Border Management Border management is a responsibility thattoday is shared by the Army with the BSFand the ITBP. Dr G. P. Bhatnagar, formerInspector General, BSF has written that thepresent border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism;

infiltration and exfiltration of armedmilitants; the emergence of non-stateactors; a nexus between narcotics and armssmugglers; illegal migrations; left wingextremism; separatist movements aidedand abetted by external powers; and theestablishment of madrasas which couldprove to be security hazards.

Smugglers, drug-traffickers andfundamentalist terrorists are often inleague with local criminals, lower rungpolitical leaders and police functionaries.Such a situation exacerbates the challenges

The present border security scenario is marked

by increased cross-borderterrorism; infiltration and

exfiltration of armedmilitants; an emergence of

non-state actors; a nexusbetween narcotics and

arms smugglers; illegalmigrations; left wing

extremism and separatistmovements aided and

abetted by external powers.

”

According to the 2009-10 annual report ofthe Ministry of Home Affairs , there areseven Central Police and ParamilitaryForces that are controlled by the Ministryof Home Affairs. These are:

ASSAM RIFLES (AR):A paramilitary force with 46 battalionsunder the operational control of theIndian Army.

BORDER SECURITY FORCE (BSF):Raised as a paramilitary force, now apolice force with 159 battalions with 29 battalions under raising.

CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITYFORCE (CISF):Police force with 1,20,000 personnel;provides security cover to 289 industrialundertakings (mostly airports, PublicSector Undertakings and heritagemonuments) and ensures fire protection.

CENTRAL RESERVE POLICEFORCE (CRPF):Police force with 206 battalions,including two Disaster ManagementBattalions, three Mahila Battalions, ten RAF (Rapid Action Force) Battalions;five Signals Battalions; and six COBRA(Commando Battalion for ResoluteAction) Battalions; 38 battalions areunder raising.

INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE(ITBP):Deployed along the Indo-Tibet borderand for VIP protection duties, it is a policeforce with 45 (service) battalions plusfour specialised battalions and 20battalions under raising.

NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG):Paramilitary force with approximately8,000 personnel and one Special ActionGroup (SAG), strike force, comprisingArmy personnel; two Special Ranger

groups (SRGs), reconnaissance and VIPprotection duties, comprising policepersonnel; Force HQ; major componentlocated at Manesar, near Delhi; fourregional hubs at Chennai, Hyderabad,Kolkata and Mumbai.

SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL (SSB, FORMERLY SPECIAL SERVICEBUREAU):Police force with 46 battalions; deployed along the Indo-Nepal andIndo-Bhutan borders.

Central Police and Paramilitary Forces: The Super Seven

AFP


30

SECURITY

tasks. It is also responsiblefor providing security toVIPs while on the move.The NSG was tested duringthe Mumbai terrorist strikesof November 2008 and while its overallperformance was satisfactory, manyequipment and training deficiencies werehighlighted. It was also found to havetaken too long to reach Mumbai from Delhias an Air Force aircraft had to be flown infrom Chandigarh. Most of these structuralproblems have been suitably addressed byHome Minister P. Chidambaram and histeam at the MHA.

However, the proposed NationalCounter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is still tosee the light of day and the well-conceivedNational Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) hasalso not been established as yet –presumably due to turf battles amongvarious intelligence agencies.

Without effective intelligence, counter-terrorist operations can never beconducted successfully. Another Mumbai-type terror strike cannot be ruled out and itis necessary to firstly prevent its recurrenceand if there is another intelligence failure, tobe able to react effectively so as to savemaximum lives and ensure minimum

damage to property, especiallyheritage buildings that are thenation’s pride.

Conflict Management Strategy The prevailing internal securityenvironment demands an astute national-level conflict management strategy, acomprehensive multi-departmental policyformulation and vigorous implementation,

while simultaneously ensuring thatrequisite steps are initiated to address the socio-political and socio-economicproblems that lead people to militancy.

However, there are downsides to theemployment of a plethora of forces. Itinevitably results in a lack of cohesivenessand dissonance in the execution of policyand is bound to lead to institutionallydebilitating turf battles.

The employment of multiple forcesresults in problems of command andcontrol as well as the lack of accountabilityfor encroachments, poor intelligence andinept handling of local sensitivities.

Though some BSF battalions in J&Kwere replaced by CRPF battalions in 2003-04, the Central government continues torepose its faith in a ‘mix-n-match’ policy ofcommitting almost all types of central police

forces like the BSF, the CRPF and the ITBP,

along with the Army, in counter-insurgencyoperations. Unfortunately, each of theforces has been raising new battalions in an ad hoc manner. This policy has not produced results commensuratewith the force levels employed, as counter-insurgency operations require a highdegree of specialisation and higher-level of coordination.

To reduce the deployment of the Armyfor internal security duties, the capabilityof the police and paramilitary forces at thedisposal of the state and Centralgovernments should be upgraded toenable them to effectively tackle internalsecurity problems. They must develop anArmy-like ethos and must raise theirstandards to match the Army’s levels ofproven junior leadership, motivation andtraining. The Army can assist in thisgradual transformation of the CPMFs andstate police forces.

Though the Group of Ministers task forceon internal security identified the CRPF asthe most suitable force for reorganisation asthe primary Central government force for counter-insurgency operations itseffectiveness has been severely challenged.

The CRPF is now deployed not only in J&K but also against left wing extremistslike Naxalites in Central India where it has repeatedly come up short in itsperformance during counter-insurgencyoperations. The infamous Dantewadaincident in 2010 in which 76 personnelwere brutally killed by Naxalites made the government sit up and take notice of the operational deficiencies of this force.

In order to be successful in their newrole, the CRPF units must be suitablyequipped with modern close quarter battleweapons and battalion-level supportweapons. Its leadership should be drawnthrough lateral induction of volunteersfrom the Army, as was done when the BSFwas initially raised.

Another aspect of reorientation necessarywill be to ensure that CRPF units operateas cohesive battalions under the directcommand of the Commanding Officer (CO)and not as independent companies in pennypackets, with the CO being given onlyadministrative responsibility.

Dealing with the various insurgenciesthreatening India’s security requires a holisticinter-ministerial and inter-departmentalapproach. Above all, it requires politicalcourage and vision to evolve and implementa comprehensive national policy.

National SecurityGuard Commandosduring the Mumbaiterrorist attack

AFP


ROSOBORONEXPORTpresents a unique combat vehicle

At the 10th anniversary IDEX 2011 in AbuDhabi (UAE) Rosoboronexport presentedthe BMPT, a unique tank support combatvehicle.

The BMPT is virtually unrivaled in theworld: it is truly a new dawn in the world ofarmored vehicles. Experts note that thenew Russian vehicle can operate bothindependently and jointly with tanks.

When tanks and BMPT are usedtogether, the efficiency is achievedthrough allocation of targets: fortificationsand heavily armored vehicles aredestroyed by tanks, while manpower,antitank weapons and lightly armoredvehicles are engaged by the BMPT.

Independently, the BMPT can be usedto strengthen and support the infantry,escort and guard convoys and facilities,defeat terrorist groups.

PowerThe vehicle’s main armament fire-controlsystem, based on a multi-channel sight(with optical and thermal channels) and apanoramic low-level TV sight, can detectand recognize small targets at longranges, day and night, in bad weather andengage them with two 30mm 2A42automatic cannons firing HE and APprojectiles. The ammunition load of is 850rounds in two magazines.

The main armament system includesalso two launchers with four supersonicAtaka-T ATGMs carrying HEAT andthermobaric warheads.

Secondary armament, consisting oftwo 30mm AG-17D automatic grenadelaunchers, is housed in armoredcompartments on the sides. Theammunition load consisting of 300grenades for each AG-17D is located atthe same place. The grenade launchersare remotely controlled and verticallystabilized. A 7.62mm machine guncoupled with the 30mm cannons is usedas ancillary armament.

BMPT’s crew includes three operatorsenabling quick detection andsimultaneous destruction of three differenttargets in the 360-degree sector at once.

The targets are allocated among the crewmembers by the vehicle’s commanderwho himself can independently fire induplicate control mode, if required.

SurvivabilityDuring the BMPT development, particularattention was given to crew protection.The vehicle is low observable, due to itssmall dimensions and disruptingcamouflage painting. Explosive reactivearmor (ERA) increases the level ofprotection against single-charge HEATwarheads, APFSDS projectiles andATGMs fitted with tandem HEATwarheads.

The vehicle’s sides are completelyprotected by add-on ERA screens andgrilled shields, which, in conjunction witharmored compartments on the hull sides,provide reliable crew protection againstlight anti-tank weapons. The hull rear isalso protected by grilled shields.Moreover, because the main armament ismounted on the turret roof, the turret frontplate has no weak areas and isstrengthened by integral ERA. Protection

of the crew from secondary fragmentsinside the hull and turret is provided byanti-spall fabric liners. In addition, the fuelinside and outside the vehicle is housedin armored compartments.

ManeuverabilityDespite its impressive armoring, theBMPT features high mobility andmaneuverability. This is achieved byinstalling a 1000hp four-stroke liquid-cooled turbocharged diesel engine,advanced powertrain and chassis,ensuring soft riding and increased cross-country capacity.

The Russian vehicle is ideal for combatmissions in urban areas, mountainousand forest terrain. It is maneuverable,because its armaments do not extendbeyond the hull when the turret turns,while the laying angles allow engagementof various targets, from basements to theupper floors of buildings.

Today, buying the tank support combatvehicle, the Army takes care of everysoldier, the whole unit and its combatants,protecting them reliably from enemy fire.

BMPT, a unique tank support combat vehicle

ROE 15-03-2011.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 18/04/11 2:35 PM Page 1

The global security environment hasshifted to the Asia-Pacific. In ongoingdisputes in the East and South China

Sea, or in regard to Taiwan, the potentialfor confrontation is at sea. Safe transit inthe narrow channels of the South EastAsian archipelago, through which energylifelines of many countries must pass, isanother important concern. More than60 percent of the world’s energy movesacross the shipping routes of the IndianOcean (IO), principally from the Gulf.Looming instability in some Gulf littoralsadds to the concern. And, if this was notenough, the waters off Somalia are infestedwith pirates who have hijacked severaldozen ships, including oil tankers,extracting millions of dollars from theowners of those ships as ransom. This is acomplex brew, almost all of it in themaritime domain. It is not surprising thenthe Asia-Pacific is increasingly beingreferred to as ‘Indo-Pacific’.

India’s ConcernsAs the largest country in the IO region,sitting astride its east-west shipping routes,India has responsibilities in ensuring safetyof the sea commons. Until recently, thefocus of its security concerns has rested inits immediate neighbourhood but in theemerging scenario,developments in the IOlittoral and even beyond, have becomeequally important. On a different plane,

APRIL 2011 DSI

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NAVY

33

n At sea, India’s naval power issuperior than that of her immediateneighbours but it should also be able toact in support of the war on land.n As a capable regional maritimepower India must be proactive in co-operating with littoral maritime forces.n To stem the fall of force levels anurgent import of some platforms isneeded especially since older shipsneed to be scrapped even as newones are brought in.

