Criminal Jurisprudence of Mental State

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Criminal Jurisprudence of Mental State of Criminals (The Evolution of

Criminal Psychology)

Psychology as we know it didn't suddenly appear on the intellectual scene. It is

impossible to say just when it began, or who was responsible for it. Instead, we

can only point to a number of currents that take us from philosophy and the

natural sciences into something recognizably psychological. This chapter looks at

two of these "primordial" currents -- associationism as the beginnings of a

cognitive theory, and the introduction of quantification in the forms of

psychophysics and intelligence testing.

Aristotles Associationism

Associationism is the theory that the mind is composed of elements -- usually

referred to as sensations and ideas -- which are organized by means of various

associations. Although the original idea can be found in Plato, it is Aristotle who

gets the credit for elaborating on it. Aristotle counted four laws of association

when he examined the processes of remembrance and recall:

1. The law of contiguity. Things or events that occur close to each other inspace or time tend to get linked together in the mind. If you think of a

cup, you may think of a saucer; if you think of making coffee, you may

then think of drinking that coffee.

2. The law of frequency. The more often two things or events are linked, themore powerful will be that association. If you have an eclair with your

coffee every day, and have done so for the last twenty years, the

association will be strong indeed -- and you will be fat.

3. The law of similarity. If two things are similar, the thought of one willtend to trigger the thought of the other. If you think of one twin, it is hard


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not to think of the other. If you recollect one birthday, you may find

yourself thinking about others as well.

4. The law of contrast. On the other hand, seeing or recalling something mayalso trigger the recollection of something completely opposite. If you

think of the tallest person you know, you may suddenly recall the shortest

one as well. If you are thinking about birthdays, the one that was totally

different from all the rest is quite likely to come up.

Association, according to Aristotle, took place in the "common sense." It was in

the common sense that the look, the feel, the smell, the taste of an apple, for

example, came together to become the idea of an apple.

For 2000 years, these four laws were assumed to hold true. St. Thomas pretty

much accepted it lock, stock, and barrel. No one, however, cared that much about

association. It was seen as just a simple description of a commonplace

occurrence. It was seen as the activity of passive reason, whereas the abstraction

of principles or essences -- far more significant to philosophers -- was the domain

of active reason.

During the enlightenment, philosophers began to become interested in the idea

again, as a part of their studies of vision as well as their interest in epistemology.

Hobbes understood complex experiences as being associations of simple

experiences, which in turn were associations of sensations. The basic means of

association, according to Hobbes, was coherence (contiguity), and the basic

strength factor was repetition (frequency).


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M'Naghten Rules

The M'Naghten Rules (pronounced, and sometimes spelled, McNaughton) were

the first serious attempt to rationalize the attitude of the criminal law towards

mentally incompetent defendants. They arise from the attempted assassination of

the British Prime Minister, Robert Peel, in 1843 by Daniel M'Naghten. In fact,

M'Naghten fired a pistol at the back of Peel's secretary, Edward Drummond, who

died five days later. The House of Lords asked a panel of judges, presided over by

Sir Nicolas Conyngham Tindal, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, to set down

guidance for juries in considering cases where a defendant pleads insanity.[1][2]

The rules so formulated as M'Naghten's Case 1843 10 C & F 200[3] have been a

standard test for criminal liability in relation to mentally disordered defendants in

common law jurisdictions ever since, with some minor adjustments. When the

tests set out by the Rules are satisfied, the accused may be adjudged "not guilty by

reason of insanity" and the sentence may be a mandatory or discretionary (but

usually indeterminate) period of treatment in a secure hospital facility, or

otherwise at the discretion of the court (depending on the country and the offence

charged) instead of a punitive disposal.

The insanity defence is recognized in Australia, Canada, England and Wales,

Hong Kong, New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland, India and most U.S. states

with the exception of Montana, Kansas, Idaho, and Utah. Not all of these

jurisdictions still use the M'Naghten Rules.

Historical Development

Today, mental incapacity as a defence, when successfully raised, absolves a

defendant in a criminal trial from liability, that is to say it applies public policies

in relation to criminal responsibility by applying a rationale of compassion,


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accepting that it is morally wrong to subject a person to punishment if that person

is deprived permanently or temporarily of the capacity to form a necessary mental

intent that the definition of a crime requires. Indeed, punishment of the obviously

mentally ill by the state may act so as to undermine public confidence in the penal

system. Thus, in such cases, a utilitarian and humanitarian approach suggests that

the interests of society are better served by treatment of the illness rather than

punishment of the individual.

