DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF INDIA - April 2010

APRIL 2010

INSURGENCY

THE NAGA SAGAThere are now possibilties of peace for one of the world’soldest insurgencies I B.G. VERGHESE

SECURITY

HOLISTIC RESPONSES With the changing nature of war democratic nations haveto contend with asymmetrical conflicts I VIJAY OBEROI

BATTLE OF THE

DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA

DSIVOLUME 2 ISSUE 5 Rs 250

Decisive trials of theArjun and Russian T-90 Main BattleTanks underscore the capability of theindigenous armouredvehicle I AJAI SHUKLA

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LETTER FROM THE editor

More worryingthan thepercievedshortage offunds for thedefence sectoris their under-utilisation.Statistics showthat over thelast ten yearsapproximatelyRs 40,000 crorehas not beenutilised.

Mannika ChopraEDITOR

Defence & Security of India

n most country’s armed formations tanks are the backbone of any assault. Theirinduction and utilisation are of critical importance. Yet ever since the governmentcommissioned the building of the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) nearly 40 yearsago the Indian Army has been ambivalent over the role of the homebuilt defencesystem. Developed and designed by the Defence Research and DevelopmentOrganisation, the Army has been continuously rejecting these tanks because of per-formance issues.

But the results of a week’s gruelling trial that took place in March in the desert terrain of theMahajan Range in Rajasthan may bring the military closer to a final decision. Unofficially seenas a showdown between the indigenously designed Arjun and the Russian T-90, the results of these critical trials are expected this month. The final outcome of the test isa prerequisite for the Army to decide the eventual operational role of the Arjun. If the tank passes muster, and DSI has learnt that the armoured vehicle performed well on all crucial parametres, it could pave the way for the Army to induct more Arjun MBTs to the disadvantage of its obsolete fleet of T-72s and the T-90s.

More often than not, the announcement of the Defence Budget brings out a collective wail ofanguish, mostly about shrinking funds, from the strategic community. But more worrying thanthe percieved shortage of funds for the defence sector is their under-utilisation. Statistics showthat over the Ninth, Tenth and current Plan periods there has been an under-utilisation of budgetary allocation to the tune of Rs 40,000 crore. In an in-depth analysis DSImakes a case forbetter utilisation and accountability mechanisms to bring about an improved fiscal awarenessand efficiency in expenditure. Steps have already been taken to delegate more financial powersbased on operational and functional requirements and not on rank. But the system needs to betightened further to ensure a clarity in strategic assessment and projection of requirement.

The latest round of talks between the Centre and the National Social Council of Nagaland-IM bring renewed hope about finding a solution to the insurgency in Nagaland, perhaps one ofthe oldest ongoing rebellions in the world. This latest exchange holds a promise that an equitable solution may soon be possible with the Centre thinking of granting more autonomyto Nagaland within the bounds of the Constitution.

We look forward to your feedback. You can send your comments and suggestions to [email protected]. Should you want to subscribe to DSI, get in touch with us [email protected] and our marketing team will do the rest.

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HOLISTICRESPONSESIncreasingly, democraciesare having to contendwith asymmetricalconflicts in whichinnovative strategies andtechnologies are beingused by weaker States ornon-State actors to exploitthe vulnerabilities of alarger opponent. This hastwo implications—firstly,a war between two Statesand secondly, a Statefighting non-State actors.

NEIGHBOURS 34

GEO-STRATEGICCHESSBOARDRecent bombings targetting Indianactivities in Afghanistan point to awar being played out betweenPakistan and India to gain influencein the ravaged country.

INSURGENCY 30

THE NAGA SAGAOne of the world’s most enduringinsurgencies seems poised for apeaceful resolution with talksbetween the government and theMuviah faction of the NSCN-IMentering a decisive phase.

NEIGHBOURS 42

A LOOMINGSHADOW Landlocked Nepal has for overhalf a century deftly balancedrelations between India andChina. With Nepal having become critical in South Asiangeopolitics, China has beenstrategically aiming to neutraliseand eliminate Indian influence inthe Himalayan kingdom.

COVER STORY 12

ARMY THINKSTANKSThe field performance of the Arjun MainBattle Tank in the recent trials has, for the firsttime, has satisfied the Indian Army to thedisadvantage of its obsolete fleet of T-72armoured vehicles and the Russian T-90s.

Cover Photo : Ajai Shukla

HELICOPTERS 26

POTENTAIRPOWER Helicopters can enhance airsupport capabilities and become ideal strike platforms. If utilised efficiently, heli-bornecombat, assault and heavy liftoperations can become animmensely effective instrumentof aerospace, military andnational power.

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DSIAPRIL, 2010

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NTE

NTS

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SECURITY 20

HOLISTICRESPONSESIncreasingly, democraciesare having to contendwith asymmetricalconflicts in whichinnovative strategies andtechnologies are beingused by weaker States ornon-State actors to exploitthe vulnerabilities of alarger opponent. This hastwo implications—firstly,a war between two Statesand secondly, a Statefighting non-State actors.

NEIGHBOURS 34

GEO-STRATEGICCHESSBOARDRecent bombings targetting Indianactivities in Afghanistan point to awar being played out betweenPakistan and India to gain influencein the ravaged country.

INSURGENCY 30

THE NAGA SAGAOne of the world’s most enduringinsurgencies seems poised for apeaceful resolution with talksbetween the government and theMuviah faction of the NSCN-IMentering a decisive phase.

NEIGHBOURS 42

A LOOMINGSHADOW Landlocked Nepal has for overhalf a century deftly balancedrelations between India andChina. With Nepal having become critical in South Asiangeopolitics, China has beenstrategically aiming to neutraliseand eliminate Indian influence inthe Himalayan kingdom.

COVER STORY 12

ARMY THINKSTANKSThe field performance of the Arjun MainBattle Tank in the recent trials has, for the firsttime, has satisfied the Indian Army to thedisadvantage of its obsolete fleet of T-72armoured vehicles and the Russian T-90s.

Cover Photo : Ajai Shukla

HELICOPTERS 26

POTENTAIRPOWER Helicopters can enhance airsupport capabilities and become ideal strike platforms. If utilised efficiently, heli-bornecombat, assault and heavy liftoperations can become animmensely effective instrumentof aerospace, military andnational power.

Contents-April 2010.qxd:contents-feb-R.qxd 09/04/10 3:50 PM Page 1


CONTRIBUTORS

Arvind Kadyan, Controllerof Defence Accounts, joined

the Indian DefenceAccounts Service in 1987.He was earlier Integrated

Financial Advisor, South-West Command

(Army) in the Ministry ofDefence. He has been

Deputy Secretary, CentralVigilance Commission andDirector (Vigilance), Delhi

Development Authority and is presently on

deputation to the Institutefor Defence Studies and

Analyses, New Delhi.

ARVINDKADYAN

DSIAPRIL, 2010

APRIL 2010 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 5

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFManeesha DubeEDITORMannika ChopraCORRESPONDENTMangala RamamoorthyART DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNAjay Kumar, Sandeep SharmaBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGERRoop AroraMANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal MehtaCOORDINATORRonald MicahCIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONAshwani RaiPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender PandeyMEDIA TRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550FINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda PRESIDENTXavier CollacoCHAIRMANJ S Uberoi

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESAustraliaCharlton D'Silva, Mass Media PublicitasTel: (61 2) 9252 3476Email: [email protected]/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected]/TurkeyLiat Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email :[email protected], [email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected]/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia/ChinaDr. Rosalind Lui, TSEA InternationalTel: (65) 6458 7885 Mobile : (65) 9886 3762E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email :[email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected] and Security of Indiais published and printed byXavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 andprinted at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area,Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. Allrights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any languagein whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MediaTransasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine arethose of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of theeditors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost toverify information published they do not accept responsibilityfor its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return ofunsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.All correspondence should be addressed to Media TransasiaIndia Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of Indiais obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact:[email protected]

B. G. VERGHESE

B.G.Verghese has been withthe Centre for Policy Research

since 1986. A recipient of theMagsaysay Award in 1975 andAssam's Sankaradeva Award

for 2005, he is currentlyChairman of the

Commonwealth HumanRights Initiative, Delhi.

A distinguished fellow of theAdministrative Staff College

of India, Hyderabad, he wasalso a member of the Kargil

Review Committee and co-author of the Kargil Review

Committee Report. He haswritten several books,

including Rage, Reconciliationand Security that deals with

managing India's diversities.He started his career in

journalism with the Times ofIndiaand was later the editorof both Hindustan Times and

Indian Express.

Jyoti Malhotra is aContributing Editor for

Business Standard in India.She has been both atelevision and print

journalist for 25 years,covering foreign policy andstrategic issues, especiallyin the Indian Subcontinent.

She has travelled toAfghanistan several times

since the Taliban wereousted from there after the

September 11, 2001 attacks.

JYOTI MALHOTRA

Vijay Oberoi, Founder-Director of the Centre for

Land Warfare Studies(CLAWS) for over four years

is also the Founder Presidentof the War Wounded

Foundation which works for the rehabilitation of war

disabled personnel. A postgraduate in Defence Studies

and an International Fellowat the Army War College in

USA, he was commissionedinto the Indian Army in 1961.

He retired as Vice Chief ofArmy Staff in 2001 and has

travelled extensively,including to Pakistan in 2003,

as part of the Track II leveltalks. He has also edited

several books on securityand intelligence.

VIJAYOBEROI

Fali H. Major, commissionedin the Indian Air Force in 1967

as a Wing Commander, hasheld several important staff

and field appointments. As aWing Commander, he

commanded the IAF’s first Mi-17 Squadron and was

awarded the Vayu Sena Medal(Gallantry) for his leadership.

A recipient also of theShaurya Chakra, he took over

as Air Officer CommandingLeh (Ladakh), in the

aftermath of the Kargilconflict in 1999. A graduatefrom the National Defence

College and Army WarCollege, he is the first

helicopter pilot to become theChief of Air Staff in 2007.

He is also the President, Air Force Association.

FALI H. MAJOR

AJAI SHUKLA

Ajai Shukla works in boththe visual and the print

medium. He is ConsultingEditor (Strategic Affairs) forBusiness Standard . He was

also Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs)

for NDTV, a reputed newsbroadcaster in India, forwhich he has anchored

prime time news and specialprogrammes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

Jayadev Ranade, a formerAdditional Secretary,

Cabinet Secretariat,Government of India, is asecurity and intelligenceexpert. He is a seasoned

China analyst with over 25years experience in the field.

His foreign assignmentshave included Bejing and

Hong Kong and his lastinternational posting, prior

to retirement in late 2008,was as Minister in the Indian

Embassy in Washington. He contributes regularly to

leading publications mostlyon strategic and security

issues relating to China — his chosen field of

specialisation. He ispresently a DistinguishedFellow with the Centre for

Air Power Studies.

JAYADEVRANADE

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhicorrespondent for Jane’sDefence Weekly, UK and

contributes to it on a diverserange of security and

military related matters. He is also the India

correspondent for the DailyTelegraph, London and

the Irish Times.

RAHUL BEDI

AFP www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html

Contributors-final-IInd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 09/04/10 5:07 PM Page 1


CONTRIBUTORS

Arvind Kadyan, Controllerof Defence Accounts, joined

the Indian DefenceAccounts Service in 1987.He was earlier Integrated

Financial Advisor, South-West Command

(Army) in the Ministry ofDefence. He has been

Deputy Secretary, CentralVigilance Commission andDirector (Vigilance), Delhi

Development Authority and is presently on

deputation to the Institutefor Defence Studies and

Analyses, New Delhi.

ARVINDKADYAN

DSIAPRIL, 2010

APRIL 2010 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 5

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFManeesha DubeEDITORMannika ChopraCORRESPONDENTMangala RamamoorthyART DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNAjay Kumar, Sandeep SharmaBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGERRoop AroraMANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal MehtaCOORDINATORRonald MicahCIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONAshwani RaiPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender PandeyMEDIA TRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550FINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda PRESIDENTXavier CollacoCHAIRMANJ S Uberoi

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESAustraliaCharlton D'Silva, Mass Media PublicitasTel: (61 2) 9252 3476Email: [email protected]/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected]/TurkeyLiat Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email :[email protected], [email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected]/Malaysia/Brunei/Indonesia/ChinaDr. Rosalind Lui, TSEA InternationalTel: (65) 6458 7885 Mobile : (65) 9886 3762E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email :[email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected] and Security of Indiais published and printed byXavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 andprinted at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area,Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. Allrights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any languagein whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MediaTransasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine arethose of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of theeditors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost toverify information published they do not accept responsibilityfor its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return ofunsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.All correspondence should be addressed to Media TransasiaIndia Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of Indiais obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact:[email protected]

B. G. VERGHESE

B.G.Verghese has been withthe Centre for Policy Research

since 1986. A recipient of theMagsaysay Award in 1975 andAssam's Sankaradeva Award

for 2005, he is currentlyChairman of the

Commonwealth HumanRights Initiative, Delhi.

A distinguished fellow of theAdministrative Staff College

of India, Hyderabad, he wasalso a member of the Kargil

Review Committee and co-author of the Kargil Review

Committee Report. He haswritten several books,

including Rage, Reconciliationand Security that deals with

managing India's diversities.He started his career in

journalism with the Times ofIndiaand was later the editorof both Hindustan Times and

Indian Express.

Jyoti Malhotra is aContributing Editor for

Business Standard in India.She has been both atelevision and print

journalist for 25 years,covering foreign policy andstrategic issues, especiallyin the Indian Subcontinent.

She has travelled toAfghanistan several times

since the Taliban wereousted from there after the

September 11, 2001 attacks.

JYOTI MALHOTRA

Vijay Oberoi, Founder-Director of the Centre for

Land Warfare Studies(CLAWS) for over four years

is also the Founder Presidentof the War Wounded

Foundation which works for the rehabilitation of war

disabled personnel. A postgraduate in Defence Studies

and an International Fellowat the Army War College in

USA, he was commissionedinto the Indian Army in 1961.

He retired as Vice Chief ofArmy Staff in 2001 and has

travelled extensively,including to Pakistan in 2003,

as part of the Track II leveltalks. He has also edited

several books on securityand intelligence.

VIJAYOBEROI

Fali H. Major, commissionedin the Indian Air Force in 1967

as a Wing Commander, hasheld several important staff

and field appointments. As aWing Commander, he

commanded the IAF’s first Mi-17 Squadron and was

awarded the Vayu Sena Medal(Gallantry) for his leadership.

A recipient also of theShaurya Chakra, he took over

as Air Officer CommandingLeh (Ladakh), in the

aftermath of the Kargilconflict in 1999. A graduatefrom the National Defence

College and Army WarCollege, he is the first

helicopter pilot to become theChief of Air Staff in 2007.

He is also the President, Air Force Association.

FALI H. MAJOR

AJAI SHUKLA

Ajai Shukla works in boththe visual and the print

medium. He is ConsultingEditor (Strategic Affairs) forBusiness Standard . He was

also Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs)

for NDTV, a reputed newsbroadcaster in India, forwhich he has anchored

prime time news and specialprogrammes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

Jayadev Ranade, a formerAdditional Secretary,

Cabinet Secretariat,Government of India, is asecurity and intelligenceexpert. He is a seasoned

China analyst with over 25years experience in the field.

His foreign assignmentshave included Bejing and

Hong Kong and his lastinternational posting, prior

to retirement in late 2008,was as Minister in the Indian

Embassy in Washington. He contributes regularly to

leading publications mostlyon strategic and security

issues relating to China — his chosen field of

specialisation. He ispresently a DistinguishedFellow with the Centre for

Air Power Studies.

JAYADEVRANADE

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhicorrespondent for Jane’sDefence Weekly, UK and

contributes to it on a diverserange of security and

military related matters. He is also the India

correspondent for the DailyTelegraph, London and

the Irish Times.

RAHUL BEDI

AFP www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html

Contributors-final-IInd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 09/04/10 5:07 PM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2010

06

DEFENCE BUDGET

07

AFP

Immediately after the presentation ofthe Union Budget 2010-11 inParliament on Febuary 26, discussions

took place in the defence fraternity aboutthe seemingly marginal increase in theallotment of funds for the defence sector.The total defence allocation for 2010-11was Rs 1,47,344 crore against Rs 1,41,703crore in 2009-10, indicating a marginal

increase of 3.98 percent. However, onecannot overlook the fact that whencompared with the Revised Estimates (RE)for 2009-10, the increase actually comes to8.13 percent. And in case of CapitalExpenditure the increase is nearly 25percent. Thus to say that the increase issmall is not justified. In fact, FinanceMinister Pranab Mukherjee even assuredParliament that additional funds could beprovided later, if necessary, to meetsecurity requirements.

Most debates on the Defence Budgetcentre on the adequacy of budgetaryallocation to meet the modernisationrequirements of the defence forces. But inthat process, the issue of utilisation ofbudgetary allocations and aspects relatingto budget accountability don’t get therequired attention of defence analysts,despite the fact that these are importantfactors for achieving economy andefficiency in defence spending.

Budget Availability vis-à-vis UtilisationScanning past Budgets, it is clear thatrecently there has been hardly any shortageof funds for defence. During last three years(2007-08 to 2009-10) the defence servicesreceived 90 to 93 percent allocations of theirprojected budgetary requirements.

More than this perceived sense of beingshortchanged, it would be more productiveto examine the worrying trend of under-utilising budgetary allocations. There has

been an under-utilisation to the extent of Rs 40,000 crore approximately during theNinth and Tenth Plan periods and in thecurrent Plan period (See Table). In fact, thisfigure is even higher if the amount paid asadvances to Public Sector Units at the fag endof the financial year, to avoid a surrender ofthe funds, is added. Indeed, if the report byKPMG on defence which states that 85 percent of defence equipment is outdatedis to be believed than such rampant under-utilisation is highly undesirable.

In fact, the under-utilisation of fundsallotted for defence has been a regular

feature for the last ten years or so. Theproblem essentially relates to CapitalExpenditure and implies that the allocationmeant for the modernisation of armed forceswasn’t spent in the stipulated timeframe.This lag could either be due to delays inthe finalisation of capital acquisitionproposals or the failure of vendors to adhereto the agreed time schedule for the supply ofitems. In both cases, the op-readiness of thearmed forces gets affected.

Quality of ExpenditureThe issue of Quality of Expenditure (QoE)is another area which should beconsidered. Indeed, the StandingCommittee on Defence has been regularlyhighlighting the need to curb wastefulexpenditure. The Thirteenth FinanceCommission has also mentioned that there isa need to improve the quality and efficiencyof defence expenditure.

The reports of the Comptroller andAuditor General (CAG) of India on defencerefer to a number of cases whereprocurement could have been avoided.They also cite instances of how delays indecision making have resulted in asubstantial cost escalation. It’s importantto note however that these reports arebased on a test checks only.

Some of the cases mentioned in the CAGreport show that it’s difficult to accept howexpenditure on these items was justified. Afew random samples:l Though the shelf life of 300 missiles of ‘X’type is slated to expire by June 2010, anddespite having a stock of 440 missilelaunchers,Air HQs procured 145 additionallaunchers between August 2006 and March2008. Thus it incurred a largely infructuousexpenditure of Rs 66.86 crore. l The Indian Navy procured six “R” radarsat a cost of Rs 18.85 crore even though theperformance of this system was suboptimaland its phasing out was under consideration.l Army HQs placed three indents during1999-2001 on Bharat Electronics Limited forthe supply of 2,500 radio sets without takinginto account their post-upgradationrequirement. After retro-modification, thespares, valued at Rs 3.01 crore, procuredmuch earlier became redundant.l An advance payment of Rs 156 crore to

Utilisation and accountability are critical factorsthat are often overlooked in an analysis of theDefence Budget

COUNTINGCOSTS

ARVIND KADIYAN

KEY POINTSn During the Ninth and Tenth Planperiods and in the current Plan period,there has been an under-utilisation of budgetary allocation by about Rs 40,000 crore.n The accountability mechanism isweak since the Defence Budget is inputoriented. The Legislature cannot makeout from the Demand for Grants thepurpose of funds and their outcome. n To expedite the procurement processand meet modernisation requirements,an independent defence acquisitionorganisation needs to be set up.

Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee holds up

his briefcase as he leaves for Parliament to

present the Union Budget in February 2010.

He is accompanied by Ministers of State for

Finance Namo Narain Meena (left) and S.S

Palanimanickam (right)

Plan/Period Budget Allocated Budget Utilised % Utilisation(Rs. in Crore) (Rs. in Crore)

8th Plan (1992-1997) 1,12,979 1,19,033 105.4

9th Plan (1997-2002) 2,43,100 2,26,134 93.0

10th Plan (2002-2007) 3,79,300 3,57,627 94.3

11th Plan (2007-2012)** 3,43,303 3,42,168* 99.7*Under capital budget Rs 16,000 crore were surrendered but more revenue budget was utilised

**Data is only available for 2007- 2010

Source: Data compiled from Defence Services Estimates

BUDGET UTILISATION TRENDS

Defence Budget.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 3:56 PM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2010

06

DEFENCE BUDGET

07

AFP

Immediately after the presentation ofthe Union Budget 2010-11 inParliament on Febuary 26, discussions

took place in the defence fraternity aboutthe seemingly marginal increase in theallotment of funds for the defence sector.The total defence allocation for 2010-11was Rs 1,47,344 crore against Rs 1,41,703crore in 2009-10, indicating a marginal

increase of 3.98 percent. However, onecannot overlook the fact that whencompared with the Revised Estimates (RE)for 2009-10, the increase actually comes to8.13 percent. And in case of CapitalExpenditure the increase is nearly 25percent. Thus to say that the increase issmall is not justified. In fact, FinanceMinister Pranab Mukherjee even assuredParliament that additional funds could beprovided later, if necessary, to meetsecurity requirements.

Most debates on the Defence Budgetcentre on the adequacy of budgetaryallocation to meet the modernisationrequirements of the defence forces. But inthat process, the issue of utilisation ofbudgetary allocations and aspects relatingto budget accountability don’t get therequired attention of defence analysts,despite the fact that these are importantfactors for achieving economy andefficiency in defence spending.

Budget Availability vis-à-vis UtilisationScanning past Budgets, it is clear thatrecently there has been hardly any shortageof funds for defence. During last three years(2007-08 to 2009-10) the defence servicesreceived 90 to 93 percent allocations of theirprojected budgetary requirements.

More than this perceived sense of beingshortchanged, it would be more productiveto examine the worrying trend of under-utilising budgetary allocations. There has

been an under-utilisation to the extent of Rs 40,000 crore approximately during theNinth and Tenth Plan periods and in thecurrent Plan period (See Table). In fact, thisfigure is even higher if the amount paid asadvances to Public Sector Units at the fag endof the financial year, to avoid a surrender ofthe funds, is added. Indeed, if the report byKPMG on defence which states that 85 percent of defence equipment is outdatedis to be believed than such rampant under-utilisation is highly undesirable.

In fact, the under-utilisation of fundsallotted for defence has been a regular

feature for the last ten years or so. Theproblem essentially relates to CapitalExpenditure and implies that the allocationmeant for the modernisation of armed forceswasn’t spent in the stipulated timeframe.This lag could either be due to delays inthe finalisation of capital acquisitionproposals or the failure of vendors to adhereto the agreed time schedule for the supply ofitems. In both cases, the op-readiness of thearmed forces gets affected.

Quality of ExpenditureThe issue of Quality of Expenditure (QoE)is another area which should beconsidered. Indeed, the StandingCommittee on Defence has been regularlyhighlighting the need to curb wastefulexpenditure. The Thirteenth FinanceCommission has also mentioned that there isa need to improve the quality and efficiencyof defence expenditure.

The reports of the Comptroller andAuditor General (CAG) of India on defencerefer to a number of cases whereprocurement could have been avoided.They also cite instances of how delays indecision making have resulted in asubstantial cost escalation. It’s importantto note however that these reports arebased on a test checks only.