KEY POINTS

PREMVIR DAS

The Indian Navy is, undoubtedly, the largestlittoral regional maritime power, but the numberof its major seagoing platforms has stagnatedover the last several years and even declined

NOT REALLYSHIPSHAPE

INS Vidyutduring anexercise in theArabian Sea offthe Porbandarcoast, Gujarat

AFP

Navy Looks Ahead7 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:20 PM Page 32

The global security environment hasshifted to the Asia-Pacific. In ongoingdisputes in the East and South China

Sea, or in regard to Taiwan, the potentialfor confrontation is at sea. Safe transit inthe narrow channels of the South EastAsian archipelago, through which energylifelines of many countries must pass, isanother important concern. More than60 percent of the world’s energy movesacross the shipping routes of the IndianOcean (IO), principally from the Gulf.Looming instability in some Gulf littoralsadds to the concern. And, if this was notenough, the waters off Somalia are infestedwith pirates who have hijacked severaldozen ships, including oil tankers,extracting millions of dollars from theowners of those ships as ransom. This is acomplex brew, almost all of it in themaritime domain. It is not surprising thenthe Asia-Pacific is increasingly beingreferred to as ‘Indo-Pacific’.

India’s ConcernsAs the largest country in the IO region,sitting astride its east-west shipping routes,India has responsibilities in ensuring safetyof the sea commons. Until recently, thefocus of its security concerns has rested inits immediate neighbourhood but in theemerging scenario,developments in the IOlittoral and even beyond, have becomeequally important. On a different plane,

APRIL 2011 DSI

32

NAVY

33

n At sea, India’s naval power issuperior than that of her immediateneighbours but it should also be able toact in support of the war on land.n As a capable regional maritimepower India must be proactive in co-operating with littoral maritime forces.n To stem the fall of force levels anurgent import of some platforms isneeded especially since older shipsneed to be scrapped even as newones are brought in.

KEY POINTS

PREMVIR DAS

The Indian Navy is, undoubtedly, the largestlittoral regional maritime power, but the numberof its major seagoing platforms has stagnatedover the last several years and even declined

NOT REALLYSHIPSHAPE

INS Vidyutduring anexercise in theArabian Sea offthe Porbandarcoast, Gujarat

AFP


another by 2020, is likely. The urge to haveand exploit maritime power consistentwith its growing stature is visible, aswitnessed recently in the East Asianwaters; it may also seek a morecomprehensive presence in the IO.

China is building ports in three littoralcountries and there are apprehensionsthat one or more of these might be madeavailable by the hosts to the Chinese forsuch use. India must monitor thedevelopments closely and ensure that its

own capabilities at sea are commensuratewith the potential threats.

With economic growth being of a vitalnational interest and security of energyand trade being its two prime ingredients,safety of the IO commons has becomecritical. Quite apart from safeguarding itsown interests, India, as the most capableregional maritime power, must beproactive in co-operating with littoralmaritime forces through the sharing ofinformation, port visits, exchange of

personnel, co-ordinated patrols and jointexercises, all of which go to build trust andconfidence. Similar interface with othernon-littoral IO players is necessary. Thewaters off Somalia, even those quite farfrom the coast, have now become thepiracy centre of the world and India’smaritime forces must be at the forefront ofthe anti-piracy effort. Effective surveillanceand patrolling of coastal waters bymaritime forces is, therefore, necessary. Tothis list should be added capabilities torespond to natural disasters and oil spills,accidental or deliberate.

Need for ReachThe Indo-Pacific is a large canvas and thechallenges at sea quite formidable. Theessence of maritime power is to have multi-faceted capabilities which can be used inboth traditional and non-traditional threatscenarios. ‘Reach’,which means the abilityto go wherever one is needed, stay there foras long as one needs to, and, finally, tooperate credibly in the area of operations,is essential.

Different types of platforms are needed,both in numbers and of quality and in allthree dimensions that is ships, submarinesand aircraft. These forces need to benetworked and supported by efficientsurveillance and reconnaissance,both fromaircraft and satellites. Quick and decisivecommand and control with real timecommunications are other imperatives.

Finally, no credible operations arepossible at sea without control of theimmediate air space, a capability that onlyaircraft carriers can provide. Given thespread of India’s maritime interests, at leastthree such ships are needed so that twomight be available for duty at any time. Withone being acquired from Russia in 2012 andanother being built in the country and likelyto be ready in the next three years, the Navywill have two of them; early ordering ofanother vessel for indigenous manufactureshould be a high priority so that a level ofthree is reached by 2020.

In equipment, apart from the normalweapons and sensors that any majorseagoing platform must have, long rangemissile capability should be givenimportance so that targets deep in theadversary’s hinterland can be attackedfrom sea. In the emerging environment,the Navy should be able to lead ‘out ofarea’ joint operations, in rescue effortssuch as the tsunami of 2004 as well as insituations where our vital interests arethreatened. More platforms like the INS

India’s energy dependence, estimated at80 percent in 2020, and its overseas trade,likely to exceed $2 trillion in the same timeframe, are both linked to safe movement inthe seas around it.

India shares maritime boundaries notonly with three South Asian neighbours butalso with three nations of South East Asia –Myanmar,Thailand and Indonesia; there isalso close proximity with Malaysia. This hasits own complexities in terms of poachingor other criminal activity.

Maritime terror, generated throughorganisations located across its westernborder is another concern. The very daringraid launched by sea on high profile targetsin Mumbai on November 26, 2008 was avisible manifestation of that threat. As canbe seen, the challenges are many and theyare increasing.

Nature of Threats Pakistan and China have been in militaryconflict with India, the former as many asfour times, and are the two countrieswhich could pose a future military threatto India. While the probability that eithermay seek military conflict with us is nothigh, it can not be ruled out. Even as the

Pakistan military establishment seesasymmetric terror actions, such as those ofNovember 2008, as cost effective itcontinues to seethe with the humiliation ofits defeat in 1971 and irrational conduct is areal possibility.

It is, therefore, essential that Indiamaintain a convincing military deterrentagainst Pakistan. At sea, our naval poweris superior and must continue to remain so;it should also be able to act in support of the war on land. High state of

preparedness to cope with terrorist threats,at and from the sea, is equally essential.

China falls in a different category.While, in the last decade, relations havebeen tranquil, there are many areas ofdiscord. Yet, China is a country that Indianeeds to engage. So, a positive butwatchful stratagem is necessary. At sea,China is modernising its naval forces bybuilding ships and submarines at a fastrate and an induction of an aircraft carrierin the next few years, to be reinforced by

35

APRIL 2011 DSINAVY

34

AFP

Navy cadetsduring the NavyDay celebrations ,Mumbai

Even as the Pakistanmilitary establishment sees

asymmetric terror actions,such as those of November

2008, as cost effective itcontinues to seethe with the

humiliation of its defeat in1971 and irrational conduct

is a real possibility. It is,therefore, essential that

India maintain a convincingmilitary deterrent against

Pakistan. At sea, our navalpower is superior and must

continue to remain so.

”


another by 2020, is likely. The urge to haveand exploit maritime power consistentwith its growing stature is visible, aswitnessed recently in the East Asianwaters; it may also seek a morecomprehensive presence in the IO.

China is building ports in three littoralcountries and there are apprehensionsthat one or more of these might be madeavailable by the hosts to the Chinese forsuch use. India must monitor thedevelopments closely and ensure that its

own capabilities at sea are commensuratewith the potential threats.

With economic growth being of a vitalnational interest and security of energyand trade being its two prime ingredients,safety of the IO commons has becomecritical. Quite apart from safeguarding itsown interests, India, as the most capableregional maritime power, must beproactive in co-operating with littoralmaritime forces through the sharing ofinformation, port visits, exchange of

personnel, co-ordinated patrols and jointexercises, all of which go to build trust andconfidence. Similar interface with othernon-littoral IO players is necessary. Thewaters off Somalia, even those quite farfrom the coast, have now become thepiracy centre of the world and India’smaritime forces must be at the forefront ofthe anti-piracy effort. Effective surveillanceand patrolling of coastal waters bymaritime forces is, therefore, necessary. Tothis list should be added capabilities torespond to natural disasters and oil spills,accidental or deliberate.

Need for ReachThe Indo-Pacific is a large canvas and thechallenges at sea quite formidable. Theessence of maritime power is to have multi-faceted capabilities which can be used inboth traditional and non-traditional threatscenarios. ‘Reach’,which means the abilityto go wherever one is needed, stay there foras long as one needs to, and, finally, tooperate credibly in the area of operations,is essential.

Different types of platforms are needed,both in numbers and of quality and in allthree dimensions that is ships, submarinesand aircraft. These forces need to benetworked and supported by efficientsurveillance and reconnaissance,both fromaircraft and satellites. Quick and decisivecommand and control with real timecommunications are other imperatives.

Finally, no credible operations arepossible at sea without control of theimmediate air space, a capability that onlyaircraft carriers can provide. Given thespread of India’s maritime interests, at leastthree such ships are needed so that twomight be available for duty at any time. Withone being acquired from Russia in 2012 andanother being built in the country and likelyto be ready in the next three years, the Navywill have two of them; early ordering ofanother vessel for indigenous manufactureshould be a high priority so that a level ofthree is reached by 2020.

In equipment, apart from the normalweapons and sensors that any majorseagoing platform must have, long rangemissile capability should be givenimportance so that targets deep in theadversary’s hinterland can be attackedfrom sea. In the emerging environment,the Navy should be able to lead ‘out ofarea’ joint operations, in rescue effortssuch as the tsunami of 2004 as well as insituations where our vital interests arethreatened. More platforms like the INS

India’s energy dependence, estimated at80 percent in 2020, and its overseas trade,likely to exceed $2 trillion in the same timeframe, are both linked to safe movement inthe seas around it.

India shares maritime boundaries notonly with three South Asian neighbours butalso with three nations of South East Asia –Myanmar,Thailand and Indonesia; there isalso close proximity with Malaysia. This hasits own complexities in terms of poachingor other criminal activity.

Maritime terror, generated throughorganisations located across its westernborder is another concern. The very daringraid launched by sea on high profile targetsin Mumbai on November 26, 2008 was avisible manifestation of that threat. As canbe seen, the challenges are many and theyare increasing.

Nature of Threats Pakistan and China have been in militaryconflict with India, the former as many asfour times, and are the two countrieswhich could pose a future military threatto India. While the probability that eithermay seek military conflict with us is nothigh, it can not be ruled out. Even as the

Pakistan military establishment seesasymmetric terror actions, such as those ofNovember 2008, as cost effective itcontinues to seethe with the humiliation ofits defeat in 1971 and irrational conduct is areal possibility.

It is, therefore, essential that Indiamaintain a convincing military deterrentagainst Pakistan. At sea, our naval poweris superior and must continue to remain so;it should also be able to act in support of the war on land. High state of

preparedness to cope with terrorist threats,at and from the sea, is equally essential.