Historically, insanity was not seen as a defence in itself but a special circumstance

in which there was no acquittal, but the jury could deliver a special verdict and the

King would issue a pardon[4]

...eo quod sensu carent et ratione, non magis quam brutum animal iniuriam facere

possunt nec feloniam, cum non multum distent a brutis, secundum quod videri

poterit in minore, qui si alium interficeret in minori tate, iudicium non sustineret.

...since they are without sense and reason and can no more commit a tort or a

felony than a brute animal, since they are not far removed from brutes, as is

evident in the case of a minor, for if he should kill another while under age he

would not suffer judgment.[5]

The next major advance occurred in Hadfield's Trial 1800 27 How St. Tr. 765 in

which the court decided that a crime committed under some delusion would only

be excused if it would have been excusable had the delusion been true.


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The Rules

The House of Lords, having deliberated, delivered the following exposition of the

Rules:

the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to be sane, and

to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the

contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the

ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of

the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from

disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;

or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.

The central issue of this definition may be stated as "did the defendant know what

he was doing, or, if so, that it was wrong?", and the issues raised have been

analysed in subsequent appellate decisions:

Presumption of sanity and burden of proof

Sanity is a rebuttable presumption and the burden of proof is on the party

relying upon it; the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities, that

is to say that mental incapacity is more likely than unlikely. If this burden

is successfully discharged, the party relying upon it is entitled to succeed.

In Lord Denning's judgement in Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern

Ireland 1963 AC 386, whenever the defendant makes an issue of his state

of mind, the prosecution can adduce evidence of insanity. However, this

will normally only arise to negate the defence case when automatism or


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diminished responsibility is in issue. In practical terms, the defence will be

more likely to raise the issue of mental incapacity to negate or minimise

criminal liability.

Disease of the mind

Whether a particular condition amounts to a disease of the mind within the

Rules is not a medical but a legal question to be decided in accordance

with the ordinary rules of interpretation. It seems that any disease which

produces a malfunctioning of the mind is a disease of the mind and need

not be a disease of the brain itself. The term has been held to cover

numerous conditions:

R v Kemp 1957 1 QB 399: arteriosclerosis or a hardening of the

arteries caused loss of control during which the defendant attacked his

wife with a hammer. This was an internal condition and a disease of the

mind.

R v Sullivan 1984) AC 156 during an epileptic episode, the

defendant caused grievous bodily harm: epilepsy was an internal condition

and a disease of the mind, and the fact that the state was transitory was

irrelevant.

Nature and quality of the act

This phrase refers to the physical nature and quality of the act, rather than


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the moral quality. It covers the situation where the defendant does not

know what he is physically doing. Two common examples used are:

The defendant cuts a woman's throat under the delusion that he is

cutting a loaf of bread,

The defendant chops off a sleeping man's head because he has the

deluded idea that it would be great fun to see the man looking for it when

he wakes up.

In R v Bell 1984 Crim. LR 685 the defendant smashed a van through the

entrance gates of a holiday camp because, "It was like a secret society in

there, I wanted to do my bit against it" as instructed by God. It was held

that, as the defendant had been aware of his actions, he could neither have

been in a state of automatism nor insane, and the fact that he believed that

God had told him to do this merely provided an explanation of his motive

and did not prevent him from knowing that what he was doing was wrong

in the legal sense.

Knowledge that the act was wrong

"Wrong" here means legally rather than morally wrong. The defendant

must be functionally unaware that his actions are legally wrong at the time

of the offence to satisfy this requirement. In Windle 1952 2QB 826; 1952

2 All ER 1 246, the defendant killed his wife with an overdose of aspirin;


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he telephoned the police and said, "I suppose I'll hang for this." It was held

that this was sufficient to show that although the defendant was suffering

from a mental illness, he was aware that his act was wrong, and the

defence was not allowed.

Crimes without specific intent

In DPP v Harper (1997) it was held that insanity is not generally a defence

to strict liability offences. In this instance, the accused was driving with

excess alcohol. By definition, the accused is sufficiently aware of the

nature of the activity to commit the actus reus of driving and presumably

knows that driving while drunk is legally wrong. Any other feature of the

accused's knowledge is irrelevant.

Criticism

There have been five major criticisms of the law as it currently stands:

Medical Irrelevance

The legal definition of insanity has not advanced significantly since 1843;

in 1953 evidence was given to the Royal Commission on Capital

Punishment that doctors even then regarded the legal definition to be

obsolete and misleading.

This distinction has led to absurdities such as


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(a) even though a legal definition suffices, mandatory hospitalisation can

be ordered in cases of murder; if the defendant is not medically insane,

there is little point in requiring medical treatment.