Some of the cases mentioned in the CAGreport show that it’s difficult to accept howexpenditure on these items was justified. Afew random samples:l Though the shelf life of 300 missiles of ‘X’type is slated to expire by June 2010, anddespite having a stock of 440 missilelaunchers,Air HQs procured 145 additionallaunchers between August 2006 and March2008. Thus it incurred a largely infructuousexpenditure of Rs 66.86 crore. l The Indian Navy procured six “R” radarsat a cost of Rs 18.85 crore even though theperformance of this system was suboptimaland its phasing out was under consideration.l Army HQs placed three indents during1999-2001 on Bharat Electronics Limited forthe supply of 2,500 radio sets without takinginto account their post-upgradationrequirement. After retro-modification, thespares, valued at Rs 3.01 crore, procuredmuch earlier became redundant.l An advance payment of Rs 156 crore to

Utilisation and accountability are critical factorsthat are often overlooked in an analysis of theDefence Budget

COUNTINGCOSTS

ARVIND KADIYAN

KEY POINTSn During the Ninth and Tenth Planperiods and in the current Plan period,there has been an under-utilisation of budgetary allocation by about Rs 40,000 crore.n The accountability mechanism isweak since the Defence Budget is inputoriented. The Legislature cannot makeout from the Demand for Grants thepurpose of funds and their outcome. n To expedite the procurement processand meet modernisation requirements,an independent defence acquisitionorganisation needs to be set up.

Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee holds up

his briefcase as he leaves for Parliament to

present the Union Budget in February 2010.

He is accompanied by Ministers of State for

Finance Namo Narain Meena (left) and S.S

Palanimanickam (right)

Plan/Period Budget Allocated Budget Utilised % Utilisation(Rs. in Crore) (Rs. in Crore)

8th Plan (1992-1997) 1,12,979 1,19,033 105.4

9th Plan (1997-2002) 2,43,100 2,26,134 93.0

10th Plan (2002-2007) 3,79,300 3,57,627 94.3

11th Plan (2007-2012)** 3,43,303 3,42,168* 99.7*Under capital budget Rs 16,000 crore were surrendered but more revenue budget was utilised

**Data is only available for 2007- 2010

Source: Data compiled from Defence Services Estimates

BUDGET UTILISATION TRENDS


authorities lower down the food chaincannot afford to return these funds theyare forced to find avenues to justify thisadditional expenditure.

Given these anomalies, some stepshave been taken in the right direction. Toensure greater transparency in theprocurement process and eliminatediscretion in government purchases, theMinistry of Defence (MoD) issued theDefence Procurement Procedure (DPP)for Capital Acquisition in 2002 andDefence Procurement Manual (DPM) forRevenue Expenditure in 2005. The DPMwas revised in 2009 to remove bottlenecksin the procurement process so that fundscould be utilised to achieve value formoney. Recently, the MoD has also made aproposal to revise the DPP on a yearlybasis to further streamline and expeditethe acquisition process.

Further, to improve the utilisation ofbudgetary allocation and improveefficiency of expenditure, the delegation offinancial powers to various authorities inthe Service Headquarters was reviewedand powers were delegated to lowerformations and unit levels by the MoD.

As a result of enhanced delegation offinancial powers in 2006, 46 percent of the

overall procurement budget has beenutilised by the Services and the balance 54percent has been utilised by the MoD ascompared to a 30 percent utilisation by theServices prior to the enhancement of powers.

Further, to ensure a uniform cash out-flow the SHQ has issued instructionsregarding the booking of expenditure. Ithas been stipulated that 40 percentexpenditure needs to be booked byAugust 31 and 75 percent by December 31.Additionally, to check cases of avoidableexpenditure, all budget holders are

required to closely monitor the trend ofexpenditure under different heads toensure that there is no last minutepurchase rush.

Weak Accountability MechanismIndia has a system of responsibility and accountability for its financialadministration based on Constitutionalprovisions. In fact, the role andresponsibility of the Legislature and theExecutive have been very well defined.Further, the Parliamentary control over

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)even before receiving approval by thesanctioning authority violated budgetaryand financial controls. Failure to conclude acontract with HAL even after eight yearsof approval of the project thus vitiated thecontrol framework of the project.l Exceeding authorisation, the ArmyHQs procured 56 imagers, involving anavoidable expenditure of Rs 10.16 crore.

On the revenue side also, there hasbeen problem of wasteful expenditure.There have been numerous recorded casesof items being procured without sufficientjustification, or in excess quantity orpurchased at higher price. Through itsInternal Audit Reports, the ControllerGeneral of Defence Accounts hashighlighted such cases of avoidableexpenditure especially those relating toRevenue Expenditure.

Wasteful expenditure have also beencaused by the self-creation of services. Forexample, the funds for revenue procurementare normally allocated by variousdirectorates in the Service Headquarters(SHQ) to lower levels of authority and units.But experience has shown that these levelsoften retain some funds to cover theunforeseen or for additional fundrequirements at a later stage.

However, at the same time, there havealso been cases when no fundrequirements were received. Additionalfunds have been released in the lastfinancial quarter to units without ademand even being put forward. Since

DSIAPRIL 2010

08

DEFENCE BUDGET

09

To improve the utilisationof budgetary allocation and

efficiency of expenditure,the delegation of financial

powers to variousauthorities in the Service

Headquarters wasreviewed and powers were

delegated to lowerformations and unit levels

by the Minister of Defence.

”

Soldiers from Gorkha Rifles

take position during a

training exercise in Varanasi

A AN-32 transport

aircraft at the Fuk Che

airbase in Ladakh

“In this and accompanying Instructions, I am putting formally on record the financialauthority which I am delegating to you on apersonal basis, in my capacity as thePermanent Head of the Department…”

“You are personally accountable to me , inrespect of my Accounting Officer,responsibility for Votes1 and 4, for theexercise of financial powers which I amdelegating to you….”—Extract from a letter written to the UK Commander-in-Chief,who is the top level budgetholder, from the Permanent Under Secretary

“I am directed to convey the sanction of the President for delegation offinancial powers to Army Authorities as contained in the schedule to this letter………”

“The exercise of the financial powers will be governed by existingorders and instructions on the subject,as amended by the Government fromtime to time……..”

—Extract from a letter written by Director, MoD, India to the Chief of Army Staff

COMPARATIVE COMMUNICATIONS


authorities lower down the food chaincannot afford to return these funds theyare forced to find avenues to justify thisadditional expenditure.

Given these anomalies, some stepshave been taken in the right direction. Toensure greater transparency in theprocurement process and eliminatediscretion in government purchases, theMinistry of Defence (MoD) issued theDefence Procurement Procedure (DPP)for Capital Acquisition in 2002 andDefence Procurement Manual (DPM) forRevenue Expenditure in 2005. The DPMwas revised in 2009 to remove bottlenecksin the procurement process so that fundscould be utilised to achieve value formoney. Recently, the MoD has also made aproposal to revise the DPP on a yearlybasis to further streamline and expeditethe acquisition process.

Further, to improve the utilisation ofbudgetary allocation and improveefficiency of expenditure, the delegation offinancial powers to various authorities inthe Service Headquarters was reviewedand powers were delegated to lowerformations and unit levels by the MoD.

As a result of enhanced delegation offinancial powers in 2006, 46 percent of the

overall procurement budget has beenutilised by the Services and the balance 54percent has been utilised by the MoD ascompared to a 30 percent utilisation by theServices prior to the enhancement of powers.

Further, to ensure a uniform cash out-flow the SHQ has issued instructionsregarding the booking of expenditure. Ithas been stipulated that 40 percentexpenditure needs to be booked byAugust 31 and 75 percent by December 31.Additionally, to check cases of avoidableexpenditure, all budget holders are

required to closely monitor the trend ofexpenditure under different heads toensure that there is no last minutepurchase rush.

Weak Accountability MechanismIndia has a system of responsibility and accountability for its financialadministration based on Constitutionalprovisions. In fact, the role andresponsibility of the Legislature and theExecutive have been very well defined.Further, the Parliamentary control over

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)even before receiving approval by thesanctioning authority violated budgetaryand financial controls. Failure to conclude acontract with HAL even after eight yearsof approval of the project thus vitiated thecontrol framework of the project.l Exceeding authorisation, the ArmyHQs procured 56 imagers, involving anavoidable expenditure of Rs 10.16 crore.

On the revenue side also, there hasbeen problem of wasteful expenditure.There have been numerous recorded casesof items being procured without sufficientjustification, or in excess quantity orpurchased at higher price. Through itsInternal Audit Reports, the ControllerGeneral of Defence Accounts hashighlighted such cases of avoidableexpenditure especially those relating toRevenue Expenditure.

Wasteful expenditure have also beencaused by the self-creation of services. Forexample, the funds for revenue procurementare normally allocated by variousdirectorates in the Service Headquarters(SHQ) to lower levels of authority and units.But experience has shown that these levelsoften retain some funds to cover theunforeseen or for additional fundrequirements at a later stage.

However, at the same time, there havealso been cases when no fundrequirements were received. Additionalfunds have been released in the lastfinancial quarter to units without ademand even being put forward. Since

DSIAPRIL 2010

08

DEFENCE BUDGET

09

To improve the utilisationof budgetary allocation and

efficiency of expenditure,the delegation of financial

powers to variousauthorities in the Service

Headquarters wasreviewed and powers were

delegated to lowerformations and unit levels

by the Minister of Defence.

”

Soldiers from Gorkha Rifles

take position during a

training exercise in Varanasi

A AN-32 transport

aircraft at the Fuk Che

airbase in Ladakh

“In this and accompanying Instructions, I am putting formally on record the financialauthority which I am delegating to you on apersonal basis, in my capacity as thePermanent Head of the Department…”

“You are personally accountable to me , inrespect of my Accounting Officer,responsibility for Votes1 and 4, for theexercise of financial powers which I amdelegating to you….”—Extract from a letter written to the UK Commander-in-Chief,who is the top level budgetholder, from the Permanent Under Secretary

“I am directed to convey the sanction of the President for delegation offinancial powers to Army Authorities as contained in the schedule to this letter………”

“The exercise of the financial powers will be governed by existingorders and instructions on the subject,as amended by the Government fromtime to time……..”

—Extract from a letter written by Director, MoD, India to the Chief of Army Staff

COMPARATIVE COMMUNICATIONS


public finances is ensured through variouscommittees of Parliament members.

Parliamentary control over publicfinances is also an instrument ofaccountability with the highest level of thegovernment. Parliament scrutinises theBudget in two stages: firstly, after itspresentation in Parliament, when a generaldebate over Budget proposals takes placeand thereafter, the Departmentally RelatedStanding Committee (DRSC) examines thedetailed Demands for Grants and submitsa report to Parliament. The Public AccountsCommittee (PAC) also examines the reportsof the CAG on Appropriation Accounts andthe various performance reports ofdevelopment projects or programmes andsubmits a report to Parliament. The CAG isan independent body and providesstrength to the accountability process.

However, in the case of defence thisaccountability mechanism becomes a littleweak since its budget is input oriented andthe Legislature cannot make out from theDemand for Grants the purpose for whichfunds are being sought or see whatoutcome will be achieved. Besides, due to alack of clear information about the nation’sDefence Policy and programmes there ishardly any meaningful discussion on theDefence Budget in Parliament.

Even the Standing Committee on Defenceis unable to play a significant role sinceneither the required information about theprogrammes and their possible outcomes is

available to them nor does it have therequired support of experts to examine theissues relating to defence. The PAC too is notable to examine and discuss the CAG’sparagraphs on defence for a long time.

As a result of all these shortcomings, theeffectiveness of the accountability systemgets compromised.

It is the administrative ministries whichare responsible for the execution of theBudget proposal. Under the newmanagement strategy introduced in 1996,the MoD introduced a substantialdelegation of financial powers for RevenueExpenditure to the three Services.

Further, in 2006, the Authority-cum-Accountability Centres in the SQH andbudget centres at lower levels wereentrusted with the responsibility of

planned utilisation of allocated resources.The performance of such centres was to bemonitored with the reference to theoutcome achieved against expenditureincurred. While these measures haveproved useful, the concept of OutcomeBudgeting is yet to be implemented in thedefence sector. In the Services, the conceptof personal responsibility for achievingoutcomes against expenditure is lacking as aresult the full benefit of the delegation ofpowers is yet to be achieved.

For instance,a comparison of the nature ofcommunication sent to top-level budgetholders of the Services from the MoD inIndia and their counterparts in the UK showsthe lack of emphasis on personalresponsibility. The point regarding personalresponsibility needs to be reinforced by

suitable communication from the DefenceSecretary, since he is the chief accountingauthority of the MoD, to achieve an optimalutilisation of financial resources (See Box).

In 2006, for the first time, financialpowers for capital schemes were delegatedto the Services at the level of the Vice Chiefand further enhanced in 2009. As a resultabout 35-40 percent procurement cases arenow finalised at this level, utilising fivepercent approximately of the capitalbudget. Thus the responsibility andaccountability for utilisation of the capitalbudget lies mainly with the MoD, though ithas to seek an approval of the Ministry ofFinance and Cabinet Committee onSecurity depending on the amount of theproposal. But the under-utilisation of thecapital budget during last ten years

indicates that the existing accountabilitysystem has some inherent problems.

Way ForwardOne way to expedite the procurementprocess without compromising themodernisation requirement of the Indianarmed forces would be the formation of anindependent defence acquisitionorganisation. Its member should be expertsfrom various fields, with a minimum fiveyear tenure and with substantial financialpowers. The head of such a organisation,should also be given immunity for hisdecisions from the three Cs—the CAG,Central Vigilance Commission and CentralBureau of Investigation.

Additionally, the present financial powerof the Defence Minister needs to beenhanced. The role of the Ministry ofFinance too needs to be reviewed to avoidduplication of work.

In 2002, the DPP was issued to bringmore transparency into the procurementprocess. However, it seems that after it wasissued the decision making process hasslowed down clearly reflecting thecontinuous under-utilisation of funds. Itwould be probably be more effective ifmore rigid guidelines are followed.

A primary requirement to bringaccountability into the system is to institutea Defence Policy so that capability plans canbe prepared. On the basis of thisframework, a Long Term Perspective Plan, aFive Year Plan and a Two Year Plan can beprepared. The Two Year Plan should beapproved by the Cabinet Committee onSecurity, which in turn would ensure timelyaction at various levels.

Further, the implementation ofoutcome budgeting in defence will create aculture of accountability and improveefficiency in resource utilisation. To makethe accountability system more effectivethe Public Accounts Committee andStanding Committee should utilise theservices of experts from various fieldsoutside the system so as to have anobjective assessment of the issues.

There is also a need to have aninformed debate on issues relating todefence in Parliament. Some NGOs whichregularly provide research basedinformation to Parliamentarians regardingspecific issues that come up for discussionin Parliament, should also take up defencesubjects but of course this can be doneonly if the MoD is willing to shareinformation with them.

One way to expedite theprocurement process

without compromising themodernisation requirement

of the armed forces wouldbe the formation of anindependent defence

acquisition organisation. Itsmember should be experts

from various fields with fiveyears tenure and substantial

financial powers.

”

DSIAPRIL 2010

10

DEFENCE BUDGET

11

A Sea Harrier takes off from

the flight deck of the aircraft

carrier INS Viraat. (Right)

Defence Minister A.K. Antony


public finances is ensured through variouscommittees of Parliament members.

Parliamentary control over publicfinances is also an instrument ofaccountability with the highest level of thegovernment. Parliament scrutinises theBudget in two stages: firstly, after itspresentation in Parliament, when a generaldebate over Budget proposals takes placeand thereafter, the Departmentally RelatedStanding Committee (DRSC) examines thedetailed Demands for Grants and submitsa report to Parliament. The Public AccountsCommittee (PAC) also examines the reportsof the CAG on Appropriation Accounts andthe various performance reports ofdevelopment projects or programmes andsubmits a report to Parliament. The CAG isan independent body and providesstrength to the accountability process.

However, in the case of defence thisaccountability mechanism becomes a littleweak since its budget is input oriented andthe Legislature cannot make out from theDemand for Grants the purpose for whichfunds are being sought or see whatoutcome will be achieved. Besides, due to alack of clear information about the nation’sDefence Policy and programmes there ishardly any meaningful discussion on theDefence Budget in Parliament.

Even the Standing Committee on Defenceis unable to play a significant role sinceneither the required information about theprogrammes and their possible outcomes is

available to them nor does it have therequired support of experts to examine theissues relating to defence. The PAC too is notable to examine and discuss the CAG’sparagraphs on defence for a long time.

As a result of all these shortcomings, theeffectiveness of the accountability systemgets compromised.

It is the administrative ministries whichare responsible for the execution of theBudget proposal. Under the newmanagement strategy introduced in 1996,the MoD introduced a substantialdelegation of financial powers for RevenueExpenditure to the three Services.

Further, in 2006, the Authority-cum-Accountability Centres in the SQH andbudget centres at lower levels wereentrusted with the responsibility of

planned utilisation of allocated resources.The performance of such centres was to bemonitored with the reference to theoutcome achieved against expenditureincurred. While these measures haveproved useful, the concept of OutcomeBudgeting is yet to be implemented in thedefence sector. In the Services, the conceptof personal responsibility for achievingoutcomes against expenditure is lacking as aresult the full benefit of the delegation ofpowers is yet to be achieved.

For instance,a comparison of the nature ofcommunication sent to top-level budgetholders of the Services from the MoD inIndia and their counterparts in the UK showsthe lack of emphasis on personalresponsibility. The point regarding personalresponsibility needs to be reinforced by

suitable communication from the DefenceSecretary, since he is the chief accountingauthority of the MoD, to achieve an optimalutilisation of financial resources (See Box).

In 2006, for the first time, financialpowers for capital schemes were delegatedto the Services at the level of the Vice Chiefand further enhanced in 2009. As a resultabout 35-40 percent procurement cases arenow finalised at this level, utilising fivepercent approximately of the capitalbudget. Thus the responsibility andaccountability for utilisation of the capitalbudget lies mainly with the MoD, though ithas to seek an approval of the Ministry ofFinance and Cabinet Committee onSecurity depending on the amount of theproposal. But the under-utilisation of thecapital budget during last ten years

indicates that the existing accountabilitysystem has some inherent problems.

Way ForwardOne way to expedite the procurementprocess without compromising themodernisation requirement of the Indianarmed forces would be the formation of anindependent defence acquisitionorganisation. Its member should be expertsfrom various fields, with a minimum fiveyear tenure and with substantial financialpowers. The head of such a organisation,should also be given immunity for hisdecisions from the three Cs—the CAG,Central Vigilance Commission and CentralBureau of Investigation.

Additionally, the present financial powerof the Defence Minister needs to beenhanced. The role of the Ministry ofFinance too needs to be reviewed to avoidduplication of work.

In 2002, the DPP was issued to bringmore transparency into the procurementprocess. However, it seems that after it wasissued the decision making process hasslowed down clearly reflecting thecontinuous under-utilisation of funds. Itwould be probably be more effective ifmore rigid guidelines are followed.

A primary requirement to bringaccountability into the system is to institutea Defence Policy so that capability plans canbe prepared. On the basis of thisframework, a Long Term Perspective Plan, aFive Year Plan and a Two Year Plan can beprepared. The Two Year Plan should beapproved by the Cabinet Committee onSecurity, which in turn would ensure timelyaction at various levels.

Further, the implementation ofoutcome budgeting in defence will create aculture of accountability and improveefficiency in resource utilisation. To makethe accountability system more effectivethe Public Accounts Committee andStanding Committee should utilise theservices of experts from various fieldsoutside the system so as to have anobjective assessment of the issues.

There is also a need to have aninformed debate on issues relating todefence in Parliament. Some NGOs whichregularly provide research basedinformation to Parliamentarians regardingspecific issues that come up for discussionin Parliament, should also take up defencesubjects but of course this can be doneonly if the MoD is willing to shareinformation with them.

One way to expedite theprocurement process

without compromising themodernisation requirement

of the armed forces wouldbe the formation of anindependent defence

acquisition organisation. Itsmember should be experts

from various fields with fiveyears tenure and substantial

financial powers.

”

DSIAPRIL 2010

10

DEFENCE BUDGET

11

A Sea Harrier takes off from

the flight deck of the aircraft

carrier INS Viraat. (Right)

Defence Minister A.K. Antony


The quarter century and more that it has taken India’s CombatVehicles R&D Establishment

(CVRDE) to design and build the ArjunMain Battle Tank (MBT) has created anear-crisis of confidence between theCVRDE and its customers, the Army’sDirectorate General of Mechanised Forces(DGMF). The DGMF, disillusioned byseemingly endless time and cost overrunsfrom the CVRDE, grew to consider the Arjun a combat liability that was being forced down its throat. The CVRDE, in turn, started viewing theDGMF as obstructionist, technically ineptand suspiciously inclined towardsRussian equipment.

In this bad marriage, the major pointof dispute––the Arjun tank’sperformance––has unexpectedly becomea settled issue. During a week of Armytrials in early March, at the Mahajan FieldFiring Ranges, near Bikaner in Rajasthan,the Arjun tank emerged conclusivelysuperior to the Russian T-90 in crucialparameters like mobility and firing. Atthe time of filing this report, the trialreport is still secret and is expected toreach the Army Headquarters in mid-April. But Defence & Security of India(DSI) has learned from multiple sourcesinvolved in the trials that the Arjun tankhas, for the first time ever, fully satisfiedthe Army with its field performance.

The trial pitted one squadron (14 tanks) of Arjuns against an equalnumber of T-90s. These squadrons weregiven three tactical tasks; each involveddriving across 75 km of desert terrain,fully buttoned down, in battle conditions.The Arjuns and the T-90s also comparedtheir shooting ability twice, engagingtargets by day and by night, while staticand on the move. During each of thesefiring trials, every tank fired at least tenrounds, with each hit being carefullylogged. In total, each tank drove morethan 225 km and fired between 20-30

DSIAPRIL 2010

12

ARMOURED VEHICLES

13

In the Army trials held recently the indigenously produced Arjun tank was quietly impressive in comparison with the Russian T-90

AJAISHUKLA

KEY POINTSn During the potentially decisive trialsheld in March, the Arjun tanks emergedsuperior to the Russian T-90 in crucialparameters like mobility and firing.n The Army’s fleet of 2,418 T-72 tanksremains night blind, underpowered andwithout a modern fire control system.n The induction of the Arjun tank by theArmy still not certain.

ARMY THINKS TANKS

An Arjun tank being test driven on the

bump track at the Combat Vehicles Research

and Development Establishment at Avadi

near Chennai in April 2008

AJA

I SH

UK

LA

Heavy Armoured.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:03 PM Page 1

The quarter century and more that it has taken India’s CombatVehicles R&D Establishment

(CVRDE) to design and build the ArjunMain Battle Tank (MBT) has created anear-crisis of confidence between theCVRDE and its customers, the Army’sDirectorate General of Mechanised Forces(DGMF). The DGMF, disillusioned byseemingly endless time and cost overrunsfrom the CVRDE, grew to consider the Arjun a combat liability that was being forced down its throat. The CVRDE, in turn, started viewing theDGMF as obstructionist, technically ineptand suspiciously inclined towardsRussian equipment.

In this bad marriage, the major pointof dispute––the Arjun tank’sperformance––has unexpectedly becomea settled issue. During a week of Armytrials in early March, at the Mahajan FieldFiring Ranges, near Bikaner in Rajasthan,the Arjun tank emerged conclusivelysuperior to the Russian T-90 in crucialparameters like mobility and firing. Atthe time of filing this report, the trialreport is still secret and is expected toreach the Army Headquarters in mid-April. But Defence & Security of India(DSI) has learned from multiple sourcesinvolved in the trials that the Arjun tankhas, for the first time ever, fully satisfiedthe Army with its field performance.