China falls in a different category.While, in the last decade, relations havebeen tranquil, there are many areas ofdiscord. Yet, China is a country that Indianeeds to engage. So, a positive butwatchful stratagem is necessary. At sea,China is modernising its naval forces bybuilding ships and submarines at a fastrate and an induction of an aircraft carrierin the next few years, to be reinforced by

35

APRIL 2011 DSINAVY

34

AFP

Navy cadetsduring the NavyDay celebrations ,Mumbai

Even as the Pakistanmilitary establishment sees

asymmetric terror actions,such as those of November

2008, as cost effective itcontinues to seethe with the

humiliation of its defeat in1971 and irrational conduct

is a real possibility. It is,therefore, essential that

India maintain a convincingmilitary deterrent against

Pakistan. At sea, our navalpower is superior and must

continue to remain so.

”


APRIL 2011 DSINAVY

Jalashva, capable of carrying reasonablylarge numbers of troops and heavyequipment and enough helicopters toairdrop them, are needed.

While the Indian Navy is,undoubtedly,the largest littoral maritime power, thenumbers of its major seagoing platformshas stagnated over the last several yearsand even declined in some categories;force level of submarines is the worstaffected. There are many reasons thathave led to this unhappy state of affairsincluding unjustifiable delays in decisionmaking; inadequate capacities in publicsector shipyards have also been, and are,a serious constraint. Recent measures tofarm out some orders to private shipyardsare a step in the right direction but willtake some time to fructify.

In order that force levels do not fallfurther, urgent import of some platforms,therefore,merits serious consideration. Itmust be realised that older ships have tobe scrapped even as new ones are broughtin. Acquisition decisions must ensure thatthe latter process is faster.

Finally, being a nuclear weapon state,India needs to have credible deterrencewhich only a submarine-based deliverysystem can provide. Such a project has to be

indigenous. After some unfortunate delays,the first of such vessels, INS Arihant, hasbeen launched last year and should beoperational by 2014. Reports indicate that atleast two more are to be built. A suitablemissile is also under development. Whendeployed, these will complete the triad thatIndia has decided to put in place.

India’s maritime security interests arespread across a broad spectrum coveringgeostrategic considerations arising fromthe country’s size and location, its energyand trade security, traditional threatsposed by nation state adversaries,and those that are of a different but equally threatening kind. We have toensure that we can safeguard our interestsacross this canvas. Ability to respond tonatural disasters which visit the IO region isalso necessary. A mix of forces is needed,ocean going as well as coastal.

Last, but not the least, to answer thechallenges arising from the evolvingscenario, it is imperative that the nation’sdiplomacy and its maritime capabilitiesfunction in tune with each other. A meshedapproach is essential if India’s sea poweris first, built to the required level, and then,exploited consistent with the nation’ssecurity interests.

A Sea Harriertakes off fromthe flight deck of the aircraftcarrier INS Viraat

AFP

India’s maritime securityinterests are spread acrossa broad spectrum covering

geostrategic considerationsarising from the country’s

size and location, its energyand trade security,

traditional threats posed bynation state adversaries,

and those that are of adifferent but equally

threatening kind. We have toensure that we can

safeguard our interestsacross this canvas.

”36


R ussian Helicopters, the sub-sidiary of United IndustrialCorporation Oboronprom, hasopened a service centre in

Greater Noida in a joint venture withIndia-based Vectra Group to cater to theneeds of its helicopters in India.Integrated Helicopter Services PrivateLimited (IHSPL) is for all type of civilRussian-made helicopters.

“The opening of a service centre inIndia is a very important event for us” saidDmitry Petrov, CEO, Russian Helicopters.“We are planning to make this centre oneof the key elements of our support net-work for existing Russian-made rotorcraftand Mi and Kamov helicopters deliveredin the future to India and South-East Asiaas a whole.”

The plans of the Indo-Russian jointventure IHSPL envision that the servicecentre will become the stronghold forwarranty service of Russian-made rotor-craft in India. The centre will offer Indianoperators and state aviation organisa-tions aftersale service, as well as sched-uled maintenance and unscheduledrepairs of any Mi and Kamov helicopters.

The aim of the existing RussianHelicopters programme is to create aglobal support of Russian-made rotor-craft throughout their lifecycle. As part ofthis programme, new MRO centres arebeing established and the existing cen-tres are being certified in key for RussianHelicopters markets of the world, includ-ing India, which is a traditional one for theRussian helicopters.

Today Russian-made rotorcraft form

the core helicopter fleet of the Indianarmed forces and Russian Helicopters isthe only official supplier of Russian civilhelicopters to the country. More than 200Russian helicopters including Mi-25(export variant of Mi-24D), Mi-35, Mi-26,and Mi-8/17 are already in service in India.

“Talking about the future growth of hel-icopter market, we would be bringing in12 to 15 rotor-blade aircraft within thenext two years. These would be Ka-32and Mi-171 or Mi-172 helicopters,” RaviRishi, Chairman, Vectra Group, said.

According to the latest KPMGresearch, Indian Ministry of Defense isalso planning to purchase 15 heavytransport helicopters, 22 attack and 197multi-purpose light helicopters.

New Russian-made Ka-226T withTurbomeca engines is one of the “light”tender participants for 197 helicopters.Ka-226T has already demonstrated itsoutstanding flight structure, altitude andmanoeuvring characteristics. The 5700 moperating ceiling, exceptional for a lighthelicopter, is yet another unique achieve-ment of Ka-226T.

Unrivalled performance of Ka-226T

makes it a helicopter of choice in moun-tainous terrains and hot climates, overwater, in windy conditions, and in urbanhigh-rise operations.

Ka-226T has a MTOW of 4 tons with apayload of 1.45 tons. Its max speed is250 km/h. It can take up to 9 peopleincluding two pilots. With 10-minute emer-gency reserves max flight time is 3.3hours and range is 525 km.

Separate cabin modules allow usingthe same helicopter for transportation,patrol, construction, medevac, firefight-ing, search & rescue, and evacuationwithout handicapping technical and eco-nomic performance.

Russian Helicopters offers its Indianpartners a diversified Russian rotorcraftlineup capable of performing any mis-sions, from passenger transportation andcommercial operations to special mis-sions in natural disaster areas. These hel-icopters can be employed for corporate,passenger, cargo, search & rescue, con-struction, patrol, and firefighting purposes.

In July 2010 the Russian helicopterindustry holding Russian Helicopterssigned a contract with the Indian compa-ny Global Vectra Helicorp on the deliveryof Ka-32A11BC helicopter which hadalready being certified for operations inIndia. Unlike Mi-17, traditional for theIndian market, Ka-32A11BC is making itsdebut in the region. Global VectraHelicorp is planning to use the Russianrotorcraft for cargo transportation andconstruction work in the civilian segment.Ka-32A11BC is scheduled for delivery toIndia in 2011.

Russian heavy lift Mi-26T2 and combat Mi-28NE are also bidding inIndian tenders for helicopters.

Russian rotorcrafts are currently operated in more than 100 countriesworldwide. Many countries have alreadyhighly appraised the unique economicand operating capabilities of Russian helicopters and expressed a need forsuch rotorcrafts. – Gopal Dubey

RUSSIAN HELICOPTERSMAKE NEW STEP FORWARD TOESTABLISH GLOBAL SUPPORTNETWORK FOR ROTORCRAFT

Mi-26T2 Russian-made multifunctional

Ka-32A11BC is one of the best in firefighting KA-32A11BC

KA-226T

Russian Helicopters final.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 18/04/11 2:38 PM Page 1

The absence of a consensus toencapsulate the happenings in theMiddle East underscores that while

there could be common features, situationsvary from country to country and it isproblematic to bring them under a singlerubric. Some call it an uprising, some see itas a revolt, while there are a few inclinedto see it as nothing less than a revolution.Most certainly, the happenings do notproceed in a uniform direction, nor is thereaction by the international community

consistent or based on common principles,

which make the strategic implications hardto fathom in the near term and highlyuncertain in the fullness of time. What canbe said with a measure of confidence forthe present is that their impact on bothIndia and Pakistan can prove to besubstantial while there is little to suggestthat the ‘democracy deficit’ in these twoSouth Asian countries is comparable to theMiddle Eastern syndrome.

The Middle Eastern developmentsconstitute a march of history. Simply put,the great Middle Eastern settlement of 1922 has by far outlived its utility anddespite repeated patch-ups, continuedwestern dominance – political, economicand cultural – of the region has becomeuntenable. The unravelling began surfacingas early as the 1950s with the rise ofMohammed Mossadeq in Iran and GamelNasser in Egypt but the West successfullysmothered the historical forces.

However, by the end of the 1970s, theprocess began gathering momentum. Theoil crisis in the 1970s, the Islamic revolutionin Iran (surge of nationalism under Islamistgarb, imbued with ideology of resistanceand justice), the injection of radical Islaminto the barricades of the cold war inAfghanistan, the consequent birth of ‘non-state actors’, the ‘de-ideologisation’ of theMiddle East divide following the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, the lingering Palestinianquestion and the Arab-Israeli problem andof course globalisation and its discontent –

39

APRIL 2011 DSI

38

MIDDLE EAST

n Neither India nor Pakistan face anyreal prospect of the spread of the‘democracy’ virus blowing in fromArabia.n Continued western intervention, asin Libya, can generate a securityclimate which will help extremistforces upto Pakistan and Afghanistan.n US regional policies are poised toundergo profound changes which willsee a new security paradigm in ourextended neighborhood.

KEY POINTS

THE MARCH OF HISTORY

M.K.BHADRAKUMAR

The unrest in the Middle East can have a substantialimpact on South Asia though there is little to suggestthat the region suffers from a democracy deficit

AFP

From Tunisia to Kashmir - NEW.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:23 PM Page 38

The absence of a consensus toencapsulate the happenings in theMiddle East underscores that while

there could be common features, situationsvary from country to country and it isproblematic to bring them under a singlerubric. Some call it an uprising, some see itas a revolt, while there are a few inclinedto see it as nothing less than a revolution.Most certainly, the happenings do notproceed in a uniform direction, nor is thereaction by the international community

consistent or based on common principles,

which make the strategic implications hardto fathom in the near term and highlyuncertain in the fullness of time. What canbe said with a measure of confidence forthe present is that their impact on bothIndia and Pakistan can prove to besubstantial while there is little to suggestthat the ‘democracy deficit’ in these twoSouth Asian countries is comparable to theMiddle Eastern syndrome.

The Middle Eastern developmentsconstitute a march of history. Simply put,the great Middle Eastern settlement of 1922 has by far outlived its utility anddespite repeated patch-ups, continuedwestern dominance – political, economicand cultural – of the region has becomeuntenable. The unravelling began surfacingas early as the 1950s with the rise ofMohammed Mossadeq in Iran and GamelNasser in Egypt but the West successfullysmothered the historical forces.

However, by the end of the 1970s, theprocess began gathering momentum. Theoil crisis in the 1970s, the Islamic revolutionin Iran (surge of nationalism under Islamistgarb, imbued with ideology of resistanceand justice), the injection of radical Islaminto the barricades of the cold war inAfghanistan, the consequent birth of ‘non-state actors’, the ‘de-ideologisation’ of theMiddle East divide following the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, the lingering Palestinianquestion and the Arab-Israeli problem andof course globalisation and its discontent –

39

APRIL 2011 DSI

38

MIDDLE EAST

n Neither India nor Pakistan face anyreal prospect of the spread of the‘democracy’ virus blowing in fromArabia.n Continued western intervention, asin Libya, can generate a securityclimate which will help extremistforces upto Pakistan and Afghanistan.n US regional policies are poised toundergo profound changes which willsee a new security paradigm in ourextended neighborhood.