(b) diabetes has been held to facilitate a defence of insanity when it causes

hyperglycaemia, but not when it causes hypoglycaemia.

(c) Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, imported into

English law by the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that a person of

unsound mind may only be detained where proper account of objective

medical expertise has been taken. As yet, no cases have occurred in which

this point has been argued.

Burden of Proof

The shift of burden of proof from the prosecution to the defence in cases

where insanity may be in issue conflicts with the Woolmington v. DPP

principle that the burden is always on the prosecution.

Ineffectiveness

The rules currently do not distinguish between defendants who represent a

public danger and those who do not. Illnesses such as diabetes and

epilepsy can be controlled by medication such that sufferers are less likely

to have temporary aberrations of mental capacity, but the law does not

recognise this.

Sentencing for Murder

A finding of insanity may well result in indefinite confinement in a

hospital, whereas a conviction for murder may well result in a determinate


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sentence of between ten and fifteen years; faced with this choice, it may be

that most defendants would prefer the certainty of the latter option. The

defence of diminished responsibility in section 2(1) of the homicide act

would reduce the conviction to voluntary manslaughter with more

discretion on the part of the judge in regards to sentencing.

Scope

A practical issue is whether the fact that an accused is labouring under a

"mental disability" should be a necessary but not sufficient condition for

negating responsibility i.e. whether the test should also require an

incapacity to understand what is being done, to know that what one is

doing is wrong, or to control an impulse to do something and so

demonstrate a causal link between the disability and the potentially

criminal acts and omissions. For example, the Irish insanity defence

comprises the M'Naghten Rules and a control test which asks whether the

accused was debarred from refraining from committing the act because of

a defect of reason due to mental illness (see Doyle v Wicklow County

Council 1974) 55 IR 71. But the Butler Committee recommended that

proof of severe mental disorder should be sufficient to negate

responsibility, in effect creating an irrefutable presumption of

irresponsibility arising from proof of a severe mental disorder. This has

been criticized as it assumes a lack of criminal responsibility simply

because there is evidence of some sort of mental dysfunction, rather than

establishing a standard of criminal responsibility. According to this view,

the law should be geared to culpability not mere psychiatric diagnosis.


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Notes

1. ^ Carl Elliott, The rules of insanity: moral responsibility and thementally ill offender, SUNY Press, 1996, ISBN 0791429512, p.10

2. ^ Michael T. Molan, Mike Molan, Duncan Bloy, Denis Lanser,Modern criminal law (5 ed), Routledge Cavendish, 2003, ISBN

1859418074, p.352

3. ^ M'Naghten's Case4. ^ Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 151; 2 Pollock & Maitland,

History of English Law, 480

5. ^ Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England II.424.24-27(1210)

Bibliography

Boland, F. (1996). "Insanity, the Irish Constitution and theEuropean Convention on Human Rights". 47 Northern Ireland

Legal Quarterly 260.

Bucknill, J. C. (1881). "The Late Lord Chief Justice of England onLunacy". Brain 4: 126. doi:10.1093/brain/4.1.1.

Butler Committee. (1975). The Butler Committee on MentallyAbnormal Offenders, London: HMSO, Cmnd 6244

Dalby, J.T. (2006). "The Case of Daniel McNaughton: Let's get thestory straight". American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 27: 17

32.


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Ellis, J. W. (1986). "The Consequences of the Insanity Defense:Proposals to reform post-acquittal commitment laws". Catholic

University Law Review 35: 961.

Gostin, L. (1982). "Human Rights, Judicial Review and theMentally Disordered Offender". (1982) Crim. LR 779.

The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia. The CriminalProcess and Persons Suffering from Mental Disorder, Project No.

69, August 1991. [1]

Elliott, Catherine; Quinn, Frances (2000). Criminal Law (Thirded.). Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education Ltd. pp. 241248. ISBN

ISBN 0-582-42352-X.


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Cesare Lombroso: The Father of Modern Criminology

Cesare Lombroso was famous in the nineteenth century because he claimed to

have discovered the cause of crime. His principal work, LUomo delinquente or

The Criminal Man, was published in 1876. He wrote a good deal more including,

in French, Le Crime, Causes et Remdes.

In these books, Lombroso claimed that anatomical investigations of the post

mortem bodies of criminals revealed that they were physically different from

normal people. He maintained that criminals have stigmata (signs), and that these

stigmata consist of abnormal dimensions of the skull and jaw. Lombroso even

claimed that different criminals have different physical characteristics which he

could discern. His book, The Criminal Man, achieved six editions.