The trial pitted one squadron (14 tanks) of Arjuns against an equalnumber of T-90s. These squadrons weregiven three tactical tasks; each involveddriving across 75 km of desert terrain,fully buttoned down, in battle conditions.The Arjuns and the T-90s also comparedtheir shooting ability twice, engagingtargets by day and by night, while staticand on the move. During each of thesefiring trials, every tank fired at least tenrounds, with each hit being carefullylogged. In total, each tank drove morethan 225 km and fired between 20-30

DSIAPRIL 2010

12

ARMOURED VEHICLES

13

In the Army trials held recently the indigenously produced Arjun tank was quietly impressive in comparison with the Russian T-90

AJAISHUKLA

KEY POINTSn During the potentially decisive trialsheld in March, the Arjun tanks emergedsuperior to the Russian T-90 in crucialparameters like mobility and firing.n The Army’s fleet of 2,418 T-72 tanksremains night blind, underpowered andwithout a modern fire control system.n The induction of the Arjun tank by theArmy still not certain.

ARMY THINKS TANKS

An Arjun tank being test driven on the

bump track at the Combat Vehicles Research

and Development Establishment at Avadi

near Chennai in April 2008

AJA

I SH

UK

LA


rounds. The trial also checked the tanks’medium fording capability, drivingthrough a water channel 5-6 feet deep.

The Arjun tanks, the Army observers allagreed, performed far beyond theirexpectations. Whether driving cross-country over rugged sand-dunes;detecting, observing and quickly engagingtargets; or accurately hitting targets, bothstationery and moving, with pinpointgunnery; the Arjun overshadowed thevaunted T-90. This was especially true inthe crucial aspect of mobility: the 60-tonneArjun––thanks to its lower NominalGround Pressure or the weight per squaremetre transferred to the ground––movedmore easily across the soft desert sandsthan the lighter, 46-tonne T-90.“The Arjun could have performed even

better, had it been operated byexperienced crewmen,” says an officerwho has worked on the Arjun. “As theArmy’s tank regiments gather experienceon the Arjun, they will learn to exploit itscapabilities,” he added. “The senior officers who attended the

trials were completely taken aback by theArjun’s strong performance,” said anotherArmy officer who was present through thetrials, “and they were also pleased that theArjun had finally come of age.”

The importance of this trial in theArmy’s armour planning is evident fromthe list of senior officers who attended.Many of the Army’s senior tank generalsflew down for the trial, including theDirector General of Mechanised Forces, LtGen D. Bhardwaj; Strike CorpsCommander, Lt Gen Anil Chait; ArmyCommander South, Lt Gen PradeepKhanna and Deputy Chief of the ArmyStaff, Lt Gen J.P. Singh. Director Generalof Military Operations, Lt Gen A.S.Sekhon, also attended the trials.

For months preceding the trials, askeptical Army had signalled itsopposition to buying more Arjuns. Themessage sent out by the Army brass was:124 Arjun tanks have been boughtalready; but no more Arjuns would beordered for the Army’s fleet of 4,000 tanks.The comparative trial, or so went themessage,merely aimed at evaluating whatoperational role could be given to theArmy’s handful of Arjuns.

Now, confronted with the Arjun’sdemonstrated capability, the Army willfind it difficult to cap the Arjun order at124, or two regiments (62 tanks each). Thisis especially so given the growingobsolescence of the Army’s fleet of 2,418 T-

72 tanks, which remains night blind,underpowered, and without a modernfire control system. This outdated tankwill, according to the Army’s currentplanning, remain in service with almosthalf the Army’s 59 tank regiments as far inthe future as 2022.

Good Money,Bad Tank To keep its T-72 fleet battle worthy, theDGMF––traditional advocate of Russianequipment––plans to spend Rs 5 crore perT-72, hoping to add another 15-20 years tothat tank’s service life by replacing crucialsystems, such as its fire control system,main engine and night vision devices (seebox). So far, the Army has refused to orderthe Arjun in larger numbers to startreplacing the vintage T-72s.

Instead, good money is being thrownafter a bad tank. The military’s AnnualAcquisition Plan for 2008-2010 (AAP 2008-10) budgets a whopping Rs 5,000 crore formodernising the T-72 fleet as follows: l New 1,000-HP engines (identical to the T-90 tank) to replace the T-72’s old 780 HP engines. The cost of each engine:Rs. 3 crore.l Thermal Imaging Fire Control Systems(TIFCS) to improve the tank’s fire controland gunners’ night vision and accuracy.Each TIFCS will cost Rs 1.4 crore. l Thermal Imaging (TI) sights to providenight vision to the currently night-blind T-

DSIAPRIL 2010

14

ARMOURED VEHICLES

15

The Directorate General of Mechanised Force plans to

spend Rs 5 crore per T-72 to make it battle worthy

During a week of Armytrials in early March, at the

Mahajan Field FiringRanges, near Bikaner in

Rajasthan, the Arjun tankemerged conclusively

superior to the Russian T-90 in crucial parameterslike mobility and firing. Thetrial report is still secret; it

will only reach ArmyHeadquarters in mid-April.

”


rounds. The trial also checked the tanks’medium fording capability, drivingthrough a water channel 5-6 feet deep.

The Arjun tanks, the Army observers allagreed, performed far beyond theirexpectations. Whether driving cross-country over rugged sand-dunes;detecting, observing and quickly engagingtargets; or accurately hitting targets, bothstationery and moving, with pinpointgunnery; the Arjun overshadowed thevaunted T-90. This was especially true inthe crucial aspect of mobility: the 60-tonneArjun––thanks to its lower NominalGround Pressure or the weight per squaremetre transferred to the ground––movedmore easily across the soft desert sandsthan the lighter, 46-tonne T-90.“The Arjun could have performed even

better, had it been operated byexperienced crewmen,” says an officerwho has worked on the Arjun. “As theArmy’s tank regiments gather experienceon the Arjun, they will learn to exploit itscapabilities,” he added. “The senior officers who attended the

trials were completely taken aback by theArjun’s strong performance,” said anotherArmy officer who was present through thetrials, “and they were also pleased that theArjun had finally come of age.”

The importance of this trial in theArmy’s armour planning is evident fromthe list of senior officers who attended.Many of the Army’s senior tank generalsflew down for the trial, including theDirector General of Mechanised Forces, LtGen D. Bhardwaj; Strike CorpsCommander, Lt Gen Anil Chait; ArmyCommander South, Lt Gen PradeepKhanna and Deputy Chief of the ArmyStaff, Lt Gen J.P. Singh. Director Generalof Military Operations, Lt Gen A.S.Sekhon, also attended the trials.

For months preceding the trials, askeptical Army had signalled itsopposition to buying more Arjuns. Themessage sent out by the Army brass was:124 Arjun tanks have been boughtalready; but no more Arjuns would beordered for the Army’s fleet of 4,000 tanks.The comparative trial, or so went themessage,merely aimed at evaluating whatoperational role could be given to theArmy’s handful of Arjuns.

Now, confronted with the Arjun’sdemonstrated capability, the Army willfind it difficult to cap the Arjun order at124, or two regiments (62 tanks each). Thisis especially so given the growingobsolescence of the Army’s fleet of 2,418 T-

72 tanks, which remains night blind,underpowered, and without a modernfire control system. This outdated tankwill, according to the Army’s currentplanning, remain in service with almosthalf the Army’s 59 tank regiments as far inthe future as 2022.

Good Money,Bad Tank To keep its T-72 fleet battle worthy, theDGMF––traditional advocate of Russianequipment––plans to spend Rs 5 crore perT-72, hoping to add another 15-20 years tothat tank’s service life by replacing crucialsystems, such as its fire control system,main engine and night vision devices (seebox). So far, the Army has refused to orderthe Arjun in larger numbers to startreplacing the vintage T-72s.

Instead, good money is being thrownafter a bad tank. The military’s AnnualAcquisition Plan for 2008-2010 (AAP 2008-10) budgets a whopping Rs 5,000 crore formodernising the T-72 fleet as follows: l New 1,000-HP engines (identical to the T-90 tank) to replace the T-72’s old 780 HP engines. The cost of each engine:Rs. 3 crore.l Thermal Imaging Fire Control Systems(TIFCS) to improve the tank’s fire controland gunners’ night vision and accuracy.Each TIFCS will cost Rs 1.4 crore. l Thermal Imaging (TI) sights to providenight vision to the currently night-blind T-

DSIAPRIL 2010

14

ARMOURED VEHICLES

15

The Directorate General of Mechanised Force plans to

spend Rs 5 crore per T-72 to make it battle worthy

During a week of Armytrials in early March, at the

Mahajan Field FiringRanges, near Bikaner in

Rajasthan, the Arjun tankemerged conclusively

superior to the Russian T-90 in crucial parameterslike mobility and firing. Thetrial report is still secret; it

will only reach ArmyHeadquarters in mid-April.

”


72 tank commanders. EachTI sight costs Rs 0.4 crore. l An Auxillary Power Unit(APU) to generate powerfor the tank’s electricalsystems. Each APU will costRs 0.16 crore.

The Rs 5 crore cost ofupgrading each T-72 willramp up the cost of eachtank to Rs 14 crore,demolishing the argument that the T-72 isvalue-for-money. In contrast, a brand newArjun, with a 1,500 HP engine, state-of-the-art integrated electronics and theindigenous, widely praised Kanchanarmour, is just marginally more expensiveat Rs 16.8 crore. “It is a folly to stick with Russian tanks

despite having developed the Arjun andthe design capability to continuouslyimprove it,” says Lt Gen Ajai Singh, whoheaded the Army’s Directorate of CombatVehicles before becoming Governor ofAssam. “India can tailor the Arjun to itsspecific requirements and continuouslyupgrade the tank to keep it state-of-the-art. Why upgrade old T-72s?”

The T-72’s drawbacks are magnified by

the MoD’s failure to manageits overhaul schedule: some800 T-72s are years overduefor overhaul. Originally, eachT-72 was to be overhauledtwice during its service life of32 years. But as the overhaulagencies––the HeavyVehicles Factory (HVF) atAvadi, near Chennai and 505Army Base Workshop,

Delhi––failed to meet their overhaultargets of 70 and 50 tanks respectively, theArmy decided that one overhaul was goodenough. And with even that schedule notbeing implemented, a desperate MoD hasnow approached Indian industry to takeup the slack in overhauling the T-72 fleet.

Despite the poor condition of India’s T-72 fleet, it was to remain a frontlinetank for another two decades, becausethe indigenous production of the T-90has fallen far behind schedule. Only lastyear, a full nine years after the T-90 wasbought, were the first built-in-India T-90srolled out of HVF, Avadi. And the Armywas refusing to order and induct theArjun in larger numbers to replace thiswhite elephant.

Serial FailuresThe T-90s less-than-spectacular perfor-mance against the Arjun should not havecome as a surprise, considering the serialfailures that have plagued this tank sinceits induction into service in 2002.

From the start, the T-90’s reality hasfallen short of expectation. In 1999, theArmy decided to push through thepurchase of the T-90s from Russiadespite vocal opposition fromParliament. Former Prime Minister H.D.Deve Gowda argued that fitting the T-72 with modern fire control systems andnight vision devices would be cheaperthan buying the T-90. Deve Gowdacorrectly pointed out that even Russia’sArmy had spurned the T-90.

To bypass Deve Gowda’s opposition,the MoD and the Army reached anunderstanding with Rosvoorouzhenie,Russia’s arms export agency. The T-90would be made artificially attractive bypricing it just marginally higher than theT-72. To bring down the T-90’s ticket price,it was ordered without key systems; theArmy planned to procure those throughsupplementary contracts once the T-90entered service. Knowing well that

16

ARMOURED VEHICLES

(Left) Major General

H.M. Singh, considered

the ‘Father of the Arjun

Tank’, and (right)

Defence Minister A.K.

Antony with officials on

a Arjun Tank at the

Combat Vehicles R&D

Establishment in Avadi

near Chennai

AFP

AJA

I SH

UK

LA

DSIAPRIL 2010

Pakistan bases its anti-tank defenceslargely on missiles (e.g. the TOW II anti-tank guided missile), India bought the T-90 without the Shtora active protectionsystem, which protects the T-90 fromincoming enemy missiles.

Other important systems were alsopared down. The MoD opted to buyreduced numbers of the INVAR missile,which the T-90 fires. Maintenance vehicles,which are vital to keep the T-90s running,were not included in the contract. All thisallowed the government to declare beforeParliament that the Russian T-90s cost justRs 11 crore apiece. The cost of the T-72 wasthen about Rs 9 crore each.

In fact, the first batch of ten built-in-India T-90s, which only rolled out ofHVF Avadi last August, nine long yearsafter the tank was bought, actually costIndia’s exchequer a whopping Rs 17.5crore. Parliament has not yet beeninformed about the 50 per cent rise incost. The Lok Sabha’s last update was

on November 30, 2006, when the MoDstated in writing that the assembled-in-India T-90s cost Rs 12 crore apiece.

But there were bigger issues than cost.In 2002, with the Indian Army poised forbattle against Pakistan, it was discoveredthat the initial batch of 310 T-90s was notbattle worthy. Their thermal imaging (TI)sights, through which the tank aims its 125mm gun, was unable to withstand Indiansummer temperatures. And the INVARmissiles that were assembled in Indiasimply didn’t work. Since nobody knewwhy, they were sent back to Russia.

Even more alarmingly, the Armydiscovered that the T-90s were unable tofire Indian tank ammunition. So, even as apanicked MoD appealed to the DRDOand other research institutions, to re-orient the T-90’s fire control computer forfiring Indian ammunition, Russia wasrewarded with an urgent order for largequantities of Russian ammunition.

To this day, none of the supplementarycontracts have gone through. With the TIsights still a problem, the Army hasdecided to fit each T-90 with anEnvironment Control System, to cool the

DEFENDER® Armor Safeguards against Lethal Threats

Defending Warfi ghters around the World

MAY TAN PVT. LTD., New Delhi, India Telefax: 011-26493333 Email: [email protected] www.ceradyne.com

Ceradyne DEFENDER® armor protects warfi ghters against the most

dangerous ballistic threats. With vertically integrated manufacturing,

state-of-the-art materials and progressive engineering, Ceradyne has

been the leader in advanced lifesaving technology for more than

forty years.

- Rugged lightweight individual combatant protection

- Vehicle crew survivability armor application

- Lightweight aircraft armor protection systems

- Custom vehicle armor defense systems

- Naval vessel modular composite armor

Untitled-2 1 4/7/10 4:04:25 PM

New 1,000 horsepower engine Rs 3 crore

Thermal Imagining Fire Control System Rs 1.4 crore

Commander’s Thermal Imaging Sight Rs 0.4 crore

Auxillary Generator Rs 0.16 crore

TOTAL Rs 5 crore

COST OF REFURBISHING ONE T-72


72 tank commanders. EachTI sight costs Rs 0.4 crore. l An Auxillary Power Unit(APU) to generate powerfor the tank’s electricalsystems. Each APU will costRs 0.16 crore.

The Rs 5 crore cost ofupgrading each T-72 willramp up the cost of eachtank to Rs 14 crore,demolishing the argument that the T-72 isvalue-for-money. In contrast, a brand newArjun, with a 1,500 HP engine, state-of-the-art integrated electronics and theindigenous, widely praised Kanchanarmour, is just marginally more expensiveat Rs 16.8 crore. “It is a folly to stick with Russian tanks

despite having developed the Arjun andthe design capability to continuouslyimprove it,” says Lt Gen Ajai Singh, whoheaded the Army’s Directorate of CombatVehicles before becoming Governor ofAssam. “India can tailor the Arjun to itsspecific requirements and continuouslyupgrade the tank to keep it state-of-the-art. Why upgrade old T-72s?”

The T-72’s drawbacks are magnified by

the MoD’s failure to manageits overhaul schedule: some800 T-72s are years overduefor overhaul. Originally, eachT-72 was to be overhauledtwice during its service life of32 years. But as the overhaulagencies––the HeavyVehicles Factory (HVF) atAvadi, near Chennai and 505Army Base Workshop,

Delhi––failed to meet their overhaultargets of 70 and 50 tanks respectively, theArmy decided that one overhaul was goodenough. And with even that schedule notbeing implemented, a desperate MoD hasnow approached Indian industry to takeup the slack in overhauling the T-72 fleet.

Despite the poor condition of India’s T-72 fleet, it was to remain a frontlinetank for another two decades, becausethe indigenous production of the T-90has fallen far behind schedule. Only lastyear, a full nine years after the T-90 wasbought, were the first built-in-India T-90srolled out of HVF, Avadi. And the Armywas refusing to order and induct theArjun in larger numbers to replace thiswhite elephant.

Serial FailuresThe T-90s less-than-spectacular perfor-mance against the Arjun should not havecome as a surprise, considering the serialfailures that have plagued this tank sinceits induction into service in 2002.

From the start, the T-90’s reality hasfallen short of expectation. In 1999, theArmy decided to push through thepurchase of the T-90s from Russiadespite vocal opposition fromParliament. Former Prime Minister H.D.Deve Gowda argued that fitting the T-72 with modern fire control systems andnight vision devices would be cheaperthan buying the T-90. Deve Gowdacorrectly pointed out that even Russia’sArmy had spurned the T-90.

To bypass Deve Gowda’s opposition,the MoD and the Army reached anunderstanding with Rosvoorouzhenie,Russia’s arms export agency. The T-90would be made artificially attractive bypricing it just marginally higher than theT-72. To bring down the T-90’s ticket price,it was ordered without key systems; theArmy planned to procure those throughsupplementary contracts once the T-90entered service. Knowing well that

16

ARMOURED VEHICLES

(Left) Major General

H.M. Singh, considered

the ‘Father of the Arjun

Tank’, and (right)

Defence Minister A.K.

Antony with officials on

a Arjun Tank at the

Combat Vehicles R&D

Establishment in Avadi

near Chennai

AFP

AJA

I SH

UK

LA

DSIAPRIL 2010

Pakistan bases its anti-tank defenceslargely on missiles (e.g. the TOW II anti-tank guided missile), India bought the T-90 without the Shtora active protectionsystem, which protects the T-90 fromincoming enemy missiles.

Other important systems were alsopared down. The MoD opted to buyreduced numbers of the INVAR missile,which the T-90 fires. Maintenance vehicles,which are vital to keep the T-90s running,were not included in the contract. All thisallowed the government to declare beforeParliament that the Russian T-90s cost justRs 11 crore apiece. The cost of the T-72 wasthen about Rs 9 crore each.

In fact, the first batch of ten built-in-India T-90s, which only rolled out ofHVF Avadi last August, nine long yearsafter the tank was bought, actually costIndia’s exchequer a whopping Rs 17.5crore. Parliament has not yet beeninformed about the 50 per cent rise incost. The Lok Sabha’s last update was

on November 30, 2006, when the MoDstated in writing that the assembled-in-India T-90s cost Rs 12 crore apiece.

But there were bigger issues than cost.In 2002, with the Indian Army poised forbattle against Pakistan, it was discoveredthat the initial batch of 310 T-90s was notbattle worthy. Their thermal imaging (TI)sights, through which the tank aims its 125mm gun, was unable to withstand Indiansummer temperatures. And the INVARmissiles that were assembled in Indiasimply didn’t work. Since nobody knewwhy, they were sent back to Russia.

Even more alarmingly, the Armydiscovered that the T-90s were unable tofire Indian tank ammunition. So, even as apanicked MoD appealed to the DRDOand other research institutions, to re-orient the T-90’s fire control computer forfiring Indian ammunition, Russia wasrewarded with an urgent order for largequantities of Russian ammunition.

To this day, none of the supplementarycontracts have gone through. With the TIsights still a problem, the Army hasdecided to fit each T-90 with anEnvironment Control System, to cool the

DEFENDER® Armor Safeguards against Lethal Threats

Defending Warfi ghters around the World

MAY TAN PVT. LTD., New Delhi, India Telefax: 011-26493333 Email: [email protected] www.ceradyne.com

Ceradyne DEFENDER® armor protects warfi ghters against the most

dangerous ballistic threats. With vertically integrated manufacturing,

state-of-the-art materials and progressive engineering, Ceradyne has

been the leader in advanced lifesaving technology for more than

forty years.

- Rugged lightweight individual combatant protection

- Vehicle crew survivability armor application

- Lightweight aircraft armor protection systems

- Custom vehicle armor defense systems

- Naval vessel modular composite armor

Untitled-2 1 4/7/10 4:04:25 PM

New 1,000 horsepower engine Rs 3 crore

Thermal Imagining Fire Control System Rs 1.4 crore

Commander’s Thermal Imaging Sight Rs 0.4 crore

Auxillary Generator Rs 0.16 crore

TOTAL Rs 5 crore

COST OF REFURBISHING ONE T-72


ARMOURED VEHICLES DSIAPRIL 2010

delicate electronics with a stream of chilledair. None of the world’s current tanks,other than France’s LeClerc, has such asystem. The American Abrams and theBritish Challenger tanks fought in the Iraqdesert without air-conditioning. India’sArjun tank, too, has “hardened”electronics that function perfectly even inthe Rajasthan summer.

Nor has the MoD managed to procurethe Shtora anti-missile system. The DGMFnow plans to equip India’s 1,657 T-90swith the advanced ARENA activeprotection system, for which it hasbudgeted Rs 2,500 crore in the ArmyAcquisition Plan for 2009-11.

Even greater concern arose whenRussia held back the transfer of thetechnology contracted for building 1,000T-90s in India. Instead of pressuringMoscow, the MoD rewarded it in 2007with a contract for 347 more T-90s. In abreathtaking Catch 22-like situation, theMoD argued that the additionalpurchase was needed becauseindigenous production had not begun.

The billion-dollar question around theArjun now is: how many more Arjuns willthe Army order? The answer to this willhinge largely upon what role the Armyassigns to the tank.

Despite the recent trials, which aimedat answering that question, it remains

unclear how the Army willderive an answer. Says MajorGeneral H.M. Singh, whooversaw the Arjun’sdevelopment for decades, “Ifthey were evaluating where the Arjunshould be deployed, they should haveconducted the trials in different types ofterrain: desert, semi-desert, plains andriverine. It seems as if the Army hasalready decided to employ the Arjun inthe desert.”

Arjun’s FutureAnother question that is crucial to theArjun’s future is: with its provenmobility, firepower and armourprotection, should the Arjun not becleared for equipping at least one of theArmy’s three strike corps? Theseformations perform a tank’s mostdevastating role: attacking deep intoenemy territory during war. Each strikecorps has eight-nine tank regiments. Ifthe Army recommends the Arjun for astrike role, that would mean anadditional order of about 500 Arjuns.

But the Army still has reservationsabout inducting the Arjun into the strikecorps. One reason for that is the Arjun’sincompatibility with other strike corpsequipment, for instance assault bridgesthat cannot bear the 60-tonne weight of

the Arjun. Another problemis the Arjun’s high fuelconsumption: it moves just180 km on a full load of fuel,compared with the T-90’s

230 km. This appetite for diesel wouldincrease the burden on the strike corps’logistics, especially when resupplyingthe Arjuns when they are deep insideenemy territory.

For the Indian Army’s generals, theArjun’s success has come as a shock; butthey are also realising that this is anadditional stream of tanks for replacingthe dangerously outdated T-72s. Thereare already divergent opinions abouthow many more Arjuns to order:ranging from an additional order of 124Arjuns to as many as 500, followed byseveral hundred more of the improvedArjun Mark II, which can be expected by2015-2016 if the DRDO allocates fundingright away.

The Arjun assembly line at the HVF inAvadi––set up at a cost of Rs 50 crore, andcapable of building 50 Arjuns per year––will finish delivery of the current order of124 Arjuns this year. In order to cater foradditional orders of the Arjun, theOrdnance Factory Board (under whichHVF Avadi operates) could begin workright away to double the capacity of theArjun line.

DGMF plans to equip

India’s 1,657 T-90s with

the advanced ARENA

active protection system

The Rs 5 crore cost ofupgrading each T-72 will

ramp up the cost of eachtank to Rs 14 crore,

demolishing the argumentthat the T-72 is value-for-

money. In contrast, a brandnew Arjun, with a 1,500 HP

engine, state-of-the-artintegrated electronics and

the indigenous Kanchanarmour can be had for

Rs 16.8 crore.