KEY POINTS

THE MARCH OF HISTORY

M.K.BHADRAKUMAR

The unrest in the Middle East can have a substantialimpact on South Asia though there is little to suggestthat the region suffers from a democracy deficit

AFP


41

APRIL 2011 DSI

40

MIDDLE EAST

all these have made the continuance of the regional political order of autocraticrule by dictators supported by the Westextremely untenable.

Change is InevitableIf the aftermath of the Iraq war highlightedthe contradictions emanating out of thesteady loss of the influence of the UnitedStates on the one hand and the rise of Iranas a regional power on the other, Israel’sdisastrous attack on Lebanon in 2006showed up for the first time the growingirrelevance of Israel’s military superiorityin the geopolitics of the region. Change, inshort, has become inevitable in the US’regional policies.

The autocratic Arab regimes haveshown extreme reluctance to reform andlargely remain resistant to change. Thereare no doubt peculiarities in the givensituations, too. In Tunisia, the dictatoralmost instinctively abdicated. In Egypt,hetried to hold on hoping that the seeminglyinchoate popular call for change wouldeventually fizzle out or can be weatheredby the truculent regime. In Jordan, thedictator is trying his best to ride the waveand stay in power as a responsive andaccountable ruler.

Meanwhile, in Bahrain and Syria,strong sectarian overtones threaten tosubsume all else. In Yemen, the politicalconfrontation is morphing into acute tribaland clan rivalry, while Saudi Arabia is acategory by itself where by raising thebogey of Shi’ite empowerment and bydoling out largesse to the populace and keeping the Wahhabi religiousestablishment on its side, the regime strivesto deflect popular discontent, but thesimmering rivalries and jockeying forpower within the royal family threaten thecohesion of the regime. The fate of the Arab states in the Persian Gulf regionwill be largely determined by whathappens in Saudi Arabia, which is itselfhighly susceptible to any regime change in Bahrain.

Amidst all this, Libya erupted on thescene rather deceptively as part of theoverall tapestry of the ‘Middle Eastrevolution’. In reality, though, whathappened in Libya was a form of ‘colourrevolution’ that didn’t quite follow thescript – given the country’s tortuoushistory of state formation and itscomplicated tribal structure and regionalimbalances as well as Muammar Gaddafi’smercurial personality. Unlike in Georgia orUkraine, things took a bloody turn,which

led to an overt western intervention. Butthe West may still prefer a negotiated‘regime change’ in Tripoli.

The Western DilemmaWhile the western attempt is to calibratethe region’s political transition and toprioritise between countries, fine-tuningmay be hard to achieve. Clearly, the Westhas shown a great appetite for change inLibya, but it condones repression inBahrain (where the US’s Fifth Fleet isbased) and just can’t contemplate theprospect of an overthrow of the politicalorder in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, especiallySaudi Arabia. What is often overlooked isthat the petrodollar recycling is integral tothe prosperity of western societies and ata time when economic recovery is stillpatchy, if Qatar or Kuwait or the UAE and Saudi Arabia were to ‘call back’their monies, amounting to trillions ofdollars, the western banking system would collapse.

This lies at the root of the westerndilemma over the emergence of a newpolitical order drawing legitimacy from

Libya erupted on the scene rather deceptively

as part of the overalltapestry of the ‘Middle East

revolution’. In reality,though, what happened in

Libya was a form of ‘colour revolution’ that

didn’t quite follow the script– given the country’s

tortuous history of stateformation and its

complicated tribal structureand regional imbalances

as well as MuammarGaddafi’s mercurial

personality.

”

Rebels ride on an armoured personnelcarrier, near Brega in north-eastern Libya

AFP


41

APRIL 2011 DSI

40

MIDDLE EAST

all these have made the continuance of the regional political order of autocraticrule by dictators supported by the Westextremely untenable.

Change is InevitableIf the aftermath of the Iraq war highlightedthe contradictions emanating out of thesteady loss of the influence of the UnitedStates on the one hand and the rise of Iranas a regional power on the other, Israel’sdisastrous attack on Lebanon in 2006showed up for the first time the growingirrelevance of Israel’s military superiorityin the geopolitics of the region. Change, inshort, has become inevitable in the US’regional policies.

The autocratic Arab regimes haveshown extreme reluctance to reform andlargely remain resistant to change. Thereare no doubt peculiarities in the givensituations, too. In Tunisia, the dictatoralmost instinctively abdicated. In Egypt,hetried to hold on hoping that the seeminglyinchoate popular call for change wouldeventually fizzle out or can be weatheredby the truculent regime. In Jordan, thedictator is trying his best to ride the waveand stay in power as a responsive andaccountable ruler.

Meanwhile, in Bahrain and Syria,strong sectarian overtones threaten tosubsume all else. In Yemen, the politicalconfrontation is morphing into acute tribaland clan rivalry, while Saudi Arabia is acategory by itself where by raising thebogey of Shi’ite empowerment and bydoling out largesse to the populace and keeping the Wahhabi religiousestablishment on its side, the regime strivesto deflect popular discontent, but thesimmering rivalries and jockeying forpower within the royal family threaten thecohesion of the regime. The fate of the Arab states in the Persian Gulf regionwill be largely determined by whathappens in Saudi Arabia, which is itselfhighly susceptible to any regime change in Bahrain.

Amidst all this, Libya erupted on thescene rather deceptively as part of theoverall tapestry of the ‘Middle Eastrevolution’. In reality, though, whathappened in Libya was a form of ‘colourrevolution’ that didn’t quite follow thescript – given the country’s tortuoushistory of state formation and itscomplicated tribal structure and regionalimbalances as well as Muammar Gaddafi’smercurial personality. Unlike in Georgia orUkraine, things took a bloody turn,which

led to an overt western intervention. Butthe West may still prefer a negotiated‘regime change’ in Tripoli.

The Western DilemmaWhile the western attempt is to calibratethe region’s political transition and toprioritise between countries, fine-tuningmay be hard to achieve. Clearly, the Westhas shown a great appetite for change inLibya, but it condones repression inBahrain (where the US’s Fifth Fleet isbased) and just can’t contemplate theprospect of an overthrow of the politicalorder in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, especiallySaudi Arabia. What is often overlooked isthat the petrodollar recycling is integral tothe prosperity of western societies and ata time when economic recovery is stillpatchy, if Qatar or Kuwait or the UAE and Saudi Arabia were to ‘call back’their monies, amounting to trillions ofdollars, the western banking system would collapse.

This lies at the root of the westerndilemma over the emergence of a newpolitical order drawing legitimacy from

Libya erupted on the scene rather deceptively

as part of the overalltapestry of the ‘Middle East

revolution’. In reality,though, what happened in

Libya was a form of ‘colour revolution’ that

didn’t quite follow the script– given the country’s

tortuous history of stateformation and its

complicated tribal structureand regional imbalances

as well as MuammarGaddafi’s mercurial

personality.

”

Rebels ride on an armoured personnelcarrier, near Brega in north-eastern Libya

AFP


APRIL 2011 DSI

42

MIDDLE EAST

popular support. The Arab revolt has notassumed any “anti-western” overtones butthe spectre that haunts the West is thatsuccessor regimes will somehow assumenationalistic overtones and militate againstforeign hegemony. Besides, the MiddleEast (and Africa) is fast becoming contestedground, with China robustly seekingaccess to minerals and other resources.

Furthermore, Libya has become thetesting ground for the emergence of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)as a global security body and for the efficacyof its unilateralist operations in global“hotspots”, even without the mandate ofthe United Nations. (The resolution 1973did not mandate NATO’s militaryintervention or ‘regime change’ in Libya.)

Now, this has serious implications fornot only the Middle East and Africa butalso for international security. Quiteobviously, it sets far-reaching precedentsfor the working of the international systemif a clutch of countries or a regional bodyarrogates to themselves the prerogative –on whatever pretext – to violate the United

Nations’ Charter and trash the territorialintegrity and sovereignty of a memberstate. The UN stands as diminished as the League of Nations was over theAbyssinia crisis.

The countries of the South Asian region,especially India and Pakistan, are deeplyinterested in the stability of the MiddleEast. However, their capacity to influencethe march of history is marginal. Norshould they aspire to exert such influence.Which makes Pakistan’s aspirations toassume the role of a provider of security tothe Sunni regimes of the Persian Gulf(Bahrain, in particular) somewhatpretentious. The Indian policy is to be juston the right side of history without beingover zealous, intrusive or prescriptive andallowing the native genius of the region towork its way out peacefully throughdialogue and reconciliation. It is the rightapproach under the circumstances.

A prolonged period of volatilityshouldn’t come as a surprise until a newequilibrium emerges in the regional order.However, there is no need for any paranoia

that the existing political order may giveway to extremist regimes. On the contrary,it is continued western intervention (like inLibya) that could generate a political andsecurity climate which works to theadvantage of extremist forces in a wide arcleading all the way to Pakistan andAfghanistan. Nor is the appearance ofIslamism in the political economy per sedisagreeable, if the overarching structurehappens to be democratic.

If Turkey’s example is anything to goby – or even, arguably, of Hizbollah inLebanon, Hamas in Gaza and MuslimBrotherhood in Egypt – extremism breedswhen political space is denied to grassrootsor ‘neighborhood’movements rather thanif an inclusive environment is provided forthem to become responsible ‘stakeholders’.

Having said that, India and Pakistanneed to factor in that the US’ regionalpolicies are poised to undergo profoundchanges in the very near future. A newsecurity paradigm is shaping up in our‘extended neighborhood’ comprisingstates that are surely going to be moreindependent and we will be called upon toadapt to the winds of change. A new

discourse is needed and a new politicalidiom needs to be crafted. Indeed, thecountries of the Persian Gulf are inherentlyfriendly in their disposition toward India and the preservation of our vital interests and core concerns can be handledwithout disruption.

Neither India nor Pakistan faces anyreal prospect of the spread of thedemocracy virus blowing in from Arabia.The problem that India and Pakistan faceis more in the nature of lack of good andresponsive governance, degradation ofstate organs and institutions and failings ofestablished political parties – and not theabsence of democratic space as such.

The state may have becomedysfunctional in Pakistan’s tribal tracts or inIndia’s ‘red corridor’ but the solutionneeds to be found within the existingdemocratic framework by a vigilant civilsociety. Anna Hazare’s fast-unto-death inthe heart of New Delhi underlines that thiscrusade is quintessentially different fromArab revolt.

The Indian policy is to be just on the right side

of history without being over zealous, intrusive

or prescriptive and allowing the native genius

of the region to work its way out peacefully

through dialogue andreconciliation. It is the

right approach under the

circumstances.