In time, and under the influence of his son-in-law, Guglielmo Ferrero, Lombroso

included the view that social factors were also involved in the causation of crime

and that all criminality is not inborn.

The concept of atavism

If one term is associated with Lombroso it is "atavism." This was the term he used

for persons who were not fully evolved. He considered these people "throwbacks"

to earlier forms of man or primates. He based this idea on his findings that in the

skulls, brains, and other parts of the skeletons, muscles, and viscera of criminals

there were anatomical peculiarities.

The central idea of Lombroso's work came to him as he autopsied the body of a

notorious Italian criminal named Giuseppe Villela. As he contemplated Villela's

skull, he noted that certain characteristics (specifically, a depression on the


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occiput that he named the median occipital fossa) reminded him of the skulls of

"inferior races" and "the lower types of apes, rodents, and birds." He concluded

that the principle cause of criminal tendencies was organic in natureheredity

was the key cause of deviance. The term Lombrosos used to describe the

appearance of those resembling ancestral, prehuman forms of life was "atavism."

"Born criminals" were thus viewed by Lombroso in his earliest writings as a form

of human sub-species. In his later writings, however, he began to regard them less

as evolutionary throwbacks and more in terms of arrested development and

degeneracy.

Criminology

Lombroso popularized the notion of a "born criminal" through biological

determinism: criminals have particular physiognomic attributes or deformities.

Physiognomy attempts to estimate character and personality traits from physical

features of the face or the body. In Lombroso's view, whereas most individuals

evolve, the violent criminal had devolved, and therefore constituted a societal or

evolutionary regression.

If criminality was inherited, then Lombroso proposed that the "born criminal"

could be distinguished by physical atavistic stigmata, such as:

large jaws, forward projection of jaw,

low sloping forehead,

high cheekbones,

flattened or upturned nose,


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handle-shaped ears,

hawk-like noses or fleshy lips,

hard shifty eyes,

scanty beard or baldness,

insensitivity to pain,

long arms relative to lower limbs.

Lombroso concentrated on a purported scientific methodology in order to identify

criminal behavior and isolate individuals capable of the most violent types of

crime. He advocated the study of individuals using measurements and statistical

methods in compiling anthropological, social, and economic data.

With successive research and more thorough statistical analysis, Lombroso

modified his theories. He continued to define atavistic stigmata, and in addition,

he identified two other types of criminal: the insane criminal, and the

"criminaloid." Although insane criminals bore some stigmata, they were not born

criminals; rather they became criminal as a result "of an alteration of the brain,

which completely upsets their moral nature." Among the ranks of insane criminals

were kleptomaniacs and child molesters. Criminaloids had none of the physical

peculiarities of the born or insane criminal and became involved in crime later in

life, and tended to commit less serious crimes. Criminaloids were further

categorized as habitual criminals, who became so by contact with other criminals,

the abuse of alcohol, or other "distressing circumstances."


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Lombroso was an advocate for humane treatment of criminals, arguing for the

removal of atavistic, born criminals from society for their own and society's

protection, for rehabilitation for those not born criminal, and against capital

punishment.

Female Criminality

Lombroso's studies of female criminality began with measurements of female

skulls and photographs, searching for atavism. He concluded, however, that

female criminals were rare and showed few signs of degeneration because they

had evolved less than men due to the inactive nature of their lives.

Lombroso argued it was females' natural passivity that withheld them from

breaking the law, as they lacked the intelligence and initiative to become criminal

(Lombroso 1980).

Cortical Dysplasia and Epilepsy

Lombroso supported a common origin of criminality, genius, and epilepsy as

caused by factors impairing the embryonic development of the central nervous

system (CNS), mainly affecting the hierarchically superior neural centers. In

1896, together with his coworkers, Lombroso was the first to describe the

observations of cortical dysplasia in patients with epilepsy.

To confirm his theories, Lombroso emphasized the need for the direct observation

of the patient, using anthropological, social, neurophysiological, economic, and

pathological data. With the collaboration of his student, Luigi Roncoroni,

Lombroso described a prevalence of giant pyramidal neurons and polymorphous

cells through the gray matter of the frontal cortex in 13 patients with epilepsy.


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Most of the large pyramidal neurons were haphazardly arranged, presenting also

an abnormal orientation of their apical dendrites. The number of nerve cells was

noticeably reduced, with the presence of abundant gliosis. Moreover, the granular

layers were dramatically reduced or absent in most patients, and numerous nerve

cells were present in the subcortical white matter. This particular finding had

never been observed in specimens from criminal and healthy control subjects.