”

18


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DSIAPRIL 2010

20

SECURITY

21

In recent years, some rogue States as wellas independent non-State actors havefound that insurgency and terrorism are

a cheaper and effective way of covertlyfighting a strong State. In broad terms,such actions fall under the rubric ofasymmetrical warfare. Such actions havehad successes, but where ever strongcounter-measures have been taken, thegains have only been marginal.

Although some analysts refer toasymmetrical warfare as Fourth GenerationWarfare,others disagree. They are of the viewthat while asymmetrical war does confercertain advantages to a weaker adversary, itcannot be called a generational shift inwarfare. Notwithstanding the semantics,there is no doubt that countries, especiallydemocratic nations, now have to contendwith asymmetrical wars or conflicts.

Understanding Asymmetric WarfareAsymmetrical warfare is the use ofinnovative strategies, tactics andtechnologies by a weaker State or a sub-Stateadversary, who avoid the strengths andexploit the potential vulnerabilities of a largerand technologically superior opponent. Thisdefinition has two distinct aspects. Firstly, awar between two States and secondly, aState fighting non-State actors.

Historically,when asymmetric methods

With the nature of war changing rapidly, asymmetric threats which include low intensity conflicts, cyber warfare and terrorism need to be dealt with

VIJAY OBEROI

A commemorative ceremony held

at the Air Force Station in New

Delhi on April 7 for the slain

Central Reserve Police Force

servicemen. The policemen were

killed in a brutal attack by

Maoist rebels in Dantewada

district of Chhattisgarh

KEY POINTSn Asymmetrical warfare is the use ofinnovative strategies, tactics andtechnologies by a weaker Statewhich avoids the strengths andexploits the potential vulnerabilitiesof a larger and technologicallysuperior opponent.n A separate unit force called the Internal Security Force of the Army should be created to fightexternal insurgencies, terrorism andproxy wars.

AFP

HOLISTIC RESPONSES

Asymmentrical Warfare.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:10 PM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2010

20

SECURITY

21

In recent years, some rogue States as wellas independent non-State actors havefound that insurgency and terrorism are

a cheaper and effective way of covertlyfighting a strong State. In broad terms,such actions fall under the rubric ofasymmetrical warfare. Such actions havehad successes, but where ever strongcounter-measures have been taken, thegains have only been marginal.

Although some analysts refer toasymmetrical warfare as Fourth GenerationWarfare,others disagree. They are of the viewthat while asymmetrical war does confercertain advantages to a weaker adversary, itcannot be called a generational shift inwarfare. Notwithstanding the semantics,there is no doubt that countries, especiallydemocratic nations, now have to contendwith asymmetrical wars or conflicts.

Understanding Asymmetric WarfareAsymmetrical warfare is the use ofinnovative strategies, tactics andtechnologies by a weaker State or a sub-Stateadversary, who avoid the strengths andexploit the potential vulnerabilities of a largerand technologically superior opponent. Thisdefinition has two distinct aspects. Firstly, awar between two States and secondly, aState fighting non-State actors.

Historically,when asymmetric methods

With the nature of war changing rapidly, asymmetric threats which include low intensity conflicts, cyber warfare and terrorism need to be dealt with

VIJAY OBEROI

A commemorative ceremony held

at the Air Force Station in New

Delhi on April 7 for the slain

Central Reserve Police Force

servicemen. The policemen were

killed in a brutal attack by

Maoist rebels in Dantewada

district of Chhattisgarh

KEY POINTSn Asymmetrical warfare is the use ofinnovative strategies, tactics andtechnologies by a weaker Statewhich avoids the strengths andexploits the potential vulnerabilitiesof a larger and technologicallysuperior opponent.n A separate unit force called the Internal Security Force of the Army should be created to fightexternal insurgencies, terrorism andproxy wars.

AFP

HOLISTIC RESPONSES


DSIAPRIL 2010

2322

SECURITY

distinctions between internal and externalsecurity and between national and societalsecurity are fast eroding. There is no clearseparation of peace and war either, as bothseem to have merged.

Fighting in the future may be conductedat several levels at once. Clear distinctionsbetween conventional and unconventionalconflicts are also fading. Traditional lines ofauthority between military control andpolitical responsibility have already becomeblurred. In the past, political control wasmainly a factor at the strategic level,wherestatecraft was required to guide the militaryinstrument. In future, political oversightmay pervade at all levels of war.

Likely Future ThreatsIn the foreseeable future, along withconventional conflicts, terrorism andinternal insurgencies will continue to beserious threats, attracting external terroristsand insurgents. Unless our neighbourscooperate, terrorist organisations will getsafe havens for their sustenance andactivities. Suicide terrorism, which givesmaximum publicity to the insurgents,willcontinue as publicity is the real ‘oxygen’

which terrorists seek at all times.The threat of terrorists’ using

chemical and biological weaponsis low but the threat of nuclearterrorism needs to be factored in. Itis important to understand thatthe political and psychologicalconsequences of even limitedattacks will be enormous and hence wehave to be wary and be prepared to meetsuch threats.

In recent years, terrorism has also almostbecome the preferred tool of States. The highcosts of modern warfare, concerns aboutnon-conventional escalation and theunwillingness to appear as the aggressor,have turned terrorism into an efficient,convenient and generally discreet weaponfor attaining State interests in theinternational realm.

States are involved in terrorism in anumber of ways, from various levels ofgeneral assistance, operational aid, toinitiating and directing a terroristorganisation’s activities and even directattacks perpetrated by official State agencies.

The most widely accepted strategy forcoping with terrorism is deterrence. Most

States resorting to terrorism takeinto account the price they will berequired to pay for their activities,in exchange for the benefitsgained for attaining their policygoals. Usually, such Statescalibrate the extent to which theiractivities will ultimately promote

their goals, so that the country’s basicinterests are not endangered.

The action taken against States engagedin terrorism must be clear, explicit, andconsistent. The way to deter a State fromengaging in terrorism or supporting terroristorganisations is to unambiguously show thatthe price for these activities will be higherthan the benefits of sponsoring terrorism.India has displayed a lack of will in doing soexplicitly and therefore we continue to be thetarget of terrorist actions.

In our country,we have to deal with bothinternal and external insurgencies andterrorism. External terrorism is of twocategories—that which is actively supportedby an inimical State (proxy war) and thatlaunched independently by non-State actors.

Democratic governments and societiesattempting to respond to internal terrorism

were used in wars fought by two States,they had a dramatic effect on the conductof war. Recent history also has manyexamples of States fighting non-Stateadversaries. Prominent examples of this arethe Mujahideen defeating the Soviet forcesin Afghanistan and the Indian Armysuccessfully fighting the Pakistanisponsored insurgents and terrorists in Jammu & Kashmir for the last two decades.

Changing Nature of WarRapid globalisation and the explosion ofInformation Technology have made theworld highly inter-dependent and inter-connected. This has helped the growth ofgroups propelled by ideologicalcommunication, religion, tribal affinities,zealotry and illegal economic activities.The result has been economic, political or security-related instability. Securityforces have to now deal with bothtraditional missions of deterrence andwar fighting, as well as non-traditionalmissions like proxy war and terrorism.Asymmetric threats now cover a vastcanvas of high grade criminal actions,low intensity conflicts, cyber warfare,terrorism and even nuclear blackmail.

The nature of war is also changingrapidly. Political, economic and militarydimensions of security are merging. State-to-state wars appear to be increasinglysupplemented by new forms of sub-Stateand trans-State conflicts. The earlier

AFP

AFP

Paramilitary soldiers patrol during Operation Green

Hunt near the jungles of Lathehar, some 188km

from Ranchi in March 2010

The owners of

German Bakery

visit the site after

it was destroyed

by a fatal bomb

blast in February,

in Pune

The Indian Army ispaying a heavy price for

its large-scalecommitments to its

secondary role. Besidesthe adverse effect on thecombat potential of theArmy: deployment over

long periods tends toalienate the populace and

tarnishes the image ofthe Army.

”


DSIAPRIL 2010

2322

SECURITY

distinctions between internal and externalsecurity and between national and societalsecurity are fast eroding. There is no clearseparation of peace and war either, as bothseem to have merged.

Fighting in the future may be conductedat several levels at once. Clear distinctionsbetween conventional and unconventionalconflicts are also fading. Traditional lines ofauthority between military control andpolitical responsibility have already becomeblurred. In the past, political control wasmainly a factor at the strategic level,wherestatecraft was required to guide the militaryinstrument. In future, political oversightmay pervade at all levels of war.

Likely Future ThreatsIn the foreseeable future, along withconventional conflicts, terrorism andinternal insurgencies will continue to beserious threats, attracting external terroristsand insurgents. Unless our neighbourscooperate, terrorist organisations will getsafe havens for their sustenance andactivities. Suicide terrorism, which givesmaximum publicity to the insurgents,willcontinue as publicity is the real ‘oxygen’

which terrorists seek at all times.The threat of terrorists’ using

chemical and biological weaponsis low but the threat of nuclearterrorism needs to be factored in. Itis important to understand thatthe political and psychologicalconsequences of even limitedattacks will be enormous and hence wehave to be wary and be prepared to meetsuch threats.

In recent years, terrorism has also almostbecome the preferred tool of States. The highcosts of modern warfare, concerns aboutnon-conventional escalation and theunwillingness to appear as the aggressor,have turned terrorism into an efficient,convenient and generally discreet weaponfor attaining State interests in theinternational realm.

States are involved in terrorism in anumber of ways, from various levels ofgeneral assistance, operational aid, toinitiating and directing a terroristorganisation’s activities and even directattacks perpetrated by official State agencies.

The most widely accepted strategy forcoping with terrorism is deterrence. Most

States resorting to terrorism takeinto account the price they will berequired to pay for their activities,in exchange for the benefitsgained for attaining their policygoals. Usually, such Statescalibrate the extent to which theiractivities will ultimately promote

their goals, so that the country’s basicinterests are not endangered.

The action taken against States engagedin terrorism must be clear, explicit, andconsistent. The way to deter a State fromengaging in terrorism or supporting terroristorganisations is to unambiguously show thatthe price for these activities will be higherthan the benefits of sponsoring terrorism.India has displayed a lack of will in doing soexplicitly and therefore we continue to be thetarget of terrorist actions.

In our country,we have to deal with bothinternal and external insurgencies andterrorism. External terrorism is of twocategories—that which is actively supportedby an inimical State (proxy war) and thatlaunched independently by non-State actors.

Democratic governments and societiesattempting to respond to internal terrorism

were used in wars fought by two States,they had a dramatic effect on the conductof war. Recent history also has manyexamples of States fighting non-Stateadversaries. Prominent examples of this arethe Mujahideen defeating the Soviet forcesin Afghanistan and the Indian Armysuccessfully fighting the Pakistanisponsored insurgents and terrorists in Jammu & Kashmir for the last two decades.

Changing Nature of WarRapid globalisation and the explosion ofInformation Technology have made theworld highly inter-dependent and inter-connected. This has helped the growth ofgroups propelled by ideologicalcommunication, religion, tribal affinities,zealotry and illegal economic activities.The result has been economic, political or security-related instability. Securityforces have to now deal with bothtraditional missions of deterrence andwar fighting, as well as non-traditionalmissions like proxy war and terrorism.Asymmetric threats now cover a vastcanvas of high grade criminal actions,low intensity conflicts, cyber warfare,terrorism and even nuclear blackmail.

The nature of war is also changingrapidly. Political, economic and militarydimensions of security are merging. State-to-state wars appear to be increasinglysupplemented by new forms of sub-Stateand trans-State conflicts. The earlier

AFP

AFP

Paramilitary soldiers patrol during Operation Green

Hunt near the jungles of Lathehar, some 188km

from Ranchi in March 2010

The owners of

German Bakery

visit the site after

it was destroyed

by a fatal bomb

blast in February,

in Pune

The Indian Army ispaying a heavy price for

its large-scalecommitments to its

secondary role. Besidesthe adverse effect on thecombat potential of theArmy: deployment over

long periods tends toalienate the populace and

tarnishes the image ofthe Army.

”


DSIAPRIL 2010SECURITY

face a number of dilemmas. If they committhe might of the military, it is likely to reflectadversely on their democratic credentials.There are also the inevitable dangers ofmilitary overreaction, as well as the fear thatonce the police and the public become usedto the deployment of troops, it becomespolitically difficult for the government towithdraw them.

In a democratic State, the instrument ofchoice for tackling internal terrorism is thecivil police, assisted by units of the CentralPolice Organisations (CPOs) like the

Central Reserve Police Force, BorderSecurity Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Policeand Central Industry Security Force. Thepolice have enormous advantages over themilitary. They have legitimacy, a closeknowledge of local conditions, anextensive bank of intelligence, means ofacquiring fresh intelligence as well as closefamiliarity with the law and expertise intechniques of criminal investigation.Although there has been an exponentialgrowth of many types of police forces inour country, they are still incapable or

unwilling, or both, to tackle insurgencies.The Government must take early andactive measures to enhance the capabilitiesof the police, including the CPOs.

Roles of the ArmyIn principle, the Army should not becommitted to tackle internal insurgencysituations. The roles of the Army are quite clear: the primary role is to fightexternal aggression and its secondaryrole is providing assistance to civilauthorities. The caveat here is that the

secondary role must never dilute theability of the Army to perform its primary role. In situations where theemployment of troops becomes essential,they should be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity.

The Indian Army is paying a heavy pricefor its large-scale commitments to itssecondary role. Besides there is an adverseeffect on the combat potential of the Army:deployment over long periods tends toalienate the populace and tarnishes theimage of the Army. Therefore, over-exposure

of the Army in internal security duties iscounter-productive, especially when theemployment is for prolonged periods.

With regards to proxy wars and otherexternally sponsored high gradeinsurgencies, the Indian Army is the onlyinstrument with the government that canhandle them with professional competence.However, this will result in lowering thewar fighting capabilities of the Army, as ishappening now. This is unacceptable sincethis reduces substantially the deterrentcapability of the Army that is essential to

impose caution on our potential enemies.In order to ensure that the Army deals

with proxy wars and external terrorismand still retains its capabilities for itsprimary task, a separate force–called theInternal Security Force of the Army orISFA–within the Army needs to be createdto fight external insurgencies, terrorismand proxy wars. This will result in theArmy still being the lead force in tacklingexternal insurgencies and proxy wars butat the same time there will be no dilutionof the combat potential and theconventional capability of the regularArmy. The existing Rashtriya Rifles andAssam Rifles already provide the kernel forraising such a force, which needs to be anintegral part of the Army.

Asymmetric threats have becomeimportant in recent years. Their contoursneed to be fully understood, so that we cantackle them with confidence. In India, weface both the internal and externaldimensions of such threats. For internalthreats, we need the synergy of goodgovernance, socio-economic developmentand security operations carried out largelyby the police.

The external asymmetric threats, asmanifested by proxy wars or independentactions by non-State groups are moreserious. These need to be tackled with theArmy playing the leading role. As theprimary role of the Army must never getdiluted, we need to restructure and formISFA, an effective unit within the Army, fortackling external insurgents and terroristsand in dealing with proxy wars.

In order to ensure thatthe Army deals with

proxy wars and externalterrorism and still retains

its capabilities for itsprimary task, we need to

create a separate forcewithin the Army, which

could be named InternalSecurity Force of the

Army or ISFA.

”2524

Central Reserve Police Force soldiers

carry an injured civilian after shooting by suspected

militants in Srinagar in March. (Right) Director General

of Police for Hyderabad R. R. Girish Kumar inspects

confiscated grenades recovered from Naxalites at a

press conference held in March

AFP

AFP


DSIAPRIL 2010SECURITY

face a number of dilemmas. If they committhe might of the military, it is likely to reflectadversely on their democratic credentials.There are also the inevitable dangers ofmilitary overreaction, as well as the fear thatonce the police and the public become usedto the deployment of troops, it becomespolitically difficult for the government towithdraw them.

In a democratic State, the instrument ofchoice for tackling internal terrorism is thecivil police, assisted by units of the CentralPolice Organisations (CPOs) like the

Central Reserve Police Force, BorderSecurity Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Policeand Central Industry Security Force. Thepolice have enormous advantages over themilitary. They have legitimacy, a closeknowledge of local conditions, anextensive bank of intelligence, means ofacquiring fresh intelligence as well as closefamiliarity with the law and expertise intechniques of criminal investigation.Although there has been an exponentialgrowth of many types of police forces inour country, they are still incapable or

unwilling, or both, to tackle insurgencies.The Government must take early andactive measures to enhance the capabilitiesof the police, including the CPOs.

Roles of the ArmyIn principle, the Army should not becommitted to tackle internal insurgencysituations. The roles of the Army are quite clear: the primary role is to fightexternal aggression and its secondaryrole is providing assistance to civilauthorities. The caveat here is that the

secondary role must never dilute theability of the Army to perform its primary role. In situations where theemployment of troops becomes essential,they should be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity.

The Indian Army is paying a heavy pricefor its large-scale commitments to itssecondary role. Besides there is an adverseeffect on the combat potential of the Army:deployment over long periods tends toalienate the populace and tarnishes theimage of the Army. Therefore, over-exposure

of the Army in internal security duties iscounter-productive, especially when theemployment is for prolonged periods.

With regards to proxy wars and otherexternally sponsored high gradeinsurgencies, the Indian Army is the onlyinstrument with the government that canhandle them with professional competence.However, this will result in lowering thewar fighting capabilities of the Army, as ishappening now. This is unacceptable sincethis reduces substantially the deterrentcapability of the Army that is essential to

impose caution on our potential enemies.In order to ensure that the Army deals

with proxy wars and external terrorismand still retains its capabilities for itsprimary task, a separate force–called theInternal Security Force of the Army orISFA–within the Army needs to be createdto fight external insurgencies, terrorismand proxy wars. This will result in theArmy still being the lead force in tacklingexternal insurgencies and proxy wars butat the same time there will be no dilutionof the combat potential and theconventional capability of the regularArmy. The existing Rashtriya Rifles andAssam Rifles already provide the kernel forraising such a force, which needs to be anintegral part of the Army.

Asymmetric threats have becomeimportant in recent years. Their contoursneed to be fully understood, so that we cantackle them with confidence. In India, weface both the internal and externaldimensions of such threats. For internalthreats, we need the synergy of goodgovernance, socio-economic developmentand security operations carried out largelyby the police.

The external asymmetric threats, asmanifested by proxy wars or independentactions by non-State groups are moreserious. These need to be tackled with theArmy playing the leading role. As theprimary role of the Army must never getdiluted, we need to restructure and formISFA, an effective unit within the Army, fortackling external insurgents and terroristsand in dealing with proxy wars.

In order to ensure thatthe Army deals with

proxy wars and externalterrorism and still retains

its capabilities for itsprimary task, we need to

create a separate forcewithin the Army, which

could be named InternalSecurity Force of the

Army or ISFA.

”2524

Central Reserve Police Force soldiers

carry an injured civilian after shooting by suspected

militants in Srinagar in March. (Right) Director General

of Police for Hyderabad R. R. Girish Kumar inspects

confiscated grenades recovered from Naxalites at a

press conference held in March

AFP

AFP


DSIAPRIL 2010

26

HELICOPTER

27

With some out-of-the-box thinking, a helicopter can beconverted into a conflict-domination weapon of choice

India’s regional security environmentcontinues to remain unstable and prone to violent manifestations. But

then, violence has not been new to us and we have had to deal with it,almost continuously since Independence.However, in the past couple of decades,there have been some subtle changes inthe security environment of our regionand specifically in the IndianSubcontinent. These shifts dictate that thefuture shape, structure and weaponsprofile of the Indian armed forces willundergo some changes, especially in theIndian Air Force (IAF). Heli-bornecombat, assault and heavy lift operationswill become an immensely potentinstrument of aerospace, military andnational power.

There are many reasons as to why thecombat assets of the armed forces willundergo a weapons profile change whichinclude the need to enhance their rotarywing assets. Firstly, all military action inour neighbourhood will take place underthe shadow of a proclaimed nuclearweapon capability, rendering the likelyscenario of a full scale hot-war in theIndian Subcontinent somewhat remote.Secondly, the operating environment andbattle-space for the armed forces will be

increasingly restricted becauseof collateral damage growingmedia activism, legalities and international pressure.

Thirdly, perhaps nowhere in the world isthe terrain so varied, hostile andunsettling, as it is in our likely conflictzones: formidable mountains, treacherousweather conditions, little or no access topopulation centres, very few or no roadsand a not-so-friendly border population.

And last, but not the least, there is the increased relevance and thereforerequirement of an urban-warfare capabilityin the existing sub-conventional and low-intensity conflict zones, given our recentexperiences of addressing conflict situationsinvolving a combination of State and non-State actors.

These fundamental factors will shape theconduct of future conflicts and the pursuit ofcombat air operations in our region.

Versatile HelicoptersThe versatile helicopter will thus becomean inescapable combat asset in thisscenario. A ubiquitous and multifacetedmachine, the helicopter has become a veryvisible face of modern military aviation—not just a ‘force multiplier’ but a stand-alone weapon system. Its presence is now

taken so much for granted that wheneverand wherever something goes wrong,people expect to see a helicopter hoveringabove them. Be it a natural calamity, searchand rescue or a conflict situation, the firstquestion that comes up is “Where is thehelicopter”? In fact, in the remote regions ofthe Northeast, there was a time whenpeople were more familiar with ahelicopter than a bus or any othertransport. The helicopter is now anomnipresent and an essential asset inevery conflict situation.

It is, therefore, appropriate that militaryplanners take a fresh look at its extendeduse, throw up some new ideas, lay outoptions and plan out a roadmap for thefuture exploitation of helicopters. In itsrelatively short span of existence, thehelicopter has re-defined militarymaneuver and expanded commercial andcivilian exploitation in a manner,previously thought unimaginable. Fewinventions have changed transportationand military aviation as rapidly and

dramatically as the helicopter has. The promise of modern technology the

ever-changing nature of conflict and thelevel of public expectations,has created anenvironment which can transform theunique capabilities of rotary wingplatforms and take them to another level.

The quest must be to evolve ahelicopter into a stand-alone, multi-function combat system, capable of beingflexibly tasked and integrated into overallmilitary operations at all levels. What thismeans is that a helicopter must have thepotential of directly influencing theconduct of operations and creating afavourable turn of events all by itself. It issuch a capability, especially in view of theexisting threats and likely scenarios thatwill enhance the potency and applicationof aerospace power.

Whilst we, as a nation, face threatsfrom across the entire spectrum of conflict,recent trends indicate, that conflicts in thefuture and especially in our region, arelikely to shift, more towards the sub-conventional levels. It is in such a scenario,that a helicopter will perhaps be the onlyoption to deliver potent air power,depending on the situation. Therefore,helicopters will be increasingly calledupon to surgically address conflict

FALI H. MAJOR

KEY POINTSn Heli-borne combat, assault andheavy lift operations will become animmensely potent instrument ofaerospace, military and national power. n The mission must be to evolve the helicopter into a stand-alone,multifunction, combat system, capableof being flexibly tasked and integratedinto overall military operations.

The Mi17 aircraft fly

in formation at the

Air Force Day Parade

AIR POWER

ASSET

Helicopter.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:12 PM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2010

26

HELICOPTER

27

With some out-of-the-box thinking, a helicopter can beconverted into a conflict-domination weapon of choice

India’s regional security environmentcontinues to remain unstable and prone to violent manifestations. But

then, violence has not been new to us and we have had to deal with it,almost continuously since Independence.However, in the past couple of decades,there have been some subtle changes inthe security environment of our regionand specifically in the IndianSubcontinent. These shifts dictate that thefuture shape, structure and weaponsprofile of the Indian armed forces willundergo some changes, especially in theIndian Air Force (IAF). Heli-bornecombat, assault and heavy lift operationswill become an immensely potentinstrument of aerospace, military andnational power.