”

Indians in Hyderabadprotest in a rally againstthe ongoing politicalturmoil in Bahrain,Libya and Yemen

Tunisians protest in front of the Libyanembassy in Tunisa

AFP

AFP


APRIL 2011 DSI

42

MIDDLE EAST

popular support. The Arab revolt has notassumed any “anti-western” overtones butthe spectre that haunts the West is thatsuccessor regimes will somehow assumenationalistic overtones and militate againstforeign hegemony. Besides, the MiddleEast (and Africa) is fast becoming contestedground, with China robustly seekingaccess to minerals and other resources.

Furthermore, Libya has become thetesting ground for the emergence of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)as a global security body and for the efficacyof its unilateralist operations in global“hotspots”, even without the mandate ofthe United Nations. (The resolution 1973did not mandate NATO’s militaryintervention or ‘regime change’ in Libya.)

Now, this has serious implications fornot only the Middle East and Africa butalso for international security. Quiteobviously, it sets far-reaching precedentsfor the working of the international systemif a clutch of countries or a regional bodyarrogates to themselves the prerogative –on whatever pretext – to violate the United

Nations’ Charter and trash the territorialintegrity and sovereignty of a memberstate. The UN stands as diminished as the League of Nations was over theAbyssinia crisis.

The countries of the South Asian region,especially India and Pakistan, are deeplyinterested in the stability of the MiddleEast. However, their capacity to influencethe march of history is marginal. Norshould they aspire to exert such influence.Which makes Pakistan’s aspirations toassume the role of a provider of security tothe Sunni regimes of the Persian Gulf(Bahrain, in particular) somewhatpretentious. The Indian policy is to be juston the right side of history without beingover zealous, intrusive or prescriptive andallowing the native genius of the region towork its way out peacefully throughdialogue and reconciliation. It is the rightapproach under the circumstances.

A prolonged period of volatilityshouldn’t come as a surprise until a newequilibrium emerges in the regional order.However, there is no need for any paranoia

that the existing political order may giveway to extremist regimes. On the contrary,it is continued western intervention (like inLibya) that could generate a political andsecurity climate which works to theadvantage of extremist forces in a wide arcleading all the way to Pakistan andAfghanistan. Nor is the appearance ofIslamism in the political economy per sedisagreeable, if the overarching structurehappens to be democratic.

If Turkey’s example is anything to goby – or even, arguably, of Hizbollah inLebanon, Hamas in Gaza and MuslimBrotherhood in Egypt – extremism breedswhen political space is denied to grassrootsor ‘neighborhood’movements rather thanif an inclusive environment is provided forthem to become responsible ‘stakeholders’.

Having said that, India and Pakistanneed to factor in that the US’ regionalpolicies are poised to undergo profoundchanges in the very near future. A newsecurity paradigm is shaping up in our‘extended neighborhood’ comprisingstates that are surely going to be moreindependent and we will be called upon toadapt to the winds of change. A new

discourse is needed and a new politicalidiom needs to be crafted. Indeed, thecountries of the Persian Gulf are inherentlyfriendly in their disposition toward India and the preservation of our vital interests and core concerns can be handledwithout disruption.

Neither India nor Pakistan faces anyreal prospect of the spread of thedemocracy virus blowing in from Arabia.The problem that India and Pakistan faceis more in the nature of lack of good andresponsive governance, degradation ofstate organs and institutions and failings ofestablished political parties – and not theabsence of democratic space as such.

The state may have becomedysfunctional in Pakistan’s tribal tracts or inIndia’s ‘red corridor’ but the solutionneeds to be found within the existingdemocratic framework by a vigilant civilsociety. Anna Hazare’s fast-unto-death inthe heart of New Delhi underlines that thiscrusade is quintessentially different fromArab revolt.

The Indian policy is to be just on the right side

of history without being over zealous, intrusive

or prescriptive and allowing the native genius

of the region to work its way out peacefully

through dialogue andreconciliation. It is the

right approach under the

circumstances.

”

Indians in Hyderabadprotest in a rally againstthe ongoing politicalturmoil in Bahrain,Libya and Yemen

Tunisians protest in front of the Libyanembassy in Tunisa

AFP

AFP


The recent publication of classifiedcable traffic between the UnitedStates embassy in New Delhi and

the State Department and Pentagon in Washington, D.C. has stirred up ahornet’s nest in India with the country’spoliticians and bureaucrats emerging inoften unflattering colours.

The cables, part of a cache of over 5,000secret, confidential or limited distributioncables, are being published by The Hindu,

which, in turn, has obtained the materialfrom the WikiLeak’s organisation. Thougha handful of cables go back to the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of 1998, the bulk of thediplomatic correspondence covers theperiod 2005-2009.

This was a period of rapid andextraordinary developments in the Indo-U.S. bilateral relationship centred aroundthree broad pillars – defence; hightechnology trade issues leading to civil

nuclear co-operation and expanding trade and investment links. The cableswhich WikiLeaks has obtained are not a complete set and are, in many ways,

quite fragmentary. The sheer volume oftraffic on the defence and military front, however, does allow us to piecetogether a reasonably coherent picture of the state of play at the bilateral level. The cables confirm clearly, from theAmerican policy perspective, the centralityof defence to the emerging strategicpartnership and the centrality of arms salesand ‘interoperability’ to the Americanexpectations from India in defence matters.The cables also offer a glimpse into India’sexpectations and priorities, though thisglimpse is understandably refractedthrough the lens of American diplomatswho were often frustrated by the fact that Washington was not always able to get its way.

APRIL 2011 DSI

44

INDIA - U.S.

Emerging Strategic Relationship At the start of 2005, the U.S. believed thetime had come to make a big push. TheNext Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)that the Bush administration had launchedthe previous year in tandem with theNational Democratic Alliance governmentof Atal Bihari Vajpayee had alreadyestablished a framework of mutualundertakings in which India and the U.S.would move the bilateral relationshipforward. In the initial phases, Indiaundertook to bring its export control andend use verification procedures for dualuse items in sync with U.S. requirements,

while the American side would lift someexport restrictions, provide a classifiedbriefing on missile defence and allow Indiato buy the Patriot system.

The Asian tsunami of December 2004provided an opportunity to open otherdoors. Impressed by the speed and nature

of the Indian military response to thehumanitarian disaster, India was included inthe ‘core group’ of the U.S.-led CombinedSupport Force (CSF-536) operating out ofUtapao, Thailand.

In a secret cable on ‘Challenges andOpportunities in 2005’ sent shortly after, the

then U.S. Ambassador David C. Mulfordnoted how the largest-ever joint India-USnaval exercises held in 2004 had laid thegroundwork for the unprecedented post-tsunami co-operation between the twomilitaries (24643; February 4, 2005). Hefurther told Washington that the Indian AirForce had extended the deadline for theU.S. to submit a bid for the 126 MRCAs and advised Pentagon to leverage theengagement that had gone on so far in tocommercial gain: “This represents the bestopportunity we have had in years to capthree years of successful exercises and othermilitary engagement with a decision toseriously compete in India’s annual $14billion defence market...”

Military Sales Pitch A month later, a cable sent in the name of Ambassador Mulford providesWashington with the crucial insight that itsmilitary sales pitch would only work if itwere connected to the wider economic andtechnology benefits the Indian side hopes toharvest. “At this juncture, it is critical that wedevise a strategy to strengthen appreciationin the Indian bureaucracy of the economicbenefits derived from a long-term strategicpartnership with the U.S. Our strongestadvocates will be the economists who arerunning the government not the traditionalmilitary establishment.” (29616; March 28,2005; confidential).

The U.S. message has to be simple, hesuggested: “That [it] is a reliable strategicpartner for defence co-production,

technology sharing and joint research.Using military sales as the platform for co-operation will catalyse development of India’s defence sector, spin off newindustries, catalyse economic growth, andcreate jobs”.

Apart from breaking bureaucraticmindsets on both sides and involving theprivate sector, the diplomat proposed the establishment of a ‘Defence ProductionCo-operation Group’ that would, “lay thefoundation for direct interaction amongIndian and U.S. business leaders aimed at creating corporate structures as the basis fordefence co-operation, beginning with a fewdiscreet projects”.

In stressing the need to emphasise

“This represents the bestopportunity we have had inyears to cap three years ofsuccessful exercises and

other military engagementwith a decision to

seriously compete inIndia's annual $14 billion

defence market...”

–– (24643; February 4, 2005)

”45

AFP

WIKILEAKS, THE DEFENCE ANGLE

n The cables are part of over 5,000secret, confidential distribution cables,accessed by The Hindu from theWikiLeak’s organisation. n Though a handful of cables goback to the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of1998, the bulk of the diplomaticcorrespondence covers the period2005-2009. n This was a period of rapid andextraordinary developments in theIndia-U.S. bilateral relationship.

KEY POINTS

SIDDARTHVARADARJAN

An insight into the tug of war ondefence policies and purchasesrevealing a state of play betweenIndia and the United States

Founder of theWikileaks website

Julian Assange

wikileaks 2nd time .qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 18/04/11 2:27 PM Page 44

The recent publication of classifiedcable traffic between the UnitedStates embassy in New Delhi and

the State Department and Pentagon in Washington, D.C. has stirred up ahornet’s nest in India with the country’spoliticians and bureaucrats emerging inoften unflattering colours.

The cables, part of a cache of over 5,000secret, confidential or limited distributioncables, are being published by The Hindu,

which, in turn, has obtained the materialfrom the WikiLeak’s organisation. Thougha handful of cables go back to the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of 1998, the bulk of thediplomatic correspondence covers theperiod 2005-2009.

This was a period of rapid andextraordinary developments in the Indo-U.S. bilateral relationship centred aroundthree broad pillars – defence; hightechnology trade issues leading to civil

nuclear co-operation and expanding trade and investment links. The cableswhich WikiLeaks has obtained are not a complete set and are, in many ways,

quite fragmentary. The sheer volume oftraffic on the defence and military front, however, does allow us to piecetogether a reasonably coherent picture of the state of play at the bilateral level. The cables confirm clearly, from theAmerican policy perspective, the centralityof defence to the emerging strategicpartnership and the centrality of arms salesand ‘interoperability’ to the Americanexpectations from India in defence matters.The cables also offer a glimpse into India’sexpectations and priorities, though thisglimpse is understandably refractedthrough the lens of American diplomatswho were often frustrated by the fact that Washington was not always able to get its way.

APRIL 2011 DSI

44

INDIA - U.S.

Emerging Strategic Relationship At the start of 2005, the U.S. believed thetime had come to make a big push. TheNext Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)that the Bush administration had launchedthe previous year in tandem with theNational Democratic Alliance governmentof Atal Bihari Vajpayee had alreadyestablished a framework of mutualundertakings in which India and the U.S.would move the bilateral relationshipforward. In the initial phases, Indiaundertook to bring its export control andend use verification procedures for dualuse items in sync with U.S. requirements,

while the American side would lift someexport restrictions, provide a classifiedbriefing on missile defence and allow Indiato buy the Patriot system.

The Asian tsunami of December 2004provided an opportunity to open otherdoors. Impressed by the speed and nature

of the Indian military response to thehumanitarian disaster, India was included inthe ‘core group’ of the U.S.-led CombinedSupport Force (CSF-536) operating out ofUtapao, Thailand.