Lombroso and Roncoroni explained their finding as evidence of an arrest of CNS

development.

Thus, more than one century ago, Cesare Lombroso and collaborators described

developmental lesions in the frontal cortex of patients with epilepsy,

corresponding to what came to be called Taylor's dysplasia.

Psychiatric art and problem of genius

Lombroso published The Man of Genius (1889) in which he argued that artistic

genius was a form of hereditary insanity. In order to support this assertion, he

began assembling a large collection of psychiatric art. He published an article on

the subject in 1880, in which he isolated thirteen typical features of the "art of the

insane." Although his criteria are generally regarded as outdated today, his work

inspired later writers on the subject, particularly Hans Prinzhorn.

Lombroso's words reveal his true beliefs vis--vis the problem of the genius and

the ordinary man:

The appearance of a single great genius is more than equivalent to the birth of a

hundred mediocrities...Good sense travels on the well-worn paths; genius, never.

And that is why the crowd, not altogether without reason, is so ready to treat great

men as lunatics...Genius is one of the many forms of insanity. (Lombroso 1889)


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Problems with some of his tenets

Lombroso's work was always hampered by his Social Darwinist assumptions. In

particular, he held the pre-genetic conception of evolution as "progress" from

"lower life forms" to "higher life forms" together with an assumption that the

more "advanced" human traits would dispose their owners to living peacefully

within a hierarchical, urbanized society far different from the conditions under

which human beings evolved.

In attempting to predict criminality by the shapes of the skulls and other physical

features of criminals, he had in effect created a new pseudoscience of forensic

phrenology. For example, he and his collaborators were the first ever to describe

and explain the form ofepilepsy known now as Taylors dysplasia. However, they

used their observations to support their scientific misconception regarding the

relationship between criminality, epilepsy, and genius.

While Lombroso was a pioneer of scientific criminology, and his work was one of

the bases of the eugenics movement in the early twentieth century, his work is no

longer considered as providing an adequate foundation for contemporary

criminology. However, psychiatry and abnormal psychology have retained his

idea of locating crime completely within the individual and utterly divorced from

the surrounding social conditions and structures.

Legacy

Cesare Lombroso was a historical figure in criminology and the founder of the

Italian School of Positivist Criminology, which included Enrico Ferri (1856

1929) and Raffaele Garofalo (18511934). They rejected the concept of free will

and the notion of equality expressed by the classicists, in which any individual


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through free choice makes rational decisions to behave as a criminal, replacing

this with an assumption of determinism.

In his later work, Lombroso differentiated the born criminal from those who

turned to crime through circumstance, and the importance of distinguishing these

types with regard to the efficacy of punishment. He is also noted for advocating

humane treatment of criminals and limitations on the use of the death penalty.


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Bibliography

Gould, Stephen J. 1996. The Mismeasure of Man. W. W. Norton.ISBN 0393314251

Kurella, Hans. 1911. Cesare lombroso: a Modern Man of Science.Rebman limited.

Rafter, Nicole. 2003. "Rethinking criminological tradition: CesareLombroso and the origins of Criminology" Retrieved February 2,

2008.

Sabbatini, R.M.E. 1997. Cesare Lombroso. A Brief Biography Brainand Mind Magazine. Retrieved February 2, 2008.


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Psychological Theories of Crime

Psychological theories of crime begin with the view that individual differences in

behaviour may make some people more predisposed to committing criminal acts.

These differences may arise from personality characteristics, biological factors, or

social interactions.

Psychoanalytic Theory

According to Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who is credited with the development

of psychoanalytic theory, all humans have natural drives and urges repressed in

the unconscious. Furthermore, all humans have criminal tendencies. Through the

process of socialization, however, these tendencies are curbed by the development

of inner controls that are learned through childhood experience. Freud

hypothesized that the most common element that contributed to criminal

behaviour was faulty identification by a child with her or his parents. The

improperly socialized child may develop a personality disturbance that causes her

or him to direct antisocial impulses inward or outward. The child who directs

them outward becomes a criminal, and the child that directs them inward becomes

a neurotic.