There are many reasons as to why thecombat assets of the armed forces willundergo a weapons profile change whichinclude the need to enhance their rotarywing assets. Firstly, all military action inour neighbourhood will take place underthe shadow of a proclaimed nuclearweapon capability, rendering the likelyscenario of a full scale hot-war in theIndian Subcontinent somewhat remote.Secondly, the operating environment andbattle-space for the armed forces will be

increasingly restricted becauseof collateral damage growingmedia activism, legalities and international pressure.

Thirdly, perhaps nowhere in the world isthe terrain so varied, hostile andunsettling, as it is in our likely conflictzones: formidable mountains, treacherousweather conditions, little or no access topopulation centres, very few or no roadsand a not-so-friendly border population.

And last, but not the least, there is the increased relevance and thereforerequirement of an urban-warfare capabilityin the existing sub-conventional and low-intensity conflict zones, given our recentexperiences of addressing conflict situationsinvolving a combination of State and non-State actors.

These fundamental factors will shape theconduct of future conflicts and the pursuit ofcombat air operations in our region.

Versatile HelicoptersThe versatile helicopter will thus becomean inescapable combat asset in thisscenario. A ubiquitous and multifacetedmachine, the helicopter has become a veryvisible face of modern military aviation—not just a ‘force multiplier’ but a stand-alone weapon system. Its presence is now

taken so much for granted that wheneverand wherever something goes wrong,people expect to see a helicopter hoveringabove them. Be it a natural calamity, searchand rescue or a conflict situation, the firstquestion that comes up is “Where is thehelicopter”? In fact, in the remote regions ofthe Northeast, there was a time whenpeople were more familiar with ahelicopter than a bus or any othertransport. The helicopter is now anomnipresent and an essential asset inevery conflict situation.

It is, therefore, appropriate that militaryplanners take a fresh look at its extendeduse, throw up some new ideas, lay outoptions and plan out a roadmap for thefuture exploitation of helicopters. In itsrelatively short span of existence, thehelicopter has re-defined militarymaneuver and expanded commercial andcivilian exploitation in a manner,previously thought unimaginable. Fewinventions have changed transportationand military aviation as rapidly and

dramatically as the helicopter has. The promise of modern technology the

ever-changing nature of conflict and thelevel of public expectations,has created anenvironment which can transform theunique capabilities of rotary wingplatforms and take them to another level.

The quest must be to evolve ahelicopter into a stand-alone, multi-function combat system, capable of beingflexibly tasked and integrated into overallmilitary operations at all levels. What thismeans is that a helicopter must have thepotential of directly influencing theconduct of operations and creating afavourable turn of events all by itself. It issuch a capability, especially in view of theexisting threats and likely scenarios thatwill enhance the potency and applicationof aerospace power.

Whilst we, as a nation, face threatsfrom across the entire spectrum of conflict,recent trends indicate, that conflicts in thefuture and especially in our region, arelikely to shift, more towards the sub-conventional levels. It is in such a scenario,that a helicopter will perhaps be the onlyoption to deliver potent air power,depending on the situation. Therefore,helicopters will be increasingly calledupon to surgically address conflict

FALI H. MAJOR

KEY POINTSn Heli-borne combat, assault andheavy lift operations will become animmensely potent instrument ofaerospace, military and national power. n The mission must be to evolve the helicopter into a stand-alone,multifunction, combat system, capableof being flexibly tasked and integratedinto overall military operations.

The Mi17 aircraft fly

in formation at the

Air Force Day Parade

AIR POWER

ASSET


vulnerabilities but there must be acontinuous effort to get around them.

There are three essential steps in thisdirection which the forces must take.Firstly, create a thorough understandingof the helicopter operational potential andthis will be the responsibility of all thoseinvolved in the conduct of combathelicopter operations.

Secondly, embed helicopter operationalcapability at various levels of strategic and tactical doctrine—in stand alone,joint operation scenarios and not simply as an add-on. There are no templates and models to follow—innovation will bethe key.

And thirdly, the ability to marry theabove mentioned factors to the promise oftechnology. A symbiotic relationshipbetween the developments in technologyand operational doctrine needs to becreated, so that they drive and mutuallycomplement each other concurrently.

A Complex MachineThis is the challenge before all men andwomen in uniform and the need of thehour is for the emergence of thinkers,whocan generate thought and vision to makehelicopter combat operations a successstory. The helicopter is an amazinglycomplex machine–difficult to make, flyand operate. There are many jokes anddescriptions about the system that onlyserve to describe the complexity ofhelicopter operations.

But notwithstanding that, thehelicopter is the only aerial vehicle thatcomes closest to fulfilling mankind’sancient dreams of the Flying Horse and theMagic Carpet. From the bulky andunwieldy machines of yesteryears, theyhave evolved into sleek, elegant and extremely potent systems. Theirpotential is indeed tremendous andemployment is only limited by theimagination of its commander and theingenuity of the operators.

The good news is that today the IAFand indeed the other two services, are inthe process of acquiring the most modernand potent rotary wing assets. Noelaboration of rotary wing assets isnecessary, as these are available for all tosee in the public domain. What isimportant,however, is that the acquisition,induction and operationalisation of theseassets will considerably augment thecombat edge and effectiveness inresponding to conflict situations by ourarmed forces.

situations and this will present acompletely new dimension to plannersand tacticians alike. The speed ofresponse, precise application of force andcontrolled destruction, will be the newfactors determining combat efficiency.

With a bit of out-of-the- box thinking, ahelicopter can be truly converted into aconflict-domination weapon of choice.The armed forces need to visualise thekind of scenarios that are likely to developin our Subcontinent and determine thekind of national response desired and theobjectives to be achieved. They must thendevelop the necessary capability toprovide a ‘heli-borne’ response—whetherit is delivery of weapons, electronicwarfare, surveillance, target acquisition orsimple transportation of national power. Itspotency and capability will be derivedfrom the seamless combination andintegration of assets, tactics, training andother complimentary capabilities. The aimshould be to develop a composite combat

system, centred around the helicopter. Such a capability cannot develop in

isolation. It will require a comprehensiveimpetus on a number of allied issues. Thearmed forces should be able to create higher utilisation rates for which they need to concentrate on maintenance-freecomponents and an upgradeableengineering architecture. Helicopter flyinghas to become vibration-free,which is notonly essential for comfort, but specificallyfor weapon delivery and sensoroperations. Increased incorporation of fly-by-wire controls, improved high altitudeperformance and better situationalawareness are some areas that our R&Defforts need to concentrate on. Thedevelopment of air-launched non-lethalweapons is another area for development,given the legalities and the repercussionsof collateral damage.

Helicopters have emerged as supremelycapable of adapting to just about any environment. They do have some

DSIAPRIL 2010

28

HELICOPTER

AFP

AFP

AFP

Helicopters will beincreasingly called upon tosurgically address conflict

situations. This wouldpresent a completely new

dimension to planners andtacticians. The speed of

response, preciseapplication of force and

controlled destruction, willbe the determining factors

of combat efficiency.

” 29

A technician adjusts a

model of a Advanced Light

Helicopter on display at the

India Aviation 2010 show

in Hyderabad held in March

Soldiers repair a tank on the

battlefield using a Advanced

Light Helicopter to drop spare

parts during the Operation Desert

Strike exercise at Pokhran


vulnerabilities but there must be acontinuous effort to get around them.

There are three essential steps in thisdirection which the forces must take.Firstly, create a thorough understandingof the helicopter operational potential andthis will be the responsibility of all thoseinvolved in the conduct of combathelicopter operations.

Secondly, embed helicopter operationalcapability at various levels of strategic and tactical doctrine—in stand alone,joint operation scenarios and not simply as an add-on. There are no templates and models to follow—innovation will bethe key.

And thirdly, the ability to marry theabove mentioned factors to the promise oftechnology. A symbiotic relationshipbetween the developments in technologyand operational doctrine needs to becreated, so that they drive and mutuallycomplement each other concurrently.

A Complex MachineThis is the challenge before all men andwomen in uniform and the need of thehour is for the emergence of thinkers,whocan generate thought and vision to makehelicopter combat operations a successstory. The helicopter is an amazinglycomplex machine–difficult to make, flyand operate. There are many jokes anddescriptions about the system that onlyserve to describe the complexity ofhelicopter operations.

But notwithstanding that, thehelicopter is the only aerial vehicle thatcomes closest to fulfilling mankind’sancient dreams of the Flying Horse and theMagic Carpet. From the bulky andunwieldy machines of yesteryears, theyhave evolved into sleek, elegant and extremely potent systems. Theirpotential is indeed tremendous andemployment is only limited by theimagination of its commander and theingenuity of the operators.

The good news is that today the IAFand indeed the other two services, are inthe process of acquiring the most modernand potent rotary wing assets. Noelaboration of rotary wing assets isnecessary, as these are available for all tosee in the public domain. What isimportant,however, is that the acquisition,induction and operationalisation of theseassets will considerably augment thecombat edge and effectiveness inresponding to conflict situations by ourarmed forces.

situations and this will present acompletely new dimension to plannersand tacticians alike. The speed ofresponse, precise application of force andcontrolled destruction, will be the newfactors determining combat efficiency.

With a bit of out-of-the- box thinking, ahelicopter can be truly converted into aconflict-domination weapon of choice.The armed forces need to visualise thekind of scenarios that are likely to developin our Subcontinent and determine thekind of national response desired and theobjectives to be achieved. They must thendevelop the necessary capability toprovide a ‘heli-borne’ response—whetherit is delivery of weapons, electronicwarfare, surveillance, target acquisition orsimple transportation of national power. Itspotency and capability will be derivedfrom the seamless combination andintegration of assets, tactics, training andother complimentary capabilities. The aimshould be to develop a composite combat

system, centred around the helicopter. Such a capability cannot develop in

isolation. It will require a comprehensiveimpetus on a number of allied issues. Thearmed forces should be able to create higher utilisation rates for which they need to concentrate on maintenance-freecomponents and an upgradeableengineering architecture. Helicopter flyinghas to become vibration-free,which is notonly essential for comfort, but specificallyfor weapon delivery and sensoroperations. Increased incorporation of fly-by-wire controls, improved high altitudeperformance and better situationalawareness are some areas that our R&Defforts need to concentrate on. Thedevelopment of air-launched non-lethalweapons is another area for development,given the legalities and the repercussionsof collateral damage.

Helicopters have emerged as supremelycapable of adapting to just about any environment. They do have some

DSIAPRIL 2010

28

HELICOPTER

AFP

AFP

AFP

Helicopters will beincreasingly called upon tosurgically address conflict

situations. This wouldpresent a completely new

dimension to planners andtacticians. The speed of

response, preciseapplication of force and

controlled destruction, willbe the determining factors

of combat efficiency.

” 29

A technician adjusts a

model of a Advanced Light

Helicopter on display at the

India Aviation 2010 show

in Hyderabad held in March

Soldiers repair a tank on the

battlefield using a Advanced

Light Helicopter to drop spare

parts during the Operation Desert

Strike exercise at Pokhran


DSIAPRIL 2010

30

INSURGENCY

The Northeast has long been in a stateof turmoil. One of the most enduringand intractable issues that has

dogged peace has been the ongoing Nagaimbroglio that, in a sense, predatesIndependence. This saw a sharpening ofdifferences with the transfer of power andfinally manifested itself in insurgency in1954. That conflict fortunately seems poisedfor a peaceful resolution with the talksbetween the government and the Muivahfaction of the National Socialist Council ofNagaland (NSCN-IM) having entered whatis hopefully a final phase.

Though there are other Naga factions,the NSCN-Khaplang group and twosplinters of the Naga National Council,originally established by the thenacknowledged Naga leader,A.Z. Phizo, theNSCN–IM is dominant. It is the kingpin ofthe turbulence in the entire region, thoughthe United Liberation Front of Asom(ULFA), certain armed Metei Manipurigroups and smaller ethnic formations ofBodos, Kukis, Dimasas and Tripura tribalsremain in the field. While some of thesearmed entities are by no meansinconsequential, any agreement with theNSCN-IM is likely to exercise a profoundinfluence on other warring groups and saptheir capabilities and ardour.

A major rebel group that resorted to armsbut then negotiated a peaceful settlement isthe Mizo National Front. It subsequentlyassumed the reins of power throughelections thus clearly indicating that there isa viable democratic alternative to the gun.

The Nagas hold that theirs is anindependence movement and notsecessionist. The argument is that they losttheir freedom to the British—as did India—and that the colonial power ruled both fromDelhi as a matter of convenience, even asthey fragmented the Naga peoples byplacing them under different administrativejurisdictions within India and Burma,whichwas administratively part of India until 1937.Hence,when the British departed in 1947,both India and the Naga people becameindependent. Indeed,Naga representativesstated the proposition openly and declaredNaga independence a day before Indiaregained its freedom.

Yet, when some British administratorsand constitutionalists proposed that theNortheast tribal belt and adjacent tribalareas in then Burma be declared a CrownColony when India became Independent,the Nagas and Mizos dissented. They optedto cast their lot with India and negotiate asettlement, no doubt aware of theirlandlocked situation and the obviousadvantages of being with a large andpowerful State that could better ensuretheir development and security. Thus wasa nine-point agreement signed by Phizowith Akbar Hydari, the Governor of Assamin 1947,which provided for a review afterten years. There were subsequentdifferences of interpretation, with theNagas reading it as a right to assert theirindependence while the Indian State sawthis as no more than implying renegotiatingthe terms of association within India.

The NNC and other modernising Nagaelites negotiated two agreements with theGovernment of India. The first, in 1960, ledto the formation of the State of Nagaland,with special provisions for autonomyincorporated in a new Article 371 A. TheShillong Accord followed in 1975. Theunderground agreed “of their ownvolition” unconditionally to accept theIndian Constitution and were given“reasonable time to formulate other issuesfor discussion for final settlement”. Theaccord and Phizo’s leadership wasdenounced by Thuingaleng Muivah andIsak Swu while on a “goodwill visit” toChina. The NSCN subsequently split intothe IM and K groups and the insurgencyintensified. After many vicissitudes, aceasefire was finally brokered between theNSCN-IM and the Government in 1996,later extended to the K faction as well and adialogue got under way.

Thirteen Years of GroundworkThe many rounds of talks between theGovernment of India’s interlocutor,K. Padmanabhiah and the NSCN, led byMuivah and Swu, over the past 13 yearspatiently laid the groundwork for a betterunderstanding of the two rival points ofview. Initial talks were aimed at reviewingthe observance of the ceasefire and resolvingcomplaints of violations. With growing trustand confidence, substantive issues came tothe fore leading the Government to declarethat it accepted the “unique history” of theNagas. This constituted something of anemotional breakthrough and resulted in anenhanced rapport. The talks were continuedthrough the NDA and UPA regimes with

KEY POINTSn The Naga insurgency seems poisedfor a peaceful resolution with talksbetween the government and theMuivah faction of the National SocialistCouncil of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) havingentered a decisive phase. n A sticking point is NSCN-IM’s demandto integrate all administrative unitsinhabited by the Naga people acrossAssam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradeshand Nagaland and Eastern Nagaland inMyanmar to constitute ‘Nagalim.’n There could be tough bargainingahead for which a Naga consensus willbe absolutely essential.

Thuingaleng Muivah, General

Secretary of National Socialist

Council of Nagaland-IM, at the

30th Republic Day celebration of

the Government of the People’s

Republic of ‘Nagalim’ at the

outfit’s headquarters at Hebron

camp in Nagaland in March

THE NAGA SAGAThere are very real

possibilities of peace for one

of the world’s oldestinsurgencies

B.G. VERGHESE

31

IND

IAN

EXP

RES

S/S

UB

HA

MO

Y B

HAT

TAC

HA

RJE

E

Nagaland.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:14 PM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2010

30

INSURGENCY

The Northeast has long been in a stateof turmoil. One of the most enduringand intractable issues that has

dogged peace has been the ongoing Nagaimbroglio that, in a sense, predatesIndependence. This saw a sharpening ofdifferences with the transfer of power andfinally manifested itself in insurgency in1954. That conflict fortunately seems poisedfor a peaceful resolution with the talksbetween the government and the Muivahfaction of the National Socialist Council ofNagaland (NSCN-IM) having entered whatis hopefully a final phase.

Though there are other Naga factions,the NSCN-Khaplang group and twosplinters of the Naga National Council,originally established by the thenacknowledged Naga leader,A.Z. Phizo, theNSCN–IM is dominant. It is the kingpin ofthe turbulence in the entire region, thoughthe United Liberation Front of Asom(ULFA), certain armed Metei Manipurigroups and smaller ethnic formations ofBodos, Kukis, Dimasas and Tripura tribalsremain in the field. While some of thesearmed entities are by no meansinconsequential, any agreement with theNSCN-IM is likely to exercise a profoundinfluence on other warring groups and saptheir capabilities and ardour.

A major rebel group that resorted to armsbut then negotiated a peaceful settlement isthe Mizo National Front. It subsequentlyassumed the reins of power throughelections thus clearly indicating that there isa viable democratic alternative to the gun.

The Nagas hold that theirs is anindependence movement and notsecessionist. The argument is that they losttheir freedom to the British—as did India—and that the colonial power ruled both fromDelhi as a matter of convenience, even asthey fragmented the Naga peoples byplacing them under different administrativejurisdictions within India and Burma,whichwas administratively part of India until 1937.Hence,when the British departed in 1947,both India and the Naga people becameindependent. Indeed,Naga representativesstated the proposition openly and declaredNaga independence a day before Indiaregained its freedom.

Yet, when some British administratorsand constitutionalists proposed that theNortheast tribal belt and adjacent tribalareas in then Burma be declared a CrownColony when India became Independent,the Nagas and Mizos dissented. They optedto cast their lot with India and negotiate asettlement, no doubt aware of theirlandlocked situation and the obviousadvantages of being with a large andpowerful State that could better ensuretheir development and security. Thus wasa nine-point agreement signed by Phizowith Akbar Hydari, the Governor of Assamin 1947,which provided for a review afterten years. There were subsequentdifferences of interpretation, with theNagas reading it as a right to assert theirindependence while the Indian State sawthis as no more than implying renegotiatingthe terms of association within India.

The NNC and other modernising Nagaelites negotiated two agreements with theGovernment of India. The first, in 1960, ledto the formation of the State of Nagaland,with special provisions for autonomyincorporated in a new Article 371 A. TheShillong Accord followed in 1975. Theunderground agreed “of their ownvolition” unconditionally to accept theIndian Constitution and were given“reasonable time to formulate other issuesfor discussion for final settlement”. Theaccord and Phizo’s leadership wasdenounced by Thuingaleng Muivah andIsak Swu while on a “goodwill visit” toChina. The NSCN subsequently split intothe IM and K groups and the insurgencyintensified. After many vicissitudes, aceasefire was finally brokered between theNSCN-IM and the Government in 1996,later extended to the K faction as well and adialogue got under way.

Thirteen Years of GroundworkThe many rounds of talks between theGovernment of India’s interlocutor,K. Padmanabhiah and the NSCN, led byMuivah and Swu, over the past 13 yearspatiently laid the groundwork for a betterunderstanding of the two rival points ofview. Initial talks were aimed at reviewingthe observance of the ceasefire and resolvingcomplaints of violations. With growing trustand confidence, substantive issues came tothe fore leading the Government to declarethat it accepted the “unique history” of theNagas. This constituted something of anemotional breakthrough and resulted in anenhanced rapport. The talks were continuedthrough the NDA and UPA regimes with

KEY POINTSn The Naga insurgency seems poisedfor a peaceful resolution with talksbetween the government and theMuivah faction of the National SocialistCouncil of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) havingentered a decisive phase. n A sticking point is NSCN-IM’s demandto integrate all administrative unitsinhabited by the Naga people acrossAssam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradeshand Nagaland and Eastern Nagaland inMyanmar to constitute ‘Nagalim.’n There could be tough bargainingahead for which a Naga consensus willbe absolutely essential.

Thuingaleng Muivah, General

Secretary of National Socialist

Council of Nagaland-IM, at the

30th Republic Day celebration of

the Government of the People’s

Republic of ‘Nagalim’ at the

outfit’s headquarters at Hebron

camp in Nagaland in March

THE NAGA SAGAThere are very real

possibilities of peace for one

of the world’s oldestinsurgencies

B.G. VERGHESE

31

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HAT

TAC

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DSIAPRIL 2010

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33

periodic breaks for reflection and reviewafter high level meetings with leadingGovernmental figures.

This spadework has created the groundfor a final push towards a settlement,withPadmanabhiah yielding place to R.S.Pandey, a senior IAS official and formerChief Secretary of Nagaland who knowsthe State well. Pandey is highly regarded forhaving implemented Nagaland’s successfulcommunitisation programme that entailedhanding over responsibility for primaryeducation and health and retail distributionof electricity in urban areas to localcommunities through direct budgetaryfunding and corresponding accountability.

Muivah was recently in Delhi and, aftermeeting the Prime Minister and HomeMinister, had a round of talks with Pandeybefore proceeding to Dimapur to consultthe local Nagas for their opinion beforesubstantive talks resume. In the run up tothis round, the NSCN leaders had beeninvited to look at the Indian Constitutionand see what parts of it might be acceptableand what special provisions might beintroduced either in amplification of the

existing Article 372 A or as a sub-text withinthe Indian Constitution. This now offers astarting point for the new discussions.

However, two things have been clearlystated by the Government. The first is thatsovereignty is not negotiable and that theNagas, as proud partners in the Indiancommonwealth of very diverse peoples,areindeed co-sovereigns in the Republic ofIndia. Nagaland enjoys wide federal powersreinforced by the special dispensation itenjoys under Article 371 A. These can befurther expanded by transferring certainheads from the concurrent list to theNagaland State list or by incorporatingcertain new provisions that might bemutually agreed upon in keeping with theunique identity of the Naga people.

A clarification is in order here. It is oftenargued that a settlement must be outside theframework of the Indian Constitution. This

need be no obstacle as any understandingcan be incorporated therein though anappropriate amendment. Thus the 1960Indo-Naga agreement and the subsequentMizo accord were both “outside” theexisting Indian Constitution but broughtwithin it through suitable amendments.

Those who might be alarmed by theideas canvassed must remember that theIndian Constitution is a very flexible andaccommodating document providing bothfor territorial variations (such as underArticles 370, 371 and 371 A to I) and specialdispensations for categories of peoplethough reservations, affirmative action,linguistic and religious minority rights,gender equity and so forth. Theseprovisions have been constructively usedboth by the Legislatures and the Courts.Devolution can be extended not only by aConstitutional Amendment but by exercise

of the powers of “entrustment” underArticle 258,which empowers the Centre toentrust to a State “any matter to which theexecutive power of the Union extends”. Norneed there be undue fears of a dominoeffect. The case of the Nagas, like that of thepeople of J&K, is sui generis.

Integration of Administrative UnitsThe other sticking point thus far has beenthe NSCN-IM’s demand for integration ofall administrative units inhabited by Nagapeople across four States, namely, Assam,Manipur, Arunachal and Nagaland itselfand even Eastern Nagaland in Myanmar toconstitute ‘Nagalim’. The Government hasstated that it is in no position to redraw Stateboundaries without the consent of allconcerned. Manipur, in particular, is amongthe oldest principalities in India with anunbroken history of 2,000 years and cannot

be unilaterally vivisected. In fact, the veryidea of attaching parts of the State’sNorthern Hills to ‘Nagalim’ aroused astorm of protest in Manipur,as it has done inAssam and Arunachal Pradesh.

The imagined boundaries of Nagalimhave no clear historical basis. Dimapur, forexample, Nagaland’s road and rail head,was the clearly identified capital of theDimasa Kingdom. It was ceded to the newlyformed Naga Hills district by the British in1936. The Dimasas claim Dimapur buthistory does not move backwards. Nagas,who are on the move, now dominate thisand other areas.