In a secret cable on ‘Challenges andOpportunities in 2005’ sent shortly after, the

then U.S. Ambassador David C. Mulfordnoted how the largest-ever joint India-USnaval exercises held in 2004 had laid thegroundwork for the unprecedented post-tsunami co-operation between the twomilitaries (24643; February 4, 2005). Hefurther told Washington that the Indian AirForce had extended the deadline for theU.S. to submit a bid for the 126 MRCAs and advised Pentagon to leverage theengagement that had gone on so far in tocommercial gain: “This represents the bestopportunity we have had in years to capthree years of successful exercises and othermilitary engagement with a decision toseriously compete in India’s annual $14billion defence market...”

Military Sales Pitch A month later, a cable sent in the name of Ambassador Mulford providesWashington with the crucial insight that itsmilitary sales pitch would only work if itwere connected to the wider economic andtechnology benefits the Indian side hopes toharvest. “At this juncture, it is critical that wedevise a strategy to strengthen appreciationin the Indian bureaucracy of the economicbenefits derived from a long-term strategicpartnership with the U.S. Our strongestadvocates will be the economists who arerunning the government not the traditionalmilitary establishment.” (29616; March 28,2005; confidential).

The U.S. message has to be simple, hesuggested: “That [it] is a reliable strategicpartner for defence co-production,

technology sharing and joint research.Using military sales as the platform for co-operation will catalyse development of India’s defence sector, spin off newindustries, catalyse economic growth, andcreate jobs”.

Apart from breaking bureaucraticmindsets on both sides and involving theprivate sector, the diplomat proposed the establishment of a ‘Defence ProductionCo-operation Group’ that would, “lay thefoundation for direct interaction amongIndian and U.S. business leaders aimed at creating corporate structures as the basis fordefence co-operation, beginning with a fewdiscreet projects”.

In stressing the need to emphasise

“This represents the bestopportunity we have had inyears to cap three years ofsuccessful exercises and

other military engagementwith a decision to

seriously compete inIndia's annual $14 billion

defence market...”

–– (24643; February 4, 2005)

”45

AFP

WIKILEAKS, THE DEFENCE ANGLE

n The cables are part of over 5,000secret, confidential distribution cables,accessed by The Hindu from theWikiLeak’s organisation. n Though a handful of cables goback to the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of1998, the bulk of the diplomaticcorrespondence covers the period2005-2009. n This was a period of rapid andextraordinary developments in theIndia-U.S. bilateral relationship.

KEY POINTS

SIDDARTHVARADARJAN

An insight into the tug of war ondefence policies and purchasesrevealing a state of play betweenIndia and the United States

Founder of theWikileaks website

Julian Assange


47

APRIL 2011 DSIINDIA - U.S.

co-production and technology sharing,

Ambassador Mulford showed heunderstood India well. Three days later,

Pranab Mukherjee, who was defenceminister at the time, told him that “defenceequipment sales while important, do not carry the same strategic significance as co-production/technology transfer and that this type of arrangement willestablish a long-term sturdy relationship.”(29834; March 31 , 2005; confidential).The ambassador agreed.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hadjust been to Delhi and announcedAmerica’s desire to help India realise itsgoal of becoming a world power in thecoming years. “Energy, military co-operation, space and defence sales werethe key areas where the US seeks to assistIndia in assuming its place as a worldpower in the 21st century,” Mulford toldthe minister.

A U.S. embassy cable sent a few dayslater as a ‘scene-setter’ for the UnitedState’s Pacific Command (PACOM)Commander William Fallon’s forthcomingvisit to India tried to tie the various strandsthat had emerged so far on the Indo-U.S.defence front. Rice had told the Indians

the U.S. government would authoriseAmerican aircraft like the F-16 and F-18 totake part in the MRCA bid. Her visit, thesecret cable said, “has produced the mostsubstantial agenda for US-India co-operation ever” (30136; April 5, 2005)noting that “military ties have developedinto one of the most important and robustaspects of the US-India bilateral relationshipand have often led the dramaticimprovements in relations that we havewitnessed since the end of the Cold War”.

The cable flags the need for the twocountries to establish a new framework fordefence engagement that could transcendthe limitations of the 1995 Agreed Minuteon Defence Cooperation and take thesecurity relationship to a new level.

One aim apart from flagging the usualthrust areas – arms sales, exercises, co-operation in the Indian Ocean – the cablesays is, ... “one key administrative goal weneed to complete to further advance ourdefence co-operation programmes is

completing the Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA) whichPACOM has been trying to get signed forclose to three years... Recommend you stresswith (Pranab) Mukherjee and other officialsthe importance of getting this signed.”

On the eve of Defence MinisterMukherjee’s visit to Washington, the U.S.embassy sent a ‘scene-setter’ cable toSecretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld.Mukherjee, it noted was “in effect, theDeputy Prime Minister, and we believe heaspires to the top job. By demonstratingour understanding of his influence beyondthe military realm, it may be easier toadvance our defence-related objectives”.Signing the Framework for US-IndiaStrategic Defence Relationship was onedeliverable it identified upfront.

The minister’s visit was taking place “at atime when the goal of establishing a keystrategic relationship ... with one of Asia’srising giants ... is becoming a reality”, thesecret cable noted. Laying out specific

objectives - “we can advance during his visit... in light of Mr Mukherjee’s position as defacto deputy PM.” (35111, June 21, 2005).These included the ‘strategic’ objective ofgetting India into the Proliferation SecurityInitiative (PSI) the U.S.-led counter-proliferation campaign to interdict ships onthe high seas suspected of carryingweapons of mass destruction or theircomponents as a full member; emphasising“the importance of a deeper defencerelationship in the context of our broader strategic relationship with India;

highlighting the opportunities presented bya larger FMS (military sales) relationshipwhile addressing concerns about USreliability as an arms supplier (and) pressingfor negotiation of an Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement...”

‘ Breakthrough Arms Sales ’Crucial, too, was the pursuit of a“breakthrough arms sale”. The “pendingobsolescence of much of India’s Soviet-

origin equipment will create once-in-a-decade opportunities for foreignsuppliers” and if the U.S. could addressIndian concerns about its reliability as asupplier, this would “lay the foundationfor a breakthrough arms sale”. Such a salewas, noted the cable, “key to deepening ourrelationship and to developing the militaryinteroperability that will help our strategicpartnership realise its potential. Despitethe US lifting of sanctions in 2001, we havenot yet achieved a breakthrough sale of amajor platform”, the cable lamented.

The new Defence Framework by theU.S. was signed on June 28, 2005, though inits final avatar, the word ‘strategic’ wasremoved from the title along with languagefrom the draft text that the Indian side feltwas too sweeping. As Ambassador Mulfordhad recommended, a Defence Productionand Procurement Group (DPPG) was setup to address Indian concerns about the need for a link between arms sales and technology transfer. The two sides

undertook to “work to conclude defence transactions, not solely as ends inand of themselves, but as a means to ...reinforce our strategic partnership.”Ambitious language was also used toenvisage a collaboration in “multinationaloperations”, a concept elastic enough toinclude humanitarian operations liketsunami relief as well as more muscularactions like PSI-style interdictions.

Regardless of the high expectations the agreement aroused within the U.S.defence and political establishment,the Indian side returned to Delhi withwhat they considered to be a singularachievement: “ US acceptance of India’sdesire for co-production and technologytransfer”. The American priorities, ofcourse, lay elsewhere – on effecting actualbig ticket sales and pushing the mil-milagenda of interoperability.

The U.S. embassy took heart from therobust defence both Prime MinisterManmohan Singh and Mukherjeemounted of the new frameworkagreement in Parliament despite thecriticism of their Left coalition partners.“PM and DEFMIN scoff at Leftist criticismof U.S. defence ties; we should, too”, wasthe title of a triumphalist post-mortemcable (36415; July 12, 2005; confidential).Again, it was left to Indian officials tosound a word of caution.

Status of Forces Agreement The point was driven home less than amonth later when U.S. officials tried toraise the possibility of India signing aStatus of Forces Agreement (SOFA)granting protection and immunity to U.S.military personnel present in India forexercises and other mutually agreedactivities. The MEA strongly discouragedthem from doing so. (38759; August 18,2005; confidential).

Since 2005, the proposal to sign ACSAhas been dropped in favour of the (LogisticSupport Analysis) LSA. But India is not yetready to commit to that agreement or the-CISMOA or the Basic Exchange and Co-operation Agreement for GeospatialCo-operation (BECA) which the U.S. saysare essential for any transfer of sensitiveelectronics and avionics. On all of theseagreements, New Delhi has toldWashington ‘Don’t call us, we’ll call you.’

Despite demonstrating a willingness totake part in PSI-like actions, India refusedto join the Initiative citing legal difficulties.

The MRCA tender is still being evaluatedbut what has moved ahead is arms sales.

46

“…the importance of adeeper defence relationshipin the context of our broader

strategic relationship withIndia; highlighting the

opportunities presented bya larger FMS (military

sales) relationship whileaddressing concerns about

US reliability as an armssupplier (and) pressing for

negotiation of anAcquisition and Cross

Servicing Agreement...”

–– (35111, June 21, 2005)

” AFP

Former US Ambassador

to India David C.Mulford addressing

a commemorativeservice in Mumbai


47

APRIL 2011 DSIINDIA - U.S.

co-production and technology sharing,

Ambassador Mulford showed heunderstood India well. Three days later,

Pranab Mukherjee, who was defenceminister at the time, told him that “defenceequipment sales while important, do not carry the same strategic significance as co-production/technology transfer and that this type of arrangement willestablish a long-term sturdy relationship.”(29834; March 31 , 2005; confidential).The ambassador agreed.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hadjust been to Delhi and announcedAmerica’s desire to help India realise itsgoal of becoming a world power in thecoming years. “Energy, military co-operation, space and defence sales werethe key areas where the US seeks to assistIndia in assuming its place as a worldpower in the 21st century,” Mulford toldthe minister.

A U.S. embassy cable sent a few dayslater as a ‘scene-setter’ for the UnitedState’s Pacific Command (PACOM)Commander William Fallon’s forthcomingvisit to India tried to tie the various strandsthat had emerged so far on the Indo-U.S.defence front. Rice had told the Indians

the U.S. government would authoriseAmerican aircraft like the F-16 and F-18 totake part in the MRCA bid. Her visit, thesecret cable said, “has produced the mostsubstantial agenda for US-India co-operation ever” (30136; April 5, 2005)noting that “military ties have developedinto one of the most important and robustaspects of the US-India bilateral relationshipand have often led the dramaticimprovements in relations that we havewitnessed since the end of the Cold War”.

The cable flags the need for the twocountries to establish a new framework fordefence engagement that could transcendthe limitations of the 1995 Agreed Minuteon Defence Cooperation and take thesecurity relationship to a new level.

One aim apart from flagging the usualthrust areas – arms sales, exercises, co-operation in the Indian Ocean – the cablesays is, ... “one key administrative goal weneed to complete to further advance ourdefence co-operation programmes is

completing the Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA) whichPACOM has been trying to get signed forclose to three years... Recommend you stresswith (Pranab) Mukherjee and other officialsthe importance of getting this signed.”