Cognitive Development Theory

According to this approach, criminal behaviour results from the way in which

people organize their thoughts about morality and the law. In 1958, Lawrence

Kohlberg, a developmental psychologist, formulated a theory concerning the

development of moral reasoning. He posited that there are three levels of moral

reasoning, each consisting of two stages. During middle childhood, children are at

the first level of moral development. At this level, the pre conventional level,

moral reasoning is based on obedience and avoiding punishment. The second


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level, the conventional level of moral development, is reached at the end of

middle childhood. The moral reasoning of individuals at this level is based on the

expectations that their family and significant others have for them. Kohlberg

found that the transition to the third level, the post conventional level of moral

development, usually occurs during early adulthood. At this level, individuals are

able to go beyond social conventions. They value the laws of the social system;

however, they are open to acting as agents of change to improve the existing law

and order. People who do not progress through the stages may become arrested in

their moral development, and consequently become delinquents.

Learning Theory

Learning theory is based upon the principles of behavioural psychology.

Behavioural psychology posits that a person's behaviour is learned and maintained

by its consequences, or reward value. These consequences may be external

reinforcement that occurs as a direct result of their behaviour (e.g. money, social

status, and goods), vicarious reinforcement that occurs by observing the behaviour

of others (e.g. observing others who are being reinforced as a result of their

behaviour), and self-regulatory mechanisms (e.g. people responding to their

behaviour). According to learning theorists, deviant behaviour can be eliminated

or modified by taking away the reward value of the behaviour. Hans J. Eysenck, a

psychologist that related principles of behavioural psychology to biology,

postulated that by way of classical conditioning, operant conditioning, and

modelling people learn moral preferences. Classical conditioning refers to the

learning process that occurs as a result of pairing a reliable stimulus with a

response. Eysenck believes, for example, that over time a child who is

consistently punished for inappropriate behaviour will develop an unpleasant

physiological and emotional response whenever they consider committing the


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inappropriate behaviour. The anxiety and guilt that arise from this conditioning

process result in the development of a conscience. He hypothesizes, however, that

there is wide variability among people in their physiological processes, which

either increase or decrease their susceptibility to conditioning and adequate

socialization.

Intelligence and Crime

James Q. Wilson's and Richard J. Herrnstein's Constitutional-Learning Theory

integrates biology and social learning in order to explain the potential causes of

criminality. They argue that criminal and noncriminal behaviour have gains and

losses. If the gains that result from committing the crime (e.g. money) outweigh

the losses (e.g. being punished), then the person will commit the criminal act.

Additionally, they maintain that time discounting and equity are two other

variables that play an important role in criminality. Time discounting refers to the

immediate rewards that result from committing the crime vis-a-vis the punishment

that may result from committing the crime, or the time that it would take to earn

the reward by noncriminal means. Because people differ in their ability to delay

gratification, some persons may be more prone to committing criminal acts than

others. Moreover, judgments of equity may result in the commission of a criminal

act. The gains associated with committing the crime may help to restore a person's

feelings of being treated unjustly by society. Wilson and Herrnstein hypothesize

that there are certain constitutional factors (such as intelligence and variations is

physiological arousal) that determine how a person weighs the gains and losses

associated with committing a criminal act. According to Wilson and Herrnstein,

physiological arousal determines the ease in which people are classically

conditioned; therefore, people who are unable to associate negative feelings with

committing crime will not be deterred from committing criminal acts. In addition,


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they argue that impulsive, poorly socialized children of low intelligence are at the

greatest risk of becoming criminals. However, they have only demonstrated that

low intelligence and crime occur together frequently; they have not demonstrated

that low intelligence is the cause of crime.


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Bibliography

Freud, S. (1961). The Complete Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 19).London: Hogarth.

Cole, M. & Cole S. R. (1993). The development of children. New York:W.H. Freeman and Company.

Bandura, Albert (1973). Aggression: A social learning analysis. Engle-wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Eysenck, H.J. (1964). Crime and Personality. Boston: HoughtonMifflin.

Eysenck, H.J., & Gudjonsson, G.H. (1989) The causes and cures ofcriminality. Contemporary Psychology, 36, 575-577.

Wilson, J.Q. & Herrnstein, R. (1985). Crime and Human Nature. NewYork: Simon and Schuster.

Wrightsman, L.S., Nietzel, M.T., & Fortune, W.H. (1994). Psychology

and the Legal System. Belmont:Brooks Cole Publishing Company.


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Genetic and Environmental Influences on Criminal Behaviour

Criminal behaviour has always been a focus for psychologists due to the age old

debate between nature and nurture. Is it the responsibility of an individual's

genetic makeup that makes them a criminal or is it the environment in which they

are raised that determines their outcome? Research has been conducted regarding

this debate which has resulted in a conclusion that both genes and environment do

play a role in the criminality of an individual. This evidence has been generated

from a number of twin, family, and adoption studies as well as laboratory

experiments. Furthermore, the research has stated that it is more often an

interaction between genes and the environment that predicts criminal behaviour.