Yet the emotional idea of ‘Nagalim’,as anentity embracing a Naga Peoplehood,can bearticulated in non-territorial terms withoutdoing violence to the integrity of any of theStates concerned. Such non-territorialentities were established to provide culturalsafeguards and ensure the economic andsocial advancement of small scattered plainstribes in Assam like the Rabhas, Tiwas andMishings by Hiteshar Saikia. These councilsreceive direct budgetary grants from Dispurand can select certain personnel toadminister their special needs. Naga peopledareas adjacent to Nagaland could similarlybe brought under special dispensations likethe Sixth Schedule or enjoy specialadministered laws that safeguard the Nagaway of life, language and socio-economic

interests. Thus, although under differentadministrative dispensations, the Nagapeoples could be enabled to sing from thesame page.

The all-Naga Ho-Ho or assembly ofNaga tribal associations across nationaland even international boundaries hasfunctioned as an umbrella organisation inthe past and could be re-engineered toplay such a role in the future. Imaginativeand innovative solutions are available.

The fact that Muivah is a ThangkulNaga from Manipur and Khaplang a HemiNaga from Myanmar need not be anobstacle to their full participation in allaspects of Naga life and in steering theNaga peoples towards a new future.Indeed, they could play an equally largerrole as Naga Indian leaders. But first, allmajor Naga groups must agree on any newconcord of self-determination within Indiaand end years of internecine strife that hasplayed havoc with the fabric of Nagasociety. Many adventurous elements toowill also need to be won over or isolated.

It would be premature to assume that aNaga settlement is almost concluded. Therecould be tough bargaining ahead and aNaga consensus, especially among thearmed Naga groups and betweenNagaland and the adjacent areas that fallwithin the ambit of any definition of a Nagapeoplehood will, of course, be absolutelyessential. Solutions are seldom reachedwith a single step. There could be interimstages, each paving the way for furtheradvance. Patience and statesmanship willbe necessary. The stakes are high, the prizegreat and the omens propitious.

The Nagas hold that theirs is an independence

movement and notsecessionist. The

argument is that they losttheir freedom to the

British as did India andthat the colonial power

ruled both from Delhi as amatter of convenience,

even as they fragmentedthe Naga peoples byplacing them under

different administrativejurisdictions within India

and Burma, which wasadministratively part of

India until 1937.

”Students from Nagaland perform a street

play during a protest in New Delhi.

(above) R.S. Pandey, former Chief Secretary

of Nagaland and presently interlocutor of the

Government of India for the Naga peace talks

AFP


DSIAPRIL 2010

32

INSURGENCY

33

periodic breaks for reflection and reviewafter high level meetings with leadingGovernmental figures.

This spadework has created the groundfor a final push towards a settlement,withPadmanabhiah yielding place to R.S.Pandey, a senior IAS official and formerChief Secretary of Nagaland who knowsthe State well. Pandey is highly regarded forhaving implemented Nagaland’s successfulcommunitisation programme that entailedhanding over responsibility for primaryeducation and health and retail distributionof electricity in urban areas to localcommunities through direct budgetaryfunding and corresponding accountability.

Muivah was recently in Delhi and, aftermeeting the Prime Minister and HomeMinister, had a round of talks with Pandeybefore proceeding to Dimapur to consultthe local Nagas for their opinion beforesubstantive talks resume. In the run up tothis round, the NSCN leaders had beeninvited to look at the Indian Constitutionand see what parts of it might be acceptableand what special provisions might beintroduced either in amplification of the

existing Article 372 A or as a sub-text withinthe Indian Constitution. This now offers astarting point for the new discussions.

However, two things have been clearlystated by the Government. The first is thatsovereignty is not negotiable and that theNagas, as proud partners in the Indiancommonwealth of very diverse peoples,areindeed co-sovereigns in the Republic ofIndia. Nagaland enjoys wide federal powersreinforced by the special dispensation itenjoys under Article 371 A. These can befurther expanded by transferring certainheads from the concurrent list to theNagaland State list or by incorporatingcertain new provisions that might bemutually agreed upon in keeping with theunique identity of the Naga people.

A clarification is in order here. It is oftenargued that a settlement must be outside theframework of the Indian Constitution. This

need be no obstacle as any understandingcan be incorporated therein though anappropriate amendment. Thus the 1960Indo-Naga agreement and the subsequentMizo accord were both “outside” theexisting Indian Constitution but broughtwithin it through suitable amendments.

Those who might be alarmed by theideas canvassed must remember that theIndian Constitution is a very flexible andaccommodating document providing bothfor territorial variations (such as underArticles 370, 371 and 371 A to I) and specialdispensations for categories of peoplethough reservations, affirmative action,linguistic and religious minority rights,gender equity and so forth. Theseprovisions have been constructively usedboth by the Legislatures and the Courts.Devolution can be extended not only by aConstitutional Amendment but by exercise

of the powers of “entrustment” underArticle 258,which empowers the Centre toentrust to a State “any matter to which theexecutive power of the Union extends”. Norneed there be undue fears of a dominoeffect. The case of the Nagas, like that of thepeople of J&K, is sui generis.

Integration of Administrative UnitsThe other sticking point thus far has beenthe NSCN-IM’s demand for integration ofall administrative units inhabited by Nagapeople across four States, namely, Assam,Manipur, Arunachal and Nagaland itselfand even Eastern Nagaland in Myanmar toconstitute ‘Nagalim’. The Government hasstated that it is in no position to redraw Stateboundaries without the consent of allconcerned. Manipur, in particular, is amongthe oldest principalities in India with anunbroken history of 2,000 years and cannot

be unilaterally vivisected. In fact, the veryidea of attaching parts of the State’sNorthern Hills to ‘Nagalim’ aroused astorm of protest in Manipur,as it has done inAssam and Arunachal Pradesh.

The imagined boundaries of Nagalimhave no clear historical basis. Dimapur, forexample, Nagaland’s road and rail head,was the clearly identified capital of theDimasa Kingdom. It was ceded to the newlyformed Naga Hills district by the British in1936. The Dimasas claim Dimapur buthistory does not move backwards. Nagas,who are on the move, now dominate thisand other areas.

Yet the emotional idea of ‘Nagalim’,as anentity embracing a Naga Peoplehood,can bearticulated in non-territorial terms withoutdoing violence to the integrity of any of theStates concerned. Such non-territorialentities were established to provide culturalsafeguards and ensure the economic andsocial advancement of small scattered plainstribes in Assam like the Rabhas, Tiwas andMishings by Hiteshar Saikia. These councilsreceive direct budgetary grants from Dispurand can select certain personnel toadminister their special needs. Naga peopledareas adjacent to Nagaland could similarlybe brought under special dispensations likethe Sixth Schedule or enjoy specialadministered laws that safeguard the Nagaway of life, language and socio-economic

interests. Thus, although under differentadministrative dispensations, the Nagapeoples could be enabled to sing from thesame page.

The all-Naga Ho-Ho or assembly ofNaga tribal associations across nationaland even international boundaries hasfunctioned as an umbrella organisation inthe past and could be re-engineered toplay such a role in the future. Imaginativeand innovative solutions are available.

The fact that Muivah is a ThangkulNaga from Manipur and Khaplang a HemiNaga from Myanmar need not be anobstacle to their full participation in allaspects of Naga life and in steering theNaga peoples towards a new future.Indeed, they could play an equally largerrole as Naga Indian leaders. But first, allmajor Naga groups must agree on any newconcord of self-determination within Indiaand end years of internecine strife that hasplayed havoc with the fabric of Nagasociety. Many adventurous elements toowill also need to be won over or isolated.

It would be premature to assume that aNaga settlement is almost concluded. Therecould be tough bargaining ahead and aNaga consensus, especially among thearmed Naga groups and betweenNagaland and the adjacent areas that fallwithin the ambit of any definition of a Nagapeoplehood will, of course, be absolutelyessential. Solutions are seldom reachedwith a single step. There could be interimstages, each paving the way for furtheradvance. Patience and statesmanship willbe necessary. The stakes are high, the prizegreat and the omens propitious.

The Nagas hold that theirs is an independence

movement and notsecessionist. The

argument is that they losttheir freedom to the

British as did India andthat the colonial power

ruled both from Delhi as amatter of convenience,

even as they fragmentedthe Naga peoples byplacing them under

different administrativejurisdictions within India

and Burma, which wasadministratively part of

India until 1937.

”Students from Nagaland perform a street

play during a protest in New Delhi.

(above) R.S. Pandey, former Chief Secretary

of Nagaland and presently interlocutor of the

Government of India for the Naga peace talks

AFP


DSIAPRIL 2010

34

NEIGHBOURS

35

AFP

The Hindukush is in ferment again.The capture of Mullah Abdul GhaniBaradar, said to be the most

important man in the Taliban hierarchy,second only to Mullah Omar, in Februaryfrom a slum town called Baldia just outsideKarachi in Pakistan has provoked a newround of the Afghan great game.

On the face of it, the capture is a coup infavour of Pakistan. As Islamabad, with itsall-powerful Army and its intelligenceagency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),attempts to deal with the impending,grand bargain that Afghan PresidentHamid Karzai is seeking to broker betweenvarious factions of the moderate Taliban,all the players in the region ––from India tothe US, from Russia to Saudi Arabia andIran to Pakistan—are watching eachother’s next move on this geo-strategicchessboard with total concentration.

Karzai is already scheduling a loya

jirga, a grand assembly of Afghan tribalchieftains, to take place on April 29, todiscuss the process of reintegrationbetween disaffected and dissentingAfghans who may have shifted theirloyalties elsewhere over the last, severelyconflicted years—whether to the QuettaShura, headed by the redoubtable MullahOmar, to the Hizb-e-Islamic grouping ofGulbuddin Hekmatyar or to the Haqqanifaction of the Afghan Taliban, responsiblefor carrying out several bomb attacks inand around Kabul, including the oneagainst the Indian embassy in July 2008and the Karzai government.

An end to violence is a precursor toreintegration, although Karzai is said to bewilling to accommodate the process ofgive-and-take that entails the surrender ofarms in exchange for the sharing of power.At the heart of the matter is the return tothe dialogue table, arguably a fundamentalprinciple of the Indian state as well asdemocracies around the world.

Let’s talk about the future ofAfghanistan, discuss and debate thecontours of the kind of country all of uswant to recreate, we can imagine Karzaisaying to the loya jirga. An IslamicRepublic with a titular head? Perhapseven a grandson or two of the late AfghanKing Zahir Shah and the continuation of a 25 percent quota for womenparliamentarians? What should be thedynamics of power-sharing between thePashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest and mostpowerful tribal dispensation), the Hazarasas well as the former Northern Alliance?

Karzai will emphasise that the futurebelongs to all Afghans and underline thespirit of neutrality that can end the civilwar, something he publicly stressed inIslamabad in early March: “Afghanistandoes not want any proxy wars on itsterritory. It does not want a proxy warbetween India and Pakistan. It does not

KEY POINTSn As President Hamid Karzai is trying tobroker peace with moderate factions ofthe Taliban, regional players active inAfghanistan are watching each other’smoves closely.n Over the last nine years, since theTaliban were ousted by the Americans,after the 26/11 attacks, India hasramped up its presence in Afghanistan.n America seem to be denying thatIndians were being targetted in suicideattacks in Afghanistan.

JYOTI MALHOTRA

GEO-STRATEGIC CHESSBOARDWith the US planning to drawdown its forces inAfghanistan by mid-2011, the question is which countrywill fill the vacuum in this battle-scarred nation?

Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao

inspects the damage incurred by a

suicide attack on the Indian embassy

in Kabul in October 2009

Afghanistan-final.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:15 PM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2010

34

NEIGHBOURS

35

AFP

The Hindukush is in ferment again.The capture of Mullah Abdul GhaniBaradar, said to be the most

important man in the Taliban hierarchy,second only to Mullah Omar, in Februaryfrom a slum town called Baldia just outsideKarachi in Pakistan has provoked a newround of the Afghan great game.

On the face of it, the capture is a coup infavour of Pakistan. As Islamabad, with itsall-powerful Army and its intelligenceagency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),attempts to deal with the impending,grand bargain that Afghan PresidentHamid Karzai is seeking to broker betweenvarious factions of the moderate Taliban,all the players in the region ––from India tothe US, from Russia to Saudi Arabia andIran to Pakistan—are watching eachother’s next move on this geo-strategicchessboard with total concentration.

Karzai is already scheduling a loya

jirga, a grand assembly of Afghan tribalchieftains, to take place on April 29, todiscuss the process of reintegrationbetween disaffected and dissentingAfghans who may have shifted theirloyalties elsewhere over the last, severelyconflicted years—whether to the QuettaShura, headed by the redoubtable MullahOmar, to the Hizb-e-Islamic grouping ofGulbuddin Hekmatyar or to the Haqqanifaction of the Afghan Taliban, responsiblefor carrying out several bomb attacks inand around Kabul, including the oneagainst the Indian embassy in July 2008and the Karzai government.

An end to violence is a precursor toreintegration, although Karzai is said to bewilling to accommodate the process ofgive-and-take that entails the surrender ofarms in exchange for the sharing of power.At the heart of the matter is the return tothe dialogue table, arguably a fundamentalprinciple of the Indian state as well asdemocracies around the world.

Let’s talk about the future ofAfghanistan, discuss and debate thecontours of the kind of country all of uswant to recreate, we can imagine Karzaisaying to the loya jirga. An IslamicRepublic with a titular head? Perhapseven a grandson or two of the late AfghanKing Zahir Shah and the continuation of a 25 percent quota for womenparliamentarians? What should be thedynamics of power-sharing between thePashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest and mostpowerful tribal dispensation), the Hazarasas well as the former Northern Alliance?

Karzai will emphasise that the futurebelongs to all Afghans and underline thespirit of neutrality that can end the civilwar, something he publicly stressed inIslamabad in early March: “Afghanistandoes not want any proxy wars on itsterritory. It does not want a proxy warbetween India and Pakistan. It does not

KEY POINTSn As President Hamid Karzai is trying tobroker peace with moderate factions ofthe Taliban, regional players active inAfghanistan are watching each other’smoves closely.n Over the last nine years, since theTaliban were ousted by the Americans,after the 26/11 attacks, India hasramped up its presence in Afghanistan.n America seem to be denying thatIndians were being targetted in suicideattacks in Afghanistan.

JYOTI MALHOTRA

GEO-STRATEGIC CHESSBOARDWith the US planning to drawdown its forces inAfghanistan by mid-2011, the question is which countrywill fill the vacuum in this battle-scarred nation?

Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao

inspects the damage incurred by a

suicide attack on the Indian embassy

in Kabul in October 2009


want a proxy war between Iran and USin Afghanistan.”

Raging Proxy WarsActually, the proxy wars that areanathema to Karzai and his countrymenhave been raging now for severalcenturies. From Alexander the Great toBabur, from the Russians and the Britishin the 19th century to the Soviets and theAmericans in the 20th, control over theHindukush has been an adrenalin surge.By the time US forces begin to drawdownin 2011, the Americans would haveoccupied Afghanistan for exactly a decade.

Pakistan is waiting for the Americanforces to leave Afghanistan. And this isexactly what India fears. Pakistan’s ArmyChief, General Ashfaq Kayani haswarned the Americans that it would be“unhelpful” if India continue to expandits sphere of influence in Afghanistan.But India’s Foreign Secretary NirupamaRao, showing both steel and spine in arecent visit to the US, declared that Indiahad no intention of downsizing itssignificant presence in that country.

Over the last nine years, since theTaliban were ousted by the Americans,

after the 26/11 attacks, India hasdeterminedly ramped up its presence inAfghanistan, as if to make up for the 15-odd years that it was kept out during theTaliban years. The first big project was a214-km-long road from Zaranj in Nimrozprovince (neighbouring Iran) to Delaramin southern Afghanistan, ultimatelyconnecting to Kabul. The idea behind

choosing a highway in the south was toconnect Zaranj to the Chabahar port inIran with another highway (which Iranhas since done), so that ships carryinggoods from India could dock at Chabaharand then take the north-east road toZaranj in Afghanistan.

Two years ago, former External AffairsMinister Pranab Mukherjee inauguratedthe Zaranj-Delaram Highway as a gift fromthe people of India to Afghanistan. Soon,other projects were at hand, whichincluded the building of electricitytransmission lines from Kabul to thenorthern town of Termez, borderingUzbekistan. A power-deficient city until thesummer of 2009, Kabul now has surpluspower thanks to this project. A third majorproject is the building of the Salma Dam inthe heart of Hazara territory in Bamyanprovince. A fourth is the building ofAfghanistan’s Parliament in Kabul.

Indian officials point out that thecommitted aid, amounting to $1.3 billion,doesn’t include the vast number ofNGOs working in the social sector. Infact, in each of Afghanistan’s 34provinces, one or another Indian project,including the training of women by

DSIAPRIL 2010

36

NEIGHBOURS

Victims being rescued by policemen

from a blast that occurred outside

Noor Guesthouse in Kabul in February

An end to violence is aprecursor to reintegration,

although Karzai is said to be willing to

accommodate the processof give-and-take that

entails the surrender ofarms in exchange of

power sharing.

”A

FP


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Ela Bhatt’s Self-Employed Women’sAssociation operates in full swing. Arecent survey commissioned by BBC,ABC and ARD-–the British, Americanand German broadcasters respectively—found that 71 percent of the Afghanpopulation wanted India to play asignificant role in Afghanistan.

So when Kayani recently offered toKarzai that Pakistan could train theAfghan Army, Karzai politely refused.This is despite the fact that the Americansseem desperate to broker peace betweenthe neighbours on either side of theDurand Line, so that all countries have acommon enemy in the US-led waragainst terror: mutual mistrust, hostilityand suspicion have tended toovershadow the occasional lapses intosentimental brotherhood.

The arrest of Mullah Baradar is a case inpoint. Karzai wanted Pakistan to extraditeBaradar, not only because he was fromKarzai’s own Popalzai tribe but alsobecause he could have become the thinend of the wedge to split the radicalisedTaliban forces. That would have been thebasis of Karzai’s own reintegrationstrategy, in which he called upon allPashtuns to unite and save the country.

Clearly, Pakistan wasn’t giving upMullah Baradar for exactly the samereasons. If Afghanistan was to remain the“strategic depth” for Pakistan, as hadbeen enunciated by Kayani, then thePakistanis needed to keep alive itslinkages with key Taliban leaders. IfBaradar had crossed the lakshman rekha,then Pakistan needed to know why. “Baradar’s arrest was a cull, not a

capture,” said a highly placed source inthe Indian establishment, speaking oncondition of anonymity. “Talks betweenMullah Baradar and people close toKarzai had been going on for over sixmonths. The Pakistanis decided to takehim out because they didn’t want thetalks to succeed.”

Training Soldiers and OfficersMeanwhile, as it became crystal clear thatthe US and NATO-led drawdown in mid-2011 would require that much largernumbers of Afghans be trained to takeover responsibilities in the Army and thecivilian police, both Pakistan and Indiaoffered to train both soldiers and officers.

In Kabul, in early December, as snowcarpeted the Hindukush just beyond thestreet lights and a raging bonfire at thehome of India’s defence attaché Brigadier

A US Army trainer

observing an Afghan

soldier during combat

training at the

Afghan National

Army camp on the

outskirts of Kabul in

September, 2009

AFP

Surinder Singh kept the cold at bay, itseemed as if Afghanistan’s status as thechessboard of great powers was beingoverhauled, dissected and reaffirmed.

As we feasted on several kinds ofkebabs, chicken and vegetables, theyoung men and women from India’sArmy Education Corps as well as thoseworking on several civilian projects thatIndia has a stake in (dams, roads,women’s Self-Help Groups), spoke oftheir growing fondness and respect forthe manner in which the Afghanscontinued to display both raw courageand guile in order to manage theirdecades-old adversity. The Afghans hadbeen through everything—occupation,civil war and in the current situation, aforeign stiffening of Karzai’s spine—andthey had lost so much, but giving updidn’t seem an option.

We toasted the Afghan spirit againand again that evening. Three monthslater, two young Majors at the party,who were teaching English to the Afghan Army, were dead. They werekilled by suicide-bombers of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the terrorist group based inPakistan, expanding its anti-Indianfootprint into Afghanistan.

But I am getting ahead of my story.As US President Barack Obama, in his

speech at West Point in early December,announced that he would send in 30,000

more soldiers into Afghanistanin the first half of 2010, beforethe drawdown began in mid-2011, the question on everyperson’s lips that night atSingh’s house was: Whichcountries were going to fill in thevacuum left by the withdrawal of theforeign forces? Since there was so littletime left for the American and theInternational Capital Security AssistanceForce to expand the Afghan Army andconvert it into a fighting force, goodenough to take on the Taliban? Who wasgoing to train these boys?

Already, Canada and the Netherlandshad announced that they no longer hadthe stomach to fight someone else’s warso many thousands of kms away and thatthey would shut shop next year.Meanwhile, it was clear that Obama’sspeech at West Point was aimed atrecharging his own re-election campaignthat would begin soon after.

Sure, he had promised to end both the“good war” in Afghanistan as well as the“bad war” in Iraq that he had inheritedfrom George Bush, but did that meanthat the never-ending Taliban insurgencywould determine Obama’s course.Television visuals of body bags returninghome was hardly the way to win thehearts and minds of Americans.

Over the next few weeks, Obama’s

plans fell into place. By the end ofJanuary 2010, the Londonconference on Afghanistan openlycame out in support of Karzai’s planfor reintegrating the dissentingTaliban, especially those low-andmiddle-level forces that had

gravitated towards the opposition becauseit had been a lucrative thing to do.Moreover, a $500 million fund for payingoff the Taliban fighters was instituted.

There was, however, absolutely noword on the need to expand the AfghanNational Army and civil police so as totouch 171,600 and 134,000 respectively byOctober 2011 (current levels are at 86,000and 80,000 respectively). Even moresignificant, there was no talk of whowould fill in the political and securityvacuum once Western forces began toleave Afghanistan.

Attack on IndiansMeanwhile, India was once again beingdrawn into the action in Kabul. In theearly hours of February 28, just beforethe Congress-led government in Delhiwas about to present its Budget, theLashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) struck the NoorGuesthouse and the Park ResidenceHotel in Kabul, where Indian doctorsworking in the Indira Gandhi Hospitalfor children and the small team from theArmy Education Corps were staying. Of

Canada and the Netherlands had

announced that they nolonger had the stomach to

fight someone else’s war so many thousands of

kms away and would shut shop next year.

Meanwhile, it was clear thatObama’s speech at West

Point was aimed atrecharging his own

re-election campaign.

” Afghan

President

Hamid Karzai

addressing a

loya jirga held

in Kabul


DSIAPRIL 2010

38

NEIGHBOURS

39

Ela Bhatt’s Self-Employed Women’sAssociation operates in full swing. Arecent survey commissioned by BBC,ABC and ARD-–the British, Americanand German broadcasters respectively—found that 71 percent of the Afghanpopulation wanted India to play asignificant role in Afghanistan.

So when Kayani recently offered toKarzai that Pakistan could train theAfghan Army, Karzai politely refused.This is despite the fact that the Americansseem desperate to broker peace betweenthe neighbours on either side of theDurand Line, so that all countries have acommon enemy in the US-led waragainst terror: mutual mistrust, hostilityand suspicion have tended toovershadow the occasional lapses intosentimental brotherhood.

The arrest of Mullah Baradar is a case inpoint. Karzai wanted Pakistan to extraditeBaradar, not only because he was fromKarzai’s own Popalzai tribe but alsobecause he could have become the thinend of the wedge to split the radicalisedTaliban forces. That would have been thebasis of Karzai’s own reintegrationstrategy, in which he called upon allPashtuns to unite and save the country.

Clearly, Pakistan wasn’t giving upMullah Baradar for exactly the samereasons. If Afghanistan was to remain the“strategic depth” for Pakistan, as hadbeen enunciated by Kayani, then thePakistanis needed to keep alive itslinkages with key Taliban leaders. IfBaradar had crossed the lakshman rekha,then Pakistan needed to know why. “Baradar’s arrest was a cull, not a

capture,” said a highly placed source inthe Indian establishment, speaking oncondition of anonymity. “Talks betweenMullah Baradar and people close toKarzai had been going on for over sixmonths. The Pakistanis decided to takehim out because they didn’t want thetalks to succeed.”