On the eve of Defence MinisterMukherjee’s visit to Washington, the U.S.embassy sent a ‘scene-setter’ cable toSecretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld.Mukherjee, it noted was “in effect, theDeputy Prime Minister, and we believe heaspires to the top job. By demonstratingour understanding of his influence beyondthe military realm, it may be easier toadvance our defence-related objectives”.Signing the Framework for US-IndiaStrategic Defence Relationship was onedeliverable it identified upfront.

The minister’s visit was taking place “at atime when the goal of establishing a keystrategic relationship ... with one of Asia’srising giants ... is becoming a reality”, thesecret cable noted. Laying out specific

objectives - “we can advance during his visit... in light of Mr Mukherjee’s position as defacto deputy PM.” (35111, June 21, 2005).These included the ‘strategic’ objective ofgetting India into the Proliferation SecurityInitiative (PSI) the U.S.-led counter-proliferation campaign to interdict ships onthe high seas suspected of carryingweapons of mass destruction or theircomponents as a full member; emphasising“the importance of a deeper defencerelationship in the context of our broader strategic relationship with India;

highlighting the opportunities presented bya larger FMS (military sales) relationshipwhile addressing concerns about USreliability as an arms supplier (and) pressingfor negotiation of an Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement...”

‘ Breakthrough Arms Sales ’Crucial, too, was the pursuit of a“breakthrough arms sale”. The “pendingobsolescence of much of India’s Soviet-

origin equipment will create once-in-a-decade opportunities for foreignsuppliers” and if the U.S. could addressIndian concerns about its reliability as asupplier, this would “lay the foundationfor a breakthrough arms sale”. Such a salewas, noted the cable, “key to deepening ourrelationship and to developing the militaryinteroperability that will help our strategicpartnership realise its potential. Despitethe US lifting of sanctions in 2001, we havenot yet achieved a breakthrough sale of amajor platform”, the cable lamented.

The new Defence Framework by theU.S. was signed on June 28, 2005, though inits final avatar, the word ‘strategic’ wasremoved from the title along with languagefrom the draft text that the Indian side feltwas too sweeping. As Ambassador Mulfordhad recommended, a Defence Productionand Procurement Group (DPPG) was setup to address Indian concerns about the need for a link between arms sales and technology transfer. The two sides

undertook to “work to conclude defence transactions, not solely as ends inand of themselves, but as a means to ...reinforce our strategic partnership.”Ambitious language was also used toenvisage a collaboration in “multinationaloperations”, a concept elastic enough toinclude humanitarian operations liketsunami relief as well as more muscularactions like PSI-style interdictions.

Regardless of the high expectations the agreement aroused within the U.S.defence and political establishment,the Indian side returned to Delhi withwhat they considered to be a singularachievement: “ US acceptance of India’sdesire for co-production and technologytransfer”. The American priorities, ofcourse, lay elsewhere – on effecting actualbig ticket sales and pushing the mil-milagenda of interoperability.

The U.S. embassy took heart from therobust defence both Prime MinisterManmohan Singh and Mukherjeemounted of the new frameworkagreement in Parliament despite thecriticism of their Left coalition partners.“PM and DEFMIN scoff at Leftist criticismof U.S. defence ties; we should, too”, wasthe title of a triumphalist post-mortemcable (36415; July 12, 2005; confidential).Again, it was left to Indian officials tosound a word of caution.

Status of Forces Agreement The point was driven home less than amonth later when U.S. officials tried toraise the possibility of India signing aStatus of Forces Agreement (SOFA)granting protection and immunity to U.S.military personnel present in India forexercises and other mutually agreedactivities. The MEA strongly discouragedthem from doing so. (38759; August 18,2005; confidential).

Since 2005, the proposal to sign ACSAhas been dropped in favour of the (LogisticSupport Analysis) LSA. But India is not yetready to commit to that agreement or the-CISMOA or the Basic Exchange and Co-operation Agreement for GeospatialCo-operation (BECA) which the U.S. saysare essential for any transfer of sensitiveelectronics and avionics. On all of theseagreements, New Delhi has toldWashington ‘Don’t call us, we’ll call you.’

Despite demonstrating a willingness totake part in PSI-like actions, India refusedto join the Initiative citing legal difficulties.

The MRCA tender is still being evaluatedbut what has moved ahead is arms sales.

46

“…the importance of adeeper defence relationshipin the context of our broader

strategic relationship withIndia; highlighting the

opportunities presented bya larger FMS (military

sales) relationship whileaddressing concerns about

US reliability as an armssupplier (and) pressing for

negotiation of anAcquisition and Cross

Servicing Agreement...”

–– (35111, June 21, 2005)

” AFP

Former US Ambassador

to India David C.Mulford addressing

a commemorativeservice in Mumbai


APRIL 2011 DSI

48

INDIA - U.S.

Through standalone FMS purchases of alanding dock ship,maritime reconnaissanceheavy lift aircraft, India has already spent(or committed to spend) more than $10billion on American hardware. The End UseMonitoring (EUM) obstacle was alsoovercome in July 2009 with the initialing of an agreed language on inspections and permissible use of U.S.-suppliedequipment. Nevertheless, a secret ‘scene-setter’ cable sent by the U.S. embassy toUnder Secretary for Defence MichelleFlournoy at the end of October 2009 – themost recent cable in the WikiLeaks archive todeal with defence matters in detail – paints acautious picture of the state of play withIndia on the defence front.

Even if the U.S. was dissatisfied by thecurrent level of interaction with India, itshould take comfort from the fact that this is making a difference and that “ourrelationship with India is more robust thanthat of any other country India partnerswith”, the cable notes. (232002,October 23,2009) The way forward lies in “nudgingIndia to expand their commitments bysigning the foundational agreements andby moving forward with military sales[which] will provide opportunities for asustained relationship far more robustthan exercises and exchanges. If we cancontinue our trend of major military sales,

we will cement a relationship for the nextseveral decades with the most stablecountry in South Asia’.

Interestingly, the Flournoy ‘scene-setter’and another 2009 cable addressed to HillaryClinton blame the civilian leadership and bureaucracy for slowing down arelationship that the military brass is keento accelerate. “India’s bureaucracy remainsstove piped and slow-moving, and in manyinstances,populated by senior officials who

came of age during the Cold War, steepedin the ‘non-aligned’ rhetoric of the 60s and70s, and perhaps afraid to take forwardleaning stances … While the Indianuniformed leadership of all three Services,and in particular the Indian Navy,appreciate their improving ties with theUnited States’smilitary,bureaucratic inertiaand recalcitrant officials in the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence continue to complicate attempts to improve thepartnership”. (216716; July 15 2009; secret).

As for politicians, the Flournoy cable was blunt: “All of the PACOM theatresecurity co-operation objectives can beimplemented only with the acquiescence ofthe civilian leadership which, at times,appears to be at odds with the Services’mil-to-mil desires. Specific examples includeMinister of Defence Antony’s rejection ofthe multilateral Malabar exercises despitethe Indian Navy’s preference for them”.

The cable sent under the signature of Ambassador Roemer, noted that the“civilian leadership continues to defer onkey foundational documents necessary tomove the US-India mil-to-mil relationshipcloser”. This, the ambassador noted, was“for fear that the political opposition wouldseize on it to further their often repeatedclaims that India is sub-serving its foreignpolicy to that of the US”.

‘ If we can continue ourtrend of major military

sales, we will cement arelationship for the next

several decades with themost stable country in

South Asia’

–– (232002, October 23, 2009)

”

A US Air Force C-17Globemaster aircraft

AFP


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DEFENCE BUZZ

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Coming Soon, Hopefully, to a Conflict Near You

IAF Mi-8 helicopters fly during the Aero India 2011 at the Yelhanka Air Force Station, Bangalore

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INDIA undoubtedly remains the world’s largestmateriel procurer as it strives to moderniseits equipment profile to meet local andregional challenges.

The recently concluded Aero India 2011 in whichparticipation over its previous edition two yearsago was significantly larger was adequatelyindicative that India is the most sought afterdestination for overseas armament suppliers.

According to a recent report by theConfederation of Indian Industry (CII) and financialconsultants KPMG (Klynveld Peat MarwickGoerdeler), India is expected to shortly ink defencedeals worth an estimated $42 billion.

This includes the much-awaited $10 billioncontract for 126 Medium Multi-Role CombatAircraft (MMRCA) – expected to rise to 200fighters for around $16 billion, 145 BAE Systems’M777 155mm/39 calibre lightweight howitzers,LaserInertial Artillery Pointing Systems for $647 millionand 197 Light Observation Helicopters for the ArmyAviation Corps and the Indian Air Force (IAF)estimated at $600 million to $700 million.

Basic trainers, 10 Boeing C-17 Globemaster IIIVery Heavy Lift Transport Aircraft and possibly 22 attack and 15 Heavy Lift Helicopters, all for theIAF, make up the list of procurements undervarious stages of evaluation and imminentprice negotiation.

At Aero India in Bangalore in early February,Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik had said, “barringcomplications” the MMRCA contract will beconfirmed by September. Price negotiations for theMMRCA,he stated,were scheduled to begin withina few weeks for which Boeing’s F/A-18E/F,Dassault’s Rafale, Eurofighter’s Typhoon,Lockheed Martin’s F-16IN, Russian AircraftCorporation’s (RSK’s) MiG-35 and Saab’s JAS 39Gripen are competing. If the Air Chief’s predictionsare vindicated, the MMRCA will be the fastest ever deal of such huge proportions that India has clinched.

Media reports indicate that a shortlist of therival MMRCA models is likely to be announced byApril following which the two or possibly threefinalists will be asked to re-submit their offsetproposals in keeping with the revised DefenceProcurement Procedures (DPP) that expandoffsets to the hitherto circumscribed civil aviationand internal security sectors.

The CII-KPMG study also reveals that India hasconfirmed $25 billion worth of military purchasessince 2007 of which the IAF has acquiredequipment worth $17.46 billion, the Indian Navy(IN) $6.16 billion, the Army $420 million and theIndian Coast Guard $616 million. “Over the lastdecade India’s huge defence industry has been in the process of undertaking one of the

AFP

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52

largest procurement cycles in the world,”the study maintained.

The big ticket items acquired so farinclude six Lockheed Martin-designedC-130J Super Hercules transport aircraftconfigured for Special Forces operationsand also eight Boeing P-8I PoseidonMulti-Mission Maritime ReconnaissanceAircraft (MRA) with a anti-submarine warfare capability.

The joint analysis further reveals thatthe present profile of military equipment inthe Service highlights a pressing need formodernisation with ‘obsolete’ materielaccounting for 50 percent of the Services’inventory which the Ministry of Defence(MoD) wants to reduce to 30 percent. Theproportion of state-of-the-art equipmentalso needs to double from its present levelof 15 percent, the report says.

Consequently, some 62 percent of majoroverseas defence equipment vendorsbelieve that India is an ‘attractiveproposition’ and also one where homelandsecurity, prompted by the November 2008attack on Mumbai by 10 gunmen fromPakistan, is projected to be one of the key focus areas. The CII-KPMG studyreckons that by 2016 the Central and stategovernment budget for homeland securitywill grow to around $10 billion which will include better weaponry, surveillanceequipment, body armour and transportationfor the paramilitaries and provincial police forces.

But India’s defence allocation forfinancial year 2011-12 of ̀ 1,644.15 billion – a11.94 percent increase over the previousyear’s outlay – will largely be ‘neutralised’by the rate of inflation presently runningat around 9.3 percent. Military officialshave regretted that the Defence Budgetthis year has amounted to merely 1.83percent of India’s Gross DomesticProduct , far less than the three percentconsistently demanded by the Servicesand far below that of nuclear rival Chinathat has officially allocated $ 91 billiontowards its defence expenditure this year.Analysts, however, believe that theundeclared amount allocated to China’sdefence spending is significantly higher.

Of India’s defence outlay, `691.99 billion has been earmarked for capitalexpenditure or acquisition of weaponsystems and modernisation. But armamentindustry sources say that around 60 percentof this will be used up as payment forequipment already acquired leaving onlyaround `200 billion to `250 billion foradditional purchases.

Leaky Business THEArmy’s long-postponed procurement of145 BAE Systems’ M777 155 mm/39-callightweight howitzers (LWH) can be delayedfurther following an investigation into therecent leakage of their field trial reports.

Several pages from the report of the M777trials conducted in Rajasthan and themountainous Sikkim region were postedanonymously to the Army Headquarters inJanuary alongside a note claming that theguns were inadequate and urging the ArmyChief, General V. K. Singh to cancel the$647 million LWH order.

The M777s were being acquired via the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) routeafter the rival Pegasus 155mm/39 cal LWHfrom Singapore Technologies Kinetics (SKT)was blacklisted for alleged corruption in June 2009 and is currently underinvestigation. The STK has denied allcharges of any wrongdoing.

The anonymous note has also threateneddire consequences for General Singh unlesshe terminates the howitzer deal which washigh on the Army Chief’s priority list duringhis six-day US visit in early March. The M777sare urgently needed to equip two mountaindivisions that are under raising for

deployment along the disputed Chinesefrontier in the Northeast.

Official sources, however, say that theArmy Headquarters is playing down theincident maintaining that leaking five pagesof the M777s ‘confirmatory’ trial reports will in no way prove detrimental to theirprocurement which will continue apace asthe Army has acquired no howitzers sincethe import of 410 Bofors FH-77B guns in 1987. Of these around 200 to 225 remainserviceable but these too need replacing.

Official sources indicate that the M777,a tried and tested weapon systemextensively and efficiently deployed in Iraqand Afghanistan by the US, British andAllied Forces, has failed in meeting the Indian Army’s Service QualitativeRequirements (SQR) during last year’s trialsin terrain where they will eventually be used.

These alleged shortcomings includecompatibility with the Indian Army’s firing tables, difficulties in air transportation,para-dropping and a helicopter under-slungmode, problems with night vision,communication systems and a questionablebarrel life. But senior officers were of the view that the M777’s failure in meeting theSQRs in no way reflects adversely on theoperational capabilities of this proven system.

Chief of Army Staff General V. K. Singh

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“Under the FMS route India has to acceptthe equipment as it exists and its ownparametres become inconsequential,” saysformer Major General Mrinal Suman, one ofIndia’s foremost experts on militaryprocurement. The US government hasaccepted no change in the draft contract andhas presented a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ optionfor the buyer country,General Suman adds.

But the M777s alleged inability in meetingthe Indian Army’s SQRs is not the onlyhurdle. In India’s Byzantine, highlybureaucratic and often corrupt militaryprocurement process anonymous letters ofthe kind sent to the Army Headquarters havepreviously resulted in extended procurementdelays, pending investigation, resulting incontracts even being cancelled.

Artillery officers concede that anypostponement, leave alone cancellation ofthe M777 contract,will disastrously defer theArmy’s Field Artillery Rationalisation Planalready delayed by over a decade by complexbureaucratic procedures and vacillation indecision making. Defence Minister A. K.Antony,however,has assured the Army thatnobody will be allowed to manipulate thehowitzer procurement process.

The Army, meanwhile, remains waryabout acquiring US military equipment via the FMS route. Last June, General

Singh cautioned the government overpursuing FMS purchases as after salesmaintenance support for such equipmentcan prove ‘problematic’.

In a letter to Antony, the Army Chiefmaintained that his force was facingrecurring trouble with 12 Thales-RaytheonSystems AN/TPQ-37 (V) 3 Firefinderartillery-locating radar acquired in 2002 for$ 142.4 million via the FMS route.

Artillery sources say that up totwo-thirds of these radar – India’s firstsignificant US military equipment purchasefor nearly four decades after Washingtonlifted sanctions on New Delhi in October2001 following its 1998 nuclear tests – were ‘frequently’ out of commissionawaiting either spare parts,maintenance orboth but decidedly precluding theiroperational deployment.

Mounted on locally built vehicles andequipped with a package supplied by Israel’sTadiran Communications, the fire-finderradar were deemed capable of detectingartillery positions at a distance of between28km to 32km and tactical missiles up to50km away with an accuracy of 10m. Armysources say that the radar which were beingupgraded by an Israeli company hasintermittently remained ‘off road’ since theirinduction was completed in mid-2007.

Hiccups On UpgradeUK’s Rolls Royce (RR) has opted out of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) $670 millionSepecat Jaguar IS/IM fighter upgrade, amove that can delay the programme to up the engines of around 60 of the hardy combat aircraft.

Official sources say RR’s decision inearly February to withdraw from thecompetition followed the IAF’s requirementfor a brand new engine and not the upgradedAdour MK 821 turbofan – an advancedversion of the incumbent Adour Mk 811power pack – on offer.

In June 2009, RR successfully tested the Adour Mk 821 turbofan in a SepecatJaguar in UK in the presence of an IndianAir Force delegation and was confident of meeting India’s requirement, especiallyas the upgraded power pack wouldnecessitate the minimum amount ofplatform re-engineering for fitment.

As a part of its sales pitch, RRmaintained that the decades-old experienceof Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) inlocally building the Adour 811 engines underlicence could also be harnessed inconstructing the Adrour 821 power pack butto no avail. Last year, RR signed a$200-million deal with HAL to supply

DEFENCE BUZZ APRIL 2011 DSI

Sepecat Jaguar


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Adour Mk 871 engines for 57 additionalBAE Systems’ Hawk 312 advanced jettrainers being acquired by the IAF and theIndian Navy (IN).

Along with a new engine, the HAL-builtupgraded Jaguar IS/IM/IB versions will alsobe equipped with the DARIN III (DisplayAttack Ranging Inertial Navigation) avionicssuite capable of Precision-GuidedMunitions (PGM) delivery and possibly,

fitted even for strategic employment.The lone Jaguar/IM squadron of

20 fighters based at Jamnagar will soon bearmed with 26 Boeing AGM/ATM-84L/84Harpoon Block II missiles acquired recentlyvia the FMS programme to reinforce theirmaritime warfare capability by striking at land-based targets and ships inlittoral environments.

One Step ForwardBRAZIL’S Embraer handed over the first ofthree EMB 145 aircraft in late February toIndia’s Defence Research and DevelopmentOrganisation (DRDO) at their headquartersin São José dos Campos. The aircraft wereunveiled for their eventual conversion toAirborne Early Warning and Control(AEW&C) platforms after being fitted withEmbraer’s locally designed phased-arrayradar, a project that has been delayed bynearly three years to 2014.

The three EMB 145 that feature anin-flight refueling system, satellitecommunication (SATCOM) capability,

enhanced electrical and cooling capacitiesbesides varied aerodynamic and structuralchanges were acquired in July 2008 for $210million. On the aircraft, DRDO’s Centre for Airborne Systems-developed S-bandactive electronically-scanned array radarwill be integrated.

But official sources say technical and‘mating’ problems have postponed theproject well beyond the 2011 deadline set bythe Cabinet Committee on Security inSeptember 2004.

These three AEW&C aircraft willsupplement an equal number of IsraelAircraft Industries (IAI)-built PhalconAEW7C radar mounted on Ilyushin Il-76 A-50Heavy Lift Transport Aircraft which the IAFhas acquired for $1.1 billion in 2004. TwoPhalcon systems have been delivered to theIndian Air Force (IAF) while the third isexpected shortly and the IAF is presentlyemploying them to effectively hone their battle space management involvingSu-30MKI multi-role fighters, Jaguars andupgraded MiG-27s.

The under-development of the AEW&Cplatforms are a replacement for the DRDO’searlier Air Surveillance Platform (ASP), theprototype of which crashed in 1999. TheDRDO’s revolving dorsal rotodome mountedatop a modified Hindustan AeronauticsLimited (HAL) HS 748 aircraft fell off aroundfive km short of the runway as the ASP was coming into land at the Indian naval station, Rajali, in south India in1999. All eight people, including four DRDOtest pilots and four military scientists,

involved in the ASP programme died in theaccident postponing the DRDO’s AEW&Cprogramme till its revival five years later.

Since 2009, DRDO scientists have beenworking closely with Embraer which hasconsiderable experience in building AEW&Csystems. It was also selected in 2004, alongwith USA’s Lockheed Martin, to develop theUS Army’s next generation of intelligencesystems known as the aerial common sensor(ACS) mounted on its ERJ 145 platform.

Once operational, the EMB 145 aircraftwith DRDO’s radar will attain surveillanceranges between 250km to 375km with a 240-degree coverage and a five-hour endurance.

In a related development, Embrarer is onthe verge of confirming the $500 million saleof nine specially configured ERJ 145s to theIAF to augment its intelligence, surveillanceand reconnaissance (ISR) capability. The aircraft will also be capable oftarget-towing, aerial photography and VIPpassenger transportations.

The varied electronic, radar andsurveillance equipment, which the IAFwants integrated onto these aircraft, will besourced from local and overseas vendors,

European and US companies. “Our lowest bid was accepted in late

2009 and we are in the process of finalising the deal shortly,” Embraer’s executivevice-president Orlando J. F. Netohe said at Aero India. Military sources say the ERJ 145s with an operational range of3,200nm and a ceiling of around 42,000 feet,has been selected over the IAI-designedGulfstream G200.

Two of the nine ERJ 145 aircraft will be dedicated to signals intelligencegathering, a requirement that has gainedurgency after the Mumbai terrorist strikes.All nine ERJ 145s will complement aerialsurveillance activity presently conductedby the shadowy Aviation Research Centre(ARC) that employs IAF pilots and operatesclosely with the country’s primary externalintelligence gathering agency, theResearch and Analysis Wing (RAW). Butthe ARC is handicapped by its ageingassets badly in need of replacing in orderto execute communication and electronicsurveillance along Pakistani and Chinese frontiers.

Earlier in 2005, the Indian Air Force and the Border Security Force hadinducted five Embraer 135BJ Legacy jets equipped with self-protection suites,

costing $166.66 million, to transportVVIP’s internally.

56

DEFENCE BUZZ

EMB-145 aircraft

APRIL 2011 DSI


Conference Topics:

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