Having a genetic predisposition for criminal behaviour does not determine the

actions of an individual, but if they are exposed to the right environment, then

their chances are greater for engaging in criminal or anti-social behaviour.

Therefore, this paper will examine the different functions that genetics and the

environment play in the criminal behaviour of individuals.

There is a vast amount of evidence that shows our criminal justice system is the

new home for individuals with psychological problems. Although this may seem

like a solution to some, it is creating a dilemma for our society. Once we label

these individuals as criminals it creates a stigma for those who may suffer from

psychological problems. Certain psychological problems have been shown to be

heritable and if given the right circumstances, individuals with those genes could

find themselves engaging in criminal activity. Therefore, should society look

towards limiting the reproductive capabilities of individuals who suffer from

certain psychological problems to better society?


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That same question was asked back in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries when the role of genetics in crime was widely accepted (Joseph, 2001).

Prominent researchers believed that genes were fully responsible for criminal

activity and that criminals could be identified by their physiological features.

Along with this information and the idea of a eugenics movement during the same

time period, it was not surprising to learn that acts of sterilization took place to rid

society of criminals, idiots, imbeciles, and rapists" (Joseph, 2001, p. 182). This

period was therefore marked with inhumane treatment and the belief that genes

were the sole reason behind criminal behaviour.

Not long after the practices of controlled breeding, there was evidence to support

the idea that the environment also played an important role in crime. Early family

studies were conducted that showed a predisposition for criminal behaviour as a

result of inherited characteristics, but that an individual's characteristics and

personality could still be modified by the environment (Joseph, 2001). Although

these studies were void of high validity and reliability, it still raised the question

of whether the environment can also influence individuals to act in a criminal

manner. The debate between genetics and environment continues today with

much more reliable research and data. Consequently, this paper will examine the

various roles in which both genes and environmental factors influence criminal

behaviour.

Neurochemicals in Criminal and Anti-Social Behaviour

Neurochemicals are responsible for the activation of behavioural patterns and

tendencies in specific areas of the brain (Elliot, 2000). As seen in the Brunner et

al. study, there have been attempts to determine the role of neurochemicals in

influencing criminal or antisocial behaviour. Included in the list of


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neurochemicals already cited by researchers are monoamine oxidise (MOA),

epinephrine, norepinephrine, serotonin, and dopamine.

Monoamine oxidise (MAO) is an enzyme that has been shown to be related to

antisocial behaviour. Specifically, low MAO activity results in disinhibition

which can lead to impulsivity and aggression (Elliot, 2000). The Brunner et al.

study is the only one to report findings of a relationship between a point mutation

in the structural gene for MAOA and aggression, which makes the findings rare.

However, there has been other evidence that points to the conclusion that

deficiencies in MAOA activity may be more common and as a result may

predispose individuals to antisocial or aggressive behaviour (Brunner et al., 1993).

MAO is associated with many of the neurochemicals that already have a link to

antisocial or criminal behaviour. Norepinephrine, serotonin, and dopamine are

metabolized by both MAOA and MAOB (Elliot, 2000). While, according to

Eysenck (1996), MAO is related to norepinephrine, epinephrine, and dopamine,

which are all related to the personality factor of psychosis.

Serotonin is a neurochemicals that plays an important role in the personality traits

of depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder (Larsen & Buss, 2005). It is also

involved with brain development and a disorder in this system could lead to an

increase in aggressiveness and impulsivity (Morley & Hall, 2003). As Lowenstein

(2003) states, studies point to serotonin as one of the most important central

neuro-transmitters underlying the modulation of impulsive aggression" (p.72).

Low levels of serotonin have been found to be associated with impulsive

behaviour and emotional aggression. In addition, children who suffer from

conduct disorder (which will be discussed later), have also been shown to have

low blood serotonin (Elliot, 2000). Needless to say, there is a great deal of


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evidence that shows serotonin is related to aggression, which can be further

associated with antisocial or criminal behaviour.

Dopamine is a neurotransmitter in the brain that is associated with pleasure and is

also one of the neurotransmitters that is chiefly associated with aggression.

Activation of both affective (emotionally driven) and predatory aggression is

accomplished by dopamine (Elliot, 2000). Genes in the dopaminergic pathway

have also been found to be involved with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder

(ADHD) (Morley & Hall, 2003). In one study cited by Morley and Hall (2003), a

relationship was found between the genes in the dopaminergic pathway,

impulsivity, ADHD, and violent offenders. Obviously, from this list of

neurochemicals it seems plausible that there is a genetic component to antisocial

or criminal behaviour.