Training Soldiers and OfficersMeanwhile, as it became crystal clear thatthe US and NATO-led drawdown in mid-2011 would require that much largernumbers of Afghans be trained to takeover responsibilities in the Army and thecivilian police, both Pakistan and Indiaoffered to train both soldiers and officers.

In Kabul, in early December, as snowcarpeted the Hindukush just beyond thestreet lights and a raging bonfire at thehome of India’s defence attaché Brigadier

A US Army trainer

observing an Afghan

soldier during combat

training at the

Afghan National

Army camp on the

outskirts of Kabul in

September, 2009

AFP

Surinder Singh kept the cold at bay, itseemed as if Afghanistan’s status as thechessboard of great powers was beingoverhauled, dissected and reaffirmed.

As we feasted on several kinds ofkebabs, chicken and vegetables, theyoung men and women from India’sArmy Education Corps as well as thoseworking on several civilian projects thatIndia has a stake in (dams, roads,women’s Self-Help Groups), spoke oftheir growing fondness and respect forthe manner in which the Afghanscontinued to display both raw courageand guile in order to manage theirdecades-old adversity. The Afghans hadbeen through everything—occupation,civil war and in the current situation, aforeign stiffening of Karzai’s spine—andthey had lost so much, but giving updidn’t seem an option.

We toasted the Afghan spirit againand again that evening. Three monthslater, two young Majors at the party,who were teaching English to the Afghan Army, were dead. They werekilled by suicide-bombers of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the terrorist group based inPakistan, expanding its anti-Indianfootprint into Afghanistan.

But I am getting ahead of my story.As US President Barack Obama, in his

speech at West Point in early December,announced that he would send in 30,000

more soldiers into Afghanistanin the first half of 2010, beforethe drawdown began in mid-2011, the question on everyperson’s lips that night atSingh’s house was: Whichcountries were going to fill in thevacuum left by the withdrawal of theforeign forces? Since there was so littletime left for the American and theInternational Capital Security AssistanceForce to expand the Afghan Army andconvert it into a fighting force, goodenough to take on the Taliban? Who wasgoing to train these boys?

Already, Canada and the Netherlandshad announced that they no longer hadthe stomach to fight someone else’s warso many thousands of kms away and thatthey would shut shop next year.Meanwhile, it was clear that Obama’sspeech at West Point was aimed atrecharging his own re-election campaignthat would begin soon after.

Sure, he had promised to end both the“good war” in Afghanistan as well as the“bad war” in Iraq that he had inheritedfrom George Bush, but did that meanthat the never-ending Taliban insurgencywould determine Obama’s course.Television visuals of body bags returninghome was hardly the way to win thehearts and minds of Americans.

Over the next few weeks, Obama’s

plans fell into place. By the end ofJanuary 2010, the Londonconference on Afghanistan openlycame out in support of Karzai’s planfor reintegrating the dissentingTaliban, especially those low-andmiddle-level forces that had

gravitated towards the opposition becauseit had been a lucrative thing to do.Moreover, a $500 million fund for payingoff the Taliban fighters was instituted.

There was, however, absolutely noword on the need to expand the AfghanNational Army and civil police so as totouch 171,600 and 134,000 respectively byOctober 2011 (current levels are at 86,000and 80,000 respectively). Even moresignificant, there was no talk of whowould fill in the political and securityvacuum once Western forces began toleave Afghanistan.

Attack on IndiansMeanwhile, India was once again beingdrawn into the action in Kabul. In theearly hours of February 28, just beforethe Congress-led government in Delhiwas about to present its Budget, theLashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) struck the NoorGuesthouse and the Park ResidenceHotel in Kabul, where Indian doctorsworking in the Indira Gandhi Hospitalfor children and the small team from theArmy Education Corps were staying. Of

Canada and the Netherlands had

announced that they nolonger had the stomach to

fight someone else’s war so many thousands of

kms away and would shut shop next year.

Meanwhile, it was clear thatObama’s speech at West

Point was aimed atrecharging his own

re-election campaign.

” Afghan

President

Hamid Karzai

addressing a

loya jirga held

in Kabul


DSIAPRIL 2010

40

NEIGHBOURS

the four-member LeT team, one killedhimself when they blew up the gate tothe guesthouse. The remaining threeterrorists then went from room to roomsearching for the Indian residents,shouting in Urdu, “Where is the Indiandirector?” When the Afghan receptionistpleaded that he was Afghani and theyshould let him go, he was shot at point-blank range. They threw a grenadeinside the room of an Indian Armydoctor, but he wasn’t there.

Another doctor, Major Laishram JyotinSingh, had in fact engaged one of theterrorists in a physical struggle, therebyenabling several other residents of theguesthouse to escape, but he was killedalong with the bomber who blew himselfup. In the gunfight that ensued, MajorDeepak Yadav of the Army EducationCorps was killed, while Major Roy wasevacuated on a special flight to Delhi, alongwith the other injured. He died at the Armyhospital in the Capital two days later.

US special envoy for Af-Pak RichardHolbrooke was already denying theIndian sacrifice. “I don’t accept the factthat this was an attack on an Indianfacility…There were foreigners and non-Indian foreigners hurt,” he said. Hequickly denied his own remarks two dayslater, but the truth was out.

Holbrooke, in conjunction with other senior members of the Obama

administration, was clearly articulatingthe view that nothing should be done toupset Pakistan, otherwise it would not fightthe war against terror on the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier with the same dedicationthat it had cleared the Swat and MalakandValleys and gone into South Waziristan.

Kayani, once named by Timemagazine as “democracy’s best friend,”told the Americans that it would be“unhelpful” if India expanded its reach inAfghanistan. The war on terror couldbecome a casualty, he implied, if India

was allowed to expand its sphere ofinfluence in Afghanistan.

It seemed that India was being asked byits closest allies, the Americans, to take aback seat in Afghanistan. Officials promisedthe setback was temporary and that theAfghans needed to decide who they couldtrust with rebuilding their lives. Let theworld ask the Afghans they said, instead ofallowing the Americans or the Pakistanis todecide what Kabul should do.

In this murky world, a sliver of lightwould soon appear on the horizon:Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State,was telling Delhi that the US believedthat India, as the only democracy in theregion, was also the only country thatcould bail out both the US as well as theAfghans in the battle for Afghanistan.

Behind the scenes, US officials wentone step further. Pakistan’s Army stillmaintained close linkages with theHaqqani group in North Waziristan aswell as with Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami.Perhaps, India could be asked to train theAfghan civil police as a way of balancingthe veto power Islamabad was beginningto exercise in other, powerful parts of theUS establishment.

Clearly, the Americans were dividedover their own policy projections inKabul. It would now be up to India toclarify matters both at home as well as in Washington.

The US Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton with Indian Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh during his visit to the

US in November, 2009

Hillary Clinton, USSecretary of State, was

telling Delhi that it was theonly democracy in the

region and was also theonly country that could bail

out both the US as well as the Afghans in the battle

for Afghanistan.

”A

FP



DSIAPRIL 2010

42

NEIGHBOURS

43

Nestled in the lee of snow cappedmountains in the sub-Himalayas,the landlocked nation of Nepal has

for nearly half a century deftly balancedrelations between India and China. ButChina’s strategic objectives in Nepal areclear: to neutralise and eliminate Indianinfluence; secure China’s borders byensuring that the Tibetan refugee populationis effectively curbed; and recover what itconsiders as one of its ‘lost’ territories seizedby ‘imperialists’. Effectively then,Nepal is animportant part of China’s South Asia policy.

After China took over Tibet in 1951, itviewed Nepal, along with Ladakh, Sikkim,Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh, as a ‘newbuffer’ between India and China. Tillrecently, its efforts in Nepal werecircumscribed by culture and geography.Despite occasional turbulence, the triangularrelationship between Kathmandu,Delhi andBeijing,was generally evenly balanced forover half a century. The situation altered onlyfrom the middle of the current decade.

Expanding Economic TiesTill recently, China followed a cautiouspolicy, which included supportingKathmandu’s effort to designate Nepal as a‘Zone of Peace’ and signing a Treaty ofPeace and Friendship in 1960. A boundaryagreement followed. Gradually, as itsmodernisation programme began to yieldresults, China’s policy towards Nepalbecame more confident and political effortswere supplemented with economiccontent. Simultaneously, Chinese officialsbegan increasingly alluding to India’s‘hegemonism’ and assured Nepalesedignitaries that China will continue tosupport Nepal’s effort to safeguard itsnational independence, sovereignty anddevelop its economy.

As imbalances between coastal areas andthe hinterland got accentuated, consequent

to the implementation of economic reforms,China’s leaders sought to assuage populardiscontent by encouraging the landlocked,hinterland provinces to explore economicopportunities. Trade was encouragedbetween the Tibet Autonomous Region(TAR) and Nepal and it increasedremarkably between 1983 and 89. A five-year trade agreement was concludedfollowed by an agreement on economic andtechnical cooperation during the lateNepalese Prime Minister G.P. Koirala’s visitto China in 1992. The year after that Koiralavisited Lhasa becoming the first NepalesePrime Minister to ever visit Tibet.

China began providing Nepal grants andassistance. In 2006, it offered a grant of Yuan100 million ($13 million) and a concessionalloan of Yuan 200 million ($26 million). Theadvent of the Maoist Government underPrime Minister Prachanda,who was openlycritical of India, elevated China-Nepal ties.China increased the grant offered to Nepalto Yuan 150 million ($21 million) andallowed duty free access to 500 Nepalesegoods. As part of its policy,where strategicinterests are involved, China identifiedinfrastructure projects for cooperation andparticularly eyed Nepal’s estimated 83,000MWs of hydro-electricity. It extended aloan of $187 million for the constructionof two power plants.

China soon expanded the scope ofrelations to include the sensitive defencesector. In June 1992, it offered Nepal anti-aircraft guns worth $70 million. This wasnot-too-subtle a pointer that India was notto be regarded as a ‘friend’. Though notaccepted, the offer paved the way for furthercontacts. Next year Nepal’s defencesecretary led a delegation to China,described by China’s then Defence MinisterChi Haotian as “a major event in the historyof contacts between the armed forces of thetwo countries”.

In mid-1994,Nepal’s Inspector Generalof Police visited Beijing for the first time ever,during which Beijing voiced its concernabout ‘anti-China’ activities by Tibetansinside Nepal. China was assured that suchactivities would be stopped. Chinesedefence supplies to Nepal and militaryexchanges escalated appreciably after thevisit of the Royal Nepal Army Chief toBeijing in 1999. The shift in Nepal’s weaponsprocurement policy was enunciated in June2005 by the Royal Nepal Army’s MasterGeneral of Ordnance. He identified Chinaas the only country that continued to supplyarms and ammunition to Nepal and evenadded that Nepal was entirely dependent

KEY POINTSn The triangular relationship betweenKathmandu, Delhi and Beijing wasgenerally evenly balanced for over half acentury. The situation has altered fromthe middle of the current decade.n China’s strategic objective in Nepal isto neutralise and eliminate Indianinfluence, secure its borders byensuring that the Tibetan refugeepopulation is effectively curbed andrecover what it considers as one of its‘lost’ territories seized by ‘imperialists’.

China’s policy towards Nepal has become moreaggressive perhaps with the aim to neutralise Indian influence in the region

A LOOMINGSHADOW

JAYADEVA RANADE

A father and his daughter in Anduo County of Tibet

Autonomous Region in China walk along the Qinghai-Lhasa

Railway Line, which connects western Nepal to Tibet

AFP

Nepal-China.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 09/04/10 4:24 PM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2010

42

NEIGHBOURS

43

Nestled in the lee of snow cappedmountains in the sub-Himalayas,the landlocked nation of Nepal has

for nearly half a century deftly balancedrelations between India and China. ButChina’s strategic objectives in Nepal areclear: to neutralise and eliminate Indianinfluence; secure China’s borders byensuring that the Tibetan refugee populationis effectively curbed; and recover what itconsiders as one of its ‘lost’ territories seizedby ‘imperialists’. Effectively then,Nepal is animportant part of China’s South Asia policy.

After China took over Tibet in 1951, itviewed Nepal, along with Ladakh, Sikkim,Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh, as a ‘newbuffer’ between India and China. Tillrecently, its efforts in Nepal werecircumscribed by culture and geography.Despite occasional turbulence, the triangularrelationship between Kathmandu,Delhi andBeijing,was generally evenly balanced forover half a century. The situation altered onlyfrom the middle of the current decade.

Expanding Economic TiesTill recently, China followed a cautiouspolicy, which included supportingKathmandu’s effort to designate Nepal as a‘Zone of Peace’ and signing a Treaty ofPeace and Friendship in 1960. A boundaryagreement followed. Gradually, as itsmodernisation programme began to yieldresults, China’s policy towards Nepalbecame more confident and political effortswere supplemented with economiccontent. Simultaneously, Chinese officialsbegan increasingly alluding to India’s‘hegemonism’ and assured Nepalesedignitaries that China will continue tosupport Nepal’s effort to safeguard itsnational independence, sovereignty anddevelop its economy.

As imbalances between coastal areas andthe hinterland got accentuated, consequent

to the implementation of economic reforms,China’s leaders sought to assuage populardiscontent by encouraging the landlocked,hinterland provinces to explore economicopportunities. Trade was encouragedbetween the Tibet Autonomous Region(TAR) and Nepal and it increasedremarkably between 1983 and 89. A five-year trade agreement was concludedfollowed by an agreement on economic andtechnical cooperation during the lateNepalese Prime Minister G.P. Koirala’s visitto China in 1992. The year after that Koiralavisited Lhasa becoming the first NepalesePrime Minister to ever visit Tibet.

China began providing Nepal grants andassistance. In 2006, it offered a grant of Yuan100 million ($13 million) and a concessionalloan of Yuan 200 million ($26 million). Theadvent of the Maoist Government underPrime Minister Prachanda,who was openlycritical of India, elevated China-Nepal ties.China increased the grant offered to Nepalto Yuan 150 million ($21 million) andallowed duty free access to 500 Nepalesegoods. As part of its policy,where strategicinterests are involved, China identifiedinfrastructure projects for cooperation andparticularly eyed Nepal’s estimated 83,000MWs of hydro-electricity. It extended aloan of $187 million for the constructionof two power plants.

China soon expanded the scope ofrelations to include the sensitive defencesector. In June 1992, it offered Nepal anti-aircraft guns worth $70 million. This wasnot-too-subtle a pointer that India was notto be regarded as a ‘friend’. Though notaccepted, the offer paved the way for furthercontacts. Next year Nepal’s defencesecretary led a delegation to China,described by China’s then Defence MinisterChi Haotian as “a major event in the historyof contacts between the armed forces of thetwo countries”.

In mid-1994,Nepal’s Inspector Generalof Police visited Beijing for the first time ever,during which Beijing voiced its concernabout ‘anti-China’ activities by Tibetansinside Nepal. China was assured that suchactivities would be stopped. Chinesedefence supplies to Nepal and militaryexchanges escalated appreciably after thevisit of the Royal Nepal Army Chief toBeijing in 1999. The shift in Nepal’s weaponsprocurement policy was enunciated in June2005 by the Royal Nepal Army’s MasterGeneral of Ordnance. He identified Chinaas the only country that continued to supplyarms and ammunition to Nepal and evenadded that Nepal was entirely dependent

KEY POINTSn The triangular relationship betweenKathmandu, Delhi and Beijing wasgenerally evenly balanced for over half acentury. The situation has altered fromthe middle of the current decade.n China’s strategic objective in Nepal isto neutralise and eliminate Indianinfluence, secure its borders byensuring that the Tibetan refugeepopulation is effectively curbed andrecover what it considers as one of its‘lost’ territories seized by ‘imperialists’.

China’s policy towards Nepal has become moreaggressive perhaps with the aim to neutralise Indian influence in the region

A LOOMINGSHADOW

JAYADEVA RANADE

A father and his daughter in Anduo County of Tibet

Autonomous Region in China walk along the Qinghai-Lhasa

Railway Line, which connects western Nepal to Tibet

AFP


DSIAPRIL 2010

44

NEIGHBOURS

45

on China for its military supplies. Majordeals for the purchase of ammunition andmilitary equipment were signed in the yearsthat followed, ousting India from theposition of solitary supplier of ammunition.

In December 2008, the visiting DeputyChief of General Staff of the Chinese People’sLiberation Army (PLA),Lieutenant General MaXiaotian, pledged $2.6million as militaryassistance for Nepal.The previous year,China had announcedmilitary aid worth $1.3million, the first suchassistance to the MaoistGovernment in Nepal.Beijing also supported the Maoists’proposalto integrate approximately 19,000 Maoistguerrillas with the Nepalese Army.Meanwhile,China ingressed Nepal’s criticaltelecommunications sector thus ensuringlong-term leverage in that country. Withintwo years,Chinese companies were engagedin 27 projects. The ZTE Corporation andHuawei made major inroads. Huawei set upthe mobile telephone networks inKathmandu and other cities, while ZTEsecured an over $50 million turnkey contractfor upgrading Nepal Telecom’s nationwidemobile phone capacity.

The Tibetan community residents inNepal were the first to feel the impact ofChina’s rising influence in Nepal. AfterKing Gyanendra assumed power in aPalace coup in 2001, in a reversal of policy,two offices of the Dalai Lama werepromptly shut down at Chinese insistence.Chinese pressure continued to bemaintained and increased once Prachandatook over as Prime Minister. Instances ofTibetans fleeing Tibet, to seek refuge inNepal or India, being captured by theNepalese police at the border and handedback to the Chinese authorities began to bereported. A visible effect of this sustainedChinese pressure is the drastic reduction innumber of Tibetans reported to be seekingrefuge in Nepal and the severely curtailedactivities of Tibetans residents in Nepal.

Wait and Watch PolicyOverall, Beijing adopted a watch and wait policy amidst the fast-paced political developments, which witnessedconsecutively the removal of KingGyanendra, rise of the Maoists, gatheringmomentum of the pro-democracymovement and protracted impasse over theConstituent Assembly. China moderated its

stance and veered to supporting pro-democracy forces. Chinese State CouncillorTang Jiaxuan’s visit to Kathmandu, inMarch 2006, signalled this shift and markedthe commencement of a more assertivepolicy. He urged reconciliation between thecontesting forces and, breaking from theearlier practice of only meeting Palaceofficials,met prominent leaders of the ‘anti-King’ Seven Party Alliance. Chinaadditionally initiated contact with theMaoists,whom a Chinese Ambassador hadin 2003, described as an embarrassment to

the image of China’s Chairman Mao. Significant visits were those of Wang

Hongwei in July 2006 and Wang Jiarui thefollowing year. Wang Hongwei, a retiredMajor General of the China’s People’sLiberation Army (PLA) and Research Fellowat the prestigious Chinese Academy of SocialSciences, expanded China’s political baseand quietly met Maoist cadres. Chinaalready had contact with the then almost30,000-strong Nepal Communist Party(United Marxist-Leninist). He expressedhope that they would participate in theinterim Government in Kathmandu. WangHongwei was later instrumental in inviting anumber of senior Maoist leaders to China.

Similarly,Wang Jiarui, a Minister in theChinese Communist Party’s powerfulInternational Liaison Department, met anumber of senior Nepalese leadersincluding the then Prime Minister Koiralaand Nepal Communist Party (UnitedMarxist-Leninist) leader Madhav Nepal. Heemphasised that stability in Nepal wouldbenefit China’s bordering regions and thatNepal should hold elections early. Herequested assistance in curbing the activitiesof Tibetan refugees who could plan to enterChina to disrupt the Olympics.

Political interaction accelerated oncePrachanda took over as Prime Minister. He

broke away from tradition and travelled toBeijing on his first visit abroad. He wenttwice after that. An estimated 38 Chinesedelegations visited Nepal in 2008-09 while12 high-level Nepalese economic,technology and defence delegationstravelled to China. China cultivated aspectrum of political parties including theCommunist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), the Nepal Communist Party (UnitedMarxist-Leninist) and the Madhesi People’sRights Forum. In April 2009, a NCP-UMLdelegation led by Jhala Nath Khanal visitedBeijing and was informed that China wants“a new kind of relationship”with Nepal.

Enhancing Connectivity A network of China Study Centres (CSCs),set up to popularise the Chinese languageand,more importantly, disseminate anti-India propaganda, reinforced traditionalChinese diplomacy. At least 35 CSCs,entirely funded by Beijing, are strategicallyestablished in southern Nepal alongIndia’s border. China’s propagandaoffensive includes the China RadioInternational’s local FM radio station inKathmandu and a Nepal-China MutualCooperation Society (NCMCS), funded bythe Chinese Embassy in Nepal.

The real game changer in China-Nepal

relations has been, however, the Qinghai-Lhasa railway operationalised in July 2006.China’s decision to extend the Qinghai-Tibet Railway line—capable of carrying anestimated 7 million tonnes of cargo a year—from Lhasa to Zhangmu, borderingwestern Nepal and Yadong in the east by2015, underscores China’s strategicinterests. The railway is augmented by all-weather expressways radiating out of Lhasaand stretching up to Yadong,on the borderwith India’s Sikkim and connecting withthe Western Highway that runs to the northof the border along western Nepal.

To enhance connectivity, China built aroad link between Lhasa and Khasa, aborder town located some 80 km north ofKathmandu, and is constructing anotherroad along the shortest route from Tibet toKathmandu. Though built to cater to theneed of military logistics, the expresswaysfulfill important strategic objectives.

Completion of these infrastructureprojects, coincidentally when Nepal wasundergoing historic political changes, hasgiven China a crucial immediate advantage.China’s new transportation network hasprovided alternate trade routes to alandlocked Nepal. China moved quickly toexploit Nepal’s sensitivities and reopenedthe Kathmandu-Lhasa highway in 2008 and

designated Zham in Tibet AutonomousRegion as a dry port for Nepal. Next year itagreed to open two more custom postsbringing the total to seven.

Chinese Ambassador Zheng Xianglinobserved in August 2008 that “Nepal issituated in a favourable geographicalposition in South Asia and a passage linkingChina and South Asia”. Separately,ChineseForeign Minister Yang Jiechi indicated thatboth countries were working towards a‘strategic partnership’,while Liu Hongcai,aVice-Minister in the Chinese CommunistParty’s International Liaison Department,reiterated the caution in February 2009 whenhe said, “We oppose any move to interfere inthe internal affairs of Nepal by any force.”

Koirala’s demise this February,before thenew Constitution has been finalised, re-introduced a high degree of uncertainty inNepal’s politics and in India-Nepal relations.A lot will depend on the support thatPrachanda and the Maoists are able to garnerand their determination to alter the variousagreements that bind India-Nepal relations.

Nevertheless, compulsions of culture,geography that inhibits easy travel andsimilarities among the people of India and Nepal will continue to impose limitson Nepal-China relations for at least a few years.

A network of China StudyCentres, set up to

popularise the Chineselanguage and, more

importantly, disseminateanti-India propaganda,

reinforced traditionalChinese diplomacy.

”

Chinese President

Hu Jintao with

Nepal Prime

Minister Madhav

Kumar Nepal

during their

meeting at the

Great Hall of the

People in Beijing

in December 2009

AFP

AFP

Tibetans gather beside

framed portraits of the Dalai

Lama in Kathmandu to mark

the 51st anniversary of the

Tibetan uprising in March 2010


DSIAPRIL 2010

44

NEIGHBOURS

45

on China for its military supplies. Majordeals for the purchase of ammunition andmilitary equipment were signed in the yearsthat followed, ousting India from theposition of solitary supplier of ammunition.