Personality Disorders and Traits

Personality traits and disorders have recently become essential in the diagnosis of

individuals with antisocial or criminal behaviour. These traits and disorders do not

first become evident when an individual is an adult, rather these can be seen in

children. For that reason it seems logical to discuss those personality disorders

that first appear in childhood. Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),

Conduct Disorder (CD), and Oppositional Defiance Disorder (ODD) are three of

the more prominent disorders that have been shown to have a relationship with

later adult behaviour (Holmes, Slaughter, & Kashani, 2001).

ODD is characterized by argumentativeness, noncompliance, and irritability,

which can be found in early childhood (Holmes et al., 2001). When a child with

ODD grows older, the characteristics of their behaviour also change and more

often for the worse. They start to lie and steal, engage in vandalism, substance


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abuse, and show aggression towards peers (Holmes et al., 2001). Frequently ODD

is the first disorder that is identified in children and if sustained can lead to the

diagnosis of CD (Morley & Hall, 2003). It is important to note however that not

all children who are diagnosed with ODD will develop CD.

ADHD is associated with hyperactivity-impulsivity and the inability to keep

attention focused on one thing (Morley & Hall, 2003). Holmes et al. (2001) state

that, impulse control dysfunction and the presence of hyperactivity and

inattention are the most highly related predisposing factors for presentation of

antisocial behaviour" (p.184). They also point to the fact that children diagnosed

with ADHD have the inability to analyze and anticipate consequences or learn

from their past behaviour. Children with this disorder are at risk of developing

ODD and CD, unless the child is only diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder

(ADD), in which case their chances of developing ODD or CD are limited. The

future for some children is made worse when ADHD and CD are co-occurring

because they will be more likely to continue their antisocial tendencies into

adulthood (Holmes et al., 2001).

Conduct Disorder is characterized with an individual's violation of societal rules

and norms (Morley & Hall, 2003). As the tendencies or behaviours of those

children who are diagnosed with ODD or ADHD worsen and become more

prevalent, the next logical diagnosis is CD. What is even more significant is the

fact that ODD, ADHD, and CD are risk factors for developing Antisocial

Personality Disorder (ASPD). This disorder can only be diagnosed when an

individual is over the age of eighteen and at which point an individual shows

persistent disregard for the rights of others (Morley & Hall, 2003). ASPD has

been shown to be associated with an increased risk of criminal activity. Therefore,


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it is of great importance that these early childhood disorders are correctly

diagnosed and effectively treated to prevent future problems.

Another critical aspect that must be examined regarding antisocial or criminal

behaviour is the personality characteristics of individuals. Two of the most cited

personality traits that can be shown to have an association with antisocial or

criminal behaviour are impulsivity and aggression (Morley & Hall, 2003).

According to the article written by Holmes et al. (2001), antisocial behaviour

between the ages of nine and fifteen can be correlated strongly with impulsivity

and that aggression in early childhood can predict antisocial acts and delinquency.

One statistic shows that between seventy and ninety percent of violent offenders

had been highly aggressive as young children (Holmes et al., 2001). These

personality traits have, in some research, been shown to be heritable.


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Bibliography

Alper, J. (1995). Biological influences on criminal behaviour: Howgood is the evidence? British Medical Journal, 310, 272-273.

Brunner, H. G., Nelen, M., Breakefield, X. O., Ropers, H. H., & vanOost, B. A. (1993). Abnormal behaviour associated with a point

mutation in the structural gene for monoamine oxidase A. Science,

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Elliot, F. A. (2000). A neurological perspective of violent behaviour. InD. H. Fishbein (Ed.), The science, treatment, and prevention of

antisocial behaviours: Application to the criminal justice system (pp.

19-1 to 19-21). Kingston, NJ: Civic Research Institute.

Eysenck, H. J. (1982). Personality, genetics, and behaviour. NewYork: Praeger.

Eysenck, H. J. (1996). Personality and crime: Where do we stand?Psychology, Crime, & Law, 2, 143-152.

Garnefski, N., & Okma, S. (1996). Addiction-risk andaggressive/criminal behaviour in adolescence: Influence of family,

school, and peers. Journal of Adolescence, 19, 503-512.

Holmes, S. E., Slaughter, J. R., & Kashani, J. (2001). Risk factors inchildhood that lead to the development of conduct disorder and

antisocial personality disorder. Child Psychiatry and Human

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Joseph, J. (2001). Is crime in the genes? A critical review of twin andadoption studies of criminality and antisocial behaviour. The Journal

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Criminal Jurisprudence of Mental State

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