In December 2008, the visiting DeputyChief of General Staff of the Chinese People’sLiberation Army (PLA),Lieutenant General MaXiaotian, pledged $2.6million as militaryassistance for Nepal.The previous year,China had announcedmilitary aid worth $1.3million, the first suchassistance to the MaoistGovernment in Nepal.Beijing also supported the Maoists’proposalto integrate approximately 19,000 Maoistguerrillas with the Nepalese Army.Meanwhile,China ingressed Nepal’s criticaltelecommunications sector thus ensuringlong-term leverage in that country. Withintwo years,Chinese companies were engagedin 27 projects. The ZTE Corporation andHuawei made major inroads. Huawei set upthe mobile telephone networks inKathmandu and other cities, while ZTEsecured an over $50 million turnkey contractfor upgrading Nepal Telecom’s nationwidemobile phone capacity.

The Tibetan community residents inNepal were the first to feel the impact ofChina’s rising influence in Nepal. AfterKing Gyanendra assumed power in aPalace coup in 2001, in a reversal of policy,two offices of the Dalai Lama werepromptly shut down at Chinese insistence.Chinese pressure continued to bemaintained and increased once Prachandatook over as Prime Minister. Instances ofTibetans fleeing Tibet, to seek refuge inNepal or India, being captured by theNepalese police at the border and handedback to the Chinese authorities began to bereported. A visible effect of this sustainedChinese pressure is the drastic reduction innumber of Tibetans reported to be seekingrefuge in Nepal and the severely curtailedactivities of Tibetans residents in Nepal.

Wait and Watch PolicyOverall, Beijing adopted a watch and wait policy amidst the fast-paced political developments, which witnessedconsecutively the removal of KingGyanendra, rise of the Maoists, gatheringmomentum of the pro-democracymovement and protracted impasse over theConstituent Assembly. China moderated its

stance and veered to supporting pro-democracy forces. Chinese State CouncillorTang Jiaxuan’s visit to Kathmandu, inMarch 2006, signalled this shift and markedthe commencement of a more assertivepolicy. He urged reconciliation between thecontesting forces and, breaking from theearlier practice of only meeting Palaceofficials,met prominent leaders of the ‘anti-King’ Seven Party Alliance. Chinaadditionally initiated contact with theMaoists,whom a Chinese Ambassador hadin 2003, described as an embarrassment to

the image of China’s Chairman Mao. Significant visits were those of Wang

Hongwei in July 2006 and Wang Jiarui thefollowing year. Wang Hongwei, a retiredMajor General of the China’s People’sLiberation Army (PLA) and Research Fellowat the prestigious Chinese Academy of SocialSciences, expanded China’s political baseand quietly met Maoist cadres. Chinaalready had contact with the then almost30,000-strong Nepal Communist Party(United Marxist-Leninist). He expressedhope that they would participate in theinterim Government in Kathmandu. WangHongwei was later instrumental in inviting anumber of senior Maoist leaders to China.

Similarly,Wang Jiarui, a Minister in theChinese Communist Party’s powerfulInternational Liaison Department, met anumber of senior Nepalese leadersincluding the then Prime Minister Koiralaand Nepal Communist Party (UnitedMarxist-Leninist) leader Madhav Nepal. Heemphasised that stability in Nepal wouldbenefit China’s bordering regions and thatNepal should hold elections early. Herequested assistance in curbing the activitiesof Tibetan refugees who could plan to enterChina to disrupt the Olympics.

Political interaction accelerated oncePrachanda took over as Prime Minister. He

broke away from tradition and travelled toBeijing on his first visit abroad. He wenttwice after that. An estimated 38 Chinesedelegations visited Nepal in 2008-09 while12 high-level Nepalese economic,technology and defence delegationstravelled to China. China cultivated aspectrum of political parties including theCommunist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), the Nepal Communist Party (UnitedMarxist-Leninist) and the Madhesi People’sRights Forum. In April 2009, a NCP-UMLdelegation led by Jhala Nath Khanal visitedBeijing and was informed that China wants“a new kind of relationship”with Nepal.

Enhancing Connectivity A network of China Study Centres (CSCs),set up to popularise the Chinese languageand,more importantly, disseminate anti-India propaganda, reinforced traditionalChinese diplomacy. At least 35 CSCs,entirely funded by Beijing, are strategicallyestablished in southern Nepal alongIndia’s border. China’s propagandaoffensive includes the China RadioInternational’s local FM radio station inKathmandu and a Nepal-China MutualCooperation Society (NCMCS), funded bythe Chinese Embassy in Nepal.

The real game changer in China-Nepal

relations has been, however, the Qinghai-Lhasa railway operationalised in July 2006.China’s decision to extend the Qinghai-Tibet Railway line—capable of carrying anestimated 7 million tonnes of cargo a year—from Lhasa to Zhangmu, borderingwestern Nepal and Yadong in the east by2015, underscores China’s strategicinterests. The railway is augmented by all-weather expressways radiating out of Lhasaand stretching up to Yadong,on the borderwith India’s Sikkim and connecting withthe Western Highway that runs to the northof the border along western Nepal.

To enhance connectivity, China built aroad link between Lhasa and Khasa, aborder town located some 80 km north ofKathmandu, and is constructing anotherroad along the shortest route from Tibet toKathmandu. Though built to cater to theneed of military logistics, the expresswaysfulfill important strategic objectives.

Completion of these infrastructureprojects, coincidentally when Nepal wasundergoing historic political changes, hasgiven China a crucial immediate advantage.China’s new transportation network hasprovided alternate trade routes to alandlocked Nepal. China moved quickly toexploit Nepal’s sensitivities and reopenedthe Kathmandu-Lhasa highway in 2008 and

designated Zham in Tibet AutonomousRegion as a dry port for Nepal. Next year itagreed to open two more custom postsbringing the total to seven.

Chinese Ambassador Zheng Xianglinobserved in August 2008 that “Nepal issituated in a favourable geographicalposition in South Asia and a passage linkingChina and South Asia”. Separately,ChineseForeign Minister Yang Jiechi indicated thatboth countries were working towards a‘strategic partnership’,while Liu Hongcai,aVice-Minister in the Chinese CommunistParty’s International Liaison Department,reiterated the caution in February 2009 whenhe said, “We oppose any move to interfere inthe internal affairs of Nepal by any force.”

Koirala’s demise this February,before thenew Constitution has been finalised, re-introduced a high degree of uncertainty inNepal’s politics and in India-Nepal relations.A lot will depend on the support thatPrachanda and the Maoists are able to garnerand their determination to alter the variousagreements that bind India-Nepal relations.

Nevertheless, compulsions of culture,geography that inhibits easy travel andsimilarities among the people of India and Nepal will continue to impose limitson Nepal-China relations for at least a few years.

A network of China StudyCentres, set up to

popularise the Chineselanguage and, more

importantly, disseminateanti-India propaganda,

reinforced traditionalChinese diplomacy.

”

Chinese President

Hu Jintao with

Nepal Prime

Minister Madhav

Kumar Nepal

during their

meeting at the

Great Hall of the

People in Beijing

in December 2009

AFP

AFP

Tibetans gather beside

framed portraits of the Dalai

Lama in Kathmandu to mark

the 51st anniversary of the

Tibetan uprising in March 2010


RAHUL BEDI

46

INDIA has yet again approved a clutch ofagreements with Russia for defence hardwareestimated at over $4 billion during Prime MinisterVladimir Putin's brief stopover in New Delhi inmid-March. This comes at a time when the efficacy of Moscow’s own military-industrialcomplex is questionable, plagued as it is by qualitycontrol problems.

Algeria, for instance, recently returned ashipment of 15 MiG aircraft delivered in 2006-07citing the "inferior quality" of certain componentsand units. Rosoboronexport, Russia’s premierweapon-selling agency, had signed a $1.28 billiondeal for 29 one-seat MiG-29SMT ‘Fulcrum’ fightersand six two-seat MiG-29UB fighters in March 2006as part of an $8 billion military-technicalcooperation agreement with Algeria.

Deliveries were to be made from March 2007 untilFebruary 2008, but Algeria began refusing deliveriesfrom May 2007, demanding that Russia take back thefirst 15 aircraft it had delivered. Importantly, Russia ispresently upgrading the Indian Air Force’s (IAF)fleet of around 65 MiG-29B fighters.

But more significantly, Russia is in negotiationswith France to buy four French amphibious assaultships, which, if concluded, would be Moscow’s firstnoteworthy materiel import since World War II.Ironically, the Indian Navy (IN) awaits delivery of

three Russian 4,000 tonne Project 1135.6Talwar-class (Krivak III) frigates.

However, during Putin’s visit the long-negotiatedand highly contentious $2.34 billion deal to refurbishAdmiral Gorshkov, the 44,500 tonne, second-handKiev-class aircraft carrier, which the IN acquired in2004 for the price of its refit, was finally confirmed.

Russia had originally agreed to retrofit the23-year old decrepit carrier crippled by a fire in 1994for $975 million. But the eventual cost ofresurrecting it had nearly tripled, resulting in bitteracrimony with Moscow, the largest supplier ofassorted weaponry to India for over four decades.Re-christened INS Vikramaditya, the carrier is nowlikely to be delivered in 2013, nearly four yearsbehind schedule due to the price wrangle.

The two sides also agreed on the $1.2 billionpurchase of 29 additional MiG-29K maritime fighters,which would form part of the air arm of the37,500-tonne aircraft carrier being constructed atKochi. The IN had acquired 16 similar MiG-29Ks for$525 million in 2004 along with the Gorshkov.

Putin's visit also set the stage for the induction ofthe Akula-II nuclear-powered submarine (SSNNerpa) into the IN later this year, under a ten-yearlease for an estimated $700 million. The SSN’s earlierinduction was delayed due to its involvement in anaccident in November 2008 during trials in the Sea of

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Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during his short visit

to New Delhi in March 2010

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Japan, in which 20 people including sailors andtechnicians died and 21 others were injured.

The two sides also furthered negotiationsto acquire 40 additional Su-30MKI Multi-RoleFighters to augment IAF’s depleting forcelevels as Soviet-era MiG variant combataircraft were retired. By 2017, the IAF planson operating some 280 Su-30MKIs, of which some 150 are being constructed locallyunder licence.

Agreements on the joint development of aFifth Generation stealth fighter and aMulti-Role Military Transport Aircraft, costsfor which will be shared equally betweenMoscow and Delhi, were also confirmed.

Since the early 1960s, India has boughtover $30 billion worth of Soviet and Russianmilitary equipment and last December bothsides agreed to extend their strategic andmilitary partnership by another decade to2020. This would include the supply of materieland maintenance contracts worth some $10billion to Moscow.

Moscow remains India’s largest materielsupplier—nearly 70 per cent of its militaryhardware is of Soviet or Russian origin—andannually conducts defence business withDelhi worth over $1.5 billion.

In reality, however, India’s military isfrustrated with Russia for its grossinefficiency in providing adequate sparesand back-up services for its equipment,Moscow’s overall unprofessional approachand, above all, rampant corruption in whatmany in the Services classify as a‘cash-and-carry’ system, a hangover of theSoviet era.

Life cycle costs, in times of financialprudence, have never been a considerationfor Soviet and Russian equipment. Andthough ‘buy back’ clauses do exist withregard to excess spares and other materiel,India’s military invariably comes off worse asthey are invariably shown to be in the wrongby Moscow, rendering Delhi ineligible toencash its options.

In 2001, for instance, the IN became thefirst—and since then the only—Service thatopenly admitted to buying "vintage" sparesfrom Russia for astronomical sums, despitebeing one of its largest customers.

Former IN chief Admiral Arun Prakashwho headed the Navy’s Personnel branch in2001 conceded that the price of the samespare could range from $15 to $6,000 since aRussian presidential decree till recentlyforeclosed buyers from dealing directly withoriginal equipment manufacturers.

The IN was forced into paying Russiathese prices to maintain operationalpreparedness, Prakash admitted at the time.

This was because over decades, India hadacquired these at "friendship rates" and wasnever told their "true" commercial value.

The IN is known to have paid Rs 17,805 for acrystal worth Rs 15 and Rs 11,192 for a relaycosting Rs 95. It also paid Rs 47,650 for abalancing piston valued at Rs 1,475 andacquired a host of other parts atastronomically high prices.

Howitzers Undergo Trial THE Indian Army is to finally begin summertrials of rival 155mm 52-calibre towed andwheeled or mounted Light Weight Howitzers(LWH) in support of its long postponedartillery modernisation drive.

The trials scheduled for April at Pokhranfor an initial procurement of 400 towed155mm/52 cal guns are expected to featureSingapore Technologies Kinetics (STK)FH2000, BAE Systems FH77 B05 L52 andpossibly Germany’s Rheinmetall PHZ 2000and Israel’s Soltam Systems TIG-2002 guns.

The eventual contract for the towed gunswill include a transfer of technology for localmanufacture, as their numbers are expectedto significantly increase in accordance withthe Army’s much-delayed ArtilleryRationalisation Plan formulated in the 1990s.

This envisages the Army importing andlocally building, by 2020, a mix of around 3,600lightweight 155 mm/39-calibre and 155 mm/52-calibre towed Howitzers, along withwheeled or mounted and tracked artillery toequip around 180 of 220 artillery regiments in

an estimated $3-5 billion programme. At present, the Army operates around five

different calibre guns, the majoritycomprising around 380 FH77B 155mm/39 calBofors guns of which 410 were imported in1987 (and are awaiting an upgrade to155mm/45 cal) and some 180 Soviet 130 mmM-46 field guns retrofitted by Israel’s Soltamto 155mm/39 cal.

The accompanying field evaluation to acquire 180 wheeled or mounted 155mm/52 cal Howitzers will feature theRheinmetall Wheeled Gun (RWG) andSlovakia’s ShKH Zuzana.

Army officials in New Delhi said summertrials for all competing 155mm/52 calguns—towed, wheeled or mounted—will befollowed by cold weather testing sometimeafter October in Kashmir where many willeventually be deployed.

Meanwhile, the MoD has approached theUS Government for the procurement of 145BAE Systems M777 155 mm/39 calLightweight Howitzers (LWH) and LaserInertial Artillery Pointing Systems for $647million through the US Foreign Military Salesor Government-to-Government route. Indiaurgently requires the LWHs to equip twomountain divisions that are presently underraising for deployment along India’s disputednorth-east frontier with China.

In a related development, the Army’sartillery directorate is likely to resurrect the proposal to upgrade the FH77B 155 mm/39calibre Howitzers to a 155 mm/45 calibrestandard over a year, after it was abandoned following overambitiousQualitative Requirements.

48

DSIAPRIL, 2010DEFENCE BUZZ

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Lack of AccountabilityTHE Army’s decision to replace theinefficient, locally designed Indian SmallArms System (INSAS) 5.56 mm Assault Rifle(AR), it has reluctantly employed since themid-1990s, with an imported alternative is yetanother instance of casual planning, financialprofligacy and overall lack of accountabilityin India’s military.

After spending crores of rupees overseveral years in developing and buildingthe incompetent INSAS AR, the Army isnow poised to secure one of the world’slargest small arms contracts estimated atover $2 billion.

The Army is also seeking an alternative toits obsolete 9mm carbine in addition toacquiring lightweight ARs for its SpecialForces (SF). The quantity of all three weaponsystems is expected to climb to over threemillion pieces as they will eventually beissued to the paramilitary units andrespective provincial State police forces. It isexpected to employ the same weaponry as theArmy as part of the ongoing reconstruction ofthe national security grid and for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

Official sources say that the Ministry ofDefence (MoD) will soon dispatch threeseparate tenders to source the Army’s initialrequirement for some 220,000 ARs, 160,000carbines and an additional 11,000 lightweightARs. The tenders envisage the outrightpurchase of limited numbers of each weaponsystem with the bulk being built locally via atransfer of technology either to theState-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB),

private sector companies or, in someinstances, both.

The competing ARs are expected toinclude Austrian Steyr’s A3, Belgium FN’sHerstal’s F2000, Bulgaria Arsenal’s AK-47,German Heckler & Koch’s G36, Israel IMI’sGalil, Israel IWI’s Tavor-21, Italian Baretta’s70/90, Singapore Technologies Kinetics’ SAR21, Switzerland SIG’s SG 515 and USAHeckler & Koch’s XM8.

The AR and carbine acquisitions are also expected to meet the Army’slong-postponed Future Infantry Soldier as asystem programme aimed at upgrading its 359infantry and 66 Rashtriya Rifles (RR)battalions that comprise the Army’sdedicated COIN force.

The Army’s association with the INSASAR programme has been turbulent andproblematic, as for years it has objected tothe Defence Research and DevelopmentOrganisation (DRDO)-designed andOFB-built INSAS 5.56 mm AR. The INSASreplaced the bulkier and less efficient 7.62mmFN FAL Self-Loading Rifles (SLRs).

But despite protestations centered roundthe INSAS ARs sights that malfunctioned inKashmir’s cold weather and its firingmechanism which jammed at crucialmoments, the Army was coerced by the MoDinto inducting the rifle that took the DRDOover eight years to design and the OFBanother five to build.

Infantry and RR units deployed on COINduties, however, preferred the testedKalashnikov-designed AK-47, of which100,000 were imported from Bulgaria in 1995for $8.3 million as a ‘stop gap’ measure till the

INSAS AR became operational. The DRDO’s decision to develop the

INSAS range of weapons in the early 1980sfollowed a proposal by the MoD to importaround 8000 5.56mm ARs for select parachuteregiments that later converted to SF.

The Army wanted to replace the 7.62MMSLR, its main assault weapons. Subsequently,Germany’s Heckler & Koch G-41 and Austria’sSteyr AUG were short-listed, with bothvendors offering free transfer of technologyworth $4.5 million. Thereafter, the Army’srequirements doubled and the FederalGovernment facing a foreign exchange crunchturned down the import proposal.

Alongside, the DRDO claimed to havemade progress in developing the 5.56mm AR atits Armaments Research and DevelopmentEstablishment in Pune, but it took almost adecade before it fructified.

Weapon experts at the time claimed thatthe INSAS 5.56mm AR was an ‘amalgam’ ofKalishnikov, FN FAL, the G41 and AUGdesigns and not in consonance with modernengineering production techniques which, inturn, would render it expensive. The INSASAR was eventually priced at around Rs 20,000per rifle compared to the imported BulgarianAK-47’s that cost around $93 or around Rs 2,400 each.

“The INSAS-AR is a non-competitiveweapon system and the Army became a tiedcustomer with little choice but to pay thequoted price, however high it might be andwhatever operational objections it had tothe rifle,” former Major General SheruThapliyal said.

For, unlike the financially accountableprivate sector, the OFB's costing is flexibleand being Government-owned theirmanpower is considered "free" and cost,time and technological overruns matterlittle, he added.

The initial INSAS family of 5.56 mmweapons also include a light machine gun andcarbine, both of which have long beenabandoned necessitating hugely expensiveimports nearly two decades later.

Fight to Flight THE first round of winter trials in support of the Indian military’s long pendingrequirement for 197 Light ObservationHelicopters (LOHs) estimated at around $750million has concluded.

Three rival helicopters—AugustaWestland’s AW 119, Eurocopter’s AS 550Fennec and Russia’s Kamov Ka-26—took partin the trials that ended in February atBhatinda in Punjab and Leh. These are

Austrian Steyr’s A3 Assault Rifle




52

locations where the majority of helicopterswould eventually be deployed.

The 197 LOHs—133 for the Army AviationCorps (AAC) and 64 for the IAF—that wouldreplace the AACs ageing Chetak (AlouetteIII) and Cheetah (SA-315B Lama) fleet wouldundergo a second round of testing in June atthe same locations before they wereshort-listed and price negotiations opened.

AAC sources said all three competingmodels had performed “well” but maintainedthat even under the most ‘optimistic’circumstances they did not envisage thehelicopters would begin arriving before2014-15 at the earliest.

The AAC and the IAF are anxious to inductthe new LOH’s to support Army unitsdeployed along the mountainous frontier withnuclear rivals Pakistan and China at heightsabove 4,200m.

The tender for the 197 helicoptersdispatched in July 2008 followed theDecember 2007 cancellation of the $650-600million order by the MoD for Eurocopter AS550C3 Fennec LoHs claiming ‘discrepancies’in the evaluation process.

Eurocopter that prevailed over the rivalBell-Textron Bell 407 model was accused notonly of using an agent to secure the deal, anarrangement that is banned in India, but alsoof fielding its AS 350B3 Ecureuil civilianvariant for extended hot weather and highaltitude trials in 2004 and 2005.

Thereafter, when the LOH tender wasreissued, Bell-Textron withdrew on thegrounds that the requirement to invest 50 percent of the contract value as offset intoIndia’s defence industry was “restrictive”. Itclaimed this obligation would renderparticipation in the tender commerciallynon-competitive and unviable.

Alongside, the MoD has quietly signed aEuro 560 million deal for 12 AugustaWestlandmedium-lift AW101 helicopters for the IAF’sVIP squadron despite vociferous andextended objections from the Central financeministry over their high cost.

The AW101 would replace Russian Mi-8helicopters at the IAF’s VIP squadron atPalam Airport which were acquired in theearly 1980s for search and rescue missionsbefore being converted for VIPtransportation. The first two helicopters areto be delivered within 24 months and theremaining 10 within the following year.

Global tenders for the medium lifthelicopters were dispatched in September2006 to USA’s Sikorsky for its S92/S76,AugustaWestland and Kamov of Russia,which was eventually disqualified technically.

Officials said the AW 101 was selected

over Sikorsky’s S92/S76 following trials inearly 2008 after fulfilling the IAF’srequirement to operate at heights between 4.5km-5.5 km and other technical specifications.

Deep Sea Troubles THE Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singhhas finally cleared the long pending paymentof an additional Rs 2,000 crore to France’sDCNS for the import of varied componentsessential for the stalled construction of sixScorpene submarines for the Indian Navy(IN) at Mazagaon Dockyard Limited (MDL).

Contentious price negotiations with DCNSover providing these components that includesub-assemblies and special steel forintegration into the three submarines beingbuilt since end-2006 has delayed theprogramme by two-three years to 2014-2015.

In February, the CCS agreed to pay thesupplementary money to MazagaonProcurement Materials (MPM), a speciallycreated entity, to source the necessarymaterials from DCNS.

Of the overall Rs 18,798-crore Scorpenedeal, inked in October 2005, the contract wasdivided under separate heads: Rs 6,135 crorewent to Armaris—then a joint venturebetween DCNS, Thales and Spain’sNavantia—and Rs 1,062 crore to the EuropeanMBDA, for sea-skimming Exocet SM39missiles with a 50 km range.

A third Rs 5,888 crore agreement wasbetween the vendor and MDL for indigenoussubmarine construction, the fourth was for Rs 3,553 crore for taxes, whilst a fifth for Rs2,160 crore—now almost doubled—was to

provide ‘varied items’ like engines, generatorsand sub-assemblies to the project.

Senior IN and armament industry sources,however, blame delays in the Scorpeneproject on protracted price negotiations forthe MPM packages over the past 18-24months. Citing inflation, DCNS had‘significantly’ hiked its price as many itemsneeded to be acquired from other suppliersmany of them European.

In June 2009, Defence Minister A. K.Antony had informed Parliament that“teething problems, absorption of technology,delays in augmentation of industrialinfrastructure and procurement of MDLpurchased materials” had delayed theScorpene programme.

A month later, the watchdog Comptrollerand Auditor General (CAG) in its reportsubmitted to Parliament castigated theGovernment for taking nine years to finalisethe Scorpene deal, resulting in a Rs 2,838crore price escalation.

The CAG also revealed that thoughconstruction work on the first Scorpenebegan in December 2006, the progress tillDecember 2008 was a mere 9.34 per centagainst the envisaged 27.43 per cent.

The IN too is deeply concerned by itsdepleting force levels, as by 2012-13 it wouldbe left with only nine of its current fleet of 16diesel-electric submarines: 10 RussianKilo-class and four German Type 1500 (HDW209) boats and two obsolete Foxtrot boats.

This number will further reduce to five by2014-2015 when the first of six Scorpenesubmarines would be ready. Under the revisedschedule, the last Scorpene is expected to bedelivered to the IN by 2019-20.